

DRAFT: JQREBER:cw  
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1. In so far as AQUATONE is used for strategic photo reconnaissance, the time element involved in setting up a staging operation is not a key factor.

2. The vital targets already established can, for the most part, be reached from Adana, Pakistan, Giebelstadt, or Eielson. Of these, the bulk of the most vital targets are reachable from Giebelstadt and Pakistan.

3. Tactical use of AQUATONE depends upon the international situation at any given moment. As of this moment, one may anticipate the most likely need for tactical use of AQUATONE to be in the Middle East area, but planning for the tactical use of AQUATONE should be based on the assumption that coverage would be required not only in the Middle East but also the Far East and Western USSR and Satellites.

4. In order to evaluate whether AQUATONE capabilities are adequate for tactical use, let us proceed on the assumption that a ZI base in western US is maintained and Base A at Giebelstadt. Recognizing that a tactical mission from Giebelstadt creates no new problem at all, let us then list the times involved in staging from various pbints,

movement of film to processing, and how a PI report on an emergency basis could be prepared. We assume that URPIC-1 is abandoned and that URPIC-2, plans for which are drawn, could be activated promptly. From a ZI base in the west coast and from Giebelstadt, AQUATONE can stage from Adana, Eielson, Japan, or Formosa within four days.

5. Return of film to processing:

- a. If staged from Adana and <sup>Japan</sup> done at Giebelstadt, 2 hours.
  - b. If staged from Adana with a long flight to, say, Aden, returning to Adana 14 hours to Wiesbaden processing.
  - c. From Eielson to Headquarters or Eastman for processing, 20 hours.
  - d. From Japan, Atsugi, to URPIC-2, 2 hours.
  - e. From Formosa to URPIC-2, 6 hours.
  - f. From Formosa or Japan to Eastman or Headquarters, 42 hours.
6. PI reports average from any processing unit 10-15 hours.
7. Given the international situation as of today, it would appear that a tactical capability as outlined would not require maintenance of a regular base at Adana or Atsugi.
8. What we have learned about the vagaries of obtaining political permission to overfly, and pending the influence of new R&D upon the

views of political authorities, it is anticipated that strategic missions will be relatively infrequent and will be carefully designed to get essential information. Add to this fact that a frugal and careful use of AQUATONE requires that intelligence research accomplish the digestion of the results of previous missions in order to adequately refine really essential targets and what it is we want to learn from going to them. An illustration of this is that as important as we think MOZHAYSK is we would not at the moment recommend the risk of going back to MOZHAYSK before we had examined TOMSK, ANGARSK, KYZL ORDA, KY, if this were at all possible. Another illustration: we have currently concluded that we would not go immediately back into KLYUCHI even though that mission was not perfect until we had run the missions out of Pakistan.