

TCS-3653-58
Copy 1 of 5

25 August 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Needs for Tactical Coverage of the CHICOM
Areas Pertinent to TAIWAN

1. This memorandum contains a recommendation in paragraph 5 submitted for DDCI approval.
2. Changes in the TAIWAN area over the weekend have prompted the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee (ARC) to call attention to the extremely limited capabilities of the US to be informed of CHICOM activities which could have serious implications inasmuch as the US Government will not tolerate CHICOM conquest of the Offshore Islands.
3. Whereas planned coverage by upcoming Mission 6018 may embrace certain of the targets of great interest for tactical purposes, it is our understanding that at the moment, since Presidential permission extends to only one more sortie and since Operations DPS/DCI is delaying that sortie until weather conditions are favorable for maximum coverage, it may well be some time before Mission 6018 is accomplished. Whereas Mission 6017 embraced areas of interest in the current tactical situation and for the most part did not give indications of imminent hostile action, there was confirmation of previously reported build-up in air capabilities and no inclusion of bomber aircraft. Whether since 20 August 1958 (the date of Mission 6017) bombers including IL-28s have arrived at these airfields becomes a question of critical importance.
4. The ARC has taken into account the possibility of coverage for tactical purposes of targets of concern by CHINAT photography. In general, this capability is limited by virtue of range of the aircraft used and by the absence of air cover to protect the CHINAT aircraft on penetration missions in the face of substantially improved CHICOM air defense capability in this forward area. The Navy is requesting of

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CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY

HANDLE VIA TALENT CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY

CINCPACFLT the coverage of critical targets presumed to be within the foreshortened capabilities outlined above with a request for prompt report as to the ability of the CHINATs to respond. (This at best, we suspect, will be limited to the coast line between SWATOW to WENCHOW.) Pending this report with the strong suspicion that it will for the most part be negative, the ARC sets forth below its recommendations for prompt action by CHALICE. In doing so, it reports also that in the face of current uncertain conditions and with the possibility in mind that they may be continuing, the ARC is preparing at once a master list of targets of critical interest in the present and possible future tactical situation to permit ready and prompt levying of requirements on CHALICE on a daily basis or as necessary.

5. Recommendation: That CHALICE coverage be obtained as soon as possible of the following target areas which are deemed to be of most immediate concern for detecting further CHICOM hostile movements and intentions against TAIWAN:

- a. SWATOW to WENCHOW.
- *b. CHANGSHU/NANCHANG Area.
- *c. SHANGHAI/HANGCHOW Bay Area.
- *d. WENCHOW to and including CHOUSHAN Islands.
- e. HSIN-CHENG -- change in bomber AOB.
- *f. NANKING.
- g. Selected targets in FUKIEN Province (namely, airfields LIEN CHENG and LUNGCHI and rail holding yards at YUNG-AN and NANPING).

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Recommendation in paragraph 5 is APPROVED:

JAMES Q. REBER
Chairman

Ad Hoc Requirements Committee
CONCUR:

C. P. CABELL
Lieutenant General, USAF
Deputy Director

RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
SA/PD/DCI

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* These target areas have already been requested for coverage and are