

FOOTNOTES TO TABLE

a. Intelligence activities of agencies other than CIA, State, and Defense are not included. However, they would not alter substantially the magnitude of total costs.

b. Intelligence as used herein is modified as follows:

Positive - in contrast to counter-intelligence or internal security;

Foreign - in contrast to domestic; and

Strategic - in contrast to tactical or operational.

c. Since this is a costing exercise which must cut across many accounts and appropriations, the figures cannot be related directly to published figures representing either actual or proposed costs.

d. Average employment, based in most instances on "on board" employment December 31, 1953.

e. The category breakdown was originally supplied by the Intelligence Advisory Committee and subsequently modified slightly by Budget Bureau staff as the figures were discussed with the agencies.

f. The Army and Navy components in AFOIN, as reported by the parent service, have been shown in the column of that service and distributed among categories on the basis of estimates provided by AFOIN. The AFOIN targets program was distributed among all seven categories of production.

g. This is an additional item designed to cover agency collection units which receive and screen requirements, and pass them on to any one or more of a number of collection facilities, both within and without the agency. This is in contrast to staff primarily supporting and servicing a single collection program.

h. Includes clandestine and "special source" collection in total only.

i. Activities were distributed among sub-categories on the basis of the subject matter of the finished intelligence product - oral or written - at each level. For example, a military staff unit working on Sovbloc production of aviation gas or bunker fuel would be considered economic, although the product of such a unit might eventually be used to estimate future military strength.

j. The word "psychological" was added to this category to prevent the need for a new classification covering (1) intelligence on psychological

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warfare plans and programs of foreign governments, and (2) intelligence, not properly classifiable in another category, on the susceptibility of foreign populations to psychological programs. Material which is gathered thru intelligence processes to be used operationally (e.g. in scripts and pamphlets) in U. S. psychological and information programs is not included in this analysis.

k. "Military technical" includes intelligence on foreign military weapons, equipment, and structures, and in a sense could be considered to augment the categories of ground, naval, and air forces. Due to the close interrelation of physical testing and evaluation of foreign weapons and our own research and development programs - both military and contract - estimated costs of this important intelligence activity are not included.

l. Screening, reproduction, and distribution herein include processing both of incoming raw and finished intelligence and of the intelligence products of the agency.

m. Includes administration, supervision and coordination not so directly related to any other specific intelligence category as to be reasonably assigned to that category. Complete uniformity among agencies has not been achieved.

n. Includes research and development for (a) mechanical devices in support of intelligence missions; (b) pilot models of techniques of intelligence analysis. External contracts involving the production of intelligence are distributed by subject matter.

o. Includes commercial costs plus estimated pro-rata shares of military and agency communication costs. Military costs based on factor of .30¢ per word group. Military man-years not available.

p. Includes estimates reported to be subject to error by 25%.

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s. Estimates of military man-years available to CIA with or without reimbursement were not available. The dollar costs of such personal services are included in the cost totals.

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