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16 May 1958
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
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Proposed Revision of SNIE 11-10-57

References: IAC-D-81/16, 5 March 1958
 IAC-M-333, item 6

The attached memorandum from the Chairman, GMIC, will be placed on the agenda of the IAC meeting now scheduled for 20 May for review. It is expected that a Board of National Estimates memorandum on this matter will be forwarded under separate cover.

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Secretary

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16 May 1958

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GUIDED MISSILE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

15 May 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chairman, Intelligence Advisory Committee

SUBJECT : First Operational Availability Date for Soviet ICBM

1. The Guided Missile Intelligence Committee (GMIC) is presently engaged in the preparation of its contribution to NIE 11-5-58, "Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in the Guided Missile Field for the Period 1958-1966".

2. Due to high national interest in a first operational availability date for the Soviet ICBM and the IAC pending action on SNIE 11-10-57, it was agreed that you should be advised that we now estimate that this date is probably 1959.* The date has been set back six months from that contained in the last national estimate, SNIE 11-10-57, because the rate of Soviet ICBM testing thus far has not been as high as expected. In addition, a warhead weight significantly in excess of two thousand pounds is indicated by the reported weight of Sputnik III and the recent analysis based on the dimensions from the final stage of Sputnik II. However, the maximum warhead weight which the USSR could incorporate in an ICBM is still under study. We have not changed the estimated CEP of 5 nautical miles for the first operational ICBMs.

3. While there will be other changes affecting the ICBM estimate, we feel that these changes are the most significant and recommend that SNIE 11-10-57 be revised accordingly. Additional changes will be reflected in the final version of NIE 11-5-58.

/s/

EARL McFARLAND, JR.
Colonel, USAF
Chairman, GMIC

* The CIA member believes that the possibility of the USSR acquiring in the latter part of 1958 a limited operational ICBM capability, although with unproven accuracy and reliability, cannot be excluded.

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
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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Present Validity of SNIE 11-10-57

Attached is a memorandum from General Collins indicating his views as to the present validity of SNIE 11-10-57. This matter will be placed on the agenda of an early IAC meeting (probably that of 18 March) for discussion and action with respect to General Collins' recommendation.

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Secretary

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IAC-D-81/16
5 March 1958
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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington 25, D. C.

DDIM-9-58
4 March 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR : Secretary,
Intelligence Advisory Committee

Subject : The Present Validity of SNIE 11-10-57

1. The majority estimate in SNIE 11-10-57 of the period during which the Soviet Union could attain operational capability with an ICBM was predicated upon a test program beginning in August of 1957.

2. The lack of evidence that an ICBM test program did, in fact, begin in August 1957 and has continued with the frequent and regular firings which we had considered necessary before operational capability could be attained has caused me to question the present validity of the estimate.

3. Accordingly, I recommend that the estimates contained in SNIE 11-10-57 be re-examined. In this connection an attempt should be made to estimate a reasonably valid timetable for those developments which must precede the attainment by the Soviets of an initial operational capability.

/s/
RICHARD COLLINS
Brigadier General, USA
Deputy Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff

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12 December 1957
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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Department of Defense Study on
Defense Against Ballistic Missiles

References: IAC-D-81/15, 30 September 1957
IAC-M-310, 8 October 1957, item 6 b
IAC-D-81/15.1, 24 October 1957
IAC-M-313, 29 October 1957, item 9

25X1A9a
1. Attached is a proposed reply to the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, in response to his request for a study by the IAC of certain questions which arose in connection with a Department of Defense study of defense against intercontinental ballistic missiles. This memorandum has been prepared by a working group under the chairmanship of [REDACTED] CIA, pursuant to the direction of the IAC on 29 October (IAC-M-313, item 9).

2. Because of its high classification, the report of the working group, upon which this draft reply to the Joint Staff is based, is being disseminated through appropriate channels to the working group members who will make it available to their respective principals.

3. It is expected that this matter will be placed on the agenda of the IAC meeting now scheduled for 17 December for review and action.

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[REDACTED]
Secretary

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff

SUBJECT : Department of Defense Study of Defense Against
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

1. In accordance with your request of 26 ~~October~~^{September} 1957, the Intelligence Advisory Committee has examined the problem posed through you by the Weapons System Evaluation Group (WSEG). As a first step, WSEG was consulted and it was agreed that the date of 1965 was unrealistic in the light of current estimates on Soviet ICBM capabilities. A date of 1963 has, therefore, been accepted for the full postulated Soviet capability. Using this earlier date and the other parameters proposed by WSEG, an assessment has been made of both U. S. and Soviet intelligence collection capabilities as related to your questions.

2. The specific problem of geodetic accuracy for both the U. S. and the USSR has been handled in a somewhat different context since this is predominantly a matter of scientific research and of availability of cartographic and technical information. The geodetic error will be basically conditioned by the cartographic coverage we have of areas where sites will be located. It has been calculated that, for the portions of the central area of Russia where launching sites are most likely to be deployed, the general probable error may be less than 1 nautical mile.

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25X1B0c

3. Our present hard information on the Soviet ICBM program is very limited, confined mainly to [redacted] and the facts which can be drawn directly therefrom. Estimates of production, troop training and deployment are far less firm as they are based on assessments of Soviet capabilities, derived from analysis of scientific and industrial factors, Soviet official statements, [redacted]

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Revised by IAC 17 Dec 1957

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[REDACTED] and an assumed military requirement. With the increasing importance to U. S. security of the growing threat, the urgent high priority assigned to intelligence efforts in this field and the planned wider deployment of technical collection systems, we anticipate that progressively better information can be procured in the future with a resultant increase in quality and quantity of our intelligence on the overall Soviet program.

4. In view of the specialized abilities of certain intelligence techniques and with no firm knowledge now of any operational ICBM launching sites, we have had to consider general areas of Russia in arriving at probable percentages of sites that could be identified. Though accessible peripheral areas are most susceptible to search by various means, a general deployment is least likely to be made there. Accepting a 6,000-mile range, the Soviets can deploy their ICBM anywhere within the Soviet Bloc north of 55°. However, transportation, communications, concealment and security will be decisive factors in their positioning of sites. It is logical to assume their deployment in inland areas well away from exposed frontiers. Considering the

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The central portion of Russia is virtually inaccessible to most intelligence means and offers our least chance for success.

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5. A major portion of the launch sites have been considered to be in this area in arriving at figures given in answer to questions 4a, b, and c. The degree of site hardening will depend primarily on two main factors - the geographic location of the site and the Soviet estimate of our attack and damage capability. The placing of sites within the permafrost area would seriously inhibit hardening. As indicated in the later discussion of the Soviet intelligence problem, their knowledge of U. S. attack capabilities under the existing and anticipated security situation will undoubtedly be quite precise.

6. In the following paragraphs are given maximum and minimum answers to questions 4a, b, and c, and summary judgements on question 4d:

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
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
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9. In regard to question 5, an assessment of Soviet intelligence concerning U. S. missile capabilities in 1963 can only be stated in general terms. The vast amount of information available to the Soviets through open sources, such as the press, lectures, exhibits, radio and television is of great value to them not only in their analysis of our capabilities and research, but also in their own research and development. The press publicity (22 and 23 November 1957) given to the proposed Warren Air Force Base launching complex near Cheyenne, Wyoming, and the 25 November issue of Life magazine, which lists 93 producers of missiles and components exemplify the present ease of access to this type of information. Public statements or criticisms by prominent Government officials covering our progress in missile development further gives the Soviets an insight into our missile efforts and accomplishments. Under our present security conditions, the Soviet intelligence services have an ample opportunity to send agents into the U. S. under various and many guises, such as refugees, displaced persons, seamen and exchange personalities to penetrate and obtain classified data concerning our missile research as well as launching and storage sites. The open information cited above provides firm leads for such activities. Assuming a continuation of our present trend of relaxation of security in the whole area of guided missile information, we believe that it can safely be concluded that the Soviets will have an excellent knowledge of U. S. missile characteristics and quantities, and will know the location and degree of hardening of a large portion, if not all, of U. S. permanent launching sites. Additionally, Soviet identification of a major portion of the transportable organizations and their firing points is considered probable.

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
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IAC-D-81/15.1
24 October 1957

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Department of Defense Study on
Defense Against Ballistic Missiles

1. Attached is the report by the ad hoc committee on General Collins' proposal (IAC-D-81/15, 30 September), prepared pursuant to the direction of the IAC (IAC-M-310, item 6 b). The Board of National Estimates has reviewed this report but does not propose to circulate any written comment.
2. This matter will be placed on the agenda of the IAC meeting now scheduled for 29 October.

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Secretary

Attachment

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23 October 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Intelligence Advisory Committee

Subject: Department of Defense Study on Defense
Against Ballistic Missiles

Reference: IAC-M-310

1. The attached terms of reference have been prepared by the IAC Ad Hoc Committee under the reference instructions.

2. The Committee understood its basic assignment to be an analysis of factors for and against undertaking the estimate.

ROBIN G. SPEISER
Colonel, U. S. Army
Chairman

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TERMS OF REFERENCE: STUDY ON THE DEFENSE
AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILE

THE PROBLEM

To determine the extent and accuracy of the target intelligence related to postulated ICBM systems for both the USSR and the United States by 1965.

SCOPE

Using a postulated ICBM system for both the USSR and the United States to determine the answers to specific questions relating to these systems as they will be assumed to exist by 1965. The specific questions are recited in IAC-D-81/15 (Enclosure "A"). The procurement of the data requested by WSEG will involve the examination of very sensitive operational information. However, it is felt that the data furnished WSEG can be sanitized to an acceptable degree. WSEG is more interested in the end product than in the means used to develop such intelligence.

ASSUMPTION

It is believed that the present Soviet-United States political environment will continue and that a major inspection system envisioned under current disarmament planning will not occur.

FACTORS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. The accuracy of Soviet and United States geodetic location capabilities must be determined for the period under study.
2. The likelihood of the Soviets employing deceptive devices such as decoy systems and their effect on our ability to determine the extent of the Soviet missile systems must be determined.
3. Although certain information regarding Soviet missile development is available, there remain serious deficiencies in the over-all Soviet ICBM program.
4. The research required to answer the questions posed by WSEG will involve extensive questioning of individuals in the Washington area and elsewhere to determine probable geodetic accuracies, the intelligence collection possibilities inherent

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in some of the Research and Development projects, and the full extent of present known data on Soviet missiles. In particular, a useful final estimate would require extensive examination of the feasibility and estimated operational date of certain existing and proposed projects being conducted under operational rather than intelligence sponsorship; this raises the question whether such an examination should be handled by intelligence agencies.

5. The assumption, in the WSEG postulated situation, to the effect that our current intelligence collection means will continue with only moderate anticipated improvements is possibly unrealistic. The problem could be approached more realistically by assuming that our collection means will improve to the degree presently anticipated by our intelligence planners. It is also necessary to note nonintelligence factors which might affect the full utilization of available collection systems.

6. The project officers of WSEG request that the answers to their questions be made available by mid-November 1957, if possible. It is anticipated that at least six weeks would be required to procure the desired data once the problem were assigned to a working group.

7. The study requested by WSEG amounts essentially to an evaluation of our intelligence problem vis-a-vis the Soviet intelligence problem.

8. The procurement of answers to the WSEG problem will involve considerable demands on other IAC committees such as GMIC.

9. An assessment of Soviet intelligence concerning United States missile capabilities in 1965 can only be stated in general terms. Assuming a continuation of present security conditions, we believe it can safely be concluded that the Soviets will have an excellent knowledge of United States missile characteristics and quantities, and will know the location and degree of hardening of a large portion of United States launching sites, with the possible exception of transportation organizations.

DISCUSSION

1. A conference was held with the WSEG project officers to determine the nature, scope and use of the information requested by WSEG. Following the conference WSEG representatives agreed to a change in their original problem which would delete their specific assumption and translate it into a

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meaningful spread of missile sites and related data and to accept the proportions of hardened sites as determined by the intelligence personnel. The amended WSEG problem is shown in Enclosure "B" attached.

2. The basic problem faced by WSEG is to recommend the degree of emphasis the United States should place, during the next few years, on the counterbattery ICBM or the anti-ICBM and passive defense measures as a means of defense against the Soviet ICBM threat.

3. It seems apparent that the WSEG request is based on an implicit assumption that the Soviets would not have before about 1965 an ICBM system on the scale indicated. Such an assumption is consistent with present NIEs. However, the IAC may wish to advise WSEG promptly if the forthcoming SNIE 11-10-57 indicates a revision in the estimated Soviet timetable.

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ENCLOSURE "A"

**IAC-D-81/15
30 September 1957
Limited Distribution**

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Request for a Special National Intelligence Estimate

1. In the attached memorandum General Collins outlines the nature of a Department of Defense requirement for a Special National Intelligence Estimate in conjunction with a study being conducted on the defense against ballistic missiles.

2. This request will be placed on the agenda of an early IAC meeting for review and action.

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Secretary

Attachment

ENCLOSURE "A"

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Washington 25, D. C.

26 September 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR : Secretary, Intelligence Advisory Committee

Subject : Request for a Special National Intelligence Estimate

1. The Department of Defense has a need for a Special National Intelligence Estimate to be used in conjunction with a study being conducted on the defense against ballistic missiles.

2. The estimate should compare the amount of intelligence on the USSR ICBM system that will be available to the United States by 1965 against the amount of intelligence on the U. S. ICBM system that will be available to the USSR.

3. To provide a vehicle for comparative intelligence estimates and a basis for specific questions, the following hypothetical ICBM system is assumed for both the USSR and the United States by 1965:

a. One hundred ICBM launching organizations each with two launching complexes. Each organization will have ten missiles (total 1000) and a capability to launch its first two missiles simultaneously and two more each subsequent hour until exhaustion of supply. Fifty of the organizational launching sites will be hardened to withstand overpressures of 100 psi. Forty sites will be unhardened but fixed. Ten of the launching organizations will be rail transportable and capable of being moved (approximately 100 miles) and re-installed in alternate positions in 72 hours. The missiles will have a range of 6000 nautical miles, an accuracy of 3 n. mi. CEP, and a warhead of 2 MT. The over-all system reliability will be 75 per cent.

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4. Assuming a continuation of current intelligence collection means, with only moderate anticipated improvements, it is desired to know how much detail of the above system would be known to us in 1965 if the Soviets had such a system. More specifically, estimates to the following questions are desired:

a. Of the 50 hardened ICBM sites

(1) How many would we know to exist?

(2) On how many would we have accurate geodetic data (within one or two nautical miles)?

(3) How many would we know to be hardened to 100 psi?

b. Of the 40 unhardened but fixed sites

(1) How many would we know to exist?

(2) On how many would we have accurate geodetic data?

c. Of the 10 transportable ICBM organizations

(1) How many would we know to exist?

(2) Assuming only a minimum of track laying, excavation and construction in thirty primary and alternate sites, on how many would we have accurate geodetic data?

d. With what confidence would we know that

(1) The Soviets have an initial ICBM salvo capability of 200 ICBM?

(2) After the initial salvo, the Soviets have a capability of launching 200 missiles per hour until depletion of stocks?

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(3) The Soviet missiles has a range of 6000 nautical miles, a CEP of 3 nautical miles, and a warhead yield of 2 MT?

(4) The over-all Soviet ICBM system has a reliability of 75 per cent?

5. Conversely, estimates are also desired as to what the Soviets would probably know in these same question areas if the United States had such an ICBM system in 1965.

6. There are no doubt other important aspects to this particular intelligence problem not specifically indicated in the above questions. Comments on such aspects as well as on possible future intelligence development or "break-through" that may have direct effect on this study are solicited.

7. It is requested that this matter be brought before the Intelligence Advisory Committee for consideration at an early date.

/s/

RICHARD COLLINS
Brigadier General, USA
Deputy Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff

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ENCLOSURE "B"

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, Intelligence Advisory
Committee

Subject: Request for a Special National
Intelligence Estimate

1. The Department of Defense has a need for a Special National Intelligence Estimate to be used in conjunction with a study being conducted on the defense against ballistic missiles.

2. The estimate should compare the amount of intelligence on the USSR ICBM system that will be available to the United States by 1965 against the amount of intelligence on the United States ICBM system that will be available to the USSR.

3. To provide a vehicle for comparative intelligence estimate and a basis for specific questions, the following hypothetical ICBM system is assumed for both the USSR and the United States by 1965:

a. ~~One-hundred~~ 50-300 ICBM launching organizations each with two launching complexes. Each organization will have ten missiles (total ~~1,000~~ 500-3,000) and a capability to launch its first two missiles simultaneously and two more each subsequent hour until exhaustion of supply. ~~Fifty~~ X% of the organizational launching sites will be hardened to withstand overpressures of 100 psi. ~~Forty~~ Y% sites will be unhardened but fixed. ~~Ten~~ Z% of the launching organizations will be rail transportable and capable of being moved (approximately 100 miles) and reinstalled in alternate positions in 72 hours. The missiles will have a range of ~~6,000~~ 4,000-6,000 nautical miles, an accuracy of 3 n.m. 1-5 n.m. CEP, and a war head of ~~2-MT~~ 500 KT to 8 MT. The over-all system reliability will be ~~75~~ 50-80 percent.

4. Assuming a continuation of current intelligence collection means, with only moderate anticipated improvements, it is desired to know how much detail of the above system would be known to us in 1965 if the Soviets had such a system. More specifically, estimates to the following questions are desired:

a. Of the ~~50~~ X% hardened ICBM sites

(1) How many would we know to exist?

TOP SECRET

Enclosure "B"

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(2) On how many would we have accurate geodetic data (within ~~one or two~~ one to five nautical miles)?

(3) How many would we know to be hardened to 100 psi?

b. Of the 40 Y% unhardened but fixed sites

(1) How many would we know to exist?

(2) On how many would we have accurate geodetic data?

c. Of the 10 Z% transportable ICBM organizations

(1) How many would we know to exist?

(2) Assuming only a minimum of track laying, excavation and construction in thirty primary and alternate sites, on how many would we have accurate geodetic data?

d. With what confidence would we know that

(1) The Soviets have an initial ICBM salvo capability of ~~200~~ 100-600 ICBM?

(2) After the initial salvo, the Soviets have a capability of launching ~~200~~ 100-600 missiles per hour until depletion of stocks?

(3) The Soviet missile has a range of ~~6,000~~ 4,000-6,000 nautical miles, a CEP of 3 1-5 nautical miles, and a war head yield of ~~2-MT?~~ 500 KT to 8 MT?

(4) The over-all Soviet ICBM system has a reliability of 75 50-80 percent?

5. Conversely, estimates are also desired as to what the Soviets would probably know in these same question areas if the United States had such an ICBM system in 1965.

6. There are no doubt other important aspects to this particular intelligence problem not specifically indicated in the above questions. Comments on such aspects as well as on possible future intelligence development or "breakthrough" that may have direct effect on this study are solicited.

7. It is requested that this matter be brought before the Intelligence Advisory Committee for consideration at an early date.

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IAC-D-81/15
30 September 1957
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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Request for a Special National Intelligence Estimate

1. In the attached memorandum General Collins outlines the nature of a Department of Defense requirement for a Special National Intelligence Estimate in conjunction with a study being conducted on the defense against ballistic missiles.

2. This request will be placed on the agenda of an early IAC meeting for review and action.

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Secretary

Attachment

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington 25, D. C.

26 September 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR : Secretary, Intelligence Advisory Committee

Subject: Request for a Special National Intelligence Estimate

1. The Department of Defense has a need for a Special National Intelligence Estimate to be used in conjunction with a study being conducted on the defense against ballistic missiles.
2. The estimate should compare the amount of intelligence on the USSR ICBM system that will be available to the United States by 1965 against the amount of intelligence on the U.S. ICBM system that will be available to the USSR.
3. To provide a vehicle for comparative intelligence estimates and a basis for specific questions, the following hypothetical ICBM system is assumed for both the USSR and the United States by 1965:
 - a. One hundred ICBM launching organizations each with two launching complexes. Each organization will have ten missiles (total 1000) and a capability to launch its first two missiles simultaneously and two more each subsequent hour until exhaustion of supply. Fifty of the organizational launching sites will be hardened to withstand overpressures of 100 psi. Forty sites will be unhardened but fixed. Ten of the launching organizations will be rail transportable and capable of being moved (approximately 100 miles) and reinstalled in alternate positions in 72 hours. The missiles will have a range of 6000 nautical miles, an accuracy of 3 n. mi. CEP, and a warhead of 2 MT. The over-all system reliability will be 75 per cent.
4. Assuming a continuation of current intelligence collection means, with only moderate anticipated improvements, it is desired

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to know how much detail of the above system would be known to us in 1965 if the Soviets had such a system. More specifically, estimates to the following questions are desired:

a. Of the 50 hardened ICBM sites

(1) How many would we know to exist?

(2) On how many would we have accurate geodetic data (within one or two nautical miles)?

(3) How many would we know to be hardened to 100 psi?

b. Of the 40 unhardened but fixed sites

(1) How many would we know to exist?

(2) On how many would we have accurate geodetic data?

c. Of the 10 transportable ICBM organizations

(1) How many would we know to exist?

(2) Assuming only a minimum of track laying, excavation and construction in thirty primary and alternate sites, on how many would we have accurate geodetic data?

d. With what confidence would we know that

(1) The Soviets have an initial ICBM salvo capability of 200 ICBM?

(2) After the initial salvo, the Soviets have a capability of launching 200 missiles per hour until depletion of stocks?

(3) The Soviet missile has a range of 6000 nautical miles, a CEP of 3 nautical miles, and a warhead yield of 2 MT?

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(4) The over-all Soviet ICBM system has a reliability of 75 per cent?

5. Conversely, estimates are also desired as to what the Soviets would probably know in these same question areas if the United States had such an ICBM system in 1965.

6. There are no doubt other important aspects to this particular intelligence problem not specifically indicated in the above questions. Comments on such aspects as well as on possible future intelligence development or "break-through" that may have direct effect on this study are solicited.

7. It is requested that this matter be brought before the Intelligence Advisory Committee for consideration at an early date.

/s/

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The Joint Staff