

Question: If 10% reduction were called for, what would the DDP do to carry out this order?

1. The DDP would first establish his right to determine the size of his Headquarters' organization and the size of Agency overseas stations and units, including the personnel assigned to such units from other components of the Agency and in support of his operations.

2. The DDP would then eliminate from his organization those functions and the personnel and slots assigned thereto which, in accordance with the findings of the second question raised by Mr. Kirkpatrick, are judged to be duplicatory or unnecessary.

3. The DDP would then allot a period of six weeks, during which an ad hoc group appointed by him would develop reduction figures for the Headquarters and overseas components of the Clandestine Services.

4. The chiefs of these components would then be given 12 weeks to select the positions in each component to be eliminated in order to meet the new ceiling thus imposed.

5. The remainder of the year, 34 weeks, would then be devoted to the selection of individuals for release. This selection would have to be handled in accordance with Agency policy, but it is believed advisable that the DDP press for a procedure which would permit the retention of the most qualified individuals rather than a procedure based on the established Civil Service reduction-in-force principles.

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
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b. c.

ICA AND OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES - NSC 1290 (d) Projects

Estimated savings of 20 personnel.

These programs are primarily overt in character, and outside CIA's sphere of responsibility. Propose they be transferred to ICA or other Government agencies with CIA responsible only for training small groups of highly-specialized FBI-type forces.



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8. STATE DEPARTMENT - Economic Reporting

Estimated savings of 4 personnel.

Propose that economic reporting, particularly in Latin America, and intelligence operations relating to East-West trade transactions and controls, where information is obtained chiefly through Liaison, be transferred to State Department. These economic policies and programs are preponderantly overt and thus render covert supplementary action virtually unnecessary.

9. McCARRAN ACT VISA NAME CHECKS 39 personnel.

X 25

Propose that necessity for CIA's continuation of this program be determined.

Name checks completed to date have resulted in no apparent action by the I&NS, the FBI, or the State Department. Evidence of activity as a result of information provided has been negligible. (Some 120,000 name check requests have been processed, involving approximately 6,000 man days.)

TOTAL estimated personnel savings by elimination or transfer of these functions - 140, or 

25X9A2

It must be pointed out here that transfer of functions to other Government agencies takes an indeterminable span of time which would not allow us to guarantee such savings by a specified date. An example is our experience in transferring the coastal raiding and maritime interdiction operations [REDACTED] to Defense, which took 25X1A6a 19 months.

c. Third Question

Are there functions or requirements now assigned you which are beyond your present capacity to perform? If so, give an indication of the number of additional personnel required to perform such functions.

Answer

(1) Overseas Operational Requirements Beyond our Present Capacity and Additional Personnel Needed: In the initial development of their programs of operations for FY 1957, the Clandestine Services Area Divisions (including IO) estimated a requirement of additional overseas personnel which was [REDACTED] 25X9A2 above the number provided for by the FY 1957 ceiling as subsequently established by the Director. The operational requirements represented by this figure include only those carefully screened and selected locations and objectives which are the most critical need for expanded or additional Clandestine Services activity. Many further possibilities for profitable and useful action were excluded.

(a) It is now estimated that [REDACTED] personnel 25X9A2 programmed above the FY 1957 ceiling could be provided for by offsetting reductions that normally occur and elimination of overseas requirements that are no longer valid, leaving a net increase of [REDACTED] which could not be met under the ceiling. 25X9A2

25X9A2

1. The [REDACTED] additional personnel positions are needed to carry out the following programmed operational requirements which are beyond our present capacity to perform:

25X1A6a

a. The need for aggressive counter-Communist effort in [REDACTED] including such activities as penetration of Soviet and Satellite installations.

b. The general insufficiency of our clandestine intelligence collection effort toward the European Satellites and the USSR itself.

c. The insufficiency of our psychological and political activities generally throughout the Middle East area, and the need for development of a wartime resistance organization in [REDACTED] 25X1A6a

d. The need for more extensive and effective political-psychological effort in Southeast Asia, especially [REDACTED] 25X1A6a
25X1A6a [REDACTED]

e. The urgent need for much more extensive clandestine intelligence collection effort against [REDACTED] 25X1A6a

f. The need for political, psychological, and counter-intelligence action against the efforts of international Communism in Latin America.

(b) While the above programming included some provision for expansion in Latin American activities, it has since become apparent that the Clandestine Services program in Latin America should be even more intensive than contemplated at that time. This will represent a requirement of approximately [REDACTED] additional personnel above the FY 1957 program. 25X9A2

(c) Likewise, the programming for FY 1957 does not provide for the development of a much needed reserve capability in terms of trained intelligence officers.

(2) Increased Headquarters Activity and Additional Personnel Requirements:

(a) The same programming for FY 1957 estimated needs for personnel increases for Clandestine Services headquarters at approximately [REDACTED] above the FY 1955

25X9A2

25X9A2 number on board. The ceiling as established by the
Director provided [redacted] positions, above the 1955 level,
for certain specifically named, high priority, headquar-
ters activities, and an additional 145 to be distributed as
needed. As compared with the initially estimated [redacted] 25X9A2
25X9A2 this leaves approximately [redacted] of this requirement still 25X9A2
25X1A8a unprovided for under the ceiling. Except for the [redacted] 25X1A8a
[redacted] the Clandestine Services headquar-
ters can get along without this [redacted] without insurmountable 25X9A2
difficulty if the field needs estimated above are not met.
If such field needs should be filled, Clandestine Services
headquarters would need either (1) a proportionate in-
crease to support such field expansion [redacted] or (2) a 25X9A2
streamlining of the headquarters organization to find
means of supporting field expansion with a headquarters
25X9A2 increase of [redacted]

25X1A8a (b) The [redacted] has grown 25X9A2
steadily to its present ceiling of [redacted] and with the per-
formance of approximately \$1000 of overtime each work-
ing day, this growth has by no means ended. Unless more
personnel can be added, overtime cannot be reduced and
may even increase. The largest backlog exists in the
maintenance of index cards and personality files. RI pulls
together reference indices for CIA as well as other ele-
ments of the U. S. Government. Over [redacted] 25X9A2
are carried in the index. However, the current backlog
25X9A2 amounts to over [redacted] Business machines are
25X1A8a being introduced into [redacted], which may offer some manpower
relief but will not erase the need for additional personnel.
25X1A8a The Government's internal security needs may throw an
additional immense task on [redacted] that of performing visa
checks. Should visa checks become a function, the present
25X1A8a strength of [redacted] would have to be doubled. Therefore, it can
25X1A8a be firmly anticipated that [redacted] will undergo further expansion
due to a steadily-increasing volume of material already
handled at headquarters and to demands for new services.
An average annual growth of 10% (increase of [redacted] for FY 25X9A2
1957) is believed to be likely for several years without the
assumption of responsibility for visa checks.

(3) In order to meet the requirements through FY 1957
set forth above, an increase of [redacted] personnel ([redacted] for overseas,

25X9A2

25X9A2

25X9A2 25X9A2
[redacted] extra for Latin America, [redacted] for Head-
25X9A2 quarters, and [redacted] for [redacted] or 9.6% will be 25X1A8a
required over our current ceiling of [redacted] 25X9A2

4. Summary

25X9A2 25X9A2
The need for [redacted] personnel in paragraph 3-c can be offset by the
25X9A2 savings of [redacted] personnel in paragraph 3-b, leaving a net requirement of
25X9A2 [redacted] personnel, or an increase of 7.2% over our current ceiling of [redacted] 25X9A2
Any constriction in the current ceiling would eliminate the possibility of
added emphasis for field activities and, further, would call for a reduction
in certain existing valid activities.


25X1A9a

[redacted]
FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

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
Activities Which Duplicate Those Within Other Agencies
and Might Therefore Be Dropped, as well as Activities
Which Might Be Transferred to Other Agencies

- X 1. There are activity areas where a duplication of effort is indicated and which, upon review, might be reduced or eliminated. Outstanding examples occur in the area of military - CIA relationships.



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wartime CIA will rely on the military for supply of all common items.




25X1X1

peculiar to CIA only and draw on the military for any cold war requirement. Materiel estimates for use in hot war situations contain items of which approximately 90% are stocked by the military. CIA has provided the military with estimates of GW potential, and it is understood that the military is coming up now with an over-all GW potential estimate on which to base stockpiling and materiel reserves.

X

b. There is indication that some duplication takes place in the research and development conducted by CIA and the military. A thorough review would be necessary to determine the extent of such duplication and what steps are necessary to assure that these efforts complement each other.

25X1C4a



2. There are three specific project activities which might be conducted by the armed services rather than CIA.

25X1A6a a. CIA has entered into a bilateral program of UW activities with the [redacted] forces. It is possible that the U.S. Army could assume the undertaking of this agreement, although the [redacted] Gov- 25X1A6a ernment would have to be receptive to such a proposal.

b. The program of UW training and operational activities presently conducted with the [redacted] Staff might well be 25X1A6a conducted by the U. S. Army. This project alone involves [redacted] staff- ? type personnel.

25X9A2

25X1A3b


c. There is a project which deals with communication with [redacted] which was originally

brought into being in response to a request from the U. S. Air Force.

There is some question as to whether this project should be continued and, if it should continue, whether it could not be more adequately performed by the military services. [REDACTED] persons are currently assigned to this project.

25X9A2

3. Certain propaganda projects designed for general conditioning of public opinion have reached a stage where they can be turned over to USIA or to "vox populi" groups. CIA should phase out of the direct support and exploitation of such projects as soon as espionage and CE considerations per



25X6D

4. A large proportion of the programs undertaken or to be undertaken by the U. S. Government under NSC Action 1290 (d) for the development of the internal security forces of free countries will be primarily overt in character. To the extent that they are overt, they lie outside the role of CIA, and executive responsibility for such programs should rest with other departments of the Government. The overt part of the training program for [redacted] internal security forces could be transferred to ICA.

This part of the project involves approximately [redacted] staff-type personnel.

The overt parts of any other NSC 1290 (d) projects should be conducted by other departments of the Government, with CIA responsible only for the training of small groups of highly-specialized, FBI-type forces.

5. As a result of the McCarran Act, CIA has been servicing visa name checks from the Immigration and Naturalization Service on individuals covered by the act. Some 120,000 name check requests have been processed, involving approximately 6,000 man days. Many such checks are on minor children, diplomatic couriers, and other individuals who remain in the U. S. only a day or two. Many have entered and departed prior to receipt of the name check request in CIA. Notwithstanding the huge expenditure of manpower by CIA, name checks completed to date have resulted in no apparent action by the Immigration Service, the FBI, or the State Department. The evidence of activity as a result of information

Mac
study
25X1C14c

25X9A2

provided has been negligible. The necessity for the continuation of this program by CIA should be determined. The project currently involves ■■■ 25X9A2 individuals.

6. Economic reporting, particularly in Latin America, and intelligence operations relating to East-West trade transactions and controls, where information is obtained chiefly through liaison, should be transferred to the State Department. A preponderance of overt economic policies and programs renders covert supplementary action virtually unnecessary.

7. If the above relationships should be ameliorated and the transfers mentioned could be effected, a considerable savings in staff-type personnel would accrue. This figure cannot be determined until a thorough study has been made.

1. This statement relates to point 3, which is as follows:

What is the Status of Requirements which have been served upon us and which we are currently unable to accomplish?

How many additional people would be required to carry out such requirements?

2. Overseas Operational Requirements and Personnel Needs: In the initial development of their programs of operations for FY 1957, the Clandestine Services Area Divisions (including IO) estimated a requirement of additional overseas personnel which was [REDACTED] above the number provided 25X9A2 for by the FY 1957 ceiling as subsequently established by the Director. The operational requirements represented by this figure include only those carefully screened and selected locations and objectives which are the most critical need for expanded or additional Clandestine Services activity. Many further possibilities for profitable and useful action were excluded.

- a. In relation to this above-ceiling requirement of [REDACTED] ^{25X9A2} additional overseas personnel, it was estimated in such FY 1957 programming that [REDACTED] ^{25X9A2} of this number could be provided for by offsetting reductions and eliminations of other overseas activities, leaving a net figure of [REDACTED] ^{25X9A2} as the portion of the requirement which could not be met under the ceiling. The reductions and eliminations permitting such offset occur variously because some specific requirements have ended, because a change of conditions has altered the character of

operation required, or because experience has shown that the activity undertaken was not effective in relation to the requirement.

b. The following are the major needs for expansion or addition which were specifically programmed in this connection, which can be met to some degree by the cutback of other activities if personnel involved can be redeployed to these purposes, but which will still not be fulfilled to the level of necessary need of national interest and importance without some provision for additional personnel:

25X1A6a

(1) The need for aggressive counter-Communist effort in [REDACTED] including such activities as penetration of Soviet and Satellite installations.

(2) The general insufficiency of our psychological and clandestine intelligence collection effort toward the European Satellites and the USSR itself.

25X1A6a

(3) The extension and exploitation of the work we have already done with the [REDACTED] in developing stay-behind and latent resistance organizations for use in the event of war.

25X1A6a

(4) The insufficiency of our psychological and political activities generally throughout the Middle East area, and the need for development of a wartime resistance organization in [REDACTED]

(5) The need for more extensive and effective political-
psychological effort in South East Asia, especially [REDACTED] 25X1A6a
[REDACTED] 25X1A6a

(6) The urgent need for much more extensive psychologi-
cal and clandestine intelligence collection effort against Com-
[REDACTED] 25X1A6a

(7) The need for political, psychological, and counter-
intelligence action against the efforts of international Commun-
ism in Latin America.

c. While the above programming included some provision for
expansion in Latin American activities, it has since become apparent
that the Clandestine Services program in Latin America should be
even more intensive than contemplated at that time. This will repre-
sent a requirement of approximately [REDACTED] 25X9A2 additional personnel above
the FY 1957 program.

d. Likewise, the programming for FY 1957 does not provide
for the development of a much needed reserve capability in terms of
trained intelligence officers.

3. Requirements for Headquarters Activity:

a. The same programming for FY 1957 estimated needs for
personnel increases for Clandestine Services headquarters at approx-
imately [REDACTED] 25X9A2 above the FY 1955 number on board. The ceiling as
established by the Director provided [REDACTED] 25X9A2 positions, above the 1955

level, for certain specifically named, high priority, headquarters activities, and an additional [REDACTED] 25X9A2 to be distributed as needed. As compared with the initially estimated [REDACTED] 25X9A2 this leaves approximately [REDACTED] 25X9A2 of this requirement still unprovided for under the ceiling. Except for the [REDACTED] (paragraph 3-b), the Clandestine Services headquarters can get along without this [REDACTED] 25X9A2 without insurmountable difficulty if the field needs estimated above are not met. If such field needs should be filled, Clandestine Services headquarters would need either (1) a proportionate increase to support such field expansion, or (2) a streamlining of the headquarters organization to find means of supporting field expansion without headquarters increase.

25X1A8a

25X1A8a

b. The [REDACTED] has grown steadily to its present on-duty strength of [REDACTED] 25X9A2 and with the performance of approximately \$1000 of overtime each working day, this growth has by no means ended. Unless more personnel can be added, overtime can not be reduced and may even increase. The largest backlog exists in the maintenance of index cards and personality files. [REDACTED] 25X1A8a pulls together reference indices for CIA as well as other elements of the U.S. Government. Over [REDACTED] 25X9A2 are carried in the index. However, the current backlog amounts to over [REDACTED] 25X9A2 Business machines are being introduced into [REDACTED] 25X1A8a which may offer some manpower relief but will not erase the need for additional personnel. The Government's internal security needs may throw an

25X1A8a additional immense task on [REDACTED], that of performing visa checks. Should
visa checks become a function, the present strength of [REDACTED] would have 25X1A8a
to be doubled. Therefore, it can be firmly anticipated that [REDACTED] will 25X1A8a
undergo further expansion due to a steadily-increasing volume of
material already handled at headquarters and to demands for new
services. An average annual growth of 10% is believed to be likely
for several years.

4. Summary

a. It is evident that it will be difficult to provide, without additional employees, the necessary added emphasis for the field activities and locations indicated in paragraph 2-b and c above. To do so as fully as required within the current number of employees would involve a redeployment which would reduce some and eliminate other existing valid requirements. A cutback of 10% in the current personnel level would make such redeployment altogether impossible.

b. In order to meet the requirements through FY 1957 set forth above in paragraphs 2 and 3-b, an increase of 7 1/2% will be required over our current on-duty strength.