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TAB to Table:
Cost of Overt Intelligence Collection
1 November 1954

BUDGET ANALYSIS ON
OVERT INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

1. Interagency arrangements, supplemental to the NSC Intelligence Directives, which will be used to produce an effective and coordinated overt intelligence collection program in 1956:

a. Publications Procurement. NSCID 16 established an Advisory Committee on Foreign Language Publications. Its subcommittees on Procurement, Exploitation, and Reference are engaged in systematically developing coordinated approaches among the IAC agencies to the major problems in the handling of foreign language materials. Increased emphasis on Washington support for the full-time and part-time Publications Procurement Officers and other designated officers at major Foreign Service posts has assisted in providing coordinated advice and instructions covering the needs of most Washington agencies.

b. Map Procurement. The Map Procurement Program is concerned with obtaining foreign maps and related materials for the intelligence community. Requirements for this Procurement Program are coordinated through the activities of the Inter-Agency Map Coordinating Committee

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on which the various organizations are represented. A second and very important part of the Geographic Attache program is the reporting undertaken by these officers. In accordance with the comprehensive reporting guide contained in "General Instructions for Geographic Attaches," the basic reports include: (a) the monthly report of activities; (b) reports of mapping and geographic research organizations; (c) reports on key personnel of foreign organizations in the field of mapping and geography, and (d) country reports which provide up-to-date and complete assessment of the mapping activities and programs of each country visited.


c. Economic Intelligence. In 1952 an Economic Intelligence Committee was established under the IAC to assist in implementing NSCID 15. Responsibility for reviewing and making recommendations concerning community-wide coordination of requirements for collection in support of economic intelligence research was assigned to an EIC Subcommittee on Requirements and Facilities for Collation - which represented the first continuing body in which interagency collection representatives had come together since dissolution of the CIG Committee on Collection 1947. Among the principal accomplishments of this subcommittee are:

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(2) The consolidation of intelligence requirements for incorporation in the Comprehensive Economic Reporting Program (CERP), which continuously revises current economic-reporting instructions to all Foreign Service posts outside the Soviet Bloc.

(3) A program of continuing intelligence-community guidance to all reporting posts behind the Iron Curtain, including coordinated preparation of individual "Guides to Economic Reporting Officers" for each major post.

(4) Interagency agreements for more effective utilization of a wide variety of incoming materials.

d. Coordination of Field Reporting. Through continuous liaison between the State Department and the various IAC agencies (either directly or through the EIC) increased community-wide coordination is encouraged, both in Washington and in the field. Chapter 900 of the Foreign Service Manual deals with coordination

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in the field, and the Department on March 22, 1954 sent a special instruction (CA5190) to all Chiefs of Mission reiterating the coordinating role of mission chiefs under NSCID 2 and urging maximum use of all available personnel, including service attaches. At the same time, the Army, Navy and Air Force dispatched similar messages to all attaches, urging maximum cooperation with mission chiefs in developing coordinated collection programs.

e. Exchange of Field Reports in Washington. As outlined in paragraph 7 of NSCID 2, there is now virtually complete exchange of field reports in Washington. Uniform subject coding of CIA, Army, and Air Force field reports prior to dissemination greatly simplifies use of these reports.

f. Overt Collection - Domestic. NSCID 7 provides that CIA shall be responsible for the exploitation "on a highly selective basis," within the U.S., of business concerns, other non-governmental organizations and individuals as sources of foreign intelligence information. Guidance in this selection is provided by the continuing requirements statements of the research elements of CIA and the other IAC agencies, supplemented by continuous liaison to discuss specific needs and individual sources.

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To assure that this service is of maximum value to consumers, conferences are being scheduled at the working level in all of the member agencies. In addition, four specific interagency arrangements are either completed or well on the way to completion:

(1) Three specialized ATIC officers have been placed in domestic field offices to guide and actually engage in the collection of technical information. The assignment of a fourth officer, trained in air electronics, is expected shortly.

(2) A similar arrangement has been worked out through G-2 for the assignment of two Signal Corps Intelligence officers to domestic field offices in an effort to increase the quantity and quality of telecommunications-intelligence collection. One of these officers is already being processed.

(3) Arrangements have been completed with the Director of Intelligence, USAF, and with the Air Research and Development Command to facilitate the exploitation of civilian employees at the various ARDC centers for intelligence information not otherwise available to the member agencies.

(4) Tentative arrangements have been concluded with G-2 for a similar program to be established in the near future with the seven Army Technical Services.

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(5) Naval District Intelligence Officers continue to furnish a substantial contribution to the domestic intelligence collection effort through the exploitation of maritime sources.

A fifth specific effort to produce more effective and coordinated intelligence collection consisted of a program to analyze critically all requirements which have been received by

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██████████ from the producing elements of CIA and the other IAC agencies, and to codify in readily usable form all basic requirements currently outstanding. Uniform indexes, each comprising some 10,000 requirements cards, have been placed in all ██████████ field offices and resident agencies and, for the purpose of ready coordination and the elimination of possible duplication of collection effort, in various CIA offices, G-2, State, and ATIC.

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g. Radio Monitoring. Under NSCID 6 a central radio monitoring service (FBID) is established, and the monitoring of foreign propaganda and press broadcasts for the collection of intelligence information by other federal agencies is specifically precluded. The facilities of FBID have been used in a number of ways in support of both IAC and non-IAC agencies; for example:

(1) Recordings are made and retained of those broadcasts likely to be required for legal proceedings, historical archives, psychological operations, etc.


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(2) There has been an expansion of effort in the analysis of broadcast propaganda which has been generally valuable to and done in close coordination with Department of State and other intelligence producing agencies.

(3) Operational information on foreign broadcasting stations is supplied to activities such as the State Department, NIS program, National Bureau of Standards research on ionospheric propagation, and Voice of America scheduling of programs and transmitters. FBID serves as the principal federal source of this type of data.

(4) Through informal arrangements the product of FBID monitoring is made available to interested U.S. Government operations in the foreign field, e.g., a liberal selection of material is sent daily to the Munich Radio Center (VOA) and to HICOG, Berlin, and in the Far East, USAFFE and subordinate commands receive a selection of items 

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Since monitoring for intelligence use is based on careful selection rather than directed collection it has been found that the most effective means of guiding the FBID effort is for the personnel of FBID to be indoctrinated in the functions of various elements of the intelligence community. This program is a continuing

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one and results to date are satisfactory. The fact that most FBID raw materials are unclassified enormously facilitates day-to-day operational liaison. FBID personnel are constantly in touch by telephone with all area and functional desks of the IAC users of their product. Some improvement in requirements for propaganda analysis is expected from offices engaged in psychological activities, when these offices have completed their organization and build-up.

h. Every government agency in Washington maintains one or more liaison officials whose function is to serve as the focal point for the transaction of intelligence matters, including the receipt and delivery of intelligence materials, the coordination of requirements, and the servicing of collection directives.

2. An evaluation of the sufficiency of the several agencies' requests in the light of that program;

The several agencies' requests are adequate only to support minimum essential requirements. Certain personnel shortages continue to handicap the overt collection effort of the intelligence community. This deficiency is applicable particularly to the fields of publications and map procurement, agricultural reporting and Foreign Service peripheral reporting.

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There is, for example, urgent need for additional personnel to procure publications in London, Cairo, Tokyo, Rangoon and Djokjakarta; to cover geographic information in Stockholm, peripheral reporting in Athens, Rome, Frankfurt; and to cover local Chinese communities and sources on Communist China in Southeast Asia.

At current staffing levels, the Foreign Service is unable to produce an adequate quantity of basic biographic information and analytical reports to meet the needs of the intelligence community. Also, because of work pressures on available staff and shortage of travel funds, reporting on areas outside post cities has suffered.

Travel restrictions in the countries of the Soviet Orbit continue to be a major obstacle to effective collection by Military Attaches. Although these restrictions have been eased, officially in some countries, there has been a simultaneous increase in surveillance and administrative harassment which severely hampers attache collection activities.

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There has been an over-all reduction in Military Attache complements, although adjustments of personnel to augment staffs at critical posts have resulted in some net improvement in coverage at these posts. No substantial improvement in overt military intelligence collection can be expected under the present personnel, equipment and operations expense limitations.

3. The areas of activity which may require altered emphasis and/or modified coordination in the near future.

a. Economic Reporting. There are still gaps in economic intelligence which will require greater collection effort. Steps already have been taken by the EIC to pinpoint the priority deficiencies. Lists of data required in the electronics and transportation fields have been approved and possible methods of collection are being considered in interagency discussions in the appropriate EIC subcommittee.

b. Better Utilization of all Governmental Overseas Personnel for Reporting Information. Many US officials overseas who are not primarily reporting officers are, nevertheless, well informed on certain geographic areas and enjoy close contacts with segments of foreign societies which are often not accessible to

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
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regular reporting officers. One of the objectives of intelligence coordination is to continue to develop systematic methods for tapping these officials.

The scope and complexity of radio broadcasting with respect to frequency usage has made it necessary for considerable attention to be devoted to technical monitoring; this type of monitoring must focus on frequency usage, jamming signals, etc. These two types of monitoring are quite different in techniques and purpose from the content monitoring of FBID, though closely related to FBID technical monitoring operations which are prerequisite to content monitoring. In some cases separate facilities have been established for technical monitoring, operational monitoring and content monitoring. It seems likely that these areas of activity may require coordination in the near future.

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