

products. After reading of the report of this Commission and learning of the present state of research and development projects, I believe that if this bill is enacted and a crash program is initiated, the demand for agricultural products could exceed the ability of our Nation's farmers to produce these raw materials. I am very hopeful that the Subcommittee on Agricultural Research and General Legislation will take action on this bill and that it will be passed by the Senate early in the second session of this Congress.

Research in agricultural products, greatly broadening the area of agricultural commodities in the various synthetic developments, is the new frontier for agriculture in the years to come. Unless we proceed in that field, it is a certainty that surpluses of all our agricultural products will continue to accumulate; and if such surpluses continue to pile up, it is a certainty that we shall have a depressed agricultural economy. It is for that reason that it is so important that we give further thought and study to expanding our research activities in the agricultural field.

Mr. CARLSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. THYE. I yield.

Mr. CARLSON. I should like to express my appreciation for the fine statement the Senator from Minnesota has made. He has again demonstrated a very particular interest in the farmers of the Nation, and in agriculture as a whole.

I invite his attention to a statement which I placed in the Appendix of the Record earlier this week, by former Representative Clifford Hope, who served for 30 years in the House. He discussed the same subject matter which the Senator has discussed today, namely, the importance of using some of our surplus agricultural crops for industrial purposes.

Mr. THYE. My distinguished friend from Kansas has referred to Clifford Hope. Clifford Hope was one of the greatest agricultural leaders to serve in Congress during my lifetime. Clifford Hope was a student of agriculture, and it was a great loss to the Nation when he retired from Congress.

Again I refer to Senate bill 2306. That bill was sponsored by a great number of Senators. It is a very important bill, and I certainly hope that study will be given to the proposals set forth in the bill, and that there will be an opportunity for consideration of the bill early in the coming session, in 1958.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

WORK OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, 85TH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION

Mr. GREEN. Mr. President, I wish to make a brief statement on the activities of the Committee on Foreign Relations during the 1st session of this 85th Congress.

The days since January have been very busy ones for the chairman and members of the committee and I take this opportunity to express my high apprecia-

tion of my colleagues' faithful attendance at our meetings, for their alert and able consideration of all matters which have come before us this session, and for their constant attention to the foreign policy problems with which this Nation is faced. I wish to record also my sincere appreciation for the splendid bipartisan spirit which continues to prevail in the deliberations of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

The meetings in which our members participated totaled 143. We have considered many measures and have taken final action on 14 treaties, 27 bills and joint resolutions, and 22 Senate and concurrent resolutions. We are carrying over very little for consideration next year—only such measures as are not yet ready for action. No measure reported by the committee is now pending on the Senate Calendar. The measures reported by the committee have passed the Senate either by voice vote or by very large majorities. The largest number of votes cast against any measure reported by the committee was 25, on final passage of the Mutual Security Act, and on that rollcall there were 57 votes in favor. The statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency was approved 67 to 19, the Middle East resolution was agreed to 72 to 19, and 12 treaties were approved by unanimous votes ranging from 78 to 0 to 86 to 0.

The first major item of business with which we dealt was the Middle East doctrine. After painstaking examination by the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services, this measure received the approval of both those committees, and of the Congress. The committee also devoted much time to a searching review of the mutual security program. This study began in 1956 when the then chairman of the committee, the late Senator Walter F. George, called for a thorough review of United States aid programs. With this in mind, the Senate created a Special Committee To Study the Foreign Aid Program, which was comprised of the full membership of the Foreign Relations Committee and two members each from the Senate Committee on Armed Services and the Senate Committee on Appropriations. The information the committee gained from this study, and the results of the study undertaken by the Subcommittee on Technical Assistance Programs were available for its members when they considered and approved the Mutual Security Act of 1957.

The Senate, moreover, has approved 13 treaties this session, all of which were examined with great care by the Foreign Relations Committee. Among these were the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, three double taxation conventions, a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation with the Republic of Korea, a cultural convention, and a number of conventions relating to activities in international waters.

In addition, the committee has received an extremely large number of nominations this session. It has acted upon 1,662 nominations, as contrasted with the 702 which it had before it during

the 1st session of the 84th Congress and the 973 during the entire 83d Congress.

As an expression of its interest in the quality of American representation abroad, the committee also adopted new procedures for the consideration of nominations. Individuals nominated to serve as chiefs of mission or as delegates to international organizations are now examined by the committee in public session. More attention has also been given to routine appointments in the Foreign Service. This year, for the first time so far as I know, the committee examined in person 6 young men chosen by lot from a list of 62 appointments to the lowest rank of the career Foreign Service. The result was most favorable as to the qualifications of those examined.

Mr. President, in summation I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a short summary of the workload of the Committee on Foreign Relations for this session, the period during which I have been privileged to be its chairman.

There being no objection, the matter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

TREATIES ACTED ON

1. Protocol to the 1949 International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (Ex. F, 85-1; Ex. Rept. 1, 85-1): This protocol, between the United States and nine other governments, is designed to make it possible for the Commission, the representative body established under the 1949 convention, to hold its meetings outside North America, if it so desires. Approved May 13, 1957, by a vote of 82 to 0.

2. Protocol to the 1930 Convention for the Protection, Preservation, and Extension of the Sockeye Salmon Fisheries in the Fraser River System (Ex. C, 85-1; Ex. Rept. 2, 85-1): The purpose of this protocol, between the United States and Canada, is the establishment of a program to conserve the pink salmon of the Fraser River system coordinate with the program set up under the 1930 convention for sockeye salmon only. Approved June 6, 1957, by a vote of 85 to 0.

3. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (Ex. I, 85-1; Ex. Rept. 3, 85-1): This statute, signed by the United States and 79 other nations, is designed to establish an International Atomic Energy Agency with responsibility for advancing the peaceful uses of atomic energy, and for developing methods for its application to industry, agriculture, and medicine for the benefit and general welfare of mankind. Approved, with an interpretation and understanding, June 18, 1957, by a vote of 67 to 19.

4. Agreement between the United States and Austria regarding Certain Bonds of Austrian Issue Denominated in Dollars, Together with a Related Protocol (Ex. H, 85-1; Ex. Rept. 4, 85-1): The agreement and protocol create a procedure under which the holders of certain dollar bonds issued prior to World War II by the Republic of Austria and by various municipalities, provinces, and companies in Austria, may establish the validity of their bonds. Approved July 2, 1957, by a vote of 78 to 0.

5. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between the United States and Korea (Ex. D, 85-1; Ex. Rept. 5, 85-1): The objective of this treaty is to protect the personal security, rights, and property of Americans in Korea and to facilitate their travel and business activities. Approved August 8, 1957, by a vote of 86 to 0.

6. Protocol amending the International Sugar Agreement of 1953 (Ex. L, 85-1; Ex.

1957

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

14821

Current prime loan rates in various countries—Continued

Country:	Rate
Japan.....	9
Finland.....	8-8½
Argentina.....	8
Uruguay.....	8
Iran.....	7½-8½
Italy.....	7½
Turkey.....	7-9
Denmark.....	7-8
Syria.....	7-8
Costa Rica.....	7
France.....	7
Honduras.....	7
Lebanon.....	7
Nicaragua.....	7
Sweden.....	6½-7
Ireland.....	6¼
Iraq.....	6-7
Singapore.....	6-7
Spain.....	6-6½
Colombia.....	6
Dominican Rep.	6
El Salvador.....	6
Guatemala.....	6
Liberia.....	6
South Africa.....	6
Venezuela.....	6
India.....	5½-6½
Egypt.....	5½-6
Hong Kong.....	5½-6
Australia.....	5½
Canada.....	5½
Netherlands.....	5½
Great Britain.....	5½-5½
Philippines.....	5-7
Belgium.....	5-5½
Portugal.....	5-5½
Cuba.....	5
New Zealand.....	5
Panama.....	5
Norway.....	4¾
Switzerland.....	4½
Puerto Rico.....	4¼
United States.....	4

¹ Not including 9 percent representing tax and other charges.

² Trading banks average rate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. THYE. Mr. President, I have a very brief statement.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I withdraw my request.

Mr. THYE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may exceed the 2-minute limitation.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. The Senator is permitted 3 minutes. If the Senator will wait momentarily we will complete the morning business and the Senator can obtain recognition and speak for as long as he likes.

Mr. THYE. My only problem is that the conference committee of which I am a member will convene at 10:30 this morning.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Minnesota may be allowed to speak for not longer than 5 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from California? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

INCREASED USE OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS FOR INDUSTRIAL PURPOSES

Mr. THYE. Mr. President, I should like to address a few remarks to the

Senate regarding a bill which 29 Senators cosponsored, namely, S. 2306, which would provide for the increased use of agricultural products for industrial purposes. This bill contains the major recommendations of the Commission on Increased Industrial Use of Agricultural Products. This Commission was authorized by Public Law 540 of the 84th Congress and submitted its report on June 15, 1957.

This report is available to the Senate and the public and is printed as Senate Document No. 45. I highly recommend the reading of this document, first of all for its recommendations, and, secondly, as a revelation of the possibilities for the increased use of agricultural products if the recommendations of the Commission are enacted into law. It is most enlightening to read of the various projects which are in the laboratory stage, the development state, and those which are now putting products on the market. I am confident that when a person has read and studied this report, he will give full support to the enactment of the bill to which I have referred.

This approach to our farm surpluses is one of the most constructive, and holds the greatest possibilities among those which have been advanced. I believe Senators will find that in industry the successful companies which are expanding are those companies which realize the importance of research and development. The report points out the fact that in 1956 approximately \$7 billion would be spent by all American sources for research and development. American industry is currently spending about \$3 billion in this area while agricultural research amounts to only \$375 million. On a percentage basis comparison, the contrast is even more striking. Manufacturing industry invests about 3 percent of its gross sales in research, while the petrochemical industries invest from 4 to 7 percent of their annual gross sales. The \$375 million spent for agricultural research represents slightly over one-half of 1 percent of farmers' total agricultural sales. However, the greater portion of these funds is used to find methods for improving and increasing production. Of the \$190 million which the Federal and State Governments spend for agricultural research, only \$16,145,000 of the Federal appropriation is used in the search for new uses of agricultural commodities.

The first recommendation of the Commission is for an increase of at least three times the amount currently spent for crop research, trial commercialization, development, and incentives. In each of the task groups which studied the various agricultural products, emphasis was placed on the need for more basic research. In bearing out this contention, the report lists some 59 projects, still in the research stage, which show promise of a commercially feasible end product. Research in wheat indicates that adhesive materials could be developed, as could hormone type weed killers and improved insecticides. Research in the cereal grains could result in the production of synthetic fibers and flexible packaging film such as cellophane. Plas-

tics could conceivably be made from raw materials found in cereal grains. Many projects are indicated which would improve the quality of textiles made from cotton. The presently known possibilities are immense. With additional funds for research, I can foresee that a vast new range of products could be manufactured from agricultural raw materials.

Another phase of this bill would investigate the possibility of introducing new crops to the United States, either from other countries or from the development of new strains and varieties. The report lists such crops as bamboo, castor beans, and others with very specialized uses.

In addition to the need for basic research there is the need for the development of commercial processes which can be used for the conversion of the raw material into the finished product. Once again, there are many programs which could be developed if funds were available for the research into the discovery of economically feasible commercial processes. To indicate the possibilities in this field, there are 19 examples in this stage of development. Basic research has found methods of producing dialdehyde starch from grain. This material is used in the production of chemicals, one of the uses of which is in plastics production and manufacture of organic chemicals. It is estimated that if this area were fully developed, 6½ million bushels of grain could be devoted to this use. The problem is to find a method which can be used commercially for the conversion of the cereal grain, into this starch at a price which is competitive.

It may also be necessary for the Government to establish pilot plants which can be used as models for private industry. In this connection, the Government should make available for these research projects quantities of our surplus agricultural products in sufficient amounts so that all of the possible avenues will be attempted.

The bill does not propose that this be a strictly governmental project, but that our universities and our industries will be encouraged to make their contribution in this most important work. Private industry should be encouraged through grants for research accompanied by increased endeavors on their own behalf. In this regard, the question of the Agriculture Department's policy on patents should be thoroughly examined. During the prosecution of World War II and the Korean conflict, patentable inventions were used by the Federal agencies, and when the emergency ended and the need for complete Government control also ended the patent rights were relinquished to the individual. Under that program, the greater incentive undoubtedly produced significant contributions.

Our agricultural economy is in a depressed condition. I have given support to programs which I believed would contribute to the solution of this problem. However, most of these programs were aimed at reducing production. The program as outlined in this bill is an aggressive and dynamic policy aimed at finding uses for these

No. 157—7

001017850

0002404

Rept. 6, 85-1). The protocol revises export quotas on sugar as among exporting countries parties to the agreement of 1953, simplifies the administration of the quotas, and provides greater flexibility in their adjustment to changing market conditions. It also revises the price objectives of the agreement. Approved August 8, 1957, by a vote of 86 to 0.

7. Convention on Inter-American Cultural Relations (Ex. C, 84-2; Ex. Rept. 7, 85-1): This convention, signed by the United States and all of the other American Republics except Costa Rica, is a revision of the Buenos Aires convention of 1936. It is intended to promote the exchange of graduate students, teachers, professors, specialists, and other persons of equivalent qualifications among the American Republics, with a view to fostering a greater understanding of the peoples and institutions of countries belonging to the Organization of American States. Approved August 8, 1957, by a vote of 86 to 0.

8. Protocol to the 1946 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (Ex. E, 85-1; Ex. Rept. 8, 85-1): The purpose of this protocol is to vest the International Whaling Commission established by the Convention for the Regulation of Whaling with additional powers so that it may effectively deal with a number of problems not anticipated when the convention was negotiated. Approved August 8, 1957, by a vote of 86 to 0.

9. Amendment to the 1940 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (Ex. M, 85-1; Ex. Rept. 9, 85-1): The purpose of the amendment is to remove from the convention a prohibition against the use of inflatable life rafts on merchant and passenger vessels in international carriage. Approved August 8, 1957, by a vote of 86 to 0.

10. Interim Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals (Ex. J, 85-1; Ex. Rept. 10, 85-1): This convention, an interim agreement effective for a 6-year period, will serve to continue the prohibition now being observed by the four signatory governments (Canada, Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States) with respect to pelagic sealing, and to provide a joint research program designed to accumulate sufficient factual data to prepare the groundwork for a permanent arrangement among the parties to conserve the valuable fur seal herds of the North Pacific Ocean. Approved August 8, 1957, by a vote of 86 to 0.

11. Income Tax Convention with Austria (Ex. A, 85-1; Ex. Rept. 12, 85-1): This convention for the avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on income follows the pattern of previous double taxation conventions into which the United States has entered. Approved August 8, 1957, by a vote of 86 to 0.

12. Income Tax Convention with Canada (Ex. B, 85-1; Ex. Rept. 12, 85-1): This convention introduces certain modifications in the income tax convention and protocol of March 4, 1942, as modified by the supplementary convention of June 12, 1950, between the United States and Canada. Approved August 8, 1957, by a vote of 86 to 0.

13. Income Tax Protocol with Japan (Ex. K, 85-1; Ex. Rept. 12, 85-1): This protocol, which supplements the convention with Japan of April 16, 1954, for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income, provides for exemption of the Export-Import Banks of Japan and the United States from taxation on interest received from sources within the country of the other party. Approved August 8, 1957, by a vote of 86 to 0.

14. Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaty with Haiti (Ex. H, 84-1). Returned to President at his request, August 8, 1957.

a vote of 57 to 25; approved August 14, 1957, Public Law 85-141): This act extended the mutual-security program for another year and authorized \$3.4 billion for various types of foreign aid.

2. The Middle East resolution (H. J. Res. 117, S. Rept. 70, passed Senate March 5, 1957, by a vote of 73 to 19); approved March 9, 1957, Public Law 85-7): This joint resolution authorized the President to undertake economic and military cooperation with nations in the general area of the Middle East in order to assist in the strengthening and defense of their independence.

3. Amendment of act creating Corridor-Batann Memorial Commission (S. 538, S. Rept. 721, passed Senate August 5, 1957; approved August 28, 1957, Public Law 85-179): This act will enable the present Executive Director of the Commission to receive, for a period of not to exceed 5 years, retired pay as a retired military officer, and civilian compensation concurrently.

4. St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation (S. 1174, S. Rept. 525; passed Senate June 26, 1957; approved July 17, 1957, Public Law 85-108): This act served to clarify the general powers, increase the borrowing authority, and authorize the deferment of interest payments on borrowing of the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation.

5. Bridge across the Pigeon River (S. 1361, S. Rept. 522, passed Senate June 26, 1957; approved July 24, 1957, Public Law 85-113): This act revived and reenacted the act of May 29, 1945, authorizing, under certain conditions, the Department of Highways of the State of Minnesota to construct, maintain, and operate a free highway bridge and approaches thereto across the Pigeon River.

6. Claim of Christoffer Hannevig (S. J. Res. 64, S. Rept. 370, passed Senate June 10, 1957; approved June 27, 1957, Public Law 85-80): This act, in implementation of a 1948 convention between the United States and Norway, confers jurisdiction upon the Court of Claims to adjudicate the claim of Christoffer Hannevig, a national of Norway, against the United States based upon the requisition of certain alleged property interests of Mr. Hannevig by agencies of the United States Government during the First World War.

7. Buffalo and Fort Erie Public Bridge Authority (S. J. Res. 95, S. Rept. 720, passed Senate August 5, 1957; approved August 14, 1957, Public Law 85-145): This act granted the consent of Congress to an agreement or compact between the State of New York and the Government of Canada providing for the continued existence of the Buffalo and Fort Erie Public Bridge Authority.

8. Second World Metallurgical Congress (H. J. Res. 404, S. Rept. 863, passed Senate August 20, 1957): This joint resolution provides for the recognition and endorsement of the Second World Metallurgical Congress, which, under the sponsorship of the American Society for Metals, will be held in Chicago, Ill., on November 2-8, 1957.

9. St. Lawrence seaway celebration (H. J. Res. 408, S. Rept. 864, passed Senate August 20, 1957): This joint resolution authorized the President of the United States to invite the States of the Union and foreign countries to participate in the St. Lawrence seaway celebration to be held in Chicago, Ill., from January 1 to December 31, 1959, inclusive.

10. Conveyance of reversionary interest of United States in certain lands in Texas (H. R. 1883, S. Rept. 369, passed Senate May 22, 1957; approved May 31, 1957, Public Law 85-42): This act authorized the Secretary of State to take the action necessary to make possible an exchange of lands held by two school districts in Texas for other lands more suitable for school purposes.

11. Alaska International Rail and Highway Commission (H. R. 4271, S. Rept. 211, passed Senate April 12, 1957; approved April 20, 1957, Public Law 85-16): This act, in amend-

ing the act of August 1, 1956 (70 Stat. 888), added the Delegate from Alaska in the House of Representatives as a member of the Commission.

12. Disposal of certain lands to aliens (H. R. 8929, S. Rept. 862, passed Senate August 20, 1957): By virtue of this act, the International Boundary and Water Commission, United States and Mexico, is given the same authority as other United States Government agencies to dispose of lands to aliens as well as to citizens of the United States.

BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS PASSED BY SENATE BUT STILL PENDING IN HOUSE

1. Transmission of executive agreements to the Senate (S. 603, S. Rept. 521, passed Senate June 25, 1957). This bill (identical with S. 147 of the 84th Cong. 2d sess.), in general, would require the Secretary of State to transmit to the Senate the text of any international agreement other than a treaty, to which the United States is a party.

2. Waiver of collection of certain financial assistance loans (S. 747, S. Rept. 767, passed Senate August 5, 1957). This bill would permit the Secretary of State, with the approval of the Comptroller General of the United States, to evaluate and to cancel, in whole or in part, certain claims of the Government against citizens of the United States growing out of personal loans and other advances made to them in emergency situations abroad.

3. Amendment of International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, as amended (S. 979, S. Rept. 612, passed Senate August 5, 1957). This bill would extend the time for filing claims against the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, Italy, and the Soviet Union under subchapter III of Public Law 285, 84th Congress, and would provide for the reduction of awards made under title III of Public Law 285 in certain cases where claimants received tax benefits from writing off war losses upon which their awards are based.

4. Implementation of the Geneva Red Cross Conventions (S. 1779, S. Rept. 772, passed Senate August 5, 1957). This bill would give effect to certain obligations which the United States assumed when it ratified the Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the protection of war victims (Exs. D, E, F, and G, 82d Cong. 1st sess.).

5. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (S. 1832, S. Rept. 223, passed Senate April 12, 1957). This bill would authorize the appointment of one additional Assistant Secretary of State to be designated as the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.

6. Danish vessels (S. 2448, S. Rept. 572, passed Senate July 3, 1957). This bill would authorize payment to the Government of Denmark in connection with the requisitioning in 1941 of 40 Danish vessels by the United States.

7. Interparliamentary Union (S. 2515), S. Rept. 600, passed Senate August 5, 1957). This bill would raise the ceiling established by Public Law 409, 80th Congress, on United States contributions to the Interparliamentary Union, from \$15,000 to \$18,000.

8. Contributions to the International Labor Organization (S. J. Res. 73, S. Rept. 528, passed Senate June 27, 1957). This measure would increase the ceiling on the United States annual contribution to the International Labor Organization from \$1,750,000 to \$2 million.

9. Contributions to the International Council of Scientific Unions and its Associated Unions (S. J. Res. 85, S. Rept. 602, passed Senate August 5, 1957). This joint resolution would raise the ceiling on United States contributions to the International Council of Scientific Unions from \$9,000 annually to \$85,000 annually.

BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS PASSED BY BOTH HOUSES

1. Mutual Security Act of 1957 (S. 2130, S. Rept. 417, passed Senate June 14, 1957, by

14824

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

August 28

SENATE RESOLUTIONS

1. United Nations Emergency Force (S. Res. 15, S. Rept. 613, agreed to by Senate August 8, 1957). This resolution expressed the sense of the Senate that a force similar in character to the United Nations Emergency Force created pursuant to resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly of November 3 and 4, 1946, now operating in the Middle East, should be made a permanent arm of the United Nations.

2. Special Committee To Study the Foreign Aid Program (S. Res. 35, S. Rept. 2, agreed to by Senate January 30, 1957). This resolution extended the Special Committee until June 30, 1957, and authorized \$75,000 for the period February 1 to June 30, 1957. By S. Res. 141 (S. Rept. 435), which was agreed to by the Senate on June 25, 1957, the subcommittee was extended until January 31, 1958 to complete its study.

3. Additional clerical assistance (S. Res. 59, S. Rept. 36, agreed to by Senate January 30, 1957). This resolution authorized the Committee on Foreign Relations to employ two temporary additional clerical assistants.

4. Subcommittee on Technical Assistance Programs (S. Res. 60, S. Rept. 37, agreed to by Senate, January 30, 1957). This resolution extended, from January 31 to February 28, 1957, the deadline for transmittal to the Senate of the final report of the subcommittee. A further extension until March 31, 1957, was subsequently made by S. Res. 99, which was agreed to by the Senate on February 20, 1957.

5. Subcommittee on Disarmament (S. Res. 61, S. Rept. 11, agreed to by Senate January 30, 1957). This resolution extended the subcommittee until June 30, 1957, and authorized \$30,000 for the period February 1 to June 30, 1957. Further extensions were granted: (1) Until August 31, 1957 (S. Res. 151, S. Rept. 524, agreed to by Senate June 26, 1957), with an authorization of \$10,000, and (2) until January 31, 1958 (S. Res. 192, S. Rept. 1044, agreed to by Senate August 26, 1957), with an authorization of \$30,000.

6. Additional committee funds (S. Res. 152, agreed to by Senate July 3, 1957). This resolution authorized an additional \$10,000 to meet the expenses of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

7. Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (S. Res. 160, S. Rept. 604, agreed to by Senate August 5, 1957, and S. Res. 177, agreed Senate August 26, 1957). These resolutions, the latter of which served to amend the certain technical respects, authorized President to appoint four Members of the Senate to attend the next general meeting of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association to be held in India, on the invitation of the Indian branch of the association, and \$15,000 to meet the expenses incurred by the members of the delegation and its staff.

CONCURRENT RESOLUTIONS

1. Printing of Technical Assistance Report (S. Con. Res. 24, no written report, passed Senate, April 12, 1957). This concurrent resolution authorized the printing of 2,500 additional copies of the final report of the Subcommittee on Technical Assistance Programs.

2. Printing of studies and reports of Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program (S. Con. Res. 30, passed Senate June 5, 1957). This concurrent resolution authorized the printing of these publications as a Senate document with 8,000 for the use of the Special Committee.

3. Problem of Hungary (S. Con. Res. 35, S. Rept. 523, passed Senate June 26, 1957). This concurrent resolution expressed the sense of the Congress that the President, through the United States representatives to the United Nations at the forthcoming special reconvening of the General Assem-

bly of the United Nations, should take every appropriate action toward the immediate consideration and adoption of the report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary and toward the immediate consideration of other available information on the brutal action of the Soviet Union in Hungary.

4. Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Meeting (S. Con. Res. 36, S. Rept. 604, passed Senate August 5, 1957). This concurrent resolution would authorize the appointment of 4 Members of each House of Congress to attend as guests the meeting of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association to be held in India, which is tentatively scheduled to begin at New Delhi on December 2, 1957, and would provide for the payment of expenses of the delegates.

5. Printing of committee hearings on the mutual-security program for fiscal year 1958 (S. Con. Res. 45, no written report, passed Senate August 26, 1957). This concurrent resolution authorized the printing of 1,000 additional copies of these hearings.

6. Admission of Spain to NATO (H. Con. Res. 115, S. Rept. 212, passed Senate April 12, 1957). This concurrent resolution expressed the sense of the Congress that the State Department should continue to use its good offices toward the end of achieving participation by Spain in the North Atlantic Treaty and as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

ROLLCALL VOTES IN THE SENATE ON FOREIGN POLICY MEASURES

Protocol to the 1949 International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: 82 to 0.

Protocol to the 1930 Convention for the Protection, Preservation, and Extension of the Sockeye Salmon Fisheries in the Fraser River System: 85 to 0.

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency: 67 to 19.

Agreement and protocol regarding certain bonds of Austrian issue: 78 to 0.

Treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation with Korea: 86 to 0.

Protocol amending International Sugar Agreement of 1953: 86 to 0.

Convention on Inter-American Cultural Relations: 86 to 0.

Protocol to the 1946 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling: 86 to 0.

Amendment to the 1949 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea: 86 to 0.

Interim Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals: 86 to 0.

Income Tax Convention with Austria: 86 to 0.

Income Tax Convention with Canada: 86 to 0.

Income Tax Convention with Japan: 86 to 0.

Mutual Security Act of 1957: 57 to 25.

Middle East resolution: 72 to 19.

LEGISLATIVE RECORD

Treaties:

Held over from previous Congress... 18

Submitted during 85th Cong., 1st sess..... 14

Total pending during 85th Cong., 1st sess..... 32

Advice and consent given..... 13

Withdrawn..... 1

Still pending at end of 85th Cong., 1st sess..... 18

Bills and joint resolutions:

Referred to the committee..... 55

Passed Senate..... 21

Provisions included in other laws... 5

Indefinitely postponed..... 1

Still pending..... 28

LEGISLATIVE RECORD—Continued

Senate and concurrent resolutions:

Referred to the committee..... 46

Passed Senate..... 18

Provisions included in other legislation..... 4

Still pending..... 24

Meetings:

Full committee:

Executive..... 60

Public..... 33

Total..... 93

Subcommittees:

Executive..... 22

Public..... 7

Total..... 29

Special Committee To Study Foreign Aid Program:

Executive..... 2

Public..... 13

Total..... 15

Conference committees: Executive... 6

Total meetings..... 143

Nominations confirmed:

Ambassadors and ministers..... 86

Department of State..... 9

NATO..... 1

International Cooperation Administration..... 2

United Nations..... 15

Advisory commissions..... 4

Brussels Fair..... 1

United States Information Agency... 1

Foreign Service..... 1,593

Total..... 1,662

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is concluded.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of executive business.

The motion was agreed to; and the Senate proceeded to the consideration of executive business.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

As in executive session,

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. TALMADGE in the chair) laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations, and withdrawing the nomination of Lee L. Altmore, to be postmaster at Tatamy, Pa., which nominating messages were referred to the appropriate committees.

(For nominations this day received, see the end of Senate proceedings.)

EXECUTIVE REPORTS OF COMMITTEES

As in executive session,

The following favorable reports of nominations were submitted:

Two hundred and sixty-one postmasters,

001017350

0002405

and good citizens of the great State of New York.

Finally, Mr. President, the Government of Puerto Rico has cooperated closely, effectively, and intelligently with the authorities of the city and State of New York in respect of this migration and integration process with credit to all and to our country.

FARM ECONOMIC SITUATION

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, yesterday the distinguished junior Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY] reported to the Senate that the Secretary of Agriculture had reduced the price supports for oats, rye, barley, flaxseed, grain sorghums, soybeans, cotton, and cottonseed. On each of the commodities, he said, the price-support levels were reduced from 5 to 6 percent of parity below the 1956 figures; and he added that the only major crop which seems to have the same price-support level as in 1946 is wheat; and that that support is at the inadequate low price of \$2 a bushel.

Mr. President, I regret to report to the Senate that farm prices have again gone down. The index of prices received has gone down from 238 in January to 234 in February.

The parity index, taking into consideration interest, taxes, and wage rates, indicates that during the same period prices paid by farmers have gone up from 292 to 294. The parity ratio as of February 15 is 80, having dropped from 82 for the previous month. This parity figure of 80 is lower than any annual average since 1939.

Mr. President, to clarify the record as to just what is going on, I should like to cite briefly some pertinent figures regarding the farmer's situation in 1956 as compared with his situation in 1955.

Farmers' net income, adjusted for inventory change, was less in 1956 than in 1955—\$11.7 billion in 1955, \$11.6 billion in 1956.

Farm prices received averaged the same in 1956 as they did in 1955. The index was 236 in 1955, and 236 in 1956.

Farm parity was lower in 1956 than it was in 1955. It was 84 in 1955, and 83 in 1956.

Farm costs were higher in 1956 than in 1955. The cost index was 281 in 1955, and 286 in 1956.

The purchasing power of farmers' net income was less in 1956 than it was in 1955. The wholesale price index in 1955 was 110.7, and is 114.3 in 1956. The consumer price index was 114.5 in 1955. It was 116.2 for 1956.

Therefore, Mr. President, when the Secretary of Agriculture or anyone else tries to paint a favorable picture of the farmers' situation in 1956 as against that of 1955, by picking out 1 month in 1956 and comparing it with 1 month in 1955, instead of taking a whole year, or by taking net income before inventory adjustment instead of using the properly adjusted figure used in all official tables of national income breakdown, I maintain this is not right.

Mr. President, the figures I have just presented prove this point conclusively.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator from Missouri yield?

Mr. SYMINGTON. I shall be glad to yield to the Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I wish to express appreciation to the Senator for his thoughtful analysis of these statistical tables which have been presented by the Secretary of Agriculture and by the Department of Agriculture. I think the Senator has made it abundantly clear that the tables as presented by the Department and by the President's Economic Council are accurate. It is the interpretation of the figures made by the Secretary which has been misleading. The Senator from Missouri has again and again on this floor tried to pinpoint the differences which come from the factual tables as compared with those which come from the rhetorical dissertations by the Secretary of Agriculture. The Senator has performed a great service, and I wish to associate myself with the tenor of his remarks this morning.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the distinguished Senator from Minnesota. There is no one from whom I would rather receive approbation in discussion of the grave problems which confront so many of the farmers of America.

Mr. President, in the RECORD last week I placed considerable information in an effort to prove that we were not being given all the facts with respect to our defense position. Certainly the figures show this morning that we are not being given all the facts about our agricultural position.

Mr. President, about a year and half ago our distinguished majority leader, the great senior Senator from Texas [Mr. JOHNSON], stated in an address that the strength of a nation depends upon the will of the people; and that under a democratic form of government, their will can function only if the people are informed.

Mr. President, that quotation just about sums this problem up.

PROMOTION OF PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Mr. President, I wish to address an inquiry to the distinguished Senator from Indiana [Mr. JENNER], relative to the matter which he brought to the attention of the Senate last night.

Does the Senator from Indiana know whether any steps are being taken to investigate the reasons why the persons to whom he referred last night have been assigned as consuls or to other United States Government positions in the Middle East?

Mr. JENNER. No; of course, I do not know what is going on in the executive departments, but I have asked our staff to make a study of the names of other persons who have been involved, to ascertain where they are now assigned. But I assume that Mr. Raymond Ludden, who is in charge of personnel in the Department of State, is taking pretty good care of his friends.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. I expect to vote against the pending amendment to the joint resolution, and I expect to

vote for the resolution on final passage. However, I certainly want the record to show that I do not believe the funds provided in the resolution should be administered, allocated, or used under the guidance of the advisers who the Senator from Indiana indicated are in positions of responsibility in Lebanon, Syria, and other countries in the Middle East.

Mr. JENNER. Let me ask the Senator from South Dakota where he thinks the State Department will get its advice in Beirut, Lebanon, and in Syria, if it does not get it from our official representatives there?

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. I wish to add my word of caution or warning to what the Senator from Indiana said last night. I suggest that the State Department and the President would be well advised to determine the character of the persons there, and to be certain that the manner in which the \$200 million may be used will not be dependent upon the advice of certain individuals who have an unsavory record concerning affairs in the Far East.

ATTENDANCE OF SENATORS ON QUORUM CALLS

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I notice on page 2525 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of Friday, March 1, 1957, following the quorum call, an announcement to the effect that a certain number of Senators were, according to the statement, absent on official business. Then I notice that among the names is that of the junior Senator from Minnesota. There are at least 20 other names.

I want the RECORD to be clear in showing that I was not absent. I was here. I was not present at the time the second call of the roll was made; but since a point was made of this yesterday, I might say that Senators have other things to do besides being in the Senate Chamber. There are many other duties which all of us have to perform.

So that the RECORD may be abundantly clear, one of the duties of United States Senators is to take care of constituents when they come to the city, particularly when they are mayors of municipalities, representatives of State legislatures, regents of universities, or persons visiting in other official capacities.

I regret that upon the ringing of the bells some of us do not have the automatic reflexes which brings us here as rapidly as the situation may necessitate.

PROMOTION OF PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Senate resumed the consideration of the joint resolution (S. J. Res. 19) to authorize the President to undertake economic and military cooperation with nations in the general area of the Middle East in order to assist in the strengthening and defense of their independence.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, so far as I am aware, all Senators who wished to speak on the unfinished business have had an opportunity to do so. I am informed that there may be 2 or 3 very brief speeches to be made

commonwealth status for those incorporated Territories, has been an integral part of our policy toward Puerto Rico from the very beginning. It has no inherent connection with commonwealth status, as such.

The next great political advance in Puerto Rico came in 1947, when we provided for the election of the Governor of Puerto Rico by popular vote every 4 years, and empowered him to appoint heads of the executive departments of the insular government with the advice and consent of the popularly elected Territorial Senate. In the election held the following year, Governor Munoz was elected and he has been reelected at every election since that time by overwhelming majorities.

I was a member of the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee which handled the legislation just described, and I am proud of my part in it, just as I am proud of my part in the establishment of commonwealth status for the island. Commonwealth status for Puerto Rico came about only 5 years ago, after the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee reported Senate Joint Resolution 151, 82d Congress, and it became Public Law 447.

This is the measure that gave the approval of the Congress to the constitution for local self-government in Puerto Rico which the people of Puerto Rico themselves drew up and had adopted. Under it the people of Puerto Rico, whose island only a little over half a century ago was an island possession of the Kingdom of Spain, now enjoy a government of the people, by the people, and for the people—a government of their own making and choosing, while at the same time enjoying the protection and the privilege of American citizenship.

INDEPENDENCE OFFERED

It is significant that there has been no movement for any change in that status that has seemed to have any popular support. In 1953 the Government of the United States announced to the world through the United Nations that Puerto Rico could have full and complete independence if she wished it. There has been no action on the part of any responsible group in Puerto Rico to accept that offer.

As so often happens, the political development attained by the people of Puerto Rico has been accompanied by outstanding economic development, also. But today we are celebrating the anniversary of an historic development that has commanded the attention of the entire world.

ALL AMERICANS PROUD OF PUERTO RICO

Today, Puerto Rico is a part of the United States of America of which all American citizens everywhere can be justly proud. And I, personally, am proud to be chairman of the committee of the Senate that has had an important role in this development.

I know I speak for all of the Members of the Senate when I congratulate our fellow American citizens in Puerto Rico, and wish them continued political and economic progress. I am certain they will continue to make splendid use of the

grant of American citizenship 40 years ago today. This action was good indeed for the people of Puerto Rico and good indeed for all of the people of the United States of America.

Mr. CHAVEZ. Mr. President, I wish to associate myself with the remarks of the Senator from Montana, and to congratulate the people of Puerto Rico on their 40th anniversary of American citizenship. I believe I know the people of Puerto Rico intimately, both the native Puerto Rican and the continental American now residing there. They live in freedom and are happy, and fully assume their responsibilities.

More than 100,000 ex-servicemen live in Puerto Rico. They are veterans of the First World War, the Second World War, and the Korean war. Puerto Rico has always made its contribution toward the preservation of the freedom of our country. I therefore am happy to associate myself with the remarks of the chairman of the committee in extending congratulations to the people of Puerto Rico.

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, I wish to associate myself with the remarks which have been made by the Senator from Montana [Mr. MURRAY] and the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. CHAVEZ], in congratulating the people of Puerto Rico on the 40th anniversary of their attainment of United States citizenship. I doubt that there is any other area of the world where in recent years a people have made such great progress under a democratic form of government as in Puerto Rico.

I ask unanimous consent that there be printed at this point in the Record remarks which I had prepared for delivery on this subject.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR SMATHERS

March 2 of this year marks the 40th anniversary of the passage of the second organic act, commonly known as the Jones Act, by which American citizenship was bestowed upon the inhabitants of Puerto Rico.

The Puerto Rican people by their increasing ability and integrity in local government have proved themselves worthy of the citizenship that was conferred upon them. The 40 years following the Jones Act have brought them ultimately to a status that was recognized in 1952 when Puerto Rico became a commonwealth. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico today enjoys a double advantage: On the one hand, complete independence from the Federal Government in its domestic affairs, and on the other hand, complete protection by the Federal Government in foreign relations, trade and defense.

Moreover, under the very able leadership of popularly elected Gov. Luis Muñoz-Marín, Puerto Rico is proving itself daily ever more capable in dealing with the complex problems of modern politics and economics. By the much publicized Operation Bootstrap, Puerto Rico has accomplished the almost impossible. Since 1940 the net income of our insular neighbors has quadrupled—going from \$227 million in 1939-40 to \$982 million in 1954-55. Average family income has increased from \$660 in 1940 to \$2,360 in 1955. Productivity per worker has been doubled. Even more dramatic has been the increase in life expectancy between 1940 and 1950, rising from 46 to 61 years. This is the most rapid rate of increase known in the world. Moreover, at the same time the

annual death rate has been reduced from 18.4 deaths per 1,000 population in 1940 to 7.1 in 1955. Tuberculosis and malaria have been almost completely eliminated; and the general death rate in Puerto Rico is now lower than the national average. Comparable achievements have been made in the field of education where school enrollment has doubled and expenditures for education have been multiplied by five in the past 15 years.

But perhaps the most significant element in the story of modern Puerto Rico is that these remarkable changes have all taken place in a free society, where constructive self-help, not government dictatorship has provided the initiative. Governor Marín himself pointed out the importance of Puerto Rico's accomplishment for the whole world when he said:

"The answer to the Communist challenge lies in the ability of the Western powers to show the less fortunate countries of the world that a greater transformation can be achieved, at an even faster rate and on sounder economic foundations, without shattering or ignoring the fabric of political and individual liberties."

The tremendous progress which has been made by the Puerto Rican people is due in no small part to the illustrious leadership of Governor Marín and their capable Resident Commissioner, A. FERNÓS-IESERN. Through the efforts of these great public servants, Puerto Rico is making an ever-increasing contribution to the Nation and world peace. I am proud and happy to recall to the minds of my colleagues the occasion 40 years ago when the people of Puerto Rico first became citizens of the United States.

In recognition of this 40th anniversary, which is so significant to the people of Puerto Rico, Governor Marín has proclaimed March 2 as Friendship Day in the Island.

I know that the Members of the Senate join with me in extending best wishes to the people of Puerto Rico on this great occasion.

Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina. Mr. President, I wish to join with my colleagues in congratulating the people of Puerto Rico on the 40th anniversary of their American citizenship. Two weeks ago I spent several days in Puerto Rico. I was astonished and amazed by the amount of building which has been done there during recent years. A great deal of that building has been in the form of small family-type housing. They are cheap homes, of the type so greatly needed at the time, and many of them sell for as little as \$3,950. The people there certainly need more of that type of homes.

I was glad to learn that a builder from South Carolina, L. D. Long Construction Co., of Charleston, S. C., constructed \$86 million worth of buildings in Puerto Rico. While there I made an inspection of the various edifices.

I wish to join other Senators in congratulating the people of Puerto Rico.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I should like to associate myself with the remarks of my colleague, the Senator from Montana. I had the privilege of addressing a joint session of Puerto Rico's Legislature on Lincoln Day some years ago, and I was tremendously impressed with their Operation Bootstrap. It is under the leadership of one of the most outstanding leaders in the whole free world, Gov. Luis Muñoz-Marín.

We are indebted to Puerto Rico for the number of its people now citizens in New York City who are making great progress and are integrating themselves as useful

1957

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

2581

on the Russell amendment before it is voted upon.

If any Senators desire to address themselves to the unfinished business at this time, there is an opportunity now for them to do so. If not, I shall suggest the absence of a quorum, in the hope that shortly thereafter a vote may be taken.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. President, I desire to speak for only a few minutes on the Russell amendment.

I have vast respect for the sponsors of the amendment, the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], the Senator from Virginia [Mr. BYRD], and the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS], as I have also vast respect for their judgment on matters such as this. After a very careful examination, however, I fail to see much difference, so far as the result is concerned, between the provisions of the amendment and those of the resolution itself. In fact, I think Congress perhaps would have a little more control over the funds to be expended in the Middle East if the amendment were not approved.

When the resolution was first presented, I thought it was much on the order of the resolution which was passed about a year ago with respect to Formosa. That resolution was one of the best resolutions Congress had ever passed. I think the President of the United States should be commended for asking for such a resolution, and that Congress should be commended for passing it.

At that time it appeared to be almost certain that Communist China would attack Formosa. I think war was averted in that area largely, perhaps entirely, because of the joint action by the President and the Congress at that time.

I firmly believe that if a similar resolution had been passed in April 1950, war would have been avoided in Korea. I think the position of the President and the Congress should have been made abundantly clear at that time.

I will go so far as to say that if the President and Congress, previous to World War I, and even previous to World War II, had made the position of the United States Government as clear as it was made in the case of the Formosa resolution, those wars might also have been averted.

In my judgment, the joint resolution will go a long way toward preventing war in the Middle East. I intend to vote, reluctantly, against the Russell-Byrd-Stennis amendment, and I intend to vote for the resolution on final passage.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. PASTORE in the chair). The question is on agreeing to the amendment, as modified, offered by the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], for himself and the Senator from Virginia [Mr. BYRD], the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS], and the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. ANDERSON], as a substitute for the committee amendment, as amended.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I shall not detain the Senate for more than a few minutes. I speak in opposition to the pending amendment. There is no

Member of the Senate for whom I have higher respect and regard than I do for the distinguished senior Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL]. He has been an able Member of the Senate for many years. I was privileged to serve under his chairmanship when I was a member of the Committee on Armed Services. I know he is deeply dedicated to the defense of the United States in all its aspects. The fact that we may have an honest difference of opinion on this particular amendment does not, of course, lessen by one iota the high respect in which he is held by all his colleagues in the Senate.

The Senator from Georgia in his able speech the other day pointed out that his amendment would give the President the same backing in regard to the use of United States forces in the critical area of the Middle East as would the amendment proposed by the committee itself. So what we are basically discussing, concerning the differences between the so-called Russell amendment and the recommendations of the combined committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, has to do with the military assistance and the economic aid features of the resolution.

We all hope and pray that by the adoption of the resolution and by putting the Soviet Union and international communism on notice, they will not blunder to trouble in the Middle East, for there is a great body of opinion among the historians and scholars to the effect that World War I and World War II, and, indeed, the Korean war, might have been averted had the aggressor understood the vital stake of the United States and the rest of the free world in those areas, as we hope they will know it in this case.

However, if by chance they should determine to commit an overt act of aggression, then under both the Russell amendment and under the resolution as reported by the committees, Congress and the Executive would be joined together in having served such notice. In that event, it seems to me it would be highly important to have in that area of the world nations which could both preserve order internally and contribute something to the common defense. It is that factor which would be eliminated to a considerable extent, at least; and certainly flexibility in that field might be jeopardized by adoption of the Russell amendment.

Mr. President, I believe this to be an important issue. The President of the United States has great responsibilities under the Constitution. Of course, no man is infallible; no one has a crystal ball which can enable him to know what the men in the Kremlin may determine. But this is a foreign-policy issue in which the President of the United States under the Constitution has grave and peculiar responsibilities, which, of course, cannot be shifted to any other person.

The President has felt that in the conduct of foreign affairs and in the establishment of this policy, in the eyes of the world—which knows of our constitutional system—his hands would be greatly strengthened by having a coordinate branch of the Government—the Con-

gress of the United States, which, under the Constitution, has the legislative powers, including the power to raise and support armies and the power to declare war—associated with him in this declaration regarding the Middle East.

For those reasons, Mr. President, I hope the amendment submitted by the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], on behalf of himself and other Senators, to the committee amendment, will be rejected, and that the joint resolution as reported by the committee will subsequently be passed.

I should like to read a letter I have received from the President of the United States:

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, February 28, 1957.
The Honorable WILLIAM F. KNOWLAND,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR KNOWLAND: I appreciate your request for my views on the amendment which would strike economic and military assistance provisions from the Middle East resolution.

Elimination of these features would gravely impair our ability to help these nations preserve their independence. The resolution is directed against two dangers, direct armed aggression and indirect subversion. To counter one and not the other would destroy both efforts.

This I emphasize once again: We cannot wage peace with America arms alone. We must understand other national needs. We must respond to human wants. We must help nations and peoples satisfy those needs and wants in order to wage peace successfully.

The pending amendment ignores the danger of subversion. This we must not do. These nations need effective security forces. Their peoples need hope for improving economic conditions. The present resolution serves these ends. Thus economic and military assistance provisions are more than desirable. They are essential to our efforts to bring peace to this area.

I trust it is clearly understood that these provisions do not make available one additional dollar. They simply authorize us to adapt these funds to the new conditions resulting from recent military action in the area and its economic consequences. It is hardly reasonable to insist that these funds, which are already appropriated, be spent only for programs approved before such drastic changes occurred.

And this I consider even more serious—the worldwide interpretation of such action. Approval of the amendment would suggest that our country wants only to wage peace in terms of war. This is neither the purpose nor the spirit of our Nation's foreign policy. I should deplore any action by the Senate that could give the world a contrary impression.

Sincerely,
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

Mr. President, I hope the pending amendment to the committee amendment will be rejected.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment submitted by the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], on behalf of himself and other Senators, to the committee amendment, as amended.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, I know we have listened patiently for a period of approximately 10 days, at least, to the arguments, both affirmative and negative, dealing with the course we should follow with regard to the Middle East.

I hope my colleagues will indulge me while I, the junior Senator from Ohio, express the judgment I have reached, predicated upon the arguments I have heard and the limited knowledge I had on the subject prior to my appearance in this Chamber.

I humbly say to you, Mr. President, that my judgment is rooted primarily on the arguments which my distinguished colleagues have made in this Chamber. In a measure, I am in the position of one standing in the distance, looking, listening intently, and honestly wanting to formulate a judgment which will best serve his country. It is in that light that I address the Senate this morning.

If I utter any words which are not in accord with views and judgments expressed by my colleagues, I hope they will not interpret them as an affront upon the sincerity of their approach. I have an abiding conviction that each Member of the Senate has given expression to his thoughts, hoping that in the end, when the pending joint resolution is voted upon, the United States will have taken a position which will in the best degree possible insure the security and the life of our country.

Mr. President, I have profound respect for the senior Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL]; he is one of the distinguished Americans of our history. I should like very much to give my support to his amendment. However, I regret to say that I do not see my way clear to do so.

At this time I should like to give to the Senate my views regarding the use of our Armed Forces. I have listened to the legalistic arguments which have been advanced; and I have come to the conclusion that, try hard as my colleagues might, they could not have used more innocuous language and weaker language in declaring support of the President if he should determine that our Armed Forces should be used to stop the expansion of communism and to give protection to the nations who stand with our cause and want our help.

What is the language of the joint resolution? I realize that to read it now will be repetitious, but it is worthy of repetition:

Furthermore, the United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East.

Who can disagree with that, in face of the conditions which prevail in the world? I cannot.

I read further from the joint resolution:

To this end, if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any nation or group of nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism.

What do we say?

The United States is prepared to use armed forces.

I cannot see how we could have used less severe language if we tried. If there is to be aggression by Communists against a friendly nation of the world, having a harmful effect upon our country, we declare we are prepared to use

armed forces. What is wrong with that, may I ask? And how can that be construed to be a commitment? We declare an intention, and only an intention.

Now may I utter a word about the wish of the President. I recognize the gravity of his responsibilities and his powers. There are 96 Members of the Senate. Let each one visualize himself as occupying the office of the President. Visualize himself in a position, under certain circumstances, to use the might and the destructive energy of the hydrogen bomb and the atomic bomb. Would he want some help from a coordinate branch of the Government in telling the world what action he might have to take?

He would not occupy the Presidential chair and flippantly say, "I will follow this course." A dictator might do that. A man indifferent to human beings might do it. But a person having love for his fellow men, recognizing his power and the destructive consequences that might come from its exercise, would turn to the United States Senate and say, "Senators, give me help in this matter. I have a grave decision to make, and if I have to make it, I want some moral support." That, in my opinion, is the position any of us would take if we were in the position occupied by the President of the United States.

I have nothing but the deepest compassion for Harry Truman. He used the power of his office, and then from all sides came criticism that he usurped the powers of the Congress of the United States. I think President Eisenhower wants to avoid that. He does not want it to be said that he usurped any powers, but he wants some assurance from us that if the circumstances demand it and force is needed, he will have advance expression that, under certain circumstances, the Senate will approve what is done.

One word now about the \$200 million item. I say to the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. JOHNSTON], the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS], and the disciple and proponent of thrift, the senior Senator from Virginia [Mr. BYRD] that in their fight to cut the budget I will stand with them foursquare in every respect. One of the menaces to our country is the huge debt and the constant advance in spending, not only by the Federal Government, but by State, county, and municipal governments.

I listened to the argument about the \$200 million being made available to the President free from any restraints, and I should like to give Senators my judgment on that matter. The money is already appropriated. It is in the control of the administrative branch of the Government, subject to investment on the basis of the conditions contained in the Mutual Security Act. It is my understanding that \$750 million was appropriated, the expenditure of which was restricted except when certain conditions exist. One hundred million dollars was appropriated to the President without any restraints whatever imposed upon its investment or expenditure. What strikes me as significant is that since

July 1, 1956, the President has had at his disposal the sum of \$100 million, free from any restraints, to be used by him in helping foreign nations that are friendly to our cause. Nine months have passed, and only \$5 million of that \$100 million have been expended. That fact is significant to me, because it indicates prudence on the part of the President in handling the money. If he were giving it away, as is sometimes implied, the \$100 million fund would not have \$95 million remaining in it. The \$850 million have already been appropriated. After the expiration of 4 months the appropriations will lapse. The President has not asked for any new money. He has asked that \$200 million of the \$750 million be liberated from the restraints Congress imposed upon it in the Mutual Security Act.

I agree with the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY] in his argument of yesterday that if the restrictions are retained on the \$200 million, the probability of imprudent expenditure is much greater than if they are removed.

The Senator from Louisiana [Mr. ELLENDER] said to me yesterday that the appropriation will lapse. I understand that to be a fact; but if prudence is exercised, as has thus far been demonstrated by the amount of money left unexpended and unreserved, I am willing, in this emergency, to trust the administration in the use of the \$295 million which will be available to it without conditions being attached.

I wish, of course, to taper off the granting of aid to nations which use it unwisely, and I will make the fight to do so; but my principal fight will be made when the final foreign-aid bill comes before the Senate.

The situation in the Middle East is critical. It has become increasingly menacing in the past 6 months since the Mutual Security Act of 1957 went into effect. Conditions today are different from what they were last July 1; and, being different, they require a different allocation of the moneys which were made available.

Mr. President, I have given my views. I give them, as I stated in the beginning, as a man sitting at a distance listening and watching and coming to the conclusion I have stated as to what course I ought to follow. I say to my colleagues that the judgment which I expressed was finally reached only 5 minutes before I started to speak. It is the consequence of the impacts made by the sincere and able arguments to which I have listened for the past 2 weeks.

I have indicated how I shall cast my vote; and I hope and pray to God that my judgment may be right.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, I shall not detain the Senate long. I think my colleagues would acquit me of any charge of extended speaking on the floor of the Senate. In this session of Congress I think I have consumed, in my own right, about 2 hours. That amounts to about 1 hour a month.

I wish to express my personal appreciation to the distinguished minority leader [Mr. KNOWLAND] and to the distinguished Senator from Ohio [Mr.

001017350

0002407

LAUSCHEL for their kind references to me. I am grateful indeed for their kindness, but I must observe that I have noticed for many years in the Senate that our respect for our colleagues sometimes increases greatly just as we are prepared to vote against some proposal which they urge. However, I am grateful for the longtime friendship I have enjoyed with the Senator from California. The good opinion which I entertained of the Senator from Ohio before he came to this body has been increased since I have listened to his very excellent speech on the subject before the Senate. I should like to add my regrets to those expressed by the two Senators to whom I have referred, that our views are not in accord.

EXTENT OF DEBATE NOT DISPROPORTIONATE TO IMPORTANCE OF SUBJECT

My objections to the joint resolution as reported are neither captious nor political. I have observed in the press during the past few days considerable criticism of the Senate leadership because of the fact that greater progress has not been made in expediting the passage of the pending joint resolution. Some of the delay has been attributed to the Democrats. I happen to be a member of the Democratic Party. However, the proposal I have urged in this connection has not been urged from any partisan standpoint. I have urged it as a Senator of the United States.

If I desired to go into detail, I could point out that there had been objections on both sides of the aisle to voting earlier on the joint resolution. I believe the joint resolution has been before the Senate for 11 days. That is not a lengthy time for debate in the Senate on such a grave and important issue. In times past—for example, on the issue of sending American troops to Europe to be stationed there—the Senate has taken a much greater length of time debating the question without provoking great criticism from the metropolitan press. The leadership has been exceedingly diligent in handling the matter and the debate has been germane.

ISSUE FAR TRANSCENDS \$200 MILLION

I assume that every other Member of the Senate will vote his honest convictions on the issues involved, as I shall vote mine. This is a question which we should consider carefully, because there is a great deal more involved than a mere \$200 million. On the determination of this issue may well rest the success or failure of efforts to bring the expenditures of this Government within controllable limits. I have never been more convinced of anything in my life than I am of the correctness of that statement; and I am willing to leave it to time to determine whether or not I am vindicated in making it.

We are told that the joint resolution applies only to \$200 million and only 4 months of time. It is agreed that the President has \$750 million available under the limitations of Congress, and \$95 million available from a fund of \$200 million with no limitations, to expend in this area. He has already spent more than half of his emergency fund. It was not \$100 million at the outset. It

was \$200 million. In the presentation to the committee, representatives of the administration claimed that they had committed all of that but \$20 million, but they had not spent it. They were advised to hold up further expenditures or commitments to await the outcome of the action on the joint resolution. So \$180 million of a \$200 million appropriation had been allocated.

Again and again the point has been urged that only 4 months remain, and that only \$200 million is involved. That is one thing that frightens me. What I am about to say is in the nature of reiteration, but the administration should be able to tell the Congress something about how it proposes to spend the money in that short space of time. We were told that if the limitations were removed, additional nations would be brought into the program, although information as to the particular nations was culled from the Record because it was classified.

Is there any Member of the Senate so naive as to believe that we can start a 4-month, \$10 million program in a country and then cut it off on July 1? We all know, as practical men, that any expansion of our foreign-aid program will continue next year and will continue to expand. When we once release the program from the very modest limitations which Congress was finally able to impose over a period of years, we cannot recapture control. It is gone; and every argument made here today against the amendment confirms that statement.

RESPECT FOR PRESIDENT NOT IN QUESTION

I repeat that I have as much respect for the present occupant of the White House as has any other Member of this body. I have not known him so intimately as have some other Senators. When I first met him, Dwight Eisenhower was a major in the United States Army. He appeared before the Appropriations Committee some 24 or 25 years ago, immediately after I became a member of the committee. He was an aide to the then Chief of Staff, Gen. Douglas MacArthur. I have known him for a long period of years, and I have great respect for him and great confidence in him. However, my belief in the nature of our form of government and the necessity of preserving our system of checks and balances is greater than my respect or admiration or affection for any one man, even though he may be one of my own beloved blood brothers.

PROCEDURE URGED COULD LOGICALLY BE EXTENDED TO ENTIRE BUDGET

Mr. President, the argument that is made in the letter which the distinguished minority leader read, that the President wishes to wage peace, not war, and that our amendment ignores the dangers within those countries, can be made in favor of the proposition to take off all limitations and all restraints on the 7 or 8 billion dollars which are now available for spending in the foreign aid field. It applies with equal cogency to the entire program.

Mr. President, it means absolutely a breakdown of all congressional control of all appropriations. This is the enter-

ing wedge. This is the camel's nose. This is the foot in the door. I shall watch with great interest as Senators undertake to get the camel's nose out. Or, rather, I shall watch to see Senators get the camel out, because the whole camel will be in here by the time the new appropriation bill rolls around in July. I shall watch with interest how Senators will get this foot out of the door.

The amendment does not ignore the dangers of subversion. It recognizes that the President has \$850 million available in current appropriations that he can use to combat subversion.

I have said it on the floor, and I reiterate, that if the President will come to Congress and give us a program for the expenditure of this money, which is the kind of explanation we are entitled to have and will demand, if we are really a coordinate branch of the Government and not just a "ja" body, such as the German Reichstag was under Hitler, I shall support the President as vigorously as any other Senator, if the President's argument has any cogency.

Why this secrecy? It has been 2 months since the program was proposed. Two months are left before the controls apply. The administration and the State Department have not told Congress how the Government proposes to spend a nickel of that money though they have had ample time to formulate and present a definite program.

The argument that has been made can apply with equal cogency to the whole mutual security program. Any Senator who can console himself with the belief that this money has already been appropriated and that it will not result in any increase in appropriations in the years to come, as the programs in the new States are increased, is very naive indeed. If he has really convinced himself that it means no increase, he has a shock coming.

Mr. President, I am truly concerned about the size of the national budget. I have been a member of the Committee on Appropriations for many years. I have been a member of it since we started the mutual security spending program. I have seen the resistance of strong men, who were opposed to approving certain expenditures in our country, broken down by the argument, "If you can increase the foreign aid spending, why can't you approve this little program here at home?"

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH MUST HAVE INFORMATION FOR PROPER DISCHARGE OF ITS FUNCTIONS

Mr. President, I do not desire to labor the issue. It is fundamental, in maintaining the position of the legislative branch of the Government under our system, that we are entitled to some information. No one has told us that the money is intended to be used for bribing anyone, or anything of that sort. It is referred to as a program of aid. The State Department does not go into that kind of business, even if such a procedure were desirable.

Mr. President, I believe the debate on the issue has already accomplished much good. It has brought forth a letter from

the Secretary of State, stating the care he will exercise in starting new programs. However, I submit that it is impossible to bring in a new country between now and the first of July and then suddenly saw it off. We will be confronted with an increased appropriation for foreign aid, and we will be confronted with the argument that we have started a program here, there or elsewhere—I could name some countries, but I shall not do so inasmuch as that information is classified and it has been deleted from*the record of the committee hearings—and that it is impossible to reduce it or cut it out now without losing the friendship of such country.

VOLUME OF FOREIGN SPENDING HAS EXPANSIVE EFFECT ON DOMESTIC BUDGET

Mr. President, until Congress shows some determination to taper off and reduce foreign aid spending, we will not be able to say no to friendly powers other than in the Middle East when they come to us and ask for money from the American Treasury—money that has been taken from the American taxpayer.

There is no way in which we can ever get the finances of the country back on an even keel without showing some determination to reduce this program, instead of voting for measures which we know in our hearts will bring about increases in foreign spending.

I am no Cato, who rose every day in the Roman senate with his "Delenda est Carthago"—"Carthage must be destroyed." But I wish again to repeat that it is impossible to level off domestic spending, much less to reduce our present burdensome taxes, unless we have the ingenuity and the fortitude to start reductions in the foreign spending. Fiscal stability can only come by tapering off on the billions spent each year in foreign lands. I fear my colleagues will not heed my words, as the Roman senate finally did Cato's warnings. But I shall repeat again and again, that it is basic under our political system, subject as we are to pressures of groups in this country, that we cannot keep our national budget on a firm foundation when we lay the predicate, day by day, for vast increases in our foreign spending.

I submit it does not cripple the program to support the pending amendment. The money is available. The State Department wants new countries brought in. If so, let them tell Congress about it. If they want to authorize new projects, I, for one, say that Congress is entitled to some information as to where the money will be spent.

It is not \$200 million. We are asked to plant the seed by taking off restrictions, and that seed will grow and grow. It may not be more than \$200 million next year. However, over a period of years it could amount to billions of dollars. In addition, Mr. President, by going along with that kind of program, Senators will find themselves disarmed later when they are confronted by demands for worthy purposes within the United States and by requests from the few nations not already on the list of our benefactions.

They will find themselves disarmed when veterans' organizations come and say, "Our veterans have bared their

breasts in defense of our country, and we want you to increase their pensions and benefits. If you can spend billions of dollars overseas, you ought to be able to give some help to the veterans who have saved our land." I shall wait to see Senators stand up against that kind of argument and say, "No; I am willing to increase foreign-aid spending, but I will vote against veterans."

When these groups come before Senators with their pleas for increased appropriations for highly desirable and laudable purposes, such as old-age assistance, and aid for dependent children and for the crippled and the halt, and with pleas to expand those programs, and when a Senator's opponent is on the stump and is saying the Senator voted for increased billions of dollars to be spent overseas, how are Senators going to vote for fiscal stability in this Nation?

I could canvass many new fields of domestic spending already planned. We already have 18 new ones in the present budget, according to the Senator from Virginia [Mr. Byrd].

When Senators vote for these measures, which they know will increase our foreign-aid spending, I hope they will have the courage to remember pleas of the American taxpayer for some little reduction in his taxes and steel themselves to tell their constituents they cannot have a tax reduction because you have supported increased foreign spending.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. RUSSELL. I am glad to yield.

Mr. YOUNG. If the Senator would change his amendment to provide for a rescission of the \$200 million, or even a rescission of \$2 billion of the unexpended \$6 billion in the fund, I would support him.

However, right or wrong, I am of the opinion that whether the Senator's amendment is adopted or whether the joint resolution as such is passed, the money we are talking about will be spent anyway. I subscribe fully to the Senator's belief that the foreign-aid spending must be reduced.

RESTRICTIONS ARE REASONABLE AND WAIVER IS BAD PRECEDENT

Mr. RUSSELL. Under the restrictions which have been imposed, should we not know about its expenditure? We were told by witness after witness, and it is generally agreed, that some of the nations to be included do not like some of the conditions which are attached. We had a point 4 program in Saudi Arabia, but because some of our representatives asked for some information about the Treasury of that country, which happened to be the King's pocket-book, the King of Saudi Arabia invited them to leave. The record shows that other countries refused to accept money under the conditions which Congress had prescribed. The conditions are mild and modest. We say to them, "You must show that you want to keep the peace, and you must let us see whether you are spending the money for the purpose for which you requested it."

I notice in the press report of the meeting of the Arab leaders that they

specifically state they will accept the money if it has no conditions attached to it.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Mr. President, will the Senator from Georgia yield?

Mr. RUSSELL. I yield.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. I do not disagree with the Senator with reference to his statement about domestic spending, but as to the \$200 million, the purpose is a recapture of the \$200 million and a reallocation of it to purposes which, in the judgment of the President, would be to our best interest.

Mr. RUSSELL. The rulers of the Middle Eastern States say today they are willing to accept the money without limitation. So, Mr. President, we are planting a seed which will bear fruit that will be poisonous to the American taxpayers and to the economy of our country.

How are we going to protect the world against communism if we pursue a course which will surely weaken us?

There is before the Congress a budget of \$72 billion, which is the greatest in peacetime history. There are programs pending which will increase it beyond that amount. Yet we are asked to go ahead and follow this reckless course. The amendment does not in anywise cast any reflection on the President. It does not take away from him any power he has. We owe a responsibility to the American taxpayer. We say to the administration, "If you must spend the money, please tell us what you have in mind."

That is all this amendment does, Mr. President.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Georgia yield?

Mr. RUSSELL. I yield.

Mr. MORSE. With reference to the point made by the Senator from South Dakota, the President does not need to spend the money, does he?

Mr. RUSSELL. Indeed not.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator from Georgia yield?

Mr. RUSSELL. I yield.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, so far as I can determine, the principal restriction is that which enables our Government to know that the money is being spent in the proper way. During the time I had the honor of serving on the Senator's committee, I found that under our procurement program we had great difficulty in finding out whether the nations concerned would be willing to let us see the weapons and tanks which they were to manufacture. They did not want an American inspector to see the tanks and the guns we were paying for.

Mr. RUSSELL. If we remove the conditions which apply to the Middle East, what are we going to tell the French and the British and others who have been associated with us for years when they say, "You have taken off all these conditions for the Middle East; certainly you should take them off for us."

Mr. LONG. The people of France and of other countries have pipelines in all directions in order to determine who is getting a better bargain than they are getting. How can we remove all condi-

001017350

6002408

1957

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

2585

tions in the case of the Middle East and expect our older and more reliable friends to be satisfied with the situation?

Mr. RUSSELL. I agree with the Senator that we cannot. That is one of the vices of the committee resolution which I seek to eliminate.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Mr. President, will the Senator from Georgia yield further?

Mr. RUSSELL. I yield.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. It is not a question of whether we spend the money at all. The question is whether we spend it for the lesser or the greater purpose.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, I wish to conclude with the statement that we cannot protect America against any outside enemy unless we protect the integrity of the American economy. We cannot save the free world unless we have fiscal stability in the United States. This we cannot do while increasing the foreign-aid spending.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the Russell amendment.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST PROGRAM

Mr. MALONE. Mr. President, I wish to join with the distinguished Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] in warning that we are destroying the economic structure of this country with continual increasing taxes. The foreign spending program, coupled with the division of American markets among the low-wage nations of the world, has established a perfect international Socialist program.

NATIONAL SECURITY VERSUS PHILLIP MOWRY M'KENNA AND THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS

In his recent propaganda statement in the Washington Daily News, Mr. Phillip Mowry McKenna has shown himself in favor of importing the products of the sweatshop foreign mining labor and for the protection of his Pennsylvania tungsten-carbide business with a tariff.

He is opposed to the employment of American labor through the 1953 Malone-Aspinall Mineral Purchase Act, as extended, which in the absence of an adequate tariff, fixed a price per unit on tungsten, fluorspar, asbestos, and columbium-tantalum enough above the world price to make the difference in the wages and cost of doing business here and in the chief competing country of each product.

MR. M'KENNA'S PROTECTED PRODUCTS

Mr. McKenna enjoys a tariff of 42 cents per pound plus a 12½-percent ad valorem on tungsten-carbide products, without which he could not operate 60 days.

Such a tariff or duty is necessary to take the profit out of the underpaid foreign labor at the water's edge on tungsten-carbide products, and I approve of the tariff principle.

SECURITY OF THIS NATION

Mr. McKenna approves the historical program of Harry Dexter White and Alger program of making this Nation dependent upon foreign nations across major oceans for the critical minerals and materials without which this Nation cannot fight a war or live in

peace—to destroy our warmaking capacity and the economic structure of the Nation.

His self-aggrandizement in the tungsten-carbide business however was not quite accurate.

FALSE CLAIMS

Mr. McKenna's claim that he invented tungsten-carbide is erroneous—it was a German invention assigned to Krupp prior to 1930 and the American rights were purchased by General Electric Co. Mr. McKenna did, however, patent a variation of tungsten-carbide, called Kennametal, which is quite a different matter among mining and steel men.

He also made the claim that 1 pound of Kennametal would replace 60 pounds of other types of tungsten-carbides, a claim which is considered to be both foolish and absurd among engineers.

FREE TRADE ON PURCHASED PRODUCTS—TARIFF ON PRODUCTS TO BE SOLD

It is good business for any American producer to favor free trade on materials he must buy and an adequate tariff on the articles they manufacture, to take the profit out of the foreign sweatshop-labor-produced competitive products.

HIGHER HEAT-RESISTANT ALLOYS

It is now well known that if we are to increase the heat-resistant alloys for use in jet engines from 1,650° F. to above 2,000° F., more than 50 percent tungsten must be utilized in such alloys, which would reduce our stockpile of tungsten to 2 years or less.

AMERICAN PRODUCERS VERSUS FOREIGN PRODUCERS

The record shows that the foreign producers of the critical minerals and materials connive to put American producers out of business, and then to charge the American consumers what the traffic will bear.

When the 1953 Malone-Aspinall Act was first put into operation, the average foreign price for tungsten was \$43.50 per unit. When the American producers got underway the average 1955 foreign unit price dropped to \$31.62.

When the Malone-Aspinall Act was extended in 1956 under Public Law 733, the guaranteed price was lowered to \$55 per unit, to again equal the difference between the foreign and American labor cost in the going concern tungsten production.

The unit price of tungsten went to above \$75 in 1950 and 1951, when we were caught without sufficient metal on hand and with few "going-concern" producers.

The foreign sweatshop-labor-produced tungsten unit price has now been dropped to \$22, and will stay at a low price until Congress acts on the appropriation bill.

If Congress approves the appropriation to maintain a going-concern mining industry in the tungsten and other metals included in the act, then the foreign price will go to \$35 or \$40 per unit, so as to just undersell the domestic product in the American market.

However, if Congress does not approve the appropriation to maintain a "going-concern" industry in these metals, then the foreign price will again be raised to \$60 or \$70, or whatever the market will

bear per unit, as the domestic industry passes out of the picture.

MR. PHILLIP MOWRY M'KENNA—A SMART OPERATOR

Mr. Phillip Mowry McKenna would then again be able to operate his American tungsten property in Nevada, which he purchased to beat the \$70 per unit tungsten cost during the Korean war. At that time he started selling the product to the Government when the foreign price dropped sufficiently below that amount, and closed the mine when the Government appropriation was exhausted in December of 1956.

THE LONG-RANGE CRITICAL MINERAL PROGRAM

My Senate bill 34, now before the Senate Finance Committee, would remove the 17 critical minerals from the jurisdiction of the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade at Geneva, and would put them under the Tariff Commission, an agent of Congress, the tariff to be adjusted to take the profit out of the foreign sweatshop mining labor, just as in the case of Mr. McKenna's tungsten-carbide products.

ORGANIZATION FOR TRADE COOPERATION (OTC)

Mr. President, the matter of the approval of the Organization for Trade Cooperation is now before the Senate Finance Committee for consideration.

If that organization is approved by Congress, it will mean that the legislative body of this Government has approved the regulation of the foreign trade and national economy of this Nation by the 35 nations which are members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), operated at Geneva, Switzerland.

The United States has one vote out of 35, therefore this Nation is merely participating in the division of the American markets between the 34 foreign "sweatshop" labor nations.

THE 1934 TRADE AGREEMENTS ACT

The markets of the United States are being divided among 34 foreign nation members through the simple expedient of a continual lowering of the duties and tariffs which normally represent the difference between the effective foreign and American wages and the cost of doing business here and in the chief competitive nations on each product.

CONGRESS TAKE BACK CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

The 1934 Trade Agreements Act will expire in June 1958. If it shall not be extended, then the constitutional responsibility for regulating our foreign trade and the national economy will revert to Congress under article I, section 8, of the Constitution; and the Tariff Commission, an agent of Congress, will then adjust the duties and tariffs on the basis of fair and reasonable competition.

The flexible tariff will be adjusted to take the profit out of the foreign "sweatshop" labor at the water's edge. Then American labor and American investors will be back in business.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I wish to reemphasize some of the arguments which have been advanced and to repeat, to some extent, a few of the points I have heretofore made on the

Senate floor with regard to the United States foreign-aid program.

When the program was begun 9 years ago the advocates of it stated that the plan envisioned for Western Europe could be done for about \$14 billion or \$15 billion. As I demonstrated a few days ago, we spent in excess of \$37 billion in Western Europe, and we are still being asked for assistance and our planners are seeing to it that aid in some way or other is being given. There is no end to it, and unless Congress takes a firm stand we will continue to drain our life blood.

Mr. President, let us not make another mistake. The plan for the distribution of aid which is proposed to be applied to the Near East is a new method, a new approach. As has been pointed out, most of the restrictions which have been heretofore imposed on countries which have received our assistance are going to be lifted so far as the Middle East is concerned. Although we have had a program there for some time which could have been put into operation for the asking, our planners could not obtain the consent of the host countries to meet our conditions.

In 1954, when I was at Jidda, I saw thousands upon thousands of dollars' worth of material stacked up in the United States Embassy compound, material which had been intended to be used in order to carry out a program, which was then in the offing, with King Saud of Arabia. But suddenly negotiations ended and the contract intended was not entered into. Why? Simply because the conditions which we sought to impose under the existing law were not acceptable to the ruler of Saudi Arabia. As a result, the machinery, the many tons of materials which were piled up in our compound at Jidda had to be crated and sent somewhere else, all at a great cost to us. Our eager beavers were so certain that the program was going through that they wasted no time in shipping the necessary equipment. Quite a few Americans and locals had been employed and we had to bear their expenses.

Mr. President, our administrators have been trying for the past 4 or 5 years to inaugurate a foreign-aid program in Syria; but the Government of Syria has consistently and insistently refused. The Government's answer was: "We do not want your aid because we do not propose to comply with the requirements which you propose to impose on us." Syria offered to borrow money, but our planners refused to let her have funds at reasonable rates of interest.

One of the purposes of the joint resolution now under consideration is to start a brandnew program in that area, a program which is different from the types of programs which have been in existence there for a number of years. An effort is being made to change the rules so that our planners can give away funds rather than loan them or make grants with a few reasonable requirements attached. To listen to some of the Members of the Senate, one would imagine that the United States had not spent a dollar in that area. Up to the present time we have spent in the same

area in excess of \$3,500,000,000. We have more available to spend there. But the recipients of our aid do not like the conditions we seek to impose.

Consider, Mr. President, for instance, the furnishing of arms in that area—a most volatile and explosive area—where war can be started almost at the drop of a hat, because of the hatred existing between the Israelis and the Arabs, without having the recipients to comply with existing restrictions. And what are some of those restrictions? First, we desire to inspect the arms when in the hands of those who receive them to make certain that they are taken care of and to be certain they will be used for the purposes intended. If the pending joint resolution as reported by the committees is enacted, the United States will not have the right to inspect and to determine how and under what conditions the arms will be used. Another restriction which previously has been imposed is that the arms must be used by their recipients to fight for the establishment of a free world. That restriction will also be removed if the joint resolution as reported by the committees is enacted. Think of what might happen in that area if we pour in arms for the Israelis and the Arabs. We are going to be creating armed camps. Should we help one side more than the other, I can see Russia stepping in and offering arms to those who will pay for them. Mr. President, we are making trouble.

Mr. President, let there be no mistake or misunderstanding. Enactment of the pending joint resolution, without inclusion of the Russell amendment, I repeat, will mean the beginning in that area of a brand new program. As was pointed out a while ago, if we begin a new program in that area, we shall be compelled to do the same in other areas. In the past, our program was based on need; but today, in fact for some time, that no longer is true. Instead, today our program is based on what we give to one country as opposed to what we give to another. When I was in Bangkok, last September, I learned from reading some of the press reports which were translated for my benefit, and I also learned from talking to some of the officials there, that it does not pay for Thailand, for instance, to cooperate to the fullest extent with the United States at the United Nations, because Thailand is penalized if she does.

The officials cited India as an illustration. India has opposed us in the United Nations; India has seldom voted there with us; on the other hand Thailand has consistently voted with us. However, it was pointed out to me that because Thailand voted with us in the United Nations, she is receiving less aid than India has received, and that is because India has voted against us. Such an argument is nonsense, but yet it registers with many of the peoples of that area. Many of our so-called friends believe that we should reward them in direct proportion to the way they cooperate with us in our attempts to maintain world peace.

Mr. President, I will again and again repeat, if the joint resolution as reported

by the committees is enacted, it will mean the beginning of a brandnew program in that area; and the good Lord knows that financially and economically we cannot stand such a program.

As I pointed out some time ago, when speaking on the floor of the Senate, when our national debt was only \$267 billion, it would require 47 years of the time of every Member of the Senate to count that debt, if each Senator were to count that debt, if each Senator were to count that debt at the rate of two \$1 bills a second, or one hundred and twenty \$1 bills per minute, and if he worked continuously, without stopping for anything at all, for 24 hours a day if all would work with equal speed. Imagine that, Mr. President. That process would require 96 of us to work 47 years to count our national debt. As I also pointed out, if we were to take the dollar bills and attach one to the other, and make a ribbon of them, the ribbon would go around the world 1,000 times, or it would reach the moon 250 times.

Mr. President, during the 20 years I have been a Member of the Senate, the carrying charge on our public debt alone has reached the total amount which was appropriated by Congress in 1937 to operate all the departments of the Government. Mr. President, any man with common sense should know that we cannot continue indefinitely on that road and expect to maintain our way of life.

If any Member of this body wishes to cause a saving in our foreign aid program, now is the time to start; because if we consent to the inauguration of the program now proposed, we shall be establishing new rules and regulations as to how the money is to be spent; we are broadening the program instead of contracting it; and if we do that for the countries of the Middle East, we shall be called upon to do likewise for every other country, lest we incur their hatred and displeasure.

Therefore, Mr. President, I believe it to be incumbent upon us, if we are desirous of beginning to taper off our foreign aid, to start to do so by voting for the Russell amendment.

Mr. CAPEHART. Mr. President, I shall take only a few minutes. Unfortunately, I have been at home, ill, during the last 3 days, with intestinal influenza. That enforced absence gave me a chance to do a great deal of thinking.

It seems to me that possibly I am in as good a position to discuss this matter, particularly the proposed economic aid, as is any other Member of the Senate, because 1 year ago I voted against the appropriation in which the \$200 million was provided.

For the past 12 years I have repeatedly been very, very critical of our foreign-aid programs. I have voted against many of them. I have not been particularly critical of the principle involved, namely, that of having our Nation try to help other nations. My criticism has been, chiefly, of the method.

As my colleagues know, for many years I have been insisting that any foreign aid provided by the United States should be placed on a loan basis, and that our Military Establishment—in other words,

001017350

0002409

the Department of Defense—should be allowed to handle the military phases of our foreign aid under the budget for the military branch of our Government.

If that were done—if those in charge of the Department of Defense felt they should spend X amount of money and that they should have X number of bases scattered around the world—that decision would be their responsibility. The responsibility should be theirs, because if we go to war we shall have to depend upon them to defend the country.

I have urged that the economic aid be placed on a loan basis. A year ago, in the Foreign Relations Committee, I offered an amendment providing that foreign aid be placed on a loan basis, to be handled through the Export-Import Bank. So I am in a sound position to discuss the pending issue, it seems to me.

Mr. BARRETT. Mr. President, at this point will the Senator from Indiana yield to me?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BIBLE in the chair). Does the Senator from Indiana yield to the Senator from Wyoming?

Mr. CAPEHART. I yield.

Mr. BARRETT. I wish to commend the Senator from Indiana for the excellent statement he is making.

Let me say that I, too, voted against the mutual aid bill a year ago.

I may say to the Senator from Indiana that the senior Senator from Idaho [Mr. DWORSHAK] and the junior Senator from South Dakota [Mr. CASE] have joined me in sponsoring an amendment which provides that \$100 million of the \$200 million shall be expended under conditions requiring repayment of the principal by the nations receiving it, under such terms as the President may determine.

The Senator from Indiana well knows that the testimony given before the committees was to the effect that approximately one-half of the \$200 million would be expended for military assistance and approximately one-half would be expended for economic aid.

The purpose of our amendment is to provide that the principal sum of the economic aid shall be covered by loans and shall be used by the President under such terms as he may direct. It seems to me that with such an amendment included in the joint resolution, we shall be attaching some strings to the \$850 million which was made available a year ago in the Mutual Security Act, whereas the pending amendment of the senior Senator from Georgia to the committee amendment does not attack the problem in the way in which we believe it should be attacked.

Mr. CAPEHART. I thank the able Senator for his contribution.

As I have said, I have been attempting to put economic aid on a loan basis and to have the administration of military aid placed in the hands of our Military Establishment. I am a member of the Foreign Relations Committee. I sat through the executive hearings on the Middle East policy. I listened to many of the speeches. I think I have read practically all of them.

I shall vote for the resolution, and I shall tell my colleagues why I shall vote for it. I shall vote for it because I am trying to be realistic. It is not because I like the idea. I am certain the President does not like the idea, but he feels it is in the best interests of the United States to do it. I am sure the Secretary of State does not like the idea. I am sure no one relishes or likes the idea that we must take this action. But I am being realistic, and I say in this instance we are dealing with a situation as it exists, rather than one I personally would like to see exist.

I have done the best I could, during the past 12 years, since I have been a Member of the Senate, to warn this body and the country that we were doing many things which would eventually get us into trouble. I believe nobody else has a better record than I have in that respect. Nevertheless, we have done many of these things anyway. So today I think we must be realistic.

I am only trying to be factual. Let us review together what has happened during the past 12 years in the matter of assistance to foreign countries. I do not know that I can remember all that has been done, but I shall try.

We started with lend-lease. Then we gave to Britain, as I recall, 50 destroyers in World War II. Under the administrations of Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Truman the national debt rose to \$275 billion. It was Mr. Truman who advocated the Greece-Turkey loan. It was Mr. Truman who advocated the Marshall plan. It was Mr. Truman who advocated the point 4 plan. It was under Mr. Truman's administration that we spent and gave away an amount I have heard estimated as being anywhere from \$55 billion up to \$91 million. It was the war, and the threat of war, and the giving away of all that money, that built up the \$275-billion debt.

I believe it was under Mr. Truman that we entered into the agreement with NATO, an agreement with the western European nations that if they were attacked, we would go to their rescue militarily, and if we were attacked, they would come to our rescue. We have such an agreement today with 43 nations throughout the world. We must be realistic. I believe we must do what the President is asking us to do in the present instance, or cancel the agreements we have with the 43 nations, because I do not believe we shall be able to defend or help defend those 43 nations if we lose the Middle East.

I presume I shall never be a good politician, for the reason that I do not know how to beat around the bush when I talk. However, it seems to me, and I believe my facts are correct, we have not any choice but to do whatever is necessary in order to keep the Communists from taking over the oil of the Middle East. If the Communists should take over the Middle East oil, we would not be able to defend Western Europe. We would lose the cold war, and we would lose a hot war. We have already entered into agreements with the 43 nations. We have already spent \$55 billion. We have

given it away to Western Europe to enable them to prepare to defend themselves against Russia.

The only place from which the western European nations can get for any period of time the oil which they must have is the Middle East. Shall we throw to the winds the \$55 billion investment we have made in Western Europe? Shall we say to the 43 nations we have agreed to defend, "We are going to let you down"?

Western Europe cannot live without oil from the Middle East. This is not a matter of oil companies. I am not interested in the oil companies as such. The oil companies could lose all the oil in the Middle East, and probably the loss could not be found in their financial statements. I am not disturbed about the oil of the King of Saudi Arabia, because he could get along without the oil. But I am interested in the oil from the standpoint of its use by tractor owners, car owners, truck owners, and diesel engine owners in Western Europe.

Western Europe has been denied Middle East oil only for a few weeks' time, and we have had to supply them oil from the United States to a large extent. I believe we are supplying them with 80 percent of their oil. I do not know how long we can continue to supply Europe with oil, because I do not know what the oil reserves of the United States are, and nobody else knows. But I do know that if we must continue to supply Europe with oil, it will cost every American automobile and tractor owner more money for his gasoline, crude oil, and diesel oil. When the oil arrives in Western Europe the price will be vastly increased. The price will be so high that it will force automobile and tractor owners to lay aside their automobiles and tractors. Western Europe will be so weakened that it will allow the mortal enemy to move in. We may as well call a spade a spade.

I am interested in this question from the practical standpoint. I have been against give-aways. I think the foreign-aid program has been handled wrongly. It should have been handled on a more practical basis. Even if it had been, I do not believe so much money should have been spent. However, knowing what has happened throughout the world, knowing the mistakes which have been made, how can my colleagues who say that it was perfectly honest and right, proper and practical to have entered into these arrangements with 43 other nations, now contend that the resolution should be rejected?

If we had a map before us, we would be able to see that Russia is surrounded by nations with whom we have agreements or treaties to defend in case they are attacked, except for the small Middle East countries. What were those who voted for the original program thinking about when they put \$55 billion or \$91 billion—whatever the figure may have been—into Western Europe and failed to enter into agreements with the small Middle Eastern countries, and failed to give them at least \$10 billion of the \$55 billion or \$91 billion? They knew the Middle East had the oil. We knew that the world is dependent on

oil. We knew that Western Europe could not defend itself against an enemy unless it had oil. We know today that Western Europe is using up its military reserve supply of gasoline.

Think of the situation in the world today. Think of all the money, all the effort, and all the time we have invested in giveaways to foreign nations. We have almost bankrupted our own Nation.

Now we have reached the point at which we know Western Europe cannot defend itself unless it has oil. We know that we cannot indefinitely supply oil from the United States. We know that even though we could supply the oil from the United States, Western Europe does not have the dollars with which to buy the oil. We would either have to lend them dollars, give them dollars, or permit them to sell goods in the United States to earn the dollars.

So why are we arguing about \$200 million, which was authorized and appropriated last year? Again, I do not like the idea. I do not know what we were thinking about. I wish we had been more consistent in years gone by.

Perhaps other Senators have a set of facts which I do not have. Perhaps there are certain facts or situations which I do not understand.

I will go along with the effort to cut down foreign aid, and I shall continue to do so. But I feel that I owe it to myself and to my own conscience to bring to the attention of the Senate and the country the situation as I see it with respect to oil.

Whether we like it or not, we must be realistic. We cannot live, we cannot protect ourselves, and we cannot protect our friends, unless we have sufficient oil to make gasoline and to develop power. There is no use in trying to make anything else out of the problem.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the modified amendment offered by the Senator from Georgia (Mr. RUSSELL) on behalf of himself and other Senators, to the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND HIS TWILIGHT

Mr. O'MAHONEY. Mr. President, I came to the floor today without any intention of speaking again on the pending joint resolution. But I find, from telephone communications, from personal conversations with other Members of the Senate, and from reading the speeches which they have delivered, that this body has never been so deeply concerned over any question as it is with respect to the request which is made of us. The speech of the Senator from Indiana (Mr. CAPEHART) is an indication of the deep patriotic concern which Members of the Senate have with respect to this question. I know of no Member of the Senate on either side of the aisle who is motivated by a mere desire to make partisan capital or personal capital against the President or the Secretary of State. But every Member of the Congress knows that we are dealing with a constitutional question which is deeper by far than any issue which has been before Congress since the Federal Union was preserved.

Senators cite previous occasions, from the beginning of our Government, when the President of the United States has directed the use of armed forces outside the continental United States. Those occasions are used as proof that the President has the power to authorize war without the consent of the Congress.

UNPRECEDENTED REQUEST

The argument is not a sound one, because here we have an unusual situation. Never before has a President of the United States asked the Congress to authorize the use of armed forces of this country at the request of a foreign nation. I had great difficulty in the beginning in seeking to have written into the joint resolution a provision that our armed services could be employed only in consonance with the Constitution of the United States. But the country is not aware of what happened. The newspapers paid little attention to what happened.

I testified before the joint meeting of the Armed Services Committee and the Committee on Foreign Relations, and pointed out that the proposal was to allow foreign nations to send American boys into military action, and that there was no mention of the constitutional power of the Congress to declare war. I asked members of the committees to point out a single instance in which Congress had ever tolerated, or any President had ever requested, the power to send armed forces into military conflict at his discretion when a foreign nation asked that it be done.

NOTIFY DRAFT BOARDS

I say to Senators, "Please notify the draft boards in your community that they may be calling into the armed services boys who, in a few months, or within a year, may be carrying their military equipment in the Middle East because a foreign nation requests it and the President agrees, even though the Congress has not declared war."

When I proposed an amendment to the effect that the action of the President and the commitment of our armed services under the joint resolution should be in consonance with the Constitution of the United States, I thought that would be sufficient to convince Members of the Senate and the executive department that it should be done.

When my amendment was adopted on the floor of the Senate, after the committee had rejected it, how many newspapers told their readers, so that the boys who were about to be drafted might know, that on that very day the Department of State wrote a letter to the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, the distinguished senior Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. GREEN), indicating that the State Department was opposed to the amendment?

I inserted that letter in the RECORD after the vote was taken. It reads, in part:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, February 28, 1957.

The Honorable THEODORE FRANCIS GREEN,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign
Relations, United States Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has requested the comments of the Department

of State on two amendments proposed by Senator O'MAHONEY to Senate Joint Resolution 19, as reported by the joint committees. Our comments are as follows:

1. Senator O'MAHONEY's amendment to strike "the Charter of the United Nations" from the proviso at the end of section 2 and to substitute instead the words "the Constitution of the United States."

This proposal would seem to be both unnecessary and undesirable. It is unnecessary to provide that the action of the President should be "consonant with . . . the Constitution of the United States" since presumably the legislation is intended to authorize only constitutional actions and Congress is entitled to assume that the President can be depended upon to act in accord with the Constitution which he is sworn to uphold and defend.

DANGEROUS PRESUMPTION

How can we dare to act upon the presumption that only constitutional action will be taken, when it is clear that the State Department was opposed to my amendment? However, when it rapidly became apparent that no Senator on the floor was willing to vote against inserting my amendment, the telephone lines from the State Department began to burn; and the word came that the amendment was acceptable to Secretary Dulles.

We all know that after the resolution is passed it will have to go to conference with the House of Representatives, which passed the joint resolution in practically the form in which it was originally presented.

Our two committees were so disturbed by the authority being given to the President of the United States in the joint resolution passed by the House, that they spent weeks taking testimony, and they finally rewrote it.

I had put before the committees the suggestion that none of the \$200 million which was to be expended by the President in his own discretion, free from any limitations contained in the Mutual Security Act of 1954, should be spent without prior submission to Congress of complete information with respect to such expenditure.

The committees did not adopt my amendment, but they did write language into the joint resolution which was intended, in part, at least, to obtain the objective I had in mind. I am grateful for their action in doing so. The resolution was improved when it was provided in section 3:

None of the additional authorization contained in this section shall be used until 15 days after the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives and, when military assistance is involved, the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives have been furnished a report showing the object of the proposed use, the country for the benefit of which such use is intended, and the particular appropriation or appropriations for carrying out the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, from which the funds are proposed to be derived.

RESTRAINING HAND

That was an improvement. It was a restraining hand by Congress upon the expenditure of public funds. But the language is still a little vague; it is still

001017350

0002410

a little indeterminate. As I said yesterday or the day before, we are not dealing with \$200 million of appropriated funds under the Mutual Security Act; we are dealing with \$400 million additional which the President in his message frankly told the Senate and House it would be his intention to ask for; and we are setting a precedent.

When my amendment, designed to make a bow to the Constitution of the United States and to the power of Congress thereunder, after being rejected by the committee, then rejected by the State Department, and then accepted by Secretary Dulles in a telephone message, was adopted by a vote of 82 to 0, we began to hear the voices of those who said, in tones of ridicule, "Why, every bill the Congress passes is supposed to be constitutional."

UNCONSTITUTIONAL ACTS

Who does not know that the Supreme Court of the United States has time and time again asserted that acts passed by the Congress were unconstitutional? I was a Member of the Senate when the NRA decision was handed down by the Supreme Court, holding that the legislation which Congress had passed at that time, for the purpose of stopping the depression, was unconstitutional. I remember when in order to wage war against the economic depression, the President of the United States, Franklin D. Roosevelt, a great man and a great President, asked Members of Congress to vote for some of the bills he proposed—and I particularly recall those with respect to the Department of Agriculture—regardless of whether or not they were considered to be constitutional. Congress yielded at that time and passed the bills. They were unconstitutional. Congress had to devise new and different bills to solve the question.

FLESH AND BLOOD

Mr. President, we are not dealing with agriculture; we are not dealing with crops and the prices of crops; we are dealing with the flesh and blood of the men who constitute our armed services. That is the reason why there is so much concern here, and that is the reason why today I venture to trespass upon the time of the Senate to discuss the light-hearted way in which some Members have spoken about the presumption that the laws passed by Congress are constitutional. That is the important fact which ought to be conveyed to every constituent of every Member of this body. A man may go into the courts as an individual citizen to test the constitutionality of an act which affects his economic welfare, but I am unaware of a method by which he can go into court to test the action of a President of the United States who has violated the Constitution of the United States by sidetracking the Congress.

The books are full of cases of this kind. I might recall to the attention of my western friends from the mining areas of the United States that Congress long ago enacted a law to enable miners to establish mining claims. That law was on the statute books and had been followed for many years. It was followed in the State of Nevada from which comes the able Senator who now presides over this

body with such ability and charm [Mr. BIBLE]. Our States in the West were built on this very law, passed by the Congress and signed by the President of the United States, under the Constitution, which provides that the Constitution and treaties of the United States are the supreme law of the land.

Because the executive branch of the Government wanted to change that mining law, but was unable to secure the approval of Congress, the then President of the United States, William Howard Taft, issued an Executive order by which all the lands which Congress had made subject to the filing of mining claims in many areas where there was oil were withdrawn.

I see the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY] pass by. I applaud him again for his statement that the language in the resolution is not satisfactory and is not clear. The Senator is moved by the same motive which I think actuates every other Senator, namely, we hesitate to do a thing which would lose face for the President in dealing with foreign relations.

AMENDMENTS TO CLARIFY

But I say to the Senator, to the Senate, to the Secretary of State, and to the President, that the way to avoid that is to suggest amendments to the resolution which will make it clear. Then they will not be playing with the lives of the boys whose numbers are coming up before the draft boards all across the country.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wyoming yield?

Mr. O'MAHONEY. I yield.

Mr. MORSE. Rather than to embarrass the President before the world, will we not, by voting against the resolution, demonstrate to the world what we mean by a constitutional system of checks and balances?

Mr. O'MAHONEY. We will be showing to the world that this is a representative government and what we can do when war is undertaken at the request of unnamed and unknown foreign nations anywhere in the Middle East.

Mr. MORSE. Does the Senator agree with me that much of the argument we have heard from some of our colleagues throughout this debate about protecting the President and seeing to it that he is not embarrassed, amounts, in fact, to an admission on the part of those Senators that they are willing to abdicate their clear constitutional duty in order to protect from embarrassment the President who has sent to us a resolution which is unconstitutional?

FREE GOVERNMENT AT HOME

Mr. O'MAHONEY. I am compelled to say that I am in sympathy with what the Senator from Oregon has just said. But I feel very deeply that these Senators are troubled, and that if this matter is placed before them in the clearest possible manner—I am not the first to try to do it—they will realize that they are asking us to defend free government abroad while we are destroying it at home.

Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wyoming yield?

Mr. O'MAHONEY. I yield.

Mr. ERVIN. I should like to ask the distinguished Senator from Wyoming if

he does not interpret this resolution as undertaking to authorize the President of the United States to commit the Armed Forces of the United States to offensive warfare as distinguished from defensive warfare, in the Middle East.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. That is correct.

Mr. ERVIN. I should like to ask the Senator if in his judgment the Constitution of the United States does not contemplate that before the United States is committed to offensive warfare, the 96 Senators and 435 Representatives shall pass upon the question whether the facts warrant the United States engaging in offensive warfare.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. Personally, I have no doubt about it, and I want to show the Senate before I conclude today precisely what is proposed to us by the words of Secretary Dulles himself.

Before the Senator from North Carolina asks me another question I wish to say, before I forget it, because I have skipped over it, that I have no hesitation whatever in saying that the telephone communications which have come from the State Department do not represent the purpose of the State Department as expressed by the Assistant Secretary, who, on the 28th of February last, sent a letter to the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee condemning my amendment making reference to the Constitution.

Why should a Secretary of State, or anyone in the Department of State, say that a mere mention of the Constitution in the resolution is undesirable, if it is not their will and intention to disregard it?

Mr. ERVIN. I wish to thank the distinguished Senator from Wyoming for yielding, and I ask him to yield for one final question.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. Very well.

Mr. ERVIN. I ask the Senator this question: If Congress passes this resolution, will not Congress be abdicating its authority to declare war?

SACRIFICE OF POWER

Mr. O'MAHONEY. I have said it over and over again, but I will go further and say to the young men of draft age that if Congress passes the resolution as it is now written, the use of those boys in the armed services will never again be protectible by the Congress of the United States, because we shall have sacrificed the superior power to legislate which the Constitution gave the Congress.

Mr. ERVIN. Does not the Senator think that the people of the United States are entitled to have the benefit of the collective judgment of the 96 Senators and of the 435 Representatives of the United States before any commitment to offensive warfare is made by the President of the United States?

Mr. O'MAHONEY. It seems to me that nobody under heaven can contend to the contrary. Representative government will be gone when that is the practice. I will prove that, as I have said, out of the mouth of the Secretary of State. The Secretary was testifying before the meeting of the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services and was being interrogated by the junior

Senator from Louisiana [Mr. LONG]. The date was January 25, 1957, and the Secretary's testimony, which I shall read, appears on page 307 of the hearings:

Senator LONG. I was under the impression that the State Department spoke for the President in this matter, and that you are testifying here as his spokesman, that you are reflecting his views and what the President feels about this matter.

I hope the Members of the Senate will listen, now, to these words of the Secretary of State. I hope that those who occupy seats in the gallery as the guests of the Senate will also listen to these words, because they come from the very lips of the spokesman of the President:

Secretary DULLES. On the general philosophy of acting with or without congressional sanction, the attitude of Presidents has historically differed.

If it be true, as the Secretary of State tells us, that the attitude of Presidents on the question of the power to send our troops overseas has historically differed, how can anyone deny that I am speaking the truth when I say that the time has come for us to make no doubt about the matter that the precedent from now on shall be that the President must act with the sanction of Congress, and not without it?

The Secretary continues by saying:

And I think it is fair to say that in the light of my judgment, at least, whatever the constitutional view may be, President Eisenhower is very reluctant to use the Armed Forces of the United States in a way which could engage the United States in war unless he has the authority of the Congress.

That is a laudable position for the President to take. But is not the position of the President merely that he is asking for an advance approval of some action he is going to take in the future? When, where, and how, is something which is nowhere explained in the resolution or in the report of the committees. Is this not an approval—and authorization—in advance? Of course it is. The Secretary goes on to say:

And I think, frankly, that the President, President Eisenhower, is more scrupulous, holds that view more strongly, perhaps, than some other Presidents have done.

WHY NO AMENDMENT?

If it be true that there has been a variation in the opinions of the Presidents, and if it be true that President Eisenhower is scrupulous to have the approval of Congress, then why does not the Department of State send to Congress, in black and white, a written amendment which will make it positively certain that neither the President of the United States nor the Secretary of State is asking for a blank check for the future use of the Armed Forces in the defense of the area of the Middle East?

Bear in mind that the resolution and the report, throughout their texts, speak not of nations but of an area—the area of the Middle East, an area which no one has defined. They go even further, the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. ERVIN] points out to me, and sometimes refer to the "general area." That may take us north of the Black Sea, beyond the Caspian Sea, and up the Volga River.

It might take us all the way across North Africa. It might even take us to the Aswan Dam. The Secretary proceeds:

There is, and always has been, I think, an area under our Constitution which is not wholly clear, and where there is a sort of a twilight zone, and within that twilight zone different Presidents often take different approaches; and I think that is an historical fact, and that it influences the situation, irrespective of the views of one or another lawyer as to what is the precise constitutional position.

The Secretary of State has told us exactly where we are: we are in the twilight zone. He said it. Does the President know he said it?

TWILIGHT ZONE

Let the newspapers tell the world that Secretary Dulles, testifying before the joint committees, made it clear to the committees and to Congress:

There is and always has been, I think, an area under our Constitution which is not wholly clear, and where there is a sort of a twilight zone; and within that twilight zone, different Presidents often take different approaches.

What approach is the present President of the United States taking in this twilight zone, which we all know exists?

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. O'MAHONEY. Will the Senator from Oregon pardon me for a moment?

Mr. MORSE. Certainly.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. I was about to say to my colleagues that we cannot fail by our votes to express our belief, when we undertake to join in an authorization to use the Armed Forces of the United States, that there shall be no twilight zone, and that the Commander in Chief should not hold his purposes in secret, but should tell us where he is leading the soldiers, sailors, and airmen who wear our uniform. Are not they entitled to know what the twilight zone of which Secretary Dulles speaks? Mr. President, a reading of this document makes it almost clear. I say "almost," because I like to give the Secretary of State an opportunity to answer. Dare he answer? Will he answer after we have finished? I should like to ask him: "Secretary Dulles, tell us, pray, are you operating in a twilight zone? Do you want to drag us in after you? Let us know what you have in mind, before you expect the Senate to vote for this resolution."

Now I yield to the Senator from Oregon.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, the Senator from Wyoming has asked what is the position of the administration regarding the twilight zone. The Senator from Wyoming recalls, does he not, that the Secretary of State—presumably speaking for the President—refused to accept an amendment under which the President would be obliged to come before the Congress, before he sent American troops to their death in the Middle East, and request congressional approval, based upon the facts then existing.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. I know the Senator from Oregon made such a proposal before the committees when the Secretary of State was testifying there, and

I know the Secretary of State regarded that proposal as undesirable.

Mr. MORSE. Next, let me ask whether the Senator from Wyoming recalls that I also asked the Secretary of State, who I presume was the spokesman for the President of the United States, whether he would accept an amendment to the effect that if the emergency were so great that, in view of the time factor, the President could not wait for the 20 minutes required to travel from the White House to the Congress, to present the facts to the Congress, or could not wait for the 24 hours required to have the Congress convene in special session—and today 24 hours are sufficient for that, in view of modern methods of transportation—

Mr. O'MAHONEY. Mr. President, on that point let me say that on one day the Vice President of the United States was in this Chamber, and the next day he was in Africa, on the Gold Coast. But now we are talking about a journey only from the White House to the Capitol.

Mr. MORSE. That is correct.

I desire to be fair to the administration and to its intentions. Sometimes time is of the essence. So I asked whether the Secretary of State would accept an amendment to the effect that if the President had to order the troops into action first, he would then be required to come before the Congress and present the facts which he believed justified his course of action, and request congressional approval or disapproval. However, the Secretary of State rejected that proposal.

Under the circumstances, Mr. President, I can reach only one conclusion; namely, that the present President of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, refused to accept such an amendment which would place that check upon him. From that circumstance others can draw any conclusion they may wish; but the conclusion I draw is that under this joint resolution, Dwight D. Eisenhower does not want to be controlled by the Constitution of the United States.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. Mr. President, I shall proceed with the reading of the argument the Secretary of State has made regarding the necessity for the action the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] and I have been urging ever since this matter came before the Senate. I turn now to page 308 of the hearings. The Senator from Louisiana [Mr. LONG] brought up the action taken by President Truman in sending troops to Korea. Secretary Dulles responded as follows:

Senator, I hope the resolution is not going to get bogged down into a constitutional discussion as to whether or not President Truman was justified in sending American troops into Korea. It would take a long while to settle that one; and, indeed, nothing that the Congress can do can itself settle it except as an expression of opinion.

NO RESPONSE

Of course the Secretary of State was correct in that answer; but he was not responding to the question asked by the Senator from Louisiana, as the Senator from Louisiana immediately explained. The Senator from Louisiana then said:

All I am asking you, Mr. Secretary, is to answer a question that previous Secretaries

001017350

0002411

had to answer, and that is, what is the power of the President to send forces outside of the United States?

If you do not care to answer the question, you can just tell me, and I will go on to the next question.

Then the Secretary of State made a statement which amounts to four paragraphs, which also are to be found on pages 308 and 309 of the hearings. In order to save time, I shall read only the third paragraph, inasmuch as the first two were designed, it seems to me, to enable the Secretary of State to get his thoughts settled, so that he would make an acceptable record. This is the third paragraph:

And when you contemplate action which may involve a major war, the President feels, President Eisenhower feels, rightly or wrongly, that he does not want to assume the sole responsibility in that respect; and also, which is a very practical matter, that a good many people abroad who are not experts on the United States Constitution, are impressed far more if the Congress has spoken and it is not just the President.

"WE DO NOT KNOW"

So there the Secretary of State told us that President Eisenhower does not want to assume the sole responsibility for this action. What is the action, Mr. President? Will some member of the committees tell me what the action is? It is, an action based upon a contingency at some time in the future, namely, that some foreign nation may ask the President to send our troops into action. Is that the manner in which the Commander in Chief of the armed services of the United States should request the authority of Congress? The President is requesting blank-check authority. The President says to Congress, "I want your cooperation: Here, sign on the dotted line. We do not know what we are going to do. We do not even know how we are going to spend the money. We do not know where or how or when we are going to spend the lives of American soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen. We do not know."

Mr. President, under the Constitution of the United States the Congress has the right to know; the people have the right to know.

Now I read from page 309:

Senator LONG. In your judgment, did President Truman have any right to send American forces or any power to send American forces into Korea?

Secretary DULLES. I never studied that as a lawyer.

In other words, he never had a case which required him to study that proposition as a lawyer. However, the answer to which the Senate is entitled is, not his answer as a lawyer, but his answer as the United States Secretary of State in charge of foreign relations. But the Secretary of State never studied it, he said; he does not know what the President's powers are.

Now I read from page 310:

Senator LONG. And what I am asking you—

He was still addressing the Secretary of State—

is, does this state your position? Is this your opinion, or is this not your opinion? And if I understand your answer, your answer is

"I haven't even thought about these matters." Is that correct?

Asked the Senator from Louisiana.

Secretary Dulles responds:

No, sir. I said I had not given a legal opinion, given legal thought as a lawyer, to the three cases you put to me. You put to me three concrete cases and asked me whether I thought in those particular cases the President had or had not the power.

I said to you that as a constitutional lawyer, I never studied the question.

Mr. President, what a spectacle to have a Secretary of State, who urges us to act promptly, speedily, without thought, upon emotions, confess that he never studied these matters of the President's power as Commander in Chief. Is this record not sufficient in itself to condemn the resolution until the Secretary answers the question?

CHALLENGE TO ANSWER

Mr. President, I challenge him now to answer those questions for the Senate before we vote. It is idle to put the pressure on. It is idle to say, "Oh, stand by the President. Don't let him lose face abroad. What will the world think of us if we state honestly what our views are?"

That is no way to conduct the foreign relations of the United States, and certainly that is no way for the Senate of the United States, which has been given the power to ratify the treaties of the United States, to act. This body itself has a share in international policy. It is being denied to us, and if it is denied now, when the question that arises is one which, as Secretary Dulles himself has admitted, is in the twilight zone, then I have no hesitation in saying, my friends, you will never get out of the twilight zone.

Do Senators think it is possible that a Secretary of State could not have given thought to these matters? He may have forgotten what he said on a previous occasion. He may have forgotten what he told foreign nations in Europe. He may have forgotten what he said in a special document issued by the Department of State.

I hold in my hand, under the imprint of the Department of State and the seal of the United States, a document entitled "Nine-Power Conference, London, September 28-October 3, 1954. Reprint from the Department of State Bulletin." On page 523 of this document, which, of course, is an extract from a more comprehensive Department of State bulletin, I read from the statement of the United States Secretary of State, the Honorable John Foster Dulles, at the fourth plenary meeting, September 29, 1954, at this Nine-Power Conference.

SECRETARY FORGETS

Of course, that was 2½ years ago, and perhaps the Secretary cannot remember, but I am going to put it in the Record so that the Members of the Senate may know what was said and so that the Secretary of State may explain it to us. Remember, we are dealing, Mr. President, with the flesh and blood of the citizens of the United States. We are dealing with the men and the women who go into our armed services, in patriotic response to the call of duty. This is no partisan

attack upon the Secretary. It will be so described, I know, by those who do not care to listen to what the Secretary said 2½ years ago, or interpret it side by side with what he said this year before the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services.

I begin on page 523, second column, about the middle of the page:

I should perhaps explain—

This is an explanation, not to the Congress of the United States; this is an explanation to the Nine-Power Conference—

I should perhaps explain that under our constitutional system the President of the United States is Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States and, as such, has the right to determine their disposition.

WHAT DID HE MEAN?

What did the Secretary of State mean when he testified before the joint committee that he never studied these matters as a lawyer? He did not say he had never studied them as Secretary of State; he said he had never studied them as a lawyer.

The law business of Sullivan & Cromwell probably never included any such problem as this, so he may not have studied them as a lawyer, but he was telling the Nine Power Conference what he thought:

That is a right which cannot be impaired by action of the Congress. Also, while Congress has no authority to deprive the President of his right as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces to make such disposition of those forces as he believes to be in the interest of the security of the United States, it is equally the case that one President of the United States is not constitutionally able to bind his successors in this matter.

Each President of the United States comes into office enjoying the right to dispose of the Armed Forces of the United States as he thinks best serves the interests of the United States in accordance with the advice which he gets—

From Congress? No. From any Member of the Senate? No. From any committee of the Senate? No. From the people of the United States? No. That is not what the Secretary was talking about. What he said in that connection was this:

Each President of the United States comes into office enjoying the right to dispose of the Armed Forces of the United States as he thinks best serves the interests of the United States in accordance with the advice which he gets from his military advisers.

SURRENDER TO GENERALS

Are we going to bypass the power of Congress to declare war and turn it over to the generals who surround the President of the United States? That is the question which must be answered before we can pose before the world as the champion of free government. Here is a statement by the Secretary of State which cannot be misunderstood—that the President has the constitutional power to dispose of the armed services as he deems proper, upon the advice of his military advisers.

I say to this body, to the Congress, and to the country that it was the purpose of the framers of the Constitution in making the President the Commander in

Chief to make certain that military advisers would not have it in their power to declare war. They were thinking of the necessity of having a civilian President, and they thought that George Washington, though a great general, was a civilian President. He resigned his commission as soon as he won the war. There is no question about that. He was a member of the Order of the Cincinnati. Everyone knows who Cincinnati was. He was a Roman general who believed that the civilian authority in a republic was the superior authority.

But that is a policy which Mr. Dulles has utterly forgotten. He tells us that the President and his military advisers will tell the mothers and fathers of America where their sons can be sent into conflict when some unknown, undescribed foreign nation calls, when the President deems it to be necessary.

NO RULE

There is no rule. There is nothing to guide him except the advice of the military. I am happy to acknowledge that President Eisenhower has not always followed the advice of the military. They would have advised him to send our Armed Forces down into Indochina when the French were being attacked by the Communist. He would not do that. What has happened, that he is now willing to ask authority to send troops, "in accordance with the advice which he gets from his military advisers"?

I continue reading from the Secretary's statement:

Therefore it is not constitutionally possible for the United States by treaty, by law, or in any other way to make a legally binding, fixed commitment to maintain any predetermined quota of armed forces in any particular part of the world for any particular period of time.

That, of course, was an understandable statement. He was telling the Nine-Power conference that the President of the United States could not constitutionally, at the request of the European nations, keep a quota of American Armed Forces in Europe to help them. If on the 29th of September, 1954, Mr. Dulles thought that the President did not have the constitutional power, does it not become clear now why we are being asked to give advance authority, when we do not know the facts?

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. O'MAHONEY. I yield.

Mr. MORSE. It would appear that the Secretary of State had studied that much of the constitutional problem involved, would it not?

Mr. O'MAHONEY. I do not think he got the right answer.

Mr. MORSE. At least he had studied it.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. He had studied it; yes.

Mr. MORSE. He indicated to us in committee that he had not.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. That is correct.

Mr. MORSE. I say, good naturedly, as an old teacher, that I never gave a very high grade to a student who studied only a small part of a problem.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. The Secretary of State is a good lawyer.

The next paragraph of the statement, which is the last I shall read, is as follows:

It is nevertheless possible for the President to define a policy which in his opinion makes it appropriate to maintain certain elements of the Armed Forces of the United States in certain areas in pursuance of that policy.

Is he asking us to follow that opinion, that finding, that statement which he made to the Nine Power Conference—

It is nevertheless possible for the President to define a policy which in his opinion makes it appropriate to maintain certain elements of the Armed Forces of the United States in certain areas in pursuance of that policy.

Where is that policy? Where is the area? Where is the nation? Where are the boys going to serve? Did the Secretary of State ever consult the President about this interpretation of the power of the President? Is this the sort of position the President wishes to take? I do not believe it. I believe it is true that the President desires to work with the Congress, but I cannot read these excerpts from the language of the Secretary of State and not come to the definite conclusion that he wants to have us establish a precedent never before undertaken by any President, whereby our armed services can be sent abroad at the demand of another nation. Surely this is an action which we shall never, never take—or should I say that we should never take?

ARMS RACE

I say to my friends who believe in economic aid rather than military aid that I share their feeling. I have long felt that by shipping arms abroad into the hands of unknown governments, unknown military leaders, we are only promoting war. We are not working for peace. We are only engaged in an arms race which may wreck the world. If we authorize this deployment of our Armed Forces in the Middle East, do we blind our eyes to the facts which are being given to us from official sources, sources which cannot be challenged, to the effect that the progress of Russia in building up its military power is steadily gaining upon us?

We came out of the World War with the largest submarine fleet and the largest Air Force in all the world, and we were willing to use them for peace. Now we are reliably informed that Russia has more submarines than we have. We are advised that her airpower has been magnified over and over again in the years during which we have been following the leadership of Secretary Dulles.

Do we not know that Soviet Russia has never abandoned its policy to conquer the world? Can anyone deny for a minute that if we commit our forces in the Middle East, we are only helping Soviet Russia to prepare for the big cataclysm, world war III, which we want to avoid?

Oh, the report comes to us with a pleasant title, one which appeals to the heart and to the sentiment of the people of the United States. I read the title from Report No. 70, 85th Congress, 1st

session. I give that number so that anyone who wants a copy of the report will know that by writing to the Superintendent of Documents at the Government Printing Office or by writing to his Senator or Representative, he may get a copy of the report. It is entitled "To Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East."

Apparently we promote peace by military assistance; apparently we promote peace by promulgating a new doctrine of constitutional powers, under which the President may order the armed services wherever he pleases, provided only that a foreign nation in the general area of the Middle East shall ask for the assistance.

SUBSTITUTES PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT

Mr. President, I feel as deeply on this subject as I have ever felt on any matter which has come before the Senate since I first became a Member of it, on the 1st day of January 1934. It rises above partisanship. It rises above personalities. It lies at the basis of the maintenance of government of the people, by the people, for the people, and substitutes government by the President.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, knowing that the Senator is about to conclude his remarks, I do not want him to close without first giving me a minute to make a comment. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. O'MAHONEY. I yield.

Mr. MORSE. I commend the Senator for the great argument he has made in the Senate against the resolution. I wish to say to him something I have never told him privately, and which I desire first to say to him publicly, namely, that the Senator from Wyoming, great lawyer that he is, has been one of my fountains of inspiration during my service in the Senate.

I have followed the Senator from Wyoming in one great constitutional argument after another. As one who tries to be a student of government, I particularly wish to thank him for the leadership he has given the Senate during this historic debate.

I fear that much of the weight of the Senator's argument, and the unanswerable premises he has advanced, are falling pretty much on a Senate that has steeled itself to ignore the great constitutional issue involved in the resolution.

However, I must say that when students of the future come to study this historic debate, the constitutional arguments of the Senator from Wyoming will stand out in all their crystal clearness and their unanswerability. I thank him very much for the courage he has displayed in the debate, in warning the Senate and the American people that in considering the issue we are confronted, unfortunately, with leaders, both in the executive branch of the Government and in the legislative branch, who are not giving heed to their constitutional responsibilities and obligations. When I come to vote against the resolution, I shall know that I am voting to support the oath I took when I became a Member of the Senate, to sustain the Constitution. The pending resolution cannot be reconciled with the Constitution.

1957

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

2593

Mr. O'MAHONEY. The Senator is very kind. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SCOTT in the chair). The clerk will call the roll.

The Chief Clerk called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Aiken	Flanders	Morton
Allott	Frear	Mundt
Anderson	Goldwater	Murray
Barrett	Gore	Neely
Beall	Hayden	Neuberger
Bennett	Hennings	O'Mahoney
Bible	Hickenlooper	Pastore
Blankley	Hill	Payne
Bricker	Hruska	Potter
Bush	Humphrey	Purtell
Butler	Jackson	Revercomb
Byrd	Javits	Robertson
Capchart	Jenner	Russell
Carlson	Johnson, Tex.	Saitonstall
Carroll	Johnson, S. C.	Schoeppel
Case, N. J.	Kefauver	Scott
Case, S. Dak.	Kennedy	Smathers
Chavez	Knowland	Smith, Maine
Church	Kuchel	Smith, N. J.
Clark	Lausche	Stennis
Cooper	Long	Symington
Cotton	Magnuson	Talmadge
Curtis	Malone	Thurmond
Dirksen	Manfield	Thye
Douglas	Martin, Iowa	Watkins
Dworshak	Martin, Pa.	Wiley
Eastland	McClellan	Williams
Eliender	Monroney	Young
Ervin	Morse	

The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quorum is present.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I may say, for the information of the Senate, that I expect the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY] to speak for a very few minutes. Then I am very hopeful that we may have a quorum call and a vote on the Russell amendment. If we are able to accomplish that, I assure the Senate, so far as I am able to protect them in this respect, that there will be no other yeand-nay votes this afternoon.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, as has been indicated by the majority leader, I shall confine my remarks to the amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by the Senator from Georgia for himself and on behalf of other Senators. I shall also refer to some of the press commentary relating to the delay in the Senate concerning the consideration of this all-important piece of proposed legislation.

There are those who have said that the "Democratic Senate," as the words are printed, was guilty of undue delay in the consideration of the Eisenhower resolution, or the Middle East resolution. I am convinced that an effort has been made, through what are called background meetings and planted stories, to tell the American public that the resolution has been delayed beyond a reasonable time, and that the responsibility for the delay rests upon the leadership of the Senate, and, in particular, upon the Democratic membership of the Senate.

Speaking only for myself, I think it is fair to state that the majority leader and, yes, the minority leader have both sought to expedite action on the resolution.

Furthermore, whenever a request has been made for unanimous consent, Mem-

bers of the Senate have exercised their prerogatives in either granting or not granting such consent. It is to be presumed that when a Senator does not want to agree to a unanimous consent agreement, he has good reason for so doing and that his motives are not to be questioned. I feel that to indicate to the contrary would be doing a disservice to this body.

In examining the RECORD, it will be found that the resolution was presented in a most unorthodox manner. I shall not burden my colleagues with a repetition of that unfortunate story. But prior to the delivery by the President of his message on January 5, concerning the situation in the Middle East, there had been for several days newspaper stories which carried the text, almost to the word, of the resolution which was ultimately presented.

The President addressed Congress in extraordinary session on January 5 concerning the Middle East situation, prior to the delivery of his state of the Union message. It will be noted that the proposal was introduced as Senate Joint Resolution 19 on January 9, 1957. It was immediately considered by the Committee on Foreign Relations, and hearings were set, by a unanimous vote of the Democrats and Republicans on the committee, to begin on January 14.

Open public testimony was taken starting on January 14. Every day was used in taking valuable testimony and in having the issues discussed openly before the American people. It should be noted that the public hearings were concluded on February 11.

On February 12 and February 13, following the conclusion of the public hearings, the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services met in joint session to consider the resolution.

The resolution was ordered reported to the Senate on February 13, 1957, by a vote of 20 to 8, and was actually reported to the Senate on February 14. The debate on the resolution commenced in the Senate on February 19.

I cite this chronology because the Senate has actually had the resolution under consideration since February 19. We have actually had before us for a little more than 2 weeks a resolution which has consequences of the gravest import, a resolution which pledges the Armed Forces of the United States for use in the Middle East, if they are needed there to resist Communist aggression; a resolution which pledges the lives, fortunes, honor, and integrity of 170 million Americans and the whole substance of this Republic; and, let me add, a resolution which fundamentally alters the economic and military assistance programs.

All I am saying, Mr. President, is that it would have been unworthy of the Senate to have taken less time.

Furthermore, let me say that during this period there have been some very critical decisions to be made in the United Nations, as regards the overall foreign policy of our country and other countries in the case of the Middle East. In addition the leaders of this body have been called to the White House, and they have been in consultation with the Sec-

retary of State. All of this has had its effect upon the time required for our consideration of so important a measure.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Minnesota yield to me?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. KENNEDY in the chair). Does the Senator from Minnesota yield to the Senator from Illinois?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I am happy to yield.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Is it not also true that the period from approximately February 10 to February 23, namely, the period during which our friends on the other side of the aisle address Lincoln Day dinners in various parts of the country, has always been set aside as one during which yeand-nay votes are not to be taken on important questions?

Mr. HUMPHREY. That is the general understanding. In this instance, however, I wish to say there was so complete an understanding on both sides of the aisle that the joint resolution required much discussion, that such an agreement was not arrived at in this instance. But the Senator from Illinois has stated what is the general pattern.

Mr. DOUGLAS. But is it not a part of the general procedure of the Senate that the period from approximately February 10 to February 23 is set aside in order that our friends on the other side of the aisle may make Lincoln Day speeches in various places of the country; and is it not also true that a similar courtesy is extended to Members on this side of the aisle when the somewhat movable date of the Jefferson-Jackson Day dinners arrives and those dinners are held?

Mr. HUMPHREY. That is correct.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, will the Senator from Minnesota yield to me?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I should like to say that I wish the RECORD to show that following the President's message, the distinguished minority leader, the senior Senator from California [Mr. KNOWLAND], informed me that he had notified all Senators on his side of the aisle that this year they could not expect to be away from the Senate on Lincoln's Birthday, and that he would not make such a request of the leadership.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes, Mr. President; and I wish to have the RECORD show that I said I knew of no such agreement in this instance.

As a matter of fact, I am not complaining about the debate on the pending measure. I think we owe a debt of gratitude to every Senator who has participated in the debate on it.

Mr. CARLSON. Mr. President, will the Senator from Minnesota yield to me?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. CARLSON. I think the RECORD should show, as the majority leader has just stated, that the minority leader wrote to every Member on this side of the aisle a letter saying that we should forget the customary observance of Lincoln's Birthday, and should not expect to be away from the Senate during the holiday.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I want the RECORD to show that the minority leader did not say they should forget Lincoln; he simply said they should not expect to be away during that period of time. [Laughter.]

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, certainly no one has tried more than have the majority leader and the minority leader to expedite the taking of action on this measure.

My point is that it is not good to have the country told that, in the case of a measure so important as this one—regardless of what may be a Senator's view or regardless of how he may intend to vote on the measure—any Senator who takes some time to debate it is engaging in foot dragging and in delaying action.

The fact is that the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. GREEN] and the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], the chairmen of the Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Services Committee, respectively, attended every session of the hearings. Important witnesses appeared at every meeting of the committees held. As all members of the committees will recall, although the discussion in the committees was not heated, yet there was great interest in it.

So I believe it is a disservice to the processes of democracy to say that when a body such as the United States Senate decides to go meticulously into every part of an important measure, there is undue delay.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, if the Senator from Minnesota will yield further to me, I should like to state for the RECORD that in the Senate of the United States we have now debated this very far-reaching and all-enveloping and important measure for 11 days, whereas in a previous Congress, the debate on the troops-to-Europe question took some 20 days.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Minnesota yield to me?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. GORE. I appreciate the statements the able junior Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY] has made. However, I must say in all candor that I do not feel that any defense of the record of the Senate in connection with this debate is necessary. I call to the attention of the Senate the fact that on yesterday and today the debate has been particularly elucidating. Both yesterday and today, Members have reached their final conclusions on the floor of the Senate, as a result of the debate. Instead of feeling that some defense should be made, I believe the Senate is to be commended for the careful, scrutinizing debate which has been conducted upon this issue.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I thank the Senator from Tennessee.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, let me say that I trust that is a bipartisan commendation, because, as the Senator pointed out earlier today, we attempted to arrive at an agreement as to when debate on the joint resolution should end and when voting should begin, but objections came from both sides of the aisle. First, the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] objected, and then the Senator from Nevada [Mr. MALONE]

objected, and then the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. McCARTHY] objected. So we have had bipartisan objection; and if the Senate is to be commended, I think the commendation should also be bipartisan.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes. Furthermore, I have said that Members who object have a right to do so, and undoubtedly have good reason for doing so, because they are experienced legislators. So there is no necessity for anyone to try to pressure them or bludgeon them; and no such attempt has been made.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. That is the position of the majority leader, and that has been his position when objection has been made.

Mr. HUMPHREY. That is correct.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Minnesota yield further to me?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. GORE. I have not objected; but I must say, in all candor, that the record of attendance of Senators during the debate on yesterday and today illustrates, I believe there is some value in having uncertainty as to the time when the vote will be taken. If we had had a unanimous-consent agreement that the Senate would vote next Thursday, I daresay we would not see one-half of the Senate in attendance at this moment. But here we are, attending to the debate, and participating in it.

I believe that no defense is necessary for the objections to proposed unanimous consent agreements or for other objections. The Senate is to be commended; and, so far as I am concerned, it may be a bipartisan commendation.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I hope the Senator from Tennessee realizes that to some extent the attendance of Senators is due to the quorum calls which have been had and to the fact that Senators could not be recorded as present unless they were present.

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, will the Senator from Minnesota yield to me?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. WILEY. An American philosopher once said, "Why explain? Your friends do not need it; and your enemies will not believe you, anyway." [Laughter.]

Mr. HUMPHREY. That was Elbert Hubbard.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Minnesota yield to me?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Oregon.

Mr. MORSE. I had stepped out of the Chamber momentarily, and I missed the beginning of what I am sure was another one of the great contributions of the Senator from Minnesota to the forensic history of the Senate.

Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator from Oregon is correct. [Laughter.]

Mr. MORSE. But from what I heard the Senator from Minnesota say, I judged that some Members had interpreted his remarks as being a defense of the objections which some of us have made to proposals that debate on the pending measure be closed. If that is what the Senator from Minnesota was doing, let me say that I appreciate his spirit and his sentiment; but so far as I am concerned,

I do not ask for any defense, and I want no defense. I intend to keep right on objecting to proposed unanimous-consent agreements.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I wish to say for the Senator from Oregon that he never leaves anyone in doubt. [Laughter.] That is always a reassuring and, let me say, a refreshing experience in political life.

I wish to assure him that no defense was being made. Instead of defending or offending, I was merely asserting.

Mr. President, this morning I listened to one Member of the Senate say that it would be politically unpopular for Senators to vote for more economic assistance or to vote for the economic assistance section of the joint resolution. I really think that is true. Nevertheless, Mr. President, some of us will run that risk.

I have also heard it said that the pending amendment of the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] to the committee amendment does not cripple the foreign-aid program. I think that is true, and I do not believe anyone should interpret the Russell amendment as being one which would cripple the foreign aid program.

However, Mr. President, my feeling is that the economic-aid section of the joint resolution has a particularly important relationship to the tone and the whole body of the joint resolution and its impact upon the world, particularly upon the Middle East. One of the witnesses said, I believe, that in part that impact was psychological. I think that should be repeated; I think it is true that in part the impact of the economic-aid section of the joint resolution is psychological.

I should like to say to my friends in the administration that to present an economic-aid program in the manner in which the joint resolution presents one is seriously to jeopardize in the future any truly effective economic-aid policy. I cannot help but say that the administration has done a great disservice to long-term economic aid by the kind of loose, undocumented presentation represented in the resolution before the Senate. I believe it has actually fed the fires of opposition to economic aid. I hope that at some time we may arrive at a truly long-term foreign economic policy.

I desire to make my views perfectly clear. There is no foreign economic policy on the part of this Government. We have not had one since the Marshall plan. It has become a policy of political and economic expediency. It has become, as was stated by the late beloved Senator from Connecticut [Senator McMahon], a checkbook reflex. That is not what we ought to have in fighting the cold war with the Communist areas of the world. We are going to need a foreign economic policy.

Later, in the final consideration of the resolution, I shall present my views in more detail than I do now. I now add only that the protections to be found in the particular section under discussion are protections in the economic field. The Senator from Texas [Mr. JOHNSON] in committee offered an amendment which was agreed to, providing that no

001017350

0002413

expenditures shall be made until there is a 15-day notice to the appropriate committees of Congress. Furthermore, the Senator from Virginia [Mr. BYRD] offered another amendment which required that the authorizations go only to the end of the fiscal year. I say that if the battle can be fought on the mutual security bill, that is where the fight should be made. I regret to say that those who may vote against the Russell amendment now, from the statements made, unless they change their minds, may vote against a sound mutual security economic policy in the days to come. I hope they will be charitable and not make up their minds so quickly.

Mr. President, I know Senators have waited to vote, and that some have commitments they desire to keep. I shall yield the floor at this time so the Senate may vote.

ORDER FOR RECESS TO MONDAY AT 11 A. M.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I remind Senators that the Senate will not vote on the resolution today. We plan to vote on only the Russell amendment. However, the Senate will be in session the rest of the day, and will be in session on Monday, when the resolution or other amendments may be discussed.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate concludes its business today, it stand in recess until 11 o'clock a. m. on Monday.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PROMOTION OF PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Senate resumed the consideration of the joint resolution (S. J. Res. 19) to authorize the President to undertake economic and military cooperation with nations in the general area of the Middle East in order to assist in the strengthening and defense of their independence.

Mr. NEUBERGER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the body of the RECORD a statement explaining my reasons for opposing the Russell amendment. In brief, my reasons are essentially these: If it is wrong for us to be in the Middle East with \$200 million in economic aid, then it is many times as wrong to authorize American soldiers to fight there.

I ask unanimous consent that my statement may be printed in the RECORD following my remarks.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR NEUBERGER

This amendment poses for me a somewhat disturbing set of values. We are asked to separate from the Middle East resolution that section which would authorize the administration to use in this area some \$200 million in funds for economic aid. These funds, incidentally, have already been appropriated. Their separation from the resolution would presumably save the Treasury no money.

But if it is wrong for us to be in the Middle East with \$200 million in economic aid,

then it is many times as wrong to authorize American soldiers to fight there. If the danger of war and of Communist aggression in the Middle East is sufficiently imminent to warrant the use of our troops in that part of the world, is the Senate going to say that \$200 million should not accompany the troops or precede them? On which is the higher value placed, blood or dollars?

I am not an expert on this—far from it. But I have been greatly puzzled by a philosophy which can bring about a prolonged debate concerning \$200 million in funds already appropriated, but which can devote apparently less discussion to the alleged need for American soldiers to assure the peace.

President Eisenhower has asked for permission to use \$200 million in appropriated funds, as he and his aides deem fit, in the Middle East area for a period of 120 days. He also has requested authority to employ American troops in that area to stem Communist aggression, if necessary. If we are to accept the President's statement that our soldiers may be needed, are we to cavil now about the \$200 million? I would authorize many times \$200 million—speaking for just one Senator—if in the slightest degree it would serve to forestall or prevent the need for sending American soldiers into combat in that troubled and strife-torn section of our globe.

I am opposed to any suggestion that this country be isolationist with dollars, and internationalist with soldiers. If we are sending troops to these distant areas, can we then hold back on money? We have to follow one policy consistently with respect to our men and to our dollars.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The Chief Clerk called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Aiken	Flanders	Morton
Allott	Frear	Mundt
Anderson	Goldwater	Murray
Barrett	Gore	Neely
Beall	Hayden	Neuberger
Bennett	Hennings	O'Mahoney
Bible	Hickenlooper	Pastore
Blakley	Hill	Payne
Bricker	Hruska	Potter
Bush	Humphrey	Purcell
Butler	Jackson	Revercomb
Byrd	Javits	Robertson
Capehart	Jenner	Russell
Carson	Johnson, Tex.	Saltinostall
Carroll	Johnston, S. C.	Schoeppe
Case, N. J.	Kefauver	Scott
Case, S. Dak.	Kennedy	Smathers
Chavez	Knowland	Smith, Maine
Church	Kuchel	Smith, N. J.
Clark	Lausche	Stennis
Cooper	Long	Symington
Cotton	Magnuson	Talmadge
Curtis	Malone	Thurmond
Dirksen	Manfield	Thye
Douglas	Martin, Iowa	Watkins
Dworsshak	Martin, Pa.	Wiley
Eastland	McClellan	Williams
Ellender	Monroney	Young
Ervin	Morse	

The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quorum is present.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I ask that, for the benefit of the Members of the Senate, the pending amendment on which the Senate is about to vote may be stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The Chief Clerk read the amendment, as modified, offered by Mr. RUSSELL, for himself and other Senators, in the nature of a substitute for the committee amendment, as amended, as follows:

In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the committee amendment, insert the following:

"That the United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East. To this end, if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any nation or group of nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism: *Provided*, That such employment shall be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the Constitution of the United States.

"Sec. 2. This joint resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the nations in the general area of the Middle East are reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise except that it may be terminated earlier by a concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress."

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. As I understand, if a Senator favors the Russell amendment, he should vote "yea"; and if he opposes it, he should vote "nay."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Did not the Senator from Georgia, at my suggestion, modify his amendment the other day by inserting the word "such" before the words "nation" and "nations" on page 1, line 6?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment was modified on page 2, line 2, only.

The question is on agreeing to the modified amendment offered by the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] on behalf of himself and other Senators as a substitute for the committee amendment, as amended. On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I announce that the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. GREEN], the Senator from Florida [Mr. HOLLAND], the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. KERR], the Senator from Michigan [Mr. McNAMARA], and the Senator from Alabama [Mr. SPARKMAN] are absent on official business.

On this vote the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. GREEN] is paired with the Senator from Florida [Mr. HOLLAND].

If present and voting, the Senator from Rhode Island would vote "nay" and the Senator from Florida would vote "yea."

The Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. KERR] is paired with the Senator from Michigan [Mr. McNAMARA].

If present and voting, the Senator from Oklahoma would vote "yea" and the Senator from Michigan would vote "nay."

I further announce, if present and voting, the Senator from Alabama [Mr. SPARKMAN] would vote "nay."

Mr. DIRKSEN. I announce that on this vote the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. BRIDGES], who is absent because of illness, is paired with the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. McCARTHY], who is detained on official business. If present and voting the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. BRIDGES] would vote "nay" and the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. McCARTHY] would vote "yea."

On this vote the Senator from New York [Mr. IVES], who is absent because of illness, is also paired with the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. LANGER], who is absent because of illness. If present and voting, the Senator from New York [Mr. IVES] would vote "nay" and the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. LANGER] would vote "yea."

The result was announced—yeas 28, nays 58, as follows:

YEAS—28

Anderson	Hruska	Neely
Bible	Jenner	Robertson
Byrd	Johnston, S. C.	Russell
Chavez	Long	Scott
Curtis	Magnuson	Smathers
Eastland	Malone	Stennis
Ellender	Manfield	Talmadge
Ervin	McClellan	Thurmond
Frear	Morse	
Goldwater	Murray	

NAYS—58

Alken	Dworshak	Mundt
Allott	Flanders	Neuberger
Barrett	Gore	O'Mahoney
Beall	Hayden	Pastore
Bennett	Hennings	Payne
Blakley	Hickenlooper	Potter
Bricker	Hill	Purtell
Bush	Humphrey	Revercomb
Butler	Jackson	Saltonstall
Capehart	Javits	Schoeppl
Carlson	Johnson, Tex.	Smith, Maine
Carroll	Kefauver	Smith, N. J.
Case, N. J.	Kennedy	Symington
Case, S. Dak.	Knowland	Thye
Church	Kuchel	Watkins
Clark	Lausche	Wiley
Cooper	Martin, Iowa	Williams
Cotton	Martin, Pa.	Young
Dirksen	Monroney	
Douglas	Morton	

NOT VOTING—10

Bridges	Ives	McNamara
Fulbright	Kerr	Sparkman
Green	Langer	
Holland	McCarthy	

So Mr. RUSSELL's amendment, as modified, to the committee amendment, was rejected.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I move that the Senate reconsider the vote by which the amendment was rejected.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I move that the motion to reconsider be laid on the table.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. KENNEDY in the chair). The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from California.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question recurs on agreeing to the committee substitute, as amended.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I may say, for the information of the Senate, that we expect the Senate to be in session for some time, but the Readership will attempt to protect Sen-

ators from any further rollcalls this afternoon.

The Senate will meet at 11 o'clock on Monday next, under the previous order. I tell Senators frankly that I do not expect any rollcalls on Monday, and I shall do all I can to see that none occur.

INTERMOUNTAIN SCHOOLS FOR INDIANS

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that an article which appeared in the New York Times of February 24 be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

This article is entitled Navajo Students Get Pick of Jobs, and deals particularly with those Navajo students who are now studying or are about to graduate from what is known as the Intermountain Indian School at Brigham City, Utah. The school is the largest Indian boarding school operated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and we were most fortunate in being able to acquire this facility for these Navajo children.

It was originally built, as the article states, to house the Bushnell General Hospital, and in 1949 was declared surplus, and was about to be disposed of for a very few cents on the dollar. At my suggestion the townspeople at Brigham City and the Bureau of Indian Affairs held conferences to discuss the possibility of having this hospital equipped as a boarding school for thousands of the Navajo children who in 1949 could not be educated because of a lack of sufficient facilities. To accomplish this purpose I sponsored legislation which authorized the General Services Administration to transfer the hospital plant to the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Later I secured a \$3,750,000 appropriation which made it possible to convert the plant into an Indian school.

The conversion from hospital to boarding school was accomplished in record time, and now 2,300 Navajo children are housed there from early fall until graduation time, the first of May. This school, incidentally, is one of the largest boarding schools in the world.

This New York Times article fairly presents the situation, and gives plaudits to the career people who have made such a success of this very worthwhile undertaking.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

NAVAHO STUDENTS GET PICK OF JOBS—EMPLOYERS BID FOR GRADUATES OF UTAH VOCATIONAL SCHOOL—2,300 IN CLASSES

BRIGHAM CITY, Utah, February 23.—Vocational training given at the Intermountain School for Indians here has proved so successful that employers are competing for the services of graduates.

Special skills of the 200 seniors in the 1957 class, who will be graduated April 30, range from body and fender repair to upholstering for the boys, and from hospital ward to film library service for girls.

Instruction covers a much broader range than the specialties the students pursue. Dr. George A. Boyce, school superintendent, says that language, mathematics, science, and other subjects are taught to help the

young people "cope with life no matter what their changing circumstances may be."

Twenty-three hundred young Navahos now are studying on the 300-acre campus. Expansive as this layout may seem by normal collegiate standards, it seems somewhat restricted, at first, to the students. They come from a 15-million-acre reservation that takes in a large part of Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, and Utah.

TWENTY-SEVEN DORMITORIES ON CAMPUS

But the youngsters, most of them reared in hogans, a kind of mud hut, are amazed at facilities of the school. These facilities include 27 dormitories, 24 vocational shops, dining halls, a 900-seat auditorium, a hospital, and other school buildings.

The school's big swimming pool strikes a luxury note many of these newcomers, fresh from the parched reservation, cannot even understand.

"Is this all to be drunk?" one asked.

Most of the students suffer, on arrival, from shyness, undernourishment, and lack of formal schooling. Dr. Boyce and a staff of 450, over 100 of them teachers, seek to overcome these deficiencies while imparting the ways of the white men.

"We expose them consciously to a great variety of problems, social, economic, esthetic, ethical, and personal," Dr. Boyce says, "so they will know how to solve problems. For example, language, mathematics, science, emotional skills become tools, rather than objectives in themselves."

Midway in their sophomore year, students make a tentative selection of the vocations they think they might like to follow. They give first, second, and third preferences. At the end of the sophomore year they make their actual choice but also give second and third choices.

START VOCATIONAL TRAINING

When they return in the fall for their junior year, they embark on vocational training. Aptitude tests are used in helping the youngsters make a decision.

Girls can study home service, store clerking, hospital ward work, restaurant duties, dormitory award work and film library service. For boys, the 20 areas of training include automobile mechanics, welding, farm-

OVERRULING CASE

1789-1932

1. *Hudson v. Guestier* ((1810) 6 Cr. 281, 285).
2. *Gordon v. Ogden* ((1830) 3 Pet. 33, 34).
3. *Louisville Railroad Co. v. Letson* ((1845) 2 How. 497, 554-556).
4. *The Genessee Chief* ((1851) 12 How. 433, 456).
5. *Gazzam v. Phillip's Lessee* (20 How. 372, 377-378 (1858)).
6. *Mason v. Eldred* ((1868) 6 Wall. 231, 238).
7. *The Belfast* ((1869) 7 Wall. 624, 641).
8. *Legal Tender Cases* ((1871) 12 Wall. 457, 553).
9. *Hornbuckle v. Toombs* ((1874) 18 Wall. 648, 652-653).
10. *U. S. v. Phelps* ((1883) 107 U. S. 320, 323).
11. *Kountze v. Omaha Hotel Co.* ((1883) 107 U. S. 378, 387).
12. *Morgan v. U. S.* ((1885) 113 U. S. 476, 496).
13. *Leloup v. Port of Mobile* ((1888) 127 U. S. 640, 647).
14. *Leisy v. Hardin* ((1890) 135 U. S. 100, 118).

001017850

0002414

1957

2525

by me that "Humble takes its orders from Standard of New Jersey." The testimony I gave its exactly to the contrary.

In fairness I would hope that you will insert this letter in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD and otherwise acknowledge the error which I feel quite sure was purely an error unintentionally made.

Sincerely,

HINES H. BAKER,
President.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is closed.

PROMOTION OF PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the joint resolution (S. J. Res. 19) to authorize the President to undertake economic and military cooperation with nations in the general area of the Middle East in order to assist in the strengthening and defense of their independence.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from California will state it.

Mr. KNOWLAND. What is the pending question?

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The pending question is on agreeing to the amendment, as modified, proposed by the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], for himself, the Senator from Virginia [Mr. BYRD], and the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS], as a substitute for the committee amendment, as amended.

Mr. FLANDERS obtained the floor.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FLANDERS. I yield.

Mr. KNOWLAND. The Senator is about to make a very important speech. I wonder if he would yield for a quorum call.

Mr. FLANDERS. I shall be glad to yield, with the understanding that I will not lose the floor.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The Chief Clerk called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Aiken	Gore	Payne
Allott	Hayden	Purtell
Beall	Hickenlooper	Revercomb
Blakley	Jenner	Robertson
Butler	Johnson, Tex.	Russell
Byrd	Knowland	Schoepfel
Clark	Kuchel	Smith, N. J.
Cotton	Lausche	Thurmond
Ervin	McCarthy	Watkins
Flanders	Morse	Williams
Frear	Mundt	Young

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Thirty-three Senators have answered to their names. A quorum is not present. The clerk will call the names of absent Senators.

The Chief Clerk called the names of absent Senators, and Mr. BARRETT, Mr. BENNETT, Mr. BRICKER, Mr. BUSH, Mr. CARROLL, Mr. CASE of New Jersey, Mr. CASE of South Dakota, Mr. CHURCH, Mr. DWORSHAK, Mr. GREEN, Mr.

HILL, Mr. HRUSKA, Mr. JACKSON, Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina, Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. MARTIN of Iowa, Mr. MARTIN of Pennsylvania, Mr. MORTON, Mr. MURRAY, Mr. PASTORE, Mr. POTTER, Mr. SALTONSTALL, Mr. SCOTT, Mrs. SMITH of Maine, Mr. SPARKMAN, Mr. SYMINGTON, Mr. TALMADGE, Mr. THYE, and Mr. WILEY answered to their names when called.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I announce that the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. ANDERSON], the Senator from Nevada [Mr. BIBLE], the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. CHAVEZ], the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DOUGLAS], the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. EASTLAND], the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. ELLENDER], the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], the Senator from Missouri [Mr. HENNING], the Senator from Florida [Mr. HOLLAND], the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY], the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. KEFAUVER], the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY], the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. KERR], the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. LONG], the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON], the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. MCCLELLAN], the Senator from Michigan [Mr. McNAMARA], the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. MONRONEY], the Senator from Oregon [Mr. NEUBERGER], the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. O'MAHONEY], the Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS], and the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS] are absent on official business.

The Senator from West Virginia [Mr. NEELY] is absent because of illness.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I announce that the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. BRIDGES], the Senator from Indiana [Mr. CAPEHART], the Senator from New York [Mr. IVES], and the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. LANGER] are absent because of illness.

The Senator from Kansas [Mr. CARLSON], the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER], the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. CURTIS], the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. GOLDWATER], the Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS], and the Senator from Nevada [Mr. MALONE] are detained on official business.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Sixty-two Senators have answered to their names. A quorum is present.

Mr. FLANDERS. Mr. President, I desire to address myself briefly to the pending question.

In order to come to a clear conclusion in my own mind as to supporting the Mideast resolution, I have had to consider it as a part of the larger picture rather than as an isolated crisis. The larger picture seems to me to be the major factor in the consideration of the resolution.

We have before us and around us the continuing world crisis. This crisis has never ceased to surround us since the day when Archduke Ferdinand was shot in the streets of Sarajevo. At no time since that date has the continuing crisis been resolved. There have been wars and military victories, but at no time for 43 years has the world had peace. We have played a deciding part in two of the

great military victories, and have endured the slow agony of a bloody stalemate in a distant Asiatic peninsula. The ending of the two World Wars and the ending of the Korean struggle solved no problems. The only result yielding the seeds of hope lies in the establishment of the United Nations. Even that has yet to prove its continuing worth and effectiveness in the continuing crisis of history.

Despite the continuing disturbances and the unsolved problems, it yet seems to me, Mr. President, that at this time the opportunities of moving toward a peace which is based on freedom and justice are nearer than at any time in this century. Furthermore, it seems to me that the wise handling of the situation in the Middle East offers an opportunity to advance this great undertaking of peace with justice and freedom. It is as a hopeful effort to meet the larger problem that we should view the restricted area to which the pending resolution is addressed.

First, let me briefly give the grounds for hope. We continue properly to keep ourselves in a strong defensive posture. We seek likewise to help maintain that same posture among the nations whose ultimate purposes are the same as ours. We end the whole free world should have learned that this is defensive only. In the words of the great strategist of a past generation, Admiral Mahan:

The purpose of military power is to provide time for moral ideas to take root.

If we are to accept this judgment, as we should, we will recognize that the authority to use armed force in this emergency, ambiguously given in the resolution in my judgment, is a necessary provision, but one of very limited usefulness. The best it can do for this particular period and in this given area is "to provide time for moral ideas to take root."

The best way to advance moral ideas is to put them in terms of self-interest. For it is a part of my own experience and my philosophy that the results from the practice of moral principles and of long-range self-interest cannot be distinguished from each other. Let me mention briefly the hopeful elements of self-interest which we can bring into the whole confused area of Europe and Africa.

First, it is to the self-interest of the Russian people that they should be permitted to devote their labor and their natural resources to increasing their own well-being. It will become evident at some time, and in the not too distant future, that power and authority in the Soviet empire can best be maintained by those rulers who devote themselves to the interests of the people. Beginnings have already been made, even though for the present the government in Moscow has attempted to erase those beginnings. Malenkov proposed them and was demoted. New promises have been made. The eyes of the people of Russia have been opened by the short-lived dethronement of Stalin. Their eyes have further been opened as to the true nature of their relations with the enslaved satel-

lites, by such information as has reached them from the bloody reconquest of Hungary. Furthermore, the objective, factual, intense educative processes to which their young technicians, scientists, and engineers are subjected are tearing away from their eyes and from their minds the fallacies in which they have been raised. They are learning to face the facts. This is hopeful.

There is a further cause for hope in the relationship between Western Germany, its unredeemed territory in the east, and the captor of that territory, the Soviet Government. The people of West Germany ever more strongly are becoming conscious of the obvious fact that rearmament does not lead to reunion except through warfare—and they are sick of warfare. It is increasingly evident that the groundwork has been laid in the minds of the people for reunion on the basis of a retreat of Soviet power toward its old boundaries negotiated in return for neutrality of the Austrian type. This constitutes a second hopeful element in our present situation.

The third to which I would refer is the experience of our friends, the British and the French, in their endeavor to free the Suez Canal from the control of Nasser. That endeavor met with a result which might have been predicted. The modern dictator, at the height of his power, is absolutely reckless. The complete blockage of the canal by sinking ships and blowing up bridges was predictable. It should be noted down in the treatises on international policy for future reference.

That enterprise was undertaken without political forethought as well as without military forethought. The nations involved should have recognized, and we must recognize, the intensity of the passion for nationality and independence on the part of the Arab peoples. Had the Suez expedition been successful, had Nasser been demoted, had a puppet been installed in his place, that puppet could have been maintained in that place only by tanks, guns, and bloody murder. It is too late in the history of the world for the old, settled, free nations to attempt to hold in bondage, no matter how benevolently, the organized peoples of other races. The expedition to Suez was doomed to failure, and it is fortunate that it ended as soon as it did.

But we are talking about hopeful situations, and not about disasters. That undertaking had a beneficent result in bringing into sharp focus what we must not and cannot, do and in bringing up for sharp decision more practical solutions.

The situation as it is today is that Israel, which, under great provocation, joined in the invasion, seems willing to return to its boundaries as fast as United Nations troops will occupy its captured positions. This gives to the thorny Palestinian problem, again in the words of Admiral Mahan, "time for moral ideas to take root." As to the canal problem, we are now free to consider the self-interest of Colonel Nasser in proposals which will be advantageous to him as well as to his Arab neighbors, Western Europe,

ourselves, and the whole seafaring world. Solutions can be found which will meet these large-scale requirements. Negotiations toward achieving these solutions can now be undertaken with all the facts of the situation staring us in the face instead of remaining hidden in what unfortunately has been a sort of shadowland of moral law. In facing this law we are facing the facts of life, and those facts have been brought to light by the ill-starred undertaking whose debris we are now so painfully clearing up.

It is because success in our undertaking in the Middle East lies in the realm of negotiations for long-range self-interest, and therefore of international morality, that I conceive the military part of this resolution, while important, to be of less importance than the authority given to spend considerable sums of money in other ways.

There is evidently fear on the part of many Members of the Senate that there lurks somewhere in the recesses of the State Department a plan for applying the money mentioned in the resolution, or a part of it, to beginning the construction of the Aswan Dam, which Colonel Nasser had hoped to erect as his monument and his contribution to the well-being of the people of Egypt. Well, Mr. President, let us face that possibility. Perhaps that idea does lurk somewhere within the dark chambers of the State Department. Let us get hold of it and drag it into the light of day. That dam would be a colossal affair. It has complications and implications beyond the simple physical factors involved. It touches on the rights and interests of Ethiopia. It submerges fertile and irrigated land and opens the way to irrigation of other fertile lands. It is in the long run a potential expander of the agricultural resources for the production of food and fiber in the great Nile Valley downstream from its location. Recognizing these facts, should we debar ourselves from examining to see whether there may not be found in such an expenditure as this some means of coming to a settlement of all the problems affecting this area?

Things that should now be clear are these: The Arab States, including Egypt from now on, are out of leading strings. They are on their own. Their people and their rulers have emotional reactions to world affairs which will have to be recognized. They also have self-interests which can likewise be recognized and which can be satisfied in ways which will help rather than hinder the legitimate interests of the rest of the world. This is where we start.

Here is the area for negotiation. Egypt's sovereignty over the canal would be recognized provided some effective recognition were made concurrently of the interests of the maritime world in the continuance of free, unobstructed, universal access to passage from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean and vice versa. That this interest is of a vital sort and that it must be recognized is a point that must be made with the Egyptian Government, and with whoever at the moment is the head of that Government. On the basis of the

recognition of sovereignty affected by world commercial interests, it would be possible to start the operation of the canal at a profit to the Egyptian Government and the mercantile world alike, and one which would within a reasonable time redeem the equity of its private owners as promised by Nasser at the beginning of the crisis. Such a solution should be accepted by, and maintained by, commercial and military powers of the world preferably, I think, through the United Nations. The use of the U. N. forces in this emergency is a valuable precedent. It should be continued in time, and, if necessary, expanded in size.

This solution would be of value to every party to such an agreement. It would require the relinquishment of arbitrary management of the canal by the Egyptian Government. This they should be glad to do, but in view of the emotional backgrounds of the situation, the tension between the Arab and the western worlds, it might become necessary to go a little further in the negotiations. If assistance on the Aswan Dam would clinch the bargain, why not offer it?

Mr. President, can we be so besotted with military action as a solution to international problems that we neither know its ineffectiveness, nor count its costs in billions of dollars? Why not experiment in this case with other means to see if we cannot reap benefits at a fraction of the military cost and which military action can never provide?

In private business matters, even though emotions run high, it is considered to be the prudent thing to see what negotiation can do before placing complete and final reliance on court action. Why is it that in international affairs we let pride and frustration of policy and other similar crippling influences interfere with a composition of differing interests in a negotiated settlement?

The resolution as reported by the committee contains adequate safeguards for formal publicity and appropriate control for any use proposed to be made of the funds which it sets aside. Furthermore, we have the word of the Secretary of State that none of the \$200 million will be used upon the Aswan Dam. In spite of the sentiments which I am now expressing, I do not propose to offer any amendments giving the administration wider discretion than is given by the wording of the resolution before the Senate. What I am doing, Mr. President, is trying to bring this body into the state of mind where they will prefer to accept a reasonable settlement on honorable terms, as against specifying so narrow a range within which negotiations must be carried on that the possibility of a desirable settlement will be foreclosed.

The purposes of this talk are, then, two: First, to oppose those amendments, including the one presently before the Senate, which cut out economic aid, and second, to ask for what, in my judgment, is a more reasonable point of view toward any future undertakings of the Department of State in the settlement of

001017850

0002415

1957

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

2527

this very difficult but not unsolvable situation.

How does this resolution fight communism? It does so by tying us in with hesitating governments by the bonds of self-interest. There is no cheaper way; there is no better way.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will my colleague yield?

Mr. FLANDERS. I yield.

Mr. AIKEN. I wish to compliment my colleague upon his remarks, especially on what he said in the beginning of them. He has demonstrated the utter fallacy of putting all our hopes for peace and stabilization in the Middle East in the one basket of military assistance, which contains the seeds of force and violence, and possibly war.

I point out that one reason why the resolution is before the Senate, and possibly the reason which instigated it in the first place, is a desire to assure the four nations of Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey that they will not be left alone, either economically or militarily, should they be put under great pressure from the Communist country to the north. Those four countries are considered to be very friendly to the United States and, very probably, to the western outlook on life.

One reason why they are friends today and are friendly to our point of view is that economic and technical assistance programs have done immense good in those four countries. In other words, such programs have succeeded in those countries.

In Iraq, for instance, our programs of economic and technical assistance have succeeded so well that this year we have allocated only \$2,300,000 to such programs in Iraq, while the Iraq Government has allocated \$238 million of its own money, or 99 percent of the total amount. That shows how our technical and economic assistance programs have worked, and indicates that we have made friends and allies among the nations.

I believe that in Jordan and Egypt, our programs have not worked so well, and that those countries are not considered to be as staunch allies of the United States as are the four countries to which I have just referred. But the proper solution is not to eliminate economic and technical assistance programs in Jordan and Egypt; the solution is to make the economic and technical assistance programs work in those countries as well as they have worked in Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, and, I might add, the small country of Lebanon. The solution is to make such programs work where they are not working today, and not to abandon them.

Mr. FLANDERS. I thank my colleague, the senior Senator from Vermont. I suggest, in support of his point of view, that we know that Russia, while always preserving its military strength in the background, has been making its defenses by the very means which we, from time to time, propose to eliminate. We had better watch the operation of those policies on the part of the Soviet Government.

Mr. AIKEN. Russia's main line of infiltration has been in the economic and technical fields.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Mr. President, will the Senator from Vermont yield?

Mr. FLANDERS. I yield.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. I desire to ask the able Senator from Vermont, to whose address I have listened with so much interest, whether or not it was true, during the consideration of this question by the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, that many times the point was brought up that the \$200 million which would be available for military and economic assistance was not assigned to specific items. Some persons would say that if we simply have a military proposal, we do not begin to solve the problem. Is it not a fact that the purpose of the reference to the \$200 million is to enable the funds to be used in such a way as to contribute to the solution of the existing problems so that military force will not have to be used?

Mr. FLANDERS. That is a very clear statement of the right way in which to view the Middle East situation. I thank the Senator from South Dakota for bringing it out so clearly.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Has the Senator from Vermont had occasion to examine the table showing the amount of emergency funds which were made available to President Roosevelt and President Truman in previous years?

Mr. FLANDERS. I have not closely examined the figures, but I have a very clear recollection that they were of considerable magnitude.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Let me invite the attention of the Senator from Vermont to a table which I placed in the RECORD only a short time before the Senate took a recess yesterday. The table appears on page 2453 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. I believe it will be of interest to Senators generally to note from the table the fact that months before Pearl Harbor, Congress made emergency funds available to the then President.

If the Senator from Vermont will examine page 2453 of the RECORD, he will find that in the Navy Department Appropriation Act approved June 11, 1940, 18 months before Pearl Harbor, \$34 million was made available to the President.

Again, on June 13, 1940, \$66 million—making a total of \$100 million—was made available to President Roosevelt as an emergency fund for him to use as he saw fit. That also was done 18 months before Pearl Harbor.

Again, on September 9, 1940, 15 or 16 months before Pearl Harbor, another \$100 million was made available as an emergency fund for the President.

Again, on March 1, 1941, an urgent deficiency appropriation act, another \$5 million was made available in the same way; also, on May 24, 1941, another \$15 million. On October 8, 1940, \$29,500,000 was made available; and on October 14, 1940, \$10 million was made available; and in the Independent Offices Appropriation Act of 1942, approved April 5, 1941, \$500,249 was made available.

They aggregate in excess of \$250 million, which was made available to President Roosevelt for emergency expenditures, without the usual restrictions of

reporting and auditing—all that being done in the name of giving the President some emergency funds with which to deal with a festering international situation.

Mr. CASE of New Jersey. Mr. President, will the Senator from Vermont yield to me?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Church in the chair). Does the Senator from Vermont yield to the Senator from New Jersey?

Mr. FLANDERS. I yield.

Mr. CASE of New Jersey. First, Mr. President, let me express to the Senator from Vermont my appreciation of his customarily wise and reasonable statement.

Then let me ask him this question: In his opinion, is it not essential in this instance that the economic and military provisions of the joint resolution be enacted in the form in which they have been reported by the committees, for the reason that in this area of tension and emotions it is necessary that the negotiations for the projects which the money is designed to further, be conducted quietly, and not in front of television cameras and not in a situation in which no one can yield publicly without losing face and prestige at home—so that, therefore, an utter stalemate would result?

Mr. FLANDERS. I agree with the Senator from New Jersey. It seems to me that very poor results would be obtained in this situation from goldfish-bowl operations. We did not request such procedure in connection with preceding Democratic administrations, as has been so ably set forth by the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. CASE].

Mr. CASE of New Jersey. I thank the Senator from Vermont.

Mr. BUSH. Mr. President, will the Senator from Vermont yield to me?

Mr. FLANDERS. I yield.

Mr. BUSH. I wish to join the Senator from South Dakota, the Senator from New Jersey, and other Senators who have complimented the Senator from Vermont on the splendid statement he has made today, which I think is the most telling statement which has been made in support of the committee amendment and in opposition to the pending amendment offered to it by the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], on behalf of himself and other Senators.

I wonder whether the Senator from Vermont will agree to the following: Yesterday afternoon we listened to the very distinguished Senator from Virginia [Mr. BYRD] address himself to the pending question; and that led him into a discussion of our budget, to which he referred as the biggest peacetime budget in the history of the United States, and so forth.

One who has been around the Capitol any time at all hesitates to take issue with the Senator from Virginia about any matter affecting the fiscal affairs or the budget of the United States. However, I particularly ask the Senator from Vermont whether he agrees with me that to call a budget which is approximately two-thirds devoted to preparedness and security acts, both at home and abroad,

a peacetime budget, is hardly a fair presentation of the facts. If this were indeed a peacetime budget, then the proportion set aside for defense, if similar to the proportion set aside for the same purpose in former years, when we were actually at peace, would not be 65 or 64 percent, but would be a very much smaller amount—perhaps 20 percent, or at the most 25 percent. So I ask the Senator from Vermont whether he agrees with me that in considering this very vital matter, which really disturbs many of our friends on the other side of the aisle, we should include both the military-aid and the economic-aid sections of the joint resolution as definite weapons of our foreign policy in a war which fortunately is not a shooting war, but is really a cold war, and that those weapons really are deterrent weapons which may lead us farther along the road to peace.

Mr. FLANDERS. In answer to that question, let me say, first, that I join the Senator from Connecticut and the Senator from Virginia in deep concern over the size of this cold-war budget. It is enormous. We must find means of cutting it down safely and constructively. I think the way to do so is to begin to place more reliance on the less expensive means, such as those called for in the part of the joint resolution which the pending amendment to the committee amendment proposes to eliminate. We can more surely and more safely reduce the tremendous military expenditures by doing a little better work—at not greatly increased expense—on the economic assistance and other political measures, as distinguished from the military measures.

Mr. BUSH. I think the Senator from Vermont has expressed that point very well indeed. I congratulate him on the statement he has made.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. President, will the Senator from Vermont yield to me?

Mr. FLANDERS. I yield.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I wish to commend the distinguished Senator from Vermont, as have other Senators; and I desire to do so especially because it seems to me that today he has presented us with a most important supplement to the remarks made by other Senators regarding the vital need of having economic-aid provisions included in the joint resolution. I believe the Senator from Vermont has set forth most ably the point that military might alone is not the solution or even a step toward the solution of these problems, and certainly is not a step toward peace. Both military and economic aid together constitute a plan by the President of the United States and the Secretary of State, who presented this matter so ably to the committees, to lead to peace, because the two elements together are a deterrent to war, rather than the opposite. Is not that a correct statement?

Mr. FLANDERS. Yes, it is a correct statement.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I thank the Senator from Vermont for his contribution.

Several Senators addressed the Chair.

Mr. FLANDERS. Mr. President, I

have concluded my statement, and at this time I shall yield.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I rise to a point of order. I would not do so except for the fact that a committee hearing which is going on at this moment is of vital concern to me.

I had an understanding that I would be recognized following the morning hour. Therefore, I shall insist on the regular order—in other words, that the Senator from Vermont not yield to other Senators for the purpose of permitting them to make short speeches, but that he yield only for questions.

Therefore, Mr. President, I call for the regular order.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Church in the chair). Under the circumstances, the Senator from Vermont may yield only for a question.

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, will the Senator from Vermont yield to me? I assure my colleague that I shall not make a speech.

Mr. FLANDERS. I yield.

Mr. WILEY. I merely wish to say that I have listened with great interest to the very remarkable and challenging statement made today by the Senator from Vermont, and also to the interchange of ideas which has occurred on the floor. Both have been most valuable to us.

Now, Mr. President—

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I call for the regular order.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The regular order has been requested.

Mr. FLANDERS. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont has yielded the floor.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I may say that the only reason why I insisted on the regular order was that we have a very important committee hearing in progress this morning, and I desire to get back to it. Arrangements had been made whereby I was to have the floor after the morning hour.

Mr. President, this is not the first time I have taken the floor for the purpose of protesting against executive encroachments on the constitutional powers of Congress. Nor, I fear, will it be the last. A steady erosion of Congress' rightful place in our National Government is plainly observable, and the process is gaining momentum every day. We must never cease trying to reverse this trend.

But, frankly, I am not optimistic. To me nothing is so discouraging, nothing so frightening, as that only a small minority of this body is resisting this latest attempt by the executive branch, perhaps the most blatant yet, to usurp congressional prerogatives. Of course, I refer to the Middle East resolution now before the Senate.

I do not propose, at this stage of the debate on the resolution, to undertake a detailed survey of recent events in the Middle East. The historical facts which have led up to the present crisis in that area are not in dispute. Nor do I think there is any substantial disagreement as to the nature of the problem these facts have created. The problem can be stated in terms of these propositions:

First, the deterioration of British and French influence and power in the Middle East, which began after the Second World War and was consummated by the humiliating withdrawal of British and French troops from Suez last December, creating a power vacuum in that area.

Second, the Soviet Union, which has long sought to dominate and communize the Middle East, is now successfully exploiting that power vacuum. By skillfully playing off Arab against Jew, and Arab against Arab, the Communists have succeeded in making several Middle East states dependent, militarily and politically, upon the Soviet Union. Egypt and Syria have already cast their lot, irrevocably it would seem, with the Kremlin. And, of course, the penetration continues. By infiltration, by subversion, by intrigues, by shipments of arms to pro-Soviet regimes, the Communists are making alarming progress toward conquest of the entire Middle East area.

Third, Communist conquest of the Middle East would, as we know, be a severe blow to the free world, perhaps a mortal blow. The economies of Western Europe are dependent upon the oil reserves in the Middle East, and upon the Suez Canal. American air bases in that area, moreover, are an integral and vital part of our own defense arrangements.

Therefore, fourth, the United States is faced with the immediate necessity of finding means of checking the spread of Soviet influence in the Middle East.

I do not recite these propositions, Mr. President, for the purpose of educating anyone. They are, I think, self-evident. I state them by way of preface, for I want the record to be absolutely clear that my opposition to the resolution which we are considering is not the result of an underestimation of the gravity of the situation in the Middle East, or of a misunderstanding of the nature—although there is a question on that point—of the problem that confronts the United States. I want the record to show that it is precisely on the basis of this analysis of the Middle East situation that I have vigorously opposed the administration's Middle East policies since the seizure of the Suez Canal last July.

I believed last July, and I so stated, that Egypt had fallen within the Soviet orbit—and there can be no question about that—and that Colonel Nasser had become a tool of Soviet policy.

I believed throughout the succeeding months, and have so stated repeatedly—and I may say sometimes those statements have not made me too popular with those at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue, in the White House, although that does not concern me too much—that the way to prevent the Soviet Union from filling the power vacuum in the Middle East was to encourage Britain and France to reestablish their influence in the area, by armed force if necessary, rather than to stab them in the back, as we did.

I believed, and so stated, that when Britain and France decided to bring

0002416

001017850

1957

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

2529

Nasser to heel last November this was perhaps the last chance of maintaining a Western foothold in the Middle East. I perhaps should say a foothold by the free world, rather than the Western World.

And when the United States decided to join hands with the Soviet Union in a successful effort to force the British and French to retreat, I believed, and so stated at that time, that we committed one of the greatest blunders in our diplomatic history.

Mr. President, an elementary understanding of the power factors involved in the Middle East indicates a need for a United States policy that supports the British and French position rather than attempts to undermine it. But undermine it we did, and, I am afraid, once and for all.

It is now up to the United States to develop a new policy that will salvage the ruins—ruins that have been, in large measure, of our own making. The question now before the Senate is whether the Middle East resolution, the so-called Eisenhower doctrine, is such a policy. I maintain that it is not. Furthermore, it strikes a blow at the very heart of our system of constitutional government.

The Eisenhower doctrine—I hesitate to refer to it as the Eisenhower doctrine; I should refer to it as the palace guard doctrine—is not a solution to Middle East problems. It is simply a device by which Congress would delegate to the executive branch of its own responsibility to find solutions to those problems.

The President, by this resolution, is asking Congress to do two things: first, to make additional funds available for assistance programs in the Middle East; second, to authorize the President to send American Armed Forces into battle at the discretion of the palace guard. This second request is by all odds the more important, and my remarks this afternoon will be devoted primarily to this subject.

Let us note, to begin with, that this request for authority to use American troops whenever and wherever the President wants to do so does not go to the heart of the problem in the Middle East. The major danger in the Middle East is not an armed invasion by the Soviet Union, but, rather, the traditional tactics of Communist conquest—namely, intrigue, subversion, and infiltration. To suggest that our problems in the Middle East will be solved by sending American Armed Forces into action is to misunderstand the problem altogether. It is like trying to fight termites with a sledgehammer.

There is, of course, always the possibility that the red army will march into the Middle East. But granting that possibility, no explanation has ever been given by administration spokesmen as to why Congress could not be consulted when and if such an invasion occurs. It would take the President roughly 3 to 4 minutes to drive in his limousine from the White House to Capitol Hill, and request, if he thought it were necessary, a declaration of war. Let us remember that the President is not asking for standby authority while Congress is out

of session. He is suggesting, while Congress is in session, that it abdicates its constitutional responsibility to decide whether or not this country should go to war.

If this is true—if Congress can cope with an invasion if it occurs, why this extraordinary request for Presidential authority to send American troops into battle at his discretion? The answer given by administration spokesmen is that if the Russians really were planning a military invasion, an expression of congressional intention to resist overt Communist aggression in the Middle East would be valuable as a deterrent.

This argument, I concede, makes a certain amount of sense—not a great deal, mind you—as I do not believe the Kremlin leaders were ever in doubt as to what the United States would do in the event of a Soviet invasion of the Middle East.

But as I say, let us concede that there is some merit in the contention that an explicit expression of Congress' intentions would be valuable as a deterrent. Very well; why did the President not ask for that? Why did he not suggest that Congress resolve that Congress regard the independence and territorial integrity of the Middle East states as vital to the security of the United States, and that Congress is prepared to use American armed forces to resist a Soviet attack. Why did the President request that Congress give him the authority to resist the attack or not to resist it, as his palace guard sees fit? I have no confidence in the palace guard, while I do have some confidence in the President. This—in the light of the administration's past record of appeasement and retreat—would provide a lesser deterrent to Soviet aggression, in my opinion, than if Congress were to state, unqualifiedly, that it is determined to resist Communist aggression in the Middle East, come what may—without, however, letting the ultimate power of decision out of Congress' hands.

The men in the Kremlin are not likely to forget that the administration concluded an armistice in Korea in the face of the unanimous judgment of our military commanders that we could have won that war if it were not for the political decision by our Government to appease the Communists. The Kremlin is not likely to forget that the administration supported the surrender of half of Indochina to the Communists, an agreement that consigned 12 million human beings to Communist slavery. The Kremlin is not likely to forget that the administration took the lead in pressuring Britain and France to retreat from Suez when victory over Nasser was within their grasp. I firmly believe that we would give the Soviet Union a far stronger warning against attempting an invasion of the Middle East if we were to leave the power of ultimate decision in Congress' hands rather than authorize the White House palace guard to appease the Soviet Union in the event the administration should decide, once again, to knuckle under.

If this resolution is passed, as it now stands, there is no guaranty against ad-

ditional American men being sent overseas under the infamous Status of Forces Treaty and similar executive agreements. As you know, Mr. President, I have always been thoroughly opposed to these agreements which deprive our servicemen of their constitutional rights when they are serving their country overseas, and subject them to the frequently unjust and barbaric criminal procedures of foreign lands. But the problem becomes even more serious when we are contemplating sending large numbers of troops into the Arabic nations of the Middle East.

In one Arabic country—and I call this particularly to the attention of the Senate and to every mother in the country whose boy we may draft—the penalty for stealing an orange from a goat cart is cutting off the hand of the thief. We would turn our boys over to that kind of a system of justice.

How can I, a United States Senator, justify a vote for sending American boys abroad when our Government deliberately permits foreign governments to subject our boys to cruel and unjust punishment without lifting a finger to protect them?

In this connection, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record at this point, as a part of my remarks, an article written by Representative FRANK T. BOW and published in the American Legion magazine of January 1957.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

WE LEARNED ABOUT JAP PRISONS FROM THE INSIDE—WHAT HAPPENS WHEN GI'S ARE SURRENDERED TO FOREIGN COURTS

(As told to Congressman FRANK T. BOW)

"When I stretched out my arms I could reach across my cell from wall to wall, and lying on the floor with arms over my head I could touch one end with my toes. There was a narrow bed, a washbasin on the wall, and a bucket to use for a toilet. This private cell of mine was in death row, next to the gallows, of Fukuoka Prison, Japan, where I spent the first 4 months of my sentence of imprisonment in solitary confinement."

Ed was describing to me the cell in which he started to serve the sentence imposed upon him by a Japanese court, which tried him for assault and robbery. He and Bill had called at my office to give me the story of their experiences in Japan at first hand. Bill is from my congressional district and when I first learned he had been tried and convicted in Japan I endeavored to persuade him to appeal his case, but he refused. Now he wanted to explain why.

Neither boy made any effort to excuse his offense. Each had been drinking, probably to the point where their actions are not now too clear to them. With a companion or two, and no money, they engaged transportation; one a ricksha, the other a taxi. At some point there was a scuffle with the driver of each vehicle over payment, and the drivers claimed to have been robbed. Assault and robbery of taxi drivers is a popular accusation in both Japan and France.

Ed said he never saw the ricksha driver again, although he heard his name mentioned in court.

The day he went to trial he was handed a piece of paper in Japanese with a typewritten translation in English which stated the charges against him. He had been visited the day before by an American officer, accompanied by a Japanese lawyer who had

been appointed by the court. This lawyer was in a great hurry, saying he would have only one chance to plead for Ed and would have to have all his argument written out in advance to hand the court; therefore he wanted to get it done.

"There were a lot of statements on paper to be read in court by the prosecutor," Ed said. "Then the court interpreter was supposed to translate these to me. He was an old man and I could not understand him. Everything was in writing. There were no witnesses in court to testify except my own character witnesses. There were three judges, some of whom seemed to be sleeping part of the time. At noon there was a recess, and after that one of the judges did not come back and another judge took his place. The last three found me guilty and sentenced me about 5 days later. I think I was the first American to be sentenced in Japan."

Ed was sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment and did not appeal his case. He thought instead of spending time in jail waiting for an appeal to be heard he had better start to serve the sentence. Bill confirmed the possibility of delay. After he was tried and convicted, he did appeal his case and lost. But it had taken 6 months for this appeal. That was the reason he would not go further when I urged him to do so.

The story of Bill's trial is similar to Ed's except that the taxi driver appeared in court and Bill's trial was stretched out in several short sessions over a month's time. He was not given a copy of the charges against him until the day of the trial, and the interpreter was not understandable. Two companions of Bill's were not tried, a fact which still puzzles him. His sentence was 3 years.

"I was really scared that first 4 months in solitary in Fukuoka Prison," said Ed. "When I first arrived I was given a 2-hour talk on the rules I had to observe and was told repeatedly that I would be punished severely if I broke any rule. I didn't know what the punishment might be. But almost every day I could hear and see through the peephole in my door the Japanese guards beating up a Japanese prisoner who was in solitary across the corridor from me. This man had a leather muzzle fastened over his mouth and his hands were handcuffed behind him. In solitary in this condition I could not see how he could break any rules; so I was mighty careful.

"There was snow on the ground when I was taken to Fukuoka Prison in March, and there was no heat in my cell. All my clothing had been replaced with thin cotton pants and shirt. My socks and boots were taken from me, and I was given some paperlike soles which fastened on my feet with thongs. During the day I tried to keep warm by putting my blankets around me, but when a guard discovered this my blankets were taken away each morning and returned at night.

"No one in the Army visited us until after the provost marshal at the airbase learned there were Americans in the prison. He came on his own, bringing magazines and books. When a major in the Army Medical Corps visited the prison we wished he hadn't. I happened to be in the corridor when he was talking to a guard who complained about the cost of taking care of the Americans. He mentioned the one egg and bottle of milk we had been getting each morning as an example. The major told him that this was unnecessary, that one egg every 3 days was sufficient. After that we got fried, boiled, or raw onion 2 out of 3 days, and finally no egg at all.

"I was allowed out of solitary every day for about 20 minutes to walk up and down the corridor between the cells, and was taken once a week to bathe. All my meals were brought to me by a Japanese prisoner; so the food was usually cold. We had cabbage,

potatoes, bread, and rice for the main meal, with fish at times or animal intestines. For a brief spell we had a small piece of meat three times a week which didn't taste bad. When I asked what it was the guard said it was dog; so I didn't eat it any more. Then they quit giving it out."

Ed said he was kept in solitary confinement because the Japanese said they were afraid of the Americans. Later they claimed they could not find work for him. It was not part of his sentence to be a solitary. They finally put him to work in a basket factory and then he got his army boots back.

Regrettably our own Defense Department does not admit confinement in this type of cell to be extra punishment. In excusing Japanese prisons to Congress the Department referred to this type of cell as an "individual" cell as if it were a privilege to occupy one. The report the Defense Department made to Congress on the prison at Fuchu is filled with inaccuracies.

Bill first met Ed in Fuchu Prison. Bill was starting to serve his sentence and Ed was transferred there as part of a program to confine all Americans in one prison. Bill had a month of solitary confinement before being put to work in an ink factory. He had several other periods in solitary.

When the bread which was baked in the prison got so dirty and full of foreign matter as to be unfit to eat, Bill and Ed and six other Americans refused to eat it. The Japanese considered this as a strike and sent 6 of the 8 to solitary. The two that were not sent were colored boys. "The Japanese thought they could work up some prejudice that way," Bill said.

"While working in the kitchen I once asked a guard for some soap to wash mess dishes because they were so greasy. When he refused I jokingly called him 'Kitchinbo.' I think that is a word for 'cheap' or 'tight.'" Bill explained. The guard got mad and told the head guard, which got me another 6 or 7 days in solitary.

"If you were working at Fuchu you lived in a large cell with seven others and ate in a mess hall," Bill continued. "There was a large table in the center of each cell with eight chairs around it. We slept on the floor on pads about an inch thick which were rolled up with the blankets during the day and arranged in rows, four bundles on each side of the room. The beds had to be made up each night and were so close to each other we had difficulty in avoiding stepping on each other if we moved around. The toilets in Fuchu cells were flush toilets, sunk in the floor, discharging on the ground outside right under the window."

The cells were not heated at Fuchu, though there were stoves in the workrooms. In March, after the winter was almost over, the Japanese started to issue hot water bottles to the prisoners. "They started filling these bottles about 3 o'clock and they were delivered to the cells at 5," Ed explained. "You got to bed as early as you could to keep warm, but usually about 7 o'clock; so there wasn't much heat left in a bottle then. I've kicked mine out on the floor many times. I've known water to freeze in the cells."

Fuchu was damp as well as cold. Ed said some of his possessions got moldy. The boys didn't think that the blankets were ever washed while they were there, although Bill said they were taken away in summer.

Other food besides the bread was pretty bad too. Bill remarked, "At dinner and supper we would have some kind of ground stuff in a patty. It might be ground beef intestines, or whale, but it smelled so bad you couldn't eat it." Ed said he could see trucks delivering food at times from where he was working in the cell blocks, and "Some of it was so rotted it had turned green. It was mostly intestines, whale, squid or something like that."

Prisoners are not allowed to smoke in Japanese prisons. This brought Ed another 57 days in solitary confinement in Yokusuka Prison. This was the prison which was said to have central heat and to which all Americans were to be transferred from Fuchu. Because he had been working in the cell blocks at Fuchu, Ed was one of those selected to go ahead and clean up and prepare the new quarters. There he got some cigarettes from a Japanese guard. About a month later he was told that his violation was known, and he was confined alone for 14 days of investigation. This was followed by a 10-day sentence and a long wait until the Japanese condescended to put him to work.

Here was revealed the attitude of Japanese toward Americans. Bill mentioned, "I had a number of conversations at my cell door with the assistant custody officer about my application for work which I had sent to his superior. He said he knew his chief had it on his desk but that I should keep on making the applications. I told him this would look as if I was begging and I wouldn't do it. He said, 'Sometimes it pays to beg.' The Japanese tried to make Americans beg for everything, but I never would."

The Japanese like their role of jailers, possibly the more because they had so recently been a conquered nation. By claiming that the Americans were dangerous, and then reducing them to supplicants, they could pose as lion tamers. This was evident whenever the prisoners could be exhibited to the public.

"The Japs never moved an American outside the prison without first handcuffing him," Ed said. "Then a rope was tied around his waist and fastened to the handcuffs. The prisoner could then only move his hands a few inches. If more than one prisoner was moved, they would be fastened to each other by ropes. When I was moved to Fuchu, two of us traveled this way for 24 hours on the train, with 4 guards, and we were paraded through the railroad station in Tokyo manacled and roped together.

There were 55 Americans in Fuchu Prison when it was decided to move them to Yokusuka. The Japanese made a continuing production of the transfer, moving a few prisoners at a time by bus, about a 4-hour trip. "I was 1 of the first 4 moved," commented Ed. "We were manacled and roped together, in a bus with seven Japanese guards and prison officials. The bus was preceded by a motorcycle policeman and an armored car, with two other cars loaded with guards and another policeman following us."

Ed and Bill did not know anything about House Joint Resolution 309, which I had introduced in the House of Representatives in May 1955, which would have directed the President to try to reclaim the criminal jurisdiction over our troops abroad. When our diplomats arranged to surrender this jurisdiction to the Japanese, they gave no thought to prison conditions in Japan or to the laws and procedure to which our boys might fall victim. When the House Foreign Affairs Committee arranged hearings on my resolution, the Defense Department paid more attention to our boys in prison or awaiting trial abroad. The move to Yokusuka Prison was probably one result of this, in an effort to provide a little warmth for American prisoners. Then, too, the criminal laws of Japan were finally translated by the Defense Department shortly before this move.

The so-called central heating in Yokusuka prison was a disappointment, the boys said. Running through the cells was a single 3-inch pipe to which small metal fins were attached for a space of about 2 feet in each cell. The steam was turned on at about 4 o'clock each afternoon and there was some warmth in the pipe for several hours, barely taking the chill off. Ed often sat on the pipe for warmth.

1957

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

2531

The steampipes really had too much cold to overcome. The floors in Yokusuka were wood, with many large cracks through which you could see the ground. The light and cold came through holes in the foundation. The men had beds to sleep on here, with rice straw mattresses. They were fortunate to get off the floor for enormous rats would come up through the wooden floors into the cells. Several rats had to be killed in the cells.

The fact that the Defense Department stepped up the visits by officers who were to check the prison conditions and consult with the prisoners did the American prisoners little good. Some officers were easily hoodwinked. One major was shown the food served to the guards; the Japs claimed it was prison fare. The major called the men liars when they described the dirty and rotted food they were getting. Another officer told our prisoners that everything was fine, that he could see nothing wrong, that he thought they were better off than they would have been in an American detention area or in prison at home.

Bill was criticized by one of these visitors for not having any pride in his appearance. The officer ignored the fact that Bill was not allowed to bathe or shave oftener than once a week, a period shortened in summer to every 5 days. Bill was caught with his whiskers out!

Ed reported that two different American officers were not deceived. Each found conditions as described by the men to be true, and each complained to the prison authorities and promised action from American headquarters. Neither of these officers was allowed to make more than two visits. They were replaced by other officers more concerned about the good will of the Japanese than the conditions surrounding the prisoners. Bill and Ed can scarcely be criticized for the belief that the higher command in Japan was not very sympathetic to their situation.

The American prisoners, having gotten nowhere through their own visiting officers, tried to present their grievances to the warden. He refused to see them. Finally they all staged a sitdown strike by refusing to leave the mess hall on one occasion. It was then arranged that a committee of three might see the warden in his office. Ed was one of the committee. They took with them a Japanese-American who had been a civilian employee of the Army and was then serving a 6-month sentence for a traffic violation. The nisei translated to the warden a long list of requested improvements, which included more recreation, more reading material, increased mailing privileges, better food, permission to bathe and shave more frequently. The warden promised everything, Ed said, but did nothing.

Ed thinks his being one of this committee and his refusal at all times to act as a beggar probably delayed his release from prison at least 7 months. He became eligible for parole under Japanese regulations long before they would grant him a hearing.

The report made by Ed and Bill must be curtailed in this narrative. I shall only refer to the indifference of the Japanese to the health of the prisoners, the inadequate and incompetent medical and dental treatment furnished them. I am also going to skip over the beatings of American prisoners which occurred on slight provocation. It seems that any guard who felt affronted by an American could by a blast of his whistle have as many as 30 guards converge on the hapless prisoner. Each guard apparently felt that face saving then required him to push or strike the prisoner with anything available. Some men still carry scars on their wrists where the manacles cut into the flesh as they struggled through such beatings.

Ed and Bill don't think that all Americans are together in one prison now. Before they

left Yokusuka the Japanese had shipped six Americans back to Fuchu on the ground that they were troublemakers. There are other Americans in jails scattered around Japan who are waiting the results of appeals or serving sentences.

Of course, I have not referred to Ed and Bill by their true names. They are having enough difficulty getting jobs because of their conviction and imprisonment abroad, and I feel they should not have the finger of shame pointed at them unnecessarily. Both boys, however, are willing, and even anxious, to appear before any congressional committee that may be interested in hearing the truth about the treatment of our soldiers in Japan. I hope that in the next session of Congress there will be such a committee, and that a resolution such as House Joint Resolution 309 will be presented to Congress for action.

I wish that the State Department representatives, who made the Agreement with Japan and the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, might have been in my office to answer Ed's last question: "What happened to my constitutional rights?" he asked. "Right after I was arrested an army officer told me that I had lost my constitutional rights. We had ancestors who fought for those rights. Soldiers have always fought for them. I was willing to fight for them. I think they're great. I was deprived of them. I can't understand why soldiers should lose them anywhere. If you can take them away from men who are defending these rights, then isn't everybody in the United States in danger of losing them?"

Perhaps the 19 members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee who voted against reporting House Joint Resolution 309 to the House for action should ponder Ed's question, too.

Mr. McCARTHY. While the Status of Forces Treaty, the part of it which gives criminal jurisdiction over our uniformed men to foreign nations, is in existence—I refer not only to the Status of Forces Treaty but also to the executive agreements covering other nations—while they are in existence I shall never under any circumstances vote to send an American boy to a foreign soil.

I believe every American uniformed man drafted into the service must know that he carries the full prestige and power of this Nation on his shoulders when he goes overseas. We owe the same duty to our soldiers that they owe to their country. I wish I could say that our country has a record of honoring its duty to our fighting men. But as everyone knows, 467 American servicemen—and they are the forgotten men, and 467 is the latest number by sworn testimony of officials of the Department of Defense and the Department of State—are now languishing in Communist dungeons or have not been accounted for, because our Government has not had the moral courage to enforce the terms of the Korean armistice.

Until that blight on our national honor has been wiped out, and until the infamous Status of Forces Treaty and similar executive agreements are repealed, I for one will never vote for a resolution which would authorize the President or anyone else to send additional troops overseas without the protection of our Constitution.

Let me now turn to the third reason I am opposed to this delegation of the warmaking powers of Congress, namely, that it violates the Constitution.

The Committee on Foreign Relations made a change in the original language of the resolution, which was intended, evidently, to overcome the constitutional objections to the resolution. However, if that was the intention, I submit it was wholly unsuccessful. Let me read the relevant part of the resolution as it now stands:

The United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East. To this end if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use Armed Forces.

In other words, Congress is being asked to say, first, that it regards the independence of the Middle East states as vital to the United States interests, and, second, that if the President—which does not mean Ike; I have no quarrel with him; it means the palace guard—decides we should go to war to protect these interests, the United States will, thereupon, do so. What is this but a clear-cut grant to the President of the right to decide whether the United States should go to war? Yet, does not our Constitution provide that Congress, and only Congress, shall have the power to declare war?

I am not denying, of course, that the President, as Commander in Chief, has, in some circumstances, the power to send American forces into action without the prior sanction of Congress. But, as I read the Constitution and the Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Constitution, the line separating what the Commander in Chief may do and may not do is very clear. He may employ the Armed Forces of the United States to defend American lives and American property.

He may not, however, undertake offensive operations or operations to defend a foreign nation. If such operations are to be undertaken, Congress must make the decision. This, in the constitutional context, amounts to one thing, that is, that without the prior approval of Congress the palace guard cannot commit the sons of American mothers to engage in war in foreign lands.

The President is clearly within his rights in ordering American Armed Forces to fight back when they are under attack, or when American property is under attack. There can be no question about that. To go further than that and to maintain that the President has the power to use our Armed Forces to "protect American interests," as the phrase goes, is to obliterate altogether the distinction between defensive and offensive operations. For any offensive war, any war to defend a foreign nation, can obviously be justified in terms of "protecting American interests." Once we acknowledge the right of the palace guard to send American forces into battle whenever they believe "American interests" to be in danger, we will have rendered utterly meaningless the constitutional provision giving Congress alone the power to declare war.

This resolution is not restricted to the defense of American lives and American property. It contemplates that the

President will send our Armed Forces into action in the event a foreign country is attacked by the Soviet Union. It attempts, in other words, to give to the President a power that the Constitution gave to Congress. But Congress cannot divest itself of its constitutional powers.

Such an alteration of the constitutional scheme can be accomplished only by an amendment to the Constitution.

Since it is for Congress, not for the President, to decide when and if we should go to war, I am offering an amendment to the resolution which would delete the phrase: "If the President determines the necessity thereof." The resolution would then read:

The United States regards as vital to the national interests and world peace the preservation and independence of the nations of the Middle East. To this end, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any nation or group of nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism.

I am offering this amendment not because it will make the resolution more palatable to me, but because I think it will improve it.

The language I propose states, as plainly as it is possible to state it, the determination of Congress to oppose Soviet aggression in the Middle East. Thus, the deterrent requested by the administration is provided, but without an unconstitutional delegation of congressional powers.

I might add that this is substantially the language recommended by the Speaker of the House, Mr. RAYBURN, several weeks ago.

Let me make my position clear: If this amendment, in substance, is not adopted, I can, under no circumstances, support the resolution. My oath of office requires that I exercise continuing discretion in matters that are the proper concern of Congress. I am not empowered, indeed, I am forbidden, to delegate that discretion to anyone.

And I wonder, Mr. President, how any Member of this body can justify this delegation of power?

I know it is very likely that my good friends of the press will headline my statement as a fight against President Eisenhower. Nothing can be further from the truth. I have no personal animosity toward him. I have raised my right hand and taken about the same oath that the President has taken to defend this country against all enemies, foreign and domestic. I must fulfill that oath regardless of who is in the White House. Even if my great and good friend the late Bob Taft were President, I imagine there would be a number of occasions when I would feel I had to oppose some of his policies—and being acquainted with the rights and duties of a United States Senator, that is exactly what he would want me to do.

As a matter of fact, when we were in the Senate together I did oppose Taft on a matter very close to his heart. I thought that Taft's housing bill was, in some respects, inadequate, and, in others, too costly and unrealistic. As a result, I rewrote the entire housing act, which, incidentally, passed the Senate without

a single dissenting vote. Bob Taft bore me no ill will for that; in fact, as I have indicated, he ended up supporting my bill. I do not, obviously, insist that President Eisenhower adopt my views. But I do insist that the differences of opinion between us be resolved on the merits of the issues that separate us.

I mention this, Mr. President, to spike any statements that, so far as I am concerned, this is a personal contest with the President of the United States. I do not care who temporarily passes across the public scene; while I am here I shall abide by my oath. And that is what I am doing today.

It has been argued that the President has promised to consult congressional leaders should he deem it necessary to use American armed forces. I am wondering if the President had reference to the kind of consultation with Congress that took place last week when the President flew back from his Georgia vacation to discuss the question of imposing sanctions on Israel. The President conferred with congressional leaders and found, so it has been reported, that they were unanimously opposed to imposing sanctions on Israel as long as Russian aggression in Hungary and Indian aggression in Kashmir went unpunished.

Yet, Mr. President, within a matter of hours—and I should like to have the attention of the very able Senator from Virginia [Mr. BYRD], because I am sure this is something which may concern him—within a matter of hours the President went before the American people, in the face of this determined congressional opposition, and declared that the administration was prepared to support sanctions against Israel.

That is the type of consultation we are being promised now as Members of Congress.

Yes, Congress may be consulted, pro forma; but what reason is there to suppose that the administration has any intention of deferring to the views of Congress?

When we come down to it, Mr. President, why should the administration pay any attention to Congress, once this resolution is adopted? If we pass the resolution as it now stands, the President will, as a matter of law, be entitled to lead this country into war or not, as he sees fit. We will have given the administration what it wants; namely, a guaranty that Congress will stay out of the picture for the duration of the Middle East crisis.

Let me hasten to add that the administration is not asking for an entirely free hand in this matter. While it wants to be free of congressional control, it is evidently determined to subject American foreign policy to United Nations control. Let me read a paragraph from the President's address to Congress on January 5:

These measures—

Meaning the employment of American Armed Forces—

would have to be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States—including the Charter of the United Nations, and with any action or recommendations of the United

Nations. They would also, if armed attack occurs, be subject to the overriding authority of the United Nations Security Council in accordance with the charter.

I invite any Senator to read any different meaning into those incredible words than that in the event of an armed attack in the Middle East by the Soviet Union, the administration's decision to resist or not to resist that attack would be subject to a decision of the United Nations Security Council, which, of course, would be subject to the Soviet veto.

It has been suggested, however, that the President did not really mean what he said. What the President really meant, Secretary Dulles has said, was that, in the event of a Soviet attack, he would take the matter to the United Nations Security Council—not to Congress, mind you, but to the United Nations Security Council—to see if the Security Council would support collective action against the aggression. If such a motion were vetoed by the Soviet Union, according to Dulles, the administration would be prepared to go ahead on its own under article 51 of the charter. I do not know what the President meant; I know only what he said in a formal address to Congress which was presumably gone over extremely carefully, word by word, comma by comma, by the President, or if not by him, by his staff. On the basis of that statement, I am unwilling to run the risk of voting for a resolution that is intended to subordinate American foreign policy to the veto power of Communist Russia.

But putting that point aside, no claim has been made that the President did not mean what he said in the first sentence of that paragraph when he asserted that any action we would take under this resolution would have to be consonant with "any action or recommendations of the United Nations." That statement can have no other meaning than that if the General Assembly of the United Nations should decide by a resolution that Soviet aggression should not be opposed, the administration would feel obliged not to resist the aggression.

Is there not something wrong here, Mr. President? Is there not something wrong when we are told (a) that the situation is so urgent in the Middle East that the Congress must be deprived of its right to participate in the making of American foreign policy and must surrender its war powers, but (b) that American policy must be subject to a veto of the United Nations, including Soviet Russia—that aimless, hypocritical, pettifogging organization in which the balance of power is held by Communists and neutralists? Did anyone in this body believe, when the Senate ratified the United Nations Charter, that the United Nations was to be given a veto over American foreign policy? If ratification of the charter had been understood to mean that, I feel it would have been rejected by the Senate.

Mr. President, I may say that I am increasingly disturbed by the apparent recognition of Dag Hammarskjöld as the Secretary of State of the United States. The United States does nothing in for-

001017850

0002418

1957

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

2533

eing policy unless Dag Hammarskjöld is first consulted. I always thought the position of Secretary of State was so important that the man who was acting as the Secretary of State would come before the Senate to have his nomination either confirmed or rejected. But that is not the situation as of today.

Now the United Nations has become a power superior to the Government of the United States. The administration is urging—and it does so increasingly, day after day, on almost all matters of foreign policy—that the United States must subordinate its own policy to the decisions of the United Nations. The administration maintains that we must follow the lead of the United Nations as a matter of moral principle. But what kind of principle is that that equates morality with a majority resolution by the United Nations? Are we henceforth to settle all questions of right and wrong on the basis of what the United Nations decides—the United Nations, which has cravenly and hypocritically refused to take any action against Soviet brutality in Hungary or Indian aggression in Kashmir, but is quite prepared to punish a nation like Israel, which is weak, and relatively friendless; and which has committed, if any, a far less serious crime?

What I am saying, Mr. President, is that the United Nations has not earned our admiration or our confidence or our trust; it has earned nothing but contempt from men who are interested in defeating world communism and in promoting international morality and justice. In the circumstances, I find the proposal that the United States subordinate its foreign policy to United Nations policy insufferable.

There is no way in which Congress can prevent the administration from trotting to the United Nations for U. N. approval before it puts its policies into effect. But we can refuse to give the administration any official sanction for doing so, and we can put the palace guard on notice that we as individual Senators are totally opposed to weakening American policy by tying it to the United Nations.

Finally, let me comment very briefly on the request for additional funds for assistance to Middle East nations. I am opposed to this request at this time for two reasons: First, there are already substantial funds available which could be spent on the Middle East, but which have not been spent so far because the administration has not yet thought up projects on which they might be spent.

For example, as will be recalled, approximately 2 years ago we appropriated \$100 million, to be used in the Middle East at the discretion of the administration. How much of that money was used? Mr. President, I do not have the exact figure at hand; but, as I recall, approximately \$7 million was used. The balance of the appropriation was not used, because our spenders could not find projects on which to spend the money.

But at this time we are asked for another \$400 million; and when the witnesses came before the committees, they

said, "We do not know how to spend it. But give it to us, and in the future we shall decide how to spend it."

Second, assuming that in the future there will be a need for greater funds than those now available, there is no reason to make more funds available until such time as the administration has definitely established a need for them. Time and again, Secretary Dulles was asked by members of the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Armed Services Committee how he intended to spend this money. His answer, invariably, was that the administration had not yet made up its mind. Mr. President, if the administration has not made up its mind, it has no business coming before Congress and requesting funds. The sensible and orderly procedure, it seems to me, is for the administration first to determine what projects are necessary in the Middle East, and then to come before Congress and request funds for the projects.

The Secretary of State has said on a number of occasions that it would be unwise to explain these projects publicly, because that would be tipping our hand to the Communists. Very well; then let him come before the appropriate congressional committees in executive or secret session. I think the members of the Armed Services Committee and the Committee on Foreign Relations are good security risks—as good, at least, as the bureaucrats in the executive branch—and can be counted on not to betray our secrets to the Communists.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wisconsin yield to me?

Mr. McCARTHY. I am glad to yield.

Mr. LONG. I certainly agree with the point the Senator from Wisconsin has made in that respect. It seems to me that Senators of the caliber of the senior Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, are excellent security risks, and are entitled to know the plans in connection with this matter, and that it would not be too great a security risk to let them be informed of the plans our country is making with foreign powers about how the money is to be spent.

Mr. McCARTHY. I thank the Senator from Louisiana for making that point. I agree with him very strongly that the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, the senior Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], and all the other members of that committee can be told about how it is proposed to spend the \$400 million. If they are not so told, I do not think the Congress should authorize the spending of one red cent, in view of the fact that there is still roughly—I admit that the figure I use may not be entirely accurate—\$95 million available.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wisconsin yield further to me?

Mr. McCARTHY. I am glad to yield.

Mr. LONG. I formerly was a member of the Armed Services Committee, and at the present time I am a member of the Foreign Relations Committee. I would not insist that something of a secret nature, if involved in this matter, be told to me. But if we have reached

the point where not one Member on this side of the aisle—not even a Member who has been entirely faithful in keeping secrets when they should be kept—can be told about this matter, that is going too far, particularly when such Senators have kept things secret when they should be kept secret, whereas, on the other hand, some members of the palace guard seem to have a way of letting secret matters be made available to Time magazine, Life magazine, the New York Herald Tribune, and certain other publications. But apparently some Members of Congress who experience has shown can be trusted, are not trusted with the information, whereas the palace guard has the information, and leaks it to certain members of the press.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I could not agree more fully with any statement recently made on the floor of the Senate. I feel that when a Senator, such as the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. LONG], formerly a member of the Armed Services Committee, and now a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, has been elected by the people of his sovereign State, he has received from them their vote of confidence, and certainly he is entitled to the information, over and above the palace guard, many of whom could not even be elected dog catcher, if they ran for the job. However, for some unknown reason they come before the Senator's committee and say, "We cannot tell you what we are going to do. We cannot trust you with the information. All we want from you is that you sign a blank check."

Mr. President, the people of Louisiana, who elected the Senator from Louisiana—and I believe they were wise in doing so—could certainly expect that in connection with the making of this decision, the Senator from Louisiana would have the information which members of the palace guard have.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator yield again to me?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. LONG. To the best of my information—I have been seeking to ascertain whether the statement is true; and I believe it is true—it seems that not a single Member on this side of the aisle, which is the majority side of the Senate, has been entrusted with any information regarding what is to be done if the strings are removed from this money and if the administration is permitted to parcel it out without making any accounting whatsoever, and with the foreign rulers being relieved of the responsibility of telling us what they are doing with the money. I am curious to know whether a single Member on the Republican side of the aisle has been entrusted with the information, for I should like to know whether a single Member of the United States Senate is in the confidence of the administration, to the extent that he has any idea whatever of a single project for which the money is to be used or how it is to be used, along the line of the information which was printed in the New York Herald Tribune, and which apparently was derived from Arabian sources.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, let me say that I am not exactly on a "Dear Milt—Dear Joe" basis with Milton Eisenhower, so that information has not been given to me. But I am sure all other Senators will agree when I say that information which could well be considered to be of a secret nature has constantly been "leaked"—not by Members of Congress, either Democrats or Republicans. I do not know of a single Democrat or Republican Member who has "leaked" any secret information, but we do read information of this type in some of the so-called—I do not like to use the word "liberal"—in some of the leftwing newspapers and magazines. I think it has been proven that the Senator from Louisiana is 100-percent correct; that so far as the Members of the Senate are concerned, we respect absolutely any confidence which is reposed in us.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, if the Senator from Wisconsin will yield further, I should like to make it clear that I do not expect the administration or any Senator to make available to me any information which it or he possesses, because it is very clear that the administration does not want the junior Senator from Louisiana to know anything about how the money is to be spent or about how much of it any particular nation would receive. But I am curious to know whether any Senator on the Republican side of the aisle knows—inasmuch as, so far as I can determine, no Member on the Democratic side has been entrusted with the information.

Mr. McCARTHY. I do not know of any Senator on either side of the aisle who has been entrusted with the information. I may say that I have read articles—the last one I believe was on January 29—to the effect that "Galloping Harold," who is supposed to be head of disarmament, was urging that we unilaterally quit experimenting with long-range, intercontinental guided missiles. I believe that, in fairness to the Senate and the members of the committee to which the Senator from Louisiana belongs, they should know why. I think we should know why a man in that high position urges so strongly that we should stop experimenting with the only weapon which may decide who will win the next war. I would much rather entrust such information to the members of the Senator's committee than to some of the bureaucrats.

Mr. LONG. I thank the Senator.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wisconsin yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I am glad to yield.

Mr. MORSE. The Senator is aware, is he not, that in the recent past the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, and others had conferences in Washington with King Saud of Arabia and his entourage?

Mr. McCARTHY. I am fully aware of that.

Mr. MORSE. Is the Senator under the impression, based upon newspaper accounts, that it is to be assumed, as a result of those conferences, an agreement of some kind was reached between the President and King Saud of Arabia

in regard to the relationships between our two countries?

Mr. McCARTHY. I may say to the able Senator I can only guess at that. My guess would be of no great value, but, in line with the thought of the Senator from Oregon, we know that the conversations, the possible agreements, were not divulged to the American people. For example, one of the matters I read about, which was leaked, was that we could not use the airbases, which we built in Saudi Arabia at tremendous cost, if we allowed any Jewish personnel on those airbases. There has been no confirmation or denial of that statement. There should be either a confirmation or denial, because I do not believe this country should bend and scrape and bow its knee and let a foreign nation decide that, because of race, religion, or color, we cannot have our citizens on bases, which we have paid for, in other countries. I may have gotten off the Senator's question slightly.

Mr. MORSE. Not at all; not at all.

Taking up another facet of my question, if arrangements were entered into, in agreement between the President of the United States and the King of Saudi Arabia, with respect to the use of airbases or with respect to any other economic understanding, does the Senator know of any member of the Foreign Relations Committee or the Armed Services Committee of the Senate who has been informed as to the specifics of those agreements?

Mr. McCARTHY. I may say I do not attend the conferences at the White House as yet; but, so far as I know, the answer is "No." However, some of the leaders on both sides of the aisle would be in a better position to answer that question.

Mr. MORSE. Does the Senator from Wisconsin think it fair to assume that, whatever agreements were entered into between the President of the United States and the King of Saudi Arabia, in all probability the members of the Arab entourage who accompanied the King of Saudi Arabia to the United States know more about that particular phase of American foreign policy than do Members of the United States Senate?

Mr. McCARTHY. I fear the Senator's statement is correct. But I hope that at an early date at least the members of the Foreign Relations Committee and the leadership on both sides of the aisle will be told very frankly, as they should be, what, if any, agreements were made or proposed.

Mr. MORSE. Does the Senator from Wisconsin agree with me that the refusal of this administration to accept any amendment to the pending resolution that would place a requirement upon the President to get the approval of the Congress of the United States for any specific grant to any of the countries of the Middle East, or for any specific project, is further evidence on the part of the administration that we are being led down the road toward government by secrecy?

Mr. McCARTHY. I am sorry. I did not get the entire question.

Mr. MORSE. Does the Senator from Wisconsin agree with me that the refusal on the part of the administration, through its chief spokesman on the pending resolution, the Secretary of State, to accept any amendment to the resolution which would require the administration to get the approval of the Congress for the use of funds for any specific project in the Middle East is but additional evidence that we are being led down the road toward government by secrecy in the United States?

Mr. McCARTHY. And also, I might add, there is a request that Congress abdicate its constitutional power—not only its power, but its duty. Under the Constitution, we have the duty to determine where American boys will fight. It is not merely our power; it is our duty to determine that. So far as I am concerned, I spent considerable time in one war. I personally would be glad to spend additional time fighting the Communist conspiracy any place else in the world. Let me say—and I am not sure if this is an answer to the question of the Senator—I will not vote to send American boys to a foreign land unless they have the assurance that they pack all the power, all the dignity, of this Nation, on their shoulders, and that never again will we see what we are witnessing as of this moment—not as of yesterday or the day before, but as of this moment—the spectacle of 467 uniformed men, according to the sworn testimony of officials of the State Department and the Defense Department, who are either in Communist dungeons or unaccounted for.

If I may digress a minute from the answer to the question, the question is what we should do. The sands in the hourglass of time are rapidly running out. We have lost our dignity as a nation. There was a time, as the Senator well knows, when no nation would dare place his foot on the neck of an American uniformed man.

For example, in 1904, when Teddy Roosevelt was President, Raisuli, a Moroccan bandit, captured Tangier and seized several foreigners whom he held for ransom. Among the prisoners was Ion H. Perdicaris, a native of Greece, who had become a naturalized American citizen. Samuel R. Gummere, the American Consul at Tangier, demanded the release of Perdicaris, but the Sultan of Morocco, who apparently did not wish to offend Raisuli, delayed action by negotiations.

One June 22, 1904, Secretary of State John Hay, after consultation with President Roosevelt, sent a message to Gummere containing the following sentence: "Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead."

This was, perhaps, the shortest note in diplomatic history.

I think if we tore a page from Teddy Roosevelt's book, the Senator and I would feel better about the Congress voting to send American boys to foreign lands.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

001017850

0002419

1957

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

2535

Mr. MORSE. In the course of his speech the Senator referred to the request in this resolution being not merely a request for \$200 million, but, in effect, a request for \$400 million. Does the Senator from Wisconsin agree with me that when we come to vote upon the joint resolution to give this unlimited discretionary power to the President of the United States to use the \$200 million mentioned in the resolution in any way he deems desirable, we also must face the fact that that will be a precedent for further requests upon the part of the President? He has already indicated in one public statement that he will ask for an additional \$200 million for each of the years 1957 and 1958. Is that the Senator's understanding?

Mr. McCARTHY. I think the Senator has stated the situation very well. I am not optimistic about this resolution receiving deep and thorough study. I am not optimistic about this fantastic resolution being defeated. I am afraid that in the Senate we shall do what we have done so often before, namely, roll over and play dead. I know that I shall hear on this floor the argument which I have heard so often in the past when the President asked for authority. The argument will be, "You must vote the authority. Otherwise you are not expressing confidence in the President." I should like to express a bit of confidence in the United States Senate instead, with no reflection on the President.

Mr. MORSE. Returning to my question for a moment for further comment on what the Senator has just said, does the Senator from Wisconsin share my fear that if we vote this \$200 million, to be followed by further requests on the part of the President, as already announced by him, we shall find ourselves, in the not distant future, as the Senator from Arkansas has said in the debate, dealing with requests for not \$200 million, \$400 million, or \$600 million, but several billion dollars, to be spent at the arbitrary discretion of a President? I speak not of this President, but of the office of the Presidency. Does the Senator think there is that danger?

Mr. McCARTHY. I could not more heartily agree with the Senator.

Mr. MORSE. Does the Senator agree with me that if we establish that kind of precedent we may even lose what has always been described in the past as one of the great strengths of the Congress, namely, its control of the purse strings?

Mr. McCARTHY. The Senator is correct. I may go a step further and say that if we continue to abdicate our duty and turn it over to a President we may as well go back to our home States and take up some other occupation. I think we are violating our duty when we turn over to a President—I am not speaking about Eisenhower, but any President, because we have seen this encroachment over the years—the power which the Constitution vests in the Congress.

Mr. MORSE. Does the Senator from Wisconsin agree with me that if we refuse to grant the President the authority he has asked for under this resolution we shall, in fact, be strengthening the Office of the President of the United

States, because we shall be protecting it in respect to its full constitutional responsibilities?

Mr. McCARTHY. Let me phrase my answer in different language. I think we would be strengthening the Government of the United States.

Mr. MORSE. Finally, on the question of lack of confidence, I have listened to some of my colleagues, in speeches off the floor of the Senate, give every reason why we should not vote for this resolution and then close their speeches by saying, "But—" I am always interested in the "but" clauses. Many such speeches end with the words, "But what can we do? If we do not vote for this, our President will stand naked before the world."

Let me say to my colleagues on this side of the aisle that I think it is about time the Democratic Party stopped providing the clothes for Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Mr. McCARTHY. I thank the Senator very much. I gather he was not calling for an answer to that observation.

Let me say also to the Senator, when we are talking about the Democrat or the Republican side, that I am a Republican, root and center. I always have been. I feel that I should support Republican principles. However, I will not support the principles of any man, whether Democrat or Republican, at any time when I feel that what he is doing is wrong. I am sure the Senator would agree with me in that position.

Mr. MORSE. I merely submit my record.

Mr. McCARTHY. In closing, let me say that if the appropriate Senate committees are satisfied that the projects are worthwhile, if they have been given information, and not a lot of gobble-dygoon, and if they are satisfied that currently authorized funds are not adequate, then there will be some force to the argument that we should authorize additional funds. But, so far as I know, no such information has been given to any congressional committee up to this time.

The electorate of my State did not send me to the United States Senate to sign blank checks, and I assure not only the people of Wisconsin, but the people of the United States, that I do not intend to sign any blank checks.

On the question of funds, as with all other aspects of the resolution, the fundamental question is whether Congress will discharge its constitutional and moral responsibilities, or will abdicate to the President. Let us not try to avoid this question, Mr. President, for the fate of representative government in our country hangs in the balance.

Mr. President, I regret I have held up for so long consideration of the Russell amendment, which is before the Senate. I shall either vote for it, or pair with one of my good friends who is absent from the Senate, in favor of the amendment, not because I intend to vote for the resolution as an end result, but because I think the Russell amendment is better than the resolution as reported.

However, there are two phrases in the Russell amendment to which I object. The first is on page 1, line 4—"if the

President determines the necessity thereof."

To make it a sensible resolution, that phrase should be stricken.

On page 2, lines 6 and 7, the phrase "created by action of the United Nations" makes it a bad resolution. Some of my friends may wonder why I shall vote for it. I shall vote for the Russell amendment in the nature of a substitute. I shall not vote for the resolution when it comes up for final passage. I shall vote for the Russell amendment only, because I think it is an improvement over the resolution.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, I believe the Senator made reference to page 2. I wonder whether he was referring to the same line I had in mind. I refer to line 2 on page 2, to the phrase "with the Charter of the United Nations."

Mr. McCARTHY. I was referring to lines 6 and 7 on page 2. The phrase on line 2 is equally objectionable, but I believe that has been stricken.

Mr. LONG. Yes. That is what I had in mind.

Mr. McCARTHY. I am referring to lines 6 and 7, which have not been stricken.

PROPOSED UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT TO
LIMIT DEBATE

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, it is my intention, as soon as we are able to obtain a quorum, to suggest to the Senate, on behalf of the distinguished minority leader and myself, a unanimous-consent agreement. I should like to read it for the information of the Senate and for the information of the staff.

Mr. REVERCOMB. Mr. President, will the Senator speak louder?

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Yes; or the Senator might move closer. It is difficult for me to speak too loud.

I should like to read the proposed agreement for the information of Senators and for the information of the staff; and to suggest to the staff that they proceed to notify each Senator that we will have a quorum call at the conclusion of my very brief statement, and that the clerk will then be called upon to read the unanimous-consent agreement.

I read the proposed unanimous-consent agreement as follows:

Ordered, That, effective on Thursday, March 7, 1957, at 10 o'clock a. m., during the further consideration of the joint resolution (S. J. Res. 19) to authorize the President to undertake economic and military cooperation with nations in the general area of the Middle East in order to assist in the strengthening and defense of their independence, debate on any amendment, motion, or appeal, except a motion to lay on the table, shall be limited to 1 hour, to be equally divided and controlled by the mover of any such amendment or motion and the majority leader: *Provided*, That in the event the majority leader is in favor of any such amendment or motion, the time in opposition shall be controlled by the minority leader or some Senator designated by him: *Provided further*, That no amendment that is not germane to the provisions of the said joint resolution shall be received.

Ordered further, That if and when the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, whether or not amended, is agreed to, the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services jointly shall be deemed to be

discharged from the further consideration of House Joint Resolution 117, the companion House measure; that said joint resolution shall be deemed to be amended by striking out all after the enacting clause, and in lieu thereof inserting the text of Senate Joint Resolution 19, as amended; and that the amendment to the said House joint resolution shall be deemed to have been engrossed and the joint resolution shall then be read the third time.

Ordered further, That on the question on the final passage of the said joint resolution, debate shall be limited to 3 hours, to be equally divided and controlled, respectively, by the majority and minority leaders; *Provided*, That the said leaders or either of them, may, from the time under their control on the passage of the joint resolution, allot additional time to any Senator during the consideration of any amendment, motion, or appeal.

Mr. President, I am prepared to change the day from Thursday to Wednesday or from Wednesday to Tuesday or from Tuesday to Monday, or from Monday to Saturday. I have previously announced that I plan to be absent from the Senate on Wednesday, and I may have to arrange with the distinguished minority leader to find me a pair on his side of the aisle.

The proposed unanimous-consent request is submitted at the suggestion of the able junior Senator from Louisiana [Mr. Long], who believes that certainly between now and next Thursday we will have ample opportunity to discuss the legislation and that every Senator will have an opportunity to express himself. This agreement would permit Senators to go ahead and firm up their schedules and make their arrangements with some certainty as to when the vote will take place.

The Senator from Texas has no preference in the matter other than to try to accommodate the wishes of Senators.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I yield.

Mr. KNOWLAND. The distinguished majority leader had consulted with me on this subject, as he has courteously done on other matters of this kind. I have joined with him in proposing the unanimous-consent request because of indications that Thursday would probably be the first day with reference to which we could get a unanimous-consent agreement applying to the whole resolution.

I might say that it would be my preference, as the distinguished majority leader has said it would be his preference, to be able to enter into an agreement which would apply today or tomorrow or Monday or Tuesday or Wednesday. However, I have learned, in almost 12 years of service in the Senate, that we cannot always get what we would like to have; therefore, it is necessary to accommodate ourselves to what can finally be worked out among 96 Members of the Senate.

I should like to make one clarifying point for the RECORD and for the information of the Senators. We now have pending before the Senate, upon which we have now had at least 2 days of debate, if not longer, the so-called Russell amendment. There are other amend-

ments at the desk, and still others may be proposed.

I should like to have an understanding, if the proposed unanimous-consent agreement should be entered into, that the agreement would not prevent a vote on either the pending amendment prior to the effective date of the unanimous-consent agreement, or on other amendments as they might be offered, but that the unanimous-consent agreement would fix the date so far as voting on the resolution itself is concerned and on any amendments which should be offered at that time.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I see nothing in the proposed agreement which would prevent a vote on the pending amendment or on any amendment thereto at any time the Senate is ready and willing to vote. However, the agreement would begin to run on Thursday, March 7, at 10 o'clock a. m. if we have not already disposed of the resolution by that time.

Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I yield.

Mr. ANDERSON. I merely wish to compliment the majority leader and the minority leader on their patience in this matter, and to express the hope that this agreement will be entered into.

Mr. THYE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I yield.

Mr. THYE. I, like the majority leader, have made a commitment. I have made a commitment for Thursday of next week, March 7. The majority leader has a commitment for Wednesday, the 6th of March. I would find it extremely embarrassing if a vote on this important question should come up on Thursday of next week, because I had agreed several months ago to address the annual national meeting of the REA at Chicago on Thursday morning. I hope it will be possible for a vote to be taken before that date. I believe that we would have ample time to discuss the question and begin voting even as early as Tuesday of next week.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Does the Senator object?

Mr. THYE. No; I do not wish to object, because I think the patience of the majority leader and the minority leader has been tried in their endeavor to bring the question to a vote. I hesitate to raise any question, and, therefore, I shall adjust myself to the convenience of the Senate, and if I am not present when the vote is had, I shall later state my position. If some Senator would be willing to pair with me I should be delighted to have him do so.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I thank the Senator from Minnesota for his fine attitude at this time as always.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, will the Senator from Texas yield?

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I yield.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, in view of the fact that the Senator from Texas is going to suggest the absence of a quorum and is discussing it now to get a complete picture, would the Senator object if I suggested the absence of a quorum?

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I was going to do it. I thought if any Senator was going to object he would so indicate by asking questions.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator from Texas yield?

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I yield.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I have just had a discussion with the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] concerning one point which may require some clarification. I think the Senator has already made it clear that nothing in the agreement, if it should be entered into by the Senate, would prevent a vote on the pending amendment or such other amendments as might be offered, prior to Thursday, if that is the date which is accepted. I should also like to ask if there is anything which would preclude supplementary unanimous-consent requests confined to individual amendments if the Senate by unanimous consent decided to fix an hour on amendments so that Senators might be advised of the time of voting.

My own answer would be that there is nothing in the unanimous-consent request which would prevent such supplementary agreements, but I wanted to get the opinion of the distinguished Senator from Texas, the majority leader.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I share the minority leader's viewpoint.

I would ask the Chair if he will advise the Senate on that point.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. COTTON in the chair). The Chair is informed by the Parliamentarian that the Senate by unanimous consent can enter into other agreements without in any way, shape, or manner affecting the pending unanimous-consent request.

Mr. CHAVEZ. Mr. President, will the Senator from Texas yield?

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I yield.

Mr. CHAVEZ. Mr. President, I understand that nothing in the proposed agreement would prevent the Senate from voting on the Russell amendment today or any other day prior to the 7th of the month. Is that correct?

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. That is correct.

Mr. CHAVEZ. I also understand that the Senate will convene on the 7th of March at 10 o'clock a. m.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. That is my hope.

Mr. CHAVEZ. And, also, that there will be a morning hour?

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. No; that is not planned.

Mr. CHAVEZ. The request calls for 6 hours of debate on the Russell amendment, if it is still pending—

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Not to exceed 6 hours.

Mr. CHAVEZ. That would mean, then, that we would hardly be voting on Thursday, March 7, until—

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I would say that the request provides not to exceed 3 hours on the resolution; that is, 3 hours to each side. Time could be yielded on any or all amendments.

Mr. CHAVEZ. Will the Senate vote on the Russell amendment if it is still pending that day?

001017850

0002420

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I hope the Russell amendment can be voted on today.

Mr. CHAVEZ. The Senator from Texas cannot hurt my feelings by bringing that about.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I am attempting to avoid hurting the Senator's feelings.

Mr. CHAVEZ. The Senator always does.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I thank the Senator.

Mr. CHAVEZ. I am trying to adjust my time. In case we have to go to the 7th, when does the Senator think a vote will be taken?

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I do not have that kind of crystal ball. I hope we can vote on the Russell amendment today, and that, then, any other amendment which may be pending will be called up, and that we can vote with as much dispatch as is possible in the event action on the amendment is not concluded today. Certain Senators have suggested that to me because they desire to make plans, and this procedure will permit them to do it. I am doing it largely as a courtesy to them, because I think they have that right.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Texas yield?

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I yield.

Mr. PASTORE. For all practical purposes, if the Russell amendment is voted upon today and adopted, will not this matter be all over?

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I would not so consider it.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, will the Senator from Texas yield?

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I yield.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my name be placed on the quorum call. An important committee meeting is to be held beginning at 2 o'clock this afternoon—

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I would have to object to that, in order to maintain the procedure which we have in the Senate.

Mr. McCARTHY. Does the Senator object to that?

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I must object. The absence of a quorum has not yet been suggested, and may not be.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Texas yield?

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I yield to my friend from Oregon.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I must object to the unanimous-consent request.

I speak somewhat with a feeling of sadness about it, Mr. President, because I do not think we need to become involved in this type of parliamentary controversy at this time. But we are in it; so, for the record, I want to make this very brief observation as to my reasons for objecting.

First, as to this specific case, I think our foreign policy is in such a state of flux in these critical hours that we should not be laboring under any misapprehensions in the debate in the Senate. I think we should keep ourselves free at every moment to take, from a parliamentary standpoint, whatever turn new

facts developing in foreign policy might warrant.

Second, Mr. President, in 12 years I have been in many discussions concerning unanimous-consent agreements. As a matter of general policy, I think unanimous-consent agreements are a bad policy in conducting Senate business. Many times when unanimous-consent requests have been denied in the Senate we have closed the debate a considerable length of time ahead of the time at which it would have been closed if we had been operating under the unanimous-consent agreement. I think that is true in this instance. If we would go ahead and debate the question and start voting on amendments, my guess is that we would be through with the whole program long before Thursday of next week.

Mr. President, I now wish to address myself to a very sensitive point which is involved in this discussion, because we know that many of these unanimous-consent requests are made in order to accommodate colleagues.

I have been accommodated many times, as has every other Member who has served any length of time in the Senate. Yet I cannot escape the fact, after 12 years of observation of this procedure, that transacting business in the Senate by unanimous consent as the rule—and it has almost become that—has done harm to debate in the Senate. It has done injury to what I think is the primary historic purpose of the Senate, that is, for the elected representatives of a free people from the various sovereign States of the Nation to come onto the floor, to exchange their respective points of view on the merits of an issue, and to vote. I have said many times that in order to perfect that system the Senate ought to adopt a rule of germaneness; but that is another matter.

What is actually happening—and no one can successfully deny it in this discussion—is that when we accept a unanimous-consent agreement to vote as of a certain time on any question, we not only accommodate X, Y, or Z, who may find himself in a position where he must go to his home or somewhere else so as to take care of some personal matter, but also we proceed to accommodate the whole Senate, or a large segment of the Senate, in a practice of absenteeism.

I do not ask any Senator to share my view about this—I know many Senators do not—but one of the reasons for the unanimous-consent rule in the Senate is to give the individual Members of the Senate the right to exercise their honest opinion as to what they consider their duty to be. I feel that that we need to do something to restore what I believe to be a very sound historic practice in the Senate, namely, that the Senate vote in accordance with the rule of the regular order, with the exception that unanimous consent may be given to limit the available time of debate for emergency purposes.

I made a study a couple of years ago, when this matter was previously before the Senate, and I intend to bring it up to date as soon as I can, of the whole history of unanimous-consent agree-

ments. There were decades in the Senate when such agreements were a rarity; but I think also in those decades the opinions were formed on the floor of the Senate more than they are now, on the basis of evidence presented in debate.

So I object to this request not only because I believe in this particular instance we ought to keep ourselves in a state of flux on the resolution before the Senate, and should not be tied down by the straitjacket of a unanimous-consent agreement, but also because some of us should raise our voices in protest against this growing change in the historic policy of the Senate, a policy which I think is doing the Senate great damage. I do not think that Members of the Senate have the right constantly to ask for personal accommodations to the detriment of what I consider to be a very important, historic practice in the Senate.

I am not saying that I shall object to all unanimous-consent agreements, but I am saying that a much stronger case for a unanimous-consent agreement will have to be made than has been made to date for this one before I shall agree to it. Therefore, I object.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. It is not yet in order to object to the unanimous-consent agreement, because the Senator from Texas has not yet offered it. He merely has served notice that he intends to offer it.

Mr. MORSE. I beg the Senator's pardon; I thought the unanimous-consent agreement was at the desk.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. No. I merely expressed the hope that Senators would give consideration to it and would try to approach it with an open mind. If it seemed to appeal to them, we could then have a quorum call. It is the practice always to have a quorum call before a unanimous-consent agreement is proposed.

Mr. KENNEDY obtained the floor.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, will the Senator from Massachusetts yield to me for two purposes: First, that I may propose an order that when the Senate concludes its business today, it stand in adjournment until 11 o'clock tomorrow morning; and second, for the purpose of suggesting the absence of a quorum, with the understanding that the Senator from Massachusetts will not lose the floor?

Mr. KENNEDY. I shall be glad to yield for those purposes.

ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 11 A. M. TOMORROW

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate concludes its business today, it stand in adjournment until 11 o'clock tomorrow morning.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PROMOTION OF PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Senate resumed the consideration of the joint resolution (S. J. Res. 19) to authorize the President to undertake

economic and military cooperation with nations in the general area of the Middle East in order to assist in the strengthening and defense of their independence.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Aiken	Ellender	Monroney
Allott	Flanders	Morse
Anderson	Gore	Mundt
Beall	Green	Murray
Blakley	Hayden	Payne
Bush	Hennings	Purtell
Carlson	Hill	Robertson
Carroll	Humphrey	Russell
Chavez	Javits	Smathers
Church	Johnson, Tex.	Stennis
Clark	Kefauver	Wiley
Cooper	Kennedy	Williams
Cotton	Long	Young
Curtis	Mansfield	
Dworshak	McClellan	

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MONRONEY in the chair). Forty-three Senators have answered to their names. A quorum is not present. The clerk will call the names of the absent Senators.

The legislative clerk called the names of the absent Senators, and Mr. BENNETT, Mr. BIBLE, Mr. BRICKER, Mr. BUTLER, Mr. CASE of New Jersey, Mr. CASE of South Dakota, Mr. DIRKSEN, Mr. DOUGLAS, Mr. EASTLAND, Mr. ERVIN, Mr. FREAR, Mr. GOLDWATER, Mr. HICKENLOOPER, Mr. HRUSKA, Mr. JACKSON, Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina, Mr. KUCHEL, Mr. LAUSCHE, Mr. MARTIN of Iowa, Mr. MARTIN of Pennsylvania, Mr. NEUBERGER, Mr. PASTORE, Mr. POTTER, Mr. SALTONSTALL, Mrs. SMITH, of Maine, Mr. SPARKMAN, Mr. SYMINGTON, Mr. TALMADGE, Mr. THURMOND, Mr. THYE, and Mr. WATKINS answered to their names when called.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Seventy-four Senators having answered to their names, a quorum is present.

In accordance with the understanding before the quorum call, the junior Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY] has the floor.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I desire to address the Senate very briefly on the two major questions pending before it:

(a) Should the President's Mideast resolution, as amended in committee, be passed; and

(b) Should the economic and military-aid provisions in the resolution be stricken, as urged by a pending amendment?

I intend to vote for the resolution, as amended by the committee, despite my very real dissatisfaction with it. Permit me to explain my position further.

I believe the resolution to have been unsatisfactorily worded, particularly in the original version prior to the amendment of the Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD] and the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY] for it dodges—and may obscure further—grave constitutional questions of presidential and congressional powers, leaving any future occupant of the White House in doubt as to whether his office has been strengthened by this broad grant of authority, weakened by a precedent that

requires congressional approval of inherent Executive powers, or left untouched.

I believe the resolution to have been unsatisfactorily designed; for it lumps together in unwieldy fashion an unnecessary repetition of existing economic and military aid authorizations, a vague and restrictive restatement of our determination to resist Communist aggression, and a more technical and temporary waiver of existing aid limitations—which waivers, I suspect, constitute all that the administration really desired in the first place, but which they felt needed a cloak of arms and crisis to pass the Congress.

I believe the resolution to have been unsatisfactorily presented to Congress and the world—through worldwide revelation before congressional consultation, a dramatic Saturday session, urgent pleas for speed and unanimity; exaggerated justifications and evasive testimony, without any demonstration of critical need.

Finally, I believe this resolution—and the time we have devoted to it—to have been largely unnecessary in terms of the real problems in the Middle East, for the resolution offers solutions to neither the immediate crises of Gaza and Aqaba, nor the more long-range crises of Communist subversion, arms traffic, Suez, refugees, boundaries, and other factors in the continuing Arab-Israeli dispute.

In short, it could well be argued that this entire undertaking was an unnecessary error from the time it was first conceived and submitted. Existing aid programs were already underway. The Soviets were already on notice of our determination to resist attack. A simple suspension of the three limitations on economic aid might have been more readily forthcoming had Congress been approached with more candor at the beginning.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield to the Senator from Tennessee.

Mr. GORE. I find the statement of the able and distinguished Senator from Massachusetts quite provocative. He has said that the resolution was unsatisfactorily presented; that, in his opinion, it was unnecessary; that, indeed, its mere presentation may have been an error. Would the Senator go so far as to add also that thus far it has been unproductive and unfruitful, and contains no promise of being so?

Mr. KENNEDY. As the Senator knows, we already have military commitments, through NATO or SEATO, with Pakistan and Turkey. The President and his secretary, Mr. Hagerty, on several occasions have indicated our close ties with Iran, and that we would view any attack in that area as a threat to the United States. Admiral Radford indicated there was no doubt in the Soviet's mind that the United States Government would act if Russia moved into Iran. These countries border on Russia. If a direct attack were made by Russia, Russia would have to go through those countries. Therefore, I say the resolution is unnecessary if it is

intended to put Russia on notice that we would regard an attack in that area as a threat to ourselves.

Mr. GORE. Will the Senator yield further?

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes.

Mr. GORE. Is it fair to conclude that the Senator has said that the resolution as such, insofar as it serves notice on the Soviet Union, contains nothing new?

Mr. KENNEDY. That is correct. It formalizes our view, but, in my opinion, Presidential statements have made our policy clear.

The fact remains, however, that the resolution has been presented to Congress—and all the world knows it. It thus seems to me that we are no longer able to consider this resolution on its merits alone. We have been forced by the President's action to consider also the effects of the resolution's passage or defeat by this body.

What are the ill effects that could result from passage of the resolution? It is said that little or nothing will be accomplished—Arab unity will not be increased, friendly governments will still fall, Communist influence will still grow, and American prestige will still decline—but this is no worse than the status quo. It is said that passage of the resolution will leave unsolved the major problems of the Middle East—but they are unsolved today. It is said that the resolution grants vast powers to the President should he feel an emergency threatens our national security—but practically all constitutional authorities agree he would possess such powers in any event. It is said that the resolution grants the President unprecedented discretion to spend vast sums in foreign aid—but, as I shall detail in a moment, this resolution does not add one penny to the foreign-aid bill; it grants no flexibility to the President in the use of foreign-aid funds substantially different from that which we have previously extended; and, on the contrary, it adds new conditions of congressional review which its defeat would deny to us. No country is to receive aid that is not already eligible to receive it; no types of projects are to be supported that could not already be supported under existing law.

In short, while this resolution may accomplish very little, while it may have originally been unnecessary, unjustifiable, and erroneous, it is difficult to demonstrate any new major ill effects that will flow from its passage.

On the other hand, if Congress defeats the resolution, we shall have gained nothing—save the political embarrassment of the President and Mr. Dulles, if that is considered a gain—for the President will still possess great constitutional and statutory powers, as the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], among other Senators, has pointed out, to make whatever financial and military commitments he feels the national security requires. But we will have repudiated the Executive on a major foreign-policy issue before the eyes of the world, in a manner that would certainly cause the fall or resignation of any government under a parliamentary system. We will

1957

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

2539

have demonstrated domestic dissension, disunity, and a lack of confidence in our Chief Executive at the very time he is involved in critical negotiations with other nations. We will have blunted our warning to the Soviets to stay out of the Middle East, and dismayed those friendly Middle Eastern nations who favor this approach.

For the reasons I believe Congress would be ill-advised to defeat this resolution, now that it has been publicized and submitted, however ill-advised that original submission may have been. Many of us would prefer not to vote for this resolution; but we dare not, under present world conditions, vote against it. And we can, perhaps, seek consolation in the words of Abraham Lincoln:

There are few things wholly evil or wholly good. Almost everything, especially of Government policy, is an inseparable compound of the two, so that our best judgment of the preponderance between them is continually demanded.

I shall vote for passage of the resolution, therefore, because of my belief that the evil flowing from its defeat would be preponderantly greater than the good.

Permit me to turn now to the second and more difficult question as to whether all economic and military assistance should be stricken from the resolution. Passage of the measure without these provisions would, of course, still serve as a warning to the Communists and as a declaration of our concern for the Middle East, and the President's request would not be wholly ignored.

But the rejection of so vital a part of the President's proposal would still have grave psychological effects on the prestige of our Government and Chief Executive abroad. It would be interpreted, moreover, with disastrous effects on our leadership in the area, and by our friends as well as by Communist and anti-American agitators, as proof of the charge that we think of the Middle East only in terms of guns and bases and military allies against communism, not in terms of friendly people and their economic well-being and stability.

Moreover, what would such an amendment accomplish? It is said that this resolution provides vast sums of money for wasteful Middle Eastern projects that could be better spent at home, but the truth of the matter is that this measure does not provide, appropriate, or authorize one additional dollar of foreign aid. Deletion of these provisions would not save the American taxpayer one cent—for the money has already been authorized and appropriated, it is already available, and can undoubtedly be obligated regardless of whether those provisions remain. Nothing more is sought by these provisions than to relieve Mr. Richards and the administration from three restrictions imposed last year which the delays caused by Middle East hostilities have outmoded, and which, if not temporarily suspended, would only cause a more hasty, wasteful expenditure of funds. Senators understand, of course, that very little of the money we appropriated for the Middle East for this fiscal year has been obligated because of

the outbreak of war. Failure to pass these three waivers will still not save any of this money, but simply require the administration to rush to obligate 80 percent of it before April 30, long before Mr. Richards can make a thorough examination of actual needs.

Whatever wasteful projects Members may fear will be forthcoming, it should be recalled that passage of this resolution is not necessary for these purposes. The money is already available, from funds appropriated for the Middle East, from the President's discretionary fund under section 401 (b), and from other sources which he can transfer under sections 401 (a) and 501 of the foreign-aid bill. The only major difference would be that Congress and its committees would not have the review of these projects that it would have under section 3 of this resolution. Though it may be argued that this is only a right of report and review, not disapproval, the administration, in the absence of this resolution, would be able to spend the same amount of money anyway without even report or review; and it would be required, moreover, to spend it in a manner and on projects which, in its judgment, are not as useful as the expenditures that could be made once these three outmoded restrictions are waived.

Furthermore, it should be remembered that Mr. Richards has a very fine reputation in the Congress and, also, a reputation for being strict in connection with foreign aid. I think he led the fight in the House for a cut of almost \$1 billion last year.

Moreover, these projects must be reported to the Congress at the very time when we shall be considering foreign aid for the fiscal year 1958. Obviously, if the projects are wasteful, it seems to me that Congress can then take suitable action in considering appropriations for 1958. However, the important point is that the administration can spend this money under the present law without making a report, however unsatisfactory the report procedure may be, as the Senator from Oregon argued in the committee.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.

Mr. PASTORE. I think the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts was on the floor yesterday when I asked questions of the Senator from Wisconsin on that very point.

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes.

Mr. PASTORE. As I recall I asked the question whether or not the use of this \$200 million would be broader than was originally intended with respect to the appropriation of \$750 million. I think the answer was in the affirmative. Do I correctly understand now from the distinguished Senator that such is not the case?

Mr. KENNEDY. Will the Senator rephrase his question, as to whether the powers are broader?

Mr. PASTORE. I mean wider purposes than those originally intended, and including other nations that might have been intended when the \$750 million was appropriated.

Mr. KENNEDY. Other nations. That is correct. There is no doubt about it. Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.

Mr. MORSE. Is it not also true that under the power proposed to be granted the President by this resolution, he could use the funds for other purposes?

Mr. KENNEDY. There is no doubt that he could use the money for other purposes. However, the point I intended to make in response to the Senator was that of the \$750 million we are discussing—and I say this without revealing classified information—more than two-thirds is intended for countries with which the United States has had intimate treaty relations. In the case of at least one of those countries, I think the administration might today argue that money which they thought could be wisely spent during this fiscal year, because of circumstances within that country, cannot be wisely spent. If we do not pass this joint resolution there will be nothing to prevent the administration from spending that money in that country, even though it does not believe it could be wisely spent.

On the other hand, instead of doing what they would consider to be wasteful, under this plan they could spend it in other areas more satisfactorily, but would be required to make a report to the Congress before obligating the funds.

In answer to the observation of the Senator from Oregon, I should say that on the one hand, taking X country, for which a large sum of the money is intended, when the administration indicates that it cannot be wisely spent in X country, it will still be possible, if we adopt the Russell amendment, for the administration to spend it unwisely in that country.

Under the resolution as it now stands, it would be possible for the administration to spend it in ways it considers more satisfactory; and the administration would have to make a report to the Congress. So it seems to me we would have more control under the resolution as it stands than if we did not pass the resolution.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield?

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.

Mr. MORSE. Is it not true that if the administration does not think the money can be spent wisely at the present time, it is not compelled to spend it at all?

Mr. KENNEDY. No; there is no obligation to spend it; but it is a question of their judgment. It seems to me that we would be suggesting, by the Russell amendment, that we do not have confidence in their judgment, and that we believe they would not provide for projects which were wise and economical. On the other hand, they still have authority to spend the money unwisely and uneconomically, so we are trusting their judgment to that extent.

Mr. MORSE. Does the Senator know what the money is to be spent for?

Mr. KENNEDY. No; but the purpose of the Richards Commission is to find out. Under the act which Congress

passed last year, the administration is entitled to spend the money with rather broad discretion. It seems to me that by passage of the resolution in its present form, the Congress would have greater control, because the administration would be obliged to make a report to us, while under the present act it is not obliged to make such a report.

Mr. MORSE. Will the Senator permit me to raise a question with respect to his comment as to whether we have confidence in the judgment of members of the administration? How can we have any feeling one way or the other until we know what they are going to spend the money for? Certainly the language of the revised resolution that the President must report his proposed expenditures 15 days before he spends the money is no effective check upon the President. The language does not provide the requirement that they must obtain our approval before they spend it. The 15-day report requirement is only a gesture. They can file a report and then go ahead and spend the money. They could wait 15 days and then go ahead and spend it anyway. Why does not the Senator support an amendment requiring the administration to obtain approval for specific expenditures after it has made its report?

Mr. KENNEDY. Under this resolution Mr. Richards, in whom we have great confidence, and who has a reputation in this field for being strict and careful, is required to approve the project himself. He is obliged to submit it to the Congress. Projects for which the money will be spent will be reported to us. They will be reported to us at the time when we are considering foreign aid for the fiscal year 1958, which will give us a sanction not only with respect to the \$250 million, but also with respect to the \$4 billion or more recommended for the fiscal year 1958.

On the other hand, we have the money appropriated last June, with respect to which the State Department does not need to make a further report to us. It can spend it in any way it wishes, within the limitations authorized last year. In at least one country they do not feel the money could be wisely spent, but they could spend it there without making a report.

Mr. MORSE. Why not stop that wrong rather than add another to it? We should not have taken such action last year.

Mr. KENNEDY. We are talking about an action which Congress took last year. Perhaps the time to review the projects more carefully was last year. Nevertheless, Congress has acted. It is now March 1, and this question is before us. The point I wish to make is that I hope no Senator will vote for the Russell amendment with the expectation that it will, if finally adopted, give the Congress more control over the expenditure of money. In my opinion, the result will be substantially less control.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.

Mr. MORSE. I would respectfully say that what the Senator from Massachu-

setts is saying, in effect, if I understand his argument, is that we may have made a mistake last year, but that he will vote for a continuation of the mistake that was made last year. In my opinion, now is the time to stop a continuation of what we did last year and require the administration to tell us what they are going to do with the taxpayers' money before they commit the money. I believe we have that obligation to the taxpayers, instead of giving authority to the President, blanket authority, to spend it for purposes of his own choosing in such amounts as he wants to spend it.

Mr. KENNEDY. I would agree with the Senator if we were confronted with an ideal condition. However, that is not the situation. I agree that Congress does not have satisfactory control over the expenditure of foreign aid funds. For some time I have been investigating the matter and have tried to arrive at some figures regarding it. However, there is no doubt that for all practical purposes Congress has lost control over the expenditure of a substantial amount of these funds. One of the problems arises from the fact that we must appropriate money far in advance of the time when it will be spent. Conditions change from time to time. For example, substantial sums of money might be appropriated for use in country X. Those funds would have been appropriated on the expectation that country X would do certain things which would make the expenditure of the money satisfactory and useful. However, X country has not done those things. That condition exists. The point I make is that the State Department and the executive branch of the Government as a whole would still be afraid to go ahead in X country because they believed it would be wasteful to do so. Therefore, we are confronted by actual conditions, not theoretical conditions; and it seems to me that we would have much more control under the resolution than otherwise.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.

Mr. MORSE. I thank the Senator for his graciousness. It seems to me that what he is asking me to do is to vote blanket authority to the President of the United States because, if I do not vote it now, the money will be spent unwisely in some country of the Middle East. I cannot accept that line of logic. It seems to me that if the Government went ahead and spent the money unwisely we would take care of the situation when we later discovered what the money had been spent for. I believe now is the time to put a stop on the expenditure, and that now is the time when the administration should tell us what it intends to spend the money for. I say that, because I am very much worried about what could be done with the \$200 million in the Middle East in the hands of certain Arab leaders. It might be used in such a way as to endanger the future security of many thousands of American boys who might have to go to that area.

Mr. KENNEDY. I should think that the time to have put a stop to it would

have been last year in the appropriations for this fiscal year.

Mr. MORSE. I did not have enough votes in support of my position, including the vote of the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. MONRONEY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.

Mr. MONRONEY. I have been following the very cogent debate of the distinguished junior Senator from Massachusetts. I wish he would clarify in my mind a point which is not very clear to me. The Senator is now referring to \$95 million. Is that what is left in the President's confidential unlimited funds?

Mr. KENNEDY. No; the testimony has indicated that practically all of that has been spent for refugees and for other purposes. What I am talking about is the \$95 million, or perhaps I should say \$120 million, which could be used out of the \$250 million which has been authorized for the worldwide development assistance.

Mr. MONRONEY. The President still has many millions of dollars, perhaps \$95 million, which he may spend without any strings attached to it, and which are considered as free funds. Therefore, actually, the resolution frees \$120 million from legislative restrictions. Is that correct?

Mr. KENNEDY. I will say to the Senator that the President has much more money than that, potentially, to be accurate about it. I believe the President could transfer from \$50 million to \$75 million, which remain unobligated from the President's discretionary fund.

He could also transfer from other funds which have been appropriated for other areas, under section 401, \$100 million to \$150 million. Then he could transfer from other areas, under section 501, for use in the Middle East, \$50 million or more.

He could also obligate about \$65 million of funds already appropriated for use in the Arab States and in Israel, but which has not as yet been obligated due to the crisis in the area.

He could spend from the worldwide economic development fund an estimated \$120 million.

There are also other funds which could possibly be transferred.

However, we are making it much easier to transfer funds if we pass the resolution.

Mr. MONRONEY. In other words, the resolution would put a ceiling of \$250 million on the transfer; is that correct?

Mr. KENNEDY. No; because previous acts which Congress has passed give the President some discretionary authority to transfer funds from one section to another. The point I am making is that there are some limitations involved on these funds. The President's discretionary fund is not subject to the 80 percent restriction; nor is the transfer of funds from other areas, under section 401, from \$100 million to \$150 million. Then there is the unobligated portion of the \$65 million obligated to the Arab States and Israel. That is subject to the 80-percent limitation. Then there is the money which is in the worldwide economic de-

001017350

0002422

1957

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

2541

velopment fund, which was originally \$95 million, but which now is almost \$120 million. That is subject to a percentage being made in the form of loans. I believe it is 80 percent, in round figures.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will my colleague yield?

Mr. KENNEDY. I am glad to yield to my colleague.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Is there not also a limitation that not more than \$35 million may be spent in any one of the countries, and would not the resolution free the President from that restriction?

Mr. KENNEDY. I am anticipating that by the end of June not more than \$35 million will be used in any one country. In any case that restriction continues in the present resolution. In any case, I believe the Government will be hard-pressed to spend more than \$100 million. Therefore that is not too important.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.

Mr. PASTORE. It is my opinion that we are more or less overemphasizing the transfer of the \$200 million. Here we have reported a resolution, and there is also before the Senate the Russell amendment. Does the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts understand that the President could employ the Armed Forces on his own, as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces?

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes; there is no doubt that he could employ the Armed Forces and then come to Congress later. The Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] developed that point very clearly.

Mr. PASTORE. Are we not actually arguing that it may be necessary to use American blood and American bodies—because the provision for the use of military force is confined in the Russell amendment, as well as in the resolution—but, although we are pledging American blood, we do not want to give the President the authority to transfer \$200 million? In other words, we are placing a greater emphasis on \$200 million than on the possible use of American Armed Forces.

Mr. CARROLL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KENNEDY. I believe the statement of the Senator from Rhode Island is completely correct. I now yield to the Senator from Colorado.

Mr. CARROLL. It seems to me the remarks of the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE] are extremely pertinent to the discussion, because, as I have followed the argument of the Senator from Massachusetts, he has pointed to the emphasis on the use of military force and military alliances, whereas greater emphasis should be placed on the desire of the people who live in that area for economic stability, through which peace will come, not through arms, as the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island has so well suggested.

As I recall the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] indicated that approximately three hundred to four hundred millions of dollars were committed to what he called military hardware, and I

believe the RECORD shows that the commitment was to Iran, Iraq, and Turkey.

Mr. KENNEDY. Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey.

Mr. CARROLL. My understanding of military hardware is that it means tanks, guns, uniforms, and so forth, and there has been committed to such armament \$300 or \$400 million. The Senator from Rhode Island has in a few words, it seems to me, demolished the whole argument against the \$200 million item about which we have been talking. I was not here at the time Congress made that commitment, but the President is now asking for a transfer, not of new money, but money which has been appropriated, to the program which the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island has discussed.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Massachusetts yield further?

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.

Mr. PASTORE. Does it not actually boil down to this: The proposal is either all good or all bad? If there is a likelihood that we have to commit American boys to service in the Middle East, why are we now talking about \$200 million for programs in the Middle East, when we have already spent \$59 billion of the taxpayers' money on foreign aid? Why start at this point? There may be a time when we can do away with these programs; but is it not a fact that if we believe the statement of the President that a crisis exists, then we must believe he needs the \$200 million? We cannot half believe him and half disbelieve him.

Mr. CARROLL. Mr. President, let me say to the Senator from Massachusetts and to the Senator from Rhode Island, that the Russell amendment provides:

That the United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East.

If it is vital in our own self-interest—let me say, our enlightened self-interest—it is vital that we have troops in that area—

Mr. KENNEDY. There are some troops in Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Mr. CARROLL. I think it is in furtherance of the protection of our own national interests that we support the statements and the arguments so ably presented by the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Massachusetts yield?

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.

Mr. JAVITS. It seems to me that the real point that is being made should be underlined. It is not a fact that what we are dealing with here is people like Saud in the Middle East, who, if fortified a bit, might ultimately fight on our side? We also ought to have an appeal to the people of the Middle East. As the Senator from Rhode Island has said, what is wrong with appealing to them? What they are suffering from is their low standard of living, and we are holding out some hope for them. Two hundred million dollars is a bag full of money to do something with in any important

area where the President chooses to put it. So we add to the romance and to the psychological situation in that area, and also provide something which the people of that area can see, grab hold of, and can understand.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Massachusetts yield further?

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.

Mr. PASTORE. Is it not a fact that Senators who will vote against the Russell amendment will do so because they do not want to be placed in such a position that the President later could say, "If you had given me the money I asked for I would not have had to use one American boy."

If the resolution passes at all it should pass on the recommendation of those who have suggested it, because if they are wrong the responsibility is theirs.

Mr. KENNEDY. That is correct.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Massachusetts yield?

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.

Mr. AIKEN. With reference to the statement of the Senator from Rhode Island, I would say that we are not arguing about \$200 million which has already been appropriated. We are arguing about the amount which may be left unallocated. We are arguing about what is left of \$200 million that can be used in the Middle East.

Mr. CARLSON. Mr. President, will the Senator from Massachusetts yield?

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.

Mr. CARLSON. I wish to commend the Senator from Massachusetts for stressing a point which is most important in this debate. This afternoon there has been developed, through the able Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE], the very point which I think must be stressed. It seems to me it would be absurd to vote to have our boys sent to foreign lands, without first giving the President \$200 million with which to take other steps to protect ourselves. I think that is the main issue raised by the Russell amendment, and I expect to vote against it on that very basis.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Massachusetts yield?

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.

Mr. MORSE. I shall speak on this matter at some length later, but I wish to put into the RECORD my point of view at this juncture.

Some of us who will vote for the Russell amendment will do so because we do not intend to give to any President authority to send American funds and boys into the Middle East when we do not know the purpose for which he is sending them. I do not propose to vote a dollar that can be used to bribe Arab leaders. American boys are too precious to be sent to the Middle East to die there without the representatives of the people knowing the purpose for which the President is sending them there. I have confidence in no President when it comes to giving him authority which the Congress under the Constitution ought to retain. The Senator from Rhode Island and the Senator from Massachusetts cannot escape this constitutional ques-

tion, because it is involved in the \$200 million, as well as in the troops issue.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, this question was gone into in great detail in the committee. I know the Senator from Arkansas made the point very clearly that the President of the United States, if he felt the national interest were at stake, could take the United States into war without consent of the Congress, although he would subsequently be obliged to come to the Congress for approval. But there is nothing that lessens the authority of the President to use United States forces if he thinks the best interests of the United States are at stake.

Mr. MORSE. I think the Senator is as dead wrong as he can be, because what will happen under the resolution will be that we will give the President predated authority, when what we ought to say to him is, "You will have to tell us what the facts are which, in your opinion, justify the sending of American boys into the Middle East. Then, under article I, section 8, of the Constitution, Congress will decide whether you shall send them there. If you have already done so, because you thought there was a great emergency that could not await a report to Congress then Congress will decide whether you should bring those boys back."

But I am not going to vote to give the President any power to make war in the Middle East by a predated declaration of war.

Mr. KENNEDY. How does the power granted in the resolution hinder the President's powers to declare war or, as Commander in Chief, to protect the security of the Nation?

Mr. MORSE. I think the Senator from Massachusetts knows very well that after Congress gives the President the power, it is not likely to take it away from him. The Senate cannot escape the fact that once this predated approval is given to any President no Congress is likely to renege on it. What we ought to do is to prevent Congress from getting into such a position that it can be said, "after all, Congress gave the President advance authority and now it is not fair after a President has relied upon it to attempt to take it away." I am against giving the President any advance authority to send boys into war in the Middle East prior to a declaration of war by Congress.

Mr. KENNEDY. Where in the resolution as it is presently drawn is there any provision for advance authority? Where in the resolution is there a provision for a predated declaration of war? Will the Senator read the language?

Mr. MORSE. Yes; I covered it at some length in my speech the other day on the floor of the Senate. The language used in the Humphrey-Mansfield amendment does not in any way change the fact that Congress will be authorizing the President of the United States, by a predated grant of authority, to commit an act of war. We will be giving tacit approval to the President in advance to send American boys into action in the Middle East. I do not propose to vote for any resolution which contains any language that could be subject to such an inter-

pretation by any President. If the Senator will just read the resolution as modified by the committee he will see that the language still permits the President to commit an act of war with the tacit advance approval of Congress.

Mr. KENNEDY. The United States can get into war in the Middle East in 1 of 2 ways: Either by the President coming before Congress and asking for a declaration of war, or second, by the President taking action as the Commander in Chief, without coming to Congress for authority, because of an emergency, and therefore committing the United States to war, and then being obliged under the Constitution to come to Congress to get the approval by Congress of his action, and be subject to impeachment if Congress should think his action was improper.

It seems to me that the passage of the resolution will not affect the basic constitutional situation. It will only increase the great interest of the United States in maintaining a non-Communist Middle East. That is my view.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.

Mr. PASTORE. I have the highest respect for the very facile, astute mind of my distinguished friend from Oregon; but the fact of the matter is that I asked the Senator from Massachusetts if under either the resolution which was reported by the committees or under the Russell amendment the President of the United States would have the authority to employ American Armed Forces without coming to Congress. I think the Senator's answer was in the affirmative.

Mr. KENNEDY. That is correct. I think in the case of Korea we have the clearest example. The President never came to Congress during the 3 years of that war.

Mr. PASTORE. As a matter of fact, the only essential difference between the committee resolution and the Russell amendment is that the Russell amendment deletes the provision for aid.

Mr. KENNEDY. It indicates that the Senator from Georgia thinks that the constitutional powers of Congress and the President are not affected by the passage of the resolution.

Mr. PASTORE. The language of the Russell amendment is identical with that part of the committee amendment, which pledges the United States to use its Armed Forces if that should become necessary.

Mr. KENNEDY. That is correct.

Mr. PASTORE. So we are giving the President that confidence under whichever form the resolution is passed. If we adopt the Russell amendment, we shall be giving the President the authority insofar as it affects the use of American Armed Forces.

Mr. KENNEDY. The Senator from Oregon is against the whole resolution.

Mr. MORSE. I was about to make the point that I shall go along with the elimination of the blanket grant of authority to the President on the economic provision. Then, I may say to my friend from Rhode Island, I shall vote against the resolution as amended by

the Russell amendment. That has been my position consistently. I have announced it on the floor of the Senate again and again. Until there shall have been written into the resolution the constitutional guarantee for which I have been fighting throughout the debate, and which I shall offer in due course of time, I shall not vote to give to the present President or to any other President the kind of broad power which will be conferred by the present resolution.

Mr. KENNEDY. It does not seem to me that the passage of the resolution will affect the constitutional powers of the President or the constitutional powers of Congress to declare war.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield on the question of law? Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.

Mr. JAVITS. The argument as to constitutionality tends to defeat itself. If a constitutional power is involved, no resolution passed by Congress can relinquish it, because the Constitution can be amended only as provided in the Constitution itself, by amendment ratified by the States. On the other hand, if the resolution is saying that we are going to back the President in our foreign policy—which is all we are doing—and which is all we are saying—then we are only dealing with a policy; we are not giving up any constitutional power.

If it is a constitutional power to declare war that we are allegedly trying to give up, we could not do it if we tried. That is the end of the matter.

I think the Senator has put his finger on the two main points. If one is in favor of the resolution at all, he ought to be in favor of both parts; the notice to the Kremlin and the economic aid. Second, if one has any doubts of the constitutional power or authority, they can be resolved by the fact that even if we tried to do so, we could not give up constitutional power; therefore it is not being given up in this resolution.

Mr. KENNEDY. I think the Senator from New York has stated the position correctly.

Mr. MORSE. I may say to my friend from New York that, in my judgment, this is a request by the administration for the delegation of power that cannot be delegated. If we go through the motion of passing a resolution with this Presidential power in it, then it is going to be very difficult, psychologically, to get Congress to do anything about it thereafter. Now is the time to establish clearly the constitutional principle, before we pass the resolution requiring congressional approval before our troops are sent into war and before the President can give away taxpayers' dollars to Arab dictators. It can be done by the addition of the proper amendment to the resolution such as I shall propose.

If it is said by Senators on both sides of the argument that we do not want to give up any constitutional rights, then let us make that crystal clear by placing in the resolution language which will make it certain that we are not giving up our constitutional rights. But when I offered such a proposal to the Secretary of State, he rejected it. That is all I need to know about this administra-

001017850

0002423

tion's tendency to play fast and loose with constitutional rights of the Congress.

Mr. DWORSHAK. Mr. President, will the Senator from Massachusetts yield? Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.

Mr. DWORSHAK. I wish to read from a brief United Press dispatch from Cairo, and then to ask the Senator from Massachusetts a question. The dispatch reads:

CAIRO.—The semiofficial Middle East News Agency said today the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria had reached a unified position on the Eisenhower doctrine and cabled their stand to Washington.

The agency quoted Jordan's Premier Suleiman Nabulsi as saying Jordan would accept any foreign economic aid which was offered without any strings attached and that "Jordan won't be hostile either to the East or the West except inasmuch as neither bloc is hostile to the Arabs."

Nabulsi's statement was interpreted as an indication the four Arab governments would tell the American Ambassador here they were ready to accept United States economic aid without committing themselves in favor of the West against the East.

Does the Senator from Massachusetts consider this information as being adequate evidence of the type of aid which the United States would receive in the Middle East in case of an involvement in some kind of war? Have not those nations merely expressed their desire for neutrality, and said that they will not take a position alongside the western world?

Mr. KENNEDY. Is the Senator from Idaho asking me whether, in view of that statement, it is improper for us to give a guaranty of the type we are asked to give?

Mr. DWORSHAK. Only partially. I am asking the Senator whether he is willing, if the dispatch is accurate, to accept neutrality from those countries which are destined to receive aid from us. Is he willing merely that they shall retain their neutrality without being more vigorous in their support of the nations of the west?

Mr. KENNEDY. I should hope we would have their support. Is Saudi Arabia a signatory to that statement?

Mr. DWORSHAK. Yes.

Mr. KENNEDY. The Saudi Arabians have permitted us to build an airbase at Dhahran, which the Chiefs of Staff consider to be vitally important in the Middle East. So I think it would be necessary to examine into the degree of neutrality, which I am certain varies from country to country.

But as to the press report, it does not seem to me that we are now in a position to form any judgment as to the ultimate position which those countries will take.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.

Mr. JACKSON. I commend the distinguished junior Senator from Massachusetts for a very excellent statement. It occurs to me that it is in the national interest of the United States, and our own security, to have strong, independent, and free states in the world, even though they are not necessarily joined with us by an alliance. The other alter-

native might well be that those states would join the Communist bloc. I do not believe that our security is necessarily to be measured, in the last analysis, by the total number of states which are joined with us in an alliance. Our security can also be served by strong, independent, healthy states which are willing to defend their own territorial integrity. After all, if the world were composed only of strong, independent, peaceful states, we could live in a climate of peace and freedom, and other nations could do likewise.

Mr. KENNEDY. I must say that I think the Senator from Washington has put the matter as precisely as it could be put, and I really appreciate the statement he has made.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. Mr. President, will the Senator from Massachusetts yield to me?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. TAMMAGE in the chair). Does the Senator from Massachusetts yield to the Senator from Wyoming?

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. Let me say to the Senator from Massachusetts that I have seldom been so disturbed as I have been about the pending joint resolution. That is why I have sought to have it amended. I find it difficult to comprehend some of the arguments being made here, and I should like to interrogate the Senator from Massachusetts about them.

We are told that we must pass this joint resolution regardless of whether we deem the resolution, as reported by the committees, to be unconstitutional. We are told that, regardless of that, the Constitution is above all of us. However, Mr. President, if the Congress disregards the Constitution, and passes a measure about which there is some doubt, there will be no possible way, in a case of this kind, to retrieve the loss of constitutional action, if we have acted unconstitutionally.

We are also told that the same is true in respect to the expenditure of money. However, I do not wish to go into that question with the Senator from Massachusetts.

I should like to ask him to turn to page 4 of the joint resolution as reported by the committees.

Mr. KENNEDY. Before the Senator from Wyoming begins to interrogate me, I wish to say that I have no objection to amendments which may be offered, if they seek to make the joint resolution conform more closely to the Constitution. If the Senator from Wyoming should present such an amendment, I would have no objection. I am not wedded to the language of the joint resolution as it now stands. But I am wedded to the idea of having the Congress pass a measure which will put the Congress on record in support of the President's desire to maintain the freedom of the countries of the Middle East.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. I thought that was the desire of the Senator from Massachusetts; and it is my desire, too.

I have no desire to harass the President or the Secretary of State; but I am

confronted with the language which has been reported by the two committees, and I should like to have the Senator from Massachusetts give his interpretation of it. I refer to the second sentence of section 2, on page 4, reading as follows:

Furthermore, the United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East.

If it be the exclusive power and authority of the President in the conduct of the foreign affairs to determine what is in the national interest, what is the reason for including that language in the joint resolution?

If the argument which is made to us—namely, that we should lie quiet, raise no objection, and merely pass the joint resolution—is valid, and if no constitutional question is involved, why are we asked now to determine—for no one knows how long a period—that in our opinion "the United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East."

We do not know what the conditions next year or next month will be. In fact, I am advised that only today in the General Assembly of the United Nations, the representative of India, Mr. Krishna Menon, exploded a bombshell when he declared that the Gulf of Aqaba is territorial water, not international water, and that the Israelis should have no right to have their shipping travel freely up and down the Gulf of Aqaba. Our Department of State is of the opinion that the Gulf of Aqaba is international water.

Does not the Senator from Massachusetts believe that in the language to which I have referred we shall be making, as the Senator from Oregon has so well stated, an advance declaration of congressional opinion which within a year may prove to be utterly wrong.

Mr. KENNEDY. Of course, it is possible to end the life of the joint resolution either—

When the President shall determine—

And so forth, or—

by a concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. Yes; of course that is true. However, I was referring to the particular sentence I read. Does the Senator from Massachusetts think that sentence is essential to the joint resolution?

Mr. KENNEDY. I regard the sentence as essential, because I believe it places the United States on record as to its position in regard to events in the Middle East; and I am not opposed to doing that.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Massachusetts yield to me?

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield to the Senator from Alabama.

Mr. SPARKMAN. As a matter of fact, is not that sentence merely a recognition of the policy which has been stated time after time by the executive branch of

the Government—in particular, by the Secretary of State, in testimony given by him before our committee, although not in connection with the pending joint resolution?

The distinguished Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN], who now is on the floor, will recall that during the past year or two, and, in fact, in open hearings, the Secretary of State has said time after time that it was a part of our policy to help preserve the national integrity of the countries of the Middle East.

If I may go a step further, let me say that in 1950 the tripartite agreement set forth that principle.

So this question is not one of having the Congress write something new; it simply involves a recognition of the policy which has been existing for some time.

Personally, I should say that we cannot always get everything we want included in such a measure. If in the joint resolution we were stating a principle on the part of the Congress, and if we were seeking to state something which perhaps would be a departure from what had previously been stated, then I should like to see this measure include language which would carry out the meaning of its title. The distinguished Senator will remember that in the committee the original title of the joint resolution was changed to a short title—namely, to preserve peace and stability in the Middle East, I believe.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. That was a Madison Avenue title.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I do not know about that. I should like to ask the distinguished Senator from Georgia, who, as I recall, submitted the amendment. I do not believe he went to Madison Avenue to get the title.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, in support of what the Senator from Alabama has said, I would say that the United States, particularly the President of the United States, in many cases in recent years has indicated that this is the policy of the United States. Mr. George Allen, in May 1955, stated that we, the United States, would be strongly opposed to the side which started a war, and would be favorably disposed to that side which proved its desire to maintain peace.

In addition, we established a liaison with the Baghdad Pact in which Iran is a member; and on April 3, 1956, the Secretary of State asserted that the United States forces might be utilized in the Middle East "without congressional authority in the event of an emergency."

And then, on April 9, Secretary Hagerly, speaking for the President, pledged the United States to oppose aggression within the Middle East, within constitutional means, to assist a victim of aggression.

In addition, we established, in 1956, military liaison with the Baghdad Pact.

Then on November 14, President Eisenhower stated the United States would oppose through the United Nations any Soviet military intervention in the Middle East.

Then on November 29, we reaffirmed our support of the Baghdad Pact, and

stated that a threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of any of the countries of that area would be viewed by the United States with the utmost gravity.

So it seems to me that this measure is in line with the policy of the United States.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Massachusetts yield to me?

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.

Mr. AIKEN. If some persons believe that the provisions of section 2 of the committee amendment might be regarded as authorizing the giving of assistance to neutral nations, let me ask whether it is not clear both to the countries of the Middle East and to the Communist world that neutral nations would automatically exempt themselves from the benefits of the joint resolution, because it provides that the benefits and the assistance may be given only to nations requesting assistance from armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism. So, Mr. President, so long as countries declare their neutrality, they automatically exempt themselves from application of the provisions of the joint resolution.

Mr. KENNEDY. In answer to what the Senator from Wyoming stated a moment ago, I should like to state that I wrote to Professor Sutherland, a noted constitutional authority at Harvard Law School, about the question of constitutional powers in this case. He replied as follows:

The wording of the Constitution does not contain any express statement of the President's powers to act in a situation like that now facing us in the Middle East. Certainly it is impossible, in any constitution, to define with any sort of precision, all the powers which an Executive like the President of the United States will need in the multitude of crises which may face the Nation. I suppose that our present constitutional concern arises out of the fact that under modern conditions, it is difficult to point out the precise difference between a state of quiescent war and the uneasy armed peace which is forced on us by the continual threat of hostilities by Soviet Russia and her Communist associates. The Congress and the people would surely not want a continuous and permanent declaration of war, and yet the Nation must be ready to take whatever action is necessary for self-protection at any time. Furthermore, the conception of war as located in one defined geographical area is tending to disappear because of worldwide mobilization in war, and the capabilities of modern weapons which have ranges of great length. Under these circumstances, the President, in the performance of his duties as the Nation's principal constitutional representative in foreign affairs, as Commander in Chief, and as the Executive Officer sworn to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, cannot under all circumstances refrain from the use of military force until a formal declaration of war shall have occurred. On the other hand, the President, with that proper profound respect which he should give toward Congress which represents the will of the national electorate, will certainly be most reluctant to involve the Nation in any hostilities, even very small ones, without congressional authorization. The fact is, I suppose, that a government of constitutionally separated powers such as ours cannot have a completely clear separation of the legislative and Executive duties, cannot effectively operate without a large

measure of cordial cooperation between the three branches, and particularly between the Executive and the Congress.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield on that point?

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield to the Senator from Wyoming.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. In order that I may draw a distinction between the theoretical discussion in the professor's letter to the Senator from Massachusetts and the facts which are before the Senate, let me say that we are being asked to declare a policy in the words and figures contained in the resolution. Let me, again call to the attention of the Senator, before I ask him to respond, what the second sentence in section 2 states, and I am also calling this to the attention of the Senator from Alabama:

Furthermore, the United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East.

Does that not mean all the nations? Does that not mean the independence and integrity of Egypt? Does it not mean the independence and integrity of Saudi Arabia?

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. Does it not mean the independence and integrity of every single one of those nations?

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. Suppose the Pan-Arab League, which has been sitting in the United Nations during the past week, should decide to absolve Egypt. Suppose it should attempt to establish a United Arab League. Would we not by these words be declaring against such a development, and authorizing our President, whoever he might be, to take action? How can we, in advance of the developments, say that it would be of vital interest to the United States that there should be no Pan-Arab League?

Mr. KENNEDY. The next sentence does not begin a separate paragraph; it follows the sentence before it, which the Senator has just read. It seems to me to be very clear that it must be a country dominated by international communism.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Is it not also true that under the resolution we would extend assistance only to nations asking for it? If I may, I should like to say that, while I may be in error, I have been under the impression that the Senator from Wyoming—

Mr. O'MAHONEY. Mr. President, I was attempting to get some information from the Senator from Massachusetts, who has the floor.

Mr. SPARKMAN. But the Senator from Massachusetts yielded to me, after he had given the Senator from Wyoming some information, in order that I might give the Senator from Wyoming additional information.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. I think the Senator from Massachusetts is capable of giving the information to me himself.

Mr. SPARKMAN. The Senator from Massachusetts yielded to me. I thought the Senator from Wyoming was seeking information.

001017850

0002424

Mr. O'MAHONEY. I am seeking information from the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I will ask the Senator from Massachusetts if it is not true that under the pending resolution the President is limited, so far as the expression of Congress is concerned, to giving assistance to nations requesting it, for the purpose of staving off aggression prompted by international communism?

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes. I would say, first, there would have to be a situation where a country was dominated by international communism. And the President would have to determine the necessity for action.

Mr. SPARKMAN. And the nation would have to request the assistance.

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes. In the first place, unless an emergency situation existed, the President would have to come to Congress for a declaration of war.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I should like to ask the Senator another question. Am I correct in my understanding that an amendment to the resolution has been offered by the distinguished Senator from Wyoming which would strike out the words "Charter of the United Nations" and write in the words "Constitution of the United States"?

Mr. O'MAHONEY. I may say that not only has the amendment been offered, but it has already been adopted by unanimous vote.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Is it not true that the language of the resolution has been changed and a proviso has been put in which reads:

Provided, That such employment shall be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the Constitution of the United States.

Under that language, is there any inference that the present Congress is willing to go along with the performance by the President of his duty in an unconstitutional way?

Mr. KENNEDY. No.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me?

Mr. KENNEDY. I thank the Senator from Alabama, and I now yield to the Senator from Wyoming.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. I believe the colloquy has been very beneficial, and I am glad the Senator from Alabama has participated in it. What struck me with particular force was a sentence, if I correctly understood the Senator from Massachusetts, in which he said, while the Senator from Alabama was attempting to instruct him, that, in his opinion, the President would have to come to Congress to obtain a declaration of war.

Mr. KENNEDY. He certainly would, unless an emergency situation arose threatening United States security, in which case the President would have authority, as Commander in Chief, to take action, in any event. But even in that case he would have to come back to the Congress for a ratification of his act.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. Is the Senator of the belief that the amendment which was unanimously adopted yesterday nails down that proposition?

Mr. KENNEDY. I would go further. Of course, nothing we can do in the Congress could affect the President's constitutional powers as Commander in Chief; but I have no objection to having written into the resolution, within that limitation and within the limits of national security, that it is our wish that he comes to Congress for a declaration of war. That is my position, and I believe the position of the Senate.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. I shall not bother the Senator from Massachusetts with any more questions, but state my own opinion with relation to the so-called constitutional powers of the President. These powers have been exercised from time to time. President Jefferson sent our naval vessels against the Barbary Pirates. That was not intervening in any warfare among the states of the Mediterranean area; it was done to defend the commerce of the United States, which was being subjected to blackmail by the Barbary pirates. All the nations of Europe were being blackmailed by the Barbary pirates, and some of the nations preferred to pay the blackmail rather than to resist the Barbary pirates. But Jefferson refused to pay the blackmail, and sent our Armed Forces for the defense of the freedom of the seas and our right to sail the seas.

The constitutional provision that the President is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, according to my reading of the Constitution and of the debates in the Constitutional Convention, was merely a declaration by the constitutional fathers that the President of the United States—who, it was expected, would be chiefly a civilian—would be the man in charge as Commander in Chief of the Army and the Navy, but that he would not necessarily be empowered, as Commander in Chief, to send our soldiers to the ends of the earth for any reason that might appeal to him to be advisable. That is why I say I am very happy that the Senator from Massachusetts has made the interpretation which he has made. I am very grateful to him.

Mr. BUTLER and Mr. JACKSON addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Massachusetts yield, and if so, to whom?

Mr. KENNEDY. I am concerned about the compliments I have just received from the Senator from Wyoming. I am not sure that I deserve them, and I am not sure exactly what he is congratulating me for. Will he restate the reason for his congratulations?

Mr. O'MAHONEY. I am congratulating the Senator for his statement that, in the circumstances described here, the President, under this resolution as it was amended by the unanimous vote of the Senate yesterday, before embroiling our boys in the burning oil pots of the Middle East, would have to come back to Congress for a declaration of war.

Mr. KENNEDY. I did not say exactly that. I say that whenever it is possible, within his constitutional responsibilities as Commander in Chief and his responsibilities with respect to the security of

the United States, he should do so. But if it is not possible to come to Congress in advance, he should come to the Congress immediately afterward.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. Does the Senator believe that the present conditions in the Middle East are such, and will be such during the remainder of the term of the present President of the United States, that we should now declare, in advance of whatever develops in the next 4 years, that the President has the authority, under his powers as Commander in Chief, to send troops into such warfare as might develop in the event Syria's submergence by Communist infiltration should be so great that, for example, Israel, which is anti-Communist, and a people's government, should seek to invade Syria, and that we should have to defend the Communist state against the free state?

Mr. KENNEDY. Obviously the resolution does not contemplate that.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. Of course, it does not.

I thank the Senator again, and again I compliment him.

Mr. BUTLER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.

Mr. BUTLER. Did Professor Sutherland refer in his letter to any Supreme Court decisions which have defined the Presidential power as Commander in Chief?

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes. He referred to the steel-seizure case.

Mr. BUTLER. Did he refer to some of the earlier cases?

Mr. KENNEDY. He referred to the Youngstown Sheet & Tube case, and he referred to the Prize cases.

Mr. BUTLER. In the Prize cases did the Supreme Court hold that power to be the usual, ordinary power possessed by the first ranking military officer, for example?

Mr. KENNEDY. I did not hear the Senator.

Mr. BUTLER. Did Professor Sutherland refer to any cases which have held—and I think there are such cases—that the power of the President as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States is only that possessed by the first ranking military or naval commander? At least that was an early conception.

Mr. KENNEDY. I am not prepared to agree with that statement. In his letter, Professor Sutherland says:

One of the most drastic of these moves was the institution of a blockade of ports in the possession of the Confederacy. The President's action and seizures taken under it were upheld in the Prize cases (2 Black, 635, 1863). And certainly in the history of vigorous action one should recall the measures taken by President Roosevelt in 1941, such as the occupation of Iceland, the Atlantic Charter, the initiation of American convoys, the shoot-at-sight order of September 1941, and the destroyer deal of 1940.

Mr. BUTLER. The Prize cases are more nearly my conception of what that constitutional power is. Any general in charge of forces in the field would have the right to cut off the supplies of the enemy. But would a general in com-

mand of forces in the United States have the right to exercise his independent judgment as to what developments in Saudi Arabia, for example, might affect the United States and its safety and to dispatch forces abroad without coming to the Congress?

Mr. KENNEDY. I am not prepared to say that the President has only the power which a senior general in the field may have.

I will say, in answer to the Senator's question, that Professor Sutherland quoted Mr. Justice Jackson in the steel case, speaking of a zone of twilight in which the President and the Congress could have concurrent authority.

Mr. BUTLER. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield?

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.

Mr. BUTLER. I do not think the President of the United States, on his independent judgment and without consulting the Congress, can say, "I consider the situation in the Middle East to be such that I am going to dispatch troops there." As a matter of fact, I do not believe that the present occupant of the White House feels that he has such power. I think that is one of the chief reasons why he has sent this resolution to the Congress, so that there may be no question about his power. He has asked us to act in concert with him, so that the world may know that the President is not acting unilaterally, but that we are acting as a Nation united in this effort.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.

Mr. JACKSON. Is it not a fact that two constitutional provisions are involved? Referring again to Professor Sutherland's letter, on the one hand we have the responsibility of the President, under the Constitution, to preserve, protect, and defend the United States. On the other hand, we have the constitutional responsibility of the Congress to declare war.

The junior Senator from Washington would like to ask this question: Would it be wise for the President to come to Congress and ask for a declaration of war before he acted if failure on his part to take action might result in the destruction of our country?

Mr. KENNEDY. No doubt the Senator is correct.

Mr. JACKSON. I have in mind, of course, the air-atomic age in which we live. We know that in the case of all-out war, if our response is to be decisive and effective and if we are to be saved, the President of the United States, rather than the Congress, will have to take initial action. Is that not correct?

Mr. KENNEDY. The Senator is correct.

Mr. JACKSON. Is it not also true that when we get into the court question relating to the power of the President in this area, they will be settled in a rather moot fashion? In other words, we shall not get a court decision until after something has happened. I do not know that anyone knows the exact powers of the President in this kind of situation. We can read old cases, but old cases are not

much help, because the world has moved a long way in a short period of time.

I think the paramount point at issue here is the ability of the President of the United States to carry out his obligation as President to preserve, protect, and defend the United States. Failure on his part to discharge that duty would be a far greater sin, in my judgment, than his failure to come to Congress immediately and request a declaration of war.

Mr. KENNEDY. I think the Senator is correct. In response to what the Senator has said, the air age and the hydrogen age have placed new responsibilities on the President in this area.

Mr. JACKSON. I think the American people are sensible enough to know that in the air-atomic age the authority to take final and decisive action, if a disaster should befall us, must often be in the hands of the President.

Retaliatory action can be taken by an officer in the field, and it can be taken immediately.

Mr. KENNEDY. That is correct.

Mr. BUTLER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.

Mr. BUTLER. There is no doubt at all that if a hostile force is approaching the United States, not only the President but the commander on the spot would have to take immediate action. What I have in mind is a situation in which, say, volunteers infiltrate Saudi Arabia, would the President be authorized without the consent of Congress to send American boys to Saudi Arabia because it may affect security?

Mr. KENNEDY. It does not seem to me that the passage of the resolution lessens the responsibility of the President to come to Congress for authority to declare war.

Mr. BUTLER. No; it coalesces the two responsibilities. We act in unity.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, will the Senator from Massachusetts yield?

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.

Mr. CHURCH. I should like to commend the Senator from Massachusetts for what I consider to be a profound statement on the resolution now pending before the Senate.

Mr. KENNEDY. I thank the Senator.

Mr. CHURCH. Aside from the colloquy which has dealt largely with the constitutional question, it seems that the statement of the Senator from Massachusetts has contributed most as it has been directed toward the Russell amendment. It seems to me that the Senator has answered the two major arguments which I have heard propounded on the floor of the Senate in support of the Russell amendment.

In order that I may be clear in my own mind as to the nature of these answers, I should like to ask the Senator two questions.

First, the major argument I have heard in support of the Russell amendment is that Congress ought not to shirk its duty but should tightly hold the purse strings, because it is Congress that has control over public money.

The answer which the Senator from Massachusetts has suggested, as I understand, is that the \$200 million with

which we are dealing may be spent with less congressional control and less congressional knowledge as to the manner in which it is spent, if the Russell amendment is passed, than if the Russell amendment is defeated. Am I correct?

Mr. KENNEDY. I would say that that is correct, as a practical matter, because of the situations which have developed in the countries of the Middle East during the past 8 months.

Mr. CHURCH. The second argument which has been made in support of the Russell amendment, and which was so persuasively made by the distinguished Senator from Georgia, is that the time has come when we should begin to taper off on foreign-aid spending.

The answer which has been suggested by the Senator from Massachusetts, I understand, is that if we adopt the Russell amendment we will not necessarily save 1 cent of the \$200 million. Is that correct?

Mr. KENNEDY. That is correct. It seems to me that the statement which the Senator from Georgia has made could be addressed, as it was addressed last year, during consideration of fiscal 1957, to the appropriations for fiscal year 1958, when that appropriation bill comes before the Senate.

Mr. CHURCH. Would the Senator agree with me that if the time has come—and I have listened with great respect to arguments advanced by the Senator from Georgia in that regard—to taper off our foreign-aid spending, the logical time to do it is when Congress considers the foreign-aid measure, which will come before it in the spring?

Mr. KENNEDY. The Senator is absolutely correct.

I should like to point out that if the Russell amendment should be adopted, the American people should not be under the misapprehension that \$200 million will have been saved. Of course the Senator from Georgia for several years has been attempting to cut expenditures in foreign aid, and therefore his position is wholly consistent.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield to the Senator from Colorado.

Mr. ALLOTT. I should like to address myself for a moment, if the Senator will permit me to do so, to the proposition advanced by the Senator from Washington [Mr. Jackson], who had to leave the floor. I am sorry that he was called out.

It seems to me that his argument was based upon what I consider to be a false premise. My view, I believe, is shared by many other people.

We have now reached the point, as has Russia also, where the horrors of hydrogen warfare and atomic warfare have been described even in the funny papers, and where it is impossible to pick up a newspaper or magazine without reading about them.

Many of us, I among them, believe that there is almost an equal chance that if we should become involved in war, it will not be by the route of atomic warfare. I say that because so long as we keep a great striking potential available,

0002425

001017850

Russia will not put any sizable number of planes in the air which could achieve an overall knockout, without our being able to place a large number of planes in the air at the same time; and because approximately the same number of American planes would get through to the heart of Russia as Russian planes would get through to the heart of the United States.

We may therefore find ourselves in the position in which we found ourselves at the beginning of World War II. At that time we had great stocks of mustard gas and a great many refinements of other gases, which had been developed after World War I. By the time World War II came along, although we had great stocks on hand—in fact, one of the first things I saw on arriving in France was a Quartermaster depot where a great many gases were stocked—none of the gases were used by either Japan or Germany. The war was fought, for the most part, with conventional weapons.

We may, therefore, find ourselves in the same situation. It seems to me we are making a big mistake if in our thinking about the protection of our country we premise the protection completely upon the possibility of nuclear warfare. With the potential threat which Soviet Russia and the United States can pose at the same time, it seems to me very likely that if we should get into another war—and such a war might grow out of a situation similar to the one in Korea or in the Far East from the situation in the Malay Peninsula—there is the possibility that we might not get into an atomic war.

Mr. KENNEDY. I thank the Senator. I hope events bear out his view.

Mr. CARROLL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KENNEDY. I am glad to yield.

Mr. CARROLL. I think it might be well to clear the record on one point. At least, I should like to know what the Senator from Massachusetts has to say about it. I was under the impression that Senate Joint Resolution 19, which is now under consideration by the Senate, contains a considerably watered-down authorization to employ the Armed Forces.

Mr. KENNEDY. That is correct.

Mr. CARROLL. It was my impression that originally the resolution authorized the President to employ the Armed Forces of the United States, and that authorization has been stricken.

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes. The reason it has been stricken, as the Senator probably knows, is because of the forceful argument made by the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS] and other Senators that it would limit and affect the President's powers; and it was the desire of the members of the committee that his powers should not be so limited.

Mr. CARROLL. In other words, the Senator would have the record show that his understanding is that the President now has the same powers he has always had. Is that correct?

Mr. KENNEDY. That is correct. While nothing that could be done could affect his constitutional powers, never-

theless the present language is much more satisfactory.

Mr. CARROLL. Therefore, if he has the same powers he has always had, Congress is not called upon to delegate any other powers. Is that correct?

Mr. KENNEDY. That is correct. All we are doing is joining him in declaring the United States interest in maintaining the security of the Middle East.

To show how vast the President's powers are, on November 14, when it seemed as though Russian volunteers would come into the area, he made the statement that such action would be opposed by the United States through the United Nations.

Congress was not called into session, and there is every reason to believe that if the Russians had intervened, the President voluntarily could have taken us into a military action in that area if the emergency situation so dictated.

Mr. CARROLL. The resolution is not asking us to delegate any warmaking power. It leaves the President in the same position in which he was before, and we, as a Congress, are in our identical position.

Mr. KENNEDY. Exactly. The President would still be free to use his constitutional powers to protect the security of the United States.

Mr. CARROLL. One further question, if the Senator will permit.

As the Senator has discussed the question today, his conclusion is, from a consideration of all the points he has made, that what is proposed is really psychology on our part; that is to say, we should not give the impression to the people of America and to the world that we are more concerned with our pocket-book than we are with the real spiritual aspects—spiritual in the sense of the economic stability of the people of the Middle East. That is of equal importance to our military program in that area.

Mr. KENNEDY. That is correct.

Mr. CARROLL. I wish to commend the Senator for his most thought-provoking speech, one with which I should like to associate myself. I think he has done a magnificent job here today. I am sorry that more Senators have not been on the floor to hear his wonderful speech.

Mr. KENNEDY. I thank the Senator.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Massachusetts yield?

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.

Mr. SPARKMAN. First, Mr. President, I should like to commend the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts for having done a very fine job and for making the speech he has made over the period of time he has had in which to present it to the Senate. I am sure he has clarified the thinking of many Senators.

With reference to the amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], I should like to ask the Senator from Massachusetts if the effect of the substitute, if it is agreed to, would be, first, to drop out any and all economic phases?

Mr. KENNEDY. That is correct.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Would it not also drop out the military assistance program?

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Would it not retain merely the proposal that if the President saw fit to do so, he could intervene with our armed forces?

Mr. KENNEDY. That is correct.

Mr. SPARKMAN. And it would not enable us to help any of those countries that might require military assistance to receive any beyond what is already authorized under the Mutual Security Act?

Mr. KENNEDY. The Senator is correct.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Does not the Senator believe that aside from all the practical operations of the program, that would be very bad psychology throughout the world?

Mr. KENNEDY. It would be a rejection of what the President considers an important feature of his program. It would not save the taxpayers a single dollar. In my opinion, it would set back the President and achieve such minor advantages at best that it seems to me it would be unwise for the Senate of the United States to do it at this time.

Mr. SPARKMAN. The Senator from Massachusetts has taken advantage of the opportunities he has had to travel in many different parts of the world, and he has had ample opportunity to observe the propaganda which has been issued over the years by Russia and by the international Communist movement. Is it not true that there has been a constant stream of propaganda by the Kremlin and the Communists that the United States is interested only in building up great military power in different parts of the world and that we are not interested in the economic welfare of peoples?

Mr. KENNEDY. I am going to show on the next page of my speech how little we have done for the countries of the Middle East, the so-called Arab countries. Israel, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey have had, of course, very close ties with the United States.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I did not intend to anticipate the Senator's speech, but I think this is most important. The Senator knows from our work in the committee and the various amendments proposed there that I did not like some of the provisions of this resolution. I do not yet like them. I should like to see them changed. I should like to see the provision dealing with economic aid changed so that it would spell out more specifically the type of economic program we seek to put into operation. I should like to see it spelled out in such a way as to emphasize the good old point 4 program, or technical assistance, as being very basic for the establishment of any kind of a future economic program. It does not meet with my complete approval. But we do not have the opportunity of getting always exactly the type of legislation we want.

But the Senator, as I understand his statements here this afternoon, takes the view, as I do, that the committees worked on the matter and now, apparently, the

Senate is going to work on it; that we need something, and it is up to us to take the best we can get; and that it would be psychologically bad throughout the world simply to reject it in toto.

Mr. KENNEDY. The Senator is correct. Most of the arguments made are in reality arguments against spending any money in the Middle East—but the time for making those arguments was last summer, or later this spring when the new foreign-aid bills come before us. As far as all the money now under debate is concerned, these arguments were made last summer, and they lost—Congress did provide aid to the Middle East—and the pending resolution simply seeks to carry out the intent of Congress by waiving certain restrictions which are no longer valid.

That is not, as has been argued, a dangerously unprecedented grant of authority. Congress has traditionally given the President a certain flexibility of discretion in a program of this nature as in sections 401 (a), 401 (b), and 501 earlier mentioned. This time we are balancing the flexibility with more careful congressional supervision—and I cannot believe that any future Congress will be so weak kneed as to accept any and all waivers, regardless of circumstances, simply because it was necessary for the last few months of fiscal 1957 to waive restrictions made unworkable by military and political emergencies in the area which Congress could not have foreseen when it appropriated these funds and imposed these restrictions a year ago.

Finally, complaint has been made that we should not be pouring vast sums into the coffers of oil-rich Arab potentates. Permit me to read exactly how much the 8 Arab States, including those with and without oil, have received from us since the very beginning of the aid program over 5 years ago, covering assistance of all kinds including the sending of certain specialists under technical assistance:

Total actual expenditures under economic and technical assistance, through June 30, 1956:	Million
Saudi Arabia.....	\$2
Yemen.....	None
Egypt.....	\$27
Sudan.....	None
Iraq.....	\$8
Jordan.....	\$22
Lebanon.....	\$14
Syria.....	None

Total military assistance grants, same period:	Million
Saudi Arabia.....	None
Yemen.....	None
Egypt.....	None
Sudan.....	None
Iraq.....	(¹)
Jordan.....	None
Lebanon.....	None
Syria.....	None

¹ Some United States military equipment sold on reimbursable basis.

² Classified, but even less than economic aid.

In short, the total amount received by all 8 Arab States in approximately 5 years has been only \$73 million worth of economic and technical assistance,

and no military assistance grants to speak of.

The bulk of our aid to the Middle East, with actual economic-assistance expenditures of \$237 million, has gone to Israel. It is true that Congress has authorized a total amount of expenditures for the Arab States of approximately \$170 million, but for various reasons, particularly because those States were not able to meet our technical standards, only \$73 million has been expended in the Arab countries in a period of 5 years, and practically none at all has gone or is going to countries having great resources in oil.

Iran, a non-Arab country, which was salvaged both from the Russians and its own antiwestern fanatics, is in a separate category, as are Turkey and Pakistan, because we have obligations to them under the NATO and SEATO treaties.

But surely \$73 million or \$200 million or even \$750 million is not an unprecedented sum with which to bolster the economic and political stability of an entire area against the spread of Soviet imperialism. We have spent more than \$2 billion for this purpose in Greece alone, roughly \$2.5 billion in Korea—not counting the war—and almost \$2 billion in Formosa and Free China. The amount under debate for the entire Middle Eastern area is less than the amount we spent for similar purposes each year—mostly in economic aid—in either Vietnam, Korea, or Formosa alone. I know of few Members of this body who feel we should withdraw all aid from Vietnam, Korea, or Formosa, or who feel that our economic support of Greece was a mistake.

Adoption of the amendment deleting all economic-assistance provisions, therefore, will only diminish congressional review of aid projects, encourage hasty and inefficient expenditures, hamper the Richards mission, embarrass our Government, and dismay friendly Middle Eastern nations. No money will be saved, no unprecedented grants of discretion will be stopped, and no economic ratholes will be plugged. If we can but consider these hard facts, apart from party bias or popular prejudice, there can be no mistaking our course. In the words of Woodrow Wilson:

The tragic events of . . . turmoil through which we have just passed have made us citizens of the world. There can be no turning back. Our own fortunes as a nation are involved—whether we would have it so or not.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I wish to take this opportunity to congratulate the Senator from Massachusetts on what I consider to be a very fair and able presentation of the question before the Senate. It is not all white or all black. But I think the manner in which the Senator has presented his views has served to clarify the air and to settle many of the questions in the minds of some persons who have wondered about the situation. I did not want the opportunity to pass without so stating.

Mr. KENNEDY. I am most appreciative of the compliment of my friend from Colorado.

During the delivery of Mr. KENNEDY's speech,

Mr. HENNINGS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a statement I have prepared relating to the Middle East resolution be printed in the body of the RECORD, at the conclusion of the statement by the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR HENNINGS

The Members of the Senate are now confronted with the necessity of deciding whether or not to support the President's proposal for a program of American assistance to the nations of the Middle East, and, if so, in what form.

Shortly after the pending resolution was introduced in the Congress, I expressed my opinion that it would not solve any of the really serious problems of the Middle East, such as those which now engage the full attention of our top policymakers.

I said at that time that I would strongly have preferred that the administration had not suggested that such a resolution be introduced. Irrespective of its wording, I feared that it would create endless confusion as to the real sources of Middle East instability, as well as to our own role with respect to local disputes and local conditions which ultimately provide the vehicle for Communist penetration.

However, the resolution had been introduced and the President pledged his word that he was dealing with matters of the greatest urgency. I then felt that the Senate would be well advised to clarify the resolution, to limit its scope, and to pass it.

In terms of concrete criticism, the resolution as originally introduced was unacceptable to me, first, because of the language by which the Congress would authorize the President to use the Armed Forces when our vital interests were threatened, and secondly, because of the request for an unprecedented freedom of spending authority. These features of the resolution involved important constitutional questions and raised serious constitutional doubts. The outstanding issue involves the question of congressional authorization. I believe the President has the necessary authority under the Constitution, and the Congress can confer no additional authority upon him in this regard.

My objections were shared by many of my colleagues, and they have been met by the action of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees in rephrasing the provisions which relate to the use of our Armed Forces and the use of funds for economic and military assistance. The new language joins the President and the Congress in a clear statement of policy, which affirms that the United States is prepared to use armed force in defending a Middle Eastern nation against Communist armed attack, if that nation so requests.

On the basis of these alterations, I am now prepared to vote for the resolution.

However, if a further amendment were adopted which restored the original word "authorize," a great constitutional problem would be revived, and I would have the gravest doubts about voting for the resolution.

I state with satisfaction that the enlightened discussion now being conducted in the Senate on the resolution, as well as recent events, has begun to focus American attention on little-known nations and their little-understood problems. However, Mr. President, I deeply regret the attacks on the amended proposal which have been made by those who believe that the United States can and should stand more or less alone in a turbulent and hostile world, without using

001017350

0002426

1957

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

2549

its powers to bring about economic progress and peaceful adjustment of disputes between other nations.

The objections from that side relate in large measure to the \$200 million fund. The proponents of that point of view would like to see all reference to the fund eliminated from the resolution. With this suggestion, I disagree. I also emphatically disagree with the idea that the bulk of our aid in the Middle East should take the form of military assistance.

Yet, while I advocate the approval of the use of the \$200 million fund—which has already been appropriated—I wish it to be clearly understood that the administration's vague plans for the employment of this money do not fully satisfy me and leave in my mind a large area of questions and doubts.

In the first place, it is the amount involved. We certainly do not believe that this sum of money is large enough to make even a good beginning in tackling the economic problems of the Middle East.

Furthermore, I originally had thought that the \$200 million would be channeled into economic projects, aimed at reducing the misery and poverty of the region. I found instead that it will be used largely for so-called budgetary assistance to keep local governments operating in the absence of their normal revenues. My criticism, then, has not been made in an attempt to lower the amount involved. It has been directed at the fact that Congress would not know how the money would be spent, and that apparently so little of it would find its way into direct economic development.

I have stated repeatedly, and I state again, that even if the resolution were passed unanimously, bringing all the psychological impact we can muster, it would not solve the problems of the Middle East. I trust that the administration will not use it as an excuse for lapsing back into inactivity. Let the administration never forget that the hard work is only now beginning. We need to reduce western dependence on the Suez Canal, for example by building alternative pipelines through Israel and other areas. It is absolutely essential to intensify our efforts to solve the Arab refugee problem. Every human effort must be bent to encouraging acceptance of a multiple-purpose project to develop most efficiently all of the resources of the whole Jordan Valley. There is no lack of things to do, but I sense at times a lack of the will and the skill to do them.

If the administration comes to Congress with a constructive, well-defined program incorporating this type of assistance, I assure them they will have my support.

Mr. KEFAUVER obtained the floor.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield so that I may suggest the absence of a quorum, without his losing the floor?

Mr. KEFAUVER. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. THURMOND in the chair). The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Aiken	Curtis	Kennedy
Allott	Dirksen	Knowland
Beall	Douglas	Kuchel
Bible	Ellender	Lausche
Blackley	Ervin	Mansfield
Bush	Flanders	Monroney
Case, N. J.	Hennings	Morse
Chavez	Hickenlooper	Morton
Church	Humphrey	Murray
Clark	Javits	O'Mahoney
Cooper	Jenner	Payne
Cotton	Kefauver	Potter

Purcell
Russell
Sparkman

Talmadge
Thurmond

Wiley
Williams

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Forty-three Senators having answered to their names, a quorum is not present.

The clerk will call the names of the absent Senators.

The legislative clerk called the names of the absent Senators; and Mr. BARRETT, Mr. BENNETT, Mr. BRICKER, Mr. CARLSON, Mr. CARROLL, Mr. CASE of South Dakota, Mr. DWORSHAK, Mr. GREEN, Mr. HAYDEN, Mr. HRUSKA, Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina, Mr. MALONE, Mr. MARTIN of Iowa, Mr. MARTIN of Pennsylvania, Mr. NEUBERGER, Mr. PASTORE, Mr. ROBERTSON, Mr. SALTONSTALL, Mrs. SMITH of Maine, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, and Mr. THYE answered to their names, when called.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Sixty-four Senators having answered to their names, a quorum is present.

The Senator from Tennessee has the floor.

WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM GAZA STRIP AND GULF OF AQABA

Mr. CASE of New Jersey. Mr. President, will the Senator from Tennessee yield to me, in order that I may make a brief statement at this time?

Mr. KEFAUVER. I yield.

Mr. CASE of New Jersey. I thank the Senator from Tennessee.

Mr. President, newspaper reports of the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the Gaza strip and the Gulf of Aqaba area are welcomed by all the peaceful nations of the world. To this country, it is evidence of the wisdom of maintaining a firm policy of justice toward all nations. It justifies the confidence the people of the country have in the President's conduct of foreign policy.

The withdrawal under the honorable conditions which have reportedly been arranged makes it possible for this Nation to continue its friendly and close relations with the country of Israel which it helped create. These conditions are based on justice and equity, and I am confident that the Arab nations, too, will realize that this is true. Israel has done its full part. The responsibility now rests squarely on the Arab nations. A renewal of the dispute cannot do either side any real good.

Now we must move forward and seek to eliminate the root causes of the continuing conflict and confusion in the Middle East. The President's Middle East resolution is the next essential step, and the military-economic aid sections of the proposed legislation are critical to the success of the joint resolution. Without this, our Nation will be hindered in achieving its goal of helping all the nations in the Middle East to resist communism and to enjoy the fruits of a durable peace and economic progress.

The economic aid section of the joint resolution especially can help meet the basic problems of the area which must be settled if we are to get away from the situation of moving from crisis to crisis, and if we are to make real progress toward lasting peace.

President Eisenhower's Middle East resolution can be the forerunner for a

cooperative program of economic development which all the nations of the area can, with our help, carry forward to their mutual benefit.

I feel that with the withdrawal of the Israeli forces and with the forthcoming enactment of President Eisenhower's Middle East resolution, there is finally a real chance to achieve lasting peace in this vital part of the world. We must move unceasingly toward this goal.

Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Tennessee for yielding to me.

PROCEDURE ON QUORUM CALLS

Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. President, will the Senator from Tennessee yield briefly to me?

Mr. KEFAUVER. I yield.

Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. President, I wonder what is happening in connection with quorum calls and yeas-and-nays votes. I am one of a large number of Senators who have come to the Chamber in response to the recent quorum call. If the quorum calls are to be ended soon after they are begun, so that it is impossible for us to come to the Chamber and answer to our names, we might just as well remain in our offices.

My office is a considerable distance from the Senate Chamber; it is in a far corner of the Senate Office Building, and it is a long way from here. By the time I am able to reach the Chamber, after the bells for a quorum call are rung, I find that the quorum call has ended.

On other occasions I have known quorum calls to last a long time; and sometimes after votes, I have known Senator after Senator to rise and ask how he was recorded—in order to give a delayed Senator time to arrive. On many occasions that procedure has continued for 10 minutes or longer, until Senators were able to reach the floor.

In the present case we were delayed because of a delay in the electric-car service in the subway. I wish to inquire whether there is any way of showing how long a quorum call has lasted.

A number of us were in our offices when the quorum bell rang; and we came as quickly as we could, although, as I have said, there was delay in the electric-car service in the subway. On our car were the Senator from Washington [Mr. JACKSON], the Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS], the Senator from Delaware [Mr. FREAR], the Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON], the Senator from Utah [Mr. WATKINS], and myself.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President—

Mr. ANDERSON. And on the second car were—among others—the Senator from Alabama [Mr. HILL], and the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. YOUNG]. We came as rapidly as we could, but we could not reach here before the quorum call had ended.

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, will the Senator from New Mexico yield to me?

Mr. ANDERSON. I yield.

Mr. WATKINS. I have asked the Senator to yield, in order to have the Record show that I am here.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator from New Mexico yield to me?

Mr. ANDERSON. I yield.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I was on the floor for approximately 2 hours today, and left only a few minutes ago, to go to my office and do some work.

Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. President, at the time when the bells for the quorum call rang, I was in my office, holding a conference in regard to a very important matter which is to come before the Finance Committee. As soon as the quorum bells rang, I told the gentlemen with whom I was conferring that it was necessary for me to answer the quorum call, and that I would have to hurry, and that I regretted that I was compelled to ask them to leave. Then I came here; but upon arriving here, I now find that the quorum call has been ended.

I wonder how we can act in order to have our names included on the list of Senators who have come to the Chamber.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the name of every Senator now in the Chamber who has just missed the quorum call be included on the roll.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I am very sorry, but I shall have to object to that request. The majority leader is not present at this time. The same issue was raised earlier in the day. I think we would get into a difficult position on rollcalls if such requests were granted, and I must object.

Mr. ANDERSON. I am going to suggest the absence of a quorum, then, so we will have another chance to show who is here.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the Senator from Tennessee yield for that purpose?

Mr. ANDERSON. I do not wish to ask for another quorum call. I think we should have some information as to whether we are to have live quorums, and whether the calls are to be completed in 2 minutes. I do not think such a procedure will contribute to the present debate, when Senators try to get to the Chamber, and on arrival are told that the quorum call has been closed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the announcement of the majority leader, the request of the Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON] can be granted only by unanimous consent. The Chair understood the Senator from California to object to the unanimous-consent request.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I should like to add that the situation alluded to by the Senator from New Mexico is one which has caught several of us short on quorum calls. I regret that is the case. I think our constituents will have to accept the fact that we are here, as they can determine by reading the Record.

VISIT TO THE SENATE BY MARY LOU ERICKSON

Mr. KEFAUVER obtained the floor.

Mr. THYE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Tennessee yield?

Mr. KEFAUVER. I yield.

Mr. THYE. The people of Minnesota are very fortunate in having as one of their citizens Miss Mary Lou Erickson,

who was chosen the Aquatennial Queen. That festival in the State of Minnesota commences on July 19 and runs through July 28.

I invite the attention of Senators to the fact that Mary Lou Erickson is sitting in the gallery, and I ask that she be permitted to stand.

[Miss Erickson rose in her place in the gallery, and was greeted with applause.]

Mr. THYE. I thank the Senator from Tennessee for yielding to me.

Mr. KEFAUVER. I may say that it is a great pleasure to yield for such a purpose.

PROMOTION OF PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Senate resumed the consideration of the Joint Resolution (S. J. Res. 19) to authorize the President to undertake economic and military cooperation with nations in the general area of the Middle East in order to assist in the strengthening and defense of their independence.

Mr. KEFAUVER. Mr. President, I rise to oppose Senate Joint Resolution 19, the so-called Middle Eastern resolution of the President. I do not reluctantly.

In matters of foreign policy, my ordinary inclination is to support the President when he comes to Congress and asks for support. I cannot bring myself to do so on this resolution.

In the first place, I think that the people of Tennessee, when they elected me, knew that, as a Member of Congress, I would vote "yes" or "no," if the time should ever unhappily arise, on the question of whether this Nation should go to war.

In this resolution, despite the changes that have been made in its wording by the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees, we are delegating the authority to someone else to decide whether or not we shall go to war.

The someone else is not necessarily the President. It is not necessarily Mr. Dulles or any other member of the Cabinet. It may very well be some commander of troops in the field whom we do not even know.

This resolution is ostensibly for the purpose of assisting any nation that requests such assistance from Communist aggression. Try as you may, Mr. President, you cannot find out from the administration how it will be determined whether it is the aggression of the nations or whether it is Communist aggression. I had long colloquies with Secretary Dulles during the course of the hearings on this resolution. I never could find out. But I did learn that, in his opinion, the most likely testing of this doctrine—to determine if we would react—would come in the air. And in that case the decision would be delegated to the commanders of the Air Force in the Middle East.

I want to be perfectly fair and perfectly accurate about this, and therefore I desire to read the exact exchange with Mr. Dulles from the record of the hearings. We had previously discussed how action might come about under the resolution,

and Mr. Dulles said it would most likely be through an action in the air.

Our colloquy, which I am reading, comes from the record of the hearings, pages 252 and 253, volume I.

Senator KEFAUVER. Is it contemplated that we will have airbases with planes manned by American airmen, in the Middle East?

Secretary DULLES. Well, we have bases already in parts of the area, and there are friendly fields available to us in the area, and it might very well be that there would be an invasion by air of the area of some of our friendly countries there, to see whether we reacted or not.

Senator KEFAUVER. Would it be the intention to react if there were Soviet planes doing that?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir; I would think if a Soviet plane started what looked like an airborne operation, that there would presumably be a reaction.

Senator KEFAUVER. Who would determine whether it was a friendly invasion, I mean just planes flying over or whether it was an armed invasion by air?

Secretary DULLES. That would be determined by the President.

Senator KEFAUVER. By the President?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator KEFAUVER. Would that be a determination that the matter would be delegated to the commanders of the Air Force in the Middle East?

Secretary DULLES. Under safeguards; yes.

Senator KEFAUVER. In other words, these men out there would have it within their power to substantially determine whether when planes came over, Soviet planes came over, to determine whether it was hostile or whether it was not?

Secretary DULLES. The situation in that respect would be precisely the same as it is in the North Atlantic Treaty areas and as it is in the western Pacific, where that situation already exists.

Senator KEFAUVER. But in the North Atlantic Treaty, we have French, British, and a lot of others there with us; do we not?

Secretary DULLES. Well, we have different areas, but if there is an invasion of our area, the people who are there have a limited discretion to act.

The same way in the case of Japan, Korea, Okinawa, the Philippines, Indochina.

Senator KEFAUVER. But in any event, whatever may be the situation, the area commander in the Middle East, the air commander, would have a certain right delegated to him to determine whether it was the type of air invasion that he should use American men and planes to combat?

Secretary DULLES. You can get more detail on that from Admiral Radford. What I would say is that it would create here precisely the same situation that already exists over a good many thousands of miles around the perimeter of the Soviet-Chinese Communist orbit.

Senator KEFAUVER. I am not talking about what exists somewhere else. I just want to know what is going to happen here.

Secretary DULLES. Well, as I say, you can get more detail from Admiral Radford. I do not know just exactly what the command instructions are, but it would be the same here as in the case elsewhere.

Senator KEFAUVER. All right, thank you, Mr. Secretary.

There is not one word of testimony anywhere in the record to indicate otherwise than that the question of whether we are going to react to something that happens in the Middle East will not be determined directly by the President or by the Secretary of State, but by some commander there, who may not even

001017350

0002427

1957

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

2551

have been given an appointment at this time.

I know that the amendment offered by the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. O'MAHONEY], which was agreed to yesterday, and which I approved, seeks to assure that the Congress eventually will have the authority to vote on a state of war. Whether that will be satisfactory to the Secretary of State or the President I do not know.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KEFAUVER. I yield.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. A very curious development took place yesterday with respect to the question which the Senator raises. A letter dated February 28 was addressed to the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. GREEN], chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, by the State Department, saying that the amendment was objectionable. Later in the afternoon, however, immediately after that letter had been handed to me, the Senator from California [Mr. KNOWLAND] reported to the Senate that he had personally communicated with the State Department, and the State Department advised that it had no objection to the amendment. I inserted in the RECORD yesterday, after the vote was taken, the letter of condemnation from the Department of State. I did so in order to make it clear that the first view of the State Department, in the morning hours of yesterday, had been rejected by the State Department in the afternoon hours, with the hope that when the resolution goes to conference the members of the conference on the part of the Senate will bear in mind that the amendment, with the approval of the Secretary of State, overruling an Assistant Secretary, was approved unanimously by the 82 Members of the Senate who were present.

Mr. KEFAUVER. I thank the Senator. He points up one of the difficulties we have had in the Middle East, and in connection with this resolution. The administration, in its handling of policies and problems in the Middle East, and even in connection with this resolution, frequently changes its opinion. I saw the letter which the Senator placed in the RECORD, indicating opposition to his amendment. Now we hear that it is satisfactory. What the opinion of the State Department with respect to it may be tomorrow, there is no way of telling. The opinion of the Department changes from time to time.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. Perhaps it might be wise for us to suggest to the State Department that there should be within the Department a plan of hour-by-hour consultation.

Mr. KEFAUVER. At least there should be more consultation, and more direct agreement reached upon great basic problems with which the Department is dealing. I am sure the Department will consider the proposal of the Senator from Wyoming.

As I have said, the O'Mahoney amendment seeks to assure that Congress eventually will have the authority to vote the question of declaring a state of war to exist.

Whether that will be satisfactory to the Secretary of State or the President I

do not know. The whole thrust of what they said they wanted was an unequivocal statement. That is what they testified they demanded in the committee hearings. The fact that there is an attempt to retain Congress, constitutional powers, under the amendment of the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. O'MAHONEY] may not be considered unequivocal by the executive department.

The House has already passed a resolution on this subject. We do not know what will happen in conference.

Nor does this change the fact that under this resolution the conditions are created which would make it impossible for Congress to do other than declare war, if there should be a test of the resolution somewhere in the Middle East and a reaction to the test by the air force commander in the Middle East.

In other words, this resolution sets up a condition under which we can be placed in a position in which the constitutional right reserved to Congress may be meaningless.

When we approve the creation of such conditions, then we are bound to agree in so doing that we will take the further step that naturally follows. Despite what the amendment says, in approving the resolution we approve the consequences.

I cannot bring myself, Mr. President, to vote for a resolution which by its very wording abandons any control Congress may have over the decision to send American troops into action and abandons this decision to some unknown individual who may not have been appointed to his post as yet.

Let me say, in this connection, that I do not question the authority the President already has to order the Armed Forces to take any action he deems necessary in the defense of the Nation. I do not question that if an aggressive act occurs in the Middle East to which the President deems it necessary to react for the protection of the United States, then he can so react.

But I am not going to vote "yes" to some vague thing which is called a doctrine but which is not a doctrine at all, which brings about a set of circumstances increasing rather than diminishing the possibility of war.

For let us make no mistake about it—the minute the field commander reacts, that will be war. Congress may later be asked to recognize that a state of war exists. But it will be no more than recognition of a fact that exists.

But Congress by this resolution will already have delegated its right to determine whether in the light of certain conditions we should or should not go to war. I am not willing to make, and I do not think the Constitution contemplated that I should make such a delegation. Under some circumstances I might be willing to vote for war, under others I might not, but under this resolution the decision would be made for me, perhaps by some military commander none of us know who is yet to be assigned to the Middle East.

In my opinion the passage of this resolution will make much more likely the occurrence of an incident to which our troops would react.

As a result of this resolution, we—the United States—may be accelerating a dangerous arms race in the Middle East. We are authorizing the expenditure of funds under this resolution to arm the nations of the Middle East. Surely, we are not so naive as to believe that this will not be met with countermeasures from the Soviet bloc. We would be met, gun for gun, tank for tank, jet for jet. Soon one side would be outdoing the other—2 guns for 1, 2 tanks for 1, 2 jets for 1. We have the conscience of the world with us—or we did have when the Czechoslovak Communist operation sent arms to Egypt—but we will not have the conscience of the world or world opinion with us if we are the ones who precipitate a further arms race. Throwing these arms into an already unstable and explosive area is hardly the road to peace.

Rather than contributing to an arms race, we should be leading the way to arms limitation agreements. I was interested in reading an article in Monday's Washington Post and Times Herald, a statement by a seasoned observer of foreign affairs, Mr. Chester Bowles, former Ambassador to India, who has been visiting this whole turbulent area.

Mr. Bowles makes the point that when we send a flood of the most modern arms to one country, we antagonize the others, increase the divisions among them all, and upset the balance of power in the entire region. He makes the equally valid point that this forces the nations whose great need is to increase the standard of living of their own people, to devote more and more of their incomes to arming themselves.

Mr. President, I am impressed by the fact that this so-called doctrine fails to meet any of the problems of the Middle East. When this doctrine comes to face a practical problem, such as the internationalization of the Suez, the prevention of further hostilities from the Gaza strip, the guaranty of free passage in the Gulf of Aqaba, the doctrine, like a piece of cotton candy, disappears into nothing but air.

These are our problems—and these are the things we should be working to solve. I cannot vote for a resolution which will lead the people to think that some bold new plan which will lead to peace in the Middle East has been evolved, when, in fact, it has not.

Another thing worries me: If we should get into trouble as a result of this policy, who will stand with us?

It is quite clear, as a result of the hearings, that in drafting this policy, our Nation conferred with no one. It is truly a go-it-alone document.

I asked Mr. Dulles long questions about it. Of course, other nations were told what we were going to do, but they were never conferred with in connection with the formation of our policy, or in trying to get them to join with us to any extent whatever.

One of the overriding necessities for the resolution, Mr. Dulles testified, is to assure Western Europe of an oil supply. We did not however confer with Britain and France or the other nations of Western Europe before producing the resolution. The NATO alliance, which has been allowed to decay through the years,

was not strengthened by this action. We did not confer with the Baghdad Pact countries—the only prowestern, multi-lateral group in the whole area of the Middle East. The Baghdad Pact was not strengthened by this action.

The purpose of the Baghdad Pact is to prevent Communist aggression. At least it has some substantial nations as members, among them England, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq, who would join in fighting aggression if we were members of it; and we might be, if it were revised. However, we elected to go alone.

I have heard no one give an answer to the statement that the resolution benefits the people of Western Europe, in their need for oil. There are 15 nations in Europe, not including Austria, with a population of over 280 million. Yet we made no effort whatever to get any of those nations, who are the beneficiaries of this program, to join with us directly or indirectly in carrying the burdens placed on us by the resolution.

Instead, all alone, we propose arming various nations of the Middle East, without knowing in which direction the arms may eventually be turned. All alone, we propose the use of our troops, to protect the oil supply of Western Europe.

And just how much protection, Mr. President, would that be if a war should erupt in the area? The Suez Canal is certainly vulnerable, as has been shown. The pipelines are vulnerable. The passage of tankers around the Cape of Good Hope, should there be a war, would be a veritable shooting gallery. In other words, strategically the Middle East is not a very certain source of oil. Yet, as we all know, the Middle East and oil are indivisible. The two are so entwined that intelligent discussion of one cannot possibly proceed without an understanding of the other. The question now at issue is, therefore, whether the foreign policy of the United States with respect to the Middle East will, under this resolution, be determined largely by the interests of the major oil companies, which may or may not represent the true long-range interests of this country and our people.

In this connection I call attention to an editorial in the Washington Post of February 26, 1957, which says in part:

The international oil companies may or may not have behaved well in the Suez emergency; certainly the confusion of statistics and the unfortunate price increases have been legitimate complaints. It would be wrong to permit the oil companies to dominate American policy even though it is entirely right to consult them about matters within their special competence. But a failure to take into account the strategic importance of oil in the Near East would be a gross dereliction in policy just as bad as toadying to the companies.

I wish to place myself on record as being in full agreement with these views. It would indeed be wrong to fail to take into account the strategic importance of oil in the Near East; it would also be wrong to fail to consult the oil companies about matters within their special competence. But it would be equally wrong to permit them to dominate American policy.

If the past is to serve as any guide to the future, there are more than sufficient grounds to be concerned over the prospect that the major oil companies will, in point of fact, dominate our Middle East foreign policies. I need not dwell upon the possible consequences here, which range all the way up to and including the precipitation of a third world war in order to protect what the oil companies may consider to be their legitimate rights and interests.

In the recent past there has been no lack of instances in which the policy of the United States Government has been directly geared to promoting the interests of the oil companies, even at times at the expense of our national security. If this has been true of the past, why should it not also be true of the future? I should like to recite just a few examples of oil-company domination of Government policy.

My first example is the action by the present administration in virtually bringing to an end the Government's program to produce oil from oil shale and coal in the United States. When this administration came into power, the Government had in operation two development plants, one at Louisiana, Mo., and the other at Rifle, Colo. The plant in Missouri was engaged in experimental work in converting coal into liquid fuel; the plant in Colorado was engaged in similar work on oil shale. Considerable progress had been made in both plants in finding economical alternatives to crude oil as a source of petroleum products. In both plants costs had been brought down to a point not far above the prevailing petroleum prices and further progress was, of course, anticipated. As we all know, the reserves of coal in this country are virtually inexhaustible. Similarly, the reserves of oil shale are enormous. It has been estimated that there are available in Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming accessible bodies of oil shale representing a potential reserve of over 500 billion barrels of recoverable oil.

Now, what has been the fate of these promising developments under this administration? The plant in Missouri has been closed down altogether; operations in the Colorado plant have been greatly curtailed, awaiting the time when it will be taken over by one of the other large oil companies, if ever. The case of the Colorado installation is particularly interesting in view of the fact that processing oil shale is a relatively simple operation and costs are less than in the case of coal. On June 30, 1954, Mr. Felix Wormser, Assistant Secretary for Mineral Resources, wrote a letter to Mr. Walter Hallanan, president, National Petroleum Council, Pittsburgh, Pa. Speaking of the experimental work on oil shale which had been carried on at the Rifle plant, Mr. Wormser asked the National Petroleum Council to "give us the benefit of its advice as to the action we should take in light of the committee's recommendation." In a report dated January 25, 1955, the National Petroleum Council gave its answer:

The committee therefore concurs in the recommendation of the Interior Department Committee to the Secretary of the Interior

to the effect that the experimental work done solely by the Bureau of Mines on the production of oil shale and oil from shale at Rifle, Colo., should be discontinued at present and that the facilities now on the site be maintained in a standby condition.

This recommendation has substantially been followed by the present administration.

In recent years about one-fifth of this country's total oil consumption has consisted of imports, and the proportion has been steadily rising. Russia, it is reported, now has at least 400 submarines, many of them equipped with the snorkel underwater breathing device. It takes no great stretch of the imagination to see what could happen to our imports if a true emergency developed. We could very readily be confronted with the absolute necessity of supplementing our domestic oil production with gasoline produced from other sources. Yet the development plants which were in the process of supplying us with the invaluable know-how to meet such a problem have been closed down. And they have been closed down because the big oil companies regarded them as a possible competitive threat and did not want them to continue operations. It is difficult to conceive of a more clear-cut case of oil-company domination of the policy of the United States Government. Commenting on the recommendation for closing the plants by the National Petroleum Council, the Denver Post, in an editorial of October 5, 1954, stated:

If a jury of railroad presidents was asked to decide whether the trucking industry should be allowed to use public highways, there would not be much doubt what the verdict would be.

We do not leave decisions on whether the Government should subsidize airlines to committees composed of bus-company executives.

Coal companies would be considered prejudiced, so we do not leave it to them to advise the Government on imports of fuel oil or the building of domestic pipelines.

We expect our Government, in passing on any matter involving Government authority, to act in the best interest of the people, not to line up with one group of competitors against another.

But Secretary of the Interior McKay, in an almost unbelievable action, has asked the liquid-petroleum industry, as represented by the National Petroleum Council, to advise the Government on whether Federal appropriations for oil-shale experimental work should be stopped. . . . The oil industry is just about as anxious to have competition from shale oil as the Republicans are to have the Democrats win the November elections.

What the oil companies wanted, the oil companies got.

Mr. President, my second example of oil-company domination concerns the formation of the so-called Consortium in 1954, an arrangement formed to absorb within the framework of the international petroleum cartel, the increased output resulting from the resumption of production in Iran. Since the Consortium would have been an illegal price-fixing arrangement, an exemption for it was secured under the antitrust laws. The background of the Consortium was the action taken by the Government of

001017350

0002428

1957

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

Iran under the then leadership of Premier Mossadegh in nationalizing its oil industry. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., which operated the huge refinery at Abadan, as well as the other major oil companies, bitterly opposed this action by the Iranian Government. Unable to market its products and unable to operate its refinery without key foreign technicians, the oil industry in Iran shut down. Economic distress and political unrest swept the country, culminating in the possibility of seizure of the country by Communist elements. Premier Mossadegh was ousted and imprisoned. The Shah of Iran was returned to power. But before oil production could be resumed, there had to be worked out an arrangement by which the increased output would, in effect, be handled by the established major oil companies. The arrangement finally arrived at was the so-called Consortium. Its principal architect was Herbert Hoover, Jr., who on September 12, 1953, was appointed special adviser to Secretary of State Dulles on problems dealing with worldwide petroleum matters.

The basic purpose and reason for the Consortium was to make sure that none of this increased output would get into the hands of outside or independent enterprises which might inject a little competition into the world petroleum markets. Its architects went to considerable lengths to be sure that no such eventuality might materialize, as is indicated by what happened to the cooperatives in their efforts to become a member.

Mr. President, in connection with making quite sure that no little independent company got in, that only the big international oil companies had a chance of securing any of this oil, I refer Senators to House hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary of the 84th Congress, entitled "Antitrust Problems," part 2, beginning at page 685. The entire matter is discussed in full and in detail there.

I also refer Members of the Senate and the public to an extremely well-documented recent book entitled "Middle East Oil and the Great Powers," by Benjamin Shwadran. This book, Mr. President, contains facts and figures; and these two documents are a part of the basis for my statement, and they are not controverted.

After the Consortium was divided up among the leading international companies, there remained 5 percent which was to be made available at cost to other American companies. Among the applicants for part of this 5-percent share was the International Cooperative Petroleum Association, which sought to obtain the modest share of one-half of 1 percent. Its application, however, was denied on the technical grounds that, inasmuch as it had affiliations with cooperative organizations in other countries, it was not an American company and, therefore, not entitled to participate. Protesting its exclusion, Howard A. Cowden, president of the Consumers Cooperative Association, issued a statement on May 18, 1955, saying:

We have seen a demonstration of the tremendous power the big international oil companies wield. They became, for all practical purposes, the spokesmen of our Government and the British Government in negotiations with Iran. They saw to it that cooperatives were barred from any participation, and I can understand their reasons. Cooperatives are opposed to their tight control of the markets in Europe. Cooperatives, with a chance to handle oil from the low-cost fields and refineries in the Middle East, might have shown the public just how much profit there is in transporting this to Europe and selling it at present prices.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KEFAUVER. I am happy to yield.

Mr. MORSE. I wonder if the Senator from Tennessee would permit me to place in the Record at this point some oil statistics which I think are of interest.

Mr. KEFAUVER. I should be happy to have the Senator from Oregon do so.

Mr. MORSE. I have been advised that the M. A. Hanna Co. holds 482,256 shares of the common stock of Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, having a current market value of \$26,885,772; and that it holds 187,500 shares of stock of Seaboard Oil Co., valued at \$11,671,875.

The Senator from Tennessee knows, I am certain, that M. A. Hanna Co. is the company with which the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. George Humphrey, is closely associated.

I happen to think, as a legislator, that I have to give at least passing notice to such facts for whatever cause-to-effect implications they may bear to United States foreign policy.

Mr. KEFAUVER. I thank the Senator from Oregon. That is information which should be made public, for it shows the interests of this great company, which is substantially dominated by the present Secretary of the Treasury, in the international oil field. It is information which the public should have.

I think it would be very interesting at some later time to bring out the facts concerning the other tremendous holdings of M. A. Hanna Co. in the United States, Brazil, and other countries of the world.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KEFAUVER. I yield.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. I was very much interested in having had brought out the fact that the Iranian consortium which was arranged and agreed to while former Under Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr., was acting for our Government, resulted in squeezing the small independent companies in favor of the gigantic companies, which now operate the oil lift to Europe.

It seems to me to be amazing that our eyes have been so blinded to what is going on that we do not realize that we are permitting the gigantic corporations to take over not only the concentrated economic control of the business, but to take a place which gives the point and direction to the foreign policy of the United States.

The Senator will remember, I am certain, the testimony given yesterday before our subcommittee by Mr. Lester

Clark, an independent operator, of Breckenridge, Tex. He told us in his testimony that today more than 8,000 wells in the State of Texas are unconnected to pipelines. Without the pipelines, without the huge tank trucks, and without the tanker ships at some gulf port and transportation by pipeline to the gulf port, such independent operators are barred from the market.

I was prompted to say to the witness, "If I understand your testimony correctly, you are telling our subcommittee that the independent operators of Texas and elsewhere in the United States are just as effectively blockaded from their market by the giant companies as the giant companies were blockaded by Nasser when he sank vessels in the Suez Canal. There is no difference between the blockades which have been erected by concentrated industry against private enterprise in this country and by the consortium throughout the world, and the blockade which Nasser has established in the Suez Canal."

I may say that the witness agreed with that statement, and said it was exactly a parallel situation.

Mr. KEFAUVER. I appreciate the statement made by the Senator from Wyoming. When we speak about the abuses of power and control which have been exercised over the Government and the people by the big oil companies, many persons may think we are including the small independent companies also. The large companies try to use the small companies as fronts in order to do their business; but we know, of course, that the operations of the large integrated companies have always thwarted and held down the chances of success of the smaller companies. That was brought out by the testimony of Mr. Clark, as the Senator from Wyoming has so well stated.

The full testimony and statement of the Consumers' Cooperative Association, which tried to get a small part of the Iranian oil, is set forth in the House hearings of which I spoke, beginning at page 703. A reading of that testimony will show that the small companies never had a chance in competition with the large international oil companies.

Some idea of the profitability of the consortium to its members can be gained from an article entitled "A Profitable Headache," written by Wanda Jablonski and published in Petroleum Week of May 13, 1955. Miss Jablonski is an outstanding writer on the subject of petroleum problems and is on the staff of the National Journal of Commerce. Her article in Petroleum Week observes:

Each barrel of crude oil should carry a profit of somewhere around 70 to 80 cents. The posted Iranian export price is roughly \$1.90 per barrel. Current initial costs are about 70 cents lower; around \$1.20 per barrel (80 cents total payments to the Iranian Government, 10 cents consideration payments to the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., and about 30 cents actual production costs). It is generally expected, however, that producing costs will drop substantially to below 20 cents per barrel once output volume picks up.

Miss Jablonski then goes on to estimate that by the third year of opera-

tions the annual profit per 1 percent share will range from \$900,000 to \$1¼ million. She adds that

Such returns on an original capital investment of only \$1.5 million per 1 percent share in the consortium are nothing to sneeze at, particularly since most of this income will, to all intents and purposes, be tax-free (after deducting depletion allowance and credits for taxes paid to Iran).

The whole Iranian matter, and the way the Government's policy was largely dictated, including Mr. Hoover's policy, of which he was, of course, the spokesman for the Government, is set forth in a chapter of the book written by Mr. Shwadran, to which I have referred.

The parallelism between the two cases is remarkable. In each, a somewhat novel situation existed; in one, the existence of promising synthetic fuel plants; and in the other, the potential resumption of Iranian production. In each case the interest of the established oil companies was obvious—to shut down the synthetic plants and to keep in their hands the distribution and marketing of the resumed Iranian output. But what is most significant here is that in each case the government agency involved not only acceded to the wishes of the oil companies, but became an active instrument in putting those wishes into effect. It was the Department of the Interior, under Secretary McKay, which curtailed the operations of the synthetic plants; and it was the State Department, under Secretary Dulles, which sent Mr. Herbert Hoover, Jr., to Tehran, for the purpose of devising an arrangement which would keep the control of Iranian production firmly in the hands of the members of the international oil cartel. Again, what the oil companies wanted, the oil companies got, despite the fact that in both cases consumers were denied advantages which a properly operating competitive system is supposed to provide, for in one case they were denied the benefits of advancing technological progress, while in the other case they were denied the benefits of low-cost natural resources.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, at this point will the Senator from Tennessee yield to me?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. LAUSCHE in the chair). Does the Senator from Tennessee yield to the Senator from Oregon?

Mr. KEFAUVER. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Oregon.

Mr. MORSE. Does the Senator from Tennessee believe that if we would be more insistent on having all Middle East policies handled through the United Nations, rather than by way of unilateral action on the part of the United States, through the so-called Eisenhower doctrine, it would be a little more difficult for the international cartel to influence foreign policy in the Middle East.

Mr. KEFAUVER. There is no question about that. Today, our Government is doing what the oil companies want. On the other hand, if more nations were involved in making the policy and if the views of more persons were considered, the chances of having our Government do what the oil companies want would

certainly be less. Undoubtedly that is true.

Mr. MORSE. I wish to congratulate the Senator from Tennessee for the courageous speech he is making on this subject. I know as well as he does what happens to liberals when we make the type of plea the Senator from Tennessee is making to protect the public interest against monopolistic combines. Of course, the Senator from Tennessee must be ready to be accused and castigated by a reactionary press which will say a great many unkind things about him for making this speech. But the liberals who have served the country before him have withstood abuse of that sort, and have left a record which subsequent generations in the Senate have quoted with approval.

I wish to say that the speech the Senator from Tennessee is making today will be turned to many times a decade from today, and probably will be given even more heed 10 years from now than it will receive in this hour of hysteria.

Mr. KEFAUVER. I thank the Senator from Oregon; his statement gives me much encouragement.

I think I should say that I have been delighted that a few newspapers—and their number is increasing—which are thinking about the public interest have not wholly taken the position of the large international companies in connection with their domination of Middle Eastern governmental policy or in connection with their greed and their desire to impose on the consuming public unjustified price increases. I hope that more newspapers will consider further the effect this matter is having upon the future of the country and upon American consumers.

However, insofar as the criticism of me is concerned, the Senator from Oregon and I have received such criticism for a long time, and we are still here.

Mr. CARROLL. Mr. President, will the Senator from Tennessee yield to me?

Mr. KEFAUVER. I am happy to yield to my friend, the Senator from Colorado.

Mr. CARROLL. In view of the testimony which has been developed within the past several weeks, I wish to say to the Senator from Tennessee that I can see no valid reason why any alert, intelligent newspaper should criticize the Senator from Tennessee or the Senator from Wyoming, because there has been overwhelming evidence of the far-reaching influence by the international oil cartel on American foreign policy. Also, there has been overwhelming evidence of their control not only of the Middle East market but also of the United States oil market. Almost without exception, the evidence has established the fact that that domination has increased the cost of fuel oil and gasoline not only to individuals, but also to industrial plants throughout the Nation and to private power utilities in Florida and California. It is estimated that the recent gasoline-fuel oil price increases will add over \$1 billion to the cost of the consumers in 1957.

At this time I rise to pay special tribute to the Senator from Tennessee for his wisdom and experience and his ques-

tioning of the witnesses and for helping to bring out these facts. I agree with him that there is a growing awareness on the part of the press of the importance of getting this message to the people. If the committee on which the distinguished Senator from Tennessee serves accomplishes nothing more than to bring this matter to the attention of the people, the committee will have performed a great service, as the able Senator from Tennessee is doing today in his magnificent speech.

Mr. KEFAUVER. Mr. President, I appreciate the comments of the Senator from Colorado. I wish to say that, as a member of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, he has been in attendance at all the joint committee hearings, and he has been participating in the questioning, and he has shown a thorough understanding of the entire problem. I agree with him that if any newspaper which wishes to do the fair thing and what is right for the consumers of the country, and which wishes our country to have a foreign policy which is not dominated and conducted by the international oil companies, will get the facts and will print them, I do not think there will be a great deal of disagreement with the conclusions I reach here.

Mr. CARROLL. Mr. President, will the Senator from Tennessee yield further, to permit me to make a brief statement?

Mr. KEFAUVER. I yield.

Mr. CARROLL. Beyond question of a doubt—at least, in my opinion, as a new Senator, and as a new member of the committee—when I study the financial structure of the major integrated oil companies of the United States and their influence upon our own economy and our own foreign policy, I am amazed that the information has not previously been made public. It is a lesson to me: to learn that one corporation—I need not mention its name—had a net profit of \$174 million, plus the depletion allowance, plus receiving the benefit of other tax loopholes which were created in the tax law. Eighty-seven percent of that company is owned by one of giant international oil companies, which, in turn, has enormous profits.

Another great oil company—and its name is unimportant, because we are talking of the matter of the financial structure—has operations extending through the 48 States, and has a net worth of \$1 billion. Its actual worth probably amounts to \$3 billion or \$4 billion. But the evidence clearly shows that the officials and lawyers of these great groups sat in with the State Department, to help formulate the policy we are debating and discussing in this Chamber today.

Mr. KEFAUVER. Yes, Mr. President; and I think it is unfortunate that information about those meetings and what happened at them has not been given to the public. However, I think it should be said that, as the Senator from Colorado so well knows, in the case of all these important governmental meetings, even those Mr. Dulles attended, and several which Mr. Herbert Hoover, Jr., attended, with the heads of the Gov-

0002429

001017350

which could have been used without any possible legal barrier. This would have been a simple appeal to hold the price line; but this weapon was ignored. In the past, appeals to hold the price line which have been made without the backing of specific statutory authority have, on several occasions, achieved a fair measure of success in arresting inflationary price increases. Thus, in World War II specific statutory authority to control prices was not granted by Congress until 2 months after Pearl Harbor. Yet for nearly 2 years prior to that time Government agencies had been achieving considerable success in holding down price increases merely by making voluntary appeals and establishing voluntary price ceilings. Again, at the outbreak of the Korean hostilities, voluntary appeals helped hold the price line before specific price control authority was granted by Congress. Yet, no member of this administration made even the slightest suggestion to the oil companies that they abstain from advancing their prices. The question was left severely alone, to quote Mr. Wormser.

Mr. CARROLL. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield?

Mr. KEFAUVER. I yield.

Mr. CARROLL. Again recalling the statement of the Senator a few moments ago, notwithstanding the enormous profits the major companies had been making, the Government should have understood what the market situation was. Their financial situation is published openly. But there was no "jawbone" enforcement, and no appeal was made, so far as we have been able to determine from the record. Is that true?

Mr. KEFAUVER. That is true. We have been suggesting for some time that an appeal be made, but to no avail.

There are only two possible explanations for this flagrant neglect of the public interest—either they regarded the price increase as a matter of only minor consequence, or they were so overawed in the presence of the oil company executives that the thought of bringing up such an unpleasant subject as prices never entered their minds. A careful reading of the transcript would suggest that the latter is probably the truer explanation. The Government officials of this administration have become so accustomed to sneezing whenever the oil companies take snuff that the very thought of doing otherwise never enters their heads. It is not a case in which there is a pulling and hauling between the Government and the private interest, with the private interest winning out. It is a case, rather, in which the pulling and hauling never takes place. What is good for the oil companies is simply, automatically, inevitably, immediately, and instantaneously assumed to be good for the country. Again what the oil companies wanted, the oil companies got.

Mr. CARROLL. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield?

Mr. KEFAUVER. I yield.

Mr. CARROLL. The Senator's reference to snuff and sneezing calls to my mind the testimony of representatives of the Texaco Co. before our committee.

Mr. KEFAUVER. I remember it very well.

Mr. CARROLL. The Humble Oil Co. increased the price of crude oil on January 3 about 35 cents a barrel, I believe.

Mr. KEFAUVER. That is correct.

Mr. CARROLL. On January 7 Texaco issued a statement that swept through 48 States, asking their refineries, their tanker operators, and their distributors to make a similar price increase, and to make it retroactive to January 3. So when Humble took snuff, as the Senator says, the other major companies all over the country sneezed, to the great detriment of the consumers of the Nation, whether they used gasoline or fuel oil.

Mr. KEFAUVER. The Senator is correct. However, it was not difficult to make them sneeze. They were waiting for Humble to raise the price, and they were so eager to follow suit, to meet competition—meeting competition by raising the prices unusual—that they even made the increase retroactive.

Another interesting point in this connection is that Humble is owned 86 percent by Standard Oil Company of New Jersey. So we have an example of a very convenient method of having a subsidiary raise the price, and the major company following along, doing the same thing.

Mr. CARROLL. Does Standard Oil Company of New Jersey have extensive holdings in the Middle East?

Mr. KEFAUVER. Yes. Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and the Texas Co. have very extensive holdings in the Middle East. The companies making up the MEEC have extensive holdings in the Middle East.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks an article entitled "Oil From the Mid East: How the Concessions Operate," written by J. H. Carmical.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the article may be printed in the RECORD, as requested.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. KEFAUVER. It is interesting to note that there has been an increase, as time has gone on, in the percentage of oil owned by American interests in the Middle East. According to the article by Mr. Carmical, to which frequent reference has been made, and which is accurate, in 1946 American companies owned 35.3 percent of the Middle Eastern oil. In 1935 American companies had 58.4 percent. The British ownership had gone down from 49.9 percent to 28.4 percent during the same time. So the stake of these large companies in the Middle East is very substantial, and, as we shall see, their influence upon Government policy is great and decisive.

There are, of course, other examples of oil-company domination of our national policy. I need but mention two such well-known cases as tidelands and the natural-gas bill, both of which were energetically supported by the present administration. With the exception of the latter, which escaped enactment only because of the arrogant and blatant excesses of political activity on its behalf, I can think of nothing during the last 5 years which the oil companies have wanted that they did not get.

Mr. CARROLL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KEFAUVER. I yield.

Mr. CARROLL. Does the Senator remember some of the testimony in the committee with reference to the Humble Oil Co.?

Mr. KEFAUVER. Yes; I remember it very well.

Mr. CARROLL. In connection with the tidelands situation, since the passage of the tidelands bill that company has acquired extensive leases in the tidelands.

Mr. KEFAUVER. That is true.

Mr. CARROLL. The Senator will recall that I asked questions along that line. This company, which is a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey, had 3 billion barrels of oil in reserve. I asked about its gas reserves. They amounted to between 16 and 17 trillion cubic feet.

The reason I mention this subject to the Senator is that in connection with the gas bill I asked whether or not, if the Harris-Fulbright bill became law, that company would cease to be intrastate, and would then begin to move interstate, swelling the enormous profits they were already making. I commend the Senator for bringing out this point, so that we can get it into the RECORD.

Mr. KEFAUVER. A great many chapters and passages in Mr. Benjamin Shwadran's book document the fact that in the past 5 years this country has been doing exactly what the big oil companies wanted. I hope that many of these references will be made public. On page 178, after discussing Mossadegh's demise, the author relates how this country exerted pressure to get him out and get a new premier in. I quote from the book:

To exist at all as well as to receive United States aid, Premier Zahedi had to show how completely and utterly his predecessor had failed, and thus pave the way for a solution which would meet with British-United States approval.

Our aid was being used for the purpose of propping up and restoring the positions wanted by the big oil companies operating in Iran at that time.

This, then, is a substantial reason for my opposition to the present resolution. We have on the basis of the past every reason to assume that domination of our national policy by the oil companies will continue in the future. In the Middle East particularly the potential consequences of oil-company domination are frightening.

The question has been raised in recent weeks as to the real need and purpose for this Middle East resolution. Beneath those which appear on the surface, there are two underlying purposes to be served by the resolution: The first is to warn the Arab countries not to nationalize oil concessions held by American oil companies; the second is to permit immediate intervention in the event such nationalization does take place, without any delay being imposed by congressional opposition or debate.

To understand these purposes, it is necessary to go back a few years in history. The oil companies are, of course, highly sensitive to the desire and wishes

ernment agencies concerned and with representatives of the big international oil companies—meetings to discuss this program—strangely enough, no minutes were made of what occurred at the meetings. We have not been able to obtain any minutes of them. In the case of almost any important meeting, and even in the case of small, informal meetings, minutes or memorandums are prepared. But they very studiously avoided making any minutes or memorandums in regard to what took place at these meetings; and we have to find out about them the hard way, and pick up pieces of information here and there, in order to get the true picture. However, at last we are getting the picture.

The American people are wondering why so much of the joint resolution relates to the wishes of the international oil companies. Before we get through this afternoon, I think we shall be able to throw some light on that matter.

A third example of oil-company domination of governmental policy has recently been disclosed in the joint hearings held before the Antitrust and Public Lands Subcommittees of the Judiciary and Interior Committees.

At this point I wish to commend the Senator from Colorado [Mr. CARROLL] for the part he has played in bringing out some of these important matters. Many of them are not carried in the press, and their full meaning has not been properly interpreted or understood. However, they are of tremendous importance.

The third example, to which I referred a moment ago, concerns the complete failure of the present administration to do anything, or indeed even to say anything, about the recent price increase in gasoline, crude oil, and other petroleum products. These price increases, it has been estimated, will cost the American public in the neighborhood of \$1 billion a year. The price increase in gasoline alone will cost nearly \$500 million a year. Officials of the Armed Forces have testified that the cost of the price increase to the Defense Department will be in the neighborhood of \$85 million, a cost which of course will have to be borne by the taxpayer.

It should be pointed out that this increased cost to the Government does not include the increased cost to the General Services Administration, and it does not include increased cost of oil to the NATO troops in Europe.

Furthermore, the price increase has the effect of reducing the amount of oil which England and France will be able to secure from us with their dwindling supply of dollars.

Mr. CARROLL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KEFAUVER. I yield.

Mr. CARROLL. Reverting again to what the increases will cost our military establishment, I was astounded to learn, because I did not really understand how comprehensive our great Navy is, that the cost of petroleum products for 1 year, as I recall the evidence, is \$1 billion. That is what the taxpayers spend. I am not complaining of it; I am merely stating what the facts show.

Mr. KEFAUVER. I believe all the oil for the Armed Services is purchased by the Navy, and that includes the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

Mr. CARROLL. I understand that, as a result of the recent price increase, the increased cost will be approximately \$85 million.

Mr. KEFAUVER. That is true. That does not include the tremendous amount of oil which is purchased by other Government agencies.

Mr. CARROLL. I thank the Senator for yielding.

Mr. KEFAUVER. Mr. President, by no stretch of the imagination can it be contended that the major oil companies are really in need of a price increase in order to secure reasonable earnings. Indeed, their earnings, even before the recent price increase, were extremely comfortable. According to the figures which the committee has obtained from the Federal Trade Commission—which are not disputed, Mr. President—the rate of profit, after taxes on stockholders' investment for the 4 largest companies in the petroleum refining industry, averaged 14.1 percent in 1955. This was a gain over the 1954 showing of 13.2 percent. That is to say, in 1955 the 4 largest companies earned an average profit rate, after paying all expenses and taxes, which would pay off their entire investment in only 7 years.

Humble Oil Co., which increased its price, is making an increased profit this year over its profit of last year. The Texas Co. did not even have a cost justification; it simply followed suit. The oil companies are squeezing the last cent they can from the consumers of the United States.

The officials of the administration in charge of the Middle East Emergency Committee were warned as long ago as September 19 of last year that prices were going to be increased. On that date, the minutes of meeting No. 4 of the Middle East Emergency Committee reveal, the chairman of the committee, Mr. S. P. Coleman, vice president of Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, "turned to discussion of the impact on crude prices and stated that it was the view of the committee these these prices would go up substantially at the sources closest to Europe, and pointed out, however, that United States gulf prices would be the most affected and that such domestic questions were outside the scope of the committee."

Consider the last few words "and that such domestic questions were outside the scope of the committee." Later testimony has clearly revealed that the governmental representatives on the committee were fully in agreement with that point of view. The matter of a price increase which costs the American consumers the slight amount of only a billion dollars a year was indeed outside the scope of their interests. In the hearings they have taken the position that, while they do have authority to enter into a voluntary agreement with respect to supply, production, transportation—and secure exemption from the anti-trust laws as to supply, production, transportation, the pooling of tankers,

and so forth—they have no authority to enter into a voluntary agreement with respect to holding the price line. The head of the anti-trust division testified to exemptions from the anti-trust laws for the purpose of enabling the companies to transport oil, but stated the companies could not do so for the purpose of holding the price line. The statement had been made that they leave that severely alone. Mr. Wormser said he would not do anything about it if the price of gasoline went up to 50 cents a gallon.

Mr. CARROLL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KEFAUVER. I yield to the Senator from Colorado.

Mr. CARROLL. As a matter of fact, does not the record show that at least 4 months before the seizure of the Suez Canal, the Oil and Gas Division of the Department of the Interior, and the Department of State, were in consultation about the possibility of a breakdown in the oil station in the Middle East?

Mr. KEFAUVER. Yes, they certainly were.

Mr. CARROLL. After 4 months of planning, and after the Suez Canal was seized, as the Senator has indicated, there was no forcible action on the part of any member of the executive branch of the Government to protect the consuming public when the so-called voluntary agreement was made for the transportation of oil, was there?

Mr. KEFAUVER. The Senator is correct. I may say the attitude of governmental officials, in not even suggesting that they were interested, was an invitation to the oil companies to do substantially anything they wanted to and to raise prices, if they wished.

Mr. CARROLL. As a matter of fact, is it not true that some of the oil officials, as the Senator has indicated, stated that, because of the enormous size of the program and its impact on our economy, there would be a price increase?

Mr. KEFAUVER. Yes. They said there would be pressure upward in the price picture, and warned about it.

Mr. CARROLL. Does the Senator not recall from the testimony that nowhere, at any time, was the Federal Trade Commission called for consultation in the formulation of the so-called voluntary agreement concerning the shipment of oil?

Mr. KEFAUVER. I think that is true. I believe it was said that somebody from the Interior Department called somebody in the Trade Commission on the telephone, but it was not known who the person talked to was. It was stated by Mr. Gwynne that there was really no consultation in connection with the matter. That is what he said in a letter.

Mr. President, I return to my statement. Suffice it to say that the present voluntary agreement, which is in the form of an amendment to a 1953 voluntary agreement, completely bypasses the 1955 amendments, and is in no way limited by their restrictions.

Quite apart from trying to secure a formal voluntary agreement not to raise prices, the Government agencies had another weapon at their disposal, one

0002430

1957

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

2557

of the rulers of the areas in which this fabulously profitable black gold is to be found.

Their sensitivity has been sharpened by the chilling prospect that their immensely valuable concessions might be nationalized. This is the real club which the Middle Eastern countries hold over the head of the oil companies and thus the present administration.

None of us likes nationalization; but I am not willing to go to war in the Middle East simply to sustain the position of these oil companies. That is what is contained in the resolution.

To help improve relationships with the Arab countries, the administration went out of its way to help build up a dictator in Egypt. But having been created with our aid and assistance, Colonel Nasser got out of hand. He became something of a Frankenstein. When we pulled the rug out from under him by canceling aid for the construction of the Aswan Dam, he did the very thing which the oil companies fear most. He resorted to nationalization. If he could nationalize something of great value to his country, the rulers of the other Middle East countries might be strongly tempted to follow suit. Indeed, it was not so long ago that one of those countries did in fact nationalize its oil industry. At that time Iran was not strong enough to be able to produce and market its own products, but since then the Middle East countries have been gaining in strength and independence. With each passing day their ability to nationalize and get away with it increases.

Nationalization of Middle East oil concessions would not only adversely affect the particular company involved; it would have a widespread effect upon the entire oil industry, since one of its probable consequences would be the sale of the nationalized oil in world markets at a price below, and possibly well below, the established cartel price. Just for rough purposes of contrast, may I point out that actual costs, excluding royalties, of producing oil in the Middle East have been estimated to be as low as 20 cents a barrel, as contrasted to the present price of around \$3. There is plenty of room to sell Middle East oil at lower prices and still reap a handsome profit.

That the prospect of nationalization of the Middle East concessions is very much on the minds of the oil companies is clearly apparent from their own statements. For example, the magazine, *The Lamp*, published by Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, has an editorial article in the winter issue, entitled "What the Middle East Means to Us." The article states that most of the countries in the Middle East are newcomers as sovereign powers and that their people are "burning with national pride, reveling in their new-found authority."

I wish to read an excerpt from that publication of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, one of whose officials is chairman of the MEEC:

There arise from time to time in the Middle East politicians who hope to achieve or hold power on a platform of hatred of for-

eigners. Such men have no scruples about breaking solemn agreements with the citizens or governments of other countries.

The article continues:

It would be helpful, for example, if the United States Government were to issue, in conjunction with expressions of support for self-determination and freedom from foreign domination, a firm, unequivocal public statement, somewhat in the following vein:

"Any government which by unilateral action, abrogates an agreement made by that government, may expect the United States, either singly, in conjunction with other countries, or through the United Nations, to take such economic measures and abrogate any agreements with the offending nation as the United States may see that the circumstances warrant."

Such a statement would tell other nations what we are for. It would let them know that neither government agreements nor private contracts are to be entered into lightly, or quickly abandoned when abandonment seems expedient. It would reaffirm our national belief that signed contracts have a validity of their own, and that when a sovereign nation has become a party to a contract it may not repudiate its pledged word with impunity.

I submit, Mr. President, that the oil companies concerns for these private contracts, their proposal of a firm unequivocal statement by this government is being quickly followed by a statement which the President now asks Congress to ratify—the Middle Eastern resolution.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KEFAUVER. I am happy to yield to my colleague.

Mr. GORE. I have followed with interest the development by my senior colleague from Tennessee of the thesis that the oil of the Middle East constitutes a motivation for the resolution which is now before the Senate.

Mr. KEFAUVER. That has been the burden of my argument.

Mr. GORE. At page 66 of the hearings the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, is quoted in a very meaningful way. It happened that I was in the committee room, listening to the testimony, when this statement was made. I may say to my able colleague that I was favorably impressed by the statement. It does have a bearing upon the thesis which my able colleague is developing. I should like to read an excerpt from that testimony if the Senator will yield to me to that extent.

Mr. KEFAUVER. I am very happy to yield for that purpose.

Mr. GORE. The question was submitted to the Secretary of State by the distinguished majority leader, the Senator from Texas [Mr. JOHNSON]:

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Secretary, it seems to me that the Congress is being asked to take a very extraordinary step. That step can be justified only if a serious threat exists.

Now, what can you say to the people of our country, within the bounds of security, which indicates that there is a present dangerous threat to the security of the Middle East?

Secretary DULLES. I would say, Senator, if asked—and I gather you have asked me—that this is the most serious threat that we have faced over the past 10 years.

I say it for several reasons. In the first place, there is a threat which, if it led to an international Communist control of this area, would mean that the Communists could

win without open war areas which are endangered, but which probably the Communists or the Soviet Union would not want to risk open war to get.

I refer particularly to Western Europe.

They are very eager, of course, to get control of Western Europe. The vast manpower, industry, raw materials that exist there would, if it fell under their control, decisively alter to their advantage and our disadvantage the balance of power in the world.

Now, there are two ways of their getting that control. One is by fighting to get it. The other is to get control of its economy so that it cannot exist except on Soviet Communist terms.

And if international communism gets control of the Middle East, they will be in precisely that position. They can, in effect, have their hand on the throttle which can either give or can cut off what is the lifeblood of Europe.

And I would not expect under those conditions it would be feasible for Europe to stay independent of Soviet Communist control.

The Secretary proceeded further with his reply, but it was that first point to which I wished to call the attention of the able Senator. So, if I may give my own interpretation of what the Secretary said, it is that if the Communists should gain control of the oil in the Middle East, they would indirectly be able to gain economic control and domination over Western Europe. The Secretary gives that as the first reason why this is the most dangerous threat we have faced in 10 years.

I wished to call that to the Senator's attention. I doubt that it is offered in the same context in which the able Senator is speaking, but it does dramatize the importance of the oil of the Middle East as a factor in this entire issue.

Mr. KEFAUVER. I appreciate my colleague's reading the question and the answer. Previously in my address, while the Senator was necessarily away from the Chamber attending an important meeting, I had talked about two things in connection with the question and the answer. One of my objections to the resolution is that, although it is for the purpose of helping Western Europe, it is singularly strange that we should assume the entire responsibility, that we should go it alone, and not even suggest that any nation whose people would be the beneficiaries of the program should sign up with us.

I pointed out, also, that the transportation of oil can very readily be stopped in the Middle East. The Suez Canal can be closed, pipelines can be blown up, and submarines can operate.

I shall point out later that we have alternatives to strengthen our position in the Middle East without adopting this resolution. We have alternatives of economic assistance of a kind that would not involve merely guns and ammunition. I think they would do more good than would any money which is going to be spent for guns and ammunition there.

I think we are also fortunate in that the Middle Eastern nations need Western Europe as their market. Russia, of course, is an oil exporting nation. It would not be able for a long time to buy oil from the Middle East, and would have no way of transporting very much of it.

So there is every reason why oil from the Middle East should go to Europe.

What I am objecting to is the involvement of the United States in a foreign policy which seems to me to evidence too much dictation from the oil companies in its preparation.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will my colleague from Tennessee yield further?

Mr. KEFAUVER. I yield.

Mr. GORE. I was not present on the floor during the first part of the able Senator's address. I did not, therefore, know that he had already addressed his attention to that particular point of view expressed by the Secretary of State. Therefore, I apologize to the Senator for burdening him with a second reply to that particular point.

Mr. KEFAUVER. I am glad the Senator brought it up, because it enabled us to discuss it more fully. I have dealt with it only very generally in my previous statement.

Mr. GORE. I thank the Senator.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Tennessee yield?

Mr. KEFAUVER. I yield.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I regret that I had to leave the floor and did not have an opportunity to hear all the Senator's address, and I may be asking him in reference to something he has already discussed.

I wish to ask particularly for the Senator's view with reference to the pending substitute which would have the effect of skeletonizing the resolution and leaving in it only the implied use of troops, and removing all economic aid and military assistance.

Does the Senator believe that it would be wise to adopt a resolution which has in it only one thing, namely, the use of armed forces?

Mr. KEFAUVER. My feeling is that this resolution got started on the wrong kind of a basis. It is like our policy in the Middle East beginning with the time when we urged the British to get out of the Suez Canal zone without some guaranty of passage, and we have directly or indirectly contributed to neutralizing the free forces in the Middle East against the British and the Israelis and pulling them out to go in ourselves.

On the general basis of the resolution, I do not think it could be of tremendous aid. I would be happy to go along with a program which would meet the specific issues, get at the real difficulty that exists, and strengthen our hand in dealing with the United Nations. That idea is contained in the Fulbright amendment and in the Mansfield amendment.

But I do not think we got started on the right foot in the Middle East. I do not like the basis of the resolution.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Tennessee yield?

Mr. KEFAUVER. I yield.

Mr. MORSE. Is there anything in the Russell amendment, in the opinion of the Senator from Tennessee, which would prevent the Congress of the United States from proceeding with a foreign-aid program in the Middle East?

Mr. KEFAUVER. There is nothing that I see in it which would do so.

In fact, I think the purpose is to let it come up in the usual way, to have the provisions presented and justified, and let Congress vote on it as it usually does.

Mr. MORSE. I think this is an appropriate place to make a very brief comment, if the Senator will permit.

I have been very much impressed at the number of opponents of the Russell amendment, leaving the impression in the record that the adoption of the amendment would bring to an end economic aid in the Middle East.

What it makes very clear is that we serve notice on Russia that if she follows an aggressive course of action she will be met with the armed might of the United States, which is pretty much in line with the earlier suggestion by the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] in this historic debate, to the effect that he thought a so-called advisory resolution should be adopted. But there is nothing in the Russell amendment which would in any way bring to an end the foreign-aid program in the Middle East, if Congress wanted to adopt one.

What the Senator from Georgia is pointing out is that with regard to an unusual extension of authority which the President of the United States is asking for in the field of foreign aid, we should bring to an end—and those of us who are supporting the Russell amendment are seeking to make it clear that we ought to bring to an end—the kind of extraordinary economic authority for which the President is asking, when he will not even send the Secretary of State to us with instructions to give us one specific fact concerning how he intends to use the money. That is the whole thing in a nutshell.

Yet while I was watching the news ticker this afternoon, I discovered that the opponents of the Russell amendment are succeeding in giving to the press the impression that we who are supporting the Russell amendment are seeking to bring to an end all economic aid in the Middle East. That simply is not so, and somebody ought to say so for the RECORD. I now do.

Mr. KEFAUVER. I am glad the Senator has made his statement. I remember specifically in the committee hearings that it was not some economic aid program to which the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] objected, or to which the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] and other Senators objected. It was the fact that the Senator from Georgia and other Senators had been unable to ascertain from Mr. Dulles or anyone else any project which was to be approved, or what was to be done with the money. The members of the committee went both ways around. First they asked if there was any particular project for which the money would be used. Being unable to get an answer to that question, they went around the other way by trying to have the Secretary exclude any projects for which the money might be used. They could not get an answer to that question either.

So a vote for the Russell amendment certainly would not be a vote against

some economic aid program. It is only a matter of congressional direction and control of the program which is involved.

Mr. President, I wish to revert to the line of reasoning or the argument I was making with reference to the handling of the present crisis in the Middle East by the Government, and the part which the oil companies played in formulating our policy.

I submit that the concern of the oil companies for the private contracts and their proposal of a "firm, unequivocal statement" by the Government is being quickly followed by a statement which the President now asks Congress to ratify—the Middle Eastern resolution.

This concern of the oil companies with the prospect of nationalization is also revealed in documents procured in the course of the investigation conducted by the Antitrust Subcommittee. As far back as August 13, a meeting was held of the Foreign Petroleum Supply Committee, at which were present representatives of the major oil companies and officials of various Government agencies. The telegram calling for the meeting, signed by Hugh A. Stewart, chairman, cautioned members that "this meeting not open to observers, no publicity authorized."

Minutes of the meeting—and I have them here—state that Secretary Dulles "spoke for about 15 minutes on matters involved in the current Middle East crisis. At the conclusion of his remarks he volunteered to answer questions. For about 10 minutes he responded to questions asked by some of the members."

Unfortunately the minutes do not give any indication of what Secretary Dulles actually said. However, the representative of one of the major oil companies who had been present wrote a memorandum describing what had transpired at the meeting, a copy of which has been secured by the Committee. This memorandum—and I have a photostatic copy of it here—is signed by A. C. Ingraham, of the Socony Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., and is dated August 15, 1956.

On the nationalization issue the memorandum summarizes what Secretary Dulles had to say in the following words:

He then stated that he recognizes the oil companies were very much interested in the nationalization issue and wanted to put forth his views and what line he expected to take at the London Conference. He indicated that the United States would not acquiesce in the rights of nationalization that would affect any other facilities in our own economic interests.

He commented that international law recognizes the right to nationalize if adequate compensation is paid, but he admits that actually adequate compensation is never really paid and nationalization in effect thereby becomes confiscation.

The line he expected to take on the problem at the London Conference, and which was written up in his communique, was to the effect that the United States felt it was "O. K." to nationalize only if assets were not impressed with international interest.

Mr. President, I call attention to the fact that the cause "assets were not impressed with international interest" is underscored:

What he meant by international interest was where a foreign government had made

0002431

001017850

promises of fixed duration in the form of concessions or contracts, upon which other nations would rely on fixing their courses of action and their own economies on the basis that these certain promises would be fulfilled. Therefore, he indicated, nationalization of this kind of an asset impressed with international interest goes far beyond compensation of shareholders alone and should call for international intervention.

In essence, Secretary Dulles was indicating his awareness of the oil companies' concern over the prospect of nationalization of their properties; he was acknowledging the general right of sovereign countries to nationalize properties; but he was making two qualifications to that right: first, that adequate compensation would have to be paid; and second, that properties "impressed with international interest" could not be nationalized. Parenthetically, it may be observed that oil properties could certainly qualify as assets "impressed with international interest." That was the idea of the gentlemen who attended the meeting.

The Secretary's conclusion is worth repeating:

Therefore—

He indicated—

nationalization of this kind of an asset impressed with international interest was far beyond compensation of shareholders alone and should call for international intervention.

Assuming that this is a correct account of what Secretary Dulles said, the Congress of the United States, before it passes the resolution, has a right to know what Secretary Dulles meant by stating that nationalization of a type of property—such as presumably an oil concession—"goes far beyond compensation of shareholders alone and should call for international intervention."

Who, for example, is going to do the intervening? There is no indication that United States troops would not be used for this purpose. And what, may I ask, would Russia's reaction be to that?

If the resolution is passed, the Congress would, in effect, be giving up its right to debate the question of whether our national interest does, in fact, warrant intervention by United States troops to prevent the nationalization of concessions held by giant oil companies. It may well be that such intervention should be undertaken. But what I am objecting to is the fact that the resolution would bind the hands of Congress before the fact.

When, as, and if intervention to protect oil-company property in the Middle East becomes a tangible prospect, should the Congress of the United States be denied the right to consider whether the cost is worth the gain?

Should we approve in advance the landing of American troops in Middle East countries for the purpose of protecting private interests? Should we now sign a blank check which may prove to be our ruination?

According to the minutes of the meeting on August 13, Mr. Dulles was of the opinion that there should be international intervention. That might even have meant war. I do not know what

he meant. I do not know what kind of international intervention would be required to prevent the nationalization of the property of some of the oil companies.

I might be willing to go to war under some circumstances in connection with oil, but I am not going to sign a blank check when it is indicated that Mr. Dulles wants to bring about international intervention which might include going to war simply for the purpose of protecting the enormous profits and holdings of some of the international oil companies.

If, for whatever reason, any one of the oil-producing countries in the Middle East were to nationalize its oil industry, it would follow, as night follows day, that the oil company involved would immediately call upon our Government to protect its interests, by way of intervention. If we may reason from the past record of the administration—from its record on the synthetic plants, on the consortium, on the recent price increase, on tidelands, on the natural-gas bill—we can only conclude that such a demand for action would immediately be followed by actual intervention. As in the past, what the oil companies want, the oil companies would get. How will the Members of this body feel, if our troops land, when we realize that by having passed their resolution, we had in advance committed ourselves not to object or even to debate the issue?

I do not want to have any property nationalized; I hope there is no nationalization of the property of these large oil companies. But, Mr. President, I am unwilling to vote to send the United States into war just on the issue of nationalization, particularly when I do not know what may be the justification for nationalization.

In summary, Mr. President, I reluctantly oppose this resolution because:

First, I am unwilling to delegate my constitutional responsibility to determine whether the circumstances of any given situation are such that we, as a Nation, should go to war.

Second, I think that passage of this resolution will contribute to and will accelerate the arms race in the Middle East, which would increase, rather than diminish, the possibility of world war III.

Third, Economic assistance is subordinated to military assistance; and I was not able to learn, through the testimony of Secretary Dulles and other officials, of any well-thought-out economic program to attack the problems of this area.

Fourth, The purpose of the resolution, we were told, is primarily to assure an oil supply for western Europe. Yet we studiously avoided asking the assistance or advice of any other nation in undertaking this responsibility.

Fifth, The resolution does not attack the real problems of the Middle East—namely, the internationalization of the Suez, the rights of free passage in the Gulf of Aqaba, or the whole area of Arab-Israeli tension, which is not a Communist nor non-Communist problem at all.

Sixth, There is too much evidence that the cloth of this program is primarily

cut to fit the needs of the international oil companies; and that instead of oil being a factor in the formation of foreign policy, oil has, instead, become the dominating influence.

The Senate today is not called upon to propose an alternative program. We are called upon either to approve or to disapprove this one. But let me say in closing that there are alternatives, and they are useful alternatives.

We could explore with other nations, including—but not necessarily limited to—the Baghdad Pact nations, the possibilities of multilateral agreements within the framework of the United Nations. We could even attempt to revise the tripartite agreement of 1950. Admittedly the tripartite agreement between Great Britain, France, and the United States was for the purpose of preventing an arms race among the Middle Eastern countries and to stabilize the territorial limits or boundaries of those countries. But we had a community of action on those matters in the Middle East, and there might be a chance of changing its limits or application, so that Britain and France would also be included.

We could seek agreements covering the Suez, the gulf, and the Israeli-Arab peace. We could work out economic assistance programs, both on our own and through the United Nations, the purpose of which would be to improve the economic standards and the living conditions of the people of these countries, to the end that they would not be such fertile areas for Communist propaganda.

Mr. President, that is what the people of the Middle East really need—namely, to have economic aid and to have a type of point 4 program which would improve their agriculture and their living standards. But, Mr. President, that will not come about as a result of enactment of the pending joint resolution. I am afraid that the money provided under the joint resolution will be used largely to prop up rulers who give the big international oil companies favorable contracts, so as to keep them in power. We have seen and learned by experience that very little of the royalties which these potentates are getting really reaches the people. But the people are the ones who need relief.

Mr. President, I wish to read the concluding chapter of a book entitled "The Middle East Oil and the Great Powers," by Benjamin Shwadran. The book is a very recent one. The author talks about the amount of the money that will trickle down to the people, in the present situation, with the big, international oil companies doing business with the shahs and certain of the other rulers in that part of the world. I read now from page 440:

Great as are the amounts the rulers and governments received from the oil resources of their countries—and these have run in the last few years into hundreds of millions of dollars—the profits of the companies have been many times greater; in fact, they have been of such magnitude as to stagger the imagination. Exclusively motivated by profit considerations, all the companies' activities have been directed toward that ob-

not a single one.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KEFAUVER. I yield to my good and distinguished friend from Illinois.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Without necessarily agreeing with everything that my good friend from Tennessee has said, I think he has performed a public service in calling attention to the big revenues which the rulers of the Persian Gulf states obtain from oil, and the profits which American oil companies make from that region. I was very glad that he quoted from the book, "The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers," by Mr. Shwadran, because it so happens that I myself have been studying that book during recent days.

It is my understanding that American companies—and I should like to have the Senator from Tennessee correct me if I am wrong—have 100 percent of the oil concession in Saudi Arabia. This is the Aramco Co., and it is owned by Standard Oil of New Jersey, Standard Oil of California, and Standard Oil of

the Sheikdom of Kuwait, which is little known to the world. Mr. Shwadran says that the revenues paid to the Sheik of Kuwait amounted in 1954 to \$217 million.

Mr. KEFAUVER. Yes; that is what it says in the book, and I understand that in 1956 the amount went up to \$250 million.

Mr. DOUGLAS. And there are only 170,000 people in the sheikdom of Kuwait.

Mr. KEFAUVER. I understand there are 200,000.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Am I correct in understanding that the Gulf Oil Co. owns approximately half of the concession in Kuwait, and the British interests the other half?

Mr. KEFAUVER. Yes, it is owned 50-50 between American ownership and British ownership.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I think it is Gulf which is the American company.

Mr. KEFAUVER. It is Gulf, which in turn has subsidiaries here in the United States.

Mr. KEFAUVER. That is entirely true. Undoubtedly one reason why they are so strong for this policy and program, and have worked so hard for it, is that they know that Mr. Dulles thinks there should be international intervention in the event of nationalization of some property which is invested with any international public functions.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Is there not a further consequence? All the Arab States, and particularly Saudi Arabia, are very antagonistic to Israel.

Mr. KEFAUVER. The Senator is correct.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Does it not follow that the economic interest of these companies would be such that they would not want the American policy toward Israel to be one which would make the Arab States seriously angry at the United States, and hence increase the danger of nationalization?

Mr. KEFAUVER. That certainly would be the case; and I think it is only fair to say that there has been a shifting of the position of the United States

jective. Even their undertakings in the fields of education, health, and economic projects have been as much for their own advantages as for the improvement of the life of the natives, and the cost of these undertakings has been insignificant in comparison with the profits reaped.

So, Mr. President, that is where our aid would really do some good. To provide more and more arms for an arms race will not do very much good for the economy of the people of the Middle East, who in the long run must have their standard of living improved. Their living conditions and their agriculture and their health and their educational opportunities must be improved if we are to have real and lasting peace in the Middle East. I favor a program which will do something about that.

I find many good suggestions in the amendments the Senator from Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD) proposes, and I shall support them. Furthermore, I think a great deal of good would be done under the provisions of the substitute offered by the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT) in the committee, which I

currencies earned by the company and in the same proportion.

In some instances, by the terms of the concession, the concessionaire specifically agrees not to interfere in the political or religious life of the country.

Virtually the entire foreign investment in the Middle East area is in oil installations or facilities needed for the handling, processing, and shipping of petroleum. The total gross investments probably exceed \$2.5 billion, excluding the tank ships needed for transporting the oil to foreign markets.

INDIRECT REVENUE

In addition to direct revenues received from the oil companies, indirect benefits are received from oil operations. These include wages paid to native employees and expenditures made in the country by foreign employees and by the companies. Allied industries provide employment for many thousands more. It is estimated that these indirect benefits add an additional income equal to one-half of the direct payments.

Before the development of the oil resources, the countries in the Middle East had little trade and commerce, virtually no industry and low agricultural production. The population in some of the countries was mostly nomadic.

Now the populations are more stationary.

SAUDI ARABIA

The Saudi Arabian concession is held by a group of American companies. Operations are by the Arabian-American Oil Co. (Aramco), with 30-percent interests held by the Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey), the Texas Co., and the Standard Oil Company of California. The remaining 10 percent is held by the Socony Mobile Oil Co., Inc. The original concession, obtained in 1933, expires in 1999. Other concessions run to 2005.

Crude oil production in Saudi Arabia before Suez was around 1 billion barrels a day.

IRAQ

With one exception the concessions in Iraq are owned by an international group in which the British Petroleum Co. holds a 23% percent interest. Similar interests are held by the Royal Dutch-Shell group, a French group and an American group. The C. S. Guibenkian interests hold the remaining 5 percent. Standard of New Jersey and Socony Mobil jointly hold the American interest. The major concession was obtained in 1925 and runs to 2000.

Iraq's total production was about 750,000 barrels a day before the Suez crisis. However, production was cut hard because of the disruption of the flow through the Iraq pipeline to the Mediterranean.

QATAR

Government, from being fairly friendly with Israel before the present administration came in, to one of greater friendliness toward the Arab nations, and less toward Israel since the new administration has been in power. Undoubtedly that is following the line which international companies would want to see this Nation follow.

Mr. DOUGLAS. In justice we should also say that in the past few days, under pressure from the country and the Senate, there has been something of a shift in the policy of the United States Government. This afternoon the United States advocated, on the floor of the United Nations, a policy which some of us have been urging for more than a month, namely, that there should be United Nations occupation of the regions controlling the Gulf of Aqaba and the Gaza strip. I hope this is final and that there is no more backing and filling on our part.

Mr. KEFAUVER. Yes. Mr. DOUGLAS. Should not all this be added to indicate that public opinion still operates in a democracy, even though we may have a Department of State strongly prejudiced in a given direction?

Mr. KEFAUVER. Yes; I think in fairness that should be stated. I am glad the administration finally changed somewhat its position with respect to voting for sanctions against Israel; but undoubtedly a position of hostility was apparent some time ago. It was only because of great public pressure, and the position of many leading Members of the United States Senate, in my opinion, that a change of heart in the administration was brought about. The administration is to be complimented upon the change of position it has made. However, I think that does not change the basic point, namely, that this administration does largely what the big international oil companies want. That is reflected in the changed position in connection with Israel and the Arab States from what was a very friendly position toward Israel. This administration has reversed that position, and is more friendly toward the Arab nations. That fits exactly the attitude which the international oil companies follow.

Mr. DOUGLAS. While not agreeing with all the implications in the statement of the Senator from Tennessee, and disagreeing with respect to some of the conclusions which he draws, I think he has performed a very valuable service in making this speech this afternoon. I wish to congratulate him.

Mr. KEFAUVER. I appreciate the comments of my distinguished friend. He has been very kind to sit and listen all afternoon to this long discussion.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield in order that I may address a question to the Senator from Illinois?

Mr. KEFAUVER. I yield. Mr. MORSE. The Senator from Illinois has made a very great contribution to this debate by the colloquy he has just had with the Senator from Tennessee in connection with the penetrating questions he has asked.

The Senator from Illinois could make a further great contribution—because he is the best qualified Member of the Senate to discuss this point with the Senator from Tennessee—if he would discuss with the Senator from Tennessee, for a very brief time, the tax benefits which American oil companies get as a result of their Middle East operations. I wonder if the Senator from Illinois would direct the attention of the Senator from Tennessee to that subject.

Mr. KEFAUVER. It is a very interesting subject. As the Senator from Oregon has said, no one is better able to give a brief summary of it than the Senator from Illinois, if he has the time to do so this afternoon. Perhaps he may wish to defer discussion of the subject until some later time.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, I intend to discuss that subject later. I do not wish to make premature charges, and I should like to reserve the subject for a later time, when a definitive analysis can be made.

Mr. MORSE. That is entirely satisfactory. I wish the Senator from Illinois to know that I shall await the discussion with great interest, and I shall be the direct beneficiary of his discussion of that subject when he presents it in his speech.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I thank the Senator. Mr. KEFAUVER. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

TRANSPORTATION AND SLAUGHTERING OF LIVESTOCK AND POULTRY IN INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, I have prepared, for insertion in the Record, a statement dealing with S. 1213, to promote the development and use of improved methods for the humane handling, transportation, and slaughtering of livestock and poultry in interstate and foreign commerce. I ask unanimous consent that the statement may be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR WATKINS

On February 14, 1957, my colleague, Senator WALLACE F. BENNETT, introduced for me a bill now designated as S. 1213. This bill is designed to promote and encourage the development and use of improved methods of humane handling, transportation, and slaughtering of livestock and poultry in interstate and foreign commerce.

It is to be noted that S. 1213 does not use the expression "to require." This has been done advisedly, because at the present time we appear not to have sufficient facts to set up a specific bill of particulars, fair to all parties concerned, requiring that the handling, shipping, and especially slaughtering of livestock shall be done thus and so.

Basically, the problem involved is how to develop humane but economical methods of handling, shipping, and slaughtering. Other problems raised at the hearings held last May by the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry included these:

1. Although certain developed methods are humane, their mandatory use at present would appear to result in a loss of potential

food product and deterioration in the quality of the end food product.

2. Under present economic conditions, arbitrary imposition of several known methods of humane slaughter would appear to work an economic hardship upon some firms, especially the size of operation which does not permit ready introduction of new innovations.

3. Certain religious groups have followed rites for untold centuries that otherwise might be proscribed, were uniform methods to be required without further study and possible modification.

S. 1213 is a step in the direction of finding solutions to these economic and social problems. This is important, because in the interest of equity, they must be reconciled with the concern the general public has for the humane treatment of animals. Under these circumstances, S. 1213 should have the wholehearted support of all groups concerned, including interested social and religious groups and the meatpacking and processing industry.

To this end, the bill directs the Secretary of Agriculture to conduct, assist, and foster research, investigation, and experimentation which will lead to and encourage the adoption of improved methods of handling, transporting, and slaughtering livestock and poultry. He is authorized to establish an advisory committee, composed of not more than eight members, exclusive of the chairman who is to be an official of the United States Department of Agriculture designated by the Secretary.

Membership on the committee would include (1) representatives of the public, including groups concerned with the humane treatment of animals; (2) producer and industry groups; and (3) scientific and professional groups. The committee will meet upon call of the Secretary of Agriculture or the chairman. It will be required to make its first report to the Congress by January 1, 1959, and thereafter, the Secretary would be required to report annually concerning the progress being made.

DIFFICULTIES OF UNITED STATES PROTESTANT MISSIONARIES IN COLOMBIA

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I invite the attention of Senators to a situation which has disturbed me for some time. I refer to the difficulties which many United States Protestant missionaries have experienced, and regrettably are still experiencing, in Colombia.

This has been the subject of almost constant negotiation between the United States Government and the Colombian Government over a period extending back several years. At times the situation has appeared to be improving, and at times it has seemed to be worsening. During 1956, it seemed definitely to be getting better, and I address myself to the subject at this time primarily because I fear that the hopes and promises of 1956 may not be fully realized.

The basic difficulty stems from the Colombian Government's interpretation of an agreement which it made with the Vatican in 1953, and which gives the Roman Catholic Church special privileges and support in areas designated as "mission territories." These territories now cover between two-thirds and three-fourths of the entire country. In 1955, the Colombian Government issued regulations interpreting this agreement as prohibiting Protestant missions from

001017850

0002433

1957

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

2563

acting on behalf of Colombians in the mission territories and as limiting Protestant pastors to services for Protestant foreigners. Protestant schools in mission territories had been closed earlier, and now Protestant churches were either closed or prohibited from receiving Colombian congregations.

Among the Protestant pastors and Protestant establishments affected by this order were American missionaries and American property. Some of these missionaries and pastors are from my own State, and they have brought this matter to my attention.

In April 1956 the Foreign Minister of Colombia sent a note to Secretary Dulles setting forth the rights of Protestants in Colombia. This note offered a very hopeful basis for a solution to the difficulties of American Protestant missionaries in Colombia. Unfortunately, this solution has not been achieved. On the contrary, isolated further acts of violence against American lives and property have occurred.

In December 1956 the Colombian Foreign Minister again stated to the American Ambassador that he hoped a method could shortly be found to permit the closed churches to reopen.

As the chairman of the Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs of the Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. President, I rise today to underline that hope. There is much that is close and harmonious and understanding in American-Colombian relations. Colombia is always at the forefront of the United Nations seeking just and peaceful solutions to world problems and supporting the actions which the U. N. takes in regard to those problems. Colombian troops fought with distinction in Korea. Colombian troops were among the first components of the U. N. emergency force in the Middle East. Colombia is becoming increasingly attractive as a field of American private investment, to the benefit of both Colombia and the United States.

In a word, Mr. President, our political, economic, and cultural relations with Colombia are so warm and friendly in so many ways that it is a great pity for the diplomats of our two countries to be so constantly preoccupied with the irritating question of the rights of American missionaries in Colombia. It is for this reason that I very much hope a solution to this question can be promptly found and the irritant removed.

I ask unanimous consent that there may be printed at this point in the Record the note of April 13, 1956, from the Colombian Foreign Minister to the Secretary of State and the Secretary's replies of April 27 and September 12, 1956.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. NEUBERGER in the chair). Is there objection? There being no objection, the documents were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Bogotá, April 13, 1956.

His Excellency JOHN FOSTER DULLES,
Secretary of State of the United States
of America, Washington, D. C.

EXCELLENCY: For the safekeeping of the excellent relations between our two Governments and with a view to dispelling the doubts that may prevail in the United States

of America about the situation of Protestants in Colombia, I am addressing this note to Your Excellency.

In order to prevent erroneous interpretations, incidents, and conflicts, and to contribute toward preservation of the cordial friendship between the peoples of Colombia and the United States of America, in which an understanding of and respect for each other's civilization, culture, and traditions have been leading factors, it is appropriate to state clearly the rights which Protestants have under the Constitution and laws of the Republic and under treaties now in force, these being rights that will continue to be fully guaranteed and protected by the authorities and rigorously respected by private individuals.

(A) In accordance with paragraph 2, article XIV, of the Treaty of Peace, Amity, Navigation, and Commerce concluded between Colombia and the United States and signed on December 12, 1846, "the citizens of the United States in Colombia may exercise their religion, publicly or privately, within their own dwelling houses, or in the chapels and places of worship appointed for that purpose, agreeably to the laws, usages, and customs of New Granada," which includes the right to construct such chapels or places of worship. [Translator's note: According to the English version of this treaty, as given in Malloy's Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols, and Agreements, vol. I, page 306, the above quotations occur, in slightly different wording, in paragraph 1 of article XIV, while paragraph 2 refers to similar privileges for citizens of New Granada in the United States.]

(B) Protestants continue in full enjoyment of the right of the process, according to law, with respect to any complaints and accusations which they may lodge before the authorities by reason of acts contrary to the provisions of the said Treaty, or of any crime, abuse, or attack of which they might be the victims.

(C) In order that accusations or complaints may be handled without difficulty, the Ministry of Justice will continue to study with all due care any reports on this subject that come to its knowledge, as well as any special reports submitted to it by representatives officially appointed by the Protestants, so that all suitable measures may be taken, under Colombian legislation, to have investigation conducted properly and appropriate penalties imposed by competent judges.

(D) In schools directed by Protestants, the latter have had and do have the right to give Protestant religious instruction to Protestant students or to children of Protestant families. To Catholic students being educated in such schools, religious instruction will be given by Catholic teachers, who are not appointed by but appointed after consultation with the bishop of the diocese; obviously, the reason for this is that the church could not entrust instruction in the doctrine to teachers who belong to another religion or who might not be qualified to perform their duties.

(E) Protestants continue to enjoy the right of being admitted to official schools and colleges in accordance with the respective regulations, without discrimination against them and without their being compelled to engage in acts contrary to their religious beliefs.

(F) Protestants have always had and will continue to have the right to present and explain their doctrine, under the constitution and pursuant to treaties and legislation now in force.

(G) With a view to preventing acts of violence and to proceeding in accordance with the determination of the Government of Colombia to maintain peace and harmony in the territory of the Republic, the appropriate authorities will accept the cooperation

of representatives duly accredited by the Protestants themselves, to furnish factors of judgment that will permit the said authorities to study adequate and effective measures leading to a solution, within the law, of deplorable conflicts or acts, as well as all other matters relating to the operation and faithful observance of the points in reference.

(H) Colombian Protestants have the same rights as foreign Protestants insofar as the practice of their religion and all related activities are concerned.

I feel sure that this note fully accomplishes the purpose that prompted it.

I avail myself of this opportunity to convey to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest and most distinguished consideration.

EVARISTO SOUNDIS.

APRIL 27, 1956.

His Excellency Dr. EVARISTO SOUNDIS,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Colombia.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note of April 13, 1956, informing me that the Government of Colombia, with a view to maintaining the cordial relations existing between our two Governments and to dissipating certain doubts that may be held in the United States regarding the situation of United States Protestants in Colombia, desires further to define the rights enjoyed by the latter in Colombia.

Your Excellency's note is receiving very careful consideration and you will receive a reply thereto in the early future.

Meanwhile, in sending Your Excellency this interim reply, I take the opportunity of expressing not only my personal satisfaction at this welcome evidence of a new approach to an old problem but also the sincere gratification of the Government of the United States for the effort which the Government of Colombia is making to find a permanent amelioration of an unhappy situation.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES,
Secretary of State of the
United States of America.

SEPTEMBER 12, 1956.

His Excellency SENOR Dr. EVARISTO SOUNDIS,
Minister of Foreign Relations
of Colombia, Bogotá.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer again to Your Excellency's communication of April 13, 1956, stating that the Government of Colombia, in keeping with the excellent relations existing between our two Governments and with a view to dispelling doubts that may prevail in the United States concerning the status of United States Protestants in Colombia, deems it advisable to set forth rights enjoyed by the latter within the territory of Colombia. I also refer in this connection to my interim response of April 27, 1956.

I am particularly gratified at the attempt toward a restatement of rights enjoyed by Protestants in Colombia since, as Your Excellency is aware, the difficulties experienced by American nationals of the Protestant faith have been owing in considerable measure to a lack of clarity regarding the extent of such rights and the corresponding obligations on the part of Colombia. To the extent, therefore, that Your Excellency's restatement of the problem tends to clarify the situation, it may be considered that marked progress is made by the contemplated statement, it being understood, of course, that United States nationals will in the future enjoy no less rights with respect to religious freedom, and with respect to resort to the courts, than those which they are now entitled to enjoy by virtue of the Treaty of Peace, Amity, Navigation and Commerce of 1846, the Constitution of Colombia, international law, or otherwise.

I am disturbed to learn that unprovoked attacks on United States Protestants

and Protestant missions have been continuing. I refer particularly to the attacks on the establishments of the Mennonite Brethren in Christ at La Cumbre, Valle, on the night of July 5 and July 8, in which American property and American lives were threatened and endangered.

I am also particularly disturbed over the situation prevailing in regions of Colombia designated as Mission Territory. The closing of Protestant churches in that area and in other parts of Colombia, including many of United States ownership or affiliations, has been the subject of numerous communications to me from many conscientious and high-minded people of Protestant faith, complaining of the uprooting of establishments that have existed unquestioned and unmolested in Colombia for many years and represent a considerable investment in property and personnel. It is difficult to reconcile these unfortunate developments with the provisions of articles XIII and XIV of the Treaty of 1846 between the United States and Colombia, guaranteeing special protection to American persons and property and security of conscience and freedom of worship throughout Colombian territory.

I refer in this connection to the frank and cordial conversation I was privileged to have recently with His Excellency, Presiden Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, concerning the Protestant situation in general and the closing of Protestant churches and schools in particular, and to the President's assurance that he was working to try to diminish the problem. I sincerely hope that one result of these efforts will be the reopening of Protestant churches in the near future as well as permission for such churches again to function normally.

It is my devout hope that the steps contemplated by Your Excellency's Government will contribute materially to the preservation of the amity so long prevailing between our two peoples by so resolving the problem that the rights of United States nationals of Protestant faith, under the principles set forth in the proposed declaration, and in conformity with the Treaty of 1846 between our two countries, the Constitution of Colombia, and international law, will be fully assured.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES,
Secretary of the State of the
United States of America.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, in closing, I wish to say, as chairman of the Subcommittee on South American Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I intend to maintain a very close and constant interest in this matter. I shall later in the year, if necessary, present to the members of my subcommittee the suggestion that we have an executive session, at least—not a public session—with the appropriate officials from the State Department in attendance, so that we may discuss the question of our relationship with Columbia, if the situation continues to worsen as I feel it has in recent months.

PROMOTION OF PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Senate resumed the consideration of the joint resolution (S. J. Res. 19) to authorize the President to undertake economic and military cooperation with nations in the general area of the Middle East in order to assist in the strengthening and defense of their independence.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I believe we had an exceedingly interesting debate

in the Senate this afternoon on the pending joint resolution. However, I fear that the arguments of some of my colleagues have left two very serious false impressions, which I believe should be corrected before we close the debate this evening.

One is that some of the speakers seem to have left the impression, so far as the press is concerned, as shown by the news ticker, that one of the results of the adoption of the Russell amendment would be to bring an end to foreign aid in the Middle East. There is not one word in the Russell amendment which would accomplish that result. The foreign-aid program of the United States, so far as our general program is concerned, is not affected by the Russell program. We would continue to decide the question of what foreign aid should be granted to the Middle East at the appropriate time in connection with the consideration of this year's foreign-aid bill.

The Russell amendment does not in any way take away from the administration the Middle East foreign-aid funds that have already been authorized and appropriated. What the Russell amendment does is to say that we believe the time has come to call a halt to giving the President blanket authority to spend the money he is requesting as he sees fit on projects that we do not have a chance to approve. It is just that simple.

As I said on last Wednesday, I am a true friend of a sound point 4 program which will benefit the very countries the Senator from Utah [Mr. WATKINS]—whom I see now walking toward me—talked about in his speech on Wednesday afternoon: Jordan, Israel, and Egypt. Those of us who have been in favor of foreign aid to help the people of those countries believe we are the real friends of foreign aid in the Senate in the sense that we are insisting that the foreign aid be granted for specific projects and purposes and that the President be required to obtain the approval of the Congress for the specific expenditures to be covered by any foreign-aid program. That point is just as simple as that, too.

It was said in debate this afternoon—and I judge from the ticker that such is the impression that has been received by the press—that the Russell amendment means that only the military program will go ahead in the Middle East and that no foreign economic-aid program will be permitted. The Senator from Alabama [Mr. SPARKMAN] seemed to be laboring under that misapprehension only a few moments ago when I replied to him. The Russell amendment does not bring to an end foreign economic aid in the Middle East. The Russell amendment does not leave us in the situation where only military aid will be available to the Middle East. What the Russell amendment does, in effect, is to carry out what the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] said earlier in the debate. It, in effect, serves notice, by way of an advisory resolution, on Russia that the United States is going to use armed force, if necessary, to meet any Russian military aggression in the Middle East.

Mr. President, it is important to make that point clear, as we close the debate this afternoon.

I should like to make one more point before I close. Earlier this afternoon in the debate, the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY] wanted me to present substantiation of my point that the so-called modified committee amendment does not clear up the constitutional objections to the original resolution.

I shall speak at some length on the subject tomorrow. However, I believe I have already covered the point in my speech on Wednesday afternoon, as I told the Senator from Massachusetts in colloquy this afternoon. Therefore, for the benefit of the Senator from Massachusetts, and so that it may appear in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD on the same day that the Senator from Massachusetts made his speech, I ask unanimous consent to insert at this point in my remarks certain key paragraphs out of my speech of Wednesday which sustain my thesis that the resolution which was reported by the committee does not change in any way the unconstitutional features of the original resolution. It still leaves the President without an adequate check, and free to commit an act of war without first getting the approval of Congress, or without being required forthwith, after ordering American troops into action in case of an emergency, to come before Congress and get the approval of Congress.

There being no objection, the excerpts were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

There is little doubt that the resolution as presented to the Congress by the President proposed an unconstitutional delegation of the power to declare war.

Article I, section 8 of the Constitution expressly empowers the Congress to declare war and there is no question that this power is exclusive with the Congress. Many Members of the Senate and House challenged the constitutionality of that provision of the original resolution which purported to authorize the President to employ the Armed Forces of the United States. During the debate on the resolution in the House several Members expressed their strong opposition to the resolution on this ground, among others.

Such distinguished constitutional authorities as the junior Senator from Wyoming [Mr. O'MAHONEY] and the senior Senator from North Carolina [Mr. ERVIN] presented challenging and conclusive arguments to this attempted usurpation of the exclusive power of the Congress, in speeches already delivered in the Senate.

I was among the first to discuss the constitutional objection to the resolution. So, on January 25, more than a month ago, I said on the Senate floor:

"I turn to my fifth and last point. It is a constitutional question. The Secretary of State, under examination, admitted that the Congress cannot delegate the power to declare war. But he is a very interesting witness. After making that admission, then, typical of his testimony, he seeks to divert attention away from that admission by saying, 'Wars are not declared any more, after all. A state of war is upon us, and what we do is recognize that a state of war exists.'

"How important that is in our constitutional system, because it is at that point, Mr. President, that the Constitutional Fathers guaranteed to the American people a check

001017850

0002434

1957

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

2565

upon the President of the United States. The remark might be made, 'Oh, Mr. Senator, you speak hypothetically, speculatively. It must be assumed that when the situation of an attack exists, a declaration of war is going to follow.' I think so, too, Mr. President. Yet it is of vital importance that the Congress exercise that check, because it is conceivable that something might happen to these democratic processes of ours in the decades ahead whereby, some time in the future, we might have a President against whom that check should be exercised. But here, Mr. President, as I said in the hearings and as I said at the time of the discussion of the Formosa resolution—the President is asking for predated action by the Congress of the United States. He is asking for approval in advance. He is asking for a blank check, knowing that if he gets it, whatever decision he renders, Congress will consider itself estopped from imposing a check. I think that is constitutionally dangerous.

"I am talking here about a constitutional abstraction of vital importance to the welfare of the American people in terms of constitutional history. I am raising my voice today, as I will in the weeks ahead, forewarning the American people that these precious checks of the Constitution should not be given up for a Dwight Eisenhower or any other President of the United States at any time."

The strict limitation of the Executive in relation to the war power was very much in the minds of the drafters of the Constitution. So, for example, in No. 69 of the Federalist papers Hamilton wrote:

"Secondly, the President, is to be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the same with that of the King of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first general and admiral of the Confederacy; while that of the British King extends to the declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies, all of which, by the Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the legislature."

We ought to learn from history, Mr. President. What I have just read into the Record makes perfectly clear Hamilton's view, which was typical of the views held by the other constitutional fathers, who were very careful to place a check on any war-making power of any President of the United States. Yet, in 1957, the President of the United States is willing to send to the Congress of the United States a resolution which beclouds, to say the least, this great constitutional check. It is an exceptionally dangerous precedent he is asking for. I shall never vote to give it to him, because I believe it violates the spirit and the intent of the Constitution itself. I think all one needs to do is to cite the Hamilton quotation in support of the thesis for which I am contending.

Mr. President, applying the Hamilton force and logic against the original language of the resolution in regard to the use of the Armed Forces had its effect, and the Senate committees attempted—I submit, unsuccessfully—to remove the objection that some of us raised.

So, for example, the committee report states:

"The joint committee gave extensive and serious consideration to the question of the use of American Armed Forces to repel Communist aggression in the Middle East. Various views were strongly held and vigorously expressed as to the constitutional powers of the President and of Congress in this respect and as to the proper constitutional procedure to be followed.

"After exhaustive consideration of the principles and concepts involved by a vote of 15-13, the joint committee agreed to the following language:

"Furthermore, the United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East. To this end, if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use Armed Forces to assist any nation or group of nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism: *Provided*, That such employment shall be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the Charter of the United Nations."

"This language has the virtue of remaining silent on the question of the relationship between the Congress and the President with respect to the use of the Armed Forces for the objective stated in the resolution."

COMMITTEE AMENDMENT DOES NOT CURE CONSTITUTIONAL DEFECT

But, Mr. President, this is a dubious virtue indeed. Congress is considering a precedent-shattering resolution which is out of all proportion to the actual gravity of the situation. It may well be that the precedent will be of greater importance than any action which may be taken under the resolution. Is it then a virtue that the resolution, as amended, is supposedly "silent on the question of the relationship between the Congress and the President with respect to the use of the Armed Forces"? To the contrary, where the basic fabric of the Government and the integrity of the checks and balance system are at issue, nothing less than gemlike clarity will suffice.

But let us see whether the resolution as amended is actually as silent as is claimed by the majority of the committees in the report. I submit to the Senate that the new language is far from silent, although the words muffle and obscure what is to be done.

In the language I have just quoted for which a majority of the committee claims magical silence, it is expressly provided that under certain circumstances the United States is prepared to use Armed Forces. Does any proponent of the amended resolution have the temerity to claim that such use of the Armed Forces would be less than an act of war? That question will echo through this Chamber and across the country until it receives a forthright answer from the proponents of the resolution, an answer the people are entitled to have. I solemnly warn the Senate tonight that such use of the Armed Forces, absent an overt attack upon the territory, property, or citizens of the United States would be an act of war committed by the United States.

How then would this act of war come about? On this point the amended resolution is unfortunately clear. It expressly provides that the act of war would be undertaken "if the President determines the necessity thereof." Under this language Congress would yield all of its power to the President to determine the use of our Armed Forces.

The original constitutional objection to the delegation of Congress' power to declare war has not been removed one whit from the resolution. It is there and is not obscured by any magical silence on the part of the majority of the committees. It cannot be made to disappear because the majority of the joint committee claims it is no longer there. Their saying it is no longer there does not make it so. If this resolution is given the force of law by the approval of the Congress, the delegation of the war power will remain as a precedent to haunt future generations of Americans.

To those who would dispute this analysis of the language I submit that the only

alternative is that the language of the resolution on the United States Armed Forces is meaningless insofar as any mention of the President is concerned. If the language relating to the President were stricken, the resolution would read:

"The United States is prepared to use Armed Forces to assist any nation or group of nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism."

Obviously this would leave the decision on the use of United States Armed Forces entirely within the power of any nation that requested armed aid against an aggressor controlled by communism.

This reductio ad absurdum demonstrates that the sole power to decide upon the use of Armed Forces of the United States—that is, to decide upon an act of war—is granted by the resolution to the President of the United States.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I shall offer a series of amendments in due course that seek to protect the constitutional powers of the Congress. The administration has opposed those amendments in committee. For example, I asked the Secretary of State if he would accept an amendment requiring the President to ask for specific approval to send our troops into action in the Middle East based upon the facts existing at the time of his request. The Secretary of State rejected my amendment. He replied in effect that the President in his speech had assured us that the President in such a crisis would be in hourly contact with Congress.

As I said then, the President's speech is not a part of the resolution. If we were to suggest to the Secretary of State that he make the President's speech an amendment to the resolution, binding the President to the statements he made in his speech, I am sure the Secretary of State would not accept that either.

The real test of this matter is not the collateral statements on the part of the Secretary of State, in which he said that the President would not do this or the President would not do that. The real test is will this administration agree to the writing of a congressional check on the use of troops into the resolution itself. We know that Dulles, speaking for the President, has rejected flatly such a congressional check.

So my reply to the Senator from Massachusetts, as I said earlier this afternoon, is that the resolution he is supporting has not changed one whit the unconstitutionality of the original resolution.

I say, good naturedly, that I was very much interested in the speech of the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY), which was exactly the type of speech to which I referred earlier in the afternoon before he took the floor. At that time, I referred to the type of speech made by many of my colleagues on this side of the aisle, not only in this debate but from platforms off the the Senate floor, which would give the American people every reason for their voting against the resolution, until they get to the "but" clause of their speech. When they reach their rationalizing "but" clause they announce that they are going to vote for the resolution. When we analyze their "but" clause it seems to add up to the

conclusion of the "butters" that if we do not vote for the resolution the President will be placed in an embarrassing position standing "naked" before the eyes of the world. Therefore they say that we simply must back up and cover up for our President.

I again say good nauredly, Mr. President—and I think it summarizes the whole thing—that I think it is about time for the Democrats to stop worrying about the President standing naked before the world. At least, Democrats should stop supplying the President with coverup foreign policy clothing in order to get him out of this embarrassing situation. He got into this difficulty without prior consultation with the Congress. He sent the resolution up to us, and we have a clear duty not to delegate to the President a power which, in my judgment, under the Constitution, cannot be delegated.

That is the constitutional issue; and I want to say to my friend from Massachusetts and to other Senators who take the same position, that if the resolution is as bad as he points out in the first part of his speech, then, so far as I am concerned, he has cast my vote for me against the resolution for those reasons. I am not interested in the "but" rationalization that follows thereafter in his speech.

Mr. President, it has been suggested by the acting minority leader [Mr. ALLOTT] that, pending securing some information for the Senate, I withhold a motion that the Senate, in accordance with the previous order, take a recess until tomorrow at 11 o'clock a. m.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I wonder if the Senator from Oregon will yield to me in order that I may suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. MORSE. I shall be happy to yield to the Senator for that purpose.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Alken	Curtis	Morse
Allott	Dworshak	Morton
Anderson	Ervin	Neuberger
Barrett	Flanders	Pastore
Bennett	Green	Payne
Blakley	Hayden	Potter
Brieker	Hickenlooper	Revercomb
Bush	Hill	Robertson
Butler	Jackson	Smith, Maine
Carlson	Javits	Thurmond
Carroll	Jenner	Watkins
Case, N. J.	Knowland	Wiley
Church	Lausche	Williams
Clark	Mansfield	Young
Coooper	Martin, Iowa	
Cotton	Martin, Pa.	

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CLARK in the chair). Forty-six Senators having answered to their names, a quorum is not present. The clerk will call the names of the absent Senators.

The legislative clerk called the names of the absent Senators; and Mr. BIBLE, Mr. CASE of South Dakota, Mr. CHAVEZ, Mr. GOLDWATER, Mr. GORE, Mr. HRUSKA, Mr. JOHNSON of Texas, Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina, Mr. KEFAUVER, Mr. LONG, Mr. MONROEY, Mr. MUNDT, Mr. RUSSELL, Mr. SCHOEPEL, Mr. SMATHERS, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, Mr. STENNIS, Mr. SYMING-

TON, and Mr. THYE answered to their names, when called.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Sixty-five Senators having answered to their names, a quorum is present.

Mr. JENNER. Mr. President, I presume that all Senators have read today the following item from the news ticker:

CAIRO.—The semiofficial Middle East news agency said today the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria had reached a unified position on the Eisenhower doctrine and cabled their stand to Washington.

The agency quoted Jordan's Premier Suleiman Nabulsi as saying Jordan would accept any foreign economic aid which was offered without any strings attached and that Jordan won't be hostile either to the East or the West except inasmuch as neither bloc is hostile to the Arabs.

Nabulsi's statement was interpreted as an indication the four Arab governments would tell the American Ambassador here they were ready to accept United States economic aid without committing themselves in favor of the West-against the East.

Of course, that is exceedingly decent of those governments, and I believe all Senators will wish to know of their attitude.

Mr. President, today I learned from the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee some information which I believe the Members of this body will find most pertinent to our discussion of the Middle East resolution.

We know the story of the American State Department officers in China who spread false information and propaganda helpful to the Communists during the critical years when the Communists were working busily to capture China and make it a satellite of the Soviet Union.

We brought out the story in the hearings on the Institute of Pacific Relations, on interlocking subversion in government, and in other reports of the subcommittee.

Let me refer to the record of one of these men, John K. Emmerson. General Wedemeyer told us he had four State Department advisers: John Service, John K. Davis, Raymond Ludden, and John K. Emmerson. General Wedemeyer said if he had followed their advice, China would have fallen to the Communists long before it did.

Their reports, said General Wedemeyer, were strongly slanted in favor of Communist aims, contrary to fundamental American policy, and harmful to our fighting ally, the Nationalist Government.

I learned today that, among other recommendations, John K. Emmerson sometime before December 8, 1944, prepared a memorandum outlining a plan to have the American Government work with Susumu Okano and the Japanese People's Emancipation League, as it operated in Communist China, in making wartime and postwar American policy for Japan.

The league, said Mr. Emmerson in his official report, "has an estimated membership of 450 Japanese prisoners in north and central China. Its declared principles are democratic. It is not identified with the Communist Party."

Mr. President, any qualified observer would have deduced that this organiza-

tion, working in Communist China according to an all-too-familiar pattern, was Communist. But we have the official word of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, in its report on The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism, that the Japanese People's Emancipation League was, as the committee says, "a Communist organization, at Yanan, China."

This House report gives the entire record of Mr. Emmerson's friend, Okano Susumu, also known as Nozaka Sanzo. They listed him as being, after the war, a member of the political bureau, the secretariat, and central committee, chief of propaganda and investigation section, and director of the party school of the Japan Communist Party. He was no ordinary Communist.

I call to your attention, Mr. President, the fact that Mr. Emmerson did not say Mr. Okano's organization was not Communist. He said it was not "identified with the Communist Party." We must always read between the lines.

Mr. Emmerson recommended that Mr. Okano and his league should be used by the United States Government to organize chapters among Japanese prisoners of war and internees in the United States, India, Australia, and elsewhere for "a wide dissemination of democratic ideas, the creation of a powerful Japanese propaganda organization, and the stimulation of a force useful at the time of invasion and in postwar Japan."

He also proposed that Mr. Okano and his organization be employed to train units of Japanese "for activity with the American pacification operations and with Military Government officials during the occupation."

This memorandum was distributed by John Davies, of our Embassy in Chungking, to Irving Friedman, of the Treasury Department, who sent it to Harry White and Harry Hopkins; and members of the State Department also had copies.

Now hear this, Mr. President: John K. Emmerson is today counselor of Embassy at Beirut, Lebanon.

Another member of this State Department group was Robert C. Strong. He was consul general in Taiwan in the critical year 1949, and was responsible for a mess of erroneous intelligence reports out of Formosa, unfriendly to Nationalist China and helpful to the Communists.

He insisted on keeping all other members of American intelligence agencies off the island of Formosa, including General Fortier, the representative of General MacArthur, who was in charge of our forces in the Far East.

Admiral Cooke, formerly chief of staff to Admiral King in the Pacific, knew some of the intelligence reports were wrong. He checked the information, and found it was incorrect; but the erroneous reports continued to be sent out. This story is told in detail in testimony given under oath by Admiral Cooke, and reported by our subcommittee.

Now hear this: Mr. Strong is now counselor of Embassy for the United States at Damascus, Syria.

I do not know how many of this group of State Department officials in China

0002435

001017850

1957

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

2567

FEBRUARY 28, 1957.

may be in the outlying parts of the area vaguely called the Middle East, that is, in Iran or Afghanistan or India or Indonesia or Uganda or Tanganyika. But I can tell the Senate that Raymond Luden, whom General Wedemeyer included in the list of State Department officials who fought to help Red China, is today in the office of Personnel of the State Department.

We can be sure, Mr. President, that the termites are hard at work today, as they were in the 1940's.

Now we know they are hard at work right in the center of things, in the Middle East.

Is the President of the United States relying on the reports of such officials in making plans for the defense of the vast Middle East area with the lives of our sons?

I think the Senate is entitled to know where these men are.

ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT TO 10 O'CLOCK A. M. TOMORROW

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate concludes its business today it stand in adjournment until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

VOTING PROSPECTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST RESOLUTION

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I should like to give my colleagues as much information as I have been able to obtain about the likelihood of a vote on the Russell amendment tomorrow. I do not expect any vote today. I have asked the 49 Senators on my side of the aisle to give me their best estimate as to the time they will require to discuss, first, the Russell amendment, and, second, any other amendments, including the resolution itself. As best we can estimate, Senators on the respective sides of the aisle will require in the neighborhood of 4 or 5 hours each, or a total of from 8 to 10 hours. Of course, Senators may change their minds and may change their plans, but we do not expect any lengthy discussion on the Russell amendment. We do expect to vote on the Russell amendment tomorrow. There is every indication that we can vote on it. We are asking Senators to return to town in order to be prepared for a vote. We do not think we can hold in 1 day the 10 hours of discussion that may be required by Senators on both sides of the aisle before a final vote. We think that will require all of Monday, and perhaps we can start voting early Tuesday. That is the hope of the majority leader. I believe that optimism is shared by the minority leader.

With the cooperation of the Senate, it will be possible to vote on the Russell amendment tomorrow. We hope to have a final vote on the other amendments, including the resolution itself, on Tuesday.

I may say to the Senators, so far as I know, there will be no yea-and-nay votes

and no quorum calls tonight. We shall do our best to protect them so far as tonight is concerned.

DISASTER AREA IN OREGON

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the body of the Record a telegram which we have received today from the Governor of Oregon with respect to an exceedingly serious flood disaster situation now prevailing in my State. In the telegram the Governor asks us to seek to have that section of the State of Oregon declared a disaster area.

I also ask unanimous consent to have inserted in the Record, following the telegram from the Governor, the joint telegram from the junior Senator from Oregon [Mr. NEUBERGER], Representative ULLMAN, from the district in Oregon particularly affected, and I sent to the Governor.

The joint telegram was sent to the Secretaries of Agriculture, Interior, Army, Federal Civil Defense Administration, Small Business Administration, Bureau of Public Roads, Housing and Home Finance Agency, and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. It calls attention to the very serious situation in Oregon, and asks that the Government agencies render every possible service, within their jurisdiction, which they are capable of rendering. We have been advised that in the last few hours the White House has declared the affected section of the State a disaster area.

I am pleased to say on the floor of the Senate that the quick action of the new Governor of my State is further indication of his great leadership, and his action reporting on the situation to members of the Oregon delegation is a further demonstration of the fine cooperation that exists between the Governor and the congressional delegation.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the unanimous-consent request of the Senator from Oregon?

There being no objection, the telegrams were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

SALEM, OREG., February 28, 1957.

Senator WAYNE L. MORSE,
United States Senate,

Washington, D. C.:

The following wire sent to the President today: As suggested in my telegram of February 26, I am now respectfully requesting you declare Malheur County and possibly sections of Baker, Union, and Wallowa Counties in Oregon as a disaster area as a result of the continuing flooding of rivers there. Existing conditions have resulted in hardship and suffering, so severe to the people of that portion of Oregon that Federal assistance is required. Careful appraisal of our State agencies of civil defense soil conservation and irrigation districts indicate 60,000 acres of land are extensively damaged that roads and bridges are seriously damaged and hundreds of people affected. These agencies are producing the maximum effort toward relief from the disaster. This is to assure you that all available State, county, and local funds are or will be committed for the purpose. Suggest that \$500,000 initially be allocated to the State of Oregon from funds available under authority of Public Law 875 of the 81st Congress to assist the State and local effort.

ROBERT D. HOLMES,
Governor of Oregon.

Hon. ROBERT HOLMES,
Governor of Oregon,
State Capitol, Salem, Oreg.

Following is copy of wire transmitted to Secretaries of Agriculture, Interior, Army, and Federal Civil Defense Administration, Small Business Administration, Bureau of Public Roads, Housing and Home Finance Agency, and Department of Health, Education, and Welfare:

"Governor Holmes of Oregon has today requested President to declare Malheur County, Oreg., a disaster area due to extensive flood damage to homes and farm lands, highways and bridges in that county. Appreciate all possible assistance that can be rendered by your department to relieve distress caused by this disaster. WAYNE MORSE, United States Senate; RICHARD L. NEUBERGER, United States Senate; AL ULLMAN, Member of Congress."

Regards,

WAYNE MORSE.

AMERICA'S MENTALLY ILL

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, once again I rise to speak in behalf of a very large group of our citizens whose plight demands the attention and consideration of every adult American. Specifically, I refer to the tragic plight of America's 10 million mentally ill.

It is my very great pleasure to come before the Senate this year with some very heartening news—news of the progress which is being made to combat this disease.

I have been informed by the National Association for Mental Health that the steep, 25-year climb of our mental hospital rolls is showing evidence of slowing down. This climb may, as a matter of fact, have actually been broken. In 1955, the association points out, the number of resident patients in the Nation's mental hospitals rose by only 6,000, compared with an average annual rise of 12,000 in the previous 10 years, and an average rise of 10,000 for the entire period of 1930 to 1955.

There is further evidence that when the figures for 1956 are complete, they will actually show a decrease in total hospital rolls. If this happens, it will be the first time in the entire history of recorded mental hospital statistics that this has happened.

Until about 1954 and 1955, a State-by-State review of hospital figures produced the same monotonous evidence year after year—evidence that hospital rolls continued to increase without any sign of letup. Then, in 1954 and 1955, the picture began to change. First one State and then another, and then another, began to report that the rise was slackening off, that discharges were beginning to exceed admissions, that end-of-the-year figures were lower than for the previous year. At first, this evidence came from only a few States. Now we find, for 1956, that this is not simply an accidental occurrence, that it is happening in many States, and that actually a national trend may be developing. This is heartening news, and I know we all hope the trend will continue.

What conclusions can we draw from these data? According to the National Association for Mental Health, the trend is attributable to two main factors:

First, the effectiveness of modern treatment methods such as the tranquilizing drugs, psychotherapy, and electroshock; and, secondly, the fact that many more patients are now getting treatment instead of mere custodial care.

With regard to the tranquilizing drugs, this may be said on the basis of existing evidence: They are effecting improvement and recovery in thousands of cases. They are being hailed by mental hospital directors as the most important development in years in the treatment of mental patients. The use of these drugs has completely changed treatment for the mentally ill, and has altered the atmosphere in mental hospitals. Wards formerly disorderly are now tidy and clean. Once indifferent patients are showing an interest in hospital life and recreation. Patients who could not have been trusted a year ago with a knife or fork are now using saws and hammers, files and chisels in occupational therapy.

There is no question about the fact that the use of tranquilizing drugs has in part been responsible for the increased rates of discharge of mental hospital patients, and ultimately in the reduction of mental hospital rolls.

But here a warning needs to be given, a warning sounded broadly by the mental hospital administrators themselves. So enthusiastic has been the public response to the use of these drugs and their valuable effects, that unfortunately an illusion has developed. It is that these drugs are the answer and cure-all of the mental health problem. There is a great danger in this illusion, for if we believe that the drugs represent the solution to the Nation's most serious health problem, then we will naturally be inclined to lose interest in the mentally ill and in their plight. This must not be allowed to happen.

The truth is that these drugs will work only in the case of some mental disorders and not in others; with some patients and not with others. Then too, the doctor cannot give a patient a few doses of these drugs and, on the first signs of recovery, discharge him. These drugs have to be administered with care, under constant observation and with considerable follow-up both inside the hospital and outside the hospital after the patient has been discharged. In many cases the drugs do not do the entire job by themselves, but merely make the patient accessible to other forms of treatment such as psychotherapy, occupational therapy and group therapy. The truth is that in many States only a very small percentage of the patients who might be helped in any way by these drugs are being helped. This is because there is not enough money to purchase the drugs, or not enough professional staff to administer them and to supervise the follow-up care, or not enough staff to administer the other forms of treatment in conjunction with the drugs.

Thus it is evident that the advent of drug treatment for the mentally ill provides only a partial answer to the entire problem.

It is my belief that the answer lies in making available to all mental patients

all the known forms of treatment which have been proved successful, including drug therapy as well as others. Even this will not guarantee that all, or even most, of the patients now in mental hospitals will be cured. But it will guarantee that everyone who can be helped by existing treatment methods and techniques will be helped, and that tens of thousands of patients now languishing in mental hospitals, will have a chance to get better and be restored to their families and communities.

There is evidence, as the National Association for Mental Health points out, that in the past year or two more mental patients are getting treatment instead of mere custodial care. This is a major factor accounting for the increased discharges and reduced mental hospital rolls in many States. But here again we must deal with the truth rather than with an illusion. More patients are getting treatment today than in years past, but not many more. Hospitals are spending more money for staff and supplies for treatment but not very much more than before and not in too many places.

For many years the National Association for Mental Health has been urging that a relatively small increase in expenditures for these purposes, will pay off 10-fold in terms of increased discharges and reduced mental hospital rolls. The evidence for this contention is now available to us in the mental hospital statistics of the past 2 years. If so small an improvement has brought so great a change, then I say it is folly for us not to expand and intensify this improvement even a little more in order to bring about an even greater change.

We who have watched the progress in mental health during the past few years are very keenly aware of the fact that changes do not come about by themselves. It takes continued public education, professional guidance, and coordinated citizen action in the communities. We have observed how from a small band of interested citizens, the National Association for Mental Health has grown into a large, national citizens organization with great influence in the Nation and in the communities. We have observed, too, how this organization has brought hundreds of thousands and even millions of citizens in their communities into action for the improvement of the plight of the mentally ill. It is on this organization and its affiliates that we must rely heavily to provide leadership for expanded progress in this field.

This great organization has not only concerned itself with the plight of the hospitalized mentally ill. It has worked for and helped to establish hundreds of community mental health clinics, the first aid stations for mental health. It has worked for and helped to establish information services to serve friends and relatives of the mentally ill and to ease their anxiety, doubt, and fear. It has helped to establish rehabilitation services for discharged mental patients. It has helped to establish in schools and industry, mental health programs for early detection and treatment of mental dis-

orders. It has helped establish programs in the practice of mental health principles for the guidance of teachers, foremen, supervisors and personnel administrators for the improvement of mental health and the prevention of mental illness. It has helped to take the skeleton of mental illness out of the closet and dissipate the fear, mystery, and stigma which have surrounded mental illness and for so many years retarded progress in the fight against it. These untiring efforts have convinced America that the mentally ill do come back, improved, healthy, ready and capable to take their place again with their families and in their communities.

This year the slogan for Mental Health Week, which will take place April 28 to May 4, is "The Mentally Ill Can Come Back—Help Them." This appeal is made to the entire Nation. This appeal calls for participation of millions of Americans in the observance of Mental Health Week and in the fund-raising drive of the National Association for Mental Health.

It is therefore important that the American people be aroused to the plight of the mentally ill—be made aware of the hopeful outlook—be organized in their communities in citizens mental health associations to combat this disease in every way possible and be stimulated to cooperate wholeheartedly with the National Association for Mental Health, which nationally and through its local and State mental health associations, has been leading the fight against mental illness.

To express the sense of the Congress concerning this serious problem with which the Nation is confronted, I desire to introduce at this time for appropriate reference, the following joint resolution, which is cosponsored by my able and distinguished colleague [Mr. HOLLAND], and request that it be permitted to lie at the desk for 5 days in order to permit such other of my colleagues who desire to do so, to join as cosponsors:

Whereas there is presently a great need for nationwide action for the prevention, treatment, and cure of mental illness; and

Whereas the National Association for Mental Health and the State and local mental health organizations associated therewith are working diligently in the fight against mental illness; and

Whereas the mental health fund campaign is in dire need of public support in order to improve conditions in mental hospitals, provide more adequate treatment for the mentally and emotionally ill, carry on research in the field of the prevention, treatment, and cure of mental illness, and promote mental health education: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the President of the United States is authorized and requested to issue a proclamation designating the week beginning April 28 and ending May 4, 1957, as National Mental Health Week, and urging the people throughout the Nation to cooperate in the fight for the prevention, treatment, and cure of mental illness, inviting the communities of the United States to observe such week with appropriate ceremonies and activities.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The joint resolution will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the joint resolution will lie on the desk,

bers of our physically handicapped. It has brought help and hope to many disabled or physically handicapped persons and has placed thousands in gainful occupations. It has the strong support of many who, like myself, are interested in and deeply concerned with the problems of physical rehabilitation. I would like to see the work greatly expanded and extended to every large community in the country.

The New York Times this morning carried a very interesting editorial with regard to the purposes and work of JOB. I ask unanimous consent that this editorial be printed in the body of the RECORD at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

JUST ONE BREAK

Six years ago a group of young New York businessmen, headed by Orin Lehman, formed a unique new organization known as Just One Break. The initials of this organization, JOB, spelled its purpose—to assist physically handicapped persons in finding jobs.

During these 6 years more than 4,000 physically handicapped New Yorkers have found employment through JOB. Most important is the fact that they have held the jobs in which they were placed. Less than 5 percent required a second job placement.

Today, the JOB is attempting to expand its service, for its success has brought more disabled persons to its doors than its limited staff can handle. It also hopes to initiate a research program so that its experience and methods can be shared by communities in other States and in 12 foreign nations that have appealed to JOB for such assistance. Contributions mailed to JOB, Bellevue Hospital, New York City, will help them place the right man in the right job.

VIEWS OF LABOR ON PUBLIC HYDROELECTRIC DEVELOPMENT AT NIAGARA FALLS

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, on Sunday there appeared in the editorial section of the New York Times a full page advertisement purporting to be an expression of opinion from the New York State Association of Electrical Workers in favor of the giveaway of the publicly owned hydroelectric potential at Niagara Falls, and in opposition to the Lehman-Buckley bill for a public development.

This advertisement claimed to be the voice and views of labor on this matter.

It is probably unnecessary to correct the record, but it would be dangerous to let this prominently displayed advertisement go without challenge. As the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD will show, Mr. President, in the course of the debate on our Niagara bill, I introduced into the record some of the many scores of messages I received from labor unions throughout New York State as well as from various international labor organizations. All these messages indicated support of the Lehman-Buckley bill.

Very recently, the executive council of the AFL-CIO, representing 16 million American workers—the voice of organized labor in America—passed a resolution ranging the labor movement in support of public development of the Niagara project, and specifically in sup-

port of the Lehman-Buckley bill. I am convinced that the overwhelming majority of labor union members in New York State and in the Nation, support this bill.

I regret very much that the employees of the private utilities in New York State have constituted themselves a lobby to defeat this bill. I don't think that the membership of even those unions—and they are just a small part of the labor movement of New York State—realize exactly what they are doing. I don't think they have been told that there is no chance whatever for the passage of a giveaway bill, turning this resource over to a private monopoly. The choice is between the Lehman-Buckley bill and no legislation whatsoever.

Even the Niagara Mohawk Co. has come to recognize this, and has withdrawn its all-out opposition to legislation authorizing a public development at Niagara. The Niagara Mohawk Co. wanted to attach some conditions to its withdrawal of opposition, and even offered to support a public development bill if the terms of the Niagara Mohawk Co. were met.

I was certainly not ready to go all the way with Niagara Mohawk, which demanded a heavy price for its support—much too great a price. But I was perfectly willing to go part of the way and meet those demands which were reasonable.

The House Public Works Committee, in its report, has indicated its endorsement of some of the proposals of the Niagara Mohawk Co.

I wish that the employees of the Niagara Mohawk Co. would keep up with their employers in recognizing where their true interests lie.

I will take a back seat to no one in my record of support for the legitimate demands of organized labor. I think that the benefits of a public development at Niagara will be extended especially to working men and women in New York State. Most of the working men and women in New York State recognize this. The advertisement which appeared in the New York Times is not the voice of labor. Labor is for the Lehman-Buckley bill.

STUDIES REGARDING FOREIGN ASSISTANCE BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I move that the unfinished business be temporarily laid aside, and that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 2458, Senate Resolution 285, providing for a foreign-aid study by the Foreign Relations Committee.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The resolution will be stated by title, for the information of the Senate.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A resolution (S. 285) arranging for exhaustive studies to be made regarding foreign assistance by the United States Government.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. WOFFORD in the chair). Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Massachusetts?

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. President, I shall not object; but I should like to ask the Senator from Massachusetts whether it is the desire of the majority leader to have the Senate resume the consideration of the unfinished business, Senate bill 3877, to promote the development and rehabilitation of the coastwise trade, and for other purposes; or have the majority decided to discontinue the consideration of that bill?

Mr. KENNEDY. No; as soon as Senate Resolution 285 is disposed of, it is the proposal of the majority to have the Senate resume the consideration of Calendar No. 2440, Senate bill 147, requiring that international agreements other than treaties, hereafter entered into by the United States, be transmitted to the Senate within 30 days after the execution thereof; and then it is planned to have the Senate resume consideration of the unfinished business, Senate bill 3877, relating to the construction of certain vessels.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Massachusetts for the present consideration of Calendar No. 2458, Senate Resolution 285?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the resolution (S. Res. 285) arranging for exhaustive studies to be made regarding foreign assistance by the United States Government, which had been reported from the Committee on Foreign Relations without amendment, and subsequently had been reported from the Committee on Rules and Administration with amendments on page 2, line 24, after the word "than", to strike out "February 15" and insert "January 31"; on page 3, line 14, after the word "through", to strike out "February 15" and insert "January 31"; and in line 20, after the word "Relations", to insert "The chairman may designate one or more members who may act for him for the purpose of this resolution," so as to make the resolution read:

Resolved, That the Committee on Foreign Relations shall arrange for exhaustive studies to be made of the extent to which foreign assistance by the United States Government serves, can be made to serve, or does not serve, the national interest, to the end that such studies and recommendations based thereon may be available to the Senate in considering foreign aid policies for the future.

Sec. 2. The committee shall, without limiting the scope of the study hereby authorized, direct its attention to the following matters:

(a) The proper objectives of foreign aid programs and the criteria which can be used to measure accomplishment.

(b) The capability of the United States to extend aid, in terms of the Nation's economic, technical, personnel, and other resources.

(c) The need and willingness of foreign countries to receive aid, and their capacity to make effective use thereof.

(d) The various kinds of foreign aid and alternatives thereto as well as the methods by which and conditions on which aid might be furnished.

(e) The related actions which should be taken to make foreign aid effective in achieving national objectives.

Sec. 3. The committee shall transmit to the Senate not later than January 31, 1957, the results of the study herein authorized together with such recommendations as may at that time be found desirable.

11160

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

July 11

Sec. 4. In the conduct of this study full use shall be made of the experience, knowledge, and advice of private organizations, schools, institutions, and individuals. The committee may divide the work of the study among such groups and institutions as it may deem appropriate and may enter into contracts for this purpose. Full use shall be made of studies and plans prepared by executive agencies, and such agencies are requested to give the committee or any of its authorized study groups or consultants such assistance as may be required.

Sec. 5. For the purpose of this resolution, the committee is authorized to employ on a temporary basis through January 31, 1957, such technical, clerical or other assistants, experts and consultants as it deems desirable. The expenses of the committee under this resolution, which shall not exceed \$300,000, shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations. The chairman may designate one or more members who may act for him for the purpose of this resolution.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendments of the Committee on Rules and Administration.

The amendments were agreed to.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Will the adoption of the committee amendments preclude the amendments to be offered by the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. BRIDGES]?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Not unless they are amendments to a committee amendment.

Mr. KNOWLAND. In order that there may be no question, I ask unanimous consent that, following the adoption of the committee amendments, the resolution, as amended, be considered, for purposes of amendment, as original text.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The resolution is open to further amendment.

Mr. BRIDGES. Mr. President, I offer the amendments, which I send to the desk and ask to have stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendments offered by the Senator from New Hampshire will be stated.

The CHIEF CLERK. On page 2, lines 1 and 2, it is proposed to strike out "the Committee on Foreign Relations shall arrange for exhaustive studies to be made" and insert in lieu thereof "there shall be established a committee which shall make exhaustive studies."

On page 2, between lines 7 and 8, it is proposed to insert the following new section:

"Sec. 2. (a) The committee shall be composed of the full membership of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the chairmen and ranking minority members of the Senate Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Armed Services. In the event a Senator is the ranking minority member of both the Senate Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Armed Services, he shall, for the purposes of the first sentence of this subsection, be deemed to be the ranking minority member of the Senate Committee on Appropriations and the second ranking minority member of the Senate Committee

on Armed Services shall, for the purposes of such sentence, be deemed to be the ranking minority member of the Senate Committee on Armed Services.

"(b) Any vacancy in the membership of the committee shall not affect its powers and any vacancy in the membership of the committee shall be filled in the same manner as provided for determining the original membership.

"(c) The chairman of the committee shall be the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

"(d) Ten members of the committee shall constitute a quorum."

On page 2, line 8, it is proposed to strike out "2" and insert in lieu thereof "3."

On page 2, line 23, it is proposed to strike out "3" and insert in lieu thereof "4."

On page 3, line 3, it is proposed to strike out "4" and insert in lieu thereof "5."

On page 3, line 13, it is proposed to strike out "5." and insert in lieu thereof "6. (a)."

On page 3, line 20, it is proposed to strike out "Committee on Foreign Relations" and insert in lieu thereof "committee."

On page 3, after line 22, it is proposed to insert the following:

(b) For the purposes of this resolution, the committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized to hold such hearings, to sit and act at such places and times, to require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, to take such testimony, to procure such printing and binding, and to make such expenditures, as it deems advisable. The committee shall cease to exist at the close of business on January 31, 1957.

Mr. BRIDGES. Mr. President, the purpose of the amendments is to provide other committees, which have responsibility for mutual aid, some insight into what will be going on in the conduct of the investigation. The investigation could be carried on in two ways. It could be handled by the Foreign Relations Committee as a committee proceeding along with its investigation, and with the Committee on Armed Services proceeding with its own investigation, particularly on the phases of mutual aid which deal with military assistance; or it could be handled by one special committee made up of members from the various interested standing committees.

Certainly in connection with this general subject, I believe the Armed Services Committee and the Committee on Appropriations have a responsibility to the Senate. My proposal seems to me to provide a reasonable way to proceed. If the proposal cannot be adopted I should say the only thing left to do would be for the Committee on Armed Services to proceed on its own with its part of the investigation and possibly the Appropriations Committee should do likewise. If my amendments are adopted, we will save duplication and we will proceed with the investigation as a Senate group. Personally, I cannot see any reason for duplication.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BRIDGES. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. As I understand, the purpose of the Senator's amendments is to attach to the full Committee on Foreign Relations the chairmen and the ranking minority members of the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Appropriations. Is that correct?

Mr. BRIDGES. That is correct.

Mr. MANSFIELD. It would appear to me that such a proposal would be acceptable, because the principle of senatorial responsibility is maintained. I mean that the authority and the responsibility would still lie with the Senate. Of course, as the Senator from New Hampshire knows, an investigating subcommittee has already been created by the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], and it will look into the military aspects of the foreign-aid program.

The Senator from New Hampshire knows also, I am sure, that the Committee on Appropriations, of which he is the ranking minority member, has the right to investigate any and all questions relating to foreign aid it deems fit to investigate.

There is also a matter of time to be considered. Speaking personally, and on the basis of my understanding of the amendments offered by the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire, it would appear to me that the proposed approach to the problem would be a good one, because there is a decidedly important part for the Committee on Appropriations and certainly for the Committee on Armed Services to take in this connection. What appeals to me most is that the principle of senatorial responsibility is being maintained in the conduct of the investigation over the remainder of this year and extending until January 31, 1957.

Mr. BRIDGES. I thank the Senator. Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BRIDGES. I yield.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. President, do I understand correctly that the amendments of the Senator from New Hampshire are satisfactory to the Committee on Armed Services and to the Committee on Appropriations; or will those committees continue with their separate investigations?

Mr. BRIDGES. I cannot speak for the Committee on Armed Services or for the Committee on Appropriations. I have discussed the matter with proposal or commended it, but I cannot speak with authority for either committee. The amendments may not be satisfactory to either committee, or they may be. I know that some of the members with whom I have discussed the subject have spoken highly of the proposal or commended it, but I cannot speak officially for either committee.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I am interested in the pending resolution, but it was not until a few minutes ago that I heard of the amendments of the Senator from New Hampshire. I have looked them over, and I am impressed with the general idea.

001017350

0002437

1956

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

11161

I know there was a time when the military phase of the mutual-aid program was referred to the Committee on Armed Services, and that in other years we had joint meetings of the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services. I have always felt it was quite helpful to have such a joint study made in connection with the consideration of mutual aid.

Through no one's fault, that practice has fallen into disuse in recent years. That is one reason why the mutual-aid program is no better understood than it is. Some uncertainty has been creeping into it in late years.

I commend the Senator for his proposal, and I hope it will be acceptable to the Committee on Foreign Relations. Certainly it would strengthen the survey, and certainly it would provide an opportunity for an expression of views on the various aspects of the program.

Mr. BRIDGES. I thank the distinguished Senator from Mississippi. I should like to point out to him that, as I am sure he is aware, when the first mutual aid bill was considered by Congress—and I am not now referring to the pre-war and war periods, when we considered lend lease—but rather post-war when we started with the Marshall plan; a joint congressional committee was established as a sort of watchdog committee, to which Members of various committees of both House were appointed. Those members were not appointed at large; they were appointed from the Committees on Appropriations and from various other committees which were concerned with the questions which were involved. For a time the Senator from New Hampshire was chairman of that group. Subsequently, I believe the Senator from Nevada and other Senators served as chairman. In that way, we were able to keep in constant touch with all phases of the subject. Such an opportunity has been lacking recently. I believe it would be wise to have not merely an investigation but a sort of review of the activities, before we face the issue in another year. I believe it would make for a little better feeling on the part of the other committees as well, because they are so vitally concerned; at least it would give those committees some liaison with the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Mr. FLANDERS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BRIDGES. I yield.

Mr. FLANDERS. I wish to support the proposals of the Senator from New Hampshire. The undertaking, while it lies obviously and mainly within the Committee on Foreign Relations, is wider than the Foreign Relations Committee's field of responsibility. It seems to me to be very fitting indeed that that fact should be recognized. It can be recognized without in any way indicating any criticism of the Committee on Foreign Relations. There is involved merely a suggestion that in a part of the field Committee's have overlapped onto the jurisdiction of other committees. I would be very glad if the amendments were accepted by the proponents

of the resolution, so that the investigation could proceed on a broader base.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, we are glad to accept the amendments.

Mr. BRIDGES. I thank the Senator.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I have previously expressed concern in the Senate over certain phases of our foreign-aid program, and have suggested that a reappraisal and study of this program is badly needed. I am pleased that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has taken positive action on this important subject and has reported Senate Resolution 285, calling for an extensive study of foreign aid. This is certainly a sound and timely approach for getting valuable information so badly needed for a complete reappraisal and adjustment in our foreign-aid program.

I have supported foreign aid as a necessary part of our foreign policy, but certain phases of the program have been a great disappointment in terms of obtaining the basic objectives. I strongly believe that the time has come when we need to take a new look at this program and examine the original objectives and determine to what extent these objectives have been fulfilled and what course we should follow in future years.

MILITARY AID

The military-aid program has proved to be of great value, and I would not want to see it entirely abandoned. At the same time, we should concentrate our military aid in countries where proof clearly shows it is necessary and will better our military position. The expenditure of large sums of money in these countries without proper planning in terms of benefits received will not increase our military protection or the military strength of the countries we are trying to help.

Special attention should be given to getting countries who receive this aid to show more actual results in building their own military strength in both weapons and men and with a determined effort on their part to accomplish the primary objectives of this program.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

My on-the-ground observations have convinced me that technical aid should be on a limited scale and only where such aid is actually administered in helping the mass of people to help themselves. We should certainly take a careful look at these programs, which are in effect merely give-away programs and which encourage excessive increases in production of agricultural commodities which directly compete with American products.

The technical aid program was not intended to be one worked from a highly diplomatic level nor a multi-billion dollar program destined to be a constant drain on our own economy. It was conceived as a down-to-earth approach in which countries help themselves and at the same time carry it out in such a way as to establish and build friendly relations with the people themselves. This was designed to bring about a better understanding and to strengthen our relations with the people and their country. I strongly believe that our future

program should be designed to especially help the masses of the people rather than to benefit those in favored groups.

I hope this study will include a careful appraisal of aid from other countries and establish safeguards which will place foreign aid on a sound basis.

Russia has entered into a new field of activity by offering economic aid to various countries. I strongly feel that a great mistake will be made if we permit our foreign-aid program to become a scheme to outbid Russia. We must call her hand on this new policy of economic aid and see if she will deliver her commitments to other countries. Personally, I do not believe that there will be any substantial delivery on these promises. But, more important, I do not believe that it is a sound policy to pursue a course of obtaining and holding the good will of any nation by merely out-bidding in the field of economic aid.

I am convinced that we must now have a long range plan based primarily on loans rather than outright grants. In the undeveloped countries, we have an opportunity to give some direct aid for limited programs which they themselves actually want and need. We must make a special effort to eliminate programs which will in the end have a serious effect on our farmers and merchants. We have a solemn obligation and duty to the American taxpayer to critically review this program, and I believe that Senate Resolution 285 is a step in the right direction. I hope that it will receive the full support of the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the consideration en bloc of the amendments offered by the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. BRIDGES]? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

The question is on agreeing en bloc to the amendments offered by the Senator from New Hampshire.

The amendments were agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The resolution is open to further amendment. If there be no amendment to be proposed, the question is on agreeing to the resolution.

The resolution (S. Res. 285) was agreed to, as follows:

Whereas there has been no public non-partisan examination of United States foreign aid policies since studies undertaken prior to the beginning of the Marshall plan; and

Whereas an important portion of the United States Government budget has been and is being devoted to foreign aid programs; and

Whereas since the inception of foreign aid programs fundamental changes have taken place in the world situation and in the relative strength of countries both friendly and unfriendly toward the United States: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That there shall be established a committee which shall make exhaustive studies of the extent to which foreign assistance by the United States Government serves, can be made to serve, or does not serve, the national interest, to the end that such studies and recommendations based thereon may be available to the Senate in considering foreign aid policies for the future.

Sec. 2. (a) The committee shall be composed of the full membership of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the chairman and ranking minority members of the Senate Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Armed Services. In the event a Senator is the ranking minority member of both the Senate Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Armed Services, he shall, for the purposes of the first sentence of this subsection, be deemed to be the ranking minority member of the Senate Committee on Appropriations and the second ranking minority member of the Senate Committee on Armed Services shall, for the purposes of such sentence, be deemed to be the ranking minority member of the Senate Committee on Armed Services.

(b) Any vacancy in the membership of the committee shall not affect its powers and any vacancy in the membership of the committee shall be filled in the same manner as provided for determining the original membership.

(c) The chairman of the committee shall be the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

(d) Ten members of the committee shall constitute a quorum.

Sec. 3. The committee shall, without limiting the scope of the study hereby authorized, direct its attention to the following matters:

(a) The proper objectives of foreign aid programs and the criteria which can be used to measure accomplishment.

(b) The capability of the United States to extend aid, in terms of the Nation's economic, technical, personnel, and other resources.

(c) The need and willingness of foreign countries to receive aid, and their capacity to make effective use thereof.

(d) The various kinds of foreign aid and alternatives thereto as well as the methods by which and conditions on which aid might be furnished.

(e) The related actions which should be taken to make foreign aid effective in achieving national objectives.

Sec. 4. The committee shall transmit to the Senate not later than January 31, 1957, the results of the study herein authorized together with such recommendations as may at that time be found desirable.

Sec. 5. In the conduct of this study full use shall be made of the experience, knowledge, and advice of private organizations, schools, institutions, and individuals. The committee may divide the work of the study among such groups and institutions as it may deem appropriate and may enter into contracts for this purpose. Full use shall be made of studies and plans prepared by executive agencies, and such agencies are requested to give the committee or any of its authorized study groups or consultants such assistance as may be required.

Sec. 6. (a) For the purpose of this resolution, the committee is authorized to employ on a temporary basis through January 31, 1957, such technical, clerical or other assistants, experts and consultants as it deems desirable. The expenses of the committee under this resolution, which shall not exceed \$300,000, shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the committee. The chairman may designate one or more members who may act for him for the purpose of this resolution.

(b) For the purposes of this resolution, the committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized to hold such hearings, to sit and act at such places and times, to require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, to take such testimony, to procure such printing

and binding, and to make such expenditures, as it deems advisable. The committee shall cease to exist at the close of business on January 31, 1957.

The preamble was agreed to.

MORE SOVIET SECRETS

Mr. BRIDGES. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an article entitled "More Soviet 'Secrets,'" written by Marguerite Higgins, and published in the New York Herald Tribune of Sunday, June 18, 1956.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MORE SOVIET "SECRETS"

(By Marguerite Higgins)

For the first time, the United States has obtained apparently authentic accounts of the real story behind the great post-Stalin shifts of power within the Kremlin.

From documents in the possession of the Western powers, it turns out that the outside world until now has had only fragmentary and often distorted accounts of the liquidation of Lavrenti Beria, Soviet chief of internal security, the demotion of Georgi Malenkov, former Premier, and the ouster of Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov. The documents portray the Communist Party boss Nikita Khrushchev, the former plumber from the Ukraine, as an expert in-fighter in the struggle for power that has made him "first among equals" in the current Soviet hierarchy.

Additionally, the Kremlin curtain has been widely parted by testimony (both public and private) before the Senate Internal Security Committee given by Seweryn Bialer, an important Polish Communist official who recently defected to America.

This has been supplemented and corroborated by independent Western access to at least 5 documents (3 of them mentioned by Bialer): A summary of some private conversations between Russia's top leaders and Marshal Tito; 2 secret letters of the Soviet Party Presidium (Politburo) explaining respectively Beria's purge and Malenkov's downfall; Khrushchev's Warsaw speech denouncing Malenkov; and a stenographic account of the July 1955, Communist Party meeting in which Molotov's fate was sealed.

Such a deep look into the inner workings of the Kremlin is unprecedented. Ironically it has been made possible primarily by Khrushchev himself. For in the process of denouncing Stalin's one-man rule, Khrushchev has initiated the policy of dispatching "secret" letters of information to key coming "secret" letters of information to key comrades as a measure of "democratizing" the party to the extent of letting at least the elite few know what's going on. Mr. Khrushchev may well be regretting this "democratization" and the unpreventable new leaks to the West. For as compiled by the Communists themselves, the record casts the current Communist Party boss in a tricky light.

An outstanding example is the Politburo letter—signed by Khrushchev—on the Beria case. In light of recent events, it comes as a shock to read that one of the reasons Beria was suspected of espionage was that he sought to renew ties between Moscow and Belgrade. One of the points against Beria was that he suggested establishing a special telephone line between the two capitals so that there could be direct contact with Marshal Tito.

The supreme irony is that Khrushchev only a year after joining in such accusations against Beria should not only take the lead in seeking the rapprochement with Yugoslavia but denounce Beria as responsible for past hostility between Moscow and Belgrade.

Among the hitherto unpublished charges against Beria outlined in the Politburo explanation of his liquidation are:

1. That he was spying on his colleagues in the Politburo to the extent of putting them under surveillance and tapping their wires. The letter cites one occasion when an NKVD subordinate ventured to express surprise at orders to spy on Soviet leaders. According to the letter, Beria replied "If you don't carry out my orders I will crush you into labor camp dust."

2. That Beria was a moral degenerate, staging erotic orgies in a special Moscow apartment. He was accused of selecting women from Moscow prisons and then dispatching them to labor camps after dispensing with their services.

Beria was shot December 1953, at the time when Georgi Malenkov was still Prime Minister. So far as the outside world could tell, the entire Politburo was united against Beria.

There certainly was no outward hint of a link between Beria and Malenkov. But when the time came for Malenkov's demotion, another Politburo letter asserted that the fallen Soviet Premier was responsible with Beria for the 1946 Leningrad trials. According to the current Communist line, these trials were fabricated as part of the Stalinist terror and involved the unjust liquidation of thousands of good Communists.

In commenting on the impact of the Politburo's Beria-and-Malenkov letter, Mr. Bialer told the Senate committee: "I came to the conclusion that Khrushchev, aiming at seizure of power in the party, had adopted the tactics of removing his rivals one by one. As long as it was necessary he, together with Malenkov, accused Beria of staging the Leningrad trials. Eighteen months later when Malenkov's turn came, Khrushchev made him co-responsible. Yet Malenkov had been at Khrushchev's side when Beria was purged. Why wasn't Malenkov accused of it in those days? The answer was that Malenkov was indispensable in the fight against Beria and his turn had not yet come."

Khrushchev personally carried the fight against another Malenkov "mistake"—over-emphasis on consumer goods—directly to the East European satellites, for he feared the effect of Malenkov's "soft" example. In another not-so-secret speech made in the spring of 1955 in Warsaw, Khrushchev engaged in a revealing burst of prose, saying to top Polish Communists: "It is true that you do not have good ladies' hats; it is true that there is probably not enough food in Poland. But you must remember that we must have first of all heavy industry. The more steel we produce for the Soviet bloc the more sleepless nights Mr. Dulles will have in Washington."

Malenkov, the first prominent Russian to be demoted rather than purged is now minister of electric power stations.

The showdown with Molotov came at the July 1955 meeting of the Communist Party. According to Mr. Bialer, who hid many Communist Party posts including that of propaganda chief for the Polish Politburo, the showdown had been brewing for many months. "Molotov's mistakes" were tolerated by Khrushchev for obvious reasons," Mr. Bialer testified. "Molotov's help was necessary to force Malenkov's resignation. In February 1955 Molotov was still indispensable to Khrushchev, as Malenkov had been indispensable during the purge of Beria in July 1953."

Yugoslavia was the touchstone of the Khrushchev-Molotov controversy. According to the stenographic reports of the July meeting, Molotov favored a rapprochement with Tito on a governmental level but insisted that Communist Party problems should not be discussed with him because the Yugoslav Marshall was "anti-Soviet and his views far removed from communism."