

# The Department of State

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## ARMISTICE IN KOREA:

President's Message to the Nation . . . . .	131
Statement by Secretary Dulles . . . . .	131
Text of Armistice Agreement and Supplementary Agreement on Prisoners of War . . . . .	132

AMERICA'S STAKE IN A HEALTHY FREE-WORLD ECONOMY • <i>by Assistant Secretary Waugh</i> . . . . .	142
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ADMINISTERING THE PACIFIC TRUST TERRITORY • <i>Statement by Frank E. Midkiff</i> . . . . .	150
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*For index see inside back cover*



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# ARMISTICE IN KOREA

## THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO THE NATION<sup>1</sup>

White House press release dated July 26

My fellow citizens: Tonight we greet, with prayers of thanksgiving, the official news that an armistice was signed almost an hour ago in Korea. It will quickly bring to an end the fighting between the U.N. forces and the Communist armies. For this Nation the cost of repelling aggression has been high. In thousands of homes it has been incalculable. It has been paid in terms of tragedy.

With special feelings of sorrow—and of solemn gratitude—we think of those who were called upon to lay down their lives in that far-off land to prove once again that only courage and sacrifice can keep freedom alive upon the earth. To the widows and orphans of this war, and to those veterans who bear disabling wounds, America renews tonight her pledge of lasting devotion and care.

Our thoughts turn also to those other Americans wearied by many months of imprisonment behind the enemy lines. The swift return of all of them will bring joy to thousands of families. It will be evidence of good faith on the part of those with whom we have signed this armistice.

Soldiers, sailors, and airmen of 16 different countries have stood as partners beside us throughout these long and bitter months. America's thanks go to each. In this struggle we have seen the United Nations meet the challenge of aggression—not with pathetic words of protest, but with deeds of decisive purpose. It is proper that we salute particularly the valorous armies of the Republic of Korea, for they have done even more than prove their right to freedom. Inspired by President Syngman Rhee, they have given an example of courage and patriotism which again demonstrates that men of the West and men of the East can fight and work and live together side by side in pursuit of a just and noble cause.

And so at long last the carnage of war is to cease and the negotiation of the conference table

<sup>1</sup> Delivered over radio and television at 10 p. m., e. d. t. July 26, immediately after the signing of the Korean armistice at Panmunjom.

is to begin. On this Sabbath evening each of us devoutly prays that all nations may come to see the wisdom of composing differences in this fashion before, rather than after, there is resort to brutal and futile battle.

Now as we strive to bring about that wisdom, there is, in this moment of sober satisfaction, one thought that must discipline our emotions and steady our resolution. It is this: We have won an armistice on a single battleground—not peace in the world. We may not now relax our guard nor cease our quest.

Throughout the coming months, during the period of prisoner screening and exchange, and during the possibly longer period of the political conference which looks toward the unification of Korea, we and our U.N. Allies must be vigilant against the possibility of untoward developments.

And as we do so, we shall fervently strive to insure that this armistice will, in fact, bring free peoples one step nearer to their goal of a world at peace.

My friends, almost 90 years ago, Abraham Lincoln at the end of a war delivered his second inaugural address. At the end of that speech he spoke some words that I think more nearly express the true feelings of America tonight than would any other words ever spoken or written. You will recall them:

With malice toward none; with charity for all; with firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in . . . to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and a lasting peace among ourselves and with all nations.

This is our resolve and our dedication.

## STATEMENT BY SECRETARY DULLES<sup>2</sup>

We welcome the Korean armistice.

The commander of the U.N. forces, with whom are joined the troops of the Republic of Korea, has signed for his command. The Communist commanders have signed for their commands. We hope that they have acted and will proceed in good faith. However, until that is demon-

<sup>2</sup> Delivered to the Nation over radio and television on July 26 (press release 397).

strated, the present armistice is by no means the equivalent of assured peace. So, we shall not relax our vigilance nor shall we reduce our strength in Korea until future events show that this is prudent.

This is a solemn hour.

In this hour, it is fitting that as God-fearing people we should give thanks to the Almighty that the killing and maiming of man by man will stop and that evil passions will be allayed. That is a precious gain for all who believe in human dignity and in the moral law.

In this hour, we rejoice that the shadow of apprehension which, for over 3 years, has darkened many a home is now lifted. Tomorrow, no new names will be added to the long list of American casualties. Also, our thoughts go out eagerly to those of our sons, for long months captives of the enemy, who are now to be returned. But our mood is also one of sorrow as we think of the many who never will return, or who return bearing grievous hurts.

In this hour, let us also think of the cause for which so great a sacrifice was made. For the first time in history an international organization has stood against an aggressor and has marshaled force to meet force. The aggressor, at first victorious, has been repulsed. The armistice leaves him in control of less territory than when his aggression began, and that territory is largely wasted.

The North Korean Army is virtually extinct, the Chinese and Korean Communist armies have sustained about 2 million casualties, and of the 10 million people of North Korea, one out of every three has died from the war ravages and the inhuman neglects which their rulers have imposed. These tragic results will surely be pondered by other potential nominees for aggression-by-satellite. All free nations, large and small, are safer today because the ideal of collective security has been implemented and because awful punishment has been visited upon the transgressors.

In this hour, we welcome also the triumph of the principle of political asylum. Many of the North Korean and Chinese prisoners of war want hereafter to live in freedom. The Communists stubbornly insisted that these prisoners must be forcibly returned. Now that demand is abandoned. No prisoners will be returned against their will. They may choose freedom. The consequences of this decision run far beyond Korea. The Communist rulers now know that if they wage another war of aggression, those who unwillingly serve in their Red armies can escape to freedom, confident that they will never be handed back. Thus the Red armies become less dependable as instruments of aggression and the chance of aggression is correspondingly reduced.

In this hour, when we think of the gains which

this armistice records, we must think also of the cost. We owe much, indeed all humanity owes much, to the gallant troops who fought under the U.N. Command. The young Americans of our armed forces wrote, often with their blood, an epic chapter of heroic response to duty. The brave people of the Republic of Korea, under the inspiring leadership of President Rhee, sustained their will to fight in the face of frightful suffering. Also, 15 members of the United Nations, in addition to the United States, contributed valiant fighting men to the U.N. Command. All of this cost must be held in grateful remembrance.

In this hour, as we recognize our debt, let us also recognize that gratitude is not enough. We face new tasks. An immediate task is the binding up of the wounds that war has inflicted. We shall do so in South Korea, and indeed in all Korea, if unification can be achieved. We are no less determined than before to achieve this unification. Since World War II, it has been our firm conviction that the unification of the peninsula must come about through political means rather than by force. Nothing has happened to alter that conviction. Now we shall press forward, in political conference, to end an unnatural division which, so long as it persists, will be a potential cause of strife.

Finally, in this hour, let us recognize that the need for effort and for sacrifice has not passed. In war, men make vast sacrifices for peace. Then, when peace is won, they fail to make the lesser sacrifices needed to keep the peace. Let us, this time, not relax, but mobilize for peace the resources, spiritual and material, which we too often reserve for war. Now more than ever we are bound irrevocably to press forward toward the goals of universal peace and justice.

#### TEXT OF ARMISTICE AGREEMENT

Agreement between the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the other hand, concerning a military armistice in Korea.

#### PREAMBLE

The undersigned, the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the other hand, in the interest of stopping the Korean conflict, with its great toll of suffering and bloodshed on both sides, and with the objective of establishing an armistice which will insure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved, do individually, collectively, and mutually agree to accept and to be bound and governed by the conditions and terms of armistice set forth in the following articles and paragraphs, which said conditions and terms are intended to be purely military in character and to pertain solely to the belligerents in Korea.

ARTICLE I

MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE AND  
DEMILITARIZED ZONE

1. A military demarcation line shall be fixed and both sides shall withdraw two (2) kilometers from this line so as to establish a demilitarized zone between the opposing forces. A demilitarized zone shall be established as a buffer zone to prevent the occurrence of incidents which might lead to a resumption of hostilities.

2. The military demarcation line is located as indicated on the attached map (Map 1).<sup>3</sup>

3. This demilitarized zone is defined by a northern and a southern boundary as indicated on the attached map (Map 1).

4. The military demarcation line shall be plainly marked as directed by the Military Armistice Commission hereinafter established. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall have suitable markers erected along the boundary between the demilitarized zone and their respective areas. The Military Armistice Commission shall supervise the erection of all markers placed along the military demarcation line and along the boundaries of the demilitarized zone.

5. The waters of the Han River Estuary shall be open to civil shipping of both sides wherever one bank is controlled by one side and the other bank is controlled by the other side. The Military Armistice Commission shall prescribe rules for the shipping in that part of the Han River Estuary indicated on the attached map (Map 2). Civil shipping of each side shall have unrestricted access to the land under the military control of that side.

6. Neither side shall execute any hostile act within, from, or against the demilitarized zone.

7. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to cross the military demarcation line unless specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armistice Commission.

8. No person, military or civilian, in the demilitarized zone shall be permitted to enter the territory under the military control of either side unless specifically authorized to do so by the Commander into whose territory entry is sought.

9. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to enter the demilitarized zone except persons concerned with the conduct of civil administration and relief and persons specifically authorized to enter by the Military Armistice Commission.

10. Civil administration and relief in that part of the demilitarized zone which is south of the military demarcation line shall be the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command; and civil administration and relief in that part of the demilitarized zone which is north of the military demarcation line shall be the joint responsibility of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. The number of persons, military or civilian, from each side who are permitted to enter the demilitarized zone for the conduct of civil administration and relief shall be as determined by the respective Commanders, but in no case shall the total number authorized by either side exceed one thousand (1,000) persons at any one time. The number of civil police and the arms to be carried by them shall be as prescribed by the Military Armistice Commission. Other personnel shall not carry arms unless specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armistice Commission.

11. Nothing contained in this article shall be construed to prevent the complete freedom of movement to, from, and within the demilitarized zone by the Military Armistice Commission, its assistants, its Joint Observer Teams with their assistants, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission hereinafter established, its assistants, its Neutral

<sup>3</sup> The 5 maps are not printed here.

Nations Inspection Teams with their assistants, and of any other persons, materials, and equipment specifically authorized to enter the demilitarized zone by the Military Armistice Commission. Convenience of movement shall be permitted through the territory under the military control of either side over any route necessary to move between points within the demilitarized zone where such points are not connected by roads lying completely within the demilitarized zone.

ARTICLE II

CONCRETE ARRANGEMENTS FOR CEASE-FIRE AND  
ARMISTICE

A. General

12. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall order and enforce a complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by all armed forces under their control, including all units and personnel of the ground, naval, and air forces, effective twelve (12) hours after this armistice agreement is signed. (See paragraph 63 hereof for effective date and hour of the remaining provisions of this armistice agreement).

13. In order to insure the stability of the military armistice so as to facilitate the attainment of a peaceful settlement through the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, the Commanders of the opposing sides shall:

(a) Within seventy-two (72) hours after this armistice agreement becomes effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies, and equipment from the demilitarized zone except as otherwise provided herein. All demolitions, minefields, wire entanglements, and other hazards to the safe movement of personnel of the Military Armistice Commission or its joint observer teams, known to exist within the demilitarized zone after the withdrawal of military forces therefrom, together with lanes known to be free of all such hazards, shall be reported to the MAC by the Commander of the side whose forces emplaced such hazards. Subsequently, additional safe lanes shall be cleared; and eventually, within forty-five (45) days after the termination of the seventy-two (72) hour period, all such hazards shall be removed from the demilitarized zone as directed by and under the supervision of the MAC. At the termination of the seventy-two (72) hour period, except for unarmed troops authorized a forty-five (45) day period to complete salvage operations under MAC supervision, such units of a police nature as may be specifically requested by the MAC and agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing sides, and personnel authorized under paragraphs 10 and 11 hereof, no personnel of either side shall be permitted to enter the demilitarized zone.

(b) Within ten (10) days after this armistice agreement becomes effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies, and equipment from the rear and the coastal islands and waters of Korea of the other side. If such military forces are not withdrawn within the stated time limit, and there is no mutually agreed and valid reason for the delay, the other side shall have the right to take any action which it deems necessary for the maintenance of security and order. The term "coastal islands", as used above, refers to those islands which, though occupied by one side at the time when this armistice agreement becomes effective, were controlled by the other side on 24 June 1950; provided, however, that all the islands lying to the north and west of the provincial boundary line between HWANGHAE-DO and KYONGGI-DO shall be under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, except the island groups of PAENGYONG-DO (37°58' N., 124°40' E.), TAECHEONG-DO (37°50' N., 124°42' E.), SOCHONG-DO (37°46' N., 124°46' E.), YONPYONG-DO (37°38' N., 125°40' E.), and U-DO (37°36' N., 125°58' E.) and which shall remain under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Na-

tions Command. All the islands on the west coast of Korea lying south of the above-mentioned boundary line shall remain under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. (See Map 3.)

(c) Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing military personnel; provided, however, that the rotation of units and personnel, the arrival in Korea of personnel on a temporary duty basis, and the return to Korea of personnel after short periods of leave or temporary duty outside of Korea shall be permitted within the scope prescribed below:

"Rotation" is defined as the replacement of units or personnel by other units or personnel who are commencing a tour of duty in Korea. Rotation personnel shall be introduced into and evacuated from Korea only through the ports of entry enumerated in paragraph 43 hereof. Rotation shall be conducted on a man-for-man basis; provided, however, that no more than thirty-five thousand (35,000) persons in the military service shall be admitted into Korea by either side in any calendar month under the rotation policy. No military personnel of either side shall be introduced into Korea if the introduction of such personnel will cause the aggregate of the military personnel of that side admitted into Korea since the effective date of this armistice agreement to exceed the cumulative total of the military personnel of that side who have departed from Korea since that date. Reports concerning arrivals in and departures from Korea of military personnel shall be made daily to the MAC and the NNSC; such reports shall include places of arrival and departure and the number of persons arriving at or departing from each such place. The NNSC, through its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, shall conduct supervision and inspection of the rotation of units and personnel authorized above, at the ports of entry enumerated in paragraph 43 hereof.

(d) Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition; provided, however, that combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition which are destroyed, damaged, worn out, or used up during the period of the armistice may be replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type. Such combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition shall be introduced into Korea only through the ports of entry enumerated in paragraph 43 hereof. In order to justify the requirements for combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition to be introduced into Korea for replacement purposes, reports concerning every incoming shipment of these items shall be made to the MAC and the NNSC; such reports shall include statements regarding the disposition of the items being replaced. Items to be replaced which are removed from Korea shall be removed only through the ports of entry enumerated in paragraph 43 hereof. The NNSC, through its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, shall conduct supervision and inspection of the replacement of combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition authorized above, at the ports of entry enumerated in paragraph 43 hereof.

(e) Insure that personnel of their respective commands who violate any of the provisions of this armistice agreement are adequately punished.

(f) In those cases where places of burial are a matter of record and graves are actually found to exist, permit graves registration personnel of the other side to enter, within a definite time limit after this armistice agreement becomes effective, the territory of Korea under their military control, for the purpose of proceeding to such graves to recover and evacuate the bodies of the deceased military personnel of that side, including deceased prisoners of war. The specific procedures and the time limit for the performance of the above task shall be determined by the Military Armistice Commission. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall furnish to the other side all available information pertaining to the places of burial of the deceased military personnel of the other side.

(g) Afford full protection and all possible assistance and cooperation to the Military Armistice Commission, its Joint Observer Teams, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, in the carrying out of their functions and responsibilities hereinafter assigned; and accord to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and to its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, full convenience of movement between the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the ports of entry enumerated in paragraph 43 hereof over main lines of communication agreed upon by both sides (See Map 4), and between the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the places where violations of this armistice agreement have been reported to have occurred. In order to prevent unnecessary delays, the use of alternate routes and means of transportation will be permitted whenever the main lines of communication are closed or impassable.

(h) Provide such logistic support, including communications and transportation facilities, as may be required by the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and their Teams.

(i) Each construct, operate, and maintain a suitable airfield in their respective parts of the demilitarized zone in the vicinity of the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission, for such uses as the Commission may determine.

(j) Insure that all members and other personnel of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission hereinafter established shall enjoy the freedom and facilities necessary for the proper exercise of their functions, including privileges, treatment, and immunities equivalent to those ordinarily enjoyed by accredited diplomatic personnel under international usage.

14. This armistice agreement shall apply to all opposing ground forces under the military control of either side, which ground forces shall respect the demilitarized zone and the area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side.

15. This armistice agreement shall apply to all opposing naval forces, which naval forces shall respect the waters contiguous to the demilitarized zone and to the land area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and shall not engage in blockade of any kind of Korea.

16. This armistice agreement shall apply to all opposing air forces, which air forces shall respect the air space over the demilitarized zone and over the area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and over the waters contiguous to both.

17. Responsibility for compliance with and enforcement of the terms and provisions of this armistice agreement is that of the signatories hereto and their successors in command. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall establish within their respective commands all measures and procedures necessary to insure complete compliance with all of the provisions hereof by all elements of their commands. They shall actively cooperate with one another and with the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in requiring observance of both the letter and the spirit of all of the provisions of this armistice agreement.

18. The costs of the operations of the Military Armistice Commission and of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of their Teams shall be shared equally by the two opposing sides.

#### B. *Military Armistice Commission.*

##### 1. *Composition*

19. A Military Armistice Commission is hereby established.

20. The Military Armistice Commission shall be composed of ten (10) senior officers, five (5) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and five (5) of whom shall be appointed jointly

by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Of the ten members, three (3) from each side shall be of general or flag rank. The two (2) remaining members on each side may be major generals, brigadier generals, colonels, or their equivalent.

21. Members of the Military Armistice Commission shall be permitted to use staff assistants as required.

22. The Military Armistice Commission shall be provided with the necessary administrative personnel to establish a Secretariat charged with assisting the Commission by performing record-keeping, secretarial, interpreting, and such other functions as the Commission may assign to it. Each side shall appoint to the Secretariat a Secretary and an Assistant Secretary and such clerical and specialized personnel as required by the Secretariat. Records shall be kept in English, Korean, and Chinese, all of which shall be equally authentic.

23. (a) The Military Armistice Commission shall be initially provided with and assisted by ten (10) Joint Observer Teams, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission.

(b) Each Joint Observer Team shall be composed of not less than four (4) nor more than six (6) officers of field grade, half of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and half of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, and interpreters shall be furnished by each side as required for the functioning of the Joint Observer Teams.

## 2. Functions and Authority

24. The general mission of the Military Armistice Commission shall be to supervise the implementation of this armistice agreement and to settle through negotiations any violations of this armistice agreement.

25. The Military Armistice Commission shall:

(a) Locate its headquarters in the vicinity of PANMUNJOM (37°57'29" N. 126°40'00" E). The Military Armistice Commission may relocate its headquarters at another point within the demilitarized zone by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Commission.

(b) Operate as a joint organization without a chairman.

(c) Adopt such rules of procedure as it may, from time to time, deem necessary.

(d) Supervise the carrying out of the provisions of this armistice agreement pertaining to the demilitarized zone and to the Han River Estuary.

(e) Direct the operations of the Joint Observer Teams.

(f) Settle through negotiations any violations of this armistice agreement.

(g) Transmit immediately to the Commanders of the opposing sides all reports of investigations of violations of this armistice agreement and all other reports and records of proceedings received from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

(h) Give general supervision and direction to the activities of the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War and the Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians, hereinafter established.

(i) Act as an intermediary in transmitting communications between the Commanders of the opposing sides; provided, however, that the foregoing shall not be construed to preclude the Commanders of both sides from communicating with each other by any other means which they may desire to employ.

(j) Provide credentials and distinctive insignia for its staff and its Joint Observer Teams, and a distinctive marking for all vehicles, aircraft, and vessels, used in the performance of its mission.

26. The mission of the Joint Observer Teams shall be

to assist the Military Armistice Commission in supervising the carrying out of the provisions of this armistice agreement pertaining to the demilitarized zone and to the Han River Estuary.

27. The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of either side thereof, is authorized to dispatch Joint Observer Teams to investigate violations of this armistice agreement reported to have occurred in the demilitarized zone or in the Han River Estuary; provided, however, that not more than one half of the Joint Observer Team which have not been dispatched by the Military Armistice Commission may be dispatched at any one time by the senior member of either side on the Commission.

28. The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of either side thereof, is authorized to request the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to conduct special observations and inspections at places outside the demilitarized zone where violations of this armistice agreement have been reported to have occurred.

29. When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation of this armistice agreement has occurred, it shall immediately report such violation to the Commanders of the opposing sides.

30. When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation of this armistice agreement has been corrected to its satisfaction, it shall so report to the Commanders of the opposing sides.

## 3. General

31. The Military Armistice Commission shall meet daily. Recesses of not to exceed seven (7) days may be agreed upon by the senior members of both sides; provided, that such recesses may be terminated on twenty-four (24) hour notice by the senior member of either side.

32. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of the Military Armistice Commission shall be forwarded to the Commanders of the opposing sides as soon as possible after each meeting.

33. The Joint Observer Teams shall make periodic reports to the Military Armistice Commission as required by the Commission and, in addition, shall make such special reports as may be deemed necessary by them, or as may be required by the Commission.

34. The Military Armistice Commission shall maintain duplicate files of the reports and records of proceedings required by this armistice agreement. The Commission is authorized to maintain duplicate files of such other reports, records, etc., as may be necessary in the conduct of its business. Upon eventual dissolution of the Commission, one set of the above files shall be turned over to each side.

35. The Military Armistice Commission may make recommendations to the Commanders of the opposing sides with respect to amendments or additions to this armistice agreement. Such recommended changes should generally be those designed to insure a more effective armistice.

## C. Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission

### 1. Composition

36. A Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is hereby established.

37. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be composed of four (4) senior officers, two (2) of whom shall be appointed by neutral nations nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, namely, SWEDEN and SWITZERLAND, and two (2) of whom shall be appointed by neutral nations nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, namely, POLAND and CZECHOSLOVAKIA. The term "neutral nations" as herein used is defined as those nations whose combatant forces have not participated in the hostilities in Korea. Members appointed to the Commission may be from the armed forces of the appointing

nations. Each member shall designate an alternate member to attend those meetings which for any reason the principal member is unable to attend. Such alternate members shall be of the same nationality as their principals. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may take action whenever the number of members present from the neutral nations nominated by one side is equal to the number of members present from the neutral nations nominated by the other side.

38. Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be permitted to use staff assistants furnished by the neutral nations as required. These staff assistants may be appointed as alternate members of the Commission.

39. The neutral nations shall be requested to furnish the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission with the necessary administrative personnel to establish a Secretariat charged with assisting the Commission by performing necessary record-keeping, secretarial, interpreting, and such other functions as the Commission may assign to it.

40. (a) The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be initially provided with, and assisted by, twenty (20) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be responsible to, shall report to, and shall be subject to the direction of, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission only.

(b) Each Neutral Nations Inspection Team shall be composed of not less than four (4) officers, preferably of field grade, half of whom shall be from the neutral nations nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and half of whom shall be from the neutral nations nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Members appointed to the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams may be from the armed forces of the appointing nations. In order to facilitate the functioning of the Teams, sub-teams composed of not less than two (2) members, one of whom shall be from a neutral nation nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and one of whom shall be from a neutral nation nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, may be formed as circumstances require. Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, interpreters, and communications personnel, and such equipment as may be required by the Teams to perform their missions, shall be furnished by the Commander of each side, as required, in the demilitarized zone and in the territory under his military control. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may provide itself and the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams with such of the above personnel and equipment of its own as it may desire; provided, however, that such personnel shall be personnel of the same neutral nations of which the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is composed.

2. *Functions and Authority*

41. The mission of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be to carry out the functions of supervision, observation, inspection, and investigation, as stipulated in sub-paragraphs 13 (c) and 13 (d) and paragraph 28 hereof, and to report the results of such supervision, observation, inspection, and investigation to the Military Armistice Commission.

42. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall:

(a) Locate its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.

(b) Adopt such rules of procedure as it may, from time to time, deem necessary.

(c) Conduct, through its members and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, the supervision and inspection provided for in sub-paragraphs 13 (c) and 13 (d) of this

armistice agreement at the ports of entry enumerated in paragraph 43 hereof, and the special observations and inspections provided for in paragraph 28 hereof at those places where violations of this armistice agreement have been reported to have occurred. The inspection of combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be such as to enable them to properly insure that reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition are not being introduced into Korea; but this shall not be construed as authorizing inspections or examinations of any secret designs or characteristics of any combat aircraft, armored vehicle, weapon, or ammunition.

(d) Direct and supervise the operations of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams.

(e) Station five (5) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams at the ports of entry enumerated in paragraph 43 hereof located in the territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command; and five (5) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams at the ports of entry enumerated in paragraph 43 hereof located in the territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers; and establish initially ten (10) mobile Neutral Nations Inspection Teams in reserve, stationed in the general vicinity of the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission. Not more than half of the mobile Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be dispatched at any one time in accordance with requests of the senior member of either side on the Military Armistice Commission.

(f) Subject to the provisions of the preceding subparagraphs, conduct without delay investigations of reported violations of this armistice agreement, including such investigations of reported violations of this armistice agreement as may be requested by the Military Armistice Commission or by the senior member of either side of the Commission.

(g) Provide credentials and distinctive insignia for its staff and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, and a distinctive marking for all vehicles, aircraft, and vessels, used in the performance of its mission.

43. Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be stationed at the following ports of entry:

Territory under the military control of the United Nations Command

INCHON.....	(37°28' N, 126°38' E)
TAEGU.....	(35°52' N, 128°36' E)
PUSAN.....	(35°06' N, 129°02' E)
KANGNUNG.....	(37°45' N, 128°54' E)
KUNSAN.....	(35°59' N, 126°43' E)

Territory under the military control of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers

SINUJU.....	(40°06' N, 124°24' E)
CHONGJIM.....	(41°46' N, 129°49' E)
HUNGNAM.....	(39°50' N, 127°37' E)
MANPO.....	(41°09' N, 126°18' E)
SINANJU.....	(39°36' N, 125°36' E)

These Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be accorded full convenience of movement within the areas and over the routes of communication set forth on the attached map (Map 5).

3. *General*

44. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall meet daily. Recesses of not to exceed seven (7) days may be agreed upon by the members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; provided, that such recesses may be terminated on twenty-four (24) hour notice by any member.

45. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meet-



ings of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be forwarded to the Military Armistice Commission as soon as possible after each meeting. Records shall be kept in English, Korean, and Chinese.

46. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall make periodic reports concerning the results of their supervision, observations, inspections, and investigations to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission as required by the Commission and, in addition, shall make such special reports as may be deemed necessary by them, or as may be required by the Commission. Reports shall be submitted by a Team as a whole, but may also be submitted by one or more individual members thereof; provided, that the reports submitted by one or more individual members thereof shall be considered as informational only.

47. Copies of the reports made by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be forwarded to the Military Armistice Commission by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission without delay and in the language in which received. They shall not be delayed by the process of translation or evaluation. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall evaluate such reports at the earliest practicable time and shall forward their findings to the Military Armistice Commission as a matter of priority. The Military Armistice Commission shall not take final action with regard to any such report until the evaluation thereof has been received from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of its Teams shall be subject to appearance before the Military Armistice Commission, at the request of the senior member of either side on the Military Armistice Commission, for clarification of any report submitted.

48. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall maintain duplicate files of the reports and records of proceedings required by this armistice agreement. The Commission is authorized to maintain duplicate files of such other reports, records, etc., as may be necessary in the conduct of its business. Upon eventual dissolution of the Commission, one set of the above files shall be turned over to each side.

49. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may make recommendations to the Military Armistice Commission with respect to amendments or additions to this armistice agreement. Such recommended changes should generally be those designed to insure a more effective armistice.

50. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, or any member thereof, shall be authorized to communicate with any member of the Military Armistice Commission.

### ARTICLE III

#### ARRANGEMENTS RELATING TO PRISONERS OF WAR

51. The release and repatriation of all prisoners of war held in the custody of each side at the time this armistice agreement becomes effective shall be effected in conformity with the following provisions agreed upon by both sides prior to the signing of this armistice agreement.

(a) Within sixty (60) days after this armistice agreement becomes effective each side shall, without offering any hindrance, directly repatriate and hand over in groups all those prisoners of war in its custody who insist on repatriation to the side to which they belonged at the time of capture. Repatriation shall be accomplished in accordance with the related provisions of this article. In order to expedite the repatriation process of such personnel, each side shall, prior to the signing of the armistice agreement, exchange the total numbers, by nationalities, of personnel to be directly repatriated. Each group of prisoners of war delivered to the other side shall be accompanied by rosters, prepared by nationality, to in-

clude name, rank (if any) and interment or military serial number.

(b) Each side shall release all those remaining prisoners of war, who are not directly repatriated, from its military control and from its custody and hand them over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission for disposition in accordance with the provisions in the annex hereto: "Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission."

(c) So that there may be no misunderstanding owing to the equal use of three languages, the act of delivery of a prisoner of war by one side to the other side shall, for the purposes of this armistice agreement, be called "repatriation" in English, "Song Hwan" ( ) in Korean, and "Ch'ien Fan" ( ) in Chinese, notwithstanding the nationality or place of residence of such prisoner of war.

52. Each side insures that it will not employ in acts of war in the Korean conflict any prisoner of war released and repatriated incident to the coming into effect of this armistice agreement.

53. All the sick and injured prisoners of war who insist upon repatriation shall be repatriated with priority. Insofar as possible, there shall be captured medical personnel repatriated concurrently with the sick and injured prisoners of war, so as to provide medical care and attendance enroute.

54. The repatriation of all of the prisoners of war required by sub-paragraph 51 (a) hereof shall be completed within a time limit of sixty (60) days after this armistice agreement becomes effective. Within this time limit each side undertakes to complete the repatriation of the above-mentioned prisoners of war in its custody at the earliest practicable time.

55. PANMUNJOM is designated as the place where prisoners of war will be delivered and received by both sides. Additional place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war in the demilitarized zone may be designated, if necessary, by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.

56. (a) A committee for repatriation of prisoners of war is hereby established. It shall be composed of six (6) officers of field grade, three (3) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and three (3) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. This committee shall, under the general supervision and direction of the Military Armistice Commission, be responsible for coordinating the specific plans of both sides for the repatriation of prisoners of war and for supervising the execution by both sides of all of the provisions of this armistice agreement relating to the repatriation of prisoners of war. It shall be the duty of this committee to coordinate the timing of the arrival of prisoners of war at the places of delivery and reception of prisoners of war from the prisoner of war camps of both sides; to make, when necessary, such special arrangements as may be required with regard to the transportation and welfare of sick and injured prisoners of war; to coordinate the work of the Joint Red Cross teams, established in paragraph 57 hereof, in assisting in the repatriation of prisoners of war; to supervise the implementation of the arrangements for the actual repatriation of prisoners of war stipulated in paragraphs 53 and 54 hereof; to select, when necessary, additional places of delivery and reception of prisoners of war; to arrange for security at the places of delivery and reception of prisoners of war; and to carry out such other related functions as are required for the repatriation of prisoners of war.

(b) When unable to reach agreement on any matter relating to its responsibilities, the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall immediately refer such matter to the Military Armistice Commission for decision. The Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War

shall maintain its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.

(c) The Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall be dissolved by the Military Armistice Commission upon completion of the program of repatriation of prisoners of war.

57. (a) Immediately after this armistice agreement becomes effective, Joint Red Cross teams composed of representatives of the National Red Cross Societies of the countries contributing forces to the United Nations Command on the one hand, and representatives of the Red Cross Society of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and representatives of the Red Cross Society of the People's Republic of China on the other hand, shall be established. The joint Red Cross teams shall assist in the execution by both sides of those provisions of this armistice agreement relating to the repatriation of all the prisoners of war specified in sub-paragraph 51 (a), hereof, who insist upon repatriation, by the performance of such humanitarian services as are necessary and desirable for the welfare of the prisoners of war. To accomplish this task, the Joint Red Cross teams shall provide assistance in the delivering and receiving of prisoners of war by both sides at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war, and shall visit the prisoner-of-war camps of both sides to comfort the prisoners of war and to bring in and distribute gift articles for the comfort and welfare of the prisoners of war. The Joint Red Cross teams may provide services to prisoners of war while en route from prisoner-of-war camps to the places of delivery and reception of prisoners of war.

(b) The Joint Red Cross teams shall be organized as set forth below:

(1) One team shall be composed of twenty (20) members, namely, ten (10) representatives from the national Red Cross societies of each side, to assist in the delivering and receiving of prisoners of war by both sides at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. The chairmanship of this team shall alternate daily between representatives from the Red Cross societies of the two sides. The work and services of this team shall be coordinated by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.

(2) One team shall be composed of sixty (60) members, namely, thirty (30) representatives from the national Red Cross societies of each side, to visit the prisoner-of-war camps under the administration of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers. This team may provide services to prisoners of war while en route from the prisoner-of-war camps to the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. A representative of the Red Cross society of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or of the Red Cross Society of the People's Republic of China shall serve as chairman of this team.

(3) One team shall be composed of sixty (60) members, namely, thirty (30) representatives from the national Red Cross societies of each side, to visit the prisoner-of-war camps under the administration of the United Nations Command. This team may provide services to prisoners of war while en route from the prisoner-of-war camps to the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. A representative of a Red Cross society of a nation contributing forces to the United Nations Command shall serve as chairman of this team.

(4) In order to facilitate the functioning of each joint Red Cross team, sub-teams composed of not less than two (2) members from the team, with an equal number of representatives from each side, may be formed as circumstances require.

(5) Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, and interpreters, and such equipment as may be required by the joint Red Cross teams to perform their missions, shall be furnished by the Commander of each side to the team operating in the territory under his military control.

(6) Whenever jointly agreed upon by the representa-

tives of both sides on any joint Red Cross team, the size of such team may be increased or decreased, subject to confirmation by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.

(c) The Commander of each side shall cooperate fully with the joint Red Cross teams in the performance of their functions, and undertakes to insure the security of the personnel of the joint Red Cross team in the area under his military control. The Commander of each side shall provide such logistic, administrative, and communications facilities as may be required by the team operating in the territory under his military control.

(d) The Joint Red Cross teams shall be dissolved upon completion of the program of repatriation of all the prisoners of war specified in sub-paragraph 51 (a) hereof, who insist upon repatriation.

58. (a) The Commander of each side shall furnish to the Commander of the other side as soon as practicable, but not later than ten (10) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the following information concerning prisoners of war:

(1) Complete data pertaining to the prisoners of war who escaped since the effective date of the data last exchanged.

(2) Insofar as practicable, information regarding name, nationality, rank, and other identification data, date and cause of death, and place of burial, of those prisoners of war who died while in his custody.

(b) If any prisoners of war escape or die after the effective date of the supplementary information specified above, the detaining side shall furnish to the other side, through the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War, the data pertaining thereto in accordance with the provisions of sub-paragraph 58 (a) hereof. Such data shall be furnished at 10-day intervals until the completion of the program of delivery and reception of prisoners of war.

(c) Any escaped prisoner of war who returns to the custody of the detaining side after the completion of the program of delivery and reception of prisoners of war shall be delivered to the Military Armistice Commission for disposition.

59. (a) All civilians who, at the time this armistice agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, and who, on 24 June 1950, resided north of the military demarcation line established in this armistice agreement shall, if they desire to return home, be permitted and assisted by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, to return to the area north of the military demarcation line; and all civilians who, at the time this armistice agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, and who, on 24 June 1950, resided south of the military demarcation line established in this armistice agreement shall, if they desire to return home, be permitted and assisted by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers to return to the area south of the military demarcation line. The commander of each side shall be responsible for publicizing widely throughout territory under his military control the contents of the provisions of this subparagraph, and for calling upon the appropriate civil authorities to give necessary guidance and assistance to all such civilians who desire to return home.

(b) All civilians of foreign nationality who, at the time this armistice agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers shall, if they desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, be permitted and assisted to do so; all civilians of foreign nationality who, at the time this armistice agreement be-

comes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, shall, if they desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, be permitted and assisted to do so. The Commander of each side shall be responsible for publicizing widely throughout the territory under his military control the contents of the provisions of this subparagraph, and for calling upon the appropriate civil authorities to give necessary guidance and assistance to all such civilians of foreign nationality who desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the commander of the other side.

(c) Measures to assist in the return of civilians provided for in subparagraph 59 (a) hereof and the movement of civilians provided for in subparagraph 59 (b) hereof shall be commenced by both sides as soon as possible after this armistice agreement becomes effective.

(d) (1) A committee for assisting the return of displaced civilians is hereby established. It shall be composed of four (4) officers of field grade, two (2) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and two (2) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. This committee shall, under the general supervision and direction of the Military Armistice Commission, be responsible for coordinating the specific plans of both sides for assistance to the return of the above-mentioned civilians, and for supervising the execution by both sides of all the provisions of this armistice agreement relating to the return of the above-mentioned civilians. It shall be the duty of this committee to make necessary arrangements, including those of transportation, for expediting and coordinating the movement of the above-mentioned civilians; to select the crossing points through which the above-mentioned civilians will cross the military demarcation line; to arrange for security at the crossing points; and to carry out such other functions as are required to accomplish the return of the above-mentioned civilians.

(2) When unable to reach agreement on any matter relating to its responsibilities, the Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall immediately refer such matter to the Military Armistice Commission for decision. The Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall maintain its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.

(3) The Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall be dissolved by the Military Armistice Commission upon fulfillment of its mission.

#### ARTICLE IV

##### RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED ON BOTH SIDES

60. In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after the armistice agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.

#### ARTICLE V

##### MISCELLANEOUS

61. Amendments and additions to this armistice agreement must be mutually agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing sides.

62. The articles and paragraphs of this armistice agreement shall remain in effect until expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides.

63. All of the provisions of this armistice agreement, other than paragraph 12, shall become effective at 2200 hours on July 27, 1953.

Done at PANMUNJOM, Korea, at 1000 hours on the 27th day of July 1953, in English, Korean, and Chinese, all texts being equally authentic.<sup>4</sup>

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*General, Korean People's Army, Senior Delegate, Delegation of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers*

WILLIAM K. HARRISON, Jr.

*Lieutenant General, United States Army, Senior Delegate, United Nations Command Delegation*

**Editor's Note.** The official text of the agreement reached Washington as this issue was going to press. A comparison with the unofficial text, as distributed by the Department on July 26, disclosed a number of minor differences, chiefly of a stylistic nature. All substantive changes have been made in the text as printed here; in order not to delay publication, changes in style, such as the capitalization of "armistice agreement," "demilitarized zone," and "military demarcation line," have not been made.

#### SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT ON PRISONERS OF WAR<sup>5</sup>

In order to meet the requirements of the disposition of the prisoners of war not for direct repatriation in accordance with the provisions of the terms of reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the one hand, and the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, on the other hand, in pursuance of the provisions in paragraph 61, article 5 of the agreement concerning a military armistice in Korea, agree to conclude the following temporary agreement supplementary to the armistice agreement:

1. Under the provisions of paragraphs 4 and 5, article II of the terms of reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, the United Nations Command has the right to designate the area between the military demarcation line and the eastern and southern boundaries of the demilitarized zone between the Imjin River on the south and the road leading south from Okum-Ni on the northeast (the main road leading southeast from Panmunjom not included), as the area within which the United Nations Command will turn over the prisoners of war, who are not directly repatriated and whom the United Nations Command has the responsibility for keeping under its custody, to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the armed forces of India for custody. The United Nations Command shall, prior to the signing of the armistice agreement, inform the side of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers of the approximate figures by nationality of such prisoners of war held in its custody.

2. If there are prisoners of war under their custody

<sup>4</sup>The agreement was subsequently signed by Gen. Mark W. Clark, Commander-in-Chief, U. N. Command; Marshal Kim Il Sung, Supreme Commander, Korean People's Army; and Peng Teh-Huai, Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers.

<sup>5</sup>For text of the Agreement on Prisoners of War signed on June 8, see BULLETIN of June 22, 1953, p. 866.

who request not to be directly repatriated, the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers have the right to designate the area in the vicinity of Panmunjom between the military demarcation line and the western and northern boundaries of the demilitarized zone, as the area within which such prisoners of war will be turned over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the armed forces of India for custody. After knowing that there are prisoners of war under their custody who request not to be directly repatriated, the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers shall inform the United Nations Command side of the approximate figures by nationality of such prisoners of war.

3. In accordance with paragraphs 8, 9, and 10, article I of the armistice agreement, the following paragraphs are hereby provided:

a. After the cease-fire comes into effect, unarmed personnel of each side shall be specifically authorized by the Military Armistice Commission to enter the above-mentioned area designated by their own side to perform necessary construction operations. None of such personnel shall remain in the above-mentioned areas upon the completion of the construction operations.

b. A definite number of prisoners of war as decided upon by both sides, who are in the respective custody of both sides and who are not directly repatriated, shall be specifically authorized by the Military Armistice Commission to be escorted respectively by a certain number of armed forces of the detaining sides to the above-mentioned areas of custody designated respectively by both sides to be turned over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the armed forces of India for custody. After the prisoners of war have been taken over, the armed forces of the detaining sides shall be withdrawn immediately from the areas of custody to the area under the control of their own side.

c. The personnel of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and its subordinate bodies, the armed forces of India, the Red Cross Society of India, the explaining representatives and observation representatives of both sides, as well as the required material and equipment, for exercising the function provided for in the terms of reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall be specifically authorized by the Military Armistice Commission to have the complete freedom of movement to, from, and within the above-mentioned areas designated respectively by both sides for the custody of prisoners of war.

4. The provisions of sub-paragraph 3C of this agreement shall not be construed as derogating from the privileges enjoyed by those personnel mentioned above under paragraph 11, article I of the armistice agreement.

5. This agreement shall be abrogated upon the completion of the mission provided for in the terms of reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

Done at Panmunjom, Korea, at 1000 hours on the 27th day of July 1953, in Korean, Chinese, and English, all texts being equally authentic.

## Korean Armistice Problems

### Press Conference Remarks by Secretary Dulles

Press release 389 dated July 21

I am sure that the topic which is on the minds of most of us, as it is on my mind, is the question of Korea and whether or not there will be an armistice in Korea. I know that you would like me to tell you what the answer to that question is. I am sorry that I shall have to disappoint you in that respect and not make any prophecies.

The prospects for an armistice in Korea have gone up and down and up and down so many times that I think it is important for all of us to keep a steady view, not to become elated, enthusiastic, before the event or to become depressed before the event. We are, of course, hopeful that there will be an armistice, but to go beyond that would be inaccurate. There are still matters that need to be ironed out, and one can never be confident of the Communist intentions until they are fully reflected in their actual deeds. We do not have that yet at the present time.

There are a number of details in relation to the armistice—the question of remapping the line; the question of the physical arrangements for handling prisoners of war of various categories—problems, I believe, of translation. These are matters which ought not to be an insoluble difficulty if there is a real will to conclude the armistice, but whether or not there is that will is the factor which is uncertain and will remain uncertain until the last moment.

There are no qualifications that I am aware of to the assurance, which I referred to in my radio talk the other night with Mr. Robertson,<sup>1</sup> that President Rhee will not take any measures to impede the carrying out of the armistice. There are, of course, a very large number of matters which are for discussion between our two Governments. Those were revealed in the letter of June 6 which President Eisenhower wrote to President Rhee.<sup>2</sup> They relate to questions of economic aid, a mutual security pact, and consultation in connection with the political conference which will follow an armistice.

All of these matters were fully discussed by Assistant Secretary Robertson when he was in Korea with President Rhee. He has brought back further ideas of President Rhee on those matters. Secretary Robertson has in turn discussed them with the President, with myself, and with congressional leaders. He appeared before both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and the further views of our Government with respect to those matters are being communicated to President Rhee. But I do not think that those matters need be or, in fact, can be finally resolved before an armistice. That was made perfectly clear to President Rhee. For example, a security treaty would have to go before the Senate for ratification, and probably it will not be practical to do that at this session of Congress. That was explored while Assistant Secretary Robertson was in Korea, and we were advised by Senator Knowland that it would not be practical, probably, to deal with matters of that sort at this session of Congress.

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<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of July 27, 1953, p. 99.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, June 15, 1953, p. 835.

We have a firm idea that at least two nations should be there [at the political conference to follow an armistice]. One is the Republic of Korea, and the other is the United States. Undoubtedly the U.N. Assembly will meet and will designate a delegation, I suppose, which will take part in the political conference. But we have not given any particular thought to the composition of such a delegation, which would be determined by the General Assembly after it meets. I assume that on the other side there will be representatives of the so-called Peoples Government of North Korea, presumably the Chinese Communist regime, and possibly the Soviet Union, but that latter is speculation because the decision on their side about participation will be made by them and not by us.

Now as to agenda, I think what I said at an earlier news conference<sup>3</sup> as best as I recall, is that we would not necessarily exclude the possibility of some other questions coming up, and I particularly referred to the point which had been made several times by President Eisenhower, by myself, and was referred to in the three Foreign Ministers' communique<sup>4</sup> to the effect that we would not expect a truce in Korea to release forces for aggression elsewhere. Now, you can say that is a Korean problem, or you can say it's a problem which relates and extends beyond Korea, but we would not certainly exclude discussion on that point.

#### Statement by the Secretary

Press release 393 dated July 22

The question of an armistice is up to the Communists. We retain confidence that President Rhee will honor the assurances he has given. He personally wrote President Eisenhower under date of July 11, 1953, that, in deference to the President's request, he would not obstruct in any manner the implementation of the armistice terms. On the same date he wrote to me that, while he questions the wisdom of a truce, he has yielded his convictions to U.S. policies. A truce, he wrote to me, will now be signed and the Republic of Korea will abide by its agreement to give the United Nations another chance to try to unify Korea by political negotiation.

President Rhee has sought various assurances from the United States and has reserved his Government's position in the event of a collapse of the political talks which would follow an armistice. This we believe he is entitled to do. With reference to the assurances sought, the U.S. Government has responded to the best of its ability.

The President has agreed to initiate, immediately upon the conclusion of an armistice, a program of rehabilitation which will cover a 4 to 5 year period and involve heavy expenditures. He

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, June 29, 1953, p. 908.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, July 27, 1953, p. 104.

has agreed to negotiate promptly a security treaty along the lines of the United States-Philippine Mutual Security Treaty, with certain modifications drawn from the United States-Japan Security Treaty which President Rhee has indicated he thought would be desirable.

It has been agreed that, upon the conclusion of an armistice, I would be prepared promptly to meet with President Rhee at a time and place to be mutually determined, with a view to concerting our policies at the political conference which will follow an armistice, thus assuring the maximum chance that the conference will achieve a unification of Korea.

We have agreed, in concert with our principal allies, that in the event the Communists should renew their aggression in Korea after an armistice, we shall vigorously act to restore peace and security.

The present is a time when rumors are rife and when it is necessary to be steady in our purpose and in our trust in our friends.

We assume that President Rhee, despite his misgivings, will abide by his assurances to the President, the Secretary of State, and Assistant Secretary Robertson. President Rhee, in turn, can be confident that the United States will loyally support the Republic of Korea in the rebuilding of its land and in the attainment of its honorable objectives.

#### Netherlands Approves European Defense Community Treaty

*Statement by Secretary Dulles*

Press release 395 dated July 23

The Second Chamber of the Netherlands Parliament today voted approval of the treaty which will establish the European Defense Community. The action of the Netherlands Parliament shows clearly that the movement toward European unity, despite inevitable obstacles and delays, is steadily going forward. I believe unity offers our European friends their strongest assurance of freedom and security, their best hope of lasting peace, and their greatest opportunity for economic and social advancement.

The American people, I know, will welcome this constructive step, not only because of their deep and demonstrated interest in European unity, but because of our conviction that the need for unity transcends the problems and tensions of the present and has implications that extend far into the future.

The statesmen and people of the Netherlands can take pride in the fact that they have been at the forefront of this movement.

## America's Stake in a Healthy Free-World Economy

by Samuel C. Waugh  
*Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

It occurred to me that, rather than attempt an erudite discourse, you might at the outset be interested in several of the particularly sharp impressions I have gained during the last 60 days.

First, there is the question of the State Department as an institution. I am deeply impressed by the necessity for the United States, and indeed for the free world, that there be an effective and responsible Department of State. Our international responsibilities today are so great and we are all to such a great extent dependent upon the skill with which our international relations are conducted that none of us can be content with anything less than the most effective agency for handling our international affairs.

It is clearly the responsibility of the Secretary of State and his principal assistants to do their utmost in creating such an institution. At the same time it is the responsibility of all of us as citizens to see that criticism of the Department is constructive and not destructive.

In view of the limited time I have been in the Department, I feel competent only to comment on the professional and technical staff immediately under my jurisdiction. And with respect to these career people, I can unequivocally state that they are, by and large, a highly qualified, hard-working group of people. Indeed, before accepting my present position, I was reliably informed that the staff in the economic offices under my jurisdiction was competent. My experience in the last 2 months has confirmed these statements.

A second, and as you will note an unrelated, point that I should like to make is how one gets along with other countries. It is common today, and thoroughly understandable, for a great many

Americans to be impatient with our allies in the free world, to wonder at their actions and inaction, and to allow this impatience to take the form of criticism of Washington and the State Department and its alleged failure to get our friends abroad to do the things which we believe they should do. This criticism is put in various forms. Some say that as long as we are giving and have given so much money to these people, they certainly should be willing to do the many things we believe they ought. Others insist that the United States is invariably out-negotiated. It is said that we are the only ones that make concessions.

Now against these criticisms, one of the things that I have come to realize is the enormous problem of dealing on a cooperative and nondictatorial basis with a large number of countries with diverse interests, with varying traditions, and a multitude of governmental systems. It is useful to realize that we are dealing with sovereign countries, proud of their independence, all of which are responsive in one way or another to their own people, and whose governments will stand or fall on the basis of this consent. This is in sharp contrast to the police-state techniques of the Communist world, which maintains an iron control backed by military power and a controlled government.

In short, it is essential to put this coalition we have in the free world in its proper perspective and appreciate the elementary fact that coalition calls for continual give and take, with no one country calling all the shots and with other countries making all the concessions.

The third impression which has been so sharply brought home to me is the great and unpredictable effects very small actions taken by the United States can have on our friends and allies abroad. And I am talking here not about those actions which are necessarily aimed at the international

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the University of Illinois Institute on International Trade at Monticello, Ill., on July 18 (press release 386 dated July 17).

situation but more of those things we do which have a quite coincidental effect on international affairs.

Let me say here that one of the most interesting experiences about Washington is the fact that, once I took over my office, there has been a constant stream of ambassadors and ministers who have come in to see me to pay what are called courtesy calls. This is their manner of welcoming me to Washington, and I have been provided a remarkable opportunity to meet a distinguished group of representatives from a wide number of countries.

It is in the nature of these courtesy visits not to make any request or to attempt to transact any serious business. However, in each case there has been a constant thread of deep concern expressed by all these people as to where the United States was going in its foreign economic policy. These ambassadors and ministers pointed out again and again the deep effects various American actions have had upon their own economies, in each case far beyond what I would have imagined. The Dutch, the Danes, and the Italians have all been adversely affected by our restrictions over the imports of dairy products. The gallant Finns, struggling to survive, have had their meager exports of doors affected by boycotts in this country. The Commonwealth Ambassadors from New Zealand, Australia, and South Africa are vitally concerned with what we shall do about the imports of wool.

What I have come to realize, in a way I never understood before, are the implications of American dominance in the world today. One of the major tasks before America and one of the tasks of groups such as this is to impress upon the American public the implications of our actions. Only as we realize the significance of these actions can we consider and in time reach sound decisions on the kinds of policies we should decide upon in the future.

The presence of all of you during this past week at this conference is a clear demonstration of the mounting appreciation of problems confronting this country in the foreign economic field.

In the remaining time, I should like to give some indication of why this economic aspect of our international relations, and indeed the economic situation of the free world, is of such critical importance to us and to our allies. Then I believe it may be useful to indicate two or three of the areas of economic activity which pose difficult problems that need to be analyzed on an urgent basis and for which solutions must be found.

Economic strength and the rate of economic growth are of critical importance to the free world. The present strength and the rate of growth today are inadequate for the minimum security of the free world, and in turn the United States. Massive foreign assistance has gone out to our allies abroad in the postwar period, and such aid

has been given not for altruistic purposes but to serve our own immediate security objectives.

This aid is a clear demonstration of economic weakness. Our friends feel that the strength of the free world is inadequate so long as they are incapable on their own resources of maintaining, in cooperation with us, a defense force and internal political and economic stability adequate to meet the great threat posed for us by the Soviet Union and its satellites.

To test adequately where we stand regarding free world economic strength requires some benchmarks. It is insufficient to say that we need more strength or that our rate of growth must be accelerated. One of the important benchmarks is the rival economic strength and growth of the Soviet Union.

#### Soviet Economic Progress

The Soviet Union has made remarkable and disheartening economic progress since the end of the war. While we do not have the firm statistical basis for evaluating the growth of the Soviet Union that we do for the free countries of the world, we do have intelligent estimates, and they are not reassuring. Let us take the four elements on which a strong civilian or military economy must be based: coal, steel, oil, and electricity.

Since 1940 the Soviet Union has doubled its production of coal. While Soviet production of coal is still only 52 percent of ours, the rate of increase of production is the key element to consider. Steel production was also practically doubled in this period and is now 29 percent of U.S. production, but is three-fifths of Western European capacity. Production of petroleum which was at 31 million tons in 1940 is today at 47 million tons, and well on its way to surpassing production in Western Europe. Electric power within the Soviet Union is only 23 percent of that in the United States but the increase from 1940 to the present time is 69 billion kilowatt hours. This is very rapid progress indeed.

Any comparison with the industrial potential of the Soviet Union should be made with Western Europe rather than with the United States, and it is here that the comparative figures are startling. If the rate of increase continues, it is highly probable that sometime in the 1960's the economic strength of the Soviet Union will intersect and pass that of Western Europe. This is not a reassuring situation but a factor which we must always bear in mind.

The picture which is posed to the United States is one of rapidly mounting Soviet Union strength, arising out of a land mass rich in natural resources, with the prospect of a rapidly increasing population. In the preceding analysis, no account has been taken of the potential contribution of economic strength which may be expected to come

from the satellite countries or from Communist China. When we assume aggressive Soviet intentions—which we must in the absence of concrete indications of contrary objectives—the United States is confronted by a growing potential of economic power, much of which can be devoted, as Soviet rulers wish, to aggressive adventures.

Now, against this picture, we hear it proposed from time to time that our allies are unworthy of us; that they do too little for themselves; that in fact we cannot afford our allies. The people suggesting this view insist that they are not isolationists; they present themselves as realists. I submit that the only realist, in the face of the international situation with which we are confronted today and into the future, is the man who sees clearly the necessity of constantly closer relationships among the free nations of the world. This association is indispensable to our mutual security and certainly vital to America's security.

While this requirement of cooperation within the free world is generally recognized in its political and its military forms, it appears to be less evident when one considers the economic area.

If we look at the Soviet system again for a moment, we see a police state devoting its energies to the construction of the basic economic elements essential to a rapidly expanding industrial state, with its implied military strength. Certainly the free world has an equal responsibility to see that its energies are at least equally devoted to the same purposes.

Our common military forces in the free world and indispensable political stability rest upon an economic foundation. One of the major problems in the field of foreign affairs confronting the United States is to design an economic program for the free world which will be an appropriate adjunct to the progress which has been made in the military and political spheres.

It was with this problem in mind and with the clear recognition of the responsibility for leadership which rests on the United States that the President has asked the Congress to establish a commission to reassess American foreign economic policy and to recommend the next steps to be taken domestically and internationally.<sup>2</sup> This study, which is expected to get under way within the next few weeks, must be completed early next year in time for consideration and action by the Congress early in 1954.

This administration is determined to examine the patchwork of laws and regulations which now exist in our own approach to international economic affairs and, on the basis of this analysis, to develop a coordinated and comprehensive program which we hope will find some answers to the economic questions and economic ills which confront us and our allies.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of May 25, 1953, p. 747.

We are the leaders in this world of ours, whether we like it or not, and this country must take the domestic measures necessary to maintain and increase its own economic health and to support and participate in coordinated actions with other countries, to help solve our economic and political problems.

Without attempting to suggest what the solutions are, it may be useful to outline three main categories of problems, the finding of solutions to which is vital to us and to our allies.

The first problem is that of food and raw materials. The second is that of investment capital. The third—and one with which you are all familiar—is the acute weakness, or what might even be called the breakdown, of the trading system of the free world.

#### **The Problem of Food Surpluses**

With respect to food and raw materials, the free world is confronted by a bitter paradox. The United States, without question the most efficient producer of a large range of agricultural products, is bewildered by mounting surpluses of various products and naturally turns to the international market. It needs to be stated here, of course, that many of the surpluses that are in the headlines today arise out of certain rigidities of the present agricultural program, as Secretary Benson has indicated.

Nonetheless, if we take a long view of the position of the United States in the food producing and consuming world, it is vital to the economic well-being of a very important segment of our economy—and not just farmers but all those people whose income to some extent depends upon the handling and processing of food—that there be a large and stable market for American farm products abroad. It would be foolhardy to suggest that in its present condition the free world offers such assurances.

Now, the other part of this paradox is the fact that, while production of foodstuffs has tended to increase in various parts of the world, in no area outside the United States and Canada has the increase in the supply of food kept pace with the increase of population. War, internal unrest, transfer of resources to industrial activity—all of these have contributed to the inadequacy of food production measured against the requirements of the free world. In short, food is a problem in the Middle East and the Far East and to some extent in Latin America.

Present or prospective inadequacy of food supply holds the threat of hunger and internal unrest. In other countries, especially Western Europe, it has meant increased reliance on the United States and Canadian supplies, with a consequent major new requirement for dollars. Indeed, it has been argued that the necessity of buying, from the United States and Canada, food previously pro-



duced from indigenous sources or from third markets calls today for about \$2 billion worth of expenditures over and above expenditures made in previous periods. This \$2 billion comes quite close to approximating the dollar gap.

What must be found then is a solution for the free world which will see an adequate movement of food to the countries in the free world and one which gives assurances to this country that there will be adequate and stable markets abroad for the products of its efficient agricultural industry.

There is another aspect of the food and raw material problem which must be given careful consideration, and that might be called the requirements of the United States in the first instance, but of the free world as a whole, for constantly increasing supplies of strategic materials. It is well to bear in mind that the United States is now self-sufficient in only 9 out of 38 minerals vital to U.S. industry. The report of the Materials Policy Commission<sup>3</sup> prepared under the chairmanship of William Paley forecasts even greater dependency on outside sources in coming years. Along with our growing need and the need of our allies for raw materials for the industrial plant of the free world, there has been inadequate new discovery, exploitation, and development of raw materials.

Most of the needed materials come from sections of Latin America, the Middle East, Asia, and Africa, which in the past decade have been disrupted by tides of nationalism, political unrest, and economic instability. To the underdeveloped areas, exploitation of natural resources frequently is viewed as only another variety of imperialism.

Along with the problem of greater need is the corollary problem of surpluses in world demand. You and I are familiar with the difficulties encountered during the depression days with one-crop farms. Extend that to one-crop countries and you can readily understand the economic chaos resulting from sharp fluctuations in world market prices of primary raw materials. The instability of prices has resulted not only in political unrest but in inability of countries to plan their economic development.

In recent years we are receiving more and more suggestions from the raw material producing countries for some sort of international system to stabilize commodity prices. While we believe that competition in the long run is the only force that can make fair decisions in the field of trade, we cannot lightly brush aside the need of the underdeveloped areas for assurances on the marketability of their products. Confronted with a similar situation in the United States in regard to wheat, we became one of the principal proponents of the International Wheat Agreement. We cannot but take seriously this drive on the part of the

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, July 14, 1952, p. 54.

underdeveloped areas for some assurance on the stability of the price structure for some of their basic exports.

#### Encouragement to Private Investment Abroad

The second major problem is that of capital investment. The new administration has made clear that it will do all it can to encourage a high level of investment abroad by American private enterprise. Not only the capital, but the managerial skills, technical competence, and engineering ability of American firms can have an important impact upon foreign productivity and economic development. The question naturally arises as to what lengths the U.S. Government can appropriately go in encouraging or offering incentives for investment overseas by American firms. I recently attended a meeting in Washington called by the Secretaries of Commerce and Treasury to discuss just this problem. That meeting was attended by many of the outstanding industrialists and financiers of this country. As a result of the discussion that night a committee was formed to evaluate the problem and to see what positive steps can be taken by this Government to encourage such investment.

No matter how successful we may be in encouraging American private investment to go abroad, this investment will be only a small portion of the amounts of capital the free world requires.

Total direct U.S. private investment abroad is estimated today as being something in the area of \$11 billion. The vast bulk of this investment is in Canada, the Western Hemisphere, and in Middle East petroleum. We can anticipate that American investment will go into industrial expansion in minerals exploration, development, and processing. But there remain those basic segments of the free world economy to which it is most unlikely that the private investor will be attracted—transportation, port development, irrigation, water supply. The major sources of capital for these endeavors must be indigenous. The primary responsibility for attracting such capital rests, of course, with the government of the country in which such potential capital resides.

There will remain an important field for international institutions such as the International Bank and also for the public lending activities of the Export-Import Bank.

But I do not wish to prejudice this question for, as I stated earlier, it is not my intention here to outline solutions. It is vital, however, for all of us to recognize the gravity of this problem of capital investment and to appreciate that today there appear to be no immediately discernible solutions which assure us that the capital necessary for minimum economic development in the free world is available.

Lastly, we come to the most crucial issue facing

the United States in its foreign economic policy, namely, the principal and basic weaknesses of the free world trading system.

As you know from your analysis in the last few days, the efficient exchange of goods and services is one of the most important elements of an economic system. Whatever may be the weaknesses of the Soviet machine, artificial barriers restricting the exchange of goods and services is not one of them. The Marxist machine determines what it wishes to produce, decides where it will be produced, and presumably attempts to achieve this production with the most efficient use of basic resources. We would all agree that any totalitarian machine, where decisions of this sort are made by bureaucrats, has built into it grave inefficiencies which a competitive private enterprise system does not. Nonetheless, their system is not weakened by artificial barriers to the movement of goods produced by such devices as inconvertibility of currencies, multilateral exchange rates, quotas, discrimination, and protectionism. In short, there is no question but that the free world is not making adequate use of its manufacturing capacity, its raw material resources, its ingenuity, its investment—of all of its great economic resources.

An argument one frequently hears is that the rest of the free world is, unfortunately, devoted to discriminating against American goods; that currency restrictions are designed to frustrate the American exporter; that our allies are unwilling to permit the import of American goods and that this attitude is all the more deplorable "in view of all we have done for them."

I would submit that there is something much more fundamental involved in this situation than any idle protectionism on the part of our friends against American goods. On the other hand I would not say that many of these restrictions do not have some indication of protectionism contained within them. But, if we are to find solutions, we have got to have an accurate assessment of the problem.

#### **The Dollar-Gap Problem**

The basic problem is simple. Our friends just do not have enough dollars to buy the things they would like to get from this market, or, more importantly, that we would like to sell them. They can get these dollars in only a few ways. They can get them from private U.S. investors, from public institutions such as the Export-Import Bank or the International Bank. But investment to be attractive must have the promise of profits, interest, and dollars. It must, furthermore, have the promise of eventual repatriation of capital.

Dollars can be made available through grant assistance, as has been the case of the \$40-odd

billion we have made available to the free world since the end of World War II. We are all agreed that this is an unsatisfactory and undesirable means of providing dollars to our allies.

And finally we come down to trade—imports of goods and services. In the final analysis, it is our purchase of goods and use of the services of our friends, and, of course, of such collateral activities as tourist expenditures, that these precious dollars will be made available.

President Eisenhower has stated that the very security of our country is involved in trade. In the President's own words:

We must trade with others or we cannot exist, and that is the material foundation of our whole foreign policy.

Expanding trade and lessened restrictions are vital elements in our common defense of freedom and our common struggle for world peace.

Earlier I indicated the stake the agricultural community had in the export market. The American economy as a whole has a vital interest in this market.

In 1952 our exports amounted to over \$16 billion. This includes nearly half of our wheat production,  $\frac{2}{5}$  of our cotton and rice production, and  $\frac{1}{4}$  of our production of tobacco. We also export more than  $\frac{1}{5}$  of our output of tractors. On the other hand we are importing at a rate of less than \$11 billion a year. With the reduction of military and economic assistance programs, we will either have to decrease our exports or increase our imports to bridge the gap.

This is not to say that the United States can solve the dollar-gap problem merely by a U.S. reduction in tariffs, simplification of customs procedures, and so forth. Our allies must also take constructive action. They must eliminate their own trade barriers, revamp their financial, exchange, and credit policies; efficient tax programs must be instituted in those countries. Underdeveloped countries in need of capital must take action to improve the climate for domestic and foreign investment. However, the major responsibility for leadership in this field is on the United States. As the President has stated:

Our leadership in the free world imposes upon us a special responsibility to encourage the commerce that can assist so greatly in bringing economic health to all people.

Before I conclude, I would like to say one word about the responsibility of American industry to support the programs proposed by our President in this field. All of our activities are aimed primarily at our own self-benefit. This places upon men like yourselves a responsibility to inform the people of this country what is at stake for American industry, American labor, and American agriculture.

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**Food for East Germany**

White House press release dated July 20

*Following are the texts of letters exchanged by President Eisenhower and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of the Federal Republic of Germany:*

**Chancellor Adenauer to the President, July 13**

Your letter of July 10th<sup>1</sup> has been conveyed to me through Ambassador Conant. Your generous offer to relieve the want of the population of the Soviet Zone through immediate and extensive deliveries of foodstuffs has touched me deeply. This spontaneous demonstration of humane readiness to help, which is in the best traditions of the American people, has caused great joy in all of Germany and especially has given new hope and new courage to the people in the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany. I should, therefore, like to express to you, in the name not only of the Federal Government but also in the name of the entire German people, my heartiest thanks.

It is with regret that I have learned that the Soviet Government has refused its cooperation in the relief action which you had planned. I would like to request that the delivery of foodstuffs should not as a result be withheld. On the contrary, I wish to express the hope that the foodstuffs may be placed at the disposal of the Federal Government, which for its part will do everything to make the food available in the most effective way possible for relief of the suffering of the population who have fallen into need as a result of the situation in the Soviet Zone.

**The President to Chancellor Adenauer, July 20**

I share the regret expressed in your letter of July 13, 1953, at the refusal of the Soviet Government to admit the food which the United States Government offered the East German population in response to your appeal of July 4.<sup>2</sup>

Immediately after the receipt of Mr. Molotov's rejection of my offer,<sup>3</sup> I made it clear that the offer continues to stand and that the food continues to be available. Since it is our joint purpose to aid the people of Eastern Germany in spite of the obstacles which the occupation authorities of that area have created, I have directed the Secretary of State and the Director for Mutual Security to place quantities of these foodstuffs at your disposal for use in relieving the suffering of the

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of July 20, p. 67.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> For texts of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. exchange of notes, see *ibid.*, p. 68.

people of Eastern Germany in the best available manner.<sup>4</sup>

At the same time, we shall continue to make clear to the Soviet Government that the offer which was made on July 10, 1953, was motivated solely by humanitarian impulses and that the food is available if that Government wishes to permit its entrance into the Soviet Zone of occupation.

**U.S. Views on German Unity**

*The White House on July 25 released the following letter from the President to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of the Federal Republic of Germany:*

JULY 23, 1953

MY DEAR MR. CHANCELLOR: During the development of the conversations between the U.S. Secretary of State and the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain and France, it occurred to me that it might be helpful if I were to write you a letter in amplification of the thoughts so tightly compressed in the final communique.<sup>5</sup>

It seems to me that certain definite patterns are emerging from the situation in East Germany and the Eastern European satellite countries—patterns which will unquestionably have a profound effect upon the future, including the proposed meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers.

I think, therefore, that it will be useful for me to share my thoughts with you in some detail at this time.

Great historical developments, such as the recent Berlin and East German anti-Communist demonstrations, rarely have single roots. Nevertheless, I am quite certain that future historians, in their analysis of the causes which will have brought about the disintegration of the Communist empire, will single out those brave East Germans who dared to rise against the cannons of tyranny with nothing but their bare hands and their stout hearts, as a root cause. I think also that those same historians will record your own extraordinary steadfastness in the cause of European peace and freedom over many, many years.

In analyzing these recent developments, there appear to be five points of greatest significance.

First, this eruption against Communist oppres-

<sup>4</sup> The Mutual Security Agency on July 16 announced that 4,500 tons of food would be shipped from New York City to Hamburg, Germany, between July 17 and July 23, and that the entire \$15 million program would provide up to 50,000 tons of food. The announcement stated: "Distribution plans are being worked out by the U.S. High Commissioner in Germany in consultation with the German Federal Republic."

<sup>5</sup> BULLETIN of July 27, 1953, p. 104.

sion was spontaneous. I know that I need not go into any elaborate denial with you of the fantastic explanation put out by Moscow that the uprising was caused by American provocateurs. No provocateur of any nationality can persuade human beings to stand up in front of rumbling tanks with sticks and stones. Such action comes from the heart and not from any foreign purse.

Second, this uprising was not just a momentary flash of desperation. The continuing news of disorders in Eastern Germany indicates a fundamental and lasting determination to be fully and finally free, despite long years of stern Sovietization.

Third, nowhere were the rioters "bourgeois reactionaries" or "capitalist warmongers." They were workers. Therefore, the martyrs who fell before Russian Communist guns were the very same workers in whose name the Kremlin has falsely and cynically built their empire of oppression, their farflung "workers' paradise."

Fourth, the fact of the uprising, the conduct of the German Communist leaders during the event and their actions since the event, all indicate the complete political bankruptcy of the SED [*Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands*].

Fifth, and to me of utmost significance, when the riots developed in the Russian sector of Berlin, the workers' chant was, "We want free elections." In this phrase, the people clearly and simply summed up their yearning for the alleviation of their grievances and sufferings.

The combination of these five facts actually forms the background for that portion of the July 15 Foreign Ministers' communique dealing with German unification and free elections. And the communique itself, as you know, is actually the diplomatic confirmation of your own earlier statements, of my June 26 cable to you,<sup>6</sup> and most important, of the resolution of the German Bundestag of June 10.

For the past many months there have been endless arguments and debates on both sides of the Atlantic over the respective priorities of such words and phrases as "unification," "peace treaty," "free elections," "withdrawal of occupation troops," etc.

It has always seemed to me—and these recent events, to me at least, clearly confirm the thought—that there can be no solution without free elections and the formation of a free all-German Government, leading to unification. From that point on can flow a logical, orderly sequence of events, culminating in an honorable peace treaty and the re-emergence of a new united German Republic, dedicated to the welfare of its own people, as a friendly and peaceful member of the European family of nations.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, July 6, 1953, p. 10. The cable, dated June 25, was released to the press on June 26.

To this first step of free elections, the Government of the United States will continue to lend the full force of its political, diplomatic, and moral support.

There are sincere people in Germany, in the nations of Western Europe, and even in my own country, who have come to believe that free elections, and therefore the unification of Germany, contradict and possibly exclude the concept of the European Defense Community which has been ratified by both your Houses of Parliament and is now before your Constitutional Court. I do not and have never accepted this theory that the EDC and unification of Germany are mutually exclusive. Quite the contrary.

As the three Foreign Ministers stated at the conclusion of their recent meeting in Washington, since the European community corresponds to the lasting needs of its members and their people for peace, security, and welfare, it is looked upon as necessary in itself and not linked up with existing international tensions.

It has long been my conviction that the strengthening of the Federal Republic, through adoption of the EDC, the contractual agreements and further progress in the integration of Western Europe, can only enhance the prospects for the peaceful unification of Germany, by increasing the attractive power of this prosperous Western Germany vis-a-vis the Soviet Zone, an attractive power which has already been demonstrated by the steady stream of refugees in recent months, as well as the demonstrations which began on June 17. This increasing contrast between Western and Eastern Germany, the latter with its bankrupt regime and impoverished economy, will in the long run produce conditions which should make possible the liquidation of the present Communist dictatorship and of the Soviet occupation.

While a future all-German Government must obviously be free to choose the degree to which it wishes to enter into defensive and other arrangements compatible with the principles of the United Nations, I can hardly imagine that it would seek the path of complete and premature disarmament in the presence of other nations still heavily armed. I believe this is a matter worthy of serious attention. Those who in Germany believe they can suggest an easy, safe solution through defenseless neutralization should carefully ponder the true wisdom and safety of such a course.

Speaking for America, and I believe the rest of the free world shares this view, I can say that there has been enough bloodshed and enough misery and enough destruction in the past 50 years to deter any people or any Government of the West from any ideas of military aggression. But the peace we all so dearly seek cannot be maintained through weakness. EDC will be the simplest, most unequivocal, and most self-evident demonstration of strength for peace.

No one can foretell what the unfolding months

will bring, but it can certainly be said that the workers of Berlin's Soviet Sector and the workers of East Germany, with the workers of Czechoslovakia, have started something that will have an important place on the pages of history. May the concluding chapter of that history record the reemergence of freedom, of peace, and of happiness.

With kindest personal regard,  
Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

## Current Legislation on Foreign Policy

- Reorganization Plans Nos. 7 and 8 of 1953. (Foreign Operations Administration); (United States Information Agency). Hearings before the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, Eighty-Third Congress, First Session on H. J. Res. 261 and H. J. Res. 262. June 22, 23, and 24, 1953. 219 pp.
- International Wheat Agreement. Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-Third Congress, First Session on Ex. H, 83d Cong., 1st sess. The Agreement Revising and Renewing the International Wheat Agreement. June 26, 1953. 59 pp.
- An Act To provide for the transfer of price-support wheat to Pakistan. Public Law 77-83d Congress, Chapter 150-1st Session, S. 2112. 2 pp.
- Expressing the Friendship and Sympathy of the American People for the People of East Germany. Report (To accompany S. Con. Res. 36). S. Rept. 499, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 pp.
- Agreement Regarding Status of Forces of Parties of the North Atlantic Treaty. Supplementary Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-Third Congress, First Session on Status of Forces of the North Atlantic Treaty. June 24, 1953. 89 pp.
- Agreements With the Federal Republic of Germany. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-Third Congress, First Session on Executives D, E, F, and G (83d Congress, 1st Session). June 17 and 18, 1953. 169 pp.
- Double Taxation Conventions With Belgium and Australia. Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-Third Congress, First Session on Executive I (81st Cong., 1st Sess.), A (83d Cong., 1st Sess.), I (83d Cong., 1st Sess.), J (83d Cong., 1st Sess.), and K (83d Cong., 1st Sess.), Double Taxation Treaties With Belgium and Australia. June 29, 1953. 59 pp.; Report (To accompany Executive I, Eighty-first Congress, first session; Executive A, Eighty-third Congress, first session; Executive I, Eighty-third Congress, first session; Executive J, Eighty-third Congress, first session; and Executive K, Eighty-third Congress, first session). S. Exec. Rept. 2, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 pp.
- Requiring "United States of America" on Shipments Abroad. Hearing before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, United States Senate, Eighty-Third Congress, First Session on S. 1962 A Bill To Require the Marking of the Containers of

### Correction

BULLETIN of July 6, 1953, page 12, second column, 29th line, the figure should read: "3.45 billion deutschmarks."

- American Goods Exported With the Words "United States of America," and For Other Purposes. June 12, 1953. 33 pp.
- Foreign Trade in Agricultural Products. Hearings before the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, United States Senate, Eighty-Third Congress, First Session on Agricultural Exports and Imports and Their Effect on Farm Price Programs. Part 4, Dairy Products. May 4, 5, and 6, 1953. 122 pp.
- Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1954. Report (To accompany H. R. 6200). H. Rept. 762, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 47 pp.
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## Administering the Pacific Trust Territory

*Statement by Frank E. Midkiff  
Special U.S. Representative to the U.N. Trusteeship Council*<sup>1</sup>

I should indeed be gauche were I to begin my remarks except by acknowledging the benefits I have received from this conference on the administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. I have been sincerely impressed with the broad knowledge of members of the Council in trusteeship administration generally. One also is much impressed by the accurate acquaintance revealed by all members in the detailed and excessively factual Administering Authority's report covering our past year's work.<sup>2</sup> As I indicated in my introductory statement and as it has been borne out fully in the discussions, of prime value to us has been the firsthand observations of the United Nations very competent Visiting Mission.

The Council has provided a full discussion of the mission's findings. The penetrating questions of the Council have aided in pointing up aspects of administration that the members—so many themselves with distinguished records in administering dependent areas—have found to be important and worthy of special attention. I therefore acknowledge with gratitude my indebtedness to the Trusteeship Council for its constructive handling of the report of the Administering Authority and for the many sound suggestions made for improving administration and further benefiting the people of Micronesia. It is evident that the service being rendered by the United Nations through the eminent members of this Trusteeship Council is of great value to the many areas under the Council's cognizance.

I should like to comment on some of the points that have been made by members of the Council. My opening statement was directed specifically to many of these points and I request that without its repetition in this speech, my statement be

drawn upon where appropriate by the drafting committee and used in the committee's task of formulating the Council's report on conditions in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. It may be useful for me, however, at this time to expand on that statement in certain items and to add to it where new points have been raised.

I have been gratified that in the field of political development the members of the Council in general have expressed agreement with the line of approach being used by the Administering Authority in the territory and which the Visiting Mission so competently analyzed and reported upon.

In looking at the situation in the territory, I suggest that two differing ways of approaching political change amongst the people of the trust territory might be possible. First, we might urge haste and strive for a violent or cataclysmic and dramatic coup in which the old ways of governing by the system of "the extended family" would be overthrown and a new Western-type, democratic-political system imposed in place thereof. It is pertinent to note, however, that this course often is fraught with unhappiness for the people themselves. It is a course responsible men adopt only when conditions under old customs and regulations have become unduly oppressive and restrictive. Such oppressive conditions do not obtain in Micronesia; actually there long has been a family form of control and self-government, with a healthy and happy people living under it.

The second way of political advance is fundamentally different from the way described above. It involves study and observance of the situation, the needs, and the factors underlying the existing system as worked out by the people themselves over untold and long generations to meet the conditions imposed by their environment. And we may observe that such a system in Micronesia has a clearly reliable feature; namely, it works. Thus while it is not the policy or objective of the administration to foster and more solidly entrench the

<sup>1</sup>Made in the Trusteeship Council on July 2 and released to the press on the same date by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. For Mr. Midkiff's opening statement to the Council on this subject, see BULLETIN of July 6, 1953, p. 22.

<sup>2</sup>U.N. doc. T/1047.

### Micronesian Representative Addresses Trusteeship Council

*Mr. Midkiff, High Commissioner of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, on June 23 introduced to the Trusteeship Council Mrs. Dorothy Kabua of Majuro, Marshall Islands, first indigenous inhabitant of the territory ever to attend a Council session. Speaking in Marshallese, with her son Amata interpreting, Mrs. Kabua made the following statement:*

We bring you greetings, over a distance of about 7,000 miles, from our people of the Marshall Islands in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. We wish also to express our gratitude for the opportunity to be present with the U.S. delegation at this great assembly of nations. It is a unique experience in our lives and it is, we feel, a landmark in the history of the Micronesian people.

It is only in the last hundred years that our people in the Trust Territory have been aware of any world other than their own islands. Being here today in this great city and meeting here in this living symbol of the brotherhood of nations will increase to the full our awareness of the world around us and will help us to see our place in that world.

The Micronesians are a happy island people who seek, even as you do, life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Because our life is simple, perhaps we enjoy a greater measure of happiness than you do. However, as in the present world no group of people can remain isolated and unaffected by the rest of the world, we are working hard to establish ourselves alongside the rest of mankind. To this end our efforts toward economic self-sufficiency are uppermost in importance in our minds so that we might be a burden to no man and so that we might feed and clothe ourselves through our own talents and efforts.

The U.S. Trusteeship Administration is helping us toward that end, and we are grateful for all that they are doing for us and for aiding us in establishing ourselves firmly in the brotherhood of free nations.

Of equal importance are our efforts toward greater self-government which, with the guidance and assistance of the U.S. trusteeship administrators who are doing their utmost to encourage us toward this goal, promises to be a reality in the not-too-distant future.

May we say again that we thank you for the privilege of being here with you, and that we are proud to stand with you as a very small but equally peace- and freedom-loving people.

“extended family” type of controls and governance, neither is it the intention to destroy these controls that keep the communities happily and soundly functioning until we are quite sure they are being effectively replaced by something just as good or better.

We may say, under the second approach, that while changes may be made to advantage, these changes should be made only in an evolutionary manner and over a period of years in response to the felt needs of the responsible people themselves, including their competent leaders, and after the proposed new ways have been tested properly, in connection with and over against established cus-

tom, to see whether or not the new ideas are sound in the circumstances.

This second method recognizes two essential factors: one, that there is no progress without change; and two, that in a position where life itself depends so intimately upon established controls set up after long experience, it is unwise to “destroy the ancient landmarks” without offering in their place an equally valid system that will meet the needs of island society. Political advancement in this manner *would* promote progress under a system of checks and balances which should insure sound progress. In the trust territory, therefore, the latter procedure would mean approval of change with tactful pressure and encouragement by the Administering Authority, as suggested by one member of the Council, with caution in relation to destruction of existing competent and indigenously developed controls. This is our policy. We are attempting through education—using the word in its broad sense—to promote the understanding and acceptance of new ideas and practices, all of which are to be adapted by the Micronesians to their own particular needs and desires.

It is suggested that the idea of the family or extended family be used in thinking of Micronesian society. The idea of “tribe” and tribal law tends to mislead thinking here. The groups usually are small, and are restricted to locally controlled areas above the beaches or on small islands. All members are in constant touch with each other—family style.

### Saipan Advisory Council

On the specific issue of the development of a Saipan Regional Advisory Council, regarding which I have promised further information, I should like to clarify the statements appearing in the report presently before the Council and in the report of the previous year. The proposed charter submitted in 1950 for a governmental body in the Saipan District had called for the grant of legislative authority to that proposed body. The proposal as presented was to endow the people of Saipan with the power over all the Marianas (except Guam), but it did not provide for adequate representation from the islands other than Saipan. It was the opinion of the responsible administrators that such a grant of legislative authority would be beyond the political capacity of the people and that the proposed council was not in certain respects properly set up.

The proposed charter was therefore subjected to reconsideration. At that time, in August 1950, the organic act for Guam was passed and a change was made on Guam from a bicameral to unicameral legislative body. This unicameral legislature has operated with effectiveness on Guam and such had been noted by the leaders of Saipan. It was thus, I believe, that the proposal for a unicameral

body in Saipan came about and as a result of which arose the present problem of satisfying the desires of outer islands in the Saipan District for representation in the advisory body sufficiently large to insure that these smaller islands would not be a voiceless minority in comparison with the island of Saipan itself. Here again, if haste is avoided, it is believed the whole matter will be worked out in due time. The people at present cannot be said to be held under an oppressive government while they are working on the problem.

I also promised information to the Council regarding which municipalities in the territory still have appointed magistrates. I find that there are appointed magistrates in Ponape in the municipalities of Net, Sokaze, U, Metalanim, and Kiti; and in the Truk District on the islands of Oneap, Pis, Satawan, Magur, and Tamatam. It is my belief that careful review of these cases will reveal situations in most cases in which there are good and sufficient reasons for permitting the people to continue their hereditary chiefs also as magistrates (as in the very small islands) or to appoint magistrates where the hereditary chiefs may not qualify or where elections are not yet practical. These cases will be studied at once.

As for the number of cases in which the magistrates of municipalities also serve as judges, I find that there are 16 in Truk, 5 in Ponape, 10 in Yap, and 4 in the Marshalls.

In both of these situations, one, where the magistrates are appointed, and, two, where there is the combination of executive and judicial functions in the magistrates, the Administering Authority, in accordance with our basic philosophy, will welcome and encourage change just as rapidly as the people in those municipalities are ready and able to adjust to elected magistrates in the one instance and to the independent exercise of judicial functions in the other. Without willingness of the people to accept and recognize the relocation of authority that would thus be brought about, a rapid change to new ways well might be more harmful than beneficial in certain basic factors of effective self-government; namely, respect for and observance of authority, and the enforcement of law.

The fact that over the period of a few years the great majority of the municipalities (97 out of 117) have already elected magistrates and have achieved a separation of executive and judicial functions is in itself evidence that acceptance of democratic procedures has been and is being encouraged by the administration. It will be noted that at the time of the annual report there were 86 elected magistrates, whereas there has been a gain of 11 since that time. This is a large majority of the total. Actually, as men experienced in administration of dependent peoples know, there is an inevitable variation amongst municipalities in the degree to which the people absorb changes in

substance even though the form of government may be modified.

#### **Training of Administrative Personnel**

It is the policy of the United States to replace Americans in the administration with inhabitants of the territory just as rapidly as qualified people can be developed. This has been a basic principle of the United States in all of its territorial administrations and we are following it in the trust territory.

I spoke in my opening statement of the work of the training specialist who is establishing a pilot project in Truk to accelerate the training of Micronesians for positions in the administration.

The report under examination shows 305 trained Micronesian medical personnel. It shows 331 trained teaching personnel in addition to whom there are indigenous elementary-school supervisors. All municipal and all district court judges are Micronesians. Twenty-one special Micronesians assist the High Court. All court recorders and other court staff personnel are Micronesians. The report also shows 143 Micronesian supervisors, clerks, and technicians. In addition, there are Micronesian administrative assistants, accountants, and others. This I think is a good record for the few years of our responsibility for the trust territory.

It is very encouraging to observe the wisdom and experience expressed by the members of the Council in connection with the necessary relationship between political stability of government on the one hand and economic stability on the other hand. Development and evolution politically would seem necessarily to walk hand-in-hand with development and evolution economically. The point has been stressed that the Micronesian people—after the rather turbulent set of experiences with the Spanish, the Germans, the Japanese, the preparations for war and the devastations of war, and now with the Americans—these people are entitled to all guaranties possible that they will have continuity of government and of peace in the future. It may be mentioned that continuity of government depends also upon not too turbulent, but a gradual and evolutionary change in the form of government, for it may hardly be said to provide for stability in government should the administration attempt to undermine existing controls and the “extended family” set-up of government in the communities, unless there are worked out by the people themselves substitutes and different forms of controls and government. This observation merely points up beliefs voiced by several members of the Council during the past few days, and it would seem to express a point of view that the administration constantly must bear in mind.

The problem of the location of the headquarters of the administration of the trust territory has been raised by many members of the Council.



Rather than review the points brought out in the questioning period, I should like to assure the Council that the decision on this matter, as one representative suggested, will be made so as to achieve the maximum administrative efficiency.

Recognition will also be given to the implications of the decision as to the site of the headquarters on the progressive assumption of administrative responsibility by the Micronesians, although I would suggest that this point is of a long-range nature and will not be of decisive importance for some time insofar as headquarters staff functions are concerned. This is particularly so since a number of departments on the High Commissioner's staff have been or are being located either in the trust territory or on Guam. Wherever staff personnel may be located, they continually will have to take long trips to make contact with the various districts. During most of their time they will be absent from a central headquarters. This is inherent in the geography of this trust territory. The problems must be solved in the field to a large extent.

#### **Continuation of Island Trading Company**

Virtually all members of the Council have commented upon the desirability of continuing the Island Trading Company or of giving attention to plans for the satisfactory transition of commercial activities in the event of its termination. Let me assure the Council that the importance of these matters is appreciated by the Administering Authority. The continuation of the Island Trading Company for one or more years is presently under consideration. I have personally conferred with district administrators and their staffs and also with the Micronesian leaders themselves concerning this problem. We also have been giving attention to defining the problems that would arise as a result of the company's termination and to devising solutions to those problems. The Island Trading Company, as I believe members of the Council appreciate, has been operated solely in the interests of the inhabitants of the trust territory without thought of profit to anyone else. If it is continued the operation will be on the same basis. Whenever it is terminated, every effort will be made to insure the continuation of commercial activities on the same basic principle—to wit, in the best interests of the inhabitants.

The administration is aware of the need of assisting any Micronesian successor to the Island Trading Company with capital, managerial assistance, and marketing and purchasing services. The Island Trading Company is not a monopoly, except in the field of marketing copra. Whatever authority it enjoys is used entirely for the benefit of the Micronesians—and no one else. At present, there are Micronesian firms in each district which are being encouraged to expand and which

are, in fact, now handling over half of the trust territory's trade.

Perhaps I should mention, as a point of clarification, that the Island Trading Company and the Copra Stabilization Fund, while interrelated to the extent that the Island Trading Company acts as agent of the Copra Stabilization Board in buying and selling copra, and they are presently mutually beneficial, nevertheless they are separate operations. The continuation of the Copra Stabilization Board may be possible if a suitable successor to the Island Trading Company can be devised and placed in operation.

Also I should clarify the point that the economic development activities in which the Island Trading Company at one time engaged, have been relocated since the preparation of the annual report under examination and are now carried on with other administration funds. These activities, therefore, would not terminate with the company.

Another subject upon which virtually all members of the Council and the Visiting Mission have urged action is the settlement of currency and land claims in the territory. I touched upon these subjects in my opening statement. The Visiting Mission and members of the Council noted on the part of the people a lack of understanding of the administration's program for settling land claims. I might point out that until recently the efforts of the land claims and title personnel were concentrated in Saipan, and now that these efforts are being extended to the other districts, there should result an increased understanding by the Micronesians of the land settlement program. Certainly the point is well taken that every effort should be made to give a clear explanation of the policies and program. This we shall undertake. All public-domain land is held by the government of the trust territory for the benefit and use of the Micronesians.

Again for the record may it be recalled that while 434 square miles of land is still designated "public domain," none of the trust territory public domain taken over from the Japanese is withheld from use by the Micronesians if this area is suitable for use or residence, except small areas needed as sites for offices and for strategic use of the Administering Authority, for all of which compensation is being arranged. The very great percentage of this public-domain land is in forest reserve and steep slopes. All of it that is arable is now being put to use by the Micronesians or by agricultural experiment stations for the Micronesians, and all Micronesians who wish land to use are supplied. The Administering Authority, that is, the U.S. Government, except for strategic purposes, does not benefit in the slightest by any public domain of this trust territory. It will be recalled that at the time of the annual report approximately 200 cases had been settled whereas at the time of the Visiting Mission's report 434

cases were shown as determined and decided upon for settlement.

### **Agricultural Development**

I endeavored to stress in my opening statement the importance which to date has been placed upon agriculture. I would hope that the reorganization of our agricultural personnel which I mentioned in that statement largely will meet the need pointed out by the Visiting Mission for a separate Department of Agriculture. I am by no means adverse to organizing agriculture as a separate department, but possibly the program we now have adopted will satisfy the requirements of our situation.

The Visiting Mission and the members of the Council very properly have stressed the necessity for improving agriculture both from the standpoint of abundance for subsistence and also for the possibilities of exports to exchange for trade goods. A detailed and approved agricultural program has been drawn up since the Visiting Mission made its study. This includes a thorough land-use survey, stepped-up efforts in control of the rhinoceros beetle, improved quarantine regulations and enforcement, improvement of genetic strains of coconuts and livestock, and improved husbandry of plants and animals.

Our major pest is the rhinoceros beetle which has been held localized to the Palau Islands. The scolia wasp, a predator of the beetle in Africa, has been introduced, but the results so far seem negative. The trust territory employs a qualified entomologist and an assistant to him. These men are conducting a program of clearing out fallen and decayed coconut trees in order to destroy the beetles' breeding places. These trees were felled by war bombing in nearly all cases. The trust territory will cooperate in the South Pacific Commission's project to control and eradicate the beetle. Quarantine regulations are in force to prevent spread of the beetle to other areas outside of Palau.

Planting of coconuts in areas overlaid with concrete will be further investigated. Some steps already have been taken in this regard.

As stated during the discussions, the necessity of preserving land for future agriculture will determine whether or not further mining of phosphates and bauxite will be allowed.

Every effort will be made to decrease dependence upon imported foods.

Agricultural development is indeed basic to the economy of the territory and we shall continue to give it vigorous emphasis. Due to limitation of funds we have to avoid creating an imbalance in relation between expenditures on agriculture and expenditures on other essential programs in the territory, including health and education.

In reference to the desires of the people of

Bikini, it is hoped that final and happy solutions of their problems will be available before the next annual report. Studies have been in progress to this end.

The suggestion was made by one member of the Council that there should be developed a coordination of all shipping facilities available to the territory in order to make it economical to lift regularly all the produce that can be made available. It now is believed that with the addition of the second large cargo vessel to the trust territory service there will be ample shipping capacity to handle the products of the territory. All of our vessels, I should explain, since the point has not before been brought out, are scheduled by the Pacific Micronesian Lines, Inc., operators of the vessels, in consultation with the executive officer on the High Commissioner's staff. The Pacific Micronesian Lines, Inc., is a corporation created for this purpose. It is a subsidiary of the Pacific Far East Steamship Company. The trust territory executive officer is now located on Guam, where he can work in close coordination with the Pacific Micronesian Lines, which also has its offices on Guam.

Before leaving economic matters, I should like to say that I was unaware the Council had not been informed of the economic survey that was made in 1946 by the U.S. Commercial Company, the predecessor of the Island Trading Company. This survey has been produced in only a limited number of copies because of its size, but a summary of the report is available and I shall have a copy sent to the U.N. Library.

Several members of the Council have noted that there is still room for improvement in medical and educational activities on the outer islands of the various districts. The problem of serving these outer islands is a difficulty that constantly troubles us. We hope that it will be materially improved when schooners are available in each district so that they will be able to make longer and perhaps more frequent field trips. Our continuing program for education of Micronesian medical and education personnel will also help materially.

### **Public Health Services**

At each of the six district hospitals there are well-qualified American or European doctors and nurses. These doctors also make regular field trips to the outer islands.

On the outer islands there are Micronesian medical practitioners who have been trained on Guam or at the Central Medical School in Fiji. There are also Micronesian nurses at the district hospitals who have been trained on Guam, in the district hospitals, or at Truk.

No person in the trust territory is refused medical treatment because of inability to pay. We are experimenting with a system of token pay-

ments for medical services because one of the basic principles and foundations of self-government is the acceptance of responsibility for governmental functions, whether they be political, social, economic, or educational in nature. The charges, however, are nominal and are not now designed to support the services provided—as our budget will testify. If, however, a person cannot pay these nominal charges, he is nevertheless provided medical care.

In this connection, I should like to say that the work of the medical-survey vessel, the *Whidbey*, has not been lost. This vessel, which operated from 1948 to 1951, visited every district and completed medical and dental examinations of about 75 percent of the population. Health records for each individual were opened at the respective district centers, and the data for each person so examined were placed on an individual card. These cards are now used at each district center for reference purposes.

In the opening statement which I originally prepared, I had a description of a new health or diagnostic schooner which we have readied to operate in the trust territory. This vessel would continue the operations which the members of the Council found were so effectively carried on by the *S. S. Whidbey*. Under the stringent plan of economy which confronts the administration due to a cut in Federal appropriations, reductions are contemplated in several activities. These reductions were chiefly in the field of new construction which was to be practically entirely eliminated, in "housekeeping services" which would be drastically reduced, and, unfortunately, also even in the more important services including education and health. Because of the reductions, some important personnel necessarily were dispensed with and it has been necessary to plan to lay up the new diagnostic ship until we see whether or not we can afford to operate it. For this reason, I regretfully withdrew the section of my report which described our new diagnostic ship. The Council may rest assured that an activity of this sort is receiving priority consideration and it is hoped that we may be operating the ship in the not too distant future through savings in other lines.

I should be remiss were I not to take this opportunity to express a debt of gratitude to our friends in Fiji for the work that has been done at their Central Medical School at Suva. The young men being trained under those auspices are rendering a type of service to their people that could not be expected of foreigners. We can only say that we plan to increase the number of native medical practitioners, native nurses, and sanitarians in our trusteeship.

It is pleasing that members of the Council and the Visiting Mission, as well as UNESCO, have expressed their general approval of the revised focus of our education program in order that it may

meet the needs of the people of the trust territory for their life in the islands. Due to budget limitations, it is difficult at this time for me to be optimistic regarding an immediate expansion of secondary-school facilities in the territory or the establishment of a normal school for increased specialized teacher training. One factor that well may be considered in increasing secondary-school attendance is the ability of the territory adequately to utilize in its economy and administration the graduates of these schools.

I am opposed to any rationing of education. Nevertheless, with decided budgetary limitations and many needs of the territory to be filled, we cannot afford so to emphasize education that other needs are not taken care of and further, to the extent that graduates who have anticipated increased monetary return for their services in the community as a result of their education, are merely disillusioned. Probably education basically should be for the purpose of improving the ability of young people to do the things in their communities which they will have to do anyway. Nevertheless, it is well known that there is a strong correlation between graduating from high school and dissatisfaction with the so-called lowlier opportunities afforded by a community. The Council, I hope, will be patient with us if we weave into our consideration as one of the basic factors this latter practical aspect.

#### "Bicultural" Education Program

We may call our setup for education "bicultural" in that we try to conserve the good things of the old Micronesian culture that work so well in their environment while at the same time offering the good of modern culture—reading, writing, a unifying language, the use of numbers, and the use of applied science. It would seem foolish to discard the good of old Micronesian culture.

The budget of the territory does not reflect the money expended by the municipalities for elementary education. Supervisors of elementary education are paid by the trust territory government, and aid is given to municipalities when they cannot afford adequate support of their elementary schools.

The intermediate schools and the Pacific Island Central School are supported by the trust territory government. In the year under review, 505 scholarships providing free subsistence and incidental costs were provided to intermediate school students who came from outer islands and were in residence at the district centers' intermediate schools. Virtually all students at the Pacific Islands Central School at Truk received scholarships and subsistence.

One further point on which I was asked to give information was on examples of comparative salaries for Micronesian and American personnel. I

have obtained some examples on which a comparison might be possible, as follows:

Position	Micronesian scale	American scale
Clerk-typist	\$582. 40-\$811. 20	\$2, 950-\$3, 430
Agricultural Extension Agent	\$1, 164. 80-\$1, 456. 00	\$5, 060-\$5, 810
Superintendent of Elementary Schools	\$1, 019. 20-\$1, 331. 20	\$5, 060-\$5, 810
Intermediate School Teacher	\$665. 60-\$873. 60	\$3, 410-\$4, 160

The foregoing examples show what was earlier stated to be the case: there is considerable difference between the two pay scales. The Micronesian pay scale is geared to the normal range of income for persons engaged in other local pursuits such as copra production, local shipping enterprises, and so forth. In short, it is tied to the economy of the area in which the employees must live among their fellow Micronesians. The American pay scale is determined by what is required to attract qualified people to leave the advantages of their life in the United States and to accept employment in a remote area away from their homes. These people are needed to help the Micronesians advance and must be offered a salary that will be attractive. As a rule they lose seniority in similar work and organizations where they formerly had been employed in America.

The subsistence economy of the territory and the "extended family" system mean that individuals do not live on their salaries. They purchase some imported foods not because of necessity but because of desire. Their salaries, therefore, cannot be used as a yardstick to measure their standards of living.

The "extended family" system in the territory means that money generally is not considered as individual property but is a contribution to the other resources of all in the family. It also means that there is not great divergence in monetary earnings since work such as copra production is engaged in as a family activity. Everyone on the island works at it.

It will be seen therefore that the people who long have used the custom of paying the "head tax" probably will wish to continue this system for some years to come, and until there seems to be more point to setting up a graduated income tax. This head tax permits payment in labor as well as in cash.

#### Social Security

The Micronesian society itself provides one of the most complete and satisfactory forms of social security. Food is readily available and the "extended family" system insures that no aged person or young child is permitted to fend for himself. These individuals are accepted as a respon-

sibility of the family. Aged persons are particularly respected and cared for. Children are welcomed and their training, care, and well-being are well-defined responsibilities among the family members.

Under such a system, the social-security measures of a monetary society would be superfluous and, probably, also lacking in the human qualities now so manifest in Micronesian society.

This may not be exactly "normal" if the norm is taken from our modern, Western, urbanized situations. It is normal to the Pacific Islands, and the way it works results in happiness and adequacy.

Now, in the field of social welfare, in contrast with social security, the report speaks of the very substantial sums spent by the Administering Authority for health services and the promotion of foods and nutrition.

One of the weaker features of our administration, but nevertheless an exceedingly important feature in connection with stability of government, is continuity of service by qualified personnel. Members of the Council have pointed out that we have not yet gotten to the point where we can assure our carefully selected employees that they will have a true career in the area and therefore that they must do all things necessary to make a success of their administration and service including immediately learning the language of the people they work with. We are endeavoring to work out a solution for this problem. Manifestly, those conditions cannot be applied to all of our present employees, because we are endeavoring to prepare Micronesians to replace a very substantial percentage of our present American staff as soon as practicable. As I mentioned in my opening statement, we are aware of this problem and are giving it attention. We do not have within our Federal system of employment a colonial service. Broadly speaking we have only the Civil-Service and Foreign-Service systems. Neither of these is entirely suited to the trust territory employment situation. However, attention is being given to modifications of the present system that may be desirable in order to improve matters.

A suggestion was made by one representative that our future reports on the administration of the territory should give more detail as to plans and accomplishments and be more specific in matters as they affect the separate districts or the trust territory as a whole. We shall endeavor to improve this situation in our next report.

Another representative asked for greater detail regarding budgetary information, specifically what comes from the general budget and what from the local budgets. I may be able to clarify this by explaining that the budget shown in the report is the expenditure from the general budget into which go the appropriated funds from the Federal Government and those classes of local revenue which are designated prior to collection to

accrue to the trust territory government. Expenditures of the districts are from allotments from this general budget. We do not have budgets for the municipalities, which collect and spend certain local revenues. We surely can improve these tables in our next report and we appreciate the suggestion for a method of clarifying our presentation.

It has been very gratifying to note that so many members of the Council took the trouble to welcome Mrs. Dorothy Kabua and her son, Amata Kabua, as members of the U.S. delegation to the Trusteeship Council meeting. As we had expected, it was found that there is a value in having representatives of the people of the trust territory present to listen to the deliberations and afford counsel and advice to the Special Representative during his presentations.

Mr. President, I hope that these remarks may have helped shed further light on the problems that members of the Council have raised. May I express my sincere appreciation again for the consideration I have been shown by the Council, for the encouraging words of commendation members have seen fit to bestow, and for the assistance that I have received. It has been a benefit and a pleasure to be here.

## Administration of Pacific Trust Territory

### EXECUTIVE ORDER 10470<sup>1</sup>

AMENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 10408,<sup>2</sup> TRANSFERRING THE ADMINISTRATION OF A CERTAIN PORTION OF THE TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS FROM THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

1. Executive Order No. 10408 of November 10, 1952, transferring the administration of that portion of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands which includes the islands of Tinian and Saipan from the Secretary of the Interior to the Secretary of the Navy, is hereby amended to provide that that portion of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands over which administration is transferred from the Secretary of the Interior to the Secretary of the Navy shall include all of the Northern Mariana Islands of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands except the Island of Rota.

2. Nothing contained in Executive Order No. 10408, as amended by this order, shall be construed to modify the rights or obligations of the United States under provisions of the Trusteeship Agreement for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands approved by the President on July 18, 1947, or to affect or modify the responsibility of the Secretary of State to interpret the rights and obligations of the United States arising out of international agreements.

*Dwight D. Eisenhower*

THE WHITE HOUSE,  
July 17, 1953.

<sup>1</sup> 18 Fed. Reg. 4231.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Jan. 12, 1953, p. 46.

August 3, 1953

## THE FOREIGN SERVICE

### Chiefs of Mission To Remain at Their Posts

The President said on July 7 that the following Chiefs of Mission will remain at their posts:

William J. Sebald, Ambassador to Burma  
Thomas E. Whelan, Ambassador to Nicaragua  
Harold H. Tittmann, Jr., Ambassador to Peru  
Waldemar J. Gallman, Ambassador to the Union of South Africa  
Fletcher Warren, Ambassador to Venezuela  
Donald R. Heath, Ambassador to the State of Viet-Nam and the Kingdoms of Cambodia and Laos

### Confirmations

The Senate on July 6 confirmed Philip K. Crowe as Ambassador to Ceylon and Roy Tasco Davis as Ambassador to Haiti.

### Consular Offices

Plans to close the consulate at Valletta, Malta, as reported on January 22, 1953, have been canceled. The consulate is to remain open. As in the past, Valletta will not be under the direct supervision of any other Foreign Service establishment. As of July 1, 1953, Departmental jurisdiction of this post is to be transferred from the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs to the Bureau of European Affairs.

The Department of State on July 15 announced (press release 381) that because of the need for greater economy in the overseas operations of the Government, the U.S. consulate at Gibraltar will be closed on July 31, 1953. The American Embassy at London will assume consular jurisdiction over Gibraltar as of that date.

The consulate at Tenerife, Canary Islands, is in the process of closing and will cease to perform consular services as of the close of business on July 17. Consular activities formerly performed at Tenerife are to be carried out by the consulate at Seville, Spain.

The consulate at Torreón, Mexico, was closed to the public July 9, 1953, and will be officially closed July 31, 1953. The consular district of Torreón will be transferred to the jurisdiction of the consulate at Monterrey.

The consulate at Guaymas, Mexico, will be closed to the public July 16, 1953, and will be officially closed July 31, 1953. That portion of the Guaymas consular district in Baja California will be transferred to the Tijuana consular district and the remainder of the Guaymas consular district in the State of Sonora will be transferred to the Nogales consular district.

### Calendar of Meetings

The "Calendar of Meetings," regularly featured in the BULLETIN's first issue of the month, will appear in the August 10 issue.

## President Warns Against Cuts In Mutual Security Funds

White House press release dated July 23

*The following letter was sent by the President to Styles Bridges, chairman of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, on July 22:*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I wish to bring to your urgent attention my deep concern with the Mutual Security appropriations now before you for consideration.

This program and these appropriations directly involve the security of our own Nation. The program is specifically directed toward strengthening the collective security of the free nations—in which the safety of our Nation is inescapably involved. The sums requested were carefully worked out in connection with, and as an inseparable part of, our entire security program comprising the U.S. military forces and the Atomic Energy Commission. By strict rescreening, they were reduced one-third from those requested in the budget of the outgoing administration.

Our country must exercise constructive and courageous leadership, for its own sake as well as for the sake of the other free nations. Invariably, if leadership falters in the face of grave danger in a complex situation, the result is disastrous. The amounts now in the Mutual Security Program have already been reduced and vigorously rescreened; deep cuts will certainly be received, on both sides of the Iron Curtain, as evidence of faltering.

As you know, I have never taken the attitude that an exact dollar in this program marks the difference between success or failure. But it is my conviction that grave consequences would follow from a major cut below the requested amounts carefully scrutinized and unanimously approved by my key advisers, including the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Defense, as well as the Director for Mutual Security.

The funds requested for military assistance are indeed large. They are large because that is the size of the threat before us. They are large because the implements of military strength are not cheap.

It must be remembered, however, that our funds are exceeded by much larger funds expended by our NATO and other allies themselves. Our tanks, planes, ships, and ammunition are essential if we are to take advantage of the readiness of other nations throughout the world to join together with us in a firm posture of strength. Across the world—from the impressive buildup of military strength in NATO, to the bitter fighting against Communist forces in Indochina—we have allies who rely on us to provide certain missing ingre-

dients in their military strength. We must not slow down the momentum of strength and growing unity.

I realize that these military assistance appropriations involve a substantial question of judgment as to the necessary amount of "lead time" that must be allowed to permit delivery of equipment on schedule in the future, and that this lead time allowance has an important effect in the amount to be appropriated in any one year. I know from first-hand observation that the lead time required in almost every case—the building up of a division in Turkey, or a jet squadron in Norway, or an armored unit in France—has been a very long one. The emphasis in our program on major items of equipment, such as aircraft and ships, and the volume of our very important off-shore procurement require a relatively large amount of lead-time financing. This necessary equipment-pipeline accounts for the large amounts of carry-over funds in this program, as reflected in my request.

I have requested these funds only to meet demonstrated military requirements, including only essentials for forces that our allies are now in process of raising, training, and maintaining to receive this military equipment. The responsible members of this Administration have proven their alertness in identifying possible savings; we have reported these savings to the Congress, and we have made full allowance for them in our request. This Administration will continue to exercise that same care in the management of funds, and will take every advantage of opportunity to economize in the use of funds with which they are entrusted.

I wish also to emphasize the importance of economic and technical assistance for the Near East, for India and Pakistan, for Latin America, and for the Far East, where it is vital that the people see evidence of improved conditions of living flowing from freedom and independent sovereignty as contrasted to totalitarian methods. And I place great value on the work of the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, with its cooperative approach by many nations in the interest of children of many areas of the world, and on the related United Nations Technical Assistance Program, which brings to the people of the underdeveloped areas concrete evidence that the United Nations is actively assisting their quest for economic progress. These programs, many of which require only modest amounts of money, are an integral part of our program for America's security.

This is a program for building strength. Evidence is beginning to appear in many parts of the world of the success that comes from a firm foreign policy backed by growing strength and unity on the part of the free nations. This, of all times, is not a moment to hesitate. It is, above

all, a time to make more strong and effective our relationships with all other free peoples, a moment to help speed the momentum of their growing strength.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

## Disposal of Government-owned Synthetic Rubber Plants

*Following is the text of a letter which Secretary Dulles sent to Homer E. Capehart, chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency:*<sup>1</sup>

JULY 20, 1953

DEAR SENATOR CAPEHART: On June 26 Assistant Secretary of State Morton wrote to you in support of S. 2047, a bill to authorize disposal of the Government-owned synthetic rubber plants. I am personally writing to you at this time in order to reemphasize the importance to our foreign relations of passage of this legislation.

Natural rubber is the life blood of several friendly countries in South and Southeastern Asia. It is vital to Malaya, where a bitter and bloody struggle is being fought against Communist-inspired bandits. It is vital to Indonesia, a newly independent country whose economic progress and political orientation are of great concern to the United States. It is important to Thailand, whose troops have fought valiantly in the cause of the United Nations in Korea, and to Vietnam, a country at grips with armed communism.

What we do in rubber is to a large extent the standard by which these countries measure the professions and the actions of the United States. So long as the United States Government owns and operates synthetic rubber plants there will remain a source of friction between these countries and ourselves. They are convinced that Government operation of these plants means subsidization and, therefore, unfair competition with natural rubber. On any other assumption they find it difficult to understand why the United States, the champion of free enterprise, should maintain a Government monopoly of synthetic rubber. They say they are prepared to meet the competition of synthetic rubber privately produced, but are reluctant to proceed with investment in replanting and normal expansion so long as they are faced with the risk of arbitrary production and pricing policies on the part of a Government-owned industry.

At recent international meetings, representatives of both the previous and present administrations have assured these countries that a plan for disposal of the synthetic rubber plants was being prepared and that this Congress would be urged to act on the disposal legislation at this session. In the light of these statements, the many expressions of dissatisfaction with our rubber policy have been

<sup>1</sup> Reprinted from *Cong. Rec. of July 21, 1953*, p. 9656.

largely stilled. That dissatisfaction will be revived and multiplied if Congress fails to approve disposal legislation.

I hope very much that the legislation reported by your committee will be acted upon favorably by the Senate. Failure of the legislation at this time would reintroduce a source of friction and suspicion into our relations with an area that is of great political and strategic importance to us and the rest of the free world.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES.

## Use of Surplus Agricultural Commodities for Foreign Aid

*Statement by Samuel C. Waugh, Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

The Department of State favors the passage of S. 2249, which has been introduced by Senator Aiken. This bill provides the authority that the President requested of Congress in his message which was communicated to the Senate on June 30 of this year.<sup>2</sup>

In recent years there have been a number of famine emergencies in foreign countries. Similar emergencies are likely to arise during the period covered by this bill. We now have unusually large stocks of agricultural products held by the Government. No one wants these stocks to go unused while human beings starve. If Senator Aiken's bill becomes law, the President would be authorized to make use of some part of these stocks in a constructive way to meet famine or other urgent relief requirements of friendly nations. This use would be consistent with the humanitarian instincts of the American people and would further our foreign policy.

I want to emphasize that the administration understands that the purpose of this bill is to meet emergencies. It is in the nature of emergencies that programs to meet them cannot be planned in advance. When they arise, prompt action is needed. In the past, as the President pointed out in his message, the Congress has been forced to add consideration of these emergency programs to its very heavy workload. It is also possible that an emergency of this kind could arise when the Congress is not in session. It therefore seems very desirable that the President be granted the authority to act promptly under these circumstances, so that human suffering may be prevented and so that the United States can use its resources promptly for the aid of friendly countries.

Just as emergencies themselves cannot usually be foreseen, all of the conditions that may exist

<sup>1</sup> Made on July 16 (press release 384) before the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry in support of S. 2249, giving the President authority to utilize agricultural commodities held by the U.S. Government to meet urgent emergency relief requirements of friendly countries.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of July 13, 1953, p. 60.

are unforeseeable. For this reason, the President asked for maximum flexibility as to the terms under which the relief may be extended. This flexibility is provided by S. 2249. Since emergencies of the kind described in the bill are likely to involve countries which do not have large financial resources, we would expect that the aid given under this authority would normally be in the form of a grant. However, the language is sufficiently flexible to permit the President to impose other conditions where they may be appropriate. Similarly, it may be appropriate in certain cases to provide for the establishment of a special fund of local currencies from the proceeds of local sales of the commodities. In other cases, the individuals receiving the help may be in no position to pay for it, and such provision might be inappropriate. In the light of the impossibility of foreseeing the circumstances of each case, the President in his message said, "I am requesting authority to establish, when the need arises, the terms and conditions under which these agricultural commodities shall be made available."

One aspect of this bill involves a question which

is of great importance to the Department of State. I think that most of the bills that have been submitted to Congress having to do with the use of Government-held agricultural stocks have recognized the danger that such use by the Government might compete unfairly with normal commercial exports from the United States or with such exports from friendly foreign countries. This problem, however, should not arise under the bill you now have under consideration. In the kind of emergency provided for in this bill, people will be fed who would otherwise go hungry. The aid given under this bill will necessarily be in addition to the amounts which would otherwise be imported by the country concerned. This is another reason why the use for relief purposes of some part of these large stocks of agricultural commodities should particularly commend itself to the Congress.

In summary, I am authorized to say that it is the view of the administration that S. 2249 provides the kind of authority requested by the President and it is supported by the administration as a whole.

## Friendship Treaty With Japan

### PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO THE SENATE<sup>1</sup>

THE WHITE HOUSE, *June 27, 1953.*

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation between the United States of America and Japan, together with a protocol relating thereto, signed at Tokyo on April 2, 1953.

I transmit also, for the information of the Senate, a report by the Secretary of State with respect to the treaty.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

(Enclosures: (1) Report of the Secretary of State; (2) treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation, with protocol, signed at Tokyo, April 2, 1953.)<sup>2</sup>

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  
*Washington, June 22, 1953.*

The PRESIDENT,  
*The White House:*

The undersigned, the Secretary of State, has the honor to submit to the President, with a view to its transmission to the Senate to receive the advice

and consent of that body to ratification, if the President approve thereof, a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation between the United States of America and Japan, together with a protocol relating thereto, signed at Tokyo on April 2, 1953.

This treaty places commercial relations between the United States and Japan on a normal bilateral treaty basis for the first time since the termination on January 26, 1940, of the treaty of commerce and navigation, signed at Washington on February 21, 1911 (37 Stat. 1504). It was envisaged in article 12 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, which contains, in addition to temporary commercial arrangements, a declaration by Japan of its readiness to enter into negotiations for the conclusion, with each of the Allied Powers, so desiring, of treaties or agreements to place their respective "trading, maritime and other commercial relations on a stable and friendly basis."

The present treaty is a comprehensive instrument which expresses the common faith of the two countries in liberal principles and is designed to provide an effective basis for the development of business, trade, and other commercial relationships. It is the first treaty of this type which Japan has negotiated with any country since the end of World War II and may be regarded as a significant step in the strengthening of cordial relations between the United States and Japan.

In common with other treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation entered into by the United States in recent years, the new treaty deals in considerable detail with a wide range of subject

<sup>1</sup> S. Exec. O, 83d Cong., 1st sess.

<sup>2</sup> Text of the treaty is not printed here. For announcement of the signing, see BULLETIN of Apr. 13, 1953, p. 531.



matter. In general, each of the two Governments (1) agrees to accord, within its territories, to citizens and corporations of the other country treatment no less favorable than it accords to its own citizens and corporations with respect to normal commercial and industrial pursuits; (2) affirms its adherence to the principles of nondiscriminatory treatment of trade and shipping; (3) formally endorses standards regarding the protection of persons and their property and interests that reflect the most enlightened constitutional principles; and (4) recognizes the need for special attention to the problems of stimulating the flow of private capital investment. Specifically, the provisions of the treaty fall into nine broad categories: (1) entry, travel and residence; (2) basic personal freedoms; (3) guaranties with respect to property rights; (4) the conduct and control of business enterprises; (5) taxation; (6) exchange restrictions; (7) the exchange of goods; (8) navigation; and (9) exceptions, territorial applicability, and miscellaneous provisions. In the formulation of the provisions of the treaty special attention has been given to the type of assurances which American businessmen and investors are understood to regard as useful and desirable.

The new treaty with Japan resembles most nearly (a) the treaty of friendship, commerce, and economic development with Uruguay, signed at Montevideo on November 23, 1949 (S. Ex. D, 81st Cong., 2d sess.), the treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation with Ireland, signed at Dublin on January 21, 1950 (S. Ex. H, 81st Cong., 2d sess.), both of which treaties have received Senate advice and consent to ratification; and (b) the treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation with Israel, signed at Washington on August 23, 1951 (S. Ex. R, 82d Cong., 1st sess.), with Greece, signed at Athens August 3, 1951 (S. Ex. J, 82d Cong., 2d sess.), and with Denmark, signed at Copenhagen October 1, 1951 (S. Ex. I, 82d Cong., 2d sess.), which treaties were submitted to the Senate on October 18, 1951, January 30, 1952, and January 29, 1952, respectively.

There are several provisions in the treaty with Japan, however, which are not found in other treaties, as follows: (1) A clause providing for visa privileges for persons desiring to enter either country for the purpose of developing the operations of a business enterprise in which they have a substantial investment (art. I, par. 1 (b)); (2) a clause assuring that if new limitations are imposed upon the extent to which aliens are accorded national treatment with respect to carrying on certain activities reserved from the "national treatment" rule, such limitations shall not be applied against enterprises which are engaged in such activities at the time the new limitations are adopted and which are owned or controlled by na-

tionals and companies of the other country (art. VII, par. 2, second sentence); (3) a provision designed to further the United States policy of favoring the broad dissemination of nonsecurity technological information (art. V, par. 2); (4) a provision designed to discourage certain deceptive marking practices in international trade (protocol, par. 7); and (5) a paragraph designed to assure the maintenance of a free market in the field of marine insurance (art. XV, par. 3). The provision indicated under (1) above was authorized by section 101 (a) (15) (E) (ii) of the new Immigration and Nationality Act. The provision indicated under (5) above was recommended by the Association of Marine Underwriters of the United States.

The provision on the application of quantitative trade restrictions (art. XIV, par. 3) has been restated along the lines of article XII, paragraph 3, of the treaty of amity and economic relations with Ethiopia (S. Ex. F, 82d Cong., 2d sess.) in the interests of greater clarity and adequacy.

As has been done in similar treaties with other countries, certain changes in the standard language have been made by way of clarification or accommodation and various adjustments of substance have been included to meet special circumstances existing with respect to the foreign government. Most of such changes in the present treaty are included in the protocol (in pars. 3 through 6, 8 through 10, and 13 through 15), which protocol is considered an integral part of the treaty. Further, it will be noted that in paragraph 1 of article IX of the treaty the provision on real property is confined to lease rights with respect to property needed for the conduct of activities permitted by the treaty and does not deal with ownership rights; and the second sentence of paragraph 3 of article XXI has been restated so that Japan will be entitled to concessions granted by the United States to other countries parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in the event of continued Japanese nonparticipation in that agreement for reasons beyond Japanese control, and in the event that the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade remains in its present form. These changes are, on the whole, of secondary consequence and, though deviations from the standard treaty, are founded on precedents.

Provision is made in the treaty for its entry into force 1 month after the day of exchange of ratifications and for its continuance in force for a period of 10 years from that day and indefinitely thereafter, subject to termination on 1 year's written notice by either Government to the other Government.

Respectfully submitted.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES.

One of the main objectives of our policy in the Pacific area is the development of a close and friendly relationship between the United States and Japan. Both Japan and the United States saw during the period of World War II what could happen in the Pacific when the two countries were aligned on opposite sides. Both Japan and the United States have come to recognize more and more the mutual advantage to be gained from cooperative effort in political and economic fields.

The peace treaty and the security treaty with Japan were fundamental steps in the establishment of a friendly association between Japan and the United States. Since the coming into force of those treaties, we have proceeded along several lines to establish a firm basis for our relations with Japan. We have concluded a fisheries treaty with Japan. We have completed negotiation of a civil air transport agreement. We have almost completed a negotiation of conventions for the avoidance of double taxation. The treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation with Japan, which is now before you, is another step, and an important step, in progress toward sound and mutually advantageous Japanese-American relations.

Prewar commercial relations between the United States and Japan rested upon a commercial treaty concluded in 1911. This treaty was terminated by the United States in January of 1940. At the present time our commercial relations with Japan rest upon the temporary arrangements provided by article 12 of the peace treaty. This article expresses Japan's willingness promptly to enter into negotiation of comprehensive commercial treaties with the Allied Powers. In the same article, Japan agreed in the meantime to accord to Allied Powers on a reciprocal basis most-favored-nation treatment with respect to the importation and exportation of goods and national treatment with respect to other commercial activities normally covered by such treaties. The pending treaty with the United States is Japan's first postwar commercial treaty.

Final negotiation of the treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation with Japan took place in Tokyo during the early part of this year. Ambassador Robert Murphy represented the United States. The Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Katsuo Okazaki, represented Japan. The negotiation was the culmination of a series of preliminary discussions which extended over a period of many months. These discussions and the final negotiation were conducted in a spirit of cordiality and mutual accommodation.

The final text of the treaty now before you

\* Made before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on July 13 (press release 373). Mr. Johnson is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs. The Senate approved the treaty on July 21.

emerged from a set of proposals formulated by the Department in consultation with other agencies and interested business groups, as adjusted during negotiation to Japanese needs and circumstances. The treaty is designed to protect American interests already established in Japan or which may become established in the future. It is designed to afford the maximum opportunity to the citizens of both countries to exercise their abilities, industry, and resources constructively in business relationships with each other. It will provide a legal framework within which economic relations between the two countries can be developed to their mutual advantage.

The treaty with Japan is of particular significance because of the magnitude of present and potential U.S. investment in and trade with Japan. Private foreign investment in Japan has been estimated to total at the end of 1952 about \$350 million. Of this amount it has been estimated that about 70 percent represents American private investment in Japan. The provisions of the treaty concerning investment create a climate favorable to increased American investment in Japan under conditions of mutual benefit to both countries.

In 1952 Japan ranked 10th among the nations of the world in foreign trade. Total U.S.-Japanese trade in that year amounted to about \$850 million. This trade represents a comparatively small fraction of the foreign trade of the United States, but it is a substantial portion of the foreign trade of Japan. Imports from the United States accounted for almost one-third of Japanese imports. Exports to the United States accounted for about one-sixth of Japanese exports. The establishment of conditions for the maintenance and expansion of U.S.-Japanese trade is, consequently, of considerable importance to both countries.

The treaty under consideration is a treaty of friendship as well as a treaty of commerce. Obligations in the treaty are stated in reciprocal terms to make plain that the treaty rests on a foundation of mutual respect and trust. The encouragement and stimulation of the spirit of respect and trust are essential to the establishment of satisfactory business relationships between citizens of the United States and Japan. It is fully as essential as the careful delineation of rights and obligations in the treaty.

I appreciate the great pressure of urgent matters for consideration by the Senate, but it is my hope that the Senate will find it possible to approve this treaty before the end of this session. The Japanese Diet at the present time is considering whether to recommend Japanese ratification of the treaty. The coming into force of the treaty will tend to reduce uncertainties and risks now experienced by American and Japanese nationals in doing business with each other. It will also help to strengthen the cooperation between the two countries which is essential to the achievement of our mutual aims.

August 3, 1953

Index

Vol. XXIX, No. 736

**Agriculture**  
 Use of surplus agricultural commodities for foreign aid (Waugh) . . . . . 159

**Asia**  
**JAPAN:** Friendship treaty with Japan (Eisenhower, Dulles, Johnson) . . . . . 160

**KOREA:**  
 Armistice in Korea (Eisenhower, Dulles, text of agreement) . . . . . 131  
 Korean armistice problems (Dulles) . . . . . 140  
 Supplementary agreement on prisoners of war (text) . . . . . 139

**Congress**  
 Current legislation on foreign policy . . . . . 149  
 Disposal of Government-owned synthetic rubber plants (Dulles) . . . . . 159  
 Friendship treaty with Japan (Eisenhower, Dulles, Johnson) . . . . . 160  
 President warns against cuts in mutual security funds . . . . . 158  
 Use of surplus agricultural commodities for foreign aid (Waugh) . . . . . 159

**Europe**  
**GERMANY:**  
 Food for East Germany . . . . . 147  
 U.S. views on German unity (Eisenhower) . . . . . 147  
**NETHERLANDS:** Approves European defense community treaty . . . . . 141

**Foreign Service**  
 Chiefs of mission to remain at their posts . . . . . 157  
 Confirmation of Crowe, Davis . . . . . 157  
 Consular offices . . . . . 157

**Mutual Aid and Defense**  
 America's stake in a healthy free-world economy (Waugh) . . . . . 142  
 President warns against cuts in mutual security funds . . . . . 158

**Presidential Documents**  
**EXECUTIVE ORDERS:** Administration of Pacific Trust Territory . . . . . 157  
 Food for East Germany . . . . . 147  
 President warns against cuts in mutual security funds . . . . . 158  
 U.S. views on German unity . . . . . 147

**Prisoners of War**  
 Armistice in Korea (Eisenhower, Dulles, text of agreement) . . . . . 131  
 Supplementary agreement on prisoners of war (text) . . . . . 139

**Strategic Materials**  
 Disposal of Government-owned synthetic rubber plants (Dulles) . . . . . 159

**Treaty Information**  
 Friendship treaty with Japan (Eisenhower, Dulles, Johnson) . . . . . 160

**Trust Territories**  
 Administering the Pacific Trust Territory (Midkiff) . . . . . 150  
 Micronesian representative addresses Council (Kabua) . . . . . 151

**United Nations**  
 Armistice in Korea (Eisenhower, Dulles, text of agreement) . . . . . 131  
 Korean Armistice problems (Dulles) . . . . . 140  
 Micronesian representative addresses Council (Kabua) . . . . . 151  
 Supplementary agreement on prisoners of war (text) . . . . . 139

*Name Index*

Adenauer, Konrad . . . . . 147  
 Crowe, Philip K. . . . . 157  
 Davis, Roy Tasco . . . . . 157  
 Dulles, Secretary . . . . . 131, 140, 141, 159, 160  
 Eisenhower, President . . . . . 131, 147, 157, 158, 160  
 Johnson, V. Alexis . . . . . 160  
 Kabua, Dorothy . . . . . 151  
 Midkiff, Frank E. . . . . 150  
 Waugh, Samuel C. . . . . 142, 159

**Check List of Department of State Press Releases: July 20-26, 1953**

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.  
 Press releases issued prior to July 20 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 373 of July 13, 381 of July 15, 384 of July 16, and 386 of July 17.

No.	Date	Subject
†388	7/20	Chemistry Union meeting
389	7/21	Dulles: Armistice problems
*390	7/21	Gideonse: Visit to India
†391	7/22	Niagara Falls remedial works
†392	7/22	Venezuelan literary contest
393	7/22	Dulles: Rhee's stand on truce
†394	7/23	Egypt's Liberation Day
395	7/23	Dulles: Enc treaty
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