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3 October 1957

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Deputy Director for Intelligence [redacted]

SUBJECT: Production of Guided Missile Intelligence from Evidence Gathered by AQUATONE

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REFERENCE: Memorandum to Chairman, IAC, Subject: "GMIC Comments Relative to AQUATONE [redacted] 25X1

1. This memorandum contains recommendations for action in paragraph 5.

2. Background:

a. At a meeting on 4 September 1957, the Guided Missile Intelligence Committee (GMIC) issued Reference which contained the following statement:

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"5. We consider a technical assessment by a group of selected, highly qualified US guided missile developmental and test personnel to be essential to fully exploit this AQUATONE data. We, therefore, recommend that the IAC approve the establishment of such a group under the guidance of GMIC, and authorize the preparation of suitably sanitized working data for consideration of this panel."

b. The above GMIC recommendation was not specifically considered by the IAC, but was approved in principle by General Cabell, Acting Director of Central Intelligence, who asked that the community explore means of early implementation. It was later ascertained also that consultants brought in should be on a fully cleared basis rather than use the sanitized data approach.

WITHDRAWN

USAF review(s) completed.

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c. Although an attempt was made about the middle of September to secure GMIC guidance to HTAUTOMAT regarding the exploitation of AQUATONE data, the USAF delayed Committee consideration, stating that they had not arrived at a position. As a result, an exploitation guidance paper to HTAUTOMAT was forwarded by CIA, Army, and Navy on 20 September 1957. This HTAUTOMAT guidance was further augmented on 25 September. GMIC has not, as yet, given guidance to HTAUTOMAT.

3. At a GMIC meeting on 30 September 1957, the USAF made the following proposal: That:

a. The USAF would be happy and willing to sponsor a special engineering assessment group to produce intelligence on Kapustin Yar and Tyura Tam range areas from AQUATONE data. This group would function at ATIC, but it was stated that this group would make frequent reports to GMIC.

b. The USAF PI work now in progress be completed (estimated to take about two weeks) and that this work be forwarded to ATIC, Wright Field, Ohio.

c. The engineering group would consist of about [redacted] people and should be cleared for AQUATONE and preferably for special intelligence. This group would be formed by community nomination and would be augmented by [redacted] USAF cleared PI specialists. (The USAF nominated [redacted] 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1

d. The engineering assessment at ATIC (estimated to take about four weeks) would have four objectives:

(1) To outline Soviet test objectives;

(2) To categorize the launching support facilities;

(3) To determine probable state of missile development; and

(4) To derive missile and missile performance characteristics.

e. The USAF would furnish intelligence back-up and technical (US test range data, including photography, details of launching area and support facilities, etc.) back-up.

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f. A small panel of high level, community selected scientists be formed and fully cleared--including special--to provide a senior review of the engineering report prior to its submission to GMIC and the IAC. (The USAF nominated

4. Discussion: We agree with the concept and scope of the USAF proposal. There are reasons, however, for recommending a different placement and subordination of the study group. If the engineering group is located at ATIC:

a. The facilities and personnel at HTAUTOMAT will not receive optimum use. This is the most highly skilled PI group and is a joint CIA-Army-Navy effort.

b. Close community liaison with the progress of the study will be much more difficult to affect because of the distance between ATIC and Washington, and the guidance to the project will therefore be essentially unilateral.

c. Significant items which might be detected during the progress of the study will be difficult for the community to ascertain, and the taking of timely action thereby delayed.

d. A relatively uninformed community would be quite slow to react to a comprehensive, detailed study of two test ranges.

5. It appears that an alternative placement and subordination of the study group may alleviate several of the objections listed above, although it is anticipated that the USAF may enter objections. It is proposed that:

a. A community selected group of highly competent test range and missile engineers be organized to make an engineering assessment of the Kapustin Yar and Tyura Tam AQUATONE data. This group should be cleared for AQUATONE data and also for special intelligence, if the time delay in doing the latter is not excessive.

b. The engineering panel should work in the facilities of HTAUTOMAT, and under the sponsorship and terms of reference supplied by GMIC.

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c. The Army, Navy, USAF, and CIA should each assign one competent scientific intelligence officer to work with the engineering panel. These officers will additionally act in liaison with their services to assure adequate panel back-up of US technical guided missile data or other services the panel might require.

d. An additional panel of about five high level scientists knowledgeable in the guided missile field be cleared for special intelligence and AQUATONE to review the engineering study in conjunction with the GMIC review. The functioning of this panel would be essentially as proposed by the USAF. 25X1

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