


25X1


TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP61S00750A000600150063-9



Copy of 19 25X1
13 February 1957

**JUSTIFICATION FOR PENETRATION FLIGHTS BY AQUATONE
BASED ON INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS**


1. The Ad Hoc Requirements Committee on AQUATONE has identified three intelligence problems of vital importance to the defense of this country. Their solution can have vital effects upon this nation's economy. These problems are set forth below. In exploring the way in which AQUATONE, with its unique ability  might contribute significantly to the solution of these three intelligence problems, the Committee has required that each target listed could affirmatively meet the test: "Will we learn significant new information that will likely make a fundamental difference in our estimates of Russian capabilities".

25X1

2. The three problems are as follows:


a. Soviet Guided Missile Capability Against the United States.

1) The limited amount of information available to the intelligence community indicates that the Soviet Union has given a very high priority to the development of both offensive and defensive guided missiles. Current estimates give the Soviet Union a capability in the field of air-to-surface and surface-to-surface weapons suitable for nuclear attack on the United States and predict an ICBM capability by 1960. To achieve this latter threat, the Soviets would have to begin testing ICBM's and/or components thereof not later than 1958; such testing, however, could start in 1957.



25X1
25X1

In view of this, we are, therefore, seeking initially pioneer




25X1

NSA review completed

HANDLE

Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP61S00750A000600150063-9

TOP SECRET




25X1

Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP61S00750A000600150063-9

Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP61S00750A000600150063-9

TOP SECRET



ONI

6) Coverage of the foregoing targets, one or more, and study of the results with collateral information, should enable us to sharpen our requirements not only for AQUATONE but also for other sources in respect of the guided missile problem.

b. Soviet Long Range Aircraft Capability.

1) We feel that the solution to this problem must go hand in hand with efforts to solve the guided missile capability problem because of the interrelationships of the two delivery systems. AQUATONE missions [redacted] revealed that eight of the nine home bases of the Soviet long range aviation had storage sites the existence of which had previously been unknown. If the ratio of eight out of nine should also apply to the remaining long range aviation bases and, assuming that the sites contain nuclear weapons, current estimates regarding the status of long range aviation nuclear readiness as well as nuclear production capabilities would probably require readjustment.

25X1

2) [redacted]

of the highest priority long range aviation airfields would serve both to indicate the size and the composition of the

25X1




25X1

25X1

HANDLE VI

TOP SECRET



25X1

TOP SECRET



25X1

TOP SECRET

bomber force and the scope of the forward deployment of



25X1

3) Coverage of the long range aircraft bases coupled with the information obtained on the guided missile installations will indicate which is receiving the greater emphasis in the USSR and whether Soviet development in these fields is surpassing that of the US.

25X2




25X1D



Attachments

25X1



25X1

HANDLE

TOP SECRET

