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The achievements of the Office of Intelligence Coordination can be divided into the following general categories:

1. Regularization of certain IAC practices and the IAC structure
2. Intelligence publications
3. Advice on and the negotiation of NSCIDs and DCIDs
4. Resolution of jurisdictional problems among agencies regarding intelligence activities and stimulating cooperative action to meet urgent intelligence needs
5. Relations of services of common concern to the rest of the community and provision of guidance to those services
6. Support for DDP and psychological warfare

THE IAC:

The major activity of the IAC, as far as its meetings are concerned, has been in consideration and approval of National Intelligence Estimates. It is interesting to note that General Smith among his first actions in 1950 was to insist that National Intelligence Estimates should be reviewed by the IAC chiefs in meeting. More than any single thing the use of the IAC for approval of estimates furthered the development of an intelligence community. The weekly meetings of the intelligence chiefs for this purpose, the necessity for give and take, General Smith's happy sense of balance in recognizing the other's responsibility while

seeing clearly his own -- all of these things provided a new basis and method for cooperation. The example of the IAC table as one should expect had its greatest effect upon those who sat in the back row and who witnessed the proceedings. In the main these were the estimates officers in the various agencies. This no doubt accounts in considerable measure for the fact that ONE and the Board of Estimates have been outstanding in carrying out their responsibilities for inter-agency coordination at the sub-IAC level.

However, it would be misleading to assume that the IAC's function in coordination was confined to estimating. A review of the IAC documents will show that half are non-estimate in character and deal rather with intelligence activities. It is in this area where the Office of Intelligence Coordination, through its mission in part as secretary and in part as coordinator, made its primary contribution in at least two ways: First in the careful review of non-estimate papers going to the IAC and making suggestions to action offices for the clear presentation of problems and solutions; and second, in that on frequent occasion the coordination responsibility on an inter-agency problem was assigned to OIC, not as secretary but as the Director's principal assistant for coordination of federal intelligence activities. A list of those of the problems which fall into the latter category is as follows:

Dissemination of National Intelligence

IAC Progress Reports to the NSC

Protection of Intelligence Sources and Methods

Controls over Dissemination and Use of Intelligence

Foreign Language Publications

Budgeting Analysis of Intelligence Programs

Publicity of Intelligence Activity

Biological Warfare

Survey of Psy War Intelligence Needs and Assets

In carrying out these coordinating assignments as well as others which were not handled as IAC problems it was OIC practice to work closely with the offices in the Agency having the greatest interest and responsibility and to urge those offices to do as much as possible toward the solution of the problem rather than taking the matter out of their hands. The capabilities of the CIA offices to exercise leadership role in such problems have gradually developed over the several years. OIC's detachment from direct responsibility on the one hand and its opportunity to observe the attitudes and philosophy of the DCI at IAC meetings on the other hand, at times prompted solutions which appeared to the CIA offices to be a surrender of DCI responsibility. Accordingly, OIC not infrequently appeared to the offices to be leaning far too much in the direction of the interests and rights of the other agencies at the Agency's expense although OIC preferred to consider this aspect as one of recognition of interests whether CIA's or others'. However, this provided more acceptability for the propositions which the Agency sponsored in negotiations with the other agencies. In certain cases this disagreement was ameliorated by extended discussions over a period of time. In other instances it provoked the offices to circumvent OIC. This is particularly true of the Office of Current Intelligence

which in USCIB matters as well as others preferred to and in fact did deal directly with the DCI, DDCI or subsequent to its establishment, the Office of the DDI. This is also true but less so with regard to the Office of Scientific Intelligence. Greatest cooperation was achieved with ORR, OO and OCD. While there were no great difficulties with ONE, OIC made relatively little contribution to ONE's coordinating role simply because they did it so well.

As far as FI is concerned (formerly OSO) OIC made practically no contribution because (a) the top authorities did not for whatever reason prefer that OIC should be called in to play a role and (b) the security and other devices available to FI were sufficient permit them to handle their problems as they desired. Exceptions to this were in the field of requirements and subsequently in the field of intelligence support for clandestine operations, and, at the request of the DDCI, OIC assisted in the agreed activities problem. In the case of requirements this is explained by the fact that FI was frustrated in its own handling of that problem. In the case of intelligence support it was due to (a) that the office established in DDP for intelligence support was based on a plan drawn up by OIC, at the request of DDP, (b) that its leadership was drawn from the DDI area and (c) that leadership fully agreed with the OIC proposal and the methodology which it recommended.