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November 21, 1957

MEMORANDUM

TO : I - Mr. Allen

FROM : IRI - Henry Loomis

SUBJECT: Membership in the IAC

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In 1947 when the National Security Council and the CIA were created by law, the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) was set up to advise the President and the Council. The NSC directed that the Chairman be the Director of CIA and that the other members should be Army, Navy, Air Force, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of State, AEC and FBI. The latter two contribute specialized information; as a member, USIA would take a similar position. There has been no change in IAC membership since 1947.

The IAC has the responsibility for establishing roles and missions within the intelligence community, of establishing priorities for intelligence gathering, and for estimating the course of events.

It was to the Intelligence Advisory Committee that we went in 1954 with the problem of how to get the unique information required by the Information Agency. The Intelligence Advisory Committee established a working group to study the problem, and issued IAC-82 which formally established our role and mission within the intelligence community.

The report recommended against USIA being a member of the IAC but stated that "IAC membership should be re-examined after a sufficient amount of time has passed for the implementation of this report."

The report also recommended that USIA could be invited to participate when matters within our purview were being discussed. We have never been invited.

After a year and a half during which the Agency position within government had materially improved and during which our intelligence assets had been developed, the issue of our membership was raised formally by

Mr. Streibert before

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Mr. Streibert before the IAC on May 8, 1956. At that time Mr. Streibert and I both made a presentation - a summary of which is attached.

While there are many arguments for our membership, I think one of the strongest is that the IAC is an integral part of the National Security Council structure along with the Planning Board and the OCB. You are a member of the OCB. You are represented on the Planning Board and you attend the National Security Council. I think, therefore, that the Agency has the right and the need to be represented in the remaining part of the National Security Council apparatus. You could well ask the reverse question -- Why should USIA not be a member?

By formal action on June 19, 1956 the IAC turned down the request for admittance. No reason was stated. I understand, however, that only CIA and AEC voted in our favor. The FBI abstained. All others were negative, I believe, largely on bureaucratic and emotional grounds which could not be stated publicly.

Since that time no formal action has been taken. I discussed it briefly with Mr. Larson but he had enough problems to worry about and it seemed a little too soon.

This is a particularly opportune moment to raise the issue again. Your arrival, your experience, and your relationships with the Department all add new factors. Secondly, the Killian Committee (The President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities) has recommended that all the existing National Security Intelligence Directives (NSCIDS) be reviewed and brought up to date. The NSCIDS deal with such matters as role and membership of the IAC and the responsibilities of each intelligence organization. Our views could perhaps be more effective in this fluid situation.

One possible approach would be for you to discuss the matter with The President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities of which Mr. Lovett may be the new chairman.

Enclosure:  
as stated.

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cc: CIA-Amory

Membership was declined on  
June 19, 1956

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Brief for U.S. Information Agency  
Membership in the IAC

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BACKGROUND

In the spring of 1954, the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) requested the DCI to study its intelligence needs. DCI agreed, and the completed study was submitted as IAC D-82. The IAC approved, in July of 1954, pertinent sections of the study, including the conclusion that "USIA should have an intelligence organization designed to ensure that full use is made of the resources of the intelligence community and to be responsive to those USIA needs which cannot be met by the community."

While IAC D-82 held that USIA should not become a member of the IAC at that time, it recommended that "the question of IAC membership should be reexamined after sufficient time had passed for implementation of the report."

ADVANTAGES OF USIA MEMBERSHIP IN THE IAC

The primary mission of USIA is to engage in activities designed to affect public opinion and combat hostile propaganda abroad. To assist the Agency in its mission, the intelligence responsibilities of the Office of Research and Intelligence (ORI) include measurement of foreign public opinion and attitudes and the analysis of hostile propaganda.

Membership of USIA in the IAC would benefit both the intelligence community and USIA, with the principal advantages including:

- Fuller and more timely use by the IAC of USIA's unique assets and resources;
- Increased responsiveness of the IAC to both long-range and immediate USIA requirements;
- Deeper awareness within the intelligence community of propaganda intelligence as a vital segment of the complete intelligence picture of any area or country.

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Among the unique USIA assets and resources of which the IAC would make fuller and more timely use are:

- \* The established mechanism for measurement of foreign public attitudes on issues affecting the U.S. national interest.

(A poll conducted in Iceland accurately forecast the unpleasant developments involving NATO and U.S. airbases in that country. A similar survey could have been conducted in, for example, Ceylon prior to the recent elections.

This service, the only one of its kind in the Government, has never been requested by the IAC, and USIA -- since it is not kept informed of IAC deliberations -- has never been in a position to offer the facility at appropriate times.)

- \* USIA field personnel -- numbering 1,200 Americans and 7,000 local employees -- at 200 posts in 79 countries.

(Not only do USIS employees travel more frequently and more widely than other members of the Country Team, but -- by the very nature of their activities -- they have sources and channels available exclusively to them. In a significant number of posts, furthermore, USIS officers are the only official Americans -- if not the only Americans -- resident in the area.

while voluntary reports from USIS posts currently total 2,000 per month, the potential -- except in terms of USIA requirements -- has been exploited only sporadically.)

Increased IAC responsiveness to USIA requirements would

- \* Insure timely receipt by USIA of items not now received or received too late to be of value. (USIA does not, for example, regularly receive IAC series papers, FDs, draft HIEs, or FRIS ticker items marked 'IAC only');

Eliminate certain critical gaps. One example concerns USIA's present attempt to compile an estimate of communist propaganda expenditures outside the bloc. Despite the recognized importance of propaganda in the communist scheme of things, no such estimate has ever been made.

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An increased awareness of propaganda intelligence as a vital segment of the complete intelligence picture would add significantly to the comprehensiveness and accuracy of estimates.

- \* Propaganda is more than words spoken, printed, broadcast. It is more than threats or promises or statements of national leaders, more than a slanted film. It also encompasses activities like trade fairs, cultural exchanges, exhibits.
- \* Propaganda viewed in its entirety is a weapon -- used by the enemy, used by us. It is, further, a weapon used in both cold and hot wars. It is a weapon designed not to kill people or demolish cities, but rather to create favorable attitudes and elicit desired actions. The uses of propaganda have always played a central role in communist strategy. This country has never fully reacted to this fact, perhaps because, until comparatively recently, this country had no propaganda apparatus of its own.
- \* It follows that propaganda intelligence is more than sifting of intelligence for items usable as ammunition. Propaganda intelligence must also estimate the enemy's propaganda intentions. It must assess the effectiveness of his propaganda. And it must include analysis of his propaganda apparatus -- its command structure, control, policies, methods, and financing.
- \* What propaganda intelligence would contribute to the intelligence picture, then, are such factors and considerations as: public attitudes on given issues, probable public reaction to given situations or events, and an indication of the nature and relative priority of the attitudes which the enemy is trying to create and what actions he hopes to elicit from the populace.

NOTE ON ANNEX

The Annex to this memorandum, entitled "United States Information Agency, Office of Research and Intelligence", is designed to provide brief data on the mission, assets and resources, and current procedures of IRI. As such, it necessarily duplicates a few points covered in the foregoing, but, for the most part, it serves to supplement and present additional details.

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ANNEX to  
Brief for U.S. Information  
Agency membership in the IAC

United States Information Agency  
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND INTELLIGENCE

1. Mission

Reporting to the Director of the United States Information Agency (USIA), the Office of Research and Intelligence (ORI) is charged with a threefold mission:

Analysis of communist propaganda in all its aspects;

Analysis of foreign public attitudes on issues which affect the United States national interest;

Measurement of impact or effectiveness of USIS operations.

\* \* \* \* \*

Each phase of ORI's mission involves a multitude of requirements and corresponding tasks which must be performed by specialists.

(The analysis of communist propaganda, for example, must cover the apparatus -- its manning, its methods, its financing, its fronts; the output -- press, periodicals, books, radio, films, television, exhibits, trade fairs; and its reflection of communist vulnerabilities, tactical shifts, and intentions;

The analysis of foreign public attitudes on issues affecting the U.S. national interest involves not only repetitive measurement of those attitudes, but also estimates of what has and will affect attitudes and estimates of the part played by public opinion in the policy decisions of or actions taken by the country concerned.)

\* \* \* \* \*

The processing of information must be such that ORI's output is fast, brief, and often unclassified in order that two major needs may be fulfilled:

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Facts upon which USIA can base information policy, program planning, and operational decisions;

Unclassified information to document and otherwise support and strengthen the U.S. case before world opinion.

## 2. Assets and Resources

At the Washington end, IRI's resources fall into four distinct categories:

### The Office of Research and Intelligence

(staffed by 125 specialists, operating on a budget of \$1,000,000, and concentrating on all aspects of propaganda -- with special emphasis on public attitudes of foreign peoples and on communist propaganda activities throughout the world);

### The Propaganda Library

(which possesses the only organized collection of communist propaganda materials. These materials are utilized for detection of shifts in emphasis of communist propaganda, detection of channels of distribution, identification of methods, and as sources for documenting USIS output. There are currently more than 10,000 items in the collection);

### The unclassified "Morque"

(not unlike that of a large city daily newspaper. The Morque is vital to our press and radio operations and is unique in the Government. It contains over 5,000,000 items classified under 80,000 headings, including clippings from foreign and domestic newspapers, unclassified documents issued by all branches of the U.S. Government, reports of international organizations, and private studies);

### Technical proficiency in Survey Research

(reflected in part by the fact that IRI has the only office in Government which regularly conducts surveys abroad. The top American professionals, including George Gallup, are consultants. Additionally, access to indigenous research organizations is exploited. \$350,000 per year is currently being spent for polls, which have already been taken in most European, a few Latin American, and one Far East country.)

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Field assets of IRI divide into three groups:

The staffs of USIS at 200 posts in 79 countries, totaling 1,300 Americans and 7,000 local employees.

(Members of the USIS staff necessarily travel more widely and more often than other members of the Country Team, coming into contact with more of a cross-section of the population, and consequently have access to sources available exclusively to them. Local employees are experienced, educated specialists. They are all cleared and, while not having access to classified material, are often top-drawer sources of intelligence. USIS voluntary reports number 2,000 per month.)

Research Officers.

(Research Officers are now stationed in 14 countries, and the number will soon be increased to about 20.)

Indigenous Survey Organizations.

(These exist in nearly all countries. USIS has established confidential commercial relationships with many and will be making similar arrangements with more in more countries.)

### 3. Current Procedures

Security considerations are met by:

Having all American employees of USIA cleared under Executive Order 10450; Considering all positions sensitive; security checking all local employees; and using normal IAC declassification procedures.

(There has been no compromise of security by USIA since its inception.)

\* \* \* \* \*

Coordination within the intelligence community has been assured by USIA's adopting accepted practices and procedures.

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Input to the IRI intelligence mechanism derives from a variety of sources:

IRI's sources include, but are not limited to, U.S. Government agencies, certain foreign government agencies, foreign newspapers and periodicals, communist publications, and defectors.

(During April, IRI -- which receives more than 10,000 intelligence documents per month -- received these documents as follows: State/6,000; CIA/2,200; USIA/2,000; G-2/360; Air Force/300; and Navy/100. During April 200-Odd finished intelligence reports were received from CIA, State, G-2, Air Force, and Navy.)

\* \* \* \* \*

The intelligence output of IRI for USIA similarly takes a variety of forms -- in keeping with specific needs -- which may be divided into four principal types:

Program Guidance

(including "Barometer" Studies on foreign public attitudes on issues affecting U.S. national interest and on foreign communication habits; and analyses of communist propaganda activities);

Program Documentation

(in the form of unclassified reports and which usually are placed -- without attribution to the U.S. Government -- in foreign media, e.g. press, radio, and books.);

World-wide Press Reaction to Significant Events

(such as nuclear tests and racial problems within U.S.);

Program Effectiveness Studies.

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