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PSYCHOLOGICAL BACKGROUND STUDY
OF INDIA

State Department review completed

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Stage I

STRATEGY

Why pick this country?

In order to attain U.S. foreign policy objectives in Asia it is vitally necessary that India not fall under Communist military or political control whether through attack from without or subversion from within. As there is at present more likelihood of the latter than of the former development, the task of maintaining friendly relations between India and the U.S. and the free world and giving strength to those forces within India which serve to keep India a non-Communist country becomes a foremost political and psychological objective of U.S. foreign policy. An analysis of forces at present working within and from without to influence or determine India's domestic developments and foreign relations will be set forth below to estimate the degree to which India is capable of resisting Communist subversion, to disclose attitudes held by leaders and influential groups toward the East-West conflict and how attitudes adverse to the U.S. and the free world might be effectively altered.

India's strategic position geographically in event of war and psychologically in the "cold war" is of first importance. While India leaders generally consider that the USSR and China have major targets possibly requiring aggressive action by their own forces elsewhere, nevertheless Indian leaders are alert to the growing threat to the northern border states of Chinese Communist penetration into border areas from Tibet and Burma and the opportunity which this position on the frontiers gives them to lend direct support to dissident elements within the border states. They have reacted to this threat by strengthening these areas including Nepal and Assam in recent years and by conducting military surveys, improving communications and dispatching additional troop units. (81-15).

As India has the best strategic location of any nation in south Asia and Indian ocean area it is logical to assume that it is a prime objective of the USSR and China to at least neutralize India in event of war and prevent the utilization of the sub-continent as a staging and supply base by enemy forces. From the point of view of the free world should an enemy force succeed in cutting communications between India and the West, the denial of Indian-produced strategic materials would require substantial readjustments in the economy of Western countries. (60-19) Moreover from bases in India, military operations could be supported or conducted in east Africa, southwest Asia, south-central U.S.S.R. and southeast Asia. India is close to the oil fields of the Middle East and the industrial areas of Soviet Central Asia. (81-14) Consequently Indian Government leaders and most politically conscious elements among the Indian public believe that while the U.S.S.R. is not prepared to risk a world war to conquer India and is relying instead on extending its influence and ideology by working through the Indian Communist Party. (55-20)

From the point of view of U.S. policy objectives India would be a valuable ally in event of war. India's major assets as an ally are 1) its reserve of strategic materials; 2) its potential as a base of operations, which arises

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out of its strategic location; 3) its important reserves of manpower; and 4) the political and psychological value of the support of a leading nation with an important reputation in both Asian and non-Asian eyes. (60-19, 81-4 and 63-1)

In time of peace India's support of free-world policies is particularly valuable not only because it is a major country, due to its size and its great population, but also due to the potential leadership role which Indian leaders, especially Nehru, play in Southern and Southeast Asia and the psychological support which an anti-Communist India can give the smaller Asian countries from falling to Communist subversion.

Since August 15, 1947, when India received its independence from the British and became a wholly self-governing dominion in the Commonwealth of Nations, it has by degrees come to exercise an increasing influence in world affairs. It is clear, despite the disclaimers of Prime Minister Nehru, that India aspires to a position of leadership, not only in Asia and Africa, but in the world. India is constantly seeking opportunities to play the role of mediator between the Communist Bloc countries and the Western democracies and to relax tensions that threaten world peace. To this end India seeks to obtain the adoption of a policy of non-alignment by as many nations (especially Asian and African ones) as possible and thereby create "a third area of peace." India has sought to make itself the leader and spokesman of non-Communist Asia and its influence is unquestionably considerable on the countries of this region. India has tightened its hold on Bhutan and Sikkim and greatly strengthened its influence in Nepal. India exerts considerable influence in Burma and Indonesia and despite the fact that India is regarded with some apprehension by Ceylonese, Indian influence in Ceylon is by no means negligible. India also exerts some influence in the Near Eastern countries where Nehru's policies are not without appeal.

India has taken a strong interest and prominent role in the UN. It is a, if not the, leading nation of the Afro-Asian (otherwise known as the Arab-Asian) Bloc in the UN, a group of 15 Arab, Asian and African nations who generally present a united front on racial and colonial issues. India's role in the negotiations leading to the armistice agreement in Korea was a crucial one and its chairmanship of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission placed it in a position of great responsibility. The responsibilities that India has assumed in connection with Indochina are even more crucial. Hence the loss of India to Communist control, although this is not now imminent, would be a serious psychological and political defeat for the West. Fortunately, at present Indian political, economic, and cultural ties with the West are actually much stronger than those with the Soviet bloc.

Indian leaders have to the present demonstrated their effective capabilities to meet and suppress Communist subversive tactics involving violence in the past and to handle Communist-inspired border uprisings. However, India does not alone have the capability of resisting a large scale Soviet or Chinese Communist attack from without. Moreover, the Communist Party of India (CPI) although not an immediate major threat to the stability of the Government of India (GOI), occupies at present a stronger tactical position than at any time in its history. The Party's unexpectedly good showing in the general elections of 1951/52 enhanced its opportunities for political action. In the Central Parliament and in four or five of the state legislative assemblies Party members have a platform which enables them to obtain wide

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publicity for Communist propaganda and for attacks on the government. The tactical line adopted by the Party in 1951 and reemphasized at the Third Congress in December 1953, which calls for cooperation with other parties and groups in the formation of united fronts, and increased concentration on peasant and labor organizations, together with the emphasis on legal methods to achieve its current goals, has proved advantageous to the Communists. One of the greatest assets of the Communists is the marked absence, among a majority of Indians, of strong anti-Communist sentiments. Despite these advantages the CPI seems not to have made as much progress since the election as initially appeared possible and in some areas it appears even to have suffered reverses. On the other hand, if the CPI can overcome its factionalism and consistently follow a non-violent "united front" policy, it can become a serious internal subversive threat.

The economic and social conditions prevailing in India have long contributed to the development of subversive activity and the modern leadership of India will have to struggle vigorously for years to come out victorious over subversion by the Communist left. Harsh economic conditions and degrading social pressures to which all but a small segment of the population are subject have created a situation ripe for exploitation by an astute political manipulator. In the past the bulk of India's population scattered in more than 500,000 villages has tended passively to accept meager standards of living, high land rents, and the never-ending payments to the money lender as man's inevitable lot and the rigid stratification of society into castes as a divinely ordained system under which those belonging to the lower castes are destined to perform life's menial duties and to defer to members of the upper castes. This passive acceptance has been encouraged both 1) by the fact that most of the population has known no other life because its knowledge of conditions in other parts of the world has been limited and remote and 2) by Hinduism's religious ideals which stress the deliberate abandonment of material comforts in pursuit of the spiritual life and which attribute a man's lowly station and hardships in this life to sins committed in earlier existences.

The awakening political consciousness among India's vast rural population during the past few decades, however, has already begun to provide subversive groups with a favorable climate in which to whip up popular discontent over age-old economic and social inequalities. This awakening political consciousness dates back to the independence movement and the efforts of nationalist political leaders, notably Mohandas K. Gandhi, to arouse support in rural areas through a "grass-roots" campaign which began slowly during the first and second decades of the present century, and which gained momentum during the world depression of the 1930's. The Congress Party, which spearheaded the independence movement, had as its main objective in rural areas the arousing of villagers to the possibility of bettering their social and economic conditions through political action. At the advent of independence there was a general expectation that a nationalist government would usher in a new era. When no appreciable change in the social and economic lot of the people as a whole developed, the rural population tended to sink back into general apathy. Considerable disillusionment and discontent ensued, which the communists and other subversive groups have begun to exploit with some success. The communists now pose as the champions of the peasants' demands and as the only genuine advocates of social and economic betterment.

A second feature which tends to render India susceptible to the overtures of subversive elements is the wide gap existing between the rural populace and

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the government. Once in power, the Congress Party lost much of its former contact with the general village population. The Congress Party leadership has become largely absorbed in tackling some of the more immediate problems with which it has been confronted and in handling the day-to-day business of government. Furthermore, a certain post-freedom complacency has replaced some of the old pre-independence drive and there are a number of office holders, particularly in the state governments, who have yielded to the temptation to use public office for personal gain. In any case, the Congress Party has shown a certain loss of interest in, and lack of attention to, the country's rural areas, which has left a political vacuum for opposition parties to exploit. Moreover, as a consequence of the long-standing popular identification of governmental authority with foreign rule, there has persisted in India a general tendency to blame government for every ill and to find fault with it on every conceivable occasion, both for what it does and for what it fails to do. In addition the Congress Party has had to bear the brunt not only of well-founded criticism but also of the characteristic rural distrust of all supra-village authority with which villagers feel only remotely connected. This traditional distrust of higher authority has been reinforced by certain governmental police actions which have seemed to many Indians unwarrantably high-handed and reminiscent of the worst features of British rule. Both left- and right-wing subversive elements have shown themselves alert to these potentialities in the rural scene. They have also been quite successful in making a bid for public sympathy when indiscriminate police action directed against communists or militant communalists has fallen upon the innocent as well as the guilty.

Another very important asset to subversive elements, particularly to the communists, is the opportunity to exploit an interrelated group of commonly held Indian attitudes. The Communist Party of India has had some success in identifying its own aspirations and beliefs: 1) with the general Indian concern for world peace; 2) with India's natural pride of independence; and 3) with Indian fears and suspicions of the West and resentment over racial discrimination, which are the heritage of long years of colonial rule. The communists have played upon these themes and have attempted to direct the public sentiment thus aroused against the Congress government, charging it with being the naive or willing dupe of Western capitalist imperialism. When the communists make such charges or attempt to make dramatic capital of their championship of Indian sensitivities, there is a large audience emotionally predisposed to believe them.

Still another feature that has lent itself to exploitation by subversive groups has been the very complexity and heterogeneity of Indian society with its numerous languages, its important regional groupings and its strong traditions of local particularism. The importance of these group division lies not only in their inherent challenge to Indian national unity but also in the opportunity afforded subversive elements to exploit regional loyalties and group rivalries as a means of gaining political strength.

An acute internal problem arising out of this heterogeneity stems from the demands for the formation of linguistic states and the readjustment of existing state boundaries along linguistic lines. This problem is India-wide.

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It has long been the policy of the Indian National Congress to redefine State boundaries to correspond with major linguistic groupings, but the Government of India has taken the position until 1952 that this should not be attempted at present in view of the desirability of devoting all energies to constructive activities particularly in the economic field. Readjustment of boundaries on a scale sufficiently wide to meet all demands would seriously disrupt the existing administrative structure. In certain areas it might also weaken the local Congress Party organizations and enable opposition governments to come to power, and so result in friction between the GCI and the State concerned. Nevertheless, by postponing the formation of linguistic states, and refusing to yield to the increasingly urgent demands of local political leaders, the government has come to realize that it has been playing into the hands of agitators, prominent among whom are the Communists, who make use of this issue to criticize the central government and to build up their strength.

Consequently on December 19, 1952 the government formally announced its decision to create the new state of Andhra. The new state, composed of the Telugu-speaking half of Madras State, was formally established in October 1953. In December 1953 the government appointed a commission to examine the whole problem and make recommendations by June 30, 1955. The future of India as a national state hinges on the wisdom with which the government handles this fundamental linguistic issue which agitators can so easily play upon to gain their subversive ends.

Apart from these broad conditions which favor the development of subversive activity on a nation-wide scale there are certain special features which particularly favor communist inroads. The Indian mind, traditionally attracted to abstruse and metaphysical thinking, is peculiarly apt to be drawn to the intricate subtleties of Marxism. Added to this is the predisposition of the Indian populace to admire selfless devotion to a cause, a type of devotion that the CPI demands of its party members and which was once associated with many members of the Congress Party in the days before independence.

Finally, there is the disillusion and disappointment of large segments of the white collar classes and intelligentsia who provide most of the leadership and drive to the subversive organizations in the country. These are the groups who are disgruntled or embittered by the limited opportunities available to them to realize their capabilities or to use their scholastic training. In present day India, although there are some important employment opportunities afforded in public service and in fields requiring technical skills, the British-founded, classical educational system continues to turn out a disproportionate number of graduates in the liberal arts and in a few professions, notably the law. Thus the groups who had earlier nurtured high hopes of progress under independence, not only have been disillusioned by the fact that there has been little economic or social improvement, but also often face gloomy employment prospects, and have begun to chafe under the slow pace of the Congress-promised reforms. These groups therefore are particularly vulnerable to the communists' positive assurances of accelerated social and economic betterment.

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Subversive elements in India today are attempting to exploit not only the patriotic sentiment but also the techniques of popular organization which were associated with the nationalist movement in pre-independence days. During the period of British rule subversive activity against the Government of India, as in other colonial areas, was closely identified with nationalism. It was carried on by a number of political organizations, many of which are still in existence. During the struggle for self rule and independence, the Indian National Congress, the present ruling party, was itself declared illegal and its leaders thrown in jail. As far back as 1917 Mahatma Gandhi promoted civil disobedience, proposing that Indians undermine their government by peaceful defiance of its authority. During the following two decades people from all social and economic levels joined in Gandhi campaigns of civil disobedience that were considered subversive by the Government of British India, and which met with severe suppression. Thousands of persons, including Gandhi and Nehru, proudly went to jail. No stigma was attached to defiance of the government or the consequent punishment, and jail sentences came to be regarded as evidences of patriotism. Similarly, Subhas Chandra Bose and his followers, who joined the Japanese when they occupied Southeast Asia, set up a puppet government and put an army known as the Indian National Army (INA) into the field against the Allied forces, were and still are acclaimed as heroes of the nationalist movement. Common phenomena of these nationalist days were student demonstrations, illegal strikes, boycotts and even some organized rural rent campaigns.

The Communist Party of India (CPI) is the strongest and most dangerous subversive organization in the country today. In India as in other non-communist countries, the party works within the law as well as outside it. The Party has tried to bring about internal revolution in India since independence first by attempting to foment a general strike of industrial workers as a preparatory step for country-wide insurrection and, when this approach failed, by trying to stir the peasantry to revolt in the more remote areas of Assam, where government control was not well established and loyalties to a central or provincial government were either negligible or nonexistent. Much of the party's work has also been concentrated on infiltrating and capturing the leadership of popular organizations, such as the All-India Trade Union Congress, the All-India Kisan Sabha, and the All-India Students' Federation. Although communist capture resulted in disaffection and the formation of rival organizations, the original bodies are now "front organizations" whose subversive roles promise to become increasingly important as the party continues to form a coalition of anti-Congress groups by legal means. A few instances of communist infiltration in the police and armed forces as well as in the emphasize "United Front" tactics and attempts to civil service have been reported from time to time. However, information on this subject is so fragmentary that the extent of such infiltration cannot be properly assessed. There is no evidence of any attempt on the part of the communists to infiltrate the Congress Party. Their efforts are confined mainly to the left opposition parties. Policies of the Congress Party which seem to play into communist hands are apparently arrived at independently of communist efforts. However, communist propaganda, which seeks to play upon Indian nationalism and desires

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for peace, may possibly have influenced to some extent the thinking of Congress leaders and government officials either directly or indirectly.

With regard to subversive activity carried on against the Government of India by foreign governments, there is very little information. Available data indicate that the Soviet Embassy, the Soviet Trade Agency, and TASS, possibly engaged in subversive activity to the extent of providing financial aid to further communist activity and propaganda in India and provide a courier service for the transmission to the U.S.S.R. of sensitive information gathered by local communists.

India's new Constitution makes no specific reference to subversive activity. Nevertheless it gives the government wide authority to deal with any situation which threatens national security. The Constitution provides that if the security either of India or of any part of it is threatened by internal disturbance, the President of the Union may, by proclamation, suspend the enforcement of the Fundamental Rights enumerated in the Constitution (including the rights to freedom of speech and expression, to assemble peaceably and without arms, and to form associations or unions). Furthermore, the Constitution stipulates that none of its fundamental rights clauses shall affect the operation of any existing law "in so far as it imposes, or prevents the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the security of the State or of public order, reasonable restrictions on the rights conferred." The Constitution also empowers the government to enact legislation on preventive detention for reasons connected with the security of India or the individual states. In the latter case the Union legislates concurrently with the states. The states are empowered to legislate on the subject of public order, but not on the use of the armed forces of the union to aid civil forces in the maintenance of such order.

The Union and the states all have laws relating to preventive detention and the maintenance of public order generally. Many of these were enacted during the British rule and were directed to limiting the activities of nationalists who were fighting for political independence. Since independence, however, these same laws have been utilized by the Congress Party government against both the extreme left and right. The enforcement of these laws resulted in the banning of the CPI in many states, the short-term imprisonment of many communist leaders, and considerable disruption of the party itself. Nevertheless, the communists have had some success in exploiting popular sentiment against these laws dating back to pre-independence days. Communist-front civil liberty committees and leagues have been organized in different parts of the country to fight for the abolition or drastic reform of these laws and to supply legal aid for the persons arrested under them. Furthermore, the CPI's 1951 decision to abandon its open policy of violence and to participate in the 1951-52 election campaign enabled the party to recover much of its organizational strength and to exploit not only the inevitable political opposition sentiment but a host of local aspirations and grievances as well. With the gains made by the communists in the legislative branch of the central and southern state governments in the 1951-52 general elections, it will be increasingly difficult for Congress governments, both at the National and state levels, to carry out repressive measures against the Communist Party of India.

While the repressive measures adopted by the government have been successful in keeping subversive activity within controllable proportions, the most effective counter

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counter measures in the long run will be those taken to mitigate the causes of unrest, dissatisfaction, and frustration among the people which often find their outlet in subversive activity. The Congress Party government has begun to take a few positive measures in this direction. Land reform legislation, irrigation and hydroelectric schemes, multi-purpose rural development projects and the revival of village panchayats (councils) at the local government level, are all designed to enlist active cooperation and support from the rural population and give positive evidence of government concern in rural welfare. In urban areas a few much more halting steps are being taken to improve the employment opportunities and enlist the idealism and support of the rising school generation and of the middle classes in general. These are the groups who are currently the source of all political leadership as well as of all vocal political opinion in the country. Some effort is being made to revive the student movement on constructive lines, to strengthen the scientific and practical side of education, to open the recruitment to public service on the widest possible basis, and to encourage industrialization with its expanding opportunities for training and employment. As of spring 1952, however, most of these programs were still only in the initial stages and relatively little substantive progress had been made. Accordingly the present prospects are that subversive activity will continue to be on the increase in India, capitalizing on frustrated and restive elements in both rural and urban areas.

The Communist Party of India (CPI) is the strongest and most dangerous subversive organization in India today. Stronger now than at any time since independence, the party has made a rapid recovery from the spring of 1950, when it was riven by internal conflict and isolated from all other political groups by its policy of exclusiveness and its use of terroristic tactics. An important element of the present strength of the CPI is perhaps to be found in its own shrewd estimate of the situation which it is attempting to exploit in India, namely that the Congress Party government is faced with a grave crisis but is not yet sufficiently discredited and isolated from the people to be ousted. The success of the CPI in organizing "united front" parties, whose candidates made good showings in India's 1951-52 elections, is a good measure of the general soundness of the party's political estimate and of its new influence.

The CPI is an orthodox Stalinist party and as such looks to Moscow, the Cominform, and to certain brother parties, especially the Communist Party of the United Kingdom, for guidance and direction. There is evidence that, so far as basic policy and tactics are concerned, the CPI to the best of its ability adopts its line in accordance with the dictates of Moscow and the Cominform.

In view of the importance of India to the Communist world both the USSR and China are devoting considerable effort and money in seeking through skillful employment of all the arts of diplomacy and propaganda to keep the country and its leaders at least "neutral" in the "cold war". Marxist literature and slick magazines glorifying the USSR can be bought cheaply in "people's book stores" in every large city. The Soviet technique of indirect control through the Cominform, of working through Asian nationals, and its willingness to arm and train Asians has done much to obscure its aggressive designs. The result is many educated Indians accept Soviet propaganda at face value. Moreover, Indians are interested and impressed by the claims of economic progress and industrialization in the Soviet Union. Faced by similar problems of industrialization and improvement in agriculture Indians are curious to find the

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key to USSR's seeming success in these lines. (42-21,22)

China as well as the USSR rely heavily upon the exchange of cultural missions, exhibits, fairs, dramas and plays to influence Indian public opinion. Cultural missions between Communist China and India began to be exchanged in 1951 followed by the establishment of Chinese-Indian "friendship" associations. Only England and France among the non-Communist nations had more delegations going to and from the USSR in 1954 than did India. Moreover, of the 40 delegations between the two countries in that year 32 of them went from India to the USSR. The increased use of films for propaganda purposes shows that this medium has a high priority. Soviet film festivals have been held in a number of large Indian cities while the Soviet Embassy sponsors the showing of documentaries. There are a considerable number of Communists and fellow-travelers in all sectors of the Indian motion picture industry, and the organization of the industry is such as to allow easy Communist exploitation. Soviet and Chinese exhibits dominated the Bombay International Industries Fair in 1952 in which the U.S. and the UK did not participate. Though it was an industrial fair, the Communists used the occasion for extensive cultural campaigns. A "multimillion dollar" modern art collection opened in Delhi in March 1952. Composed of 80 paintings, 20 sculptures and 50 other items, the exhibit was the first Soviet art display ever held outside the USSR. In all of these ways and many others both the USSR and Communist China reveal at one and the same time the high priority they give to the "conquest" of India through the diplomacy of cultural and artistic propaganda and their skills by adroitly linking them up with the major Communist theme of "peace", "anti-imperialism", and "anti-capitalism."

India's will and capacity to resist Communist attack by force or subversion varies from time to time, from one part of the country to another and the nature and subtlety of the campaign. In general since 1951, for example, there has been an apparent increasing consciousness of the threat of Communist attack as Communist China approached the borders of India along the northern frontier accompanied by a more critical view of the USSR and skepticism as to its peaceful protestations and promises.

Indians are broadly tolerant of Communism's ideology and economic system reflecting the eclecticism of Hinduism and Indian political and economic thinking favors nationalization of segments of the economy and criticizes capitalism as a form of imperialist expansion and colonization. (42-23) Their new nationalism still being in part a reaction to Western imperialism, politically-conscious Indians tend to accept Soviet propaganda claims about the USSR as being "anti-imperialistic" and "interested only in promoting aspirations for freedom and a better life of the common people everywhere." Indians have been greatly interested and impressed by claims of economic progress and industrialization in the Soviet Union and to a lesser extent in Communist China. Many Indians also admire the USSR as a country known to include Asian peoples, as one which has publicly championed nationalist movements in Asia, in the 1920's, and by aid to Communist China and the Asian insurgents weakened Western control of Asia. Many Indians have been impressed by Communist China's military capacities and it is widely felt that India would be foolish to antagonize unnecessarily a potentially dangerous neighbor. (42-22)

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The government maintains a sizeable modern military force capable of meeting any threat except a determined attack by USSR or Communist forces. Despite certain well-known attitudes in favour of pacifism, India thus far has had no trouble maintaining a sufficiently large army on a volunteer basis. In a country with a huge population, abject want, and underemployment, the ranks of the army can be filled by men who are seeking any employment that will give them food and clothing. The armed forces can draw upon a number of castes and communities with a tradition for military life, such as the Sikhs and Kshatriyas of India and the Gurkhas of Nepal. In spite of the pacifist tendencies inherent in Hinduism and consciously encouraged by Gandhi, the government has received considerable support for its defense of Kashmir, and Prime Minister Nehru's assurance that India would resist any encroachments from the north by force, if necessary, met with general approval. (42-24)

Civilian morale in India in World War II was not high as the Indians were much more concerned with the political struggle for independence than they were with the military struggle which they considered largely the affair of others. A better test of their morale is the fighting in Kashmir since the end of the war. Popular support in India for the defense of Kashmir has never wavered. There has been little complaint against military expenditures, although they absorb half of the national budget, thus preventing much-needed developments of non-military programs. (42-24)

Against a really determined all-out attack by the Soviet Union and/or Communist China India's forces would be defeated and forced to resort to guerrilla warfare. Against anything less than such an attack, the Indian Armed Forces are capable of maintaining internal security and defending successfully India. However, a sharp decline in the popularity of the Government in New Delhi would greatly increase the external military danger. (80-1)

India is still one of the lesser naval powers of the world, although compared with other Asian and Australasian naval forces the Indian Navy ranks second in number of ships and strength of personnel to Australia. The Navy is considered capable of carrying out its mission against the naval forces of its immediate neighbors, but not against a major naval power. (80-2) The present aircraft strength of the Air Force, level of training, and high morale render it a significant military factor in South Asia. India has considerable military industrial capacity, particularly in regard to basic infantry weapons. Government arsenals and factories can produce all the small arms and small-arms ammunition required for an army of 500,000. In addition, ordnance factories produce Bren guns, shells, mortar projectiles, artillery, explosives, and other items. Indian textile mills produce all the fabric items required for military use. (80-2)

Without external assistance the capacity of the Indian Communists to carry on guerrilla or paramilitary activities is at present quite limited. While it is virtually impossible for them to endanger seriously the stability of the government without such external assistance, they might for a time seriously embarrass one or two state governments. While some external aid could be infiltrated, apart from an external attack by the Communists on India local Communists could not overthrow the government. Given a year or

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so of maximum feasible assistance from the USSR and Communist China in the preparation for guerrilla activity the Indian Communists might be able to give substantial guerrilla assistance to invading Communist forces.

The police have shown themselves to be acutely aware of the Communist menace and are prepared to take drastic measures against any indication of Communist violence. They have also developed a rather extensive network of agents and informers to keep the Communist Party and its numerous front organizations under surveillance. By and large the police are loyal, dependable, and continue to keep away from politics. (54-1)

A serious problem confronting the new independent post-war government was the subversive campaign directed against it by the Communist Party of India (CPI). During the political struggle leading up to independence the Congress Party welcomed the cooperation of the communists in line with its policy of accepting cooperation from all groups -- whether as members or simply in affiliation -- so long as such groups were prepared to accept the Congress Party's basic policies and to recognize the directives of its duly constituted authorities. The CPI had been bitterly critical of the Congress Party, including its socialist wing, up until 1936 when the CPI adopted a "United Front" policy. The United Front policy was regarded in Congress Party circles as a genuine recognition by the CPI of its past errors and its offer of "cooperation" was accepted. This "cooperation" was reasonably smooth until 1942, with the exception of a brief internal struggle within the Congress Party in 1939-40 between communist-supported radical elements under the leadership of the Bengali patriot, S. C. Bose, and the old-line leadership of the party under Gandhi. The Bose group was eventually forced out of the Congress Party. Between mid-1941 and the spring of 1942 the CPI and the Congress Party were on good terms, as both groups appeared to expect Soviet support of Indian nationalist demands for British guarantees of postwar independence. The failure of the U.S.S.R. to support these demands, coupled in the spring of 1942 with the CPI's unconditional support for World War II and its bitter attack on the Congress Party, was viewed as a betrayal of the Indian nationalist cause and as evidence of the CPI's subservience to the Soviet Union. This CPI betrayal was further aggravated, in the Congress Party's view, by the communists' decision to cooperate with the Muslim League and by the CPI's sympathetic attitude towards the league's demand for Pakistan. The arrest of virtually all of the Congress Party's leadership by the British government authorities in India in August 1942 prevented the Congress Party from taking any action at the time, but one of its first acts following the release of its leadership at the end of the war was to expel all known Communists from the Congress Party. During the immediate postwar years, while major nationalist attention was focused on the negotiations for independence, the conflict between the CPI and the Congress Party became steadily more intense. A sharp rivalry developed for control of Indian labor, peasant, and student organizations. Furthermore, the CPI's advocacy of revolution and its efforts to organize violence and country-wide uprisings brought it into open conflict with Congress Party authorities who were sharing responsibility in the interim Dominion government at the center and were in control of most of the interim state governments as well.

For a short period just before independence the CPI, under the leadership of P. C. Joshi, adopted a conciliatory policy towards Gandhi, Nehru and the socialist elements in the Congress Party, apparently in an attempt to pave the way for closer relations between an independent India and the Soviet bloc.

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During this period the CPI temporarily stopped its promotion of urban strikes and peasant uprisings. The communists, however, were unable to achieve any rapprochement with the Congress Party. Instead the rivalry over the control of popular organizations increased and was even further intensified by the development of rivalry for the control of the popular movements for responsible government in the princely states. When the Congress Party came to power, one of the new government's first moves was to forbid publication of any material on communal or princely state affairs by the CPI newspaper People's Age.

In the spring of 1948 the CPI gave up all pretense of "cooperation", asserted that India had achieved independence only in name and was still being exploited by the "Anglo-Americans", accused Nehru of compromising with "Western imperialists", and launched a campaign of ruthless violence and terror. However, the government moved promptly to deal with the new tactics. The success of the Congress Party Government's policy in dealing with the CPI was assisted by the crudity and violence of communist tactics which alienated many people and largely isolated the CPI even from urban labor. The attempts by the communists to capture labor, peasant, and student organizations precipitated the disintegration of these groups, enabling the Congress Party to make a strong bid for reorganization, leaving the CPI with only a segment of the original body while most of the balance of the members were reorganized under Congress Party leadership.

The open violence of the communists was met with strict repression by the state governments, which have the major responsibility for police action under the Indian constitution. Following a raid of the CPI's headquarters in Bombay, the CPI was declared illegal in a number of states where it was most active, including Madras, Travancore, Cochin, Hyderabad, and Bengal. Preventive detention ordinances, formerly used by the British against nationalist elements, were now used by the Congress Party against the Communists. Indian Army units in Hyderabad carried on a small-scale war against Communist rebels who, first posing as popular champions against the Razakars, began in mid-1948 to occupy and terrorize a large part of the Telengana area in the eastern part of the state. The central government also sent military aid to north Madras and Assam to help these states suppress Communist violence in the Andhra area bordering on Hyderabad and among the Tribals along India's border. Nehru defended the government's action before the central legislature on February 28, 1949. He stated that the government had a mass of evidence indicating that the CPI was making organized attempts to sabotage the Indian railway system and such other vital installations as telephone, telegraph, and power stations. He declared that while his government was "determined to maintain the well-established rights of labor," it could not "submit to threats of violence and incitement to active revolt from any quarter," and that consequently it had arrested a number of CPI members and taken other necessary precautionary measures, and had advised provincial governments to do likewise. Nehru has frequently reiterated this policy of distinguishing between the CPI's alleged social and economic objectives, many of which he is prepared to admit are humanitarian; its resort to violence and subversion, which he is firmly determined to resist; and its subservience to Moscow which he denounces.

In September 1949 the Indian Home Ministry issued a counterpropaganda booklet entitled "Communist Violence in India," which exposed the underlying

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purposes and practices of communism for the Indian reading public. The pamphlet contained much detailed documentation and was well argued, but its appeal was essentially to the sophisticated intellectual and could hardly compare with the sensationalist pamphleteering of communist publications and the yellow journalism of such "fellow travelers" as the Bombay weekly, Blitz. Furthermore, India began to face the same problem confronting many governments in the West, namely, that under a democratic constitution it did not have the authority to deal with agitators of the communist type as firmly as it would like. Most of the arrests made by the states had been made with special powers under State Emergency Acts which had been held over from World War II days, or under Section 144 of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code which continues to be regarded by many Indians as a piece of authoritarian British legislation. With the adoption of the constitution, however, these legal sanctions soon proved ineffective. Indian courts began to declare several of the state ordinances and actions unconstitutional since they contravened guarantees of basic individual liberties. Except where convictions for specific crimes had been obtained, therefore, the states were unable to keep communists in jail and had to release most of them. The ban on the CPI was lifted in one state after another for similar reasons. In order to provide itself with the authority to apply the drastic measures felt necessary to deal with the communist threat, the government introduced a bill amending the Fundamental Rights' section of the constitution so as to enable both the Union and state governments, to deal summarily with individuals or groups endangering the domestic peace or India's friendly relations with other powers. This amendment was passed in November 1951 against considerable opposition from both the left and the right. Anyone arrested under the new provisions, however, has the right of appeal to the courts, so that there is some protection against the arbitrary use of the executive power.

The Congress Party Government's firm policy toward the communists has undoubtedly made an important contribution to India's internal stability, contributing to the decline of the CPI between 1948 and 1950, a period during which the party was also being torn by inner conflicts on policy and leadership. The Indian public, somewhat alienated by CPI violence, has tended to support the government's action. Furthermore, the government's exposure of communist tactics and methods has also helped to disillusion some groups both within and outside the Congress Party.

The subsequent forced relaxation of government controls, however, followed by the CPI's widely publicized abandonment of its policy of open violence in 1951, helped the party to regain some of its influence and prestige as self-advertised "champions of the underdog." By the clever use of the United Front policy during the 1951/52 elections and the successful exploitation of growing criticism of the Congress Party, the CPI won a number of seats both in the state and central assemblies. The CPI's nomination of a number of candidates who were still in jail virtually forced the government to speed up its review of most of the cases against communists who had been rounded up without specific charges and who were being detained indefinitely. Although the process of trial and release for CPI members was thus greatly accelerated, preventive detention orders continue to be invoked. The growing dissatisfaction with the Congress Party and the desire to organize an effective political opposition has disposed a few groups of both the right and the left to cooperate with the CPI for tactical reasons.

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Despite certain successes of the government's anticommunist policy the record of the 1951-52 elections indicate that the communists will probably continue to gain in strength as their "legal" tactics make it difficult for the government to move against them on legal grounds, and as they continue to cultivate non-Congress Party groups or whatever political hue in their efforts to oust the Congress Party government. The communists have also had some success in exploiting popular sympathy through charges of government oppression and appeals for the defense of civil rights. The government, however, is now even more alert, to the communist danger and apparently intends to make full use of preventive detention ordinances and its new constitutional powers.

National Defense Policies

Many of the same considerations that underlie Indian foreign policy have determined India's defense policies. Prime Minister Nehru has been primarily responsible for the policies, with only a minor role in their formulation played by the armed services and former Defense Minister Baldev Singh. In line with the decision to pursue an independent foreign policy, India has avoided all military alliances or commitments and has even kept aloof from formal military agreements and conferences within the Commonwealth. Following the London Commonwealth Conference in 1951, Nehru stated in reply to questioning in Parliament that India had in no way participated in the round table discussions on defense. There is, however, on a confidential basis a wide exchange of information which covers military matters as well as mutual political and economic interests.

Although refusing to make military or diplomatic commitments, India has demonstrated its determination to maintain as strong a military arm as possible and to defend itself against attack. For the past few years 45% to 50% of India's budget has been marked for defense purposes. In view of India's stringent economic position this percentage constitutes a far heavier burden than for an industrially developed nation. In absolute terms, however, the amount of defense is relatively small -- Rs. 916,000,000 (US\$192,000,000) for 1952/53. Thus India has been unable to develop a large air force or substantial mechanized forces and still relies principally on infantry units. The Indian Army has approximately 400,000 men. The government realizes that it is in no position to resist a concerted Soviet attack. Indian leaders, however, do not feel that the U.S.S.R. intends a direct attack and appears to be nursing the hope that in case of war the Soviet Union will disburse its forces in Europe and Northeast Asia. Consequently India is stressing preparedness against attacks from nearer and more likely quarters, such as Pakistan and Communist China, and against internal subversion.

Defense policy vis-a-vis Pakistan

The dispute over the accession of Kashmir which started in October 1947 has resulted in India's defense policies since independence being largely focused on Pakistan. From November 1947 until the cease-fire in January 1949 Indian troops were engaged in fighting Northwest Frontier tribesmen, Pakistani irregulars, and eventually Pakistani troops. Although this campaign aggravated popular hostility between the two nations, it appears to have resulted in mutual

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respect for each other's military capabilities and to have made important contributions to the training of both armies. Since the beginning of 1949 there has been no major fighting but the generally tense situation has kept both sides alert and forced them to maintain their military strength.

India has made it clear that it will resist aggression from Pakistan but has made it equally clear that India does not want war with Pakistan. In the fall of 1951 when there appeared to be some danger that Pakistan might attempt to press its demands on Kashmir by some precipitate action, India's conspicuous movement of troops to the East and West Pakistan borders was clearly intended to discourage such action and to disabuse Pakistan of any belief that a war could be limited to the state of Jammu and Kashmir alone. During the course of the protracted negotiations both sides have made a few concessions. Presently there is every indication that India will continue to defend the Abdullah government and will resist any renewed attempt by Pakistan to get a solution by force. In an attempt to improve relations between the two nations, however, Prime Minister Nehru urged Pakistan in 1950 and again in 1951 to sign a mutual "no-war declaration" and to agree that all disputes would be peacefully settled. Pakistan rejected these overtures as pointless unless accompanied by specific proposals for the settlement of all outstanding disputes. At the same time, however, most Pakistani leaders, appear to be well aware of the heavy cost of war and the doubtful success of the effort in view of India's larger forces.

The disputes and rivalry between India and Pakistan have prevented full cooperation on mutual defense problems, particularly along the Tibetan-Jammu and Kashmir border and in the Assam-Burma area. The constant negotiations, between the two countries, however, have provided a system of cooperation and a medium for exchange of information which has proved helpful against subversive and communist elements in the northeast border area and which would enable similar inconspicuous cooperation against foreign infiltration. In the event of a direct attack that threatened both countries there is little doubt that they would cooperate in resistance. But while the disputes smolder between the two and each finds it necessary to deploy a large part of its forces against the other, there is not likely to be any combined defense efforts against Communist China or the U.S.S.R.

Defense policy vis-a-vis China

The military occupation of Tibet by Communist Chinese has aroused Indian concern over the defense of the long Indian-Nepalese-Tibetan border. Although India has continued a formal policy of friendship for China there are many indications that India is concerned over the threat posed by Chinese forces to the north. Most of India's northern borders lie in difficult, mountainous terrain and have never been officially demarcated.

Indian apprehension has been increased by recently revealed Chinese maps which claim as Chinese territory large tracts in Assam, all of Bhutan and parts of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, thus laying the groundwork for future controversy. Communist China has not officially pressed these claims. However,

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Prime Minister Nehru has indicated that India recognizes the McMahon line (the boundary drawn by the British for northeast India but never formally recognized by the Chinese) and that India's forces will resist any hostile attack against the country. In the spring of 1952 Prime Minister Nehru toured the northeastern border regions which command the main passes leading from Tibet and stressed the need for constant vigilance.

The Indian government has taken several steps to strengthen the defense of Assam which borders southeastern Tibet and western Sikkim. Indian troops and police have struck hard against the Bengali terrorists revolutionary Communist Party of India which was fomenting antigovernment activities among the Tribals of the state, most of whom are in the border areas. Partially in order to counteract subversive propaganda among the Tribals, Prime Minister Nehru has arranged to convene a conference of Tribal representatives and other interested groups during June 1952 to evolve a plan for improving the welfare of India's Tribal peoples -- of whom some 800,000 live in Assam. In addition the Indian Army in Assam has been strengthened, the air force has aeriially mapped the Assam region, and a systemative survey of the border has been undertaken.

India has assumed the position formerly held by the British Government with respect to the three northern border areas of Bhutan, Sikkim, and Nepal. Since independence India has negotiated new treaties with all three states. Bhutan, a small Buddhist state ruled by an autonomous Maharajah, is a full protectorate. In 1949 it concluded a treaty with India under which India controls Bhutan's foreign relations and defense. Bhutan is an isolated region and natural barriers largely separate it from adjoining Indian areas but Bhutanese officials are in a position to report on developments in Tibet. Bhutanese scouts have been organized by the Indian police to reconnoiter the Tibetan border. Sikkim, which commands the main communication routes from India is under even closer Indian control. It is the only princely state which has not been fully integrated into the Union continuing to occupy the same position of close dependence on the Delhi government formerly occupied under the British. India handles not only Sikkim's defense and foreign relations but its transport and communications as well and, in addition, an Indian official has been in complete control of Sikkim's internal administration since August 1949.

India also maintains special relations with Nepal, for although Nepal controls its own foreign affairs it shares its defense responsibilities with India. India's defense interests in Nepal center on Nepal's long border with Tibet and its proximity to major population centers in northern India. India's defense objectives in Nepal are threefold: establishment of an adequate defense of the mountain passes, maintenance of internal stability to prevent subversion from within or any weakening of the state that might handicap its defense, and continuance of a government not unfriendly to India. Within the past two years India has pursued these objectives with heightened urgency. The Government of India inherited its responsibility for the defense of Nepal from its British predecessor under a treaty of 1923. In 1950 Nepal and India signed treaties of friendship and commerce shortly after which the Prime Minister of India made a speech stating that any attack on Nepal would be considered to be an attack on India and that the Himalayas were India's northern defense border. In the autumn of 1951 a joint Nepalese-Indian military

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team surveyed the northern border and in January 1952 Nepal's Prime Minister requested, and received, an Indian military mission to train and reorganize Nepal's armed forces. Finally, India has offered to build a highway from Katmandu, Nepal's capital, to northern India, and to improve the existing airstrip in Katmandu.

The transfer of government in Nepal from the hereditary autocratic rule of the Rana family to a more representative popular government has not come without friction between the Rana family and the other contending groups. Since February 1951 Nehru has on several occasions mediated Nepalese disputes and in July at Nepal's request Indian troops aided in the capture of the Nepalese rebel leader, K. I. Singh. To further aid Nepalese stability India has proposed a development program which India will largely finance on a long-term basis.

The biggest threat to close an effective Indian-Nepalese cooperation are the sharp personal rivalries within the Nepalese Government which threaten its stability and handicap efforts to strengthen it. The Nepalese Congress Party which has led the movement for popular government in Nepal is anxious to keep dependence on India at a minimum but it is both conscious to the threat along the northern border and of the considerable aid and support it has received and still needs from India. For its part, India appears anxious to avoid excessive interference in Nepalese affairs, recognizing the odium it may incur, and hopes to achieve its aim through the cooperation of a moderate government. In the event of the breakdown of government or the coming to power of a hostile group, however, India can be expected to react strongly and to occupy Nepal if necessary.

In the northern Indian border states of Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh which lie west of Nepal, the frontier guards were sizeably strengthened in mid-1951 when Chinese Communist troops appeared for the first time along the border. In addition, the Indian Army in Kashmir has been in a particularly good position since 1948 to check on infiltration and continually sends patrols out from the town of Leh to cover eastern Kashmir.

The northern border of India has extremely difficult terrain which provides some advantage to the defender. In addition India has shorter and better lines of communication than China. These advantages may be offset if there is a significant build-up of air power to the north, since India is particularly weak in air defense.

Defense policy vis-a-vis Burma

While Chinese Communist aggression in Southeast Asia would be deeply resented in India, would lead to a cooling of Indian-Chinese relations, and would cause India to further strengthen its armed forces, India does not at

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this time appear likely to bolster resistance to communist aggression in any Southeast Asian country with the possible exception of Burma. It is reported that the Indian Army considers aid to Burma necessary in such an eventuality, but the government has carefully refrained from any public statements comparable to those made in reference to Nepal. Privately, also, the government has refrained from committing itself to a definite course of action in the event that Burma is attacked. Confidentially, government officials have stated that a threat to Burma's territorial integrity would be viewed as a threat to India and that some action would be taken but that formal representation might be the extent of it. Present indications are that in case of a direct attack India would elect to husband its military resources in its own defense. Diplomatically and in the UN, however, India would probably support Burma. On the other hand, in the event of obvious Chinese infiltration and greatly increased internal subversion, India might be expected to encourage and support Burmese resistance and furnish Burma such arms and other military equipment as it could spare. India, however, is not likely to allow its forces to become directly involved except in the defense of the India-Burma border.

Certainly India considers Burma within its sphere of interest, and the officials of the two countries have had several confidential consultations on defense matters. But, India's present policy with respect to Burma is dictated by India's relatively small armed forces, the need to be prepared for war with Pakistan, and fear of a direct attack from Tibet by Chinese Communist forces. In addition India, apparently on the basis of its consultations with the Burmese, does not believe that the Communists are currently preparing for any military thrust into Burma.

Military-civilian relationship

Independent India inherited a British-trained and organized army which had been deliberately kept isolated from politics. The present government has been anxious to maintain the sharp distinction between the military and civilian branches of government. The cabinet, led by Prime Minister Nehru, has assumed full initiative and responsibility for defense policy and the armed services have operated within this framework. The services have been encouraged to maintain a nonpolitical professional status and attitude, and generally they have adhered rigidly to this principle.

The Government of India has been generally alert to the welfare and morale needs of the Army. Loyalty, discipline, and morale of the services is reasonably good. During British rule there was little provision for Indian officers in the upper grades to get the necessary training and experience. This weakness has been corrected to some extent through Commonwealth training facilities and by actual experience in the Hyderabad and Kashmir campaigns. Indian officers are reported to be improving in the caliber of their leadership. The main weaknesses of the Indian forces are not political but strictly military -- such as lack of training facilities, equipment and fire power needed by a modern army.

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Strengthening India's Resistance to Communism

Both India's will and capacity to resist Communist attack from without or within can be strengthened in a number of feasible ways and through programs some of which are underway. From the military point of view a settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute would increase India's defense capacity. As time goes on the strength of Indian armed forces will increase as the shortage of qualified Indian personnel for higher staff command positions, occasioned by the former British practice of allowing only British officers to hold such posts, is gradually being overcome. (80-1) The combat capabilities of the Air Force are limited by its dependence upon foreign sources of supply for combat aircraft, aircraft parts and aviation petroleum products. (80-1) While India does have the potentiality of becoming one of the leading naval powers of Asia (82-9) at this time (1952) the Indian navy is not capable of defending the Indian Ocean area (82-1). A ten year expansion program involving the acquisition of an additional cruiser, seven additional destroyers, the establishment of a marine corps, and development of a fleet air arm will bring India over to its goal of self-defense.

Domestic economic and social programs supported by the government are contributing in strengthening the country from within. The organization of popularly selected village government bodies, the development of "basic" rural schools, the encouragement of cooperative societies, the pioneer efforts in developing an adult education program, an agricultural extension service, and rural community development programs, have all demonstrated the effectiveness of such programs in countering communist propaganda and arousing public interest and support. To date, however, most of the country's limited financial resources have had to be devoted to defense and to the maintenance of police and essential administrative service, while only relatively small sums have been available for economic development and improvement of the general welfare.

As a young nation confronted by serious internal problems of building an independent state and raising the economic level of its people, India has been trying desperately to keep from becoming involved in the cold war. (42-23) Prime Minister Nehru has many times declared that India will seek to avoid aligning itself with any bloc of powers and this point of view has won widespread support. They want their country to remain free and independent in order to choose their own role as crises arise. Because of the relationship to the U.K., they became involved in the world wars and suffered inflation and famine and they now want to avoid involvement in third war. With some exceptions Indians are opposed to joining either side in the cold war. (42-23)

India's Foreign Policy

The major tenets of Indian foreign policy formulated since independence are: 1) a desire to maintain political neutrality in the East-West struggle; 2) a desire to prevent war by acting as a moderating force between the power blocs and, if possible, to avoid involvement if war occurs; 3) reliance on

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collective security through peaceful measures under the United Nations; 4) support of all nationalist independence movements, particularly in Africa, the Near East and Asia, and, finally, 5) opposition to racial discrimination against the colored peoples of the world. This basic framework of foreign policy has been determined in large part by 1) India's position as an Asian power, 2) its long experience as a colonial nation, 3) its dangerous proximity to the U.S.S.R. and Communist China in the face of the relative weakness of India's own military defenses, and 4) the need to devote a maximum of attention and resources to meet the serious internal problems confronting the country.

India's vulnerability to Soviet attack, the relatively poor equipment of its defense forces, and the need for an extended period of international peace to enable it to meet its difficult economic and political problems have all contributed to the country's fear of war and the fervent desire to avoid it. This attitude is probably further strengthened by the influence of certain pacifist ideas stressed by the late national leader, Mohandas K. Gandhi. India under Gandhi's leadership gained freedom with a minimum of force and with considerable reliance on "nonviolence" techniques of protest. As a result there is some tendency in India to believe that many world problems also could be solved by less reliance on force or threat of force and that India has a positive obligation to counsel moderation and, where possible, to act as mediator between the rival blocs. At the same time, the Indian Government has clearly indicated its intention to fight any direct attack. (55-25,26)

While it would, of course, be an important gain for the US if India were to abandon its policy of non-alignment, accept the principle of collective security, enter into defensive alliances with other free nations under American aegis, the fact that there is virtually no likelihood of India's doing so under present circumstances is not calamitous. However, the loss of India to the Sino-Soviet bloc, however it occurred, would be a severe political and psychological blow to the West. It would almost certainly result in the loss of much of the rest of Asia and tend to create throughout the world the impression that the ultimate triumph of Communism was inevitable. It is therefore of much greater importance to the US that India remain non-Communist than that it abandon its neutral foreign policy. It is also a much more feasible objective as opportunities exist for strengthening India's will and capacity to resist Communism whereas opportunity for influencing India's neutralism are at present negligible.

Indian Neutralism

Unless its own immediate interests are involved, India can be expected to follow a policy of neutrality in the event of a third world war, regardless of whether the Soviet bloc or the West or the West is considered to have precipitated the conflict. If its own interests are threatened, India would probably be prepared to align itself with the West in the hope of obtaining military assistance. Even though neutral, India would be likely to attempt to maintain as much of its trade with the UK and the US as possible; this will, as the war continues, tend to draw India toward the West.

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India's neutrality in the East-West struggle is fundamental to the country's foreign policy. It is based on several important considerations; (1) the conviction that the US and the USSR are engaged in a struggle for world supremacy and that to support either, in Nehru's view, would be both morally wrong and imprudent; (2) the desire to avoid any alignment which might derogate from the full exercise of the country's newly won independence; (3) the fear of involvement in a third world war at a time when India desperately needs a period of peace to build up its economy and stabilize its political structure; (4) the persistence of anti-Western and anti-colonial attitudes developed during the fight for independence; (5) the belief that India cannot rely upon the West to defend South Asia against direct Soviet or Chinese Communist attack; (6) India's ambition for Asian leadership; and (7) the conviction that India can make its greatest contribution to world peace by acting as a mediator between East and West. India's neutrality is a major obstacle to US efforts to rally and unite the free nations of Asia in the struggle against Soviet world domination. Nevertheless, it denies to the Soviets the very substantial political and psychological advantages they would derive from positive Indian support.

The loss to Soviet control -- either through internal subversion or external force -- would have a serious adverse effect on the position of the Western democracies vis-a-vis the Soviet bloc. It would bring into the Soviet sphere the largest and most influential non-communist country in Asia, thereby enhancing Soviet prestige and influence. The stability of the remaining non-communist regimes of Asia would be threatened, and, without strong outside support, many of them would doubtless follow India into the Soviet camp. The repercussions of such a development would not be limited to Asia alone.

India's economic problems are of major significance not only in determining the prospects of the present moderate government but also in influencing the country's foreign policy. These problems are not likely to be solved without a considerable amount of outside economic assistance. Since the West is the only probable source of such aid, economic considerations tend to impel the Indian Government to expand its ties with the West without, however, committing itself firmly and to hold back in the development of closer bonds with the Soviet bloc.

If India should become a member of the Soviet bloc, its potential contribution would depend largely on the degree of developmental assistance extended by the Soviet Union. Since higher priorities within the Soviet orbit would probably prevent the USSR from providing India with the necessary machinery for large-scale industrialization, India would remain primarily an agricultural country with ever-growing pressure of its population on the land and with little to contribute to the economy of the Soviet sphere.

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If India's accession to world communist ranks were to result in the loss of all South and Southeast Asia's resources to the West the advantage of the Soviet bloc would be considerable. This advantage would, however, consist more in the denial of important sources of strategic materials to the West than in their acquisition by the Soviet bloc, particularly, as in time of war, shipping difficulties would impose severe limitations on Soviet ability to utilize supplies from this area.

Indian products have a much higher priority on the West's purchasing list than on that of the USSR. The absorption of India into the Soviet bloc would place under communist control one of the West's principal sources of jute goods, tea, manganese, mica, shellac, and kyanite. As important to the West as India's own products are the rubber, tin, and graphite produced in neighboring countries, the supply of which would be seriously jeopardized if a communist regime should come to power in India.

India's economic importance to the US and the West depends on the status of US-USSR relations. In normal times the total trade of the US with India is not substantial. India absorbs only 2.1 percent of US exports and supplies but 3 percent of US imports. In the current cold war situation, however, India contributes strategic materials in significant amounts to the economies of the free world, and to that of the US in particular. Nevertheless, with these commodities are important, none of them is absolutely indispensable. In a total war, India's contribution might include not only exports of strategic materials, but large scale production of military supplies and local support for military forces such as was provided to British and other Allied forces during World War II. The magnitude of that contribution can not be assessed precisely, but it was apparently around \$8,000,000,000. Since the country has not yet fully recovered from the effects of World War II, and is currently restricting its capital goods imports severely, it is doubtful that an equally large contribution could be expected under present conditions.

In a continuing cold war situation, India is most important to the West as a major supplier of jute goods, tea, manganese, mica, shellac, and kyanite. The loss of any one of these commodities would create difficulties and would involve at best a shift to more costly and less satisfactory sources of supply. Presumably, tea could be dispensed with. In the case of jute goods, the substitution of other fiber and paper bagging is possible, but alternative materials are also in short supply. For manganese, mica, and kyanite, alternative sources of supply can be developed only with considerable delay and with a loss in the quality of the raw material. India alone supplies the best quality of shellac, but the use of shellac can be restricted. Even more important to the West than India's own products are such commodities as natural rubber, tin graphite, etc., produced in neighboring countries, the supply of which would be seriously jeopardized, if not lost entirely if a communist regime should come to power in India.

The full alignment of the Indian Government with the Western democracies would be an important gain for the West not only because it would strengthen the democratic camp by the addition of the largest non-communist country in

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Asia, but also because such a striking conversion to the democratic point of view after a long period of suspended judgment would have a powerful psychological effect and do much to confirm in their adherence to the democratic cause a number of Asian countries that presently adopt neutral or timid positions.

Continued Indian neutrality would deprive the USSR of the striking political and psychological benefits that would accrue from an Indo-Soviet alliance. But as has been indicated in the discussion of India's political significance to the US, Indian neutrality is not without significant advantages to the USSR since such neutrality is an important obstacle in the way of US leadership in the struggle against world communism; on occasion, it gives support to Soviet maneuvers, as, for example, in the UN and its specialized agencies. These positive benefits, together with the fact that Indian neutrality denies important advantages to the West, make the continuance of Indian neutrality a worthwhile objective of Soviet foreign policy, failing the possibility of gaining India's adhesion to the Soviet bloc.

In conclusion then the loss of India to Soviet control would have a serious adverse effect on the position of the Western democracies vis-a-vis the Soviet bloc. It would deprive them of an important source of a number of strategic materials since India's adhesion to the Soviet orbit would probably soon result in the West being denied free and unrestricted access to all the resources of South and Southeast Asia. It would bring into the Soviet sphere the largest and most influential non-communist country in Asia. Its psychological effect would be tremendous and Soviet prestige and influence would be greatly enhanced. All the non-communist regimes of Asia would be gravely threatened and without strong outside support, many of them would doubtless follow India into the Soviet camp. Nor would the effects be confined to South and Southeast Asia, as there would doubtless be repercussions in Africa and the Near East as well.

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