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Attach. to ER7-7481

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Report on the Coordination of Collection of Intelligence Information

1. You requested that in consultation with the representatives of the other agencies I undertake a review of the existing provisions for the development and coordination of information requirements and collection tasks in conformity with established Priority National Intelligence Objectives.

2. While there are many details which bear upon this subject matter the following are major factors which help us to put this problem in perspective:

a. Priority National Intelligence Objectives DCID 4/4 have been approved by the IAC. They indicate the fundamental direction which our intelligence efforts should take in regard to the national security.

b. In many cases departmental objectives which arise from departmental needs are coincident with the priority objectives, though, of course, not in all cases.

c. The IAC now has a well established procedure for the approval and review of annual and quarterly programs for the

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production of National Intelligence Estimates, provision being made for flexibility to meet the changing and urgent needs of the National Security Council. Gaps in intelligence in NIE's are highlighted thru the post-mortem procedure.

d. There already exist mechanisms, such as the Economic Intelligence Committee and the Scientific Estimates Committee with their various respective subcommittees, which make it possible to develop coordinated research programs on subjects required to support the estimating program or other security programs of interest to more than one department and in some cases mainly relevant to a single department. These coordinated research programs also provide collection guides, where necessary. In addition, it should be recalled that each of the intelligence producing units among the IAC agencies has a research program designed to fulfill its various responsibilities to community or national programs as well as departmental needs.

3. It is reasonable to inquire whether there is a need for greater central direction or coordination and more detailed accounting in the deployment of research resources in respect to Priority National Objectives. I do not believe so, except as special problems arise. In such cases we should deal with them as necessary. Furthermore, I believe no new overall machinery is required in the coordination of research for the purpose of providing

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better guidance for the collection of intelligence information.

4. Associated with each research office in the intelligence agencies and centrally for each agency there are well established units with quite similar procedures for acquiring the raw data and intelligence information which the intelligence producers need by levying requirements on appropriate reference or collection facilities. "Requirements" officers are in a sense middle men who are essential because of the size of our research organizations and our collection organizations as well as their remoteness from one another. The requirements officers must understand the needs of research, the resources available and problems of collection. Their procedures are designed to provide a clear request to the collectors for intelligence information needed for research, to guard against duplication and to work out proper priorities with the collectors. It should also be noted that collectors collect information which they have not been specifically requested to obtain, some of which when disseminated may give rise to requests for additional collection along the same lines. A fuller description of the coordination of requirements is submitted at Tab A.

5. I have discussed this matter with the IAC representatives concerned at some length. After consultation with the heads of their agencies they advise me:

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a. That their respective agency's requirements are responsive to DCID 4/4 although, of course, their responsibilities also include requirements not covered by that Directive.

b. That in their view the existing arrangements for the coordination of requirements, where necessary among the agencies, are adequate, and

c. That, in their opinion, no new overall coordination mechanism or procedures are required.

6. In these discussions it was recognized that there are specific problems in the coordination of requirements which arise from time to time such as the need for guidance on the part of the director of NSA or such as has recently been the concern of the IAC with regard to defectors. It was recognized that individual collection administrators are plagued from time to time with shortages of funds and personnel or other weaknesses. It is believed that these can be best corrected by being dealt with as specific problems, as indeed in certain cases they are or have been.

7. Another aspect of improvement in collection is the coordination of assets available to the US missions abroad as they proceed to act on the requirements served from Washington Headquarters. A review of reports from the Chiefs of Mission to the Department of State indicate that coordination in the field is generally effective and that systematic efforts are being made for improvement.

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8. Recommendations:

a. That no new overall mechanism be established for the coordination of requirements for the collection of information.

b. That as specific requirements problems arise they be treated directly.

c. That, insofar as the regular procedures of the agency or the IAC do not seem suited to deal with a given problem, you assign an officer to make a special investigation with a report and recommendations to you, or to the IAC when appropriate.


Special Assistant to the Director
for Planning and Coordination

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COORDINATION OF REQUIREMENTS
FOR
COLLECTION OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

1. What is Meant by the Coordination of Requirements?

Judgements on the following questions are required before requirements for field collection can be said to be adequately coordinated at headquarters. The eventual responsibility for making these judgements falls not upon researchers but upon middlemen known as "Requirements Officers" in research offices or upon similar officers associated directly with the managers of the collection facilities.

a. Can the Answer to the Requirements be Found in Washington?

Requirements Officers in research offices normally seek assurance from researchers that the information requested is not available in finished intelligence or in existing literature in Washington, both unclassified and classified or in possession of other Government agencies. The IAC has in the last several years established the advisory committee on NSCID 16 to insure full collaboration of the agencies in developing more adequate reference facilities for finding intelligence information in foreign literature as well as for the recovery of intelligence information already received from collectors, to insure the more systematic and adequate procurement of foreign language publications and to insure the maximum

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effective utilization of linguistic assets for the exploitation of foreign language publications. All of the foregoing cannot obviously guarantee that requirements will not be levied on collectors regarding which information may be available at headquarters but it does reflect that, at this juncture, the machinery exists for concentrating our efforts to prevent unnecessary levying of requirements on collectors.

b. Have Requirements for the Same Information Already Been Levied?

Requirements Officers in the research offices have established procedures for screening against possible duplication. The collection facilities have "requirements officers" with procedures for making a check against requirements previously levied on that particular facility. Additionally, procedures exist for rescinding requirements once collection has been accomplished, though the human element involved no doubt accounts for error in some cases. ~~Consideration is currently being given to the establishment~~ ^{has been estab.} of a central register in CIA of its requirements regardless of what collector has been requested to collect, in order to assure against duplication. It is possible, of course, that the same requirement may be placed with more than one collector, though again the procedures of requirements officers as well as those of collection facilities operate to reduce this to a minimum taking into account that in some cases placing the same requirements on more than one collector may be justified either in terms of the

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importance of the subject matter, or the fact that varying capabilities exist.

c. Which Collection Facility Should Receive the Assignment?

The research analyst by experience has a useful judgement to make on this question. His suggestion is checked by the requirements officers and will be tested by the staff of the administrator of the collection facility to which it is assigned. Each agency understandably thinks first of the capability of its own collection facility. Among those whose fields of collection responsibility are identical with their research responsibility this of course makes sense. Requirements officers' judgements, however, will be affected by their experience and their knowledgeability of the collection capabilities of the various facilities as well as by the response which they get from the collectors when they attempt to levy requirements. It should not be overlooked that the collectors themselves affect the requirements they receive in that collectors collect on their own initiative as well as by direction and their reports are frequently the stimulus for a request for additional information from the same source or on related matters. Thus, the administrative connection between research offices and collectors is indeed a two-way street and the actual process has elements

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of pure chance and coincidence as well as elements of planning and control.

Clandestine collection, because of its hazards and expense is normally not undertaken until collection from overt sources fail or can be reasonably anticipated to fail and the matter is of importance. Exceptions arise where clandestine capabilities have been developed and should be utilized since they exist even though the subject matter is of secondary importance. In certain of such cases coordinated requirements have been developed. The machinery exists for providing the necessary overall direction for clandestine collection in order that its major effort may be responsive to the Priority National Intelligence Objectives as stated in DCID 4/4 as the agencies seek to meet their individual intelligence production responsibilities in that regard.

d. Does the Requirement Reflect the Immediately Related Needs of Others than the Originator?

In the main, such correlation, if any, is a responsibility shouldered by the requirements officers or the staff of the given collection facility itself. Some improvements in this regard have been made as a result of advances in the coordination of research. Thus, requirements which take account of related needs may emerge, for example, from the Watch Committee, the EIC, the JAEIC and from the NIS program and, stated in broader form, from the IAC post mortem procedures managed by ONE.

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In addition, in the last year a statement has been made of requirements for intelligence information for support of propaganda and pay-warfare activities of the Government.

e. Is the Requirement Properly Handled in Keeping With Its Importance and the Capabilities of the Collection Facility to Which it Has Been Assigned?

This is frequently called the "priorities" problem and is one which has proved fascinating to explore theoretically. There is no IAC machinery that assigns priorities directly and explicitly to all requirements for intelligence information. Priority National Intelligence Objectives DCID 4/4 is the authoritative overall guidance on critical intelligence matters relating to national security. Where indeed real competition develops in the handling of comparably important requirements on which the collector has capability, DCID 4/4 provides a guide for reaching decisions explicable to all concerned. This is notably true in connection with clandestine collection.

In trying to apply Priority National Intelligence Objectives usefully in establishing priorities among requirements for intelligence information the following comments should be kept in mind:

(1) That National Intelligence Objectives are, in the main, more meaningful to the researcher than to the collector.

(A proper translation by the researcher of the national intelligence

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objectives eventually into collection requirements which exclude intelligence already collected or produced, is the way in which objectives become meaningful to the collector.)

(2) That a collection facility may have relatively little capability at the time of receipt to collect on requirements directly related to national intelligence objectives.

(3) That a collection facility may have great capability on matters not directly related to national intelligence objectives. (Those analysts working on subject matter which is readily identified with major national intelligence objectives thus may seek to impose the theory that such objectives should guide all collection, although when they find their own work to be related to a subordinate objective they may be inclined to point out the importance of exploitation of "incidental" capabilities while major objectives are being pursued.)

(4) That a low priority might properly be given to minor supplementary information on a high priority item than to major basic information necessary to a low priority item.

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