

I never knew a man who faced up to the buffets of life's storms with greater spirit. He did not ask quarter of life because of his physical infirmities. He could truly say:

In the fell clutch of circumstance
I have not winced nor cried aloud,
Under the bludgeonings of chance
My head is bloody but unbowed.

—Henley.

Alabama has lost a great citizen. The people have lost a friend.

It seems to me that Charles C. McWhorter's poem describes the philosophy that motivated Luther Patrick's being:

And I am repaid and my soul is serene,
If I put you one flower you might not have seen,
My mission accomplished in deed and in word;
If you hear one sweet note that you might not have heard.

FORMOSA

(Mr. DORN of South Carolina asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DORN of South Carolina. Mr. Speaker, the riots on Formosa, disrespect for the American flag, destruction of American property and injury of American nationals is shocking. It is obvious that this lawless demonstration was instigated by a few well-placed individuals who are enemies of the United States and are enemies of freedom. I believe these riots were Communist inspired and were aimed at the free world's defense line in the Pacific.

The Japanese used Formosa as a base to conquer the Philippines and all of southeast Asia. Formosa in Communist hands today would threaten the independence of the Philippines, Australia, Indonesia, Malaya, all of southeast Asia, Japan and the United States itself.

I am glad that in the crisis the free world had a courageous leader, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang acted with alacrity and decision. He did not equivocate, he did not hesitate. He declared marshal law, rushed three divisions into the capital, T'ai-pei, and soon had the situation well in hand. I am glad that Formosa, the key of freedom's defense in the Pacific, is governed by such a fearless leader upon whom we can depend. Chiang acted in the tradition of Douglas MacArthur, Syngman Rhee, and the late immortal Magsaysay.

The Government of Formosa, under Chiang Kai-shek, will bring out the facts and we will soon know that the Communists and their allies are trying to destroy south Pacific solidarity and our friendship for that area.

CORRECTION OF ROLL CALL

Mr. LANHAM. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to correct the RECORD. On rollcall No. 86, page 6804 of the RECORD of May 24, I am listed as not answering to my name. I was present and did answer to my name.

The SPEAKER. Without objection, the permanent RECORD will be corrected accordingly.

There was no objection.

POWER TO DECLARE RECESS TOMORROW

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, of Germany, now on an official visit to our country, is one of the great leaders of this important and trying period of the world's history.

Chancellor Adenauer is not only a practical and courageous leader but, in my opinion, he is the No. 1 idealist in the world of today, and we need leadership on the level of idealism to meet the challenge that confronts us.

There is no man in the world today who better understands the Communist mind and intent than Chancellor Adenauer. He is an affirmative minded leader, not only to the people of Germany, but to all the peoples of the non-Communist world and to the countless of millions behind the Iron Curtain who seek liberty and who are praying and hoping for the day of their early deliverance from Communist oppression.

The people of Germany are justified in feeling proud of him.

The House of Representatives will receive this fine gentleman and great leader tomorrow as its guest. He will address the Members of the House of Representatives tomorrow, Tuesday, May 28, at 12:30 noon.

The House of Representatives has had many great men as its guest, but none greater and none who symbolizes more the spirit of liberty than Chancellor Adenauer.

I know the Members are looking forward to his visit to the House tomorrow.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that it may be in order at any time on tomorrow, May 28, 1957, for the Speaker to declare a recess for the purpose of receiving His Excellency Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

There was no objection.

CALL OF THE HOUSE

Mr. WIGGLESWORTH. Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER. Evidently a quorum is not present.

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, I move a call of the House.

A call of the House was ordered.

The Clerk called the roll, and the following Members failed to answer to their names:

[Roll No. 87]

Andresen,	Dawson, III.	Johnson
August H.	Dellay	Jonas
Barrett	Diggs	Kearney
Baumhart	Fino	Kee
Beamer	Fogarty	Kelley, Pa.
Belcher	Garmatz	Kilburn
Blatnik	Granahan	Kitchin
Blich	Grant	Kluczynski
Bolton	Green, Oreg.	Lipscomb
Bowler	Green, Pa.	McCarthy
Boyle	Griffin	McConnell
Buckley	Gubser	Mailliard
Byrd	Hardy	Miller, Md.
Byrne, Pa.	Healey	Moore
Carnahan	Hemphill	Morgan
Celler	Hoeven	Murray
Chelf	Holtzman	Patterson
Chudoff	James	Perkins
Cooley	Jenkins	Pfost

Pillion	Robson, Ky.	Teller
Folk	Santangelo	Van Pelt
Powell	Shelley	Watts
Prouty	Siler	Wolverton
Rains	Spence	Zelenko
Reece, Tenn.	Taylor	

The SPEAKER. On this rollcall 359 Members have answered to their names, a quorum.

By unanimous consent, further proceedings under the call were dispensed with.

CORRECTION OF ROLL CALL

Mr. BROOKS of Texas. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 84 I am recorded as being absent. I was present and answered to my name. I ask unanimous consent that the RECORD and Journal be corrected accordingly.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

There was no objection.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATION BILL, 1958

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill (H. R. 7665) making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1958, and for other purposes.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill H. R. 7665, with Mr. KEOGH in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the unanimous-consent agreement of Friday, May 24, general debate will continue for not to exceed 4 hours, the time to be equally divided and controlled by the gentleman from Texas [Mr. MAHON] and the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. WIGGLESWORTH].

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas [Mr. MAHON].

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. SIKES], chairman of the Army panel.

(Mr. SIKES asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, this is a new day of new weapons—weapons with a capacity for destruction that is beyond the comprehension of man. Every city is now within range of planes which can deliver these weapons. In a few years planes will not be needed to deliver them. They will cross oceans and swoop down upon targets in a matter of minutes. Defense against that ultimate weapon is still largely a hope and a prayer.

There are those who believe with sincerity that there is no place for the Army in today's warfare; that the day of land fighting is over; that the Army's principal mission henceforth is not as a fighting force, but as an occupying or police force. If that is so, we are wasting a lot of money in this bill. But, there is another side to the story.

World War II seems a long time ago, but there still are lessons to be learned from it and those weapons used were very effective for the times. Air power gutted Germany—literally destroying it—but the German's didn't stop fighting until their territory was overrun by the allied armies. A lot of destruction and a lot of deaths, allied and enemy, would have been unnecessary if Patton and Bradley had been given gasoline and supplies in 1944.

Korea is a more recent experience—one whose outcome we cannot point to with pride because of the limitations put on America's fighting forces through our timid allies. In Korea we had unquestioned air and naval superiority. Within territorial limits we bombed at will. What happened? We got kicked all over the lot until we had enough troops and weapons on the ground to stop the enemy.

Please remember joint American forces readied for the defense of Taipan undoubtedly staved off a Red-Chinese invasion. But the collapse of allied efforts in Indochina permitted the partition of that unhappy area.

The valiant patriots in Hungary were crushed and now are held captive by the armed might of the Russian Army. No help can reach them while this is true. The overwhelming air and naval power of Britain and France did not frighten Nasser into submission and they allowed themselves to be talked out of a successful land, air, and water campaign by another timid ally; this time the United States. The Israeli kicked the living daylight out of the Egyptians on the ground with troops and armor. Jordan would not be an independent nation today if the Sixth Fleet and its Marines had not made its dramatic and forceful appearance in the Mediterranean.

I have brought you to very recent days and to the type of operation which is becoming more and more clearly the pattern of Soviet troublemaking.

I know full well of the hurried preparations for thermonuclear war on both sides of the Atlantic. Yet, I do not think we will ever see a thermonuclear war. I cannot imagine anyone being so mentally depraved or so completely a fool that he would pull the trigger on what almost certainly would be mutual mass destruction and the end of civilization. Thermonuclear war is indescribable and unthinkable. The capability we must possess, otherwise there would be no security in the world we now know. But, I think and I pray to God that we will never have to use that capability.

Tactical atomic weapons are an entirely different consideration. They are devised for military targets—not for mass destruction. They are a part of a modern army's equipment. When we say that the next war will involve the use of atomic weapons, we do not necessarily mean thermonuclear weapons. It is entirely conceivable that the only atomic weapons used will be tactical weapons designed for combat purposes. Every service is important. Every service is essential. No one service is self-suffi-

cient. If limited wars are to be the pattern or if Russia suddenly moves to occupy all of Europe, we must have trained and equipped troops on the ground and ready.

Now, let me point to the fact that we have troops all over the world. We have commitments or treaty obligations to defend 42 nations. I want to be sure that American fighting forces have a chance to defend themselves if trouble comes. I don't want our forces to be sitting ducks whose weakness invites aggression. Now, theoretically, we have considered ourselves in the main the supplier of weapons and our allies the supplier of troops. That is not entirely true. Despite the promises and the treaty commitments of our allies, their forces are much smaller today than we had anticipated or planned for. Britain is sharply retrenching, cutting her forces back 34,500 men, seriously weakening her commitments for the defense of Europe. France mired in north Africa is keeping only skeleton divisions in Europe. West Germany, more than 2 years behind schedule, is just beginning a serious defense program with fewer than 100,000 men under arms. Japan does virtually nothing toward the defense of the Far East. Today the United States is putting more men and money into the defense of Europe than is any European nation.

The fighting machines of Russia and Red China are huge steamrollers, well organized and newly reequipped. They have every weapon that we do and more of most. The Soviet claims of reductions in troops strength are paper reductions not borne out by demobilization if our intelligence is not deceived. They have launching sites behind the Iron Curtain from which guided missiles can reach all of Europe if our intelligence is not deceived. Soviet military strength always has depended upon mass steamroller tactics by which they seek to overrun enemy positions regardless of cost in manpower.

Diplomatically, their strategy is to pinch off territory whenever and wherever they can by whatever means they can. That is the kind of threat American forces live under in all parts of the world. I want them to have the ability to fight back and live.

Again, let us think back to Korea. There American forces without adequate training and with World War II equipment were thrown into the gap to try to stop hordes of disciplined enemy troops in the most brutal and savage fighting experienced by American troops in many a decade. I would not want that to happen again. But, this budget makes no provision for modern equipment for American or Korean forces now in Korea. American forces and Korean forces are equipped with weapons of the type that they had when the fighting stopped. They are equipped with the planes they had when fighting stopped. There were no atomic tactical weapons in use in the field when the fighting stopped in Korea so our forces have none today. On the other side of the defense line, Chinese and Red Korean forces have been

augmented and completely equipped with new weapons. They have atomic weapons. They have hundreds of newly developed airfields with the latest planes. The last token forces of our allies other than the Koreans are pulling out. The fact that this budget makes no provision for the improvement of that picture is not an Army decision. The Army grimly contemplates its responsibility in Korea and knows that the cards are stacked against us. Policy considerations directed by the State Department and the administration require that we observe armistice terms which forbid modernizing our forces. The Communists made the same agreement, but they are not similarly inhibited by moral or treaty obligations. They have broken the contract. Therefore, I say it is no longer binding on us, and that American and Korean forces there should have every type of modern equipment our arsenal possesses.

What about the Army budget for fiscal 1958?

Mr. CANFIELD. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SIKES. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. CANFIELD. I am glad to hear the very able gentleman from Florida make that statement about our military situation in Korea, because I am very much concerned about it.

A dispatch from Korea in the Associated Press today makes this statement, that if the North Korean forces and the Red Chinese move against our forces and the Southern Korean forces today those forces would have little hope.

Mr. SIKES. I am afraid that is true.

Mr. MORANO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SIKES. I yield to the gentleman from Connecticut.

Mr. MORANO. Does the gentleman have any information as to whether or not we have the kind of equipment that you think is needed in Korea in nearby Okinawa, Japan, or the Philippines that it would be able to get into Korea in an emergency?

Mr. SIKES. Of course, there is limited equipment that is available within the same geographical area but not in the amounts we would need; and this budget does not provide it. I think I can explain that to the gentleman's entire satisfaction later. There is simply not enough money in the budget to do the job.

Mr. MORANO. What about atomic tactical weapons in that area? Are they in that area? Are they in that area where they can be used in case of emergency, or can they be gotten into Korea?

Mr. SIKES. The atomic tactical weapons and their crews have been directed almost wholly to assisting our allies in Europe.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SIKES. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. MAHON. This question of the American military position in Korea is a question that is presently being considered on a very high level. It is a

question of treaty obligations; various countries are involved. I have discussed this matter within the last 3 days with appropriate officials of the Government. I am assured that plans are being made to work this problem out to the best interests of the United States.

It is not a matter of shortage of weapons in being, so I am told by the Pentagon, but a decision as to what we should do towards strengthening our position in Korea. But this is a matter of negotiation between governments, as I understand, and I think it would be a mistake to discuss this matter at length on the floor at this time. Later when top level decisions are made we can discuss the problem more freely.

Mr. SIKES. That is correct. In the meantime our defenses in Korea deteriorate each day in comparison with the defenses of the enemy.

Now, what of the Army budget for fiscal 1958. Generally, I support it. I am not an enthusiastic supporter in that there are areas where the cuts go very deep. I will discuss them later. Not all of this is chargeable to the committee. The Department of Defense and the Bureau of the Budget held the Army to a low figure in nearly every category. In addition, Mr. Eisenhower pinpointed and thereby insured one cut that I consider too deep for sound management and planning.

Nevertheless, the Army possesses and will improve its position generally in its ability to wage both conventional and atomic warfare. It will be a powerful force to reckon with and it is becoming increasingly mobile and air transportable. The committee does not recommend, nor do we see a necessity for any cuts in uniformed personnel.

The Army has had to develop a new concept for training, supply, and maneuver. This is the atomic capability concept. Now smaller divisions must operate with greatly modernized equipment, spread over a much larger area. It must strike in many directions at once, seek out and destroy enemy concentrations and targets. The Army must have a capability for sustaining operations even though ports may be rendered unusable, water transportation more difficult, and production facilities destroyed by atomic attack. The Army must still be prepared to deny friendly territory to the enemy, to take and hold enemy territory. Only then can we be sure the enemy resistance has ended. All of this does not make an easy task nor a cheap one.

Costs are going right out of the top of the tent. Each soldier is costing us \$7,000 a year and Congress authorized every item of expenditure including all the comforts and conveniences and security we like to provide as a part of modern soldiering. Despite the enormity of this budget, our mobilization reserves are low. We will not have enough weapons or supplies to keep going long. We have tried to strike a balance with reality, drawing on the world knowledge of the administration and the battle experience of the Pentagon. Then, because the Nation has said it wanted cuts, we have doubly studied each item and re-

assessed each item for its necessity and importance. The cuts are in this bill. You now are the judges of our wisdom or lack of it.

The services say they are hurt badly by the reductions. In some instances I think they are. In other instances I do not agree. I do think this is the tightest military budget in years. The services have on the whole been doing a progressively better job in avoiding or eliminating unnecessary expenditures. I believe the Army in particular has done a good job in trying to eliminate waste. The Army's presentation to this committee was outstanding, clear, and factual.

Mr. VINSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SIKES. I yield to the gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. VINSON. The gentleman stated that the Army felt in certain instances it was hurt by the reduction and that thought was concurred in by the gentleman from Florida. Particularly am I concerned about military personnel. I understood the gentleman to say that there was no intention to cut the ground forces but I have been advised by the Department that the way the figures turn out there will be a forced reduction and I particularly invite the committee's attention to a reduction of 15,000 men or one division out of money that is being made available for military personnel. Am I correct?

Mr. SIKES. I expect to touch on that in detail in a few minutes. I believe I can show the gentleman without question that there is not any necessity for cuts in personnel. I would deplore any substantial reduction. I do not feel that it is necessary. I will explain in just a few minutes why I do not consider it necessary.

Mr. BROOKS of Louisiana. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SIKES. I yield to the gentleman from Louisiana.

Mr. BROOKS of Louisiana. I think the gentleman is making a most impressive statement here, and I have listened to it with a great deal of attention. In addition to what my able chairman the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. Vinson] has referred to, I am disturbed in reference to this cut of \$10 million in the Army Reserve program. We have been making a fight through the years to build up the Reserve program. We have brought it now into a shape where it looks like a real active Reserve program. I am told that this cut will destroy the 6-month training program for the Army Reserves, and I would like to get the gentleman's idea in that respect.

Mr. SIKES. Well, I am disturbed about it, too, and I must point out to my good friend, who has been very zealous in his own efforts in behalf of the Reserve, that information given to the committee at the time the hearings were held does not coincide with information which has subsequently been given to the committee. The new information is the result of the effects of the very rapid augmentation of the 6-month training program. I think very likely we will need to put back the money that was eliminated. I am going to discuss that

in detail in just a few minutes. If my friend will bear with me, I will get to that, also.

Mr. BROOKS of Louisiana. I certainly appreciate the consideration of that particular item.

Mr. SIKES. I thank the gentleman.

Before I get into the actual details of the budget, I want to comment for a little bit about waste, because there always is talk about waste. And, I have to admit that a certain amount of waste appears to be built into any organization as big as the military services. A certain amount, I presume, is inherent anywhere in Government. It is part of the system. There are little bits of waste everywhere in Government, and some of it is going on and will continue to go on regardless of what you and I do about it. We try to force elimination of waste. We try to make it impossible by the nature of the cuts we inflict, but the real challenge for the elimination of waste must lie within the departments, whether that be Defense or any other. If a general wants to fly in his personal plane to Rio de Janeiro for lunch or a golf game, there is nothing that Congress can do about it, because it goes down in the record as a training trip. But, in our indignation about this, let us remember that we in the Congress are not above waste, also. An official in Government recently told me that he arranged 15 trips abroad for 1 Congressman in 6 years. I find it awfully hard to believe that all of those trips were necessary.

Now, we do a lot of things for the services that cost a lot of money. These are the things that Congress has authorized: They include transportation overseas for the families of the soldiers, rental, canteens, medical, educational, and retirement privileges. We are educating 48,000 Army children abroad, 91,000 children of all the services. Two hundred and thirty-four thousand Army dependents are abroad, five hundred and twenty-four thousand dependents of all the services. It costs \$37 million a year to send out 2 checks a month to all of the people who draw pay from the United States Government rather than to send them 1 check a month. There are so many places where a lot of money is spent doing the things that we think make the services more attractive and make Government service more attractive, and in none of this do I speak in the same connotation as I spoke about waste a little earlier.

I am disturbed about the cost of the CIA. We spend hundreds of million of dollars a year on this organization. It has almost no screening or control from the Congress. That in itself is an invitation to excessive spending and to empire building. I seriously question that it is earning its keep. These are but a very few examples:

Now, if I can, I want to talk briefly about the actual budget estimates and appropriations for the Army. The 1957 appropriation was \$7,752,000,000. The 1958 budget request was \$8,465,000,000. We recommended in this bill \$7,239,000,000. That is \$332 million less than the 1957 appropriation, \$1,226,000,000 less than the 1958 appropriation request.

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However, \$400 million of this is to be derived by transfer. We have directed that \$350 million be derived from the Army stock fund and used to pay salaries and expenses, and \$50 million be transferred from the Army industrial fund.

Where does the Army's stock fund money come from? During the Korean war we built up a great backlog of supplies. In subsequent years the Army has been using those supplies but the Army's mobilization reserves have been dropping. As a result money accumulates in the stock fund and by the same token in the industrial funds. Instead of leaving that money for subsequent use when needed, we are requiring that it be used within the Army structure for current needs, thereby cutting back on the amount of new money that we must appropriate.

The reduction in the bill also contemplates that the Federal Government of Germany will supply approximately \$105 million, which is the amount they supplied to help bear the cost of American forces in Germany during the past year. They are becoming more and more reluctant to share in those costs. If the State Department is unable to work out an agreement with the German Republic for the continuation of the deutchemark support, then we will have to put back a proportionate part of the \$105 million we have eliminated.

The gentleman from Georgia [Mr. VINSON] just a moment ago asked about Army strength figures under this budget. It is contemplated that we will begin the fiscal year 1957 with 1 million men and that we will end it with 1 million men. The average strength will run from 997,000 to 999,000. The money for military pay and related purposes for the year is calculated at \$3,113,000,000 plus the transfers that I mentioned a little while ago. That is the money that goes for pay, food, clothing, and travel. These are necessary items, housekeeping items, things we obviously cannot eliminate. From the requested \$3,549,000,000 program the committee recommended a cut of \$36 million, as an actual cut; that is all, \$36 million. That is 1 percent.

Mr. VINSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SIKES. I yield to the gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. VINSON. As a matter of fact, the request for the next fiscal year was \$49 million below what it was for fiscal 1957. So if you add the \$36 million and the \$49 million, you get \$84 million, which represents a budget cut below the current year. Then if you add to that the \$28 million on account of the increased cost of subsistence, railroad rates, and so forth, you get a total reduction of \$113 million below the current year; is that right?

Mr. SIKES. \$113 million less than the comparable figure would have been for 1957.

Mr. VINSON. That is right, to take care of the same number of troops, 997,000 or 1 million.

Mr. SIKES. But let me say to the gentleman from Georgia that it is only \$36 million less than the Army requested for fiscal 1958. It is not 113 million less

than the army stated would be needed. Economies and adjustments within the Department eliminated the requirement for the additional items which the gentlemen has enumerated.

Mr. VINSON. That is right.

Mr. SIKES. Now let me go just a little further and see where that \$36 million reduction is to come from. Remember this is \$36 million less than the Army actually requested for a million men for fiscal 1958. We propose that those reductions be taken in certain ways, and we specify that we do not want them to come through reduction of uniformed personnel.

We believe that the decline in reenlistments is going to mean that the Army has asked for more reenlistment allowance money than is needed. We deducted \$6,500,000 from that item.

The 1957 aircraft procurement program was subjected to a slowdown. We feel that the buildup in aircraft inventory in fiscal 1958 is not going to be sufficient for Army to use all of the flying pay requested for 1958 and, therefore, we deducted \$1,500,000 from that item.

The enlisted dependents are entitled to allowances under the law. However, if the enlistment rate does not increase, the replacements which must be obtained through the draft will have fewer dependents. We deducted another \$5,100,000 from that item.

Now, here is the big cut, in travel. The service requested \$229,900,000 for travel. We believe there still is much more travel within the services than there is justification for, much more than there can possibly be a necessity for, and we took a 10-percent slash out of that item and reduced the amount available by \$22,900,000.

Nearly 23 million of the 36 million reduction is in travel. You cannot tell me that if we cut travel \$22,900,000 it is going to mean we have to discharge 15,000 uniformed personnel. It simply will not hold water. Now I know this: I know that travel costs more because of increases in rates. The Interstate Commerce Commission gives the common carriers a rate increase about once a month, it seems to me, and those increases come out of this budget. The Government pays a very big part of the increase its own agencies granted to the carriers. I claim that the \$22,900,000 decrease in travel is a very big cut. I think the Army should have to try to live within the money appropriated. I think travel in all the services is excessive, and I insist that it must be curtailed.

Mr. VINSON. I want to clear this matter up because I think the committee is entitled to it. The way my mind runs, I think this is the most serious cut, probably, in this whole bill. If the gentleman will bear with me just one second, I should like to give the figures so the committee can understand them.

Your report shows that the Army requested \$3,549,000,000 for fiscal 1958 to support approximately 1 million military personnel of the Army. The Army admitted that it had \$49 million more than this amount in 1957 to support approximately the same number of troops. The committee cut this request for fiscal 1958

funds by an additional \$36 million. This means that the Army will have \$84 million less to maintain approximately the same military strength in fiscal 1958 than it had in fiscal 1957.

Mr. SIKES. That is overlooking the fact that the Army did not ask for that \$49 million.

Mr. VINSON. That is true.

Mr. SIKES. They said they could live without it.

Mr. VINSON. But they did ask for the \$36 million.

Mr. SIKES. That is right. I have just told the gentleman where we made the cut of \$36 million, \$23 million of that \$36 million is travel. When you require a reduction in travel, it cannot possibly follow that you have to discharge troops.

Mr. VINSON. Let us sum up the two things. The Army comes in and asks \$49 million less. Then you cut it \$36 million. That is the result of it. Now see if this is correct. I further understand that the Army will be required to absorb an additional sum of \$28 million due to an increase in freight rates and sea transportation.

Mr. SIKES. The Army knew it had to absorb those costs when it made its request for NPA funds.

Mr. VINSON. That is right.

Mr. SIKES. The Army cannot in my opinion have a sound justification for its statement that it will be necessary to discharge 15,000 men as a result of a \$36 million cut in this item, the major part of which is for travel.

Mr. VINSON. Here is the question: As a result of these cuts, the Army states it will be necessary to reduce its strength, which would average 997,000 in fiscal 1958, by approximately 15,000 men—equivalent to 1 division. The question I have is, Is this cut going to bring about a reduction of one Army division?

Mr. SIKES. If I were convinced there would be a necessity for a substantial reduction, I personally would offer the amendments to put back the money, but I am not convinced by any information which has been made available to me. I will be very glad indeed to learn any facts that can be helpful to me in this particular matter.

Mr. VINSON. May I say this. I want to state to the committee that I was advised by the proper officials last Friday that as a result of this reduction they would be forced to reduce military personnel by 15,000 and that that many men would have to be discharged.

Mr. SIKES. I say to my good friend, we have 4 hours of debate here today and probably considerable more under the 5-minute rule on tomorrow before we get through but if the Department of Defense has any figures which will show that 15,000 men must be discharged as the result of the committee action, I want to see them also.—I am just as concerned as my distinguished friend on this point. But the Department of the Army has made no information available to me thus far which changes my position.

Mr. SMITH of Mississippi. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SIKES. I yield.

Mr. SMITH of Mississippi. I commend the committee for the effort that has been made to achieve greater economy in travel within the military services. On that point, in regard to the Army's travel allowances that have been made and the reduction which the gentleman has just been discussing, it is my understanding that the Army figures the cost of an individual soldier averages about \$19 a day. With regard to these overall costs and all of the Army expenditures in travel time, has the committee taken into consideration the value of a man's time in travel? I would like to ask the gentleman if he agrees that we should make it known to the military that we expect the value of a man's time to be taken into consideration in selecting the mode of transportation to be used for movements of military personnel.

Mr. SIKES. The committee has so indicated in its discussions with the Department of Defense. The committee does feel that there are times when air travel could be used to good advantage at savings to the Government and it is not being used to the extent that it could be. I hope we have made this completely clear in our discussions with the Department of Defense.

Mr. SMITH of Mississippi. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. DEVEREUX. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SIKES. I yield.

Mr. DEVEREUX. I would like to ask the gentleman this question with reference to the reenlistment rate. My recollection is that the report to the Committee on Armed Services was to the effect that the reenlistment rates have been increasing and that the picture looks much better now, and that is primarily because we have provided for reenlistment bonuses. As I understand the gentleman from Florida, you have reduced those funds because, according to your information, the reenlistment rates have fallen off.

Mr. SIKES. Unfortunately it is true that reenlistment rates are dropping. The figures are shown very clearly in the hearings.

We are very concerned about the fact that reenlistment rates have been dropping during recent months. That is the factor we used in making this reduction. Last year, the reenlistment figures went up very nicely and we thought we were over that hump. Now the reenlistment rate has dropped and it is difficult to assign definite reasons, although probably it is because there are many civilian jobs available at higher pay.

Mr. DEVEREUX. Does the gentleman believe that by reducing these funds, with reference to the reenlistment bonus that we may curtail some of the reenlistments?

Mr. SIKES. I do not think so. We reduced the money by the amount which we thought would not be used. Certainly, it is not our intention to discourage reenlistments. We want reenlistments wherever it is possible to get them. The men who reenlist are those who have training. The greatest economy comes through keeping trained

men in the service. The reenlistment rates are down; consequently, we believe the Army has asked for more money than it can use in this particular field if that is true. There is no point in appropriating money which will not be used.

Mr. DEVEREUX. Would there be a possibility, for instance, if we believe that there will be a need for additional money to encourage reenlistments that we can transfer any funds from the training funds—which is the crux of the whole thing—to the reenlistment fund?

Mr. SIKES. I would have no objection whatever to making any transfers within reason that will be helpful in increasing reenlistments.

Mr. DEVEREUX. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. SIKES. Now if I may proceed. I have used up much time but I do want to talk about operation and maintenance. The 1957 appropriation was \$3,055,000,000. The 1958 budget estimate was \$3,400,000,000. We made an actual cut of \$150 million. This, I think, is where we made the deepest cut and where we may have done damage. Operation and maintenance includes all the training of soldiers, training in atomic concepts, training with modern weapons, all maintenance of facilities, weapons, buildings, everything the Army owns. Operation and maintenance money, is actually the life blood of the services. When you cripple that, you cripple the Army. The men cannot be trained if the facilities cannot be properly maintained and you soon cease to have an effective fighting force.

Let me mention at this point the matter of deferred maintenance. The service establishment, including all its posts and stations, is getting bigger all the time. The costs of repair and upkeep and maintenance are getting bigger all the time. Unfortunately, the Army has to defer some of the needed maintenance each year and the amount has now climbed to \$100 million. It is like saying if your house needs to have the roof repaired this year, you are going to postpone it until next year when you hope you will have more money. By next year the leaky roof has caused a rotting of lumber within the house and the job has grown considerably bigger. There is nothing in this budget for deferred maintenance.

As this bill is written, in addition to this decrease of \$150 million in operation and maintenance, there are many factors where additional costs are required for O. and M. I list some of them:

Survivor benefit, \$48 million; civil service retirement fund, \$85 million; transfer of aircraft depot maintenance and Army pilot training from the Air Force, \$49 million; increase in classified activities, for Department of Defense, \$25 million; freight rate increases, Military Transport Service, \$24 million; dependent medical care program, \$19 million, 6 months' training for trainees at a cost of \$85 million, more than in the comparable period in the last budget year.

In other words, the cost of operation and maintenance has gone up tremendously, yet we cut it \$150 million. That

is a serious cut. The Army is going to be very hard pressed to live within it.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Florida has again expired.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman 4 additional minutes.

Mr. SIKES. I promised to discuss the Reserve and National Guard. For Reserve personnel we have allowed \$197 million. The Army requested \$207 million. We based that cut on the fact that each year we have given to the Army more money for its Reserve program than they have been able to use, yet each year we cut the Army below the amount they estimated they could use. We gave them less than they wanted, and they spent less than we gave them. With that experience factor we felt there was no justification for appropriating all of the \$207 million the Army requested.

There are now in training 255,000 men in the Reserve program. The Army wants to increase that number to 297,000 during the next fiscal year. If they are able to do that, they will need every bit of the money that was requested in this budget, and they could need even more. The Army is not going to spend all the money we gave them for the Reserves in fiscal 1957, but if we hold them to the committee figure, there is a distinct possibility that this will mean the end of the 6 months' program about September for the fiscal year. The reason is that the Army has placed so much emphasis on the 6 months' training program that it has reached strength figures much greater than those considered possible.

The completion of the training of the men now in the 6 months' training program will eat up a considerable part of the money originally planned for use during all of fiscal year 1958. I think the Army has overemphasized the 6 months' program at the expense of other programs. I do not agree with the Army's policy in taking in for 6 months' training those men who are 18½ to 26 and I do not agree with their policy of cutting back on the reserve obligations. Some of the information I am giving you now was not available to us at the time we heard the budget presentation.

Now let me say just a word or two about the Army National Guard: The 1957 appropriation was \$320,162,000. The 1958 budget estimate was \$320,000,000, and we allowed the full \$320,000,000. We felt from the information given us at the time of the hearing on the budget that amount would be sufficient to permit the Army National Guard to maintain a strength figure of 400,000 throughout fiscal 1958. However, we have found, as a result of recent information, that the guard is in a very difficult position. Because of that we have written language into the report inviting the Army, if they run into trouble maintaining the National Guard strength at 400,000, to come back and discuss it with us in January, when we can give consideration to providing more money if it is needed.

Their problem is simply this: They have built enlistments to about 437,000 in the National Guard. However, the National Guard strength figure carried in the budget is 400,000 men for the en-

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tire year beginning July 1. Obviously, if they forcibly reduce the National Guard to a figure of 400,000 by the first of July, many men are going to have to be discharged, and the National Guard will not be able to enlist any new men after August for the entire fiscal year.

That sort of thing is ruinous to the morale of any organization and would be very destructive to the National Guard. It is the feeling of this committee that the required attrition should be brought about gradually, and that it should not be forced attrition that the drop in strength predicated upon a strength of 400,000 should be accomplished over a period of several months, and that there would be modified recruiting to permit replacement of those who drop out after the guard reaches the 400,000 level; that under no circumstance should the level of the National Guard drop below 400,000. We invite further information from the guard if additional action by the Congress is required.

Now a very brief word about research and development. The Army R. and D. program is apparently enjoying one of its highest levels of performance. It has a splendid staff headed by Lt. Gen. James Gavin. It has enlisted the services of many outstanding scientists in the guided missile and other important modern fields. It is unfortunate in my opinion that the Army does not have money in this budget to continue its valuable work on the intermediate range ballistic missile Jupiter. We do have the assurance of the Department of Defense that money will be made available by the Secretary from funds at his disposal to carry on the work as long as there is justification. There will undoubtedly be question about the wisdom of a 2-percent cut of \$8 million in this item. Actually, it is part of a servicewide cut intended to cause each of the services to tighten up on its R. and D. program to eliminate deadwood and unnecessary projects. There is no question but the research and development must be carried on at a level in keeping with the requirement of the times.

My last comments will be directed at procurement and production. For a number of years, as a matter of fact since the Korean war, we have utilized funds appropriated in the final stages of that war and not spent for new weapons by the Army. This year the Army estimated a requirement for \$583 million in new money. However, there are available to the Department of the Army \$516 million additional which the Army had planned to use in fiscal 1959. The President suggested that this money be used in fiscal 1958 although he pointed out it would be done at the expense of sound programing. Actually, to require the use of all of the \$516 million will create considerable difficulty for the Army. A substantial portion of this money must come from MAP reimbursements which will not be available until late in the fiscal year. There is a possibility that a part of it will not be available at all. Nevertheless, the committee accedes to the recommendation. For modern day procurement and production the Army

needs to spend about \$2 billion yearly on new weapons. This budget provides only about \$1½ billion. Approximately one-half will go for guided missiles. They are very costly and the number to be produced is low in comparison with the possible requirement.

It would be a wonderful thing if we could safely ignore national defense. We find ourselves building great plants at Government expense, utilizing the Nation's best brains, expending literally billions of dollars each year on preparations to kill people. It is a tragic commentary on the times that 2000 years after Christ lived on earth that the world's major emphasis is still on destruction. Yet, what is the choice? Russia has every weapon that we have today. They have concentrated on some. We have concentrated on others. They have more of most weapons than we. Significantly all of Europe is now under the threat of Russia's guided missiles that are in being and in place. By the same token, all of Russia is under the threat of weapons which we can order into action instantaneously. In a strong defense lies the only sure and certain guaranty of safety from this mass destruction that man is capable of inflicting. Russia knows that the attempt to bring destruction upon the free world will also produce destruction for communism. By spending these great amounts for security, we hold Russia in check and give the diplomats a chance to find a way.

Let me thank most sincerely and commend most highly my colleagues and the clerk of the Army panel for their outstanding work on this bill.

Mr. WIGGLESWORTH. Mr. Chairman, I yield 45 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. FORD].

(Mr. FORD asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, on Friday you heard intelligent, competent, persuasive and eloquent remarks by my colleagues on the Subcommittee on National Defense of the Committee on Appropriations. Rather than talk to you about the overall, as some of them did, I would like to confine my remarks today to specifics in reference to the Army.

I speak as a member of the Army panel, 1 of 3 panels of the subcommittee dealing with military appropriations.

It would be unforgivable if I did not compliment each and every one of my colleagues whether I agreed with them or not. I think they are conscientious and intelligent. In my judgment, the staff members of this subcommittee have done the most able job in the preparation of this committee report that I have seen in the 5 years of my membership on this subcommittee.

I can also say that the presentation by the Army to the Army panel was excellent. It was most helpful to the Army panel.

We hear, or we used to hear, from time to time severe criticism—perhaps some of it is justifiable—about the way we run our Armed Forces. I think it is wise, however, for those who have the opportunity to see the facts to recognize the

good things that have been done and to show to our colleagues the progress that has been made. I would like to talk first about the personnel situation, both military and civilian, for the Department of the Army.

At the end of the fiscal year 1953, the Army had on active duty 1,534,000 men.

On June 30, 1956, the Army had on active duty 1,024,000.

On June 30 of this year the Army will have approximately 1 million; and at the end of the fiscal year 1958, if this budget is recommended by this subcommittee as approved, the Army can and should have 1 million men on active duty. In other words, over a period of 4 or 5 years the size of the Army has been reduced one-third.

Let us talk about the civilians who are employed by the Army. On June 30, 1953, the Army employed, worldwide, that is civil service, foreign nationals, and so forth, 883,000.

On June 30, 1956, the Army employed 592,000.

On June 30, 1957, it is anticipated the Army will employ 589,000.

On June 30, 1958, it is anticipated the Army will employ 586,000.

So we can see over a span of approximately 4 to 5 years the Army has gone down about one-third in uniform personnel and about 30 to 40 percent in civilian employees.

Let us turn now to the fiscal picture.

In 1953—that is, the fiscal year—the Army expended \$16,300,000,000 plus 600 million in what we call deutschemark support. May I explain what we mean by deutschemark support. Since the termination of World War II we have had in West Germany a sizable armed force. The Germans over this period of time have reimbursed us for these forces by contributing what they call deutschemark support. They could not pay us in dollars but they could provide us with services and with supplies. As a consequence, in fiscal 1953 the Army received in lieu of dollars about 600 million deutschemarks.

In the fiscal year 1956 the Army expended \$9.5 billion, plus \$268 million in deutschemark support. In the fiscal year 1957 the Army expended \$8.6 billion, plus about \$120 million in deutschemark support. It is expected, if this budget is approved, that the Army will expend in the fiscal year 1958 \$9.2 billion plus \$104 million in deutschemark support.

The point I want to make, and I intend to reemphasize it during the afternoon, is that the Army has constantly improved its fiscal policies and has done a remarkably good job in tightening its belt.

Now, Mr. Chairman, let us turn to the question of unexpended balances. We hear from time to time a good deal of criticism—some of it might be justified—that many of our agencies, particularly the military, have too much stashed away some place which the Congress has lost control of and which is uneconomical and wasteful. The Army, in my opinion, has done a very competent job in the reduction of its unexpended balances. At the end of the fiscal year 1955 the Army had in unexpended balances \$11.3

billion. It is anticipated, if this budget is approved, that the Army at the end of fiscal year 1958 will have reduced that unexpended balance to approximately \$5,300,000,000. In other words, they have reduced their unexpended balances in a 5-year period by 50 percent.

Let us turn now to the unobligated balances picture. Again there has been criticism, perhaps justified, that the services have had too much in unobligated balances available. At the end of fiscal 1955 the Army had in unobligated balances slightly over \$6 billion. At the end of fiscal 1958, if this budget is approved, the Army will have left less than \$500 million in unobligated balances. And I suspect that it will be closer to \$300 million in unobligated balances.

I think these remarkable improvements in the fiscal picture in the Army can be attributed to two factors: First, that Congress has been more alert to the need for closer scrutiny; at the same time, the officials in the Department of Defense, both civilian and military, have done a better job. The net result is that this Congress today has greater control over the dollars and the policies of the military than we have had at any time in my service in this body. My chairman on the Army panel has done an excellent job, in my opinion, in presenting the picture as far as the Army is concerned.

I would now like to express several personal views about the recommendations you have before you as they affect the Army. In the first place, we cut \$36 million out of the military pay account. That is 1 percent of that account. The Army requested almost \$3.6 billion. The reduction, as the gentleman from Florida [Mr. SIKES] pointed out, is 1 percent. Aid, we did not apply the meat ax. We, I think, intelligently and constructively pointed out where those reductions of 1 percent can be made.

Now we turn to the second biggest item reduction in the bill as far as the Army is concerned, that is the account of what we call operations and maintenance.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FORD. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, I wish to propound a question to my distinguished colleague from Michigan. Let me preface it by saying that his service has been outstanding on this committee, and it is typical of the very fine work he does in all of his work in the Congress. Is the gentleman of the opinion, as I am, that the cut of \$36 million will not require or will not justify the loss of any uniformed personnel?

Mr. FORD. It is my opinion and most sincere view that this reduction of \$36 million will not, under any circumstances, require the reduction of 15,000 in uniformed personnel for the Army. I think that the people who are saying that in the Pentagon are being a little unfair with the committee, because they know as well as we do that you cannot translate dollars of reductions in this account precisely into personnel or the

loss of personnel. And, I personally resent their attitude in trying to sell the restoration of that amount on that basis.

Mr. SIKES. And does my distinguished colleague join me in the statement that it is not the intention of this committee that any uniformed personnel be discharged as the result of this cut?

Mr. FORD. Our subcommittee specifically pointed out that we wanted no reduction in uniformed personnel, and it is our considered opinion, among the 5 of us on the Army panel, that the \$36 million cut, 1 percent, does not require such a reduction.

Mr. NICHOLSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FORD. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. NICHOLSON. Why do we need 1,000 generals, while we are on this subject of doing away with uniformed personnel? Was the question of the enormous amount of generals that we have taken up in the committee?

Mr. FORD. I would say to the gentleman from Massachusetts that our subcommittee does not dictate policy as to the arrangement of rank and rate within the military. That is done by the committee chaired by the very able gentleman from Georgia. They determine the rate or rank structure within the Army. All we do is appropriate the money for the payment of the personnel involved. We do not have the right, even if we wanted to, to legislate on an appropriation bill. The minute we try to do it, certain people rise up in righteous wrath; so we stay clear of any such action. That is the responsibility of the legislative committee.

Mr. GAVIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FORD. I yield.

Mr. GAVIN. With reference to this cut of \$36 million, the Army asked \$49 million less this year than last year; is that right?

Mr. FORD. That is right.

Mr. GAVIN. On top of their voluntary cutback of \$49 million, the committee cut them back an additional \$36 million; is that correct?

Mr. FORD. That is correct.

Mr. GAVIN. Does not the gentleman from Michigan believe that with the many responsibilities they have, with the rise in cost of clothing and subsistence, railroad freight and passenger rates, and with a full year's contribution to the social-security and retirement system that that is too much of a cut? The gentleman a moment ago complimented the Department of the Army very highly. He said they had not used all of the appropriations that had been granted them, and that they attempted to present to the committee to the best of their ability a statement of what they actually will need for the coming year.

Mr. FORD. In the first place may I say this: The Army on its own, without any urging from the committee, reduced the uniform personnel of the Army about 2,500. That brings up a rather interesting point. When the Army reduces personnel voluntarily they do not arbitrarily assign so much money per man.

And yet they are condemning us by saying that if we cut \$36 million, that means we are going to cut out 15,000 members of the uniformed services. The two just do not follow necessarily.

Mr. GAVIN. That may be.

Mr. FORD. So the Army actually in fiscal 1958 asked about 2,500 less than in fiscal 1957. That accounts for part of the reduction to which the gentleman refers.

Mr. GAVIN. But the gentleman who has the floor did not bring to the attention of the Committee that the Army voluntarily cut back \$49 million from what they had last year. The gentleman says they are conscientiously trying to do a good job. The gentleman admits that they are doing a pretty fair job, but the Army may disagree with the gentleman on the basis of the actual strength necessary. But they did call to your attention some of the items that have increased in cost; railroad freight and passenger rates, clothing and subsistence and there is a full year's contribution to the social security and retirement system. Therefore I think that the Department of the Army has submitted a budget which they think they can get along with and if we cut them back further, after they have made a voluntary reduction of \$49 million, there is a question in my mind whether they are going to be able to operate as efficiently as they should under the circumstances.

Mr. FORD. Let me answer the gentleman. This year the Army asked for \$222 million for travel of military personnel. We cut them back to the level of the fiscal year 1957.

Let me give you an example of the kind of unnecessary travel we think the Army has participated in. I do not like to mention names, but let us be frank about it. For a period of 18 months the Superintendent of the Military Academy at West Point was General Bryan. He is a very competent and highly respected soldier. He was transferred from there, after being there 18 months, out to the South Pacific and given a very responsible position. He was there less than a year. Do you know where they sent him? Right back to New York City. In other words, he moved himself and his family from West Point, New York, out to the South Pacific and back again in less than a year. That is the kind of unnecessary travel about which this subcommittee says, "You stop." And we mean it. We do not condone it and we will not permit it. We will reduce the funds further if this is the kind of travel we are going to have face us every year.

Mr. SPRINGER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FORD. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. SPRINGER. I notice that the appropriations for 1957 were \$7,500,000,000. The budget request of the Army, as I understand it, was \$1 billion more than that for 1958. My question is, What justification did the Army give to this committee for requesting roughly 13 percent more in the budget estimate of 1958 than was granted in the appropriation for 1957?

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Mr. FORD. The answer generally falls in the area of what we call the production and procurement account; that is where the heavy procurement of guns, tanks, ammunition, missiles, and so forth occurs. At the time of the Korean war, and properly so, the Army was given substantial amounts of funds or obligational authority to handle the procurement of the necessary weapons of war. When the Korean war ended in July of 1953, they had a huge availability. Gradually over the years we have either rescinded at their initiative or at ours substantial sums. In addition, they have lived off of or used that availability. We have gradually worked it down. This was the first year since the fiscal year 1953 that the Army made any request for obligational authority for the procurement and production account.

Mr. SPRINGER. By reducing their request by \$1,225,000,000 what are you cutting out? I am talking about the major items that they requested.

Mr. FORD. As I say, there is \$36 million in the account that the gentleman from Pennsylvania refers to. The next one is the one I want to talk about mostly, if I may, because I do not happen to agree with what the subcommittee did. If the gentleman will let me discuss the operations and maintenance account, I will explain, I hope, where most of the money was reduced and why I do not happen to agree.

Mr. SPRINGER. The gentleman is talking about the major portion of the \$1,200,000,000?

Mr. FORD. May I correct the gentleman. He is talking about the Army, Navy, and Air Force. I am speaking only of the Army.

Mr. SPRINGER. I am using the Army figures as shown on page 2 of the committee report, referring to title III, Department of the Army; \$1,225,000,000.

Mr. FORD. Here is the answer to that. I am sorry. I apologize. What we have done to the extent of \$400 million as far as the Army was concerned was to take unused obligational authority which was in the stock fund, \$350 million in the stock fund and \$50 million in the industrial fund, and transfer that to the military pay account.

Mr. SPRINGER. That is \$400 million?

Mr. FORD. That is correct. The stock fund was set up 4 or 5 years ago. They capitalized all of their equipment, the supplies they had on hand. Then from that point what we did was to appropriate in this bill sufficient obligational authority for them to buy from the stock fund whatever they had to use. We put the Army on a consumer basis. The Army, because it had built up stocks during the Korean war, did not have to go out and buy new supplies. When certain elements in the Army bought from the stock funds, they simply drew their supplies from the stock fund.

Mr. SPRINGER. I believe the gentleman is looking at page 113. But is this the answer—that you took \$400 million from transfer, \$350 million from the Army stock funds and \$50 million from the Army industrial fund; and that accounts for \$800 million of this \$1,200,000,000 which is referred to on page 2?

Mr. FORD. Let me put it my way. We took \$400 million by the substitution of stock-fund obligational authority. We took \$104 million by the utilization of deutchemarks. We took \$516 million on the recommendation of the President on the P. and P. account. We took \$36 million out of the military pay account strictly on its merits. We took \$10 million out of the reserve program. We took \$8 million out of the R. and D. program. We took \$75,000 out of the rifle-practice program and \$700,000 out of the Alaska communications program. Those are the entire cuts across the board.

Mr. SPRINGER. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. WIGGLESWORTH. Is it not fair to say that the real cut, when you take into consideration the figures which the gentleman has just referred to, that the real cut as far as the Army is concerned is roughly \$200 million?

Mr. FORD. That is apparently correct. If I might, I would like to talk about the O. and M. account because to me this is the most harmful reduction made in the Army.

Mr. GAVIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FORD. I will yield to the gentleman for a question.

Mr. GAVIN. Does the gentleman have many instances such as the one he referred to where there has been a transfer to certain items or are there any similar instances or is this one which the gentleman pinpointed?

Mr. FORD. That is one that I know about. I can supply for the record several others, but that is the grossest example that I am familiar with. I am sorry I must decline to yield further to the gentleman.

I want to talk about a very serious matter, I think, as far as the Army is concerned. The operations and maintenance account is, in my judgment, the real area where the Army operates. The Army requested for the fiscal year, 1958, \$3,678,000,000. The Department of Defense reduced that to \$3,400,000,000. In the fiscal year 1957, the Army had the authority to obligate \$3,139,000,000. It would appear in fiscal 1958, the Army is going to have about \$260 million more than they had in the fiscal year 1957. When you carefully examine the facts, you find that that is not accurate. In reality, the Congress primarily, but the Department of Defense to some extent, have imposed on the Army additional financial burdens which total in this account alone about \$330 million. So the net result is in reality for its day-to-day operations, the Army will have on the budget submitted less money than it had in fiscal year 1957.

May I pinpoint for your information some of the congressionally imposed additional burdens in this account, burdens that the Army has to finance because we told them to. For example, civil service retirement. In this account alone, the Army will be required to contribute \$72 million. Dependent medical care, additional requirement in this account alone \$19 million. MSTs and railroad freight rate increases \$12 million. Now that is not an imposition by

the Congress, but it is something over which the Army has absolutely no control whatsoever. As I indicated before, these additional financial burdens imposed either by the Congress or the Department of Defense or the railroads or others total over \$300 million.

So, in the O. and M. account, the Army in reality, on the budget submitted, would have less money in fiscal year 1958 than they had in fiscal year 1957.

I might add there is about \$61 million in the O. and M. account which is an additional burden, simply because of the 6 months' trainee program. If you want the Reserve program with the 6 months' training, you have to finance it. Sixty-one million dollars of this account falls in that category.

Now what did the subcommittee do? The Army panel was unanimous that not more than \$70 million should be reduced in the O. and M. account, out of the \$3,400,000,000. The full subcommittee, after a fair hearing, overrode the decision of the Army panel and reduced it by \$150 million. In my judgment, that was a very serious mistake, and I made reservation at the time the matter was decided in the subcommittee. Consequently, it is my intention when we read the bill to offer an amendment to restore \$80 million out of the \$150 million, so that we can have the operation and maintenance part of the Army where I think it should be at the minimum.

Mr. BALDWIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FORD. I yield.

Mr. BALDWIN. There was an article in the Washington Post recently stating there would be a reduction of about 50,000 civilian employees by the reduction in this bill, a part of which would be caused by the reduction in this particular account you mentioned. Would the gentleman care to comment about the accuracy of that prediction?

Mr. FORD. As I recall the statement and the comments of the Secretary of the Army, he said in this area it would require a reduction of about 20,000 civilians by the Army. I cannot pinpoint whether it will cause a reduction of 20,000 or not, but I think one of the reasons our Army panel was willing to reduce it \$70 million was because we felt that the Army could reduce, legitimately, some civilians. I do not see a halo around any certain number of people who work for the Army. I think that the Army can reduce some civilians, and the \$70 million we cut from the O. and M. account probably would result in a reduction of a few thousand. I have grave doubt that it would be 20,000.

Mr. MAHON. The total number of civilian employees in the Army is in excess of 500,000, I believe.

Mr. FORD. Actually over 500,000.

Mr. MAHON. So, to cut out 3,000 might well be wholesome. It would probably be more wholesome to cut 10,000 in order to get more efficiency and more for the taxpayer's dollar.

Mr. FORD. As I say, there is nothing sacrosanct about 20,000 additional employees from the Department of the Army. If they can do a better job with 10,000 less, that is fine with me. I think

our Army panel has some feeling that they ought to make some reduction.

Mr. CURTIS of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FORD. I yield.

Mr. CURTIS of Missouri. It is in this area that those who are interested in getting the military out of business might lie, because, as I understand it, it is in the operation and maintenance account that the military have gotten the funds in order to go into these civilian activities. Am I not correct?

Mr. FORD. That is right. That is where most of the operations of a civilian nature are handled, and any reduction would be an incentive to get the Army to curtail some of the things they are doing.

I must say, however, that they have made substantial progress in the reduction of the number of bakeries, in the number of laundries, and in a number of miscellaneous activities of that nature.

Mr. CURTIS of Missouri. I agree with the gentleman. I think there is still a long way to go, but I did want to pinpoint this area.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FORD. I yield to the gentleman from Iowa.

Mr. GROSS. The particular subject of personnel and reduction in civilian personnel has been mentioned by the gentleman. I want to commend the committee for the attention it gave in its report to the widespread use of consultants of all kinds, particularly personnel-management consultants.

Referring to page 23 of the report, I commend the committee for bringing that to the attention of the Members, and I certainly hope they will continue to direct attention to expenditures for this purpose which in my opinion are getting out of hand.

Now I should like to ask the gentleman this: Page 21 of the report speaks of car rentals. Total vehicles proposed for 1958 with an average projected military strength of 2,800,000 is approximately 45,000 with the cost of rentals stated at \$6,600,000.

May I ask the gentleman why this extensive rental of motor vehicles in the Military Establishment?

Mr. FORD. It is not in the military as such, I may say to the gentleman from Iowa, this is for the Defense Department. Our committee was concerned about it.

The Secretary of Defense was asked to submit a statement. I believe it is in the record. I cannot give you precisely the page, but there is an explanation of their part in that regard.

Mr. GROSS. In the hearings?

Mr. FORD. In the hearings some place. I think it is in the defense portion of the hearings.

Mr. SIKES. If the gentleman will yield, the Army part I think is at page 1400 of the Army hearings. We will locate the others as rapidly as we can.

Mr. FORD. I thank the gentleman. Now, if I may, I would like to proceed and mention another part of the bill where I feel very seriously we have made a mistake.

Mr. GAVIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FORD. Let me finish my point first.

Mr. GAVIN. On that particular subject of this \$150 million.

Mr. FORD. I yield for a question.

Mr. GAVIN. The gentleman stated he intended to offer an amendment to restore \$87 million.

Mr. FORD. Eighty million dollars.

Mr. GAVIN. Eighty million dollars. I wondered what the differential was between the \$150 million and the \$80 million that warranted the committee in feeling it should restore \$80 million of the cut.

Mr. FORD. I am predicating my decision on the recommendation of the Army panel. Prior to the markup of the bill the chairman of the Army panel had a meeting at which he had a number of responsible people in the Army sit down with us and discuss where we felt and they felt some bona fide reductions could be made. We went over it, and over it, and over it; and in the O. & M. area it was the consensus that if they maintained their present plant and facilities intact, including all that they closed up, laid away, and so forth, they could not afford any reduction.

But then under interrogation by the chairman and questioning by others it was brought out that if they put the screws on and disposed of some of these plants and facilities, posts, plants, and stations which are closed up, they would not have the same financial burden in fiscal 1958 as they had contemplated.

It was further brought out that the military has a tendency once they get something, a plant, a post, a camp, a station, or whatever it may be, they just feel they cannot give it up even though it is not being currently used.

It was the considered opinion of a high-ranking, responsible official in the Department of the Army that a cut of this nature might be the one thing that would force the Army to get rid of some of those plants which they really think they ought to dispose of. On that basis our subcommittee recommended a reduction of \$70 million. I think it is a bona fide, legitimate cut.

Now, to tell you where I think we made a mistake, I refer to the research and development program for the Army. Here is the picture: During fiscal 1957 the Army will have for obligation and will obligate \$418 million for research and development.

In fiscal 1958 the Army wanted \$590 million. In the fiscal year 1957 they are going to obligate \$418 million. The Secretary of the Department of Defense authorized \$400 million. Our subcommittee, despite the adverse recommendation of the Army panel, reduced this \$400 million by \$8 million.

Here is the situation: This year they are going to obligate \$418 million. The committee recommends a reduction of \$8 million below the \$400 million. So there is 18, plus 8, which is \$26 million and, in addition to that, for the first time in the fiscal year 1958 the Army Research and Development program will have to absorb the civil-service retirement which in this instance for some 13,000 employees will total \$9 million.

So in effect for research and development in fiscal 1958; if this reduction stands, you will have \$35 million less next year for the Army to spend than they have this year.

Let me point out a fact which I think is disturbing. For the last 4 or 5 years this country, and rightly so, has been really pushing the development of our ICBM and our IRBM. We spent millions of dollars. About 2 years ago we first started to hear about the development of the antimissile missile, which is the missile that is going to pick up, seek out, and destroy the ICBM and the IRBM. That is quite a job. The ICBM travels 15,000 miles per hour, and it will go 5,500 miles, it will go to a height of some 300 miles. It can carry an atomic or nonatomic warhead.

About 2 years ago the Army decided something ought to be done to lick the problem. The strated some research and development on it. They have spent altogether, I would say, about \$20 million so far. The Army in fiscal 1958 in R. and D. wanted to spend slightly more than \$20 million for the antimissile missile program. So when they had the reduction from \$590 million down to \$400 million they had to cut that antimissile-missile program from slightly over \$20 million down to \$12 million. If you impose an additional reduction, it is logical to assume we are going to have a further reduction in this program. I think it is very serious. Right now the antimissile missile program is not current, so to speak, with the ICBM and the IRBM program. What I think we ought to do is to expedite the antimissile missile program. Let us get caught up so we do not have this hiatus of a few years where you are literally unprotected from the ICBM and the IRBM. It is my honest opinion that this reduction of \$8 million will have some impact on that program.

Mr. ANDERSON of Montana. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FORD. I yield to the gentleman from Montana.

Mr. ANDERSON of Montana. Can the gentleman tell me where in the appropriation of money for the Army they have the Jupiter missile?

Mr. FORD. There is no money in fiscal 1958 in the Army R. & D. for the Jupiter. As the gentleman undoubtedly knows, the Army is only funding in fiscal 1957 for the Jupiter program. In the testimony it has been brought out by a number of members of the subcommittee that any funds for the Jupiter program in fiscal 1958 will come out of either the emergency fund that the Secretary of Defense has or will come out of the transfer authority which the Secretary also has under his control. So that the Jupiter program, if we can rely on the people in the Department of Defense, and I am certain we can, will not be hurt in fiscal 1958. Of course, I assume the gentleman knows it has been decided that sometime early in fiscal 1958 there will be this great decision whether we are going to proceed with Jupiter or with Thor. Thor is the Air Force IRBM program.

Mr. ANDERSON of Montana. In your judgment, since the Army is going to

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continue the development of Jupiter and since we know this is going to take another \$25 million, might it not be a good idea if this Congress put into this appropriation bill the \$25 million so that we would know that Jupiter would be properly developed by the people who are now working on it?

Mr. FORD. No. I cannot agree with the gentleman, because under the bill the Secretary of Defense, and rightly so, has \$135 million in either emergency funds or transfer authority for anyone of the three services, so if one of the services needs additional funds for something, where there is a breakthrough, they can go to the Secretary of Defense and get whatever is necessary out of that \$135 million.

Mr. ANDERSON of Montana. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. FORD. As I have indicated, the Secretary of Defense or his assistants have promised the committee that the Jupiter money for fiscal 1958, which I think totals about \$35 million, will be available out of that emergency fund.

Mr. SCOTT of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FORD. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. SCOTT of Pennsylvania. Am I correct in understanding that the only antimissile missile program is the one which the Army is engaged in and that neither of the other services has anything to do with it, and therefore if this program is too seriously contracted, we simply fall back in our schedule with the entire Army forces antimissile missile program?

Mr. FORD. It is not fair to say that the Army is doing the whole job in the antimissile missile field, but I think it is reliable to say that the Army is doing 90 percent of it.

Now, if I might take a few minutes to discuss the problem on which I wrote minority views in the subcommittee report. If you will turn to pages 108, 109, and 110 of the subcommittee report, I would like to discuss with you, if I may, the minority views that I have expressed concerning the language in the bill. In the bill on page 8, lines 2 through 6, there is language which I think is detrimental to the Army program expense in dollars, and inefficient in the utilization of personnel. That language in the bill, and it exists in law today, forces the Army to keep two hospitals open, one in Waltham, Mass., called Murphy Army Hospital, and another called Army and Navy Hospital at Hot Springs, Ark. In my judgment, that language should be stricken from the bill. I intend to offer such an amendment, and if the language is stricken from the bill and the hospitals are closed, the first year's savings to the taxpayers will be \$746,000 and the annual savings each year thereafter will be \$1,043,000 plus the fact that you will get more economical, efficient utilization of not only your civilian personnel but also your military medical personnel.

Mr. DONOHUE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FORD. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. DONOHUE. I am wondering if any evidence was submitted to the committee that would indicate how this saving could be accomplished and still take care of the dependents of the many, many thousands of men from New England who are in the services.

Mr. FORD. There was ample evidence submitted in the hearings, I would say, and in my minority statement I refer to the various pages. In the Army hearings it is on page 884 and related pages, and in the Department of Defense hearings it is on page 479 and pages the follow. But, if the gentleman will let me proceed with my comments, I will be glad to answer any questions after I have finished, because I think it is a story that ought to be related in sequence. What are the facts? You have a hospital in Waltham, Mass., which was built in 1943 and 1944 called Murphy Army Hospital. It has a normal bed capacity of 450 and is expandable to a bed capacity of 525. It is of the emergency or cantonment type construction. The hospital in March of 1957 had 91 beds used out of 450. The fiscal year average of bed occupancy was no more than 95 out of a normal capacity of 450 and an expandable capacity of 525.

Let us see how many personnel were employed to take care of the 91 people who were in beds in March of 1957. They employed 183 civilians and they had 213 military personnel for a total of 396 military and civilian personnel taking care of patients who occupied 91 beds.

Let us look at another aspect of this problem. The Army has wanted to close this hospital since the fall of 1953. In the appropriation bill for the fiscal year 1954 our subcommittee took the money out. On the floor of the House, my good friend from Massachusetts, Mr. DONOHUE, offered an amendment to put the money back and to keep the hospital operating. We were swamped by those who said that we had to keep the hospital open. The amendment was approved, the money went back in, and ever since the hospital has been operating.

The Army has consistently felt that it ought to close this hospital and a year ago the Army said, "What we want to do now is to move the New England Division of the Corps of Engineers out of Boston to this hospital after we have closed the hospital up for patients."

In other words, they would not abandon the structure, they would simply substitute the Corps of Engineers personnel for the patients. It is interesting to note that today the Corps of Engineers is paying in the Boston area \$193,000 a year for rent. And we have a hospital operating at Waltham, Mass., with 91 patients and 396 people to take care of them. What the Army wants to do is to close the hospital and move the Corps of Engineers up there. They say it will save over \$500,000 a year after the process is completed.

I know some people are going to say that if we close this hospital all the soldiers, the other military personnel and their dependents in the Waltham area will not have any place to get medical care. Let us look at the facts. With-

in a radius of 15 miles there are 2 military hospitals, one at Chelsea, Mass., run by the Navy; it has a normal capacity of 887 and an expandable capacity of 1,271. In April of 1957 they had 538 beds used. So the hospital is using only five-hundred-some beds out of 887.

Let us turn to the other hospital, within 15 miles of this one, the one at Fort Devens, a pretty sizable Army installation. I remind you that this is another hospital within a few miles of this Murphy Army Hospital.

Mr. PHILBIN. If the gentleman will yield, I would like to correct the gentleman about the mileage. Fort Devens is more than 15 miles away from Murphy. I know the gentleman wants to be fair. They are 40 or 45 miles away from the Boston area. That happens to be in my district, and I know what I am speaking about.

Mr. FORD. If the gentleman tells me that is right, I agree with him, but according to the information the Army gave me it is within 15 miles.

Mr. PHILBIN. It is 40 or 45 miles away.

Mr. FORD. Anyway, Fort Devens Hospital is a maximum of 40 miles away.

Mr. PHILBIN. Further, Murphy General Hospital is the only hospital that is serving military personnel and their dependents in that area. If military personnel and their dependents were to require medical service in a general hospital, they would otherwise have to go all the way down to the Valley Forge Hospital in Pennsylvania.

Mr. FORD. Let me just clarify the situation. Here is an Army hospital at Fort Devens. It has a normal capacity of 929 and an expanded capacity of 1218. Do you know how many they had in the hospital in April of 1957? They occupied 118 beds, one-tenth of the capacity. In other words, you have two military hospitals that are not being used to capacity within a limited distance of Murphy Army Hospital. If this hospital were closed down it would save the taxpayers five-hundred-odd-thousand dollars per annum.

In addition, in 1956 the Congress, and rightly so, passed the dependents medical care bill, so that any soldier, any wife of a soldier, or any children of a soldier can go to their own civilian doctor and to their own civilian hospital. So if this Army hospital were closed in Waltham, Mass., if they did not want to drive to the Chelsea Hospital, where only about three-fifths of the beds are occupied, or they did not want to go Fort Devens, where only 1 in 10 is occupied, they could go to their own hospital in Waltham or their own doctor in Waltham.

The net result is this: We are being asked in this Congress to keep a hospital open that was of an emergency type construction at an additional extra cost to the taxpayers of \$500,000 a year. It is the grossest case of extravagance and inefficiency I have ever run into in my period of service in this Congress.

If you want to agree with the President, if you want to agree with the Secretary of the Army, if you want to

agree with the Surgeon General of the Army, if you want to agree with the Hoover Commission all you have to do is vote to strike out this language. Believe me, if you want to have the sympathy of the taxpayer, if you want to do away with the grossest extravagance I have ever run into, the most willful misuse of Federal funds, I urge you with all the conviction I have to vote to strike this language from the bill.

Mr. DONOHUE.— Mr. Chairman, the most immediate answer to the minority report filed with the appropriation bill regarding the closing of Murphy General Hospital at Waltham, Mass., is to remind ourselves that the Appropriations Committee, who have repeatedly, over these past 4 years, listened to all the evidence and thoroughly studied the background and history, are again recommending approval of the comparatively small amount involved. Let me also remind you that on two occasions the committee apparently found it necessary to rebuke the military officials rather sternly and strongly criticized them for not making a wholehearted effort to operate the hospital in a proper manner and in accord with the expressed intent of the committee and the Congress. This unfortunate attitude was reflected upon the enlisted personnel and dependents and the officials have been accused of unduly restricting and discouraging treatment at the facility.

From January 1, 1953, through April of 1954, the record shows 5,313 patients admitted; the average daily patient census was 437; average number of beds occupied 320; laboratory-service procedures performed, 143,908; 14,442 X-ray services were administered, and 59,705 outpatient visits were made; these are but a few of the fundamental figures demonstrating the vital need of the area for at least restricted hospital service and treatment.

These are some of the basic facts which inspired the committee to make their conscientious judgment. I think there are few, if any, who do not feel that the members of this Appropriations Committee, after burdensome hours of hearings and diligent study of evidence, have set a historical precedent in patriotic protection of the financial interests of our taxpayers. I know you join me in congratulating them for their unparalleled accomplishments.

With respect for truth and with regard for your obligation, I want to emphasize that this is no attempt, on my part or on the part of any other Member here, to continue a district activity for any practical selfish reason. As a matter of fact, and so far as the area economy might be affected, it would seem more beneficial locally to accept the military recommendation instead of the committees' because of the greater number of personnel the military say they plan to use in the facility. However, in my humble opinion, there are much deeper and more serious questions of national preparedness and moral principle involved.

One of those urgent questions is whether or not, in the event of war, this hospital unit is a vital part of the military-hospital network needed to adequately fulfill the military obligation.

The answer to that question appears simple and obvious. The record shows that in the war year of 1942 the military themselves requested and recommended the erection and use of this permanent modern type installation where it now strategically stands. This hospital is the only general hospital within the New England region and has been serving the population of that whole area; the next such hospital is at Valley Forge, Pa. This plant is admittedly ideally accessible by train, plane, and automobile. It is advantageously located next to one of the greatest and most renowned medical centers of the world. The New England area is among the very highest, if not the highest, potential military recruitment sections of the country in time of peace and in time of war. The expansion of military bases at Limestone, Maine, and at Otis and Bedford Air Fields in Massachusetts, with accompanying military-housing construction, is constantly bringing an ever-increasing military population to our area, thus projecting an ever-higher potential of military medical requirements for service people and dependents; these are undoubtedly reasons, and they still exist, why the military officials originally recommended the hospital. In this striking respect, the present officials have never pretended that it was a mistake to build it in the first place or flatly stated that it would not be of essential need in case of emergency. If and when they forthrightly would do so I would be personally inclined to accept their sincerity but I do not think they will ever dare. They would like us to forget, but the committee did not forget, their unhappy and unfortunate planning that resulted in the economic fiasco of closing the hospital just 2 months prior to the outbreak of the Korean war. Needless to relate they were forced to reopen it at tremendous and unnecessary cost to the American taxpayer. In view of the tense atmospheres existing in the world today, I think it is quite reasonable to question, and the committee did question, whether their judgment can be any better now than it was when they made that mistake.

The military people tell us that they can use and vitally need the hospital space for transfer of units of the Army Engineer Corps and Air Force. On the other hand, and in contradiction thereto, authoritative advice furnished me from sources associated with the Boston Army Base indicates there are over 400,000 square feet that could be used by these units at a cost of approximately 35 cents per square foot for maintenance whereas the comparative cost at the hospital would approximate and could well exceed as much as \$1 per square foot. The military have never replied to questions about the Army base space nor revealed their plans for use of the space. It seems obvious to me, and I personally would certainly have welcomed it, that they should have made full and complete disclosure of this matter if their motives were clear.

Let me remind you the President himself has expressed his concern over the vital necessity of improving military

career incentives to prevent the large military turnover involving staggering training costs for repeated short service enlistments. The Secretary of Defense also expressed himself in this matter and I quote as follows: "Medical care for dependents is one of the strongest inducements for servicemen to continue in a military career. Yet, today approximately 40 percent of our military dependents cannot be given medical care through service facilities. This is one of the major obstacles in our efforts to enhance the attractiveness of military service because it affects the wives and children of servicemen directly." That is his statement.

Mr. Chairman, I certainly do not have to emphasize here that despite possession of the most advanced weapons, the only true measure of the fighting efficiency of any military unit is the height of their morale. In my judgment, the duty of the Congress is to exercise every effort to insure the maintenance of the highest possible morale among our military personnel. It is impossible for me, then, to understand how we can meet that duty if we cooperate in a military gamble involving adequate military medical treatment to members of the Armed Forces and dependents within a large area of the country and to which they are morally and legally entitled. Especially is it difficult for me to understand, when this gamble was proved wrong on the one occasion that it was tried.

I would rather recommend and implore the officials of our armed services to patriotically and dutifully concentrate their efforts upon the elimination of the frightening and staggering waste and extravagance as repeatedly revealed by subcommittees of this committee and the Armed Services Committee. The only gamble involved in that wholesome objective would be a substantial profit and saving to the burdened taxpayer. It appears from the facts of this sorry and unhappy record that some military officials are unwittingly overlooking the certain savings to the taxpayers by scrupulous correction of admittedly existing extravagant and wasteful methods of procurement and inventory and are more intent upon gambling with military morale and military career incentives for the sake of a very dubious and comparatively small reduction in our medical program.

The only attempted answer of the military to these grave and serious considerations is the unproved and untried contention that the Military Dependents Assistance Act provisions authorizing private medical treatment for dependents will take care of the situation with an accompanying financial savings. Now these people know, but they would like to have it overlooked, and I know that their own testimony before the Appropriations Committee discloses they themselves have requested funds to take care of expected private medical treatment based on the conservative cost of \$50 per day to the Government whereas an extravagant cost of military medical treatment is based on a range of \$20 to \$26 per day—Navy appropriations, page 888. Now do those authoritative figures sound to you like anything that has even the

vaguest promise, not counting the cost of the redtape, of a potential savings to the taxpayer; I rather think not.

The record shows that Murphy General Hospital was originally and wisely recommended by the military as a vital war unit and it proved it's worth. It was closed once and that proved to be a serious mistake. It is located outside the main target area of military installations in the Boston vicinity and it's type of construction affords maximum protection against bombing attacks. Chelsea Hospital, suggested as an alternative, is 120 years old and located in the midst of a heavy industrial section. Murphy was built in 1944, comprises more than 90 acres and has plenty of room for expansion. To replace it today would cost about \$20 million. I, and many others, have earnestly suggested that this location and space be fully utilized by building expansion which could then provide an ideally situated combined service hospital which could adequately take care of the military medical needs of the whole of the New England area under the best possible conditions. Regretfully it seems no official comment or exploration of this sound practical economic suggestion has been made.

It appears that these current military officials would rather take a reckless gamble with military morale which they cannot justify on the record, cannot demonstrate to be economically wise, which once proved a sorry error and the alternatives to which they cannot adequately answer.

In my most earnest judgment, the question of the wisdom of the moral, patriotic and economic gamble is the fundamental issue involved here and on that question I ask only the individual conscientious action of the Members of this House.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. FLOOD].

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Chairman, as most of you know, I serve on the Army panel of this subcommittee. You have heard me in these debates on these appropriation bills for a number of years, and you know that under no circumstances if I thought there was even going to be remotely damage to the Department of Defense or to the Army or to any of the other branches of the service, would I be in favor of this bill. Since I have been on this committee since 1944, for 10 years, I have been a big Army, a big Navy and a big Air Force man, and under no circumstances would I let you put a glove, if I could stop it, upon the Marine Corps, and you know why. That being the case, let me direct your attention to the members of this subcommittee for defense. These men have been on this subcommittee for from 10 to 25 years. Just look at their names:

Mr. WIGGLESWORTH from Massachusetts.

Mr. SCRIVNER—POP SCRIVNER from Kansas who is proud of the fact that at one time he was an old National Guard Infantry captain—that is 100 years ago, about.

Mr. FORD from Michigan.

Mr. MILLER from Maryland, a colonel in the Reserve in two wars.

Mr. OSTERTAG from New York who has been with us for many years on this committee.

Mr. MAHON, from Texas, the chairman and ranking member of the full committee and chairman of the Air panel.

Mr. SKES, from Florida, who came to us from the Armed Services Committee where he served for years and who is now Army chairman of our committee.

Mr. NORRELL, from Arkansas, one of the ranking Members of the House of Representatives.

Mr. WHITTEN, from Mississippi, who served on this committee during the war.

Mr. SHEPPARD—the Admiral—from California, who came to this committee from the old Navy committee before unification.

Mr. ANDREWS, from Alabama, who served for 10 or 12 years on the Navy panel.

Mr. RILEY, from South Carolina—a legitimate South Carolina colonel.

Mr. Chairman, there is nobody in this country from the White House down, who is more concerned and more experienced—with deeper feeling and understanding of this defense bill than these men. They do not say their work is sacred; that there is not an element of give and take here—there always is. This is no more sacred and certainly this bill is not any more sacred than the budget itself. Let me remind you, Mr. Chairman, there is no budget for any department or any bureau in this Government for the last 150 years regardless of what administration was in power, no matter who the President is, that this Congress cannot cut and has not cut including the Department of Defense. We were not all in complete agreement, but for the purpose of bringing the bill to the floor we were. I will speak for a few minutes on the Army bill only.

I agree with much of what my friend the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. FORD] has said. I am especially concerned with the cut in the Army bill for research and development. That is what you will hear referred to as R. & D. In my judgment, one of the greatest soldiers, one of the greatest generals who ever served in the uniform of this country, Lt. Gen. Jumping Jim Gavin—and of course he comes from Pennsylvania—is Chief of the Research and Development. I am no long-haired scientist. But, by the way, neither are you. I believe this cut will not destroy the Army; it will not put research and development of the General Staff out of business; blood will not be dropped because of this \$8 million cut; but balancing all of the equities we, who feel closest to the problem are convinced, and we offer you our sincerity and our belief, that that cut should be restored.

Mr. Chairman, at the proper time I shall make an effort by amendment to restore that cut, and the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. FORD] and some of my colleagues are in agreement with my attempt.

You heard one of the most eloquent—and eloquence can be predicated upon its mere simplicity and strength—you heard one of the most eloquent addresses that I ever heard made by the gentleman from Texas [Mr. MAHON]. I was im-

pressed. I am sure you are in the same position. I know that you were impressed. The main argument for the reason for the cuts, and the value of them, he made, and I shall not attempt to gild the lily.

Let me tell you this, that yesterday I had occasion to go to my home State and to make a memorial address at the dedication of a Grant memorial to our guard division, the famous Bloody Bucket of the 28th Division of Pennsylvania. We have battle stars and battle pinions on our standards, and casualty lists from every war and every battle all over the world since the beginning of this Nation from the Revolution to the last one. We feel we have a right to speak. There a ceremony, born from the War Between the States, but now a memorial not just for Yankees, but to all dead of all our wars, and when the division band began to play very softly the old World War I song, "My Buddy," and before these rows of crosses, behind which stood a young girl with a wreath to place as the unit numbers were called, you saw in the best American tradition the belief in this Nation of a strong and inviolate Department of Defense. You must look forward with belief to a plateau of perhaps 10 years when your defense budget will not vary a half billion dollars one way or the other from the one you will pass on Wednesday. If you look forward to the continuance of gigantic cuts of a dozen billion dollars in the Defense Department for the next 10 years, forget about it; it is not going to happen.

And if you look for reduction in taxes hopefully predicated upon that expectancy, abandon it, it will not happen. Knowing the facts, there is nobody in this country who wants it to happen—knowing the facts. Those who do simply do not have the facts.

Let me point out to you that there is nothing even though you have as the motto of your country "In God We Trust"—there is nothing unless you have a private pipeline to the omnipotence which is going to guarantee this civilization and this Nation perpetuity any more than it was guaranteed to Greece, or Rome, Turkey, or other empires of medieval times.

A great historian once said that as a nation approaches its middle age it must remember its early years and be as strong and as brave; and this Nation in our history is approaching that time.

I would like to make one comment at this time outside the Army, a comment on the Air Force. Many of you know that from the beginning of these hearings this year and for the past 2 years I have been making the statement in behalf of the Army that there does not exist and there has not existed for the past 2 years, and I charge it does not exist today, an adequate airlift to transport Army atomic and air divisions to theaters of operation throughout the world. Against that broad indictment that I make you have to the contrary every member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including, believe it or not, the Army. If you are concerned, you politicians, with getting unanimity of action, I refer you to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

There is a classic example of unanimity of action on anything: You scratch my back and I will scratch yours. "Give me atomic carriers," says the Navy, "and you can have your B-52's in the Air Force." I do not know why General Taylor is going along, because I have never been able to find anything that the Army is getting out of the deal.

Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FLOOD. I yield to the gentleman from Oklahoma, of course.

Mr. EDMONDSON. I wanted to state to the gentleman that I share with him completely and wholeheartedly the apprehension he expresses about the absence of facilities to transport large numbers of men through the air in our present defense picture; and the pitiful thing about it is that the public very recently was subjected to a large dose of propaganda to the effect that we were going to build this C-132 and provide this capacity. Then within a matter of days after the public had been deluged with all that publicity it was announced in a very quiet way that they were abandoning this program on the C-132's.

Mr. FLOOD. The gentleman is quite right about the \$150 million mistake by the Air Force. With money running out of their ears, that to them was a mere bagatelle, only \$150 million, to them only a mere parenthesis.

But on this question of the Air Force we had every member of the Joint Chiefs and the top civilians, from Wilson down, at the Pentagon. Now, I want you to know what they said. We have it. I am a lawyer. I am no 4-star general, I am not the Secretary of Defense, but I have been around here a long time. I have talked to people in the Army and the Air Force who do not dare stick their necks out. I would not dream this up. This is no dream. I have been at this thing for years and I have reasonable cause to say what I will say. I say to you, Mr. Chairman, that the reason we could only take 3,000 men into Sicily in our first air junket was because we did not have the aircraft to take any more men of the 82d Division into Sicily. We could only jump with 3,000. The only reason we could not take any more men into Salerno when we jumped into Salerno was because we did not have aircraft to jump more. The only reason we did not take a greater number was because we did not have sufficient aircraft.

I say to you, it is my considered judgment for what little it is worth that if the necessity arose tomorrow to take one Army division to the Far East and tomorrow afternoon one Army division to the Suez or that area—and do not forget the necessity will rise in two theaters at once, for if the enemy hits he is going to hit in the East and he is going to hit in the West on the same day—there does not exist not alone enough aircraft, transport craft, to take one division to the East and one division to the West, but, Mr. Chairman, it is my considered judgment there does not exist sufficient aircraft to take one Army division to one theater of operation inside of 30 days and maintain it and keep it there in a supposedly modern air war.

Mr. SCRIVNER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FLOOD. To the gentleman from Kansas, who knows more about it than I do, I yield.

Mr. SCRIVNER. I do not know that I know more about it but I would point out one statement that can be found starting on page 27, part I of the hearings which shows to my satisfaction that the airlift today is 10 times what it was in World War II and it is adequate for the present military war plan.

Mr. FLOOD. That it is 10 times greater than it was in World War II there is no question. It is probably 100 times greater than it was in the War of 1812. That has nothing to do with the case *tra la*. I am talking about tomorrow afternoon. We do not have the aircraft. You are going to call upon certain civilian components, you are going to call on the commercial airlines to give you their aircraft, you are going to take these pushed up modern jet jobs, but you cannot take any more than an advance echelon with the hardware they carry on their shoulders. You will put them down in a desert with rifles, some antitank weapons and food enough for 5 days. Then I have the word of Admiral Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that he is going to supply these Army divisions only, all over the world for the next 30 days, by sea lift. The Admiral did not say what war. Why, you know the fiasco at Suez when the British and French struck there. They laid an egg because they did not have what was necessary. They did not have the aircraft and their success at Suez was not the result of diplomacy or failure, it was a lousy job. That is what the trouble was.

Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FLOOD. I yield to the gentleman from Oklahoma.

Mr. EDMONDSON. It seems to me ABC economics, if we did have an airlift, or the capacity in the air to transport these troops to danger points at very short notice and within a very short period of time, it would be possible to effect these cuts in the personnel of our services which a lot of people would like to see and still preserve the effectiveness of our striking power at a much more cost than today.

Mr. FLOOD. Now, this is the first time since we have been together in the House that I have disagreed with the distinguished gentleman from Oklahoma. I want to point out to you that it is the current opinion in the latest scientific periodicals that so-called push-button missile warfare is not going to reduce the number of uniformed bodies in the armed services. On the contrary, you will have to have more of them.

Now, let me add this. Do not forget the human element, the man. There is no scientist in the world today who has been able to make a man, and you cannot substitute with bombers and guided missiles manpower. You cannot take the place of a man, with his heart and his soul and his intelligence and his judgment. Do not forget that.

You talk about what is the lead time on bombers. Three years. What is the lead time on IRBM and ICBM or SRM? Three years, 5 years. Let me point out to you, Mr. Chairman, that the lead time on a fighting soldier is 18 to 20 years. That is the lead time it takes to make a man for the infantry or the Air Force. Do not worry about the lead time for making missiles. You have a more important element and a more important problem for which no scientist can make a substitute. This next war, God forbid, is not going to be a pushbutton war where robots are going to take the place of men. No. Always, as I say, you are going to have an Army regardless of bombers or missiles. You must have an Army to go in there and fight and hold, and in any war in the past or any war in the future, the Army is the queen, and they will fight.

Mr. BAILEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FLOOD. I yield to the gentleman from West Virginia.

Mr. BAILEY. Does the gentleman not think that we should give some attention at the present time to the proper training of the men who are going to operate these machines?

Mr. FLOOD. I think you have in the Army of the United States today and the Air Force and the Navy the best-trained and best-uniformed and best-paid and best-fighting men that you have or ever will have in any country. I cannot agree with the gentleman about the training.

Mr. BAILEY. The gentleman does not think it is necessary to train these uniformed personnel adequately to operate these powerful engines of destruction?

Mr. FLOOD. Of course, they must have training, and they will get more. I am not concerned about training. If I was, I would be the first to speak, and you know that. No. Do not worry about that. Whether we can keep them or not after we train them I do not know.

Mr. BAILEY. The answer probably is to build more school buildings.

Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FLOOD. I yield to the gentleman from Oklahoma.

Mr. EDMONDSON. I want to correct an impression the gentleman apparently received that I was supporting drastic cuts in personnel of our Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. I am in agreement with the gentleman that we must sustain those forces and maintain them at a high level. What I was trying to make clear was that the effectiveness of the man in uniform would be multiplied several times if we had the Air Force to transport them to various places where needed.

Mr. FLOOD. The gentleman has been reading my speeches. I agree with you.

Now, I would like to direct my remarks to one phase of the Air Force bill, although it comes under the general heading of defense as well. One of the most controversial phases of our entire Defense Department is the Military Air Transport Service known affectionately as MATS. Now, Secretary Wilson and the other civilian secretaries came to us

in the last 2 or 3 years and they have been sending us vast lists of where they are putting the Government out of competition with private business. Now, everybody on the appropriations subcommittee for defense is in favor of that. We have eliminated popcorn machines and shoeshining machines; we have eliminated beauty parlors; we have eliminated all kinds of paint and other factories. So we are consistent with the best wishes of a businessman's administration for whom our heart bleeds in putting the Government out of competition with business. I am for that. Everybody is for that. And we did it. And yet here, in this Military Air Transport Service—and it is not chickenfeed—you have the United States Government in competition with commercial airlines by at least \$500 million a year.

The commercial airlines are no great friends of mine; because, when I served on the Appropriations Subcommittee for the Department of Commerce, with the gentleman from New York [Mr. ROONEY] we went to bat to cut out their subsidies. So I am not a very popular fellow with them, either. And we succeeded in doing it. They can use their own money. This House did it.

But if you want to take the Government out of competition with business, and you mean it, here is where you can do it, providing, in the course of it, you do not even indirectly endanger the national security or the national defense by interfering with the operations of the Air Force. If you do that, then I am against it. But my information is that you do not, if you exercise merely the rule of reason; that the Air Force should control their aircraft and have as much of it as they need, where they need it, and when they need it. I am for that. But you can have a reasonable difference of opinion as to what constitutes how much and when and where.

We believe that in the best interests of national defense, a greater amount of military traffic, cargo and people, should be contracted for by the Department of Defense with commercial air carriers. Why not? If they cannot carry them, then do not give it to them. If they cannot buy their aircraft and maintain them properly, then do not bother about it. But if they can, if they will buy their own aircraft and maintain them and fly them safely and more cheaply—and for the purpose of emphasis I repeat "more cheaply," much more cheaply than the Air Force—then if those facts are correct, it is difficult for me to understand why these commercial airlines, businessmen in a business administration, great contributors, should not have a reasonable opportunity to engage in that transportation.

Last year this subcommittee, after an exhaustive examination, and again this year with a special investigation and long hearings, 610 pages of hearings on this question, had this to say. And I would like to have the chairman reaffirm the language which was the gist of a 2- or 3-page statement we made last year, because I do not want the Air Force on July 1, if this language is not in the report or in this Record, to pretend that we forgot about it. This is the language

from the Hoover Commission report and it is the language from the committee's and Senate report of last year. I shall read it and I hope that the gentleman from Texas [Mr. MAHON] will agree that again, for the purpose of emphasis if for no other reason, and to protect our flanks, the language be reaffirmed. This is the language:

The Government should to the greatest extent practicable adjust its use of air transportation so as to use existing unutilized capacity of United States air carriers (H. Rept. 2104, 84th Cong., 2d sess., p. 46).

What in the world is the matter with that, and who possibly could object to it? For that reason, because of his sound judgment, I am sure the gentleman from Texas would concur.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FLOOD. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. MAHON. As I understand it, the gentleman from Pennsylvania is suggesting that we agree that our view and our statement in the report of last year for the current fiscal year for the defense budget with references to MATS is still the view and opinion of the committee. I believe the view and opinion of the committee is still as we expressed it in the language we used in the report last year. I wish to assert very strongly that it is my own view that we should favor civilian aircraft as long as we can do so without jeopardizing the necessary military air transportation. I strongly support and reaffirm the language in the report last year in regard to MATS and I have so notified Air Force officials.

Mr. FLOOD. The highest form of compliment I could pay to the gentleman from Texas is to say I could not have said that better myself.

The very distinguished gentleman from Texas [Mr. MAHON], who is the chairman of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee and floor manager of this bill, has clearly expressed the sense of our committee and I know that we all expect the Defense Department to reduce its expenditures on MATS and other Government-owned air transport activities and devote these funds to making far greater use of United States air carriers.

More extensive use by the military of United States air carriers, as is being directed by our committee, will result in considerable net savings to the American taxpayers, as well as a reduction of Government competition with private tax-paying business.

(Mr. FLOOD asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may desire to the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. VINSON], chairman of the Committee on Armed Services.

(Mr. VINSON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. VINSON. Mr. Chairman, we have before the House today a bill authorizing the appropriation of some \$33,541,225,000. According to the report of the Appropriations Committee the budget estimate has been reduced by \$2,586,775,-

000, and the recommended appropriation of \$33,541,225,000 is \$1,157,298,000 below the amount approved for fiscal 1957. Of the \$2,586,775,000 reduction, the report states that the amount of \$1,996,775,000 represents a direct reduction in the defense budget, and \$590 million is a reduction in funds appropriated in prior years, but currently available to the Department for obligation and expenditure under stock and industrial fund operations.

Mr. Chairman, no Member of Congress, no member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, no President or former President, in fact no living person can state with certainty that this bill contains a sufficient amount of money to assure our national survival—nor can anyone state with certainty that it endangers our security.

But I, for one, refuse to allow our national security requirements to be determined by a dollar sign. Our way of life, our standard of living, our freedom, all that we own, all that we hold dear, depends upon our ability to withstand the onslaughts of those who would deprive us of these benefits.

If I thought that our survival depended upon a much greater annual defense expenditure, I would not hesitate to vote that amount of money because I will not allow the dollars to blind me to the inestimable value of freedom.

But, Mr. Chairman, unfortunately there is not one of us in this Congress, or out, who can state with certainty that we are acting wisely or foolishly in our attempt to determine the necessary appropriations for our national defense for the next fiscal year.

Thus, we must depend upon the combined views of many people—the President of the United States, members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Budget, the members of the Appropriations Committee, and finally, but most important of all, the decision of the Members of Congress. Only the years that lie ahead can answer the question as to whether or not this budget is adequate.

The report from the Appropriations Committee emphasizes the fact that the Soviet Union is closing the gap between the United States and Soviet military strength.

According to the report from the Appropriations Committee:

The Russian Army is 3 times the size of our own; the Soviet Navy reportedly has 1,650 active ships as contrasted with 983 in our Navy; the Soviet Union has more than 450 submarines as contrasted with 53 in the German Navy when World War II began; the Soviet Union jet fighter aircraft inventory, is probably greater than our own and the rate of production of fighter aircraft in Russia is greater than our own.

In the field of missiles, according to the Appropriations Committee—

We are in a nip and tuck race with Russia; we are probably behind the Soviet Union in progress made in the perfection of the intermediate range ballistic missile.

And finally, the Appropriations Committee says:

All available information makes it clear that there is no room for complacency among our people in the consideration of our defense program.

Last year the distinguished gentleman from Texas [Mr. MAHON] stated before the House in connection with the Defense Appropriation Act of 1957:

After all the heavy taxes we have borne and all the money we have spent on defense in recent years it must come as a bitter fact to the American people that our military supremacy is being challenged. We have talked, and rightly so, about our military might being a deterrent to war. We have said that we must get stronger and stronger in order to negotiate at the conference table from a position of strength. That has been one of our major premises. If we do not choose our course very carefully we are going to negotiate at the conference table from a position of relatively less strength and the Soviets are going to sit at the conference table and deal from a position of greater and greater strength.

The distinguished gentleman from Texas made many other wise observations during the debate last year. He stated, for example:

We have several choices. We have got to more than match the Soviet Union to keep ahead; or we have got to reconcile ourselves to be on a military parity with the U. S. S. R. or we must allow ourselves to fall behind in military strength.

After reciting the facts in connection with the period of atomic plenty, the distinguished gentlemen from Texas said what is in all of our minds:

It is hard to know what to do in the situation in which we find ourselves. I do not have the answers.

And again, the distinguished gentleman from Texas last year stated:

Indications are that we must continue the high rate of military spending; not only continue it, but perhaps raise it a bit from year to year, as recommended for next year by Secretary of Defense Wilson.

But this year, the gentleman from Texas has taken the position that since we are in a long-range defense program we ought to "fix a figure for defense spending which is within the bounds of reason and stay with it in a general way pending a decisive change in world conditions." And then the gentleman from Texas stated that we ought to set a target of "say \$35 billion per year" and further he says:

Do not tell me that we could not have a reasonable and adequate defense program for approximately \$35 billion a year rather than \$38 billion a year, as presently budgeted.

But the distinguished gentleman from Texas also stated the other day:

We cannot afford to embark upon a course of gradually whittling away of our defense program. We cannot start a trend toward a position of military weakness which would inevitably lead toward a national policy of appeasement, which we know is the road to war. * * * We must become adjusted to an indefinite period of high level defense costs without costly peaks and valleys.

Mr. Chairman, I have the greatest admiration and respect for the distinguished gentleman from Texas [Mr. MAHON], but I cannot reconcile his previous statements, or his statements contained in the debate last Friday, with a price tag national defense program geared to a fixed dollar figure. I do not subscribe to the theory that we can buy for \$35 billion as much as we can get for \$38 billion. I do not subscribe to the

theory that we buy as much for less money—not in an era of rising costs due to increased technical complexities, a higher demand for increased skills, and an ever-upward spiraling increase in the cost of living.

The report from the Committee on Appropriations shows that the Army, for example, requested \$3,549,000,000 for fiscal 1958 to support approximately 1 million personnel. I am advised by the Army that it had \$49 million more than this amount in fiscal 1957 to support approximately the same number of troops. However, the Committee on Appropriations has cut this request for fiscal 1958 funds by an additional \$36 million. This means that the Army will have \$84 million less to maintain approximately the same military strength in fiscal 1958 than they had in fiscal 1957.

I further understand that in addition to the foregoing cuts, the Army will be required to absorb additional sums of approximately \$28 million due to the increase in rates for railroad and sea transportation, as well as increases in the costs of subsistence and clothing. On the basis of these figures, which I am advised are correct figures, the Army will have \$113 million less in fiscal 1958 than it had in fiscal 1957 to maintain its military strength. As a result of these cuts, I am further advised that it will be necessary for the Army to reduce its strength, which would average 997,000 men in fiscal 1958, by approximately 15,000 persons, the equivalent of 1 division.

I then raise the serious question as to whether or not this Congress is justified in the present state of world conditions to reduce the Army by one division?

Mr. Chairman, in the face of information which was available to the Committee on Appropriations; in the face of statements which were made last year and again this year in the face of the forecasts that the appropriations for our defense this year would exceed those that were appropriated last year, I, for one, must at least raise the question as to whether these cuts are justified; and I for one will not support one additional penny reduction in the bill now before this House.

Let none of us be lulled into the complacency the Appropriations Committee warned about. I am confident in my own mind that the reductions that are contained in this bill may have to be made up by supplemental appropriations in the months ahead.

I would be remiss in my duties as a Member of this House if I did not caution the House that in my opinion this is a rockbottom bill as it now stands and it cannot be further reduced without jeopardizing our national security.

Any further reductions will have to be felt in reduced procurement, extended lead time, and reduced research. We can talk until we are blue in the face about duplication, but bear in mind that we have all the same objective in mind—the defense of the Nation. And I, for one, will not subscribe to the theory that interservice rivalry is jeopardizing our national security. Each service is seek-

ing to perfect the weapons necessary to accomplish its assigned mission. So long as those missions remain unchanged, it is not only incumbent upon, but absolutely essential, that each service perfect the weapons that will permit them to gain the weapons supremacy necessary in their field of endeavor.

Many questions have been raised by Members of Congress and others as to why it is necessary for us to maintain a stable force of approximately 2,800,000 men in our Armed Forces for the years ahead, particularly when we are approaching an era of guided missiles and so-called pushbutton warfare.

Mr. Chairman, this nation, whether we like it or not, must be prepared to fight not only an atomic war with all of its horrors, but also a conventional war that likewise is horrible to contemplate, but at least does not threaten world extinction.

Not only must we be ready to fight two types of war, but we must be ready to fight on the land, on the sea, under the sea, in the air, and in the stratosphere. Our main line of resistance does not begin at the end of the 12-mile limit; our main line of resistance is to be found in Germany, Italy, Turkey, Greece, Korea, Formosa, Indo-China, the Philippines, and every place in the world where free governments exist.

Our international commitments require manpower. These commitments are not based upon pure altruism—they are based upon the necessary strategy which will assure our victory if another world war should occur—be it atomic or non-atomic in nature.

The price of freedom is high, but the cost of defeat is beyond description.

Mr. Chairman, I have tremendous respect for the gentleman from Texas [Mr. MAHON], and I realize how difficult and complicated a defense appropriation bill must necessarily be. And while I might differ with the gentleman from Texas in some of his conclusions, nevertheless I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate him upon his masterful presentation of this defense budget. But there is one statement which the gentleman from Texas made that cannot go unchallenged and I refer to that part of his statement of last Friday when he said:

A part of the answer is a greater degree of unification instead of tension and disunity, something approaching a merger.

This statement concerns me greatly.

There is no Member of this Congress more interested in economy than I. All of us would like to see Government expenditures and the national debt reduced, and taxes decreased.

But I sincerely trust that the vast majority of this House will resist all efforts to bring about specious savings through the merger of our armed services, under one chief of staff, all wearing one uniform.

There seems to be a tendency on the part of some to adopt the wishful theory that more centralization of power brings about savings. Nothing could be further from the truth.

In 1947 the Congress approved the National Security Act which created the Office of the Secretary of Defense and

the Department of Defense, but at the same-time created a separate Air Force. I thought then, and I continue to think that that decision was a wise one.

We created a board of directors when we created the Office of the Secretary of Defense, but we also wisely acknowledged the permanent establishment of a separate military organization known as the Air Force because its roles and missions had attained a position in our defense structure which not only required but demanded its separate administration.

Today we have three separate military departments, separately administered, but under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense. But the same law that grants this authority specifically states that our military departments shall not be merged.

We will hear for years to come many well-meaning persons strongly advance the argument that billions in potential savings can be effected through a complete merger of our armed services.

Should we ever be so foolish as to succumb to this illusion we will have jeopardized the security of this Nation to such an extent that our continuation as a free Nation would be extremely doubtful.

We have made great strides in unification as evidenced by the single service procurement system, the recent adoption of the single manager system, and the identification phase of the Federal catalog program. According to a recent report of the Secretary of Defense, a total of 2,750,000 items have been identified, or approximately 90 percent of the more than 3 million separate items estimated to be in the military supply system as of June 30, 1956. Further progress has been made in the identification program based upon the work already accomplished in the catalog program.

According to the report of the Secretary of Defense, since the beginning of the identification program, more than 437,000 items have been eliminated.

In evaluating recent criticism of the Defense Department with respect to the fiscal year 1958 budget and the necessarily large outlays of funds for procurement, critics would have us believe there is extensive duplication of buying by the military services. Here are a few facts which clearly demonstrate the notable extent of unification of the armed services in the procurement and supply fields.

There are two principal management systems used to implement centralized procurement within the Department of Defense—the single-manager program and the single-procurement assignment program.

In the single-manager program the Secretary of one military department is responsible for all Department of Defense supply management functions for a designated class of commodities, or services, from research and development through procurement, stock control, financial management, distribution, issue, and disposal. This system establishes a single wholesale stock of the commodities for all military uses, centrally controlled by the single manager. It eliminates duplicate pipelines and

storage, minimizes cross-handling, and promotes effective utilization of stocks, services, and facilities.

Defense procurement for materiel and supplies is currently running at the rate of about \$15 billion annually. Of this amount, approximately \$2.5 billion or 17 percent represents the portion procured under the single managers. These commodities include petroleum products, subsistence, clothing and textiles and medical material. There is no duplication here.

In the single procurement assignment program one of the military departments, through its normal procurement system, purchases all of a given class of commodities for itself and the other services in accordance with their requirements. This program covers about one-half of all Department of Defense purchases of materiel and supplies. Exceptions are made for local procurement and certain equipment of special design.

Included in the single procurement assignment program is the plant cognizance program. Under this program each aircraft, engine, and propeller plant is under the cognizance of a single service. The cognizant service alone maintains a contract administration staff at the facility and processes orders to the plant for all of the services. Steps are now being taken to place missile plants under the plant cognizance system. Even where plant cognizance has not been assigned to a single service, one service normally performs the inspection and local contract administration functions for all the services buying from the plant.

Still another significant refutation of charges of duplication is found in the Defense Interservice Supply Support Program—a relatively new but vitally important phase of military supply management which assures the interdepartmental utilization of over-all Defense supply assets before new procurement is undertaken, and which prevents the disposal of items for which any requirement exists.

At present there are 18 commodity groups wherein this method of utilization is being effected—covering about half of the total items in the Defense supply system. Plans are being made for the inclusion of another 13 commodity groups which will cover practically all of the balance of the common supply items. This program alone assures that new procurement will be held to a minimum, where materials are already available, and that the greatest possible utilization of the supply stocks held by all the services will be made on an integrated basis to prevent duplication of buying.

Most of the remaining procurement funds not covered by the foregoing coordinated programs are for items peculiar to the individual service, such as naval combatant vessels.

In this connection, it should not be assumed that complete centralization of procurement and storage is the best and only solution in every situation. The problem of centralization versus decentralization of procurement activities is not unique to the Defense Department.

It is also quite common in private industry. In a recent article in *Business Record*, published by the National Industrial Conference Board, an organization devoted to business affairs, the point is made that there has been a gradual drift toward decentralized purchasing in private industry. One conclusion of this article is that—

The purchasing function should be guided by what offers the most effective results, whether it be centralized, decentralized, or a combination of both.

Secretary of Defense Wilson's remarks at his press conference of May 16, 1957, are singularly appropriate in this context:

My former experience, about every 3 years someone would raise the question wouldn't we save money in General Motors if we centralized the thing and did all the buying in one big place, pointing out that the Buick company paid a few cents more a thousand for some nuts or bolts or screws or something, all the common items, and we would look it over again and decide no, that it wasn't the right way to do it, and it was much more efficient and effective, and our big problem was to decentralize the thing and clarify the policy.

Mr. Chairman, there is a basic difference between the unification of our armed services as contemplated by the National Security Act and merger as recommended by those who believe that the savings of dollars possible in merger are far more important than the functions of the separate services.

Mr. Chairman, I do not believe for one moment that the merger of our armed services would save the taxpayers one thin dime. If anything, I am sure that merger might well bring about added costs.

I am convinced, and very thoroughly convinced, that were we to merge our 4 services under 1 head; were we to have 1 single staff system; were we to adopt 1 uniform—we would be creating a military monstrosity that would be an open invitation to disaster.

We hear much about duplication of efforts—I do not question for a moment that there is duplication of effort—but it is a competitive type of duplication that assures this Nation military supremacy in the quality of its weapons.

There has been altogether too much misguided criticism of so-called competition between the Armed Forces, particularly with respect to missile development.

Mr. Chairman, I have followed this missile development matter most closely and I am certain in my own mind that controlled competition, instead of being wasteful, is vitally necessary. We must approach any specific major problem of missile development with boldness and objectivity. We are dealing with a vast realm of unknown factors. We are truly exploring the unknown. I know of no surer way to jeopardize our Nation than to insist that only one line of missile development be followed.

I readily grant that it would be possible, although fatally injurious, to eliminate missile competition between the services. But while we have the power to eliminate interservice competition in

the development of missiles, we would not have the power to eliminate Russian competition for missile superiority.

Therefore our Armed Forces must not be restricted to one arbitrary line of missile development. If we do not have competition—separate but different approaches toward the solution of the missile problems—we will never know if there really was a better line of development in our quest for missile superiority. We would not know if it were possible to develop better missiles until war came and the Russians then might show us that our chosen method was perhaps not the best one.

We must not eliminate wholesome and constructive competition in the Armed Forces. It is the stimulus for great achievement. It is the only reasonable assurance of superiority in this vastly complicated technological world in which we live. Eliminate competition, establish a system that provides for only one line of development in armaments, and you have a oneway ticket to defeat.

Competition is the heart and soul of American industry, and the American people. Why should it be different in the armed services? What is wrong with esprit de corps? What is wrong with a man's having pride in his own unit, or his own branch of the service?

Those who advocate merger do so in the face of history which has proved that a single staff system cannot possibly function under a total war concept, or even a limited war concept, so long as the military movements involve land, sea, and air.

The Prussian single staff system failed Germany twice in this century. Are we to take the lessons of history, stare them straight in the face, and then completely ignore them? Even our industrial giants, such as General Motors and others, have learned that decentralization not only is profitable, but essential to successful operation.

I know of no individual now alive capable of directing all four of the services, either from a staff level or an operational level.

I know of no individual now alive who could completely divorce his own service background to the point where he could view all four services on a purely objective basis.

But beyond that is the fact that our four services exist for the simple reason that there are four separate and distinct missions which are assigned to them. The four services do not exist for the sake of tradition, nor do they exist for the sake of providing billets for generals and admirals. They exist, in my opinion, because of the urgent necessity for maintaining a balanced force, which proved its mettle in World War II, again in Korea, and may well prove its wisdom in the event of another conflict.

Under our present system we do have competition—competition which is healthy and which produces the finest weapons obtainable.

We had the same situation prior to World War II, when the Navy was developing air-cooled aircraft engines and the Army was developing liquid-cooled aircraft engines. Each thought the other

was wrong, but as it turned out there was a need for both in different phases of World War II. However, had we had a single service concept in effect at that time, we might well have ended up with just a liquid-cooled engine and our efforts in the Pacific theater might have become a world tragedy, since liquid-cooled engines could not attain the altitudes necessary to combat the Japanese Zero.

I use this merely as an illustration of the difference between competition and duplication.

The same situation may well be true in the field of guided missiles. Certainly, guided missiles are expensive, but I do not believe anyone can sincerely question the fact that guided missiles and our superiority in this field may well prove to be the one factor which will prevent another war in the years ahead. But even in this field, it is clear to me that there is adequate room for the development of 3 separate systems—1 for the Army, 1 for the Navy, and the other for the Air Force.

What might appear to some to be duplication, in my opinion, actually amounts to competition. But that competition, even in similar missiles, does not necessarily involve a waste of funds, for certainly the nation that has in its possession the most up-to-date and most improved guided missiles will control the destiny of the world.

That there is a certain amount of conflict between the Army and the Air Force with regard to the control of missiles cannot be denied. That there is a certain amount of conflict between the expenditure of funds for aircraft carriers and other types of weapons cannot be denied.

But to me it is not improper for a service to advocate its own weapons system. In fact, it is essential in order that the Congress may choose wisely in appropriating the necessary funds for future developments.

But the very thing suggested, merger, would eliminate entirely this type of advocacy, and would put the average Member in the position of having only one choice—that of believing the testimony of the single service staff, or not believing that testimony.

Should we ever adopt a single service concept in this Nation on the theory that it will save money, not only will we be endangering our own national security but we will certainly be deluding ourselves with respect to savings.

I am firmly of the opinion that no military command system has ever been devised that is equivalent to our present Joint Chiefs of Staff system. Through this system we receive the benefit of the combined views of four persons, each an expert in his own particular field. But in other areas of the world, we operate joint commands and do so very successfully. Thus, the decisions which are arrived at through a combination of sound minds, arriving at sound conclusions, make it possible for joint commands in other theaters of operation to function well.

But when the day arrives that we have a super staff, or a single staff, or a single

uniform, or a merger of the 4 services, we will have destroyed not only the morale of the armed services, not only the wisdom of the joint staff made up of representatives from all 4 services, but we will also be placing our dependence upon an assumption that 4 separate missions, involving the technicalities, the complexities, and the skills of these 4 services, can be merged into 1 at a time when it is even difficult for each of the separate services to maintain the skills necessary in their particular fields.

I trust that our Nation will never make the fatal error of merging our Armed Forces, or of even adopting something approaching merger.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. CANNON], chairman of the Committee on Appropriations and ex officio a member of all the subcommittees.

Mr. CANNON. Mr. Chairman, when we look back through the years, events stand out in sharper perspective and clearer light than at the time. But all the attrition of the years cannot change the basic facts.

With the possible exception of Waterloo, no battle has been more carefully reviewed and analyzed than Gettysburg. It is a part of the formal course of study at every national military academy in the world, the topography, the terrain, the personnel, the strategy, and the effect.

When you consider the strategy of the two commanders the conclusion is inescapable that there could not possibly have been any preliminary plans of battle, there could not have been any preconceived strategy. Neither commander had expected to fight at Gettysburg. Lee assumed he had the State of Pennsylvania largely to himself and had ample time in which to concentrate his forces for a selected field. Mead, with his troops strung out along miles of difficult road, had not expected to intercept Lee here. His first hastily occupied line of defense proved untenable and in the first day's fighting he was driven back to what proved to be a better position.

Lee, wholly unfamiliar with the territory, saw only the skyline. He sent Stuart's cavalry, the eyes of the army, forward to reconnoiter but taken unaware Stuart was outgeneraled and isolated and could not get a courier back. Lee had no knowledge of the number or composition of the troops in front of him or what lay behind.

But he did know the temper of his own men. He had tested them on every battlefield of the war. He knew that in the third of the war, outnumbered and out-equipped he had defeated every army the North could send against him. He did not know that in the remaining years of the war his campaigns in defense of Richmond were to be acclaimed by the most eminent military authorities as unsurpassed in the annals of warfare.

If he could break the line he could destroy the enemy piecemeal as he had destroyed them so many times before, and the way was open to Baltimore and Washington and to recognition of the

Confederacy by European nations—and final victory.

Mr. YOUNGER. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The CHAIRMAN (after counting). Sixty Members are present; not a quorum.

The Clerk will call the roll.

The Clerk called the roll, and the following Members failed to answer to their names:

[Roll No: 88]

Albert	Garmatz	Miller, Md.
Andresen,	Granahan	Miller, Nebr.
August H.	Grant	Moore
Barden	Green, Oreg.	Morgan
Barrett	Green, Pa.	Murray
Baumbart	Griffin	Osmers
Beamer	Gubser	Patterson
Blatnik	Hardy	Perkins
Biltch	Healey	Pillion
Bowler	Hemphill	Powell
Breeding	Hoeven	Prouty
Buckley	Holtzman	Rabaut
Burdick	James	Rains
Byrd	Jenkins	Reece, Tenn.
Byrne, Pa.	Jennings	Santangelo
Chelf	Jonas	Shelley
Chudoff	Kearney	Siler
Cooley	Kee	Spence
Dawson, Ill.	Kelley, Pa.	Taylor
Dellay	Kilburn	Teller
Diggs	Kitchin	Thornberry
Dollinger	Kluczynski	Van Peit
Dorn, S. C.	McConnell	Watts
Eberharter	McGregor	Wilson, Ind.
Fallon	McMillan	Wolverton
Fino	Machrowicz	Zelenko
Flood	Mailliard	
Fogarty	Mason	

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. KEOGH, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee having had under consideration the bill H. R. 7665, and finding itself without a quorum, he had directed the roll to be called, when 348 Members responded to their names, a quorum, and he submitted herewith the names of the absentees to be spread upon the Journal.

The Committee resumed its sitting.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. CANNON].

Mr. CANNON. Oh, Mr. Chairman, at this late date, 90 years afterward, with the battlefield spread out before you, it is easy to criticize but we are inclined to wonder if under similar circumstances the commanders of today would not have reached the same decision.

I am convinced—with perhaps a much biased point of view, of course, that if Lee had known what we know today he would have been invincible. He could not have lost. Perhaps a divine providence obscured the light. "The race is not always to the swift nor the battle to the strong but time and chance happeneth to us all."

I had an uncle at Gettysburg. He was a graduate of the University of Virginia and served 4 years under Lee. His widow, my aunt, lived to be a hundred years old. As a boy I heard her tell over and over again the tragic story of Gettysburg. When I came to Washington she came to visit me. I took her to Gettysburg, and from the crest of Cemetery Ridge with this venerable and beloved lady looked down the long slope

across which Lee launched the last lightning charge of the Confederacy.

Standing there beside the High Tide Monument, where fell the gallant Captain Armistead, of North Carolina, as leading his men with his cap on the point of his sword, he came across the stone wall to die there with the shattered remnants of the brigade that followed him, I said to her, gently, "I am a southerner, and had I lived in those stirring times and had my way, I would have marched with Lee, and had it been possible I would have come across that field with Pickett." Then, with my arm around her, I drew her closely to me, "But today I thank Almighty God that Pickett failed and the mighty Government of the United States still lives to bless mankind." I am afraid she never fully forgave me.

But times change and the minds of men react to changing issues and circumstances. In many Congresses following the war, and notably in the 53d Congress, which convened in this hall in 1893, there was not a single Member who had not served in either the Union Army or the Confederate Army. Had this question been considered then it would have occasioned some controversy. They are gone. The issues which stirred them are gone. And mercifully we let the dead past bury its dead.

But we have here today in the bill before us the same problems in another form. Perhaps it is even more serious in its possibilities because defeat in the war for which we are preparing in this bill means not merely the loss of a war, but extermination, the extinction of our people, our form of government, our civilization, and our way of life, without a trace and forever.

And yet I noted in the debate last week and today everyone has spoken of defense as if it involved only military defense. My friends, it involves vastly more than that. Wars are won not only with arms and military munitions but with money. And the United States Treasury is as important a part of national defense as the armed services.

We should write this bill with that in view. Russia has boasted since the last war that they would prod us into bankruptcy and take us without firing a shot—as they took most of their satellites. There is too much money in this bill. And some of it is for the wrong purposes. We can be defeated economically as decisively as we can be defeated militarily.

Let us look at it from a sensible light and from a practical point of view. You do not have to be a graduate of West Point or Annapolis to see it at a glance. It is so plain that he who runs may read.

The one thing that stands out like Mars at perihelion—like the headlight on a locomotive on a moonless midnight—is that if there is a war there will be no time for the Army and Navy to nibble around the edges.

The imminence of war is receding. There is less and less likelihood of a world war. We do not want a war and we will not start one. Russia does not

want a war and Russia will not start one. So we can discount by a large percent any chance of our having to use the war material we are providing in this bill. But we cannot take a chance. We must be prepared. So we are passing this bill.

If war should come, time would be of the essence. It would be necessary—immediately—to strike at the heart of Russia—at the spider in the center of the web. We would have to destroy Moscow and the Kremlin and the centers of production in Siberia and wherever they happen to be. It would be a race whether we would destroy Moscow first or whether they would bomb Washington and Detroit and Pittsburgh first.

When our radar stations reported Russian bombers on the way where would we turn for protection?

Could the Army protect us? Could the Army defend Washington and Cleveland and San Francisco? Of course not. The Army is no longer of any use in time of war except in occupying territory taken from the air and in enforcing martial law. We will never again send an expeditionary force to Europe, until after the Air Force has cleared the way. We could not possibly land an army in any European port. The Russian Army can sweep to the channel as fast as its soldiers can march. Our only army problem in event of war would be how to get our token forces out of Europe and even that would be doubtful. We ought to cut at least one Army division out of this bill—if not more. We have no use for them. Send the men home to engage in productive employment.

If war should come could the Navy protect us? Ridiculous. Enemy bombers would fly right over them. With the exception of our submarines the Navy would cease to exist in a matter of hours. And yet this bill carries \$314 million for a carrier. A carrier is the most expensive machine the world ever saw. It consumes more skilled labor, more strategic material, more money than any human contrivance the sun ever shown upon. And yet in war it would be worse than useless. It will require a flotilla of auxiliaries, tenders, destroyers, tankers and other shipping covering the sea over an area as large as Delaware and Rhode Island combined. But a single bomb—dropped from a plane flying too high and too fast to be seen or heard will cover hundreds of square miles with destruction. Or a single submarine remaining under, if need be, half way around the globe can wipe out all this vast armament and the millions of dollars it cost in the twinkling of an eye.

Listen. They propose to power this carrier with atomic energy. As the chairman told you they have not a very definite idea of just how it will be done—but they will not wait for that. They will spend the money now. And when completed, however successful, it will have a speed of 40 miles per hour. Think of it. Forty miles per hour in this age of supersonic speeds. The commander of the Air Force tells us he can sink it in 2 hours or less. And you know Russia could sink it any hour of the

day or night. They talk about a mobile base and eluding the enemy. Any one knows that the Russians would know where that carrier was from the day it was launched. Attempts to hide a target of that size would be absurd. But it is in this bill at \$314 million and with its armament and complement and protecting convoy it would run up above a billion dollars by the time it was in commission. Let us exercise just a modicum of commonsense.

The next world war will be decided in a matter of hours. There will be a period of mopping up and taking over but the war will be decisively fought in one afternoon or less. That was conclusively demonstrated in the "brush" operation last year, when over half a dozen Southern States with forces evenly divided and an impartial referee, the war was over in 40 minutes and the United States, the defenders, lost. There is no particular reason why Russia would not duplicate the performance in actual warfare unless we have an air force to stop her. Certainly neither the Army nor the Navy could stop them if the Air Force failed.

A recent United States intelligence report estimates that 88 percent of Russia's long-range bombers are based above the Arctic Circle. Only 12 percent are down in the European area. What does that mean?

When they come over the pole what can the Army do? What can the Navy do? How can we save our cities and the 92 million of our people it is estimated they would kill in one afternoon. Just how far will this bill protect us.

Mr. Chairman, we hold hearings covering weeks and months. And still fail to adduce all the facts. Added to that is the tendency to minimize pertinent facts. Here is an example. Here is one of the many weekly information letters published in Washington. Most of you subscribe to them and are familiar with them. They tell you what has happened—what is happening—and what will happen. And sometimes they are surprisingly accurate. This one happens to be one of the Kiplinger letters. It came in with this morning's mail under date of May 25, 1957. I will read the postscript:

Our letters are read in many military posts in the United States and abroad.

Recently we carried a number of reports on waste in the military service which led to the barring of the letters from the officers mess at a naval base.

It illustrates a military attitude that young officers should not be told of the waste and extravagance of higher ups.

As if they did not already know.

Also that their personal reading matter ought to be censored for them.

Mr. Chairman, some may be misled. But in writing this bill, let us not be misled. There are millions in this bill that ought to be applied to the public debt, or to tax reduction—or to real defense that will protect us when, with uplifted hands, we are "calling for the mountains to fall upon us."

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 25 minutes to the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. RILEY].

Mr. RILEY. Mr. Chairman, I like to agree with my distinguished chairman,

one of the most valuable Members in this House and one of its ablest men, my good friend, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. CANNON], but I must in some respects take issue with him in regard to this great defense team, which we need to protect this country until such time as men's minds and men's hearts are reconciled to the abolishment of war.

I like to think of our Armed Forces as a unit. I know, as you do, that we lack the full realization of that objective. However, I am firmly and sincerely convinced that there is a definite mission for each of the armed services now in being and any disparagement and depreciation of any one of these services not only tends to weaken the service attacked, but weakens the entire defense team. I believe that it is absolutely necessary to have strong Army, Navy, and Air Force units of one coordinated defense team. Because of my assignment on the Army subcommittee I would like to refresh your minds on certain features of one of these units of our defense.

I hope that what I have to say will not in any way be construed as reflecting on either of the other teams in this defense unit. Certainly I believe that each has a necessary and vital mission.

Each year under the influence of the huge military budget we are tempted to hope and to look for some easy and inexpensive out—for some short cut to military power. There is always talk about some new weapon or some push-button innovation which renders unnecessary all of the traditional paraphernalia of war which we have supported for many years. This hope has always proved to be more or less of a mirage, but a hope which harbors grave danger, in my opinion, to our security. There is no easy or safe way to fight a war and, in my opinion, there never will be. War will always be destructive, filled with sweat and tears, blood and tragedy. New and modern weapons serve our soldiers, our airmen, and our sailors, but do not replace them. In fact weapons, no matter how efficient or how marvelous, are absolutely worthless without men to handle them. The ultimate weapon in war, then, as in all other human endeavors and activities, is man.

We must evaluate our defense establishment against the background of actual existing conditions. Both the United States and the Soviet Union will soon have, if they do not now have, the ability to devastate each other's home land with thermonuclear weapons. As the full import of this fact registers throughout the world, and the strategists of both East and West ponder over its implications, it seems to me that a great general thermonuclear war becomes less and less likely as a deliberate act. Certainly, we must maintain, always, our ability to strike back, instantly and massively, with long-range bombers, and in the not too distant future with long-range missiles, so that any possessor of thermonuclear megaton destructive capability will hesitate to use that capability except as a retaliatory measure. Therefore, it seems to me that these weapons of massive retaliation will be effective only so long as they are not

used. Important as they are, such weapons are essentially weapons of hopelessness to be used as a last resort and as a final act of desperation when all other measures have failed. Do not misunderstand me—I reiterate, we must have these weapons, but we must recognize, also, that they are essentially negative in character. I, for one, would like to see more attention paid to weapons that can be used under all conditions, whether in a small engagement, or in a larger conflict.

Notwithstanding the fact that the communist powers will, I believe hesitate to use their nuclear potential, I do not believe that they have given up their aggressive, and possessive designs. I fully expect that the Soviet Union, and its satellites, will continue to look for soft spots around the edges of the free world; any weakness that they find will be swiftly and cleverly explored.

Thus, if we develop only weapons of megaton impact, the use of which we will not initiate, we will find ourselves faced, in each succeeding crisis, with the horrible choice of inviting thermonuclear disaster or being forced into disgraceful appeasement. Unless we maintain strong, strategically mobile Army Forces we will not be able, in my opinion, to successfully aid our Allies of the free world, or to adequately defend ourselves.

In the issue of Life magazine of May 6 this year, Mr. Thomas E. Murray, an able and successful engineer, and one of the five members of the Atomic Energy Commission, strongly advocates the use of smaller nuclear weapons. Only the Army and the Marines are organized to use such tactical weapons. Only the Army and the Marines offer protection in limited land engagements.

How can this Nation hope to exert its influence in the world at large unless it has Army forces that can respond, if necessary, to a Korea or to an Indochina or to a Suez? How except with Army strength can we help our friends and Allies without destroying them in the process, should they be invaded? History teaches us that wars are fought for the ultimate purpose of controlling land areas and the people who inhabit those lands. Only the Army and the Marines can occupy and hold land areas.

The Army we have is performing that role now. Army forces in Europe and Asia are a visible and constant reminder to the Communists that aggression will be resisted by the armed might of the United States and its associates. Let us not overlook the fact that since World War II there have been 14 acts of aggression but not one of these has been launched within the range of United States Army guns.

In Europe the United States Seventh Army, with its atomic punch, is the keystone of NATO defenses. The atomic capability of this Army is of a tactical nature and its weapons are designed for maximum results against an enemy army without utterly and finally destroying everything in a vast area. This army also has conventional weapons. The influence of this Seventh Army may be fully appreciated only by considering, for a moment, what would be the situation in

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Europe if they were withdrawn. This same test may be applied to the value of the United States Army Corps deployed south of the demilitarized zone in Korea. In addition to these two armies we have forces in 7 other foreign countries—making 9 in all.

Furthermore the United States Army military assistance advisory groups are located in 35 other nations making a total of 44 foreign countries in which our military missions and advisory groups are assisting the free countries in deterring aggression and promoting peace. One of the most satisfying Army missions has been the result of the Army's work in Vietnam. This valiant country, whose leaders spoke to us a few days ago in this hall, has achieved internal stability and respected strength in a very few years by its determination and resourcefulness, assisted and encouraged by the United States Army mission in Saigon.

The question may well be asked whether the Army can survive in an era of atomic weapons and missiles. I am convinced that it can. To meet such a contingency the Army is already in the process of reorganization. The combat elements of the Army—the infantry, airborne, and armored divisions—are being streamlined and reoriented toward the requirements of the atomic battlefield. The new so-called pentomic divisions are smaller, more mobile, and possess more firepower than their predecessors.

The equipment of the new airborne divisions has been either lightened or eliminated so that it too can be carried by air. The battle groups of the new infantry divisions are all completely air transportable and, like the airborne divisions, they can be moved quickly anywhere in the world. These new divisions with less total manpower than before have more fighting men and less men supporting them than their older counterparts. The new divisions have been given their own atomic punch and these atomic weapons together with the improvement of conventional weapons give our Army units their greatest firepower in history.

The new organizations depend on larger numbers of Army aircraft to give them an edge in mobility over any forces that they might some day oppose. Consequently the Army is developing an air arm of small fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, such as can be used in either a short takeoff or a vertical takeoff. This so-called air arm of the Army in no way conflicts with the Air Force.

The increasing complexities of weapons in our defense forces demands that no talent go to waste and the Army is keenly aware of this. I am satisfied that the Army now is making excellent use of the talents and abilities of the young men and women who enter its service. American parents may rest assured that their sons and daughters upon entering the service are carefully evaluated and assigned to those jobs for which they are best fitted. Especially is this so in utilizing those with scientific and professional experience. The Army is not soft, and neither is it perfect, but it has vastly improved its assignments and its training in the past few years.

Army leadership in ballistic missile development has been recognized for some time. Dr. Von Braun and his colleagues of the Army Ballistics Missile Agency at Red Stone Arsenal in Alabama are recognized as the foremost missile development team in the United States. These scientists have been working for the Army since 1947 when at the end of World War II we had the foresight to bring them into this country and reserve their talents for the benefit of this Nation. The arsenal of Army missiles which has grown out of this effort is impressive. The Honest John and the Corporal are already in the hands of our troops overseas. Others to follow in quick succession are Little John, La-Crosse and Red Stone. I am convinced that the Army Jupiter, the intermediate range ballistic missile, is the most successful development thus far of this type.

Of the many contributions of the United States Army, the most obvious, and the one closest home, is the defense of the cities and industries of our Nation against air attack by the use of Army surface-to-air Nike missiles. All the arguments about antiaircraft missiles are overshadowed by the fact that the Nike is the only fully developed land-based surface-to-air missile in business today. Nike installations are in place now in many localities including the area around Washington.

In time improved versions of these missiles will replace the fighter interceptor for the close-in defense of our vital areas. In the very near future the Army will bring the Nike Hercules in the Army Air Defense Command and it will ultimately replace the present Nike-Ajax. The Nike Hercules has a greater range and more destructive power than the Ajax, so it will afford an efficient defense against the more modern planes. The Army Air Defense Command is a strong deterrent to any would be aggressor.

The Army, like the other Services, has its problems with rising costs. The new and complicated modern equipment is very expensive. For example the cost of equipping a Nike Battalion is 2½ times as much as that of a 90 mm gun battalion which it replaces. Also the record shows that materiel costs are up some 7 percent above fiscal 1956 costs. It takes careful planning and management to keep the operational and procurement costs at realistic figures. The Army has improved its management remarkably during the past several years.

There has been considerable criticism of waste in the Armed Services over a period of years, but I submit that we should give commendation to the Army for the effort it is making to put its house in order, and give the American public an adequate defense machine at the lowest possible cost. Schools have been established to train officers in the most efficient management and to develop the most practicable and highly efficient procurement practices. Even Procedures for making small purchases, which compose the largest part of the procurement effort, now closely parallel in efficiency the practices used in business and industry.

Management in the defense forces cannot, in my opinion, be developed to the efficiency obtained in private industry, because industries are able to retain its efficient executives and workers while the officers and men of the Army are undergoing constant transfer and reassignment in order that they may have the broadest possible experience in all phases of military activity. I do believe, however, that waste in the Army is being minimized and duplication is being eliminated.

Because of its experience and organization the Army, under the single management system initiated last year, has been designated manager for subsistence, clothing and textiles, and traffic management within the United States for all defense forces. In other words, the initial procurement of food and clothing, and the transportation of goods and men in the Zone of the Interior is an Army responsibility.

I return now to my original premise that this country, in order to be properly protected, must have a balanced team of defense forces. One of the abilities that made America great has been that ability to reconcile differences, and to cooperate with each other for the best interests of all concerned. I believe that this must be our objective as regards the several elements of our Armed Forces. In his novel the Three Musketeers Dumas has his 3 heroes pledging each other "all for one and one for all."

I believe this would be a fitting motto for our airmen, our soldiers, our sailors and our marines.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. WIGGLESWORTH. Mr. Chairman, I yield 20 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. OSTERTAG].

Mr. OSTERTAG. Mr. Chairman, before commenting on the bill which is before us, I wish to pay tribute to the chairman of our subcommittee, the Honorable GEORGE H. MAHON, of Texas. There are few civilians in our country who have as profound knowledge of our defense program as Congressman MAHON. His searching, diligent study, and analysis of the budget now before us, represents years of acquaintance with defense problems, plus a broad and balanced view of their relations to our security and economy. It has been a pleasure and an honor to work with him and under his leadership.

Now, I should also like to pay tribute to the ranking minority member of the committee, the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. WIGGLESWORTH]. It has been my pleasure to work with him not only on the full Subcommittee on Appropriations for Defense, but also on the Navy panel. The members of this subcommittee, 13 in all, are devoted men and unusually equipped to deal with this tremendous task of considering some \$30 or more billions each year. It has been quite an experience to be associated with him in this task.

I should like also to pay tribute to the chairman of the Navy panel, the gentleman from California [Mr. SHEPPARD]. He has presided over the Navy subcommittee panel discussions and deliberations

and he has always been fair, conscientious, and diligent in his undertaking.

During the past 4 months, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Appropriations Committee, has spent hundreds of hours and has taken thousands of pages of testimony on the defense budget. A military establishment—any military establishment—is a giant, with an insatiable appetite. No military establishment in history ever got all it wanted, or all it thought was necessary to fulfill its missions. Ours is no different. Our Defense officials are to be commended for it. If they were willing to think in terms of half-measures, they would have no business being in the Defense Department and our armed services. On the other hand, it is our responsibility to weigh their requests within the broad framework of our national welfare. The reason our Constitution provides for civilian control over the military is to insure that the military shall be subject to checks and balances like the rest of our Government.

The President has wisely noted, that our freedom depends, in equal measure, on spiritual, economic, and military strength, and the impairment of any one of them can be fatal to the whole. There is no one on earth who can say to you with certainty that X billions of dollars will secure the safety of our country while Y billions will imperil it.

In the consideration of this budget we must give thought to inflation, which is steadily eroding the buying power of our dollar. For a time, a few years ago, the deadly virus of inflation was checked, and the dollar remained virtually stable. Then our national budget began to rise again, and inflation resumed its devastating march across our land. Defense spending is the biggest item in our national budget. Just last week we have had two solemn warnings from two joint congressional committees that Federal spending is going to outrun the original estimates, that inflation is the chief villain of the piece, and that hope of tax relief must be abandoned. This is sobering news to the American people, who are carrying the heaviest tax load in the world and the heaviest tax load in history.

We need to remind ourselves that the only way to curb inflation is through restraint and discipline. Trying to outspend it is like trying to put out a fire with gasoline. It is a sure road to disaster.

On the other hand, we must not let down our guard and we must not take second place to any power on earth. It would seem reasonable and wise to hold costs down, particularly expenditures which will in no way reduce our total military strength and national security.

Now, if I may just take a moment to review some of the general figures with regard to this bill, calling your attention once again, as has been mentioned before, the total budget request before us as presented by the administration, amounted to \$36,128,000,000.

This bill amounts to \$33,541,255,000, a reduction of \$2,586,775,000.

There is an unexpended carryover of \$32,803,000,000. After this bill has been

passed and the money is appropriated there will be available for expenditure some \$66.3 billion.

I might call your attention to the fact that estimates for spending during this next fiscal year are not the amount of money that is in this bill, but estimated for expenditure is the total sum of \$35,704,000,000.

I think, too, it is important to note, and very little has been said about it, the increased cost to our Military Establishment resulting from economic factors as a result of developments that have taken place over the years: For example, a number of years ago a conventional submarine cost about \$4,700,000; today a nuclear-powered submarine costs in the neighborhood of \$60 million.

Back in the World War II years a B-29 bomber cost \$600,000. Moving along to Korean times a B-36 cost \$4 million; and today our B-52 bombers cost \$8,500,000 each.

I might also call your attention to the fact that this bill includes within it over \$300 million to provide the funds necessary to meet the retirement contribution on the part of the Government. It also includes increased pay and allowances which were provided for by law by the Congress of the United States. It also calls for increased provisions for the so-called dependents medical care which was made law about a year ago and which we provided allowances or benefits for dependents as well as our military people in the matter of medical care. All of these services and all of these costs have added to the total overall costs necessary to meet our responsibilities in this atomic age.

Now, I think you ought to know, too, that \$190 million of this reduction is based on the transfer of excessive funds in the Navy and Marine Corps stock funds and in the naval industrial fund to the appropriation for military personnel, Navy. That is part of the changes or the items referred to heretofore as bookkeeping transactions.

The funds recommended by the committee will provide an average year's strength of 675,000 military personnel in the Navy. Others on the committee, the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. SCRIVNER] and the gentleman from Texas [Mr. MAHON], and other Members, have made reference to the fact that this bill does in no wise reduce or change our military personnel as such.

The shipbuilding program is the heart and soul of the Navy. Funds in the bill will provide for the construction of the first nuclear-propelled attack aircraft carrier. Five guided missile destroyers are included. Heavier and harder hitting than these destroyers are the guided missile frigates, of which there are 8 in this program. In these ships the full main battery is the guided missiles. Like the guided missile destroyers they will have the latest in the antisubmarine warfare weapons system. I think it might be well for me to call your attention, if it has not already been said, to the fact it is common knowledge that the Soviet Union has had a tremendous buildup of submarines. I believe the number ranges over the 400 mark.

We are continuing to put powerful emphasis on submarines. There are three nuclear-propelled guided missile submarines in this program. These submarines have the tremendous advantage of high sustained submerged speed, great maneuverability and endurance, limited only by the staying power of those who man them. They will make a major contribution to the undersea warfare capabilities of our Navy.

It has been mentioned that the fourth nuclear-propelled submarine is contained in this year's shipbuilding program.

Included in the conversion program are three guided-missile cruisers, an attack aircraft carrier, and four ocean-radar picket ships.

The heart of the striking power of the Navy continues to be the attack carrier. May I state, too, that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy, and others, have reminded us constantly that the role and mission of the Navy is control of the seas. When you stop to realize the developments and changes that have taken place, you will find with the Navy, despite the fact its mission is the control of the seas, its principal operation is airpower.

This bill will provide for the procurement of approximately 1,220 aircraft which, when coupled with prior procurement, will provide for approximately 2,100 new aircraft deliveries to the Navy and Marine Corps during this next fiscal year. I believe the record shows that the Navy's inventory today is somewhere in the neighborhood of 17,000 aircraft. The percentage of modernity and combat potential of the Navy air arm will increase during the fiscal year 1958, with the receipt of more modern aircraft. Additional Navy and Marine air squadrons will have more guided-missile capabilities. In other words, this already powerful, strong arm of the Navy will be greatly reinforced by the program contained in this bill.

The Marine Corps has developed its new vertical assault technique. The amphibious assault ship funded in the fiscal year 1958 program is the heart of this future amphibious operation. The Marine Corps will continue to be maintained at the level of 3 combat divisions and 3 Marine air wings with the necessary supporting troops. The strength of the Marine Corps will be maintained at the level of 200,000 personnel.

It has been my personal privilege to serve as a member of the Board of Visitors of the Naval Academy where one of the major problems has been the lack of maintenance to their official plant. This bill makes provision for increased maintenance support at the Academy to assure that it continues to fulfill its vital purpose.

In the field of procurement of ordnance and ammunition the committee has recommended a total of \$176 million, a reduction of \$80 million in the budget estimate. According to the data presented to the committee in the detailed hearings unobligated balances will be available in this account considerably in excess of the amount shown in the budget estimates. As a matter of fact,

\$81 million of the funds appropriated for this item in fiscal year 1957 have not even been apportioned to the Department of the Navy. These balances represent to a large degree the basis for the committee reduction. The program approved by the committee in this field for fiscal year 1958 will provide for major steps forward in equipping the fleet with modern weapons, including guided missiles and weapons systems especially designed for antisubmarine warfare.

The matter of aviation spare parts and the aviation supply system has been of particular interest to me. The spare parts problem as it relates to aircraft procurement is a complex one. Modern aircraft, with their many and varied components, make the accurate prediction of the requirements for spare parts most difficult.

This subject has been discussed by other members of the committee, particularly with reference to the Air Force, but it is still a problem in the services generally. Frequently, in the provisioning of new planes, there is little or no usage data upon which to base the spare parts requirements. In recent years, the Navy has taken firm steps to solve this problem. I believe, however, that much more remains to be done, and that continued careful and diligent analysis of this problem will result in considerable savings to the Government in the future as well as in increased operational effectiveness and efficiency in the Navy. The committee report has aptly stated:

It will be expected that the present method used on initial provisioning and in subsequent replenishment will be thoroughly reviewed and procurement (of spares and spare parts) held to the minimum consistent with the operational needs of the Navy.

An almost equally difficult problem is the matter of the aviation supply system. The complexities which plague the provisioning of spare parts are accentuated in the difficulties in operation of the aviation supply system. The aircraft in the fleet and the effectiveness of the naval air arm are responsive in a large degree to the effectiveness of the aviation supply system. Unless these planes can be supplied in the proper manner, the fleet will automatically be denied their operational capabilities. The presentation of this problem to the committee showed that progress is being made in improving the effectiveness of this supply program.

Mr. Chairman, in short, the recommended funds for the Navy, as for the other services, will, in my judgment, add great new strength to our already powerful Defense Establishment.

I have reservation on certain cuts which have been recommended, and that is in connection with the reduction of funds for all-weather fighter planes, missiles, and spare parts for aircraft. In connection with the overall missile development, there are, in fact, 26 different kinds of missiles now being developed by the 3 services, 9 of which are currently operational. Concurrent efforts in this field were originally encouraged in the Defense Department as a means of achieving operational weapons in this field at the earliest possible moment. Yet I am not entirely satis-

fied that the shift in objectives justified a reduction in this particular budget item and seriously question our action in that regard.

Despite the general acceptance that the threat of war has lessened, we must not in any way let down our guard. Our committee has, in a sense, presented a budget to you which carries with it a statement or a declaration that we have in no way reduced our missile program or prevented the production or procurement of missiles and of important bombers or other airplanes and aircraft.

I hope that we can fulfill that pledge and that promise, because we must continue to maintain a strong, modern Military Establishment. Costs will continue to rise because of these new developments in the missile field and the atomic carriers and superjets. They all mean more and more dollars.

As Admiral Radford said to our committee, as shown at page 4 of our report:

I feel that we have a Military Establishment today which is responsive to almost any situation that can be foreseen, and within a reasonable period of time we can take care of anything. And we are respected. Our power is respected.

Secretary Wilson said:

With the situation the world is in today, * * * another world war would inevitably be an atomic war, and that the big thing is to avoid any such catastrophe.

I feel, Mr. Chairman, that our best insurance of preventing an atomic war is to meet our responsibility of the best possible national security through modern development in this atomic age.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. KILDAY].

(Mr. KILDAY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. KILDAY. Mr. Chairman, I know of nothing in the present world situation which would justify any reduction in our National Defense Establishment. On the other hand, I know of nothing that would cause me to believe that our present National Defense Establishment is operated with 100 percent efficiency and economy. I feel that we can with complete safety to our country maintain our present defense forces and do so under the amount of money that has been recommended by the Committee on Appropriations. It is, therefore, my purpose when we come to reading the bill to vote to sustain the action of the Committee on Appropriations in reporting this bill to us.

I feel that the budget of the Department of Defense is the same as any other budget except that it is larger. I think it is even the same as a family budget and that like any other budget it can find ways and means of taking care of sudden emergencies or effecting some economies. I think the family man who is making perhaps \$600 a month who finds himself suddenly confronted by a doctor's or dentist's bill of \$42, which would be 7 percent of his income, just as this Congress' cut is 7 percent, will find ways and means of paying that \$42 by cutting down on some of the luxuries he had anticipated. I think every one of us

on the floor, every Member of this House, had had many, many occasions of doing the same thing, and I think our military forces can do that also.

I feel that there does exist some luxury, some activities that can be lessened and this amount of money saved. I have stated that I shall support the committee's action in applying these cuts. The committee has studied the budget of the Defense Department and has decided that in the areas it has applied the cuts it can be done with safety, and I shall support that action.

If it had been my decision and if I had the right to say the manner in which it would have been done, I would not have done it exactly as the committee has done. I feel that all that needs to be taken out of the request of the Department is an amount of savings. I do not know where those savings ought to be made specifically. I know many areas in which I know savings can be effected, but the departments should know or they can find out where those savings could be made.

I would have provided in the bill after appropriating the amount of money requested that the Secretary of each military department was required to effect savings to a stated amount within his own department, and in that manner we would have been able to save in the lowest priority of military necessity. Each department knows which item of expenditure is absolutely essential and of the highest priority. By following that system they would have been in a position to eliminate those things which they needed the least or those things which they could have postponed. I have no doubt that the departments when you ask them how they would apply a cut that might affect personnel would come up with a statement of 15,000 men, and that constitutes a division. On the other hand, I am not positive by a great deal that there are not 15,000 men in the Army who are not assigned to divisions. I know that there are military police assigned to patrolling practically ever city and community in which a military establishment is located, that the civilian police are already patrolling that city, and that that duplication is not necessary. I know the same to be true with the Air Force. I know that somewhere in the lines of communications around depots and whatnot those men could be found.

So should it be that the other body should see fit to adopt a system under which the amount requested in the budget by each military department is appropriated, and that then a stated amount equivalent to reductions made by this committee is imposed upon the Secretary of a military department as the amount that he shall reduce the funds appropriated to him, it will represent the saving that this committee has asked for, and it will not be subject to any criticism that we are cutting necessary or essential items. This is not a new departure. This has been done by this House before. In the year when we had one appropriation bill for all departments, I believe it was either 1949 or 1950, after these funds had been appropriated there was an amendment

which required the departments to reduce, I think it was by \$550 million, the amount that had been appropriated. That was done and it was found to be administratively feasible. So, I say I support the committee in their view of effecting these savings and the manner in which they have done so. Should the other body see fit to adopt the other system, I would support that.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back to the remainder of my time.

The Clerk read as follows:

TITLE II
Interservice activities
Claims

For payment of claims by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Army (except as provided in appropriation for civil functions administered by the Department of the Army), Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force, as authorized by law; claims (not to exceed \$1,000 in any one case) for damages to or loss of private property incident to the operation of Army and Air National Guard camps of instruction, either during the stay of units of said organizations at such camps or while en route thereto or therefrom; claims for damages arising under training contracts with carriers; and repayment of amounts determined by the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, or the Secretary of the Air Force, or officers designated by them, to have been erroneously collected from military and civilian personnel of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force or from States, Territories, or the District of Columbia, or members of National Guard units thereof; \$12,000,000.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly, the Committee rose, and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. KEOGH, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H. R. 7665) making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1958, and for other purposes, had come to no resolution thereon.

GENERAL LEAVE TO EXTEND

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members who spoke on the defense appropriation bill today may have permission to revise and extend their remarks and include appropriate extraneous matter.

The SPEAKER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

There was no objection.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate by Mr. McBride, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate had passed without amendment a concurrent resolution of the House of the following title:

H. Con. Res. 179. Concurrent resolution authorizing the printing of additional copies of the report to accompany H. R. 7125, a bill to make technical changes in the Federal excise-tax laws.

The message also announced that the Senate recedes from its amendments Nos. 5 and 8 to the bill (H. R. 5788) entitled "An act making appropriations for the

Executive Office of the President and sundry general Government agencies for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1958, and for other purposes."

The message also announced that the Senate had passed a concurrent resolution of the following title, in which the concurrence of the House is requested:

S. Con. Res. 33. Concurrent resolution requesting the President to return the enrolled bill S. 1463 to the Senate.

ADDRESS BY HON. SHERMAN ADAMS, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT, DELIVERED AT TRENTON, N. J., MAY 24, 1957, BEFORE THE SIXTH REGIONAL CONFERENCE SPONSORED BY THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE

(Mr. SCOTT of Pennsylvania (at the request of Mr. WIGGLESWORTH) was given permission to extend his remarks at this point, and to include an address.)

Mr. SCOTT of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, the Honorable Sherman Adams, assistant to the President, delivered a very informative address at Trenton, N. J., on last Friday before the regional conference sponsored by the Republican National Committee, as follows:

Tonight I feel as Abe Lincoln evidently did on one occasion in 1860.

You will recall that after his nomination he stayed in Springfield until the election. There he interviewed an endless procession of job hunters and their friends. This frustrating job he patiently handled with that amazing humanism, tact and insight that distinguished him from ordinary men. Then one day he contracted a mild case of smallpox. When he discovered what his ailment was, he said to his secretary, "Tell all the office-seekers to come at once, for now I have something I can give all of them."

Tonight I also have the urge to give something to everybody. I hope, however, I shall have something less uncomfortable than he had to give. I earnestly hope, too, it will prove to be of greater value to all of you.

This gathering is the sixth in a nationwide series of such meetings. To me it is best characterized as a soul searching—a coming together to evaluate how far we have progressed these past 4 years—to measure where we now are—to appraise where we, as Americans and as Republicans, must strive to go between now and 1958 and 1960.

As it is written in the Holy Book, "To every thing there is a season, and a time to every purpose under the heaven." This is our season—this is our time—to set about our common purpose in the face of the obstacles we know are ahead.

I am not used to mincing words. Nor am I accustomed, as the saying goes, to shovel smoke. It is written that there is "a time to keep silence, and a time to speak." Tonight I am here to speak.

For I am certain of this: We are at the time, and we are in the season, when straight talking is indispensable to Republican purpose and progress. In no other way can we chart for ourselves the right course. It is to do exactly this that we are gathered here.

Our self-appraisal will not be helped by turning our eyes from some of the things that have been perplexing our party. An example is our peculiar obsession right now with epithetical Republicanism.

In earlier political history Americans have known the Barnburners, the Know Nothings, the Free Soilers, the Mugwumps, the Abolitionists, and the Locofocos. Today how

freely we Republicans bandy about colorful terms.

The Democrat opposition, as all of us know, suffers from a chronic and incurable political schizophrenia. Schizophrenia, you remember, is split personality. Indeed, their party is irreparably split—and down its very middle, both geographically and philosophically—and the split is so deep that the party simply cannot put itself together again. In that party, as the North proposes, the South disposes, and never the twain shall meet.

Unfortunately, we Republicans are doing a little splitting ourselves. While this may be fun, it is a pastime we can ill afford.

Today, we have the stalwarts, the irreconcilable, and the irreconcilables. We have the liberals, the liberal-conservatives, the plain and simple conservatives, and the reactionaries. We have the moderns and the un- or anti-moderns, the old-fashioned and the traditionalists, each resoundingly the oracle of the true meaning of Republicanism. By itself that should give us concern enough.

But another concern is the 1958 Federal budget, its size and composition, what it means to us.

Another is our defense and mutual security programs and their cost and meaning to our country and our party.

Here's yet another, social progress, its scope and direction, and what difference it makes to us as a people and as a party.

Another is our party's official posture before the American people, proclaimed proudly, before all America in our party's platform adopted a short 9 months ago in San Francisco. We are concerned as well with the import of these solemn pledges to our President and to all of us who consider ourselves loyal, dependable workers in the Republican cause.

Two other concerns come to mind. One is the year 1958, as critical a year as our party has faced in its 100 years. The other is 1960, the importance of which I hardly need emphasize here.

So we need to look again to the bricks and mortar of our party structure. The outlines of this great edifice we can see easily enough. But we must test the materials that compose its foundations and walls, lest intentionally or otherwise, by our own huffing and puffing, we blow our own house down.

Now, our party is no nicely-trimmed organization including only those who think and speak precisely alike. It enforces conformity upon no one. Our party is big enough in spirit and purpose to include every single citizen who believes in its basic principles.

Every Republican is entitled to interpret for himself the nature of our commitments and objectives. Even so, if our party means anything at all, it means that every loyal member of this Republican party is committed to certain common goals and shares certain basic views.

The hyphenation of Republicanism that I mentioned earlier is a case in point. We must stop claiming allegiance to a fraction of a faction. Suppose we be just this—loyal Republicans—the kind of Republicans who are willing to join with other Republicans to get our Congress back in 1958 and keep the Presidency in 1960.

As his first term came toward a close, three considerations weighed heavily in the President's mind as he considered the possibility of another term:

1. That the foreign policies he had pursued had kept our country at peace in this dangerous world.

2. That his domestic policies had brought prosperity to our people.

3. That he felt he had the physical energy to go through four more grueling years of the Presidency.

As for the last, time and the fates will prove, but this I can report to you: The President is in great shape, and unless I miss my guess, both time and fate are on his side.