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[] REPORT ON SOVIET VULNERABILITIES: DRS COMMENTS

I. Introduction

The five volumes of [] report entitled The Vulnerability of the Soviet Union and Its European Satellites to Political Warfare 1952, SECRET, sets out to deal with the "Soviet problem" as a whole. The report seeks to single out the forces which have shaped the present day Soviet Union, to indicate the most probable lines of future development, and to suggest possible US policy courses vis-a-vis the Soviet realm which will forward US national interests.

Following a summary devoted to recommendations, the first volume of the report presents general papers on past and prospective Soviet society and on Soviet-satellite vulnerabilities. These are supplemented by more specialized papers centering on US policy on Stalin's death ("Cancellation"), US broadcasting policy re the USSR and Eastern Europe, US policy on non-Russian peoples of the USSR, and US interests in Eastern Europe and the USSR. The second volume consists of an analysis entitled The Dynamics of Soviet Society. This is supplemented by a series of papers in the third volume: [] depicts representative Soviet types of personalities; [] analyzes the reactions of Bolshevik leadership to deviant behavior, especially in agriculture; [] summarizes early Russian crises over succession, particularly when strong rulers died, (the "time of troubles" following the death of Ivan Grozny, the palace revolution in the 18th Century following Peter's death, and the Decembrist Revolt in 1825); [] discusses frustration in the totalitarian state; and [] offers some theories of Soviet society.

In the fourth volume [] discusses the problem of succession in the USSR, and [] the nationalities problem. The last volume, edited by [] contains papers on the European satellites.

These five large volumes couple analyses of past, present, and prospective developments with discussions of actual or possible US policies. The present notes consider the [] analysis without regard to the discussion and recommendations regarding US policy.

However, it is perhaps not straying too far into the field of policy recommendations for DRS to call attention to one [] recommendation (Vol. I, Part I, p. 5), namely: That the US intelligence effort be concentrated on two priority topics, (1) interplay within the Politburo, and (2) the outlook and aspirations of higher bureaucrats, especially in the armed forces. These are important topics, and intelligence circles have always treated them as such. That the US "intelligence effort" should be concentrated on these topics seems

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to be an overstatement of the case, in view of the unlikelihood that this would produce reliable data and estimates. The [] report itself offers fair warning of the difficulties involved, because the sections treating these topics are among the most controversial in the Report. Students of Soviet developments inside and outside intelligence agencies have secured their best results not by attempting to dissolve the greatest secrets but by expanding the field of knowledge in areas where stores of knowledge can be assembled from nuggets of information.

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II. Strength and Weakness of the Report

The papers collected in the [] report are of varying value. Some are rather factual, such as the paper on earlier succession crises, others more analytic. [] paper on post-collectivization Party strategy in counter-ing agricultural deviations is an interesting essay.) Many of the papers are largely historical, including that on the nationality problem (which concentrates on the Ukrainians, Georgians, and Armenians.) These are good summaries, generally factual and only occasionally marred by errors and misconceptions.

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In a sense it is a virtue of the [] study that it sets itself so broad an objective as to bring within a narrow compass the Soviet system as a whole. Nevertheless, the papers generally seem less successful when the authors strive for the broadest scope, or attempt to develop analyses in areas where the "facts" are subject to various interpretations. Good examples of the latter are the two papers centering on the Soviet succession problem: "Cancellation" in Volume One and "The Problem of Succession" in Volume Four. Neither is a distinctly original contribution to analysis of the post-Stalin possibilities in the Soviet Union, and both suffer from a certain amount of faulty theorizing as well as uncritical use of data.

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The most ambitious single paper in the collection is that of [] (comprising Volume Two) on The Dynamics of Soviet Society. Although this work is well grounded, it does not seem to do complete justice to its subject. This may be explained in part by the lack of exhaustive research for such an ambitious project:

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1. There has not been hammered out the kind of theoretic structure which is necessary to explain adequately the changing contours of Soviet society (Daniels' short paper in Volume 3 is only a beginning).

2. The various topics discussed in the "Dynamics" paper have not received, for the most part, definitive monographic treatment by students of the Soviet scene.

Because the author is unable to ground his analysis on previous works, he has to skim lightly over topics deserving more careful treatment. To take one example, in the section on "The Bureaucratization of Social and Cultural Life" he has to cover literature, the arts, history-writing, law, education,

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social mores, religion and social stratification in less than 30 pages.

In the "Dynamics" paper the entire section on economic developments consists of nine pages. The author disclaims any intention of examining in detail the Soviet economy and states that he wishes "merely to suggest the interaction between certain key economic problems and decisions and the policies, economic or otherwise, pursued by the Soviet regime." The economy is of more importance, however, as a "dynamic" of Soviet society than the treatment allows it to appear.

III. Question of Interpretation

Scattered throughout the [] report are certain basic ideas which invite critical examination:

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A. Primacy of "power" over "ideology."

"...All available evidence points to the domination of Stalin's mind and that of his colleagues by an ideology derived from their own experience in the pursuit and maintenance of power. Its effective touchstones of good and bad are the consequence of any given act for their own power. If other elements enter into the rationale for their action, they are on the whole now likely to be based on Russian nationalism rather than on Marxism." [] Vol. 1, Part II A, p. 19.

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This passage seems to say that there is a Stalinist ideology of power not only separate from the Marxist-Leninist ideology but closer to Russian nationalism than to Marxism. Much of the report seems to be based upon the idea that "power" has triumphed over "ideology" in the USSR. Unfortunately, this idea is assumed rather than argued in the work. At times the authors suggest that they mean merely that Stalin has revised, explicitly or implicitly, much of the ideology as developed by Marx, Engels, and Lenin. At other times the authors suggest that "power" considerations, completely separated from the current official ideology, are dominant in Bolshevik behaviour. Regarding the first interpretation it can be said that despite all the tactical shifts there is a remarkable continuity in Marxist-Soviet ideology, even under Stalin. Regarding the second, it is difficult to imagine the kind of power considerations, including those implied in the [] report, which cannot be handled by means of Marxist categories.

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The failure to arrive at a clear understanding of the nature of Soviet power in turn leads to dubious conclusions regarding the actions and intentions of Soviet leaders. An example of thinking which results from the rejection of Marxist ideology as a determining factor in shaping the decisions of Soviet leaders may be seen on page 7 of "Cancellation," which maintains:

...One can see at least the possibility of a group within top Soviet leadership who, because of their worker origins, their personal awareness of the unsatisfied economic wants of the people, their special technical knowledge, and their positions in industry, might, with Stalin dead, vigorously oppose a continuation of the present Soviet position vis-a-vis the West — and, therefore, oppose the bid for power of any individual or group committed to an aggressive anti-West policy. ..

This great difficulty in the work probably arises from the practice of looking upon devices of expediency and the abandonment of unworkable experiments in the USSR as an abrogation of ideological principles. While extensive changes have taken place since 1920 in such institutions as the family, law and in social relationships, these do not in any way invalidate the substantial body of dogma which is the basis of official doctrine. The [] study tends to treat the latter as one of the less essential features of the Soviet system. For instance, on page 106 of Vol. II it is stated in a discussion on increasing rigidity in the social structure:

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...On balance these changes have made for a pattern of policy more conservative, more nearly linked with the Russian national tradition, than might have been envisaged in the early days of the Revolution, although this reversion in substance has been accomplished while maintaining a residue of those elements in Marxist-Leninist doctrine, either in their original form of modified, which are judged useful to the regime for other purposes. ...

Again, on page 133 of the same volume, the authors maintain in speaking of discipline in Soviet society:

...In turn, the development and cultivation of a privileged stratum of qualified and reliable bureaucrats was judged necessary to the maintenance of such a society. Insofar as it lay within the regime's power, ideological and other obstacles were set aside. ...

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Although increasing stratification of Soviet society is an undisputed fact, it might be more accurate to say that it is really a result of the regime's desire to perpetuate its ideology. This becomes the more obvious when one considers that complete ideological reliability is essential to vertical mobility in the USSR. In this connection, it should be pointed out that the prime consideration for social advancement is not academic education, as claimed on page 132 of Vol. II, but ideological reliability.

Thus the issue of power and ideology is cogently presented in some notes which George Morgan of PSB wrote after reading the paper entitled "The Dynamics of Soviet Society," DRS agrees with the points made in this paper. Rather than repeating these, it is sufficient to attach a copy of the paper as an expression of the DRS viewpoint.

B. Russian Nationalism and Russian National Interest.

At various points in the report the authors allude to the Soviet leaders adopting "Russian nationalism." In other contexts they refer to "Russian national interests" as though these were readily definable and non-contentious, a kind of substratum underlying all regimes in the area. It is not always clear whether the word "Russian" in these contexts refers specifically to the Great Russians as distinct from the other Slavic and non-Slavic peoples, or whether Russian is used as shorthand for the people of the Russian Empire. This difficulty is minor compared to the difficulty of giving any precise content to these terms. The Russian territory has varied and Russian conceptions of national interest have varied (not to speak of other peoples' conceptions of Russian national interest). Furthermore, despite reintegration into the Soviet ideology of many elements derived from pre-Bolshevik days, it is impossible to establish any easy identification of Soviet foreign and internal policy with Tsarist foreign and domestic policy, which itself changed vastly over time.

The authors may have had in mind, when they remark on the "progressively increased reliance on Great Russian nationalism as the ideological basis for the Soviet regime's rule" (Vol. I, Part II A, p. 15), the official ideology on the relations between Russians and minority peoples, or between "Great Russian" and the non-Russian peripheral areas. No one would deny that Stalin has gone a long way in changing what was approved Communist dogma on this subject in the pre-Revolutionary or early Soviet period. This has been, of course, in the direction of viewing more favorably and placing more importance on individual Russians and the Russian people, as well as the Russian state. This does not mean, however, that the Soviet position today on the subject faithfully reproduces some mythical position supposedly constant throughout the entire Tsarist period. Even today the Soviet method of governing non-Russian peoples is rather different from any employed by the Tsars.

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C. Conflicts of Interest Within the Soviet Regime.

The authors assume too readily that there is a fundamental conflict of approach within the ruling circles of the USSR, although such a conflict may exist or occur in the future. They seem to be on weak ground in suggesting the nature of implied conflict. They attribute views to present Politburo members which are to a large extent unverifiable and somewhat implausible. Mikoyan and Kaganovich are said to be men who, if Stalin were not present, "would put practical considerations ahead of any theory of Bolshevik world movement that requires subordinating normal internal Soviet development to a war economy" (Vol. IV, Appendix B, p. 18); the careers of Kosygin and Shvernik "suggest at least a real awareness on their part of the needs of the people and, possibly, an interest, identified with their own careers, in a popular rather than a Stalin view of the national economy." (Vol. IV, Appendix B, p. 19) It is claimed that the ascendancy of these men, and of Suslov (with his "special interest in the working class,") and of Shkiryatov (a former tailor) "indicate a continuing tendency to promote to high positions men of worker and factory experience who broaden the base of popular 'feeling' in the Politburo" (Vol. IV, Appendix B, p. 19).

The report also implies that the Soviet "bureaucrats" have motivations different from the regime, and that they are kept in line only by "surveillance and compulsion." (Vol. I, Part II B, p. 20) It is said that the higher officers of the armed forces are the most vulnerable and important to US political warfare. This point is developed elsewhere in particular relationship to the Army as a kind of military force uncontrolled by Stalinist ideology but imbued 'rather' with the ideology of Russian nationalism. The tendency on page 12 of "Cancellation" to regard the military forces as a "potential reservoir of political unreliability" ignores the positive effects of Party control and indoctrination in the armed forces.

Anti-Stalinist currents may erupt in various forms even in highly-placed groups, given situations when choices are available at various levels of authority. The authors are not, however, discussing a war situation, in which many individuals may suddenly acquire the power to make dramatic choices for and against the regime. It is more difficult to visualize this occurring in a non-war situation, even on the death of the leader.

D. Importance of the Communist Party and Police.

The Report seems committed to the proposition that the Communist Party has suffered a loss of status. "No element in the Soviet structure appears to have been more weakened by the purges than the Communist Party apparatus, which lost authority to the other chains of bureaucratic command, and, notably, to the Secret Police." (Vol. I, Part II A, p. 14) In another context the authors discuss the Party's "relative weakness, as compared to the position after Lenin's death," as a limitation on the Party's ability to replace Stalin

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by a single successor. The factual evidence underlying this assumption is not clearly evident.

There has been change, of course, in the relationship of Party and government, involving greater fusion of the two at key points. In the purge period, however, the Stalin group, operating essentially from Party positions of control (at the time Stalin held no high government position), caused a thorough purge not only of the Party ranks, but also of the police and other government agencies. Two successive Secret police chiefs lost their heads, as did various government agency chiefs, top Army officers, and Party officials. In both the prewar and postwar periods the Party leadership has displayed its determinative role in the operations of Soviet society. If the survivors to Stalin in the decisive Party body (Politburo or Presidium) are unable to work out an orderly succession this will not necessarily mean that the Party has lost status in comparison to other Soviet agencies. The likelihood at the moment is that they will manage orderly succession which will continue the the Party's dominance.

The tendency to overestimate the power of the police in the Soviet state may arise partly from a lack of exhaustive research as well as an uncritical acceptance of certain popular conceptions on this subject, particularly in the field of forced labor. Much more adequate data are available on the present functions of the MVD and MGB than that presented on page 72 of Volume II. Certain statements on the historical development of the Soviet police are erroneous. Contrary to the assertion on page 71 of Volume II, the OGPU was not transformed into the NKVD in 1934, but was absorbed. The nucleus of the power of the old OGPU was retained in a new Main Administration of State Security (GUGB) under the NKVD. It is also not accurate to say, as stated on the following page, that the corrective labor camps of early years were transformed into political concentration camps. In the early period of Soviet rule, the two existed side by side, and were only gradually fused to form one type of camp in which both political and criminal prisoners were incarcerated.

In discussing the economic and political significance of forced labor, the authors err in basing their conclusions on information which is not valid in describing the present situation. It cannot be asserted, for example, that the population of the forced labor camps is now from 3.5 to 10 million (page 73, Vol. II). These estimates are based on data for 1941 and before, and therefore provide only slight criteria for judging the size of the present camp population. There is in fact no possible way of reliably estimating the magnitude of the forced labor system at present. Contrary to the assertion on page 10 of "Cancellation" the whole postwar economic program is not interlocked with the forced labor system. It is also not a new penetration of the state structure by the police, since it existed before World War II in probably much greater measure than it does today. It cannot be claimed that the desire to mobilize quickly large pools of cheap labor for special tasks of capital construction is a motive to sustain the institution of forced labor (p. 253, Vol. II). On the contrary, with very few exceptions it seems that

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the Soviet forced labor system is designed to make use of the large number of prisoners who have been incarcerated as punishment for deviant behavior.

E. Subjective Elements in Interpretation.

There is a noticeable tendency to introduce value of judgments into the study which are irrelevant to the problem under consideration. The authors assert, for example, that "the Russian revolutionary conspirators ... never accepted, or they abandoned, the lessons of some two thousand years of Western thought which regarded the handling of state power in relation to the individual as a distinct problem in all forms of society." (Vol. I, Part II A, p. 7) Subsequently the authors voice their doubts that the Soviet leaders "understand the ethical and even religious foundations of Western Societies, or the conception of politics as the arena for the settlement of differences among individuals and groups, such a settlement being made within rules designed to protect the individual as well as the community, to protect the minority as well as to permit the majority to govern." These statements reflect a strong ethnocentrism, because they are based on the assumption that there exists a system of thought which is, or should be, held by all peoples at all times. Marxism denies the propositions which the authors assert, so that there is no question of the Soviet leaders "abandoning" or not "understanding" propositions which are part of a different philosophy.

IV. The Paper on the Soviet European Satellites

Appendix D to Volume 5 of the study in question, dealing with the Soviet satellite countries of Eastern Europe, is of extremely uneven quality, containing a number of first-rate sections --- for example, some of the passages dealing with Czechoslovakia --- as well as others (particularly the introductory chapter) much less sound of substance and less well written. On the whole, the study amounts to a routine duplication of the kind of estimates of Soviet satellite strengths and vulnerabilities made by the intelligence agencies of the US Government during the past several years. Occasionally it shows unusual and penetrating insights on particular matters, but its main conclusions do not alter the generally accepted picture of the orbit. On the debit side, a number of the assumptions and generalizations made on particular topics appear to be of doubtful validity and occasionally are mutually contradictory. As a result, the study as a whole makes the effect on the reader of being loosely reasoned, despite the validity of many of its parts.

This defect is perhaps best exemplified in those parts of the outline attempting to discover "Underlying Forces Tending to Bind the Satellites to the Soviet Union." It is a blunder of methodology, for example, and a most misleading one at that, to argue at length, as this paper does, that the satellite countries tend to be bound to the USSR by their current economic dependence on the Soviet Union. The economic dependence is an artificial one created

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by the USSR and binds no one but the satellite Communist regimes themselves; it would evaporate like dew in the morning sun if the Communist hold were broken. To call these politically-imposed economic ties an underlying factor, and then to leave the additional impression that this factor tends to bind the satellite peoples (not only their rulers) politically to the USSR, is to put the cart before the horse and to compound confusion.

Equally questionable is the emphasis given in the introduction to fear of Germany as an underlying factor binding the satellite peoples to Russia. The fear exists in Poland and Czechoslovakia and probably does -- within limits -- redound in those two countries to the Soviet advantage. That it exists and plays an important role in Hungary or Yugoslavia is much more debatable; and in the cases of Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania it is much easier to argue that the people pay little if any attention to the German question -- they may even think vaguely of Germany as one of the powers that may help liberate them eventually from Soviet rule. Even in Poland and Czechoslovakia, popular attitudes on Germany are more complex and irrational than this study depicts them; for example, fear of German revival often appears alongside of hope in US power and in a liberating war from the West, in the same Polish or Czech individuals; that is to say, they lean on the US, not on the USSR, for emotional support in their disquietude on the subject of Germany. On the whole it is hazardous to imply, as this study seems to imply, that the Communists have convinced a majority of even the Czechs and Poles (let alone the people of the more remote satellite states) that Russia -- the same Russia which betrayed Eastern Europe to Hitler in 1939 -- is their defender against future German attack. This misleading implication, it is true, is watered down and qualified further on in the text; but the initial generalization, as it stands in the middle of page 2, appears far too broad.

As the text is examined for specific statements, a number of other opinions of questionable validity are found. Among them are the following:

P.3.-... "As the exploitation of the satellite areas has increased, self-sufficiency has decreased, and the feeling of dependence and security based on Soviet domination has become stronger."...

If this is true, it can be true only of the Communist leaders; there is no evidence that the present economic system fosters such a feeling among the people at large. Moreover, the reference to decreased self-sufficiency is rather meaningless in this context; the only real loss of self-sufficiency in these countries has been in the political sphere, and the economic dependence, as remarked earlier, has followed as an artificial -- not an underlying -- result of political vassalage.

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P.3.-... "Soviet policy in the western part of the satellite area has been marked by over-industrialization in terms of the real needs of the people of those areas."...

This would be vigorously disputed by many non-Communists in those areas, and by many political exiles from the countries in question. In Czechoslovakia it may be true that some distortion of the industrial apparatus, from the viewpoint of local needs and interests, has been imposed by Soviet policy; but to state that there is too much industrialization in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and Eastern Germany is tantamount to saying that this general region — most of which has suffered in the past from rural overpopulation and industrial under-development — ought to remain economically stationary. This tacit conclusion is contradicted, however, in the very next sentence at the top of page 4, which admits that the industrialization "has been of some advantage" to the satellite countries.

P.4.-... "The prospect of supplying the vast markets of the Soviet Empire is a factor of certain importance throughout the satellite area — strongest, perhaps, for Germany."...

Here again a generalization is made which attributes to the overworked satellite peoples ideas and sentiments that are scarcely likely to enter into their political thinking. It is doubtful that anyone save the Communist bureaucrat thinks in these terms.

P.6.-... "In Poland, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia (as well as in East Germany) nationalism is linked with specific territorial grievances."...

It is a major omission not to mention Hungary in this connection.

P.7.-... "The attempt to identify communism with nationalism, which was made, or appeared to be made, in the first years after the war, has failed."...

This is an important subject and one that merits careful analysis. The generalization on it, quoted above, is probably too unqualified. There is evidence, for example, that the Polish Communists have succeeded to some extent in identifying their regime with the patriotic claims to the territories annexed from Germany at the end of the war.

P.7.-... "The various churches provide a visible and active force tending to pull the satellites away from Soviet domination."...

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Again the generalization is broad to the point of being misleading, though it is somewhat watered-down further on in the paragraph. It comes closest to being true, perhaps, in the case of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland; but even there it is inexact to use such words as "tending to pull Poland away from Soviet domination," since, presumably, nothing short of war can do that at present. When it comes to the Orthodox Church and lesser churches, the generalization contains hardly any truth at all, so far as can be seen from the data filtering out of the Balkans.

P.9.--... "More dangerous from the Soviet point of view are the growing armies of the satellite nations."...

If so dangerous, why is the Kremlin rushing to enlarge them and to equip them with heavy modern arms? The conclusion is inescapable that they are not in the least dangerous to the USSR, though their fighting quality is another matter. It is a fair guess that only in the losing phase of a general Soviet war might the satellite armed forces become a Soviet political vulnerability.

P. 12. This section sounds forced; it is hard to accept the view that Poland's current dependence economically on the USSR is based on any natural or necessary underlying factor. The expansion of the Polish steel industry is impossible without Soviet assistance only because Poland is politically the captive of the USSR.

Moreover, the figures showing Polish trade dependence on the USSR appear to be wrong; the proportion is more nearly 35% than 50%.

P. 13-14. It would be interesting to learn the basis of this high estimate of Rokossovsky's role as a channel of Soviet political, as opposed to purely military, control of Poland. Though he is a member of the Polish Politburo, this fact by itself proves little as to his importance in the political picture. Actually, there is very little evidence to suggest that he was sent to Poland on any broader assignment than a strictly military one. Moreover, if Sobolev was sent to Warsaw to supervise Rokossovsky (as the last sentence on page 13 suggests), it becomes even more misleading to state that Rokossovsky "runs the whole show" (page 14). Since so little is known about the mechanics of Soviet tutelage over the satellite regimes, it would be better to eschew flat generalizations on the subject --- particularly in the case of Rokossovsky, whose blemished political record in the USSR justifies serious doubt as to the scope of the role assigned to him in Warsaw by the Kremlin.

P.16.--...Mixed industrial enterprises and joint construction projects have been set up."...

The first part of this statement gives the misleading impression that joint Soviet-Polish companies exist in Poland.

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P. 43-44. Does this analysis of the recent purges in Czechoslovakia really present all of the possible interpretations? It emphasizes personal rivalries, and speculates on national-deviationism, but says very little about the Kremlin's tremendous pressure on the Czechoslovak regime for economic results, which is a leading factor, if not the basic factor, affecting the current politics of the regime. Certainly this Soviet pressure for results would be sufficient to cause political jostling and power shake-ups within the group of men obligated to produce the results, without its being necessary to suppose any of these men less fervently Stalinist or less loyal to Moscow than the others. The discussion on pages 42-43 fails to bring out this fundamental aspect of the subject, and gives the impression, at the same time, of emphasizing nationalism among Communist leaders to an unrealistic degree. If the interpreter is going to mention the marginal and sensational possibilities inherent in his theory, such as Gottwald vs. Stalin (page 43), then he is all the more obligated to preface them with a more sober and comprehensive canvass of the more commonplace factors in the situation, such as those suggested above. If this is done, it may no longer seem so "surprising" (page 42) that the "government" Communists have made the "party" Communists take a back seat, if we suppose that this simplification of control had as one of its aims the securing of greater efficiency to meet Soviet demands.

P. 47 (top). Is Dimitrov meant, instead of Kostov? Kostov was never connected with the Comintern.

P. 48. In 1945 the Bulgarian army was not yet staffed with officers of Russian antecedents.

P. 49. This account of the Communist Party purge in Bulgaria lays perhaps too much emphasis on Kostov's alleged "intransigence" in economic dealings with the USSR, and fails to bring out with sufficient clarity the political fact that this purge was a direct consequence of the Tito-Cominform schism — i.e., was a preventive step on the part of Moscow vis-a-vis Bulgaria.

V. Recommendations

Research and writing on the USSR and its European satellites by groups outside the US Government have proved most useful to intelligence agencies where these groups have produced long-range, detailed studies, or analyses distinguished by imagination and systematic theory. Long-range studies are next to impossible for government agencies, which must necessarily focus on the more immediate problems, particularly those involving intelligence support for policy-making officials. Some of the RAND studies in the field of Soviet economics or psychological warfare have signally contributed to knowledge. Various academic individuals and groups have made comparable contributions in a variety of fields.

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Although the work [] is of unquestionable value, it creates the impression that the authors have been unduly attracted by an understandable desire to solve quickly the inner mysteries of Soviet and satellite affairs. The success of such an undertaking would seem to be in direct proportion to the amount of research preparation involved. While there is no intention to deprecate the efforts of those who contributed to these volumes, it is felt that results of greater value to the Department's intelligence operation can be obtained by more detailed studies of the individual facets of Soviet and satellite society.

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