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
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SOVIET UNION MILITARY-ECONOMIC REPORT

Translated from the German Report

Dated: 28 October 1944

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SECURITY INFORMATION

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
Personnel Situation	5
Agriculture and Food Situation	14
I. Livestock	14
II. Spring Plowing	22
III. Food Supply	31
Metal Supply	38
I. Production of Ores and Quartzite Sand	38
II. Scrap Procurement and Collection	39
III. Production Results at Individual Plants	43
IV. General Supply	44
Coal Supply	48
I. Coal Deliveries	48
II. Coal Supply	52

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Military-Economic Report

Survey for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd quarters of 1944

(Based on domestic radio traffic)

FOREWORD

The following report summarizes military-economic information from the 1st, 2nd and 3rd quarters of 1944 concerning:

Personnel situation
Agriculture and food situation
Metal supply
Coal supply.

Oil Supply and Foreign Trade have been treated specially in previous reports.

This report is based entirely on information derived from domestic radio traffic. It makes no pretense to completeness, but only presents a cross section of the economic situation in the Soviet Union. Statistics presented are not to be considered a maximum, but rather as an indication of economic development. It should be noted that the messages upon which this report is based originated almost exclusively from regions of the Soviet Union which were under great stress, and these messages, therefore, permit only partial conclusions as to the economic situation of the entire country.

PERSONNEL SITUATION

(1) The shortage of the labor force in the Soviet Union was extremely serious in the first, second and third quarters of 1944. In order to procure auxiliary workers, the time-tested measure of labor conscriptions was resorted to.

(2) Labor conscription was carried out, as already mentioned in the previous semi-annual reports, with emphasis as far as possible in the liberated territories. There they were identical to the resettlement operations carried on by NKVD troops. This had a dual objective:

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

- 1) To render ineffective any political unrest
- 2) To procure the urgently needed workers

(3) Thus, labor conscription was carried out in 1943, primarily in the Caucasus, then in the Eastern Ukraine and in 1944 in the Western Ukraine and White Russia. For example, according to a message in July, the following were conscripted in Rovno Oblast' alone:

For Blast Furnaces

Konstantinovka	200 persons
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For Coke Chemical Plants

in Ruchenkovskaya	1000 men
in Gorlovka	300 "
in Novomakeevka	200 "
in Staromakeevka	100 "
in Novoenakievo	100 "
in Staroenakievo	100 "
in Stalino	100 "

For Brick Factories

in Krasnogorovka	300 men
in Patelejmonovskaya	150 "
in Novoshamotnaya (?)	200 "
in Krasnoarmejskaya	100 "

<u>For the Brick Works of the Donbass Water Trust</u>	200 men
---	---------

(4) Likewise, according to a message in July the following were conscripted in West Ukrainian Oblasti for the reconstruction of sugar plants in areas of the Ukraine on the right bank of the Dnepr:

in Kiev Oblast'	2631 men
in Vinnitsa Oblast'	1960 "
in Kamenets Podolsk Oblast'	600 "
in Zhitomir Oblast'	400 "
in Odessa Oblast'	350 "
in Stanislau Oblast'	60 "
in Rovno Oblast'	150 "
in Tarnopol Oblast'	50 "
in Kirovograd Oblast'	210 "

(5) There were also reports of large scale labor conscriptions in the Oblasti of Pinsk and Baranovichi. In Kiev Oblast' labor conscription was carried out for North Caucasian Surface and Underground Construction.

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

(6) The following table indicates the general scale of labor conscriptions in the period covered by this report:

<u>Oblast' or Republic</u>	<u>Number of Labor Conscriptees</u>	<u>Future Conscription</u>
Azerbaijdzhan Republic	13845	17969
Georgian Republic	4693	--
Armenian Republic	--	500
Dagestan Republic	4155	7700
Ordzhonikidze Kraj	50336	9392
Checheno-Ingush Republic	1127	--
Turkmen Republic	1239	100
Krasnodar Kraj	1850	8590
Rostov Oblast'	18752	50117
Zhitomir Oblast'	2300	--
Oblast' of the Western Ukraine	8791	1390
Rovno Oblast'	7150	--
Total:	114238	95758

(7) During the labor conscription operations large numbers of women, youths and war wounded were called up. The use of women as drivers and transportation workers already noted in the first and second half years of 1943 was continued in 1944 and they were even employed more extensively. Reports were intercepted according to which many women were employed in coal mines. In June reports were intercepted for the first time concerning the conscription of women not only for employment for agriculture and industry, but also in the Army. According to a report of 20 June 1944, female students in the class of 1924 and older were to be conscripted for the Army.

(8) According to radio traffic youths were to be used principally in agriculture by the NK for the River Fleet and in Stalingrad. Moreover, many youths were sent to trade schools.

(9) Exact information concerning the use of war wounded was intercepted in messages from the Turkmen (Middle Asia) Azerbaijdzhan and Armenian (Caucasus) Republics.

Turkmen Republic

As of 1 January there were 8,121 persons in the Republic who had been wounded in the "fatherland war." Of these, 4,495 were conscripted for work

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

including 2,941 for work in industry. As of 1 March 1944 the number of invalids had risen to 8,330 persons and the number conscripted stood at 6,037 persons.

Armenian Republic

As of 1 April 1944, there were 18,412 war wounded in the Republic. Of these, 14,337 had been conscripted for compulsory labor. As of 1 July there were 20,308 war wounded in the republic of whom 16,588 had been conscripted. On 1 August the number of war wounded had risen to 21,130.

Azerbaijdzhan Republic

As of 1 August 1944, 27,822 war wounded were counted. Of these, the following were employed in individual branches of the economy:

Industry	1,204 men
Agriculture	10,166 "
Domestic work	156 "
Assigned to other organizations for auxiliary work	<u>6,906 "</u>
Total	18,432 men

A postscript to this message is worthy of note; according to it 1,274 invalids of the third group (?) were deprived of income because of refusal to work.

(10) In general, the military authorities paid particular attention to removing personnel capable of military duty from plants and activities in the rear for immediate transfer to the front. Thus, reports were intercepted according to which a re-examination of all war wounded was to be carried out, and those persons found capable of any service at the front whatsoever were to be immediately conscripted. Workers, who formerly had been considered incapable of military service, were also to be re-examined and as far as possible conscripted for the Army.

(11) Despite these extreme measures, in several cases there were extensive exemptions. Examples: According to a report of 4 July, the exemptions for students of all classes in technical institutions of the NK for the Merchant

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Fleet were decreed until further notice by the Council of Peoples' Commissars. Students at plant schools of the NK for Construction Materials were to be indefinitely exempted from military duty. Employees of the River Fleet, who were temporarily exempt from military duty, were to be exempt for the remainder of the war regardless of their service ability grade. Three categories of personnel at cement enterprises (engineering, technical, and administrative) were to be exempt until the end of 1944. Moreover, the exemptions for all personnel at the Kiev Construction Directorate of Stalino Oblast', which were to continue until 1 July, were extended until 31 December.

(12) From these reports it is apparent that not only the requirements of the Army were considered, but also that it was necessary to consider the interests of industries important to the war effort.

(13) The needs of Agriculture for tractor and combine operators were well met. Many reports were intercepted concerning exemptions for tractor and combine operators. Even agricultural workers without special skills could secure exemptions. For example: 1,000 agricultural workers were exempted from military duty for offices of the NK for Agriculture in Stavropol Oblast'.

(14) In addition, employees of other enterprises and offices were often conscripted to meet the requirements of agriculture. Several organizations were included in this compulsory conscription including the NK for the River Fleet.

(15) The labor shortage was not only a result of large numbers of men lost at the front and the large number of military assignments, but was also the result of poor administration and discipline in the labor conscription program.

(16) An order from the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the USSR gives information on this subject. The order concerns the punishment to be applied for unauthorized absence from plants and other industrial enterprises. Plant directors and other administrative personnel who concealed unauthorized

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

absences were to be very severely punished.

(17) An extreme example is contained in the following message which was sent on 24 May from Moscow to Kujbyshev:

As of 1 January the Steamship Agency had a total of 482 transportation workers. During the winter an additional 599 were assigned there. This totals 1,081 persons. According to information from the Port there are, however, only 612 on hand at the present time. What happened to the other 469?

(18) Poor shipping conditions had an especially serious effect on the labor conscription program. Examples:

On 15 January a group of tractor operators had to await further shipping space for 10 days at the Proletarskaya Railroad Station. The tractor drivers were urgently needed in the Ukraine.

Likewise, in January a group of 1,000 labor conscriptees, who were urgently needed at plants of the NK for Armaments in Slavyansk, were stranded at the Tikhoretskaya Railroad Station. For days the 1,000 persons could not be fed. In March a group of 550 persons was stranded at the Tikhoretskaya Railroad Station for two weeks. This group could be neither fed nor housed.

The report from the Office of the NK for Coal in Shakhty is particularly significant. The report is as follows:

"The Ordzhonikidze and North Caucasus Railways have not provided enough railroad cars for transportation of labor conscriptees in March. The conscriptees who had been assembled and then stranded at railroad stations were to be either released or assigned to other NK's."

(19) Great difficulties were caused at individual offices, because of deficient housing and supplies for the labor conscriptees.

For example: In January 15,671 labor conscriptees were to be dispatched

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

from Ordzhonikidze Kraj to the "Rostov/Ugol" Combine. Accommodations and supplies for these conscriptees were very poorly organized. For days the group was not actually dispatched. For weeks the workers had to sleep in unheated rooms without windows or doors. This report concludes with the note that "unauthorized absences are increasing at an alarming scale."

Additional workers were required in Baku for the construction of Plant 152 of the NK for the Chemical Industry. The labor office could provide the necessary workers, but their employment was impossible because of the shortages of clothing, shoes, linens, etc.

(20) Formalities and difficulties also had to be coped with. For example, the coal mines in Morosovskaya received 170 workers from Chernogorsk. However, the workers could not be employed for weeks since the North Caucasus Military Okrug delayed authorization.

(21) The defects mentioned above caused many losses through illness, death, and above all, unauthorized absences from work. The following messages indicate the scale of various types of losses:

Two hundred workers were conscripted for labor at a plant of the NK for the Merchant Fleet in Baku. Of these, only 77 were actually working, 81 had deserted and 41 had either fallen sick, been conscripted for training schools, had left for one reason or another or had been transferred to other plants.

As of 1 January the special construction office in Stalino Oblast' had a total of 1,431 workers. In the period from 1 January to 1 July 2,687 persons were added. In the same period however, the total losses were 1,133 persons or 27% of the total working force.

(22) Personnel status reports intercepted from the "Rostov/Ugol" Combine in Shakhty give information on a general percentage of losses of workers for the third 10 day period of April and the second 10 day period of May:

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

The third 10 day period of April:

Number of workers	37,662 persons
Arrived	1,067
Transferred from the NK for Defense	317
Special Cadres (?)	82
Conscripted	335
Others	333
	<u>Total 1067</u>
Workers Lost	769
Deserted	557
Sick	108
Invalids	18
Died	8
In prison	14
Special Cadres (?)	21
Conscripted into the Army	43
	<u>Total 769</u>

Second 10 day period of May

Number of workers	38,626 persons
Arrived	863
Transferred from the NK for Defense	1
Special Cadres (?)	77
Conscripted	78
From Trade Schools	252
Others	455
	<u>Total 863</u>
Workers Lost	809
Deserted	643
Sick	60
Invalids	7
Died	3
In Prison	7
Conscripted into the Army	13
Released	20
Other Departures	38
	<u>Total 809</u>
Employed in Mines	17,759 persons
Arrived	583
Transferred from the NK for Defense	1
Special Cadres (?)	23
Conscripted	48
From Trade Schools	230
Others	281
	<u>Total 583</u>
Workers Lost	546
Deserted	449
Sick	25
Invalids	3
Died	3
In Prison	4
Conscripted into the Army	5
Released	15
Transferred to other offices	13
Other Departures	29
	<u>Total 546</u>

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

(23) The percentage of desertions in comparison to other losses is especially worthy of note in these reports.

(24) Despite the great difficulties which arose because of increased requirements of the Front, the Armaments Industry and extensive reconstruction work, etc., technical training of youths was in no way decreased.

(25) Thus, according to a report in February the Labor Office in Makhachkala conscripted a total of 7,122 persons for technical schools in the Dagestan Republic. The majority of these conscripts were for the technical schools of the NK for Oil. In July 2,300 persons were to be trained in Baku by the NK for Oil. According to a report in June 185 persons were to be conscripted in the Turkmen Republic by the Labor Office for technical schools.

(26) Reports on the establishment of new technical schools were also intercepted. For example at Plant 447 of the Aviation Industry and at the Textile Combine in Erevan. Reports concerning the training of agricultural skilled workers were encountered especially often in domestic radio traffic. According to a report in July 6,700 tractor operators had been trained in the current school year for Rostov/Don Oblast'.

(27) In February the personnel department of the North Ossetian NK for Agriculture in Ordzhonikidze reported the following number of personnel under training:

	<u>Under Training</u>	<u>Planned</u>
Tractor Operators	406	400
Mechanics	20	20
Combine Operators	51	50
Preparatory Operators	25	30

(28) The Central Committee of the Party in Stavropol reported the following as of 1 March:

For Machine and Tractor Stations

	Requirement	Personnel on hand	To be trained according to plan	Actually trained
Tractor Drivers	14800	9798	6000	7879
Combine Operators	3185	2292	1200	8

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

	Requirement	Personnel on hand	To be trained according to plan	Actually trained
Mechanics	638	475	180	97
Preparatory workers for tractor columns	1734	1668	300	94
Technical Workers	1378	599	200	821
<u>For Sovkhoz</u>				
Tractor Drivers	1801	766	1035	922
Combine Operators	759	240	193	368
Mechanics	110	83	12	?
Preparatory workers for tractor columns	153	82	112	31
Technical Workers	361	174	90	196

(29) Moreover, refresher courses for tractor drivers were held. Instead of the scheduled 2,000 persons, only 1,688 attended these courses. At the Dagestan NK for Agriculture a course for kolkhoz directors was completed on 26 February. Ninety-nine persons were trained.

AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SITUATION

I. Livestock

(30) After a large part of the occupied territories had been liberated by Soviet troops in the summer of 1943, the NK for Agriculture in conjunction with the Council of People's Commissars began a new reconstruction program for livestock in the following liberated territories:

Ordzhonikidze Kraj
Krasnodar Kraj
Kalinin Oblast'
Orel Oblast'
Kursk Oblast'
Voronezh Oblast'
Stalingrad Oblast'
Rostov Oblast'

(31) The scope of the entire program, as well as some of the details, have been reported in the semi-annual report for the second half of 1943. For the territory liberated during 1944, no livestock reconstruction programs were noted. However, the initiation of such programs were indicated in messages

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

intercepted on domestic radio links for unspecified territories in the West Ukrainian and White Russian Republics as well as for the following oblasti:

Kiev
Stalino
Kharkov
Voroshilovgrad
Dnepropetrovsk
Zaporozhe
Leningrad

(32) The following individual reports present information on the scale of the construction program:

(33) March:

In March the Office of the NK for Agriculture in Kiev was to receive from the Azerbajdzhan Republic 3,600 head of large cattle and 5,000 head of small cattle, and Stalino Oblast' was to receive 1,000 head of horned cattle from Georgia and 2,000 head of horned cattle from Azerbajdzhan.

(34) April:

Livestock shipments totalling 6,375 head were planned from several parts of the Turkmen Republic to Ukrainian, primarily Western Ukrainian, oblasti.

(35) The Georgian NK for the Meat and Dairy Industry shipped 100 railroad cars of livestock to liberated Ukrainian oblasti.

(36) May:

According to a report intercepted at the beginning of May, Kharkov Oblast' was to receive 8,500 head of horned cattle and 13,000 head of sheep from the Kazakh Republic.

(37) The Don Kuban Reconstruction Directorate was to provide river fords by 1 May at Kalach Kachalinsk and at Serafimovich. About 1,000 head of livestock in transit from Central Asia to the Ukraine were to be transferred to each of these fords.

(38) NKRF officials in Sverdlovsk likewise had to construct fords in May for the transfer of livestock in transit from Kazakhstan to liberated Western

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Ukrainian oblasti. About 10,000 head of livestock were to be transferred here.

(39) On 3 May the arrival of 3,418 horses, 32,876 head of horned cattle, and 13,626 sheep from Karsk Oblast' (Transcaucasus) and 3,185 head of cattle from Groznyj Oblast' was reported from Soldato-Aleksandrovskoe. The livestock was to be transported to the Ukraine and White Russia.

(40) The transfer of large herds of livestock from Ordzhonikidze Kraj and Rostov/Don Oblast' to the Ukraine was to begin on 5 May.

(41) As of 1 June the kolkhozes of the Azerbajdzhan Republic sold the following to livestock procurement offices in the liberated territories. (Sales are presumably to livestock procurement offices in regions for which the livestock construction plans had not yet been included in the program for 1943):

Large Cattle	14,852
Including: Cows	1,634
Sheep and goats	1,502
Pigs	1,716

(42) From 1 through 20 June livestock had passed through transfer points as follows:

Tsymlyansk transfer point	Total 4,895 head
Including: 2,720	large cattle
937	horses
1,238	sheep
Total 4,895	

(43) From Groznyj and Stavropol oblasti 4,381 and 514 head of cattle respectively were transferred.

(44) Bataisk transfer point	Total 10,944 head
Including: 8,714	large cattle
637	horses
1,593	sheep
Total 10,944	

(45) From Groznyj Oblast' and Ordzhonikidze Kraj 9,806 and 1,138 head of cattle respectively were to be transferred.

(46) The livestock was to be transferred to the following oblasti:

Stalino	Voroshilovgrad
Kharkov	Voronezh
Kursk	Dnepropetrovsk
Orel	Zaporozhe

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

(47) From 21 through 25 June 2, 790 head of large cattle and 900 head of sheep were driven through the Zimovniki Rajon in Groznyj Oblast'.

(48) It is notable that Ordzhonikidze Kraj, which in 1943 was still under reconstruction, was already supplying livestock this year.

(49) The livestock economy and its build-up were essentially confronted with three principal difficulties:

- (1) Transport problem
- (2) Disease
- (3) Supply of fodder

(50) The following messages present information concerning the especially poor transportation conditions:

At the Chuvashi station 200 horses arrived. However, horse drivers, fodder and railroad cars were lacking.

In April, 37 railroad cars of horses were shipped from Tashkent for the sovkhoses in the liberated territories of White Russia. The shipment was held up so the sovkhoses concerned could not fulfill their spring sowing obligations.

In May, a shipment of horses destined for Leningrad Oblast' was held up in Chita. Because of a lack of fodder, more than half the horses were lost.

In the storehouses of the Animal Raw Material Supply Office in Turkestan more than 2,000 tons of slaughtered cattle (live weight) destined for the Ukraine had piled up. 370 railroad cars were required for shipment of these cattle, but only 160 cars were actually provided.

At railroad stations of the Karaganda Railroad 5,000 head of large cattle and 13,000 head of sheep destined for Kiev Oblast' had piled up. Railroad cars were not available.

(51) Very great value was placed on veterinary services. Shipments of livestock were provided with veterinarians and veterinary personnel, and at all large stopping points, animal hospital and veterinary service stations were set up. Nevertheless, large scale livestock sickness and disease could not be avoided:

For example, Groznyj reported on 12 April that horned cattle fell ill from pyroplasmus (?) in transit from the mountains to the flatlands. The loss of cattle was almost complete. Party officials did not feel obliged to assist in the transfer of livestock from the mountains to the flatlands.

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

At the Meat Combine in Nalchik large scale slaughter of livestock passing through had to be carried out, because of livestock diseases.

The Livestock Procurement Office at Groznyj could not send 400 young lambs to Stavropol because pox had broken out in Budennovsk Rajon.

There were also instances noted concerning livestock being driven in a completely starved condition.

(52) The livestock fodder procurement program encountered great difficulties.

(53) The Livestock Procurement Office in Stavropol required 14, 187 of coarse livestock fodder in 1944. However, only 13, 868 tons could be procured with great difficulty and that from their own stocks.

(54) In Ordzhonikidze Kraj the situation relative to livestock fodder was disastrous. As a result of drought in 1943 a number of sovkhoses could not produce their quotas of livestock fodder. An urgent request was made to the Council of People's Commissars in Moscow for an allotment of about 2, 000 tons of hay.

(55) Oil cakes and other refuse were also not on hand in sufficient quantity. The Office of the NK for Sovkhoses in Rostov urgently required 600 tons of oil cakes. The report concluded with the notation that, in event of non-delivery, wide-spread deaths of the livestock would be expected. On 1 April the grain sovkhos in Ejsk reported that the livestock was in extremely poor condition as a result of a shortage of fodder.

(56) Despite the isolated instances of poor conditions reported above, the build-up of the livestock economy generally seemed to be progressing satisfactorily. Based on preliminary figures in June the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian Republic could report as assured the planned delivery of a total of 72, 000 tons liveweight of cattle to the Red Army by the end of 1944. The Council of People's Commissars based its estimate on the delivery of 53, 000 tons liveweight of cattle to the Red Army and other organizations already carried out by 10 May 1944.

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

(57) A new step was taken in livestock raising. Individual messages concerning artificial insemination are considered extremely notable.

(58) 450,000 sheep in Ordzhonikidze Kraj during 1944, and 1,000 cows and 700 horses in the North Ossetian Republic during an unspecified time were artificially inseminated.

(59) The following livestock estimates and stock reports were intercepted during the third quarter:

(60) Azerbajdzhan Republic:

On 1 August the following were transferred for rearing to the NK for the Meat and Dairy Industry in Baku:

5,300 head of large cattle
6,236 head of small cattle

(61) Groznyj Oblast'

The Party Office made the following cattle estimate for 1944 for the kolkhozes of the oblast':

	Horned Cattle		25,194 head
including:	Cows	9,194 head	
	Working Oxen	3,878 "	
	Sheep and Goats		98,551 head
including:	breeders	37,290 "	
	Pigs		62,270 head
including:	breeders	13,290 "	
	Horses		7,322 head
including:	mares	3,070 "	
	Working horses		5,544 head
	Camels		419 "
	Asses		?
	Fowl		100,000 head
	Beehives		5,191 hives

The following young livestock were to be raised:

	Calves	2,244 head
	Young sheep and young goats	22,765 "
	Suckling pigs	6,556 "
	Foals	692 "

Kolkhoz employees and livestock farms were to receive:

	horned cattle	2,020 head
	sheep and goats	2,250 "
	suckling pigs	250 "

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

The following were to be sold by the kolkhozes:

Suckling pigs	total 3,462	
including to:		
newly organized kolkhozes		1,824 head
auxiliary organizations		638 head
resettled kolkhoz employees		1,000 head

Horned cattle were received by the following:

Newly established livestock farms	81 head
Stud farms	2 "
Pig sovkhoses	650 " (?)
Sheep raising farms	113 head
Fowl raising farms	78 "
Bee raising farms	15 "

(62) The average monthly yield of milk was estimated at 650 liters per cow; the average monthly yield of wool at 1-6 kilograms per sheep, and the average monthly yield of eggs at 60 per hen. A total of 400,000 eggs are to be laid. 162,000 chickens are to be sold to kolkhozes and 60,000 chickens to other organizations and kolkhoz employees.

The following were to be mated:

breeder folds	150 head
stallions of the Anglo-Don and Anglo-Kabardino breeds	20 "
breeder buffaloes	100 "
Australian Merino sheep	620 "
folds of the English breed	20 "

Livestock stalls were to be constructed for the following:

cows	8
horses	11
sheep	12
pigs	47
fowl	24
calves	16

The following were to be repaired:

cow stalls	225
sheep stalls	198
horse stalls	238
fowl stalls	154
calf stalls	69
pig stalls	111

Livestock Fodder Procurement:

hay	182,000 tons
fodder grasses	37,909 "
including silo fodder	33,000 "

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION(63) North Ossetian Republic:

As of 1 January the following livestock were on hand:

<u>Owner</u>	<u>Large cattle</u>	<u>Pigs</u>	<u>Sheep and Goats</u>	<u>Horses</u>	<u>Donkeys</u>
Kolkhoz	9947	1203	23292	4424	301
Kolkhoz employees	29764	7047	16192	13	661
?	2635	?	25	30	--
Workers resettled					
in cities	3749	2875	1205	1289	221
Cooperative farms	725	1489	802	1246	67

(64) Moreover, as of 15 January the Livestock Procurement Office had 135,000 head of livestock after fulfilling all delivery plans.

(65) Dagestan Republic:

By 1 January 1945, the kolkhozes were to have reached the following number of livestock:

Horses		27,000 head
including:	4,000 folds	
Large cattle		188,000 head
including:	39,000 cows	
Work oxen		61,000 head
Sheep		1,535,000 head (?)

(66) Turkmen Republic:

As of 1 January a stock of 413,459 sheep including 276,054 breeders was reported.

(67) Certain considerations were given to kolkhozes in liberated territories with respect to the delivery of livestock products. Thus, the following general rules were set up by a decree of 12 June from the Council of People's Commissars concerning the delivery of agricultural products in liberated territories:

- (1) Kolkhozes in regions liberated before 1 January 1944 were obliged to make complete deliveries of meat, milk and wool. During the year 1944 the kolkhozes were released from the obligation of delivering goat cheese, eggs, and raw leather.
- (2) Kolkhozes in regions liberated after 1 January 1944 were released from the obligation of delivering all animal products. In the delivery of meat the following were not to be included:

Cows which were to be used for government breeding purposes, working oxen, buffalo, Merino and Karakul breeder sheep, calves and lambs which had been driven from kolkhozes in 1943 according to an agreement to restock livestock farms. The same also applied to livestock which

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

had been allotted as government assistance to Kolkhozes in 1943. The following were not to be included in deliveries of wool: Pure-bred breeder rams and fine wool English Chigajsker which had been reserved for breeding purposes.

- (3) Delivery of raw leather by the kolkhozes in liberated territories was to be made in conformance with Point No. 4 of Government Decree 1989 of 20 Oct. 1942. A comprehensive report of deliveries was to be transmitted to the NK for Procurement by 1 August 1944.

(68) These general rules did not appear to apply to the so-called "liberated" territories of the Latvian and Estonian Republics. A report was intercepted according to which livestock confiscation points were to be set up in the Rositten, Rudsen, Modon, Bova and Abrehnen Districts several days after the occupation by Soviet Russian troops.

II. Spring Plowing and Harvest

(a) Spring Plowing

(69) Great efforts were made to complete spring plowing and thus assure a good harvest. As far as possible, all conceivable assistance was given to agriculture. Thus, government reserve bases in many regions furnished seed grain in unlimited quantities for spring sowing.

- (70) For example the following grains were issued:

Ordzhonikidze Kraj		Krasnodar Oblast'	
Wheat	2800 tons	Oats	1100 tons
Barley	11420 "	Millets	400 "
Oats	2687 "	Wheat	1500 "
Millets	1326	Barley	1500 "
Corn	420 "		
Total	18653 tons	Total	4500 tons

(71) Difficulties were inevitable. They were caused by a lack of shipping material for artificial fertilizer, by the onslaught of swarms of grasshoppers and field mice, particularly in Georgia, and also partially by a lack of seed grain in many newly liberated territories.

(72) Territories through which the battle zone had passed, were in a very serious condition and an orderly sowing program was impossible. In this respect

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

the following message merits particular attention:

The regions and areas below were in the battle zone for two years and suffered especially heavily under the German Occupation. This year these regions constitute fourteen to twenty percent of agricultural land. The regions are as follows:

Bolshokrepinskij	Myasnikovskij
Kujbyshev	Fedorovskij
Anastasievskij	Meklonovsk
Matveevo-Kurgansk	Norliono-Nesvetaevsk

(73) The extent to which the spring plowing program was successful is

indicated from the following message which was intercepted on 22 May:

"I report with satisfaction that the Ukraine office has completely fulfilled the government sowing plan. I express my personal appreciation to the workers in agricultural enterprises, particularly in the Voroshilovgrad Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozhe, Kamenets-Podolsk, Nikolaev, and Kharkov oblasti for over fulfillment of regional plans."

(The signature is lacking, but it may be assumed from the make-up of the telegram that it was Stalin himself).

(b) Preparations for the Harvest

(74) A series of extreme measures and orders were intercepted concerning preparations for the harvest as well as protecting agriculture enterprises from demands of other organizations.

(75) Thus, according to a decree from the State Committee for Defense (GoKO), special commissions were set up in the Krai, Oblasti and Republics which test the quality of truck and tractor repairs. Special bonuses amounting to two months' wages were to be awarded to leaders of units involved in the repair program at machine and tractor stations and at kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Moreover, the State Committee for Defense prohibited the requisitioning of all trucks and tractors which were in use at agricultural enterprises.

(76) In addition, according to an order from the GoKO on 13 April, the metal sales office of individual cities and oblasti were directed to make deliveries of metals to enterprises of the NK for Agriculture and the NK for Sovkhozes for the second quarter by 1 July. According to the same decree, the NK for Transportation was to ship all cargo needed for the repair of combines and harvest machinery under the priority of "Armaments Cargo."

- 23 -

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

(77) Especially notable is the "order concerning the repair of technical bases of the NK for Procurement for bringing in the 1944 harvest." According to this order, the Grain Procurement Office in Rostov received the following directives:

- (1) Before the beginning of procurement operations for bread grain, the NK for Procurement is ordered to carry out the repair and disinfection of storage spaces, grain warehouses with technical equipment, elevators and grain drying plants of grain cleaning and laboratory installations as well as tarpaulin. Moreover, the individual offices are to be supplied with blanks to be filled out indicating that the above operations have been completed. In order to expedite shipping the bread grain, shipping areas with a capacity of 70,000 tons are to be prepared at railway stations.
- (2) The Oblast' Executive Committee is ordered to allot construction material to the NK for Procurement corresponding to its needs for reconstruction work. The orders are to be fulfilled by units of the local industry. Henceforth, unlimited assistance is to be provided enterprises of the NK for Procurement in fulfilling the plans for reconstruction work. By 1 August 1944, storage points belonging to other organizations with a capacity of 25,000 tons are to be prepared for storage of bread grain, if they are located up to 10 kilometers from railway stations or river ports of the NK for Procurement. They are to be repaired by 15 August.
- (3) "GUGMR" (?) is ordered to take the grain immediately from the shipping points for its elevator stations and to guarantee expedited loading of grain shipments. Moreover, grain bases equipped with drying machines are to process the grain immediately.
- (4) Workers of the NK for Procurement who are physically fit for military service and who are employed in the repair of technical bases and the procurement of agricultural products may not be conscripted.
- (5) The directive (Point 12 of Order No. 5/94 of the State Committee for Defense) of 15 February 1944 concerning the exemption from military duty of workers and engineering personnel of the truck transportation system of the NK for Procurement engaged in reconstruction work is hereby extended until further notice. Order No. 4582 dated 15 November 1943 from the State Committee for Defense, prohibiting requisitioning of trucks of the NK for Procurement and the NK for Transportation of the Soviet Union that are in use for shipping bread grain, remains in effect. Moreover, the order prohibiting the conscription for military duty or for any other type of work of workers in the procurement or transportation industries of the Soviet Union without the permission from the State Committee of Defense also remains in effect.
- (6) The NK for Transportation is hereby ordered to give top priority to the handling of small shipments of spare parts and small pieces of equipment for enterprises of the NK for Procurement.

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

- (7) The NK for Communications is hereby ordered to guarantee smooth handling of shipments of instruments and electrical apparatus up to a weight of 8 pounds for offices of the NK for Procurement. During grain procurement operations local enterprises for the NK for Procurement received the right to give to telephone conversations the priority level of "government communications." Telegrams received the same priority.
- (8) The CD for Oil Supply is hereby ordered to carry out its deliveries to the NK for Procurement by 20 June. Until receipt of scheduled deliveries, gasoline, petroleum, ligroin and other oil products are to be drawn from agricultural stocks.
- (9) The NK for Electric Generating Stations is hereby forbidden to interrupt the delivery of power to the NK for Procurement from 1 July through 1 October 1944.

(78) These orders were to be strictly adhered to, and their fulfillment controlled. A report was to be made by 15 July concerning measures carried out by that date and reports were to be submitted every five days thereafter concerning further course of fulfillment of the orders.

(79) The message below of 25 June provides extensive information concerning the intensity of the reconstruction program of technical agricultural bases in Stalino Oblast':

	Status
Of total planned	
Current repairs of grain storehouses	100%
Reconstruction and Repair of non-grain storehouse with a capacity of 16, 750 tons	100%
Reconstruction of 19 grain storehouses with a capacity of 34, 7000 tons	70%
New Construction of 7 grain storehouses with a capacity of 5, 500 tons	16%
Repair of two grain drying installations	100%
Motors	86%
Separators (?)	100%
Grain cleaning machines	100%
Trucks	50%
Other vehicles	85%
Transportation belts	85%
Repair of railroad equipment	48%

(c) Hay, Grain and Vegetable Harvest:

(80) In the middle of June the hay harvest began. It was undertaken especially intensively. An order intercepted on 20 June 1944, from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the White Russian Socialist Soviet Republic,

gives a good deal of information on this program as follows:

"To the Secretary of the Rajon Committee of the Communist Party and to the Chairman of the Executive Committee. The hay harvest and fodder procurement program this year must be carried out under very difficult conditions. There are shortages of mowing machines, scythes, and skilled workers. All these difficulties could be eliminated by good organization and a prompt beginning of the hay harvest. Employees of the collective farm should be instructed concerning the importance of procuring fodder for the newly received livestock. In order to guarantee hay deliveries as well as procurement of hay stocks, the Central Committee of the Communist Party hereby orders that the hay harvest should be completed before the beginning of the grain harvest and that the following measures be taken:

- (1) The hay harvest is to be begun immediately. First, the highest grasses are to be cut down and wild grasses are to be stored in silos immediately.
- (2) In kolkhozes mowing teams are to be made up of men, women and youths. One scythe is to be issued to each two persons. These mowing teams are to work in two shifts from 0300 to 2200 hours continuously. Personnel will sleep in the field overnight in order not to lose any time.
- (3) In making up the mowing teams and brigades it is to be observed that experienced workers are distributed evenly among the green hands. The mowing teams are to be equipped with the necessary tools.
- (4) Every brigade, mowing team and each individual person is to be given a definite area of land. The results of the work of the brigades and mowing teams are to be compiled daily.
- (5) A socialist competition between brigades, mowing teams, and kolkhozes is to be set up. Fulfillment of the daily and five day plans is to be guaranteed and, as far as possible, overfilled.
- (6) Political lectures are to be carried out in all brigades and mowing teams. Kolkhoz farmers are to be informed concerning:
 - (a) Daily wages for mowing and silo workers
 - (b) The right to keep 10% of the hay
 - (c) The receipt of livestock fodder from collective stocks

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of White Russia is to pay particular attention to the importance of the hay harvest for successful building-up

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

of kolkhozes and livestock. Each kolkhoz is to receive by order of the Central Committee 46 head of cattle, 48 sheep, 20 pigs, and a number of horses not yet established. On 1 July 1944 a report concerning the measures taken is to be made to the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the White Russian Socialist Soviet Republic, signed Ponomarkeno."

(81) The absence of reports concerning failures in the hay harvest supports the assumption that the hay harvest generally was proceeding favorably.

(82) No conclusion can be reached concerning the failure of the grain harvest because of a lack of reliable information. The Soviet Russian Administration appeared to place great hopes on it. It was apparent from all intercepted reports that the Soviet Russian authorities were placing particular attention to the bringing in of grain for shipment. For example, in Leningrad Oblast', a grain delivery of 71,600 tons was estimated for the period from July through October. However, there was a storage capacity for only 34,400 tons available at the Grain Procurement Office.

The first known harvest results were from the Sovkhoz Trust in Ordzhonikidze Kraj. They reported on 5 September that 44,800 tons of grain had been delivered to the government, thus fulfilling their plan by 100 percent.

(83) The Groznyj Trust of the NK for Sovkhozes reported the following harvest yield in September:

	<u>Cotton Sovkhoz Aksaj</u>	<u>Sovkhoz for Sheep-raising No.1</u>
Harvested grain land	1,368 hectares	9,080 hectares
Expected harvest yield per hectare	8.5 dz *	10 dz
Actual harvest yield per hectare	4.3 dz	4 dz
Grain delivery plan	701 tons	580 tons
Seed deficit	174 tons	---
Deliveries	256 tons	480 tons
Total delivery for both sovkhoses		736 tons
Planned deliveries		1,232 tons

* Abbreviation for Doppelzentner, a measure of weight equal to 100 kilograms.

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

(84) The following intercepted messages referred to the vegetable and fruit harvest. From messages intercepted in August from the chairman of the Azerbajdzhan Council of People's Commissars in Baku, it may be assumed that the vegetable harvest for the current year was insufficient because of too great dryness. The Azerbajdzhan Republic fell short of fulfilling their procurement plan by 27,308 tons of vegetables. The potato harvest was also considered poor.

(85) The Azerbajdzhan NK for Agriculture reported that there were not enough chemicals on hand to spray insecticides on 6,000 hectares of fruit gardens.

(86) From Ejsk (North Caucasus) it was reported that the tomato harvest had fallen below plan because of drought.

(87) In Ordzhonikidze Kraj a serious shortage of vegetables was noted. A relatively satisfactory report concerning the Vegetable and Fruit Procurement Office in Kiev was intercepted, according to which the office could deliver the following in August and September:

3,000 tons fresh tomatoes
3,000 tons salted cucumbers
2,000 tons fresh cucumbers
300 tons fruit

(88) The following message intercepted on 10 October is extremely rich in information:

"Order of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Union of 4 October 1944, concerning the bringing in and procurement of potatoes and vegetables.

After the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Union had received the report from General. . . . , it was determined that the tempo on the potato and vegetable procurement operations was completely unsatisfactory and delivery to the government by the established deadlines was not guaranteed. In the following regions procurement is progressing especially poorly. On 1 October of this year they are behind the following quantities compared to 1 August of the preceding year:

<u>Region</u>	<u>Potatoes</u>	<u>Vegetables</u>
Ryazan Oblast'	7640 tons	7910 tons
Tula Oblast'	2723 "	2190 "
Kirov Oblast'	13590 "	?
Kurgan Oblast'	4380 "	1153 tons
Omsk Oblast'	6004 "	2097 "
Bashkir ASSR	6830 "	5640 "
Mordvin ASSR	7626 "	2569 "
Tatar ASSR	500 "	3030 "

- 28 -

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

In addition, the following are in arrears:

Yaroslavl Oblast'	Chernigov Oblast'
Tambov Oblast'	Sumy Oblast'
Kursk Oblast'	Ukraine SSR
Bryansk Oblast'	

In these regions the progress of the potato and vegetable harvest is likewise unsatisfactory.

The potato harvest is considered especially dangerous in the following regions:

Voronezh Oblast'	Kurgan Oblast'
Kujbyshev Oblast'	Novosibirsk Oblast'
Penza Oblast'	Altai Kraj
Ulyanovsk Oblast'	Bashkir ASSR
Tambov Oblast'	Tatar ASSR
Orel Oblast'	

Kolkhozes and sovkhoses in these regions have not yet commenced potato harvest operations. The danger exists that the mistakes of the previous year will be repeated, and that the work will be delayed into late autumn and will be endangered by rain, snow, and frost. Large quantities of potatoes will thus be lost, as were in the preceding year.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Union hereby orders:

The Party Committees of the oblasti and republics are hereby charged with the responsibility for expediting and completing on schedule the potato and vegetable harvest. For this purpose sovkhoses are to be given five day plans and the brigades in the kolkhozes are to be given one day plans. Every kolkhoz employee capable of work is to be given a definite area of land daily.

In addition to the agricultural workers already recruited from the urban population, additional personnel capable of work are to be recruited from cities, the resettled working population and rajon centers for assignment to sovkhoses and kolkhozes during the vegetable and potato harvest.

The vegetables and potatoes are to be dried promptly for immediate shipment to the procurement bases and storehouses. A competition among the workers is to be organized in this operation. The workers are to continue work until complete fulfillment of the delivery plan.

Cows, belonging to kolkhozes, kolkhoz employees, workers and conscriptees are to be drawn on for transport.

The People's Commissar for the Food Industry of the Union, Comrade Zotov, is charged with the responsibility of expediting potato procurement operations as well as prompt and scheduled delivery to the alcohol, starch and syrup industries.

The Party Committees of the oblasti, krai and republics are hereby ordered to report by 25 October 1944 on measures taken to comply with the above order.

The Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Union
MAZENKOV"

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

(d) Grain Deliveries

(89) The poor transportation situation had an especially serious effect on grain deliveries. At the end of September the following reports were intercepted:

(90) In 13 days of September only 3,900 tons of grain were shipped compared to a planned goal of 17,000 tons. The following orders were issued to carry out the transport plans on waterways in September and to ship all grain from procurement bases on the waterways before the end of the navigation:

- (1) The total amount of grain to be shipped was to be reported
- (2) Grain shipments from the kolkhozes to the harbors of the procurement bases were to be expedited.
- (3) Grain shipments from storehouses were to be increased
- (4) To avoid idling time of barges, loading was to be carried out day and night
- (5) The NK for Procurement in conjunction with the steamship agencies is to draw up a plan, according to which all grains are to be transported by the end of September.

(91) Grain shipping plans during August for individual railways were fulfilled by the following percentages:

Stalingrad Railway	50%
North Caucasus Railway	24%
Southeast Railway	21%

(92) There was a deficit of 2,970 in deliveries of railroad cars.

(93) In September the situation became still worse.

(94) In the first ten day period of September the transportation plan was fulfilled by individual railways as follows:

Stalingrad Railway	33%
North Caucasus Railway	0%
Southeast Railway	8%
North Donets Railway	0%

(95) There was a deficit of 1,223 cars in deliveries of railroad cars.

(96) In the last five days shipments ceased completely

(97) 35,000 tons of grain were stored in open storehouses.

(98) The amount of grain in storage was growing by 5 to 6 thousand tons daily.

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

(99) The danger was arising that stocks of grain would be left in the open for the autumn and winter periods.

(100) The railroads were directed to make up freight trains in close order so that all grain in storehouses could be shipped during September. Two thousand tarpaulins were ordered to protect the grain still remaining in storehouses.

(101) In many regions the use of military personnel was required to expedite handling grain shipments in every way possible.

(102) The military representative at the grain procurement office in Kirovograd, Colonel Schneider, received the following order:

"You have been appointed senior military representative for Kirovograd Oblast'. You have at your disposal 60 officers, one company of men and two battalions of trucks. Your assignment is to transport 329,000 tons of bread grains from internal bases to grain procurement offices on railroads and to transfer this grain to suitable storage. (continuation of message missing)."

III. Food Supply

(103) Information on the food supply presents a very incomplete picture. There are relatively good reports from many branches of the Food Industry, but on the other hand, many unsatisfactory reports have been intercepted. In detail the following has been determined:

(a) Bread Supply

(104) Especially great difficulties were noted during the report period in the supply of bread to the civilian population as well as to military offices. This was partly the result of low production capacity at grain mills, which had either become antiquated or had not been sufficiently reconstructed, and also partly the result of a great increase in the city population through labor conscriptions.

(105) In February the Armenia NK for Trade demanded additional allotments of flour pointing to the abnormally large growth of population in many Armenian cities. The same condition was noted in Georgia.

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

(106) In the Krasnodar Kraj and Groznyj Oblast' considerable difficulties arose in the supply of bread to the civilian population and military units, because of low production capacity at local mills.

(107) The bread supply for the population of Stalingrad was considered completely unsatisfactory and it was noted that the population had received no bread for days.

(b) Meat and Dairy Product Supplies

(108) Relatively favorable reports were intercepted concerning the Meat and Dairy Industry. Reports concerning unfulfilled plans however, were not uncommon:

(109) In March the Baku Meat and Dairy Combine achieved the following production results:

	<u>Planned</u>	<u>Actual Fulfillment</u>
Meat	450 tons	462 tons
Sausage	120 tons	121 tons
Concentrates	120 tons	147 tons

(110) In the second quarter the Meat and Dairy Industry in Rostov/Don was to produce a total of 500 tons of meat. On 20 May, 559 tons had already been produced.

(111) The Azerbajdzhan Meat Combine was also able to report over-fulfillment of the production plan for the second half year on 17 June as follows:

Meat	113%
Sausage	106%
Pastries	215%
Others	150%

(112) In general, plans for individual regions had been set higher than in the preceding year. For instance, the delivery plan for the Georgian NK for Procurement for 1943 had been set at 18,400 tons of meat products and for the year 1944 had been raised to 19,800 tons.

(113) Various measures were also taken to fulfill and overfulfill plans for meat and dairy products. For example, in Krasnodar Kraj and the Bashkir

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Republic the month of June was declared a month of special effort for the Front. The NK for the Meat and Dairy Industry of the Union anticipated significant improvement in the supply situation as the result of this measure and ordered the dairy combines of Leningrad to take similar measures in order to spur agricultural productive organs to increased production for the warriors of the Red Army.

(c) Fish and Fish Product Supplies

(114) Very great emphasis was placed on fishing. Some good production reports were issued.

(115) The Fish Trust in Kislyar had fulfilled the fishing plan for 1943 by 118% and on 28 February had fulfilled the plan for the first quarter by 230%.

(116) The fisheries in Rostov/Don had fulfilled the May fishing plan on 25 May by 104.8% with a catch of 4000 tons.

(117) The deliveries which individual fish trusts had to make were in no way small. For example, the Fish Trust in Kislyar had to make the following deliveries in March to plants of the Caspian Fish Industry:

1-5 March	420 tons fish
6-10 "	120 " "
11-15 "	125 " "
16-20 "	205 " "
21-25 "	245 " "
26-31 "	285 " "
	1100 tons fish

(118) According to the plan the Dagestan and Turkmen Fish Trusts were to deliver the following:

Turkmen Fish Trust:

To the free market of the Uzbek SSR	200 tons fish
To the Kirgiz SSR	50 " "
To the Tadzhik SSR	50 " "

Dagestan Fish Trust:

To the Dagestan Republic	500 tons fish
To the Checheno-Ingush	300 " "
To the North Ossetian Republic	150 " "
To the Kabardino-Balkar Republic	100 " "
To the Azerbajdzhan Republic	200 " "
Ordzhonikidze Kraj	350 " "

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

(119) The Fish Trusts in Krasnodar and Rostov were to deliver 500, 300 tons of fish for supplies to the civilian population in April by order of the NK for the Fish Industry.

(120) The following catches were reported by naval offices:

<u>Office</u>	<u>5 May</u>	<u>11 May</u>	<u>16 May</u>	<u>10 July</u>
Baku	7.0 tons	7.0 tons	7.0 tons	10.4 tons
Lenkoran	4.8 "	5.1 "	5.5 "	5.2 "
Astrakhan	175.4 "	253.7 "	301.7 "	9.4 " (?)
Dagestan	17.4 "	17.4 "	17.4 "	19.4 "
Krasnovodsk	5.0 "	5.0 "	8.0 "	22.6 "
Total	209.6 tons	288.2 tons	339.6 tons	67.0 tons

(121) In comparison to the good fishing results there were, however, many instances of shortages. For example, many locations were short of salt and packing material and, as in all other branches of the economy, the transportation problem had an especially serious effect. Examples follow:

(122) According to a report of 7 May, at the fish enterprises in Rostov/Don there were over 700 tons of salted fish which could not be shipped because of a lack of packing material.

(123) According to a report in August from the NK for the Fish Industry, long delays resulted because of insufficient shipping capacity in the River Fleet and the following quantities of cargoes could not be shipped:

	<u>Fish</u>
On the Upper Ob	850 tons
In Samarovo	450 "
On the Konda River	150 "
On the Lower Ob	500 "
In Tasovskaya Guba	1000 "

(124) In the first half of May the Black-Sea-Azov fisheries were to ship a total of 160 railroad cars of fish. As a result of insufficient furnishing of railroad cars however, only 15 cars of fish were actually shipped. The fisheries in Ejsk had caught 63 tons of fish from 1 through 5 April, but did not have enough salt to salt this catch.

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

(d) Salt Supply

(125) Difficulties arose in the extraction of salt in Manych Oblast' as a result of heavy rainfall. Extraction of salt in this region during the current year could not be commenced until the end of June and the beginning of July.

(126) In order to conclude the extraction of salt at Kuulinsk near Krasnovodsk a railroad spur was to be laid from Kuuli to Krasnovodsk harbor. The extraction of salt for the year was to amount to 120,00 tons.

(e) Sugar Supply

(127) In the sugar industry there were many cases of cessation of operations at enterprises because of a lack of sugar.

(128) During the first quarter in Rostov/Don Oblast' only 59% of authorized sugar deliveries were actually made and in the second quarter as of 24 May only 9% of authorized deliveries had been made so that neither workers in mines and in forges nor those on railroads could be supplied. Likewise the child strengthening campaign could not be carried out.

(f) Supplies of Tobacco, Wine and Whiskey

(129) The luxuries industry seemed generally to be operating well. For instance, the wine and whiskey industry in Rostov reported the fulfillment of its plans in January and February. In January and February 24,000 meters of wine and 10,000 meters of whiskey were produced.

(130) Difficulties were noted in connection with shipping problems.

(131) The combine "Rostov/Ugol" in Shakhty was to receive 140,000 meters of wine in the first quarter of 1944. Delivery was delayed however, because of insufficient delivery of railroad cars.

(132) Little information was available concerning the tobacco industry. On 18 February the tobacco plant in Rostov had to cease operation because of a shortage of raw materials.

(133) The Azerbajdzhan tobacco plant in Baku fell far short of meeting

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

its delivery obligations in February for the Red Army. Instead of 315 tons of tobacco and 85,000,000 cigarettes only 275 tons of tobacco and 20,000 cigarettes were delivered.

(g) Production and Delivery Results from Food Industries:

(134) The NK for the Food Industry in Kiev had fulfilled the May production plan by 118%. Plan fulfillment in detail was as follows:

Refined Sugar	110%
Bread Products	101%
Macaroni	99%
Pastries	132%
Vegetables	106%
Butter	77%
Butter Lard	94%
Margarine	107%
Concentrates	114%
Non-alcoholic drinks	109%
Cigarettes	87%
Tobacco	13%
Makhorka	287%
Alcohol	153%

(135) As of 1 March offices of the NK for Trade in Ashkhabad had made deliveries against orders from the NK for the Textile Industry in the first quarter as follows:

	<u>Order</u>	<u>Deliver</u>
Fish	134.1 tons	223.3 tons
Meat	17.8 "	22.2 "
Vegetable Fat	110.5 "	26.1 "
Animal Fat	11.3 "	2.7 "
Goat Cheese	11.4 "	2.7 "
Condensed Milk	1.4 "	0.2 "
Sugar	12.6 "	2.0 "
Sugar Products	15.6 "	25.3 "

(h) Allocations for Individual Persons

(136) In the allocations for individual persons considerable differences could be noted. However, no distinct groups of allotments of food rations could be determined from the individual messages.

(137) The allocations were distributed according to the difficulty of work. The food ration most widely distributed was received on 1 March by riveters,

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

assembly workers, and machinists in the NK for Construction. These were as follows: (per man, per month):

4.5 kilograms	fish and meat
1.0 kilogram	fat
3 kilograms	pealed grain and macaroni
0.5 kilogram	sugar products
1 kilogram	bread

(138) According to a June message the next rationing level was that issued to engineering technical personnel and workers, working in plants under unhealthy conditions, at the Taganrog Plant "Krasnyj Kotelshchik" as well as to workers and engineering technical personnel in Azerbajdzhan salt mines:

3.2 kilograms	meat and fish (monthly)
0.9 kilogram	fat
2.0 kilograms	pealed grain
0.5 kilogram	sugar and sweets
1.0 kilogram	bread (daily)

(139) The lowest rationing level was that issued on 15 May in Rostov/Don to personnel of a plant in Udzhary as well as to students in courses for village officials:

1.8 kilograms	meat or fish (monthly)
0.4 kilogram	fats
1.2 kilograms	pealed grain or macaroni
0.4 kilogram	sugar and sugar products

(140) Moreover, the students in the training courses received a supplementary warm meal.

(141) White collar workers at the Udzhary plant received the following:

1.2 kilograms	meat or fish (monthly)
0.3 kilogram	fats
0.8 kilogram	pealed grain or macaroni
0.3 kilogram	sugar and sugar products

(142) In addition, the following bread rations were noted:

<u>Office</u>	<u>Daily Bread Ration</u>
Offices in liberated territories	500 grams
Workers of the engineering technical Rajon Directorate and of the Mechanized Repair Plant of the Rostov Electricity Directorate	700 grams
Transport workers in Baku Harbor	700 grams
Workers and Engineering Technical Personnel of the Geophysical Institute in Groznyj	650 grams
Travelling personnel of the NK for the River Fleet while in a labor pool	1000 grams

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

METAL SUPPLY

(143) Few messages were intercepted concerning the production of ferrous and non-ferrous metal ores. Most of the messages concern the collection and procurement of scrap metal. Messages were also available concerning the production capacity of individual plants. In detail the following could be determined:

I. Production of Ores and Quartzite Sand

(a) Manganese ores

(144) The production of manganese ores in the Caucasus regions seemed generally to be progressing satisfactorily.

(145) In April fulfillment of the monthly shipping plan of a total of 33, 180 tons of manganese ore was reported from Chiaturi. In the third quarter the Armenian Republic was to deliver 250, 000 tons of manganese ore. In July and August 152, 000 tons of manganese ore or 61% of the quarter plan had already been shipped. No complaints concerning insufficient production of manganese ores were intercepted. Reports concerning insufficient delivery were intercepted only in connection with transportation difficulties. For example, the authorized agent of the NK for Ferrous Metals in Krasnovodsk reported on 12 April insufficient shipments of manganese ores. As of 1 April 12, 262 tons were stored in the harbor. According to a report from the authorized agent of the NK for Ferrous Metals on 21 April, 4, 223 tons of manganese ores had arrived in Krasnovodsk harbor in 20 days of April, while only 458 tons were shipped.

(b) Production of Quartzite Sand

(146) A bottleneck in the ferrous metal industry developed as a result of insufficient production of quartzite sand, although good results were noted in this industry also. For instance, the plant for fire-proof bricks in Tarasovka had delivered 2, 463 tons of quartzite sand in June, thus, fulfilling the plan completely.

(147) More often, however, reports were intercepted concerning a

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

serious shortage of quartzite sand, principally in foundries.

(148) A message from Moscow to the Mining Directorate in Tarasovka in August reads as follows:

"Successful operation of the Armaments Industry depends on regular and smooth performances by the Iron Industry. For this reason, the Committee for Defense hereby orders that the requirements of the Iron Industry for quartzite sand during the third quarter be met completely and that they take precedence over those of all other NK's and enterprises."

II. Scrap Procurement and Collection

(149) The scrap collection and delivery program was undertaken with great intensity. In general plans were fulfilled; when not, it was usually a question of transportation difficulties. The following plans, fulfillments, collections, etc., were noted:

Azerbaijdzhan Republic

(150) In May the non-ferrous metal collection point in Baku had procured 96 tons of non-ferrous metals as follows:

43 tons of brass
33 tons of aluminum
9 tons of copper
4 tons of zinc
2 tons of bronze

(151) As a result of non-delivery of railroad cars, only a part of the collected metals could be shipped. Thus, in May 17 railroad cars too few were provided. The stock of non-ferrous metal scrap remaining on hand amounted to 731 tons (probably the stock accumulated at the beginning of the year).

(152) In the second quarter 17,789 tons scrap were procured from the entire republic. Procurement of 15,000 tons had been planned, so the plan was thus fulfilled by about 120%.

(153) In the third quarter the result of the scrap collection program was almost as good as in the second quarter. 17,801 tons of scrap were collected and 17,879 shipped. The third quarter plan amounting to 17,000 tons was thus fulfilled by almost 104%.

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Georgian Republic

(154) In the third quarter 12,000 tons of scrap were to be procured, 2,000 tons were to be processed, and 7,000 were to be shipped. By 1 September the plan had already been fulfilled by 71%.

North Ossetian Republic

(155) In the second quarter a collection plan of 2,000 tons of ferrous metal scrap was established. On 1 July, 2,163 tons had been collected and the plan had thus been fulfilled by 108.1%.

Dagestan Republic

(156) In the third quarter 2,500 tons scrap were to be collected and shipped. The shipping plan could be fulfilled only 71% with a shipment of 1,787 tons of scrap, because of insufficient delivery of railroad cars.

Ordzhonikidze Kraj

(157) In the first quarter the scrap procurement plan was fulfilled by 111.4%. However, the shipping plan was fulfilled 40.2% because of insufficient delivery of railroad cars. In addition to collections carried on during the week in Ordzhonikidze Kraj, a special Sunday duty was organized in which, 10,000 Komsomol members took part. A total of 2,198 tons of scrap was collected, 10,000 tons shipped, and 1,978 transported to the railroads.

(158) In the second quarter 4,090 tons of scrap were procured and 4,652 tons of scrap shipped.

Turkmen Republic

(159) In the second quarter a total of 1,674 tons of metal scrap was procured including:

1,406 tons	steel in small pieces
1,083 tons	steel shavings
85 tons	cast iron

A total of 1,718 tons was shipped including:

1,284 tons	steel in small pieces
221 tons	steel shavings
213 tons	cast iron

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

(160) In the third quarter 1,565 tons of scrap were procured up through 1 September including:

1,311 tons steel in small pieces	
170 tons	steel shavings
84 tons	cast iron

A total of 1,556 tons of scrap was shipped including:

1,243 tons steel in small pieces	
184 tons	steel shavings
129 tons	cast iron

Groznyj Rajon

(161) In the first quarter as of 15 March 989 tons of scrap had been procured and 458 tons shipped. A total of 1,900 tons was to be procured according to plan.

Rostov/Don Oblast'

(162) In the first quarter the Oblast' had procured 17,681 tons of scrap and had shipped 17,160 tons. In the second quarter the collection plan for iron scrap had been fulfilled by 104%. According to plan 21,000 tons were to be collected. However, 21,845 tons were brought in. Fulfillment of the plan is broken down as follows:

Office	Planned (tons)	Actual fulfilled (tons)
Oblast' Consumers Union	1500	2074
Soyuzutil (?)	1000	1697
Utilsbytpromsoyuz	900	1469

(163) Other offices had been able to ship only 16,605 tons instead of the 17,600 tons planned.

(164) Results of the non-ferrous metal scrap collection program in Rostov Oblast' during the second quarter were not as satisfactory as the results of the ferrous scrap metal collection program. Instead of the 535 tons of non-ferrous metal scrap which were to be collected according to plan, only 397 tons were collected and shipped.

(165) In 1944 enterprises of the NK for Ferrous Metals were to procure

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

2,800 tons of non-ferrous metal scrap according to plan. However, the Rostov Executive Committee issued an order to the effect that the plan for 1944 would be double that of 1943. However, since in 1944 the collection of war material was to be included, the collection of non-ferrous metal scrap compared to the previous year would be reduced by 1,400 tons.

(166) In the third quarter 19,459 tons of ferrous metal scrap were procured and 17,681 tons were shipped. However, this only fulfilled the shipping plan by 68%. This nonfulfillment was attributed to non-delivery of railroad cars. In the third quarter the Stalingrad Railway had provided only 68 railroad cars instead of the 110 planned, and the North Caucasus Railway had provided only 422 instead of the 780 planned.

Leningrad Oblast'

(167) In the first quarter Komsomol members were to procure and ship 41,000 tons of scrap. The plan was almost fulfilled with the procurement and shipment of 40,200 tons. By 27 June, the local scrap metal collection points had processed 3,956 tons of scrap, received 4,921 tons, and shipped 4,127 tons since the beginning of the month. Stocks on hand amount to 38,956 tons.

(168) Despite the above good results, many messages were intercepted, according to which plants either had to close down or could not fulfill important armament contracts because of insufficient deliveries of scrap metal. Examples of these follow:

(169) The plant "Stankolit" (in Rostov Oblast' ?) required 500 tons of ferrous metal scrap in March in order to complete important specialized contracts. Scrap was not delivered, however.

(170) The plant "Shmidt" in Baku required a minimum of 2,300 tons of ferrous metal scrap in March. Scrap deliveries did not result, however.

(171) A steel foundry in Baku required 1,000 tons of steel scrap per quarter, but received for the second quarter an authorization for only 380 tons.

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

(172) A metal processing plant of the NK for Oil in Baku received in the second quarter only 5,127 tons of steel scrap instead of the 8,100 tons required.

(173) The plant "Trubostal" in Taganrog received only 230 tons of scrap instead of 4,000 tons needed.

(174) As a result of the shortage of ferrous metal scrap, the plant "Andreev" in Taganrog had to shut down its Martin furnaces. In August this plant received only 460 tons of scrap instead of the 3,000 tons needed.

III. Production Results at Individual Plants

(175) The iron foundry in Baku of the NK for Oil produced the following in January:

Cast steel	450 tons
Cast iron	677 tons
Forged parts	975 tons
Rolled metal	6,027 tons

(176) In March, production at the foundry remained at about the same level:

Cast steel	459 tons
Cast iron	977 tons
Forged products	1,077 tons
Rolled metal	612 tons

Kramatorskaya

(177) A metal processing plant fulfilled its plan in the first quarter by producing 210 tons of metal products including the following:

Parts for railroad bridges	40 tons
smoke pipes	50 tons
gas and steam pipes	50 tons
cargo cranes	40 tons
other metal products	30 tons

(178) The following production was planned for the second quarter:

10 tons cast steel
225 tons of metal products, including:
50 tons parts for railway bridges
70 tons gas and steam pipes
70 tons parts for cargo cranes
35 tons other metal products

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Makeevka

(179) On 29 April the daily production of the foundry was reported as 892 tons of steel.

Krasnyj Sulin

(180) An approximate conclusion concerning the capacity of the foundry can be derived from the following first quarter production plan:

	<u>Steel</u>	<u>Rolled Iron</u>	<u>Dinas ?</u>
January	4400 tons(?)	2000 tons	100 tons
February	3600 "	2000 "	250 "
March	3800 "	2000 "	350 "
In the quarter	<u>12000 tons</u>	<u>6000 tons</u>	<u>700 tons</u>

(181) On 29 June 5 tons of steel were produced making a total of 603 tons since the beginning of the month. On the same date 100 tons were rolled making a total of 1,965 tons rolled since the beginning of the month. The power consumption amounted to 10,470 kilowatt hours making a total 305,340 kilowatt hours since the beginning of the month.

(182) In the second quarter the plant delivered 1,013 tons of metal to enterprises of the NK for the Coal Industry. Thus, the delivery plan was fulfilled on 21 July.

Krasnogvardejsk

(183) The iron works had fulfilled the June plan for rolled metal products; 402 tons of corrugated iron and iron sheets were produced.

Leningrad

(184) The "Kirov" plant can deliver only 130 tons of thin sheeting per month, but nevertheless, received a contract amounting to 870 tons for a month.

IV. General Supply

(185) For individual branches of industry various levels of importance were set up. The highest level of importance is given in an excerpt from an

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

order from the State Defense Committee of 17 May for the NK's for Munitions, Armaments and Communications. The excerpt from the order reads as follows:

"Point 2: The directors of foundries and metal processing plants are unconditionally ordered to carry out production and shipments in the second quarter of all metal products for the railroads before all other NK's and to apply the same priority as for the NK's for Munitions and Armaments. The following deliveries are to be made:

From the Plant "Amurstal" 1,500 tons of iron sheeting, from the Plant "Andreev" in Taganrog 1,300 tons of steel sheeting. The following deliveries of steel strips for railroad cars and locomotives are to be made:

From the plant in Nizhnij Tagil 31,000 tons, from Plant "Andreev" in Taganrog 3,000 tons, from Plant "Skoba" in Kulebask 3,900 tons."

(186) Individual reports concerning the supply of metal and metal products are as follows:

January

(187) Plant "Kirov" in Tbilisi has a serious shortage of cast iron. Instead of the 155 tons of iron ordered for December, the plant received 15 tons.

(188) The motor repair shop in Erevan had to cease operations because of a shortage of steel.

February

(189) Additional cases of plant shut-downs were noted at the metal processing plants of the Azerbajdzhan Oil Combine. Serious difficulties had arisen because of a shortage of cast iron, steel and fire resistant brick. Drill press parts could not be produced. The following were immediately required.

cast iron	1,700 tons
construction steel	1,700 tons
bricks	700 tons

March

(190) Plant "Stvol" in Rostov/Don had not delivered 900 tons of 115 millimeter plates to Plant 92 in Gorkij according to a report of 19 March. Plant 92 was forced to cease production of military equipment.

(191) In the first quarter the Local Industry in Makachkala could produce only 1,000 sickles and scythes. As a result of the metal shortage, further

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

production was interrupted. For the second quarter, the production of 6,000 sickles and 3,000 scythes was undertaken, assuming ample stocks of metal.

(192) A plant of the Iron Industry in Krasnyj Sulin was to deliver 155 tons of profile iron to the NK for Power Stations for the reconstruction of electrical generating stations. As of 12 March Plant "Sevkabel" in Leningrad had received 1,300 tons less of non-ferrous metals than required in the first quarter. As a result of a copper shortage contracts for the State Committee for Defense could not be carried out.

April

(193) A rapidly increasing shortage of cast iron was noted.

(194) At "Trubostal" in Taganrog there was a shortage of cast iron and iron alloys which were urgently needed for production of special steels.

(195) Plant "Kirov" in Leningrad did not receive the authorized deliveries of cast iron and ferrosilicon.

(196) Foundries of the Rostov/Ugol combine in Shakhty were forced to cease operations because of a lack of cast iron.

(197) The plant of the NK for Agricultural Machinery in Rostov/Don could not fulfill armaments contracts because of a shortage of mold sand and cast iron.

(198) In the Azerbajdzhan Republic production of field kitchens was halted because of a shortage of spring steel.

May

(199) The open hearth plant in Gorkij could not produce parts for military vehicles because of a shortage of electrodes.

(200) Plant "Andreev" in Taganrog reported that, as of 8 May, 120 tons of iron sheets had accumulated in the plant storehouse. No possibility existed to ship this metal.

(201) Plant "Komsomolets" in Tambov could not carry out contracts for the NK for Defense because of a lack of iron sheets.

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

(202) The motor repair plant in Pyatigorsk urgently required aluminum. Parts for motors and combines could not be produced.

(203) At Plant No. 7 in Leningrad production of munitions was halted because of a shortage of cast iron.

June

(204) Plant 848 in Moscow had no ferrosilicon. Operations in the foundry had to be halted.

(205) The motor vehicle plant in Yaroslavl urgently required 400 tons of tin. Production of special vehicles for the front had to be halted.

(206) "Trubostal" in Taganrog complained about insufficient delivery of railroad cars. At the plant the following were stored:

2,036 tons rolled sheets
732 tons strip iron
1,500 tons tubing

(207) The foundries of the NK for Oil in Baku had to cease operations because of a shortage of cast iron.

(208) The ferro plant in Zestafoni required 1,000 tons of iron shavings for production of silicon. This delivery did not take place in June.

(209) The plant of the Tank Industry "Ilich" in Mariupol required 5,200 tons of cast iron. The open hearth furnaces at the plant were taken out of operation.

July

(210) Plants in Zestafoni, Magnitogorsk and Chusovo were behind schedule in their deliveries for the NK for the Oil Industry. In the second quarter the ferro plant in Zestafoni was behind schedule in deliveries to enterprises of the NK for the Iron Industry to the extent of 887 tons of 75% ferrosilicon.

(211) The foundry in Ejsk had to shut down because of a shortage of cast iron.

August

(212) The rolling mill at Chelyabinsk had not fulfilled its delivery obligations to the Azerbajdzhan Oil Combine.

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

(213) In order to avoid shutting down the foundries and other enterprises, the Oil Machine Industry in Azerbajdzhan required the following deliveries:

U shaped iron bars	ferrosilicon
Iron sheeting	tubing
Cast iron	carbon containing construction steel
Cast iron scrap	steel alloys
Bronze in blocks	aluminum blocks
Zinc in blocks	electrodes
Welding wire	

(214) The foundry in Magnitogorsk had not carried out its prescribed deliveries to the foundries in Baku.

(215) Deliveries of sheeting and tubing from Plant "Trubostal" in Taganrog were being carried out very unsatisfactorily: Instead of the 1,090 tons of sheeting contracted for in July and August only 463 tons were delivered, and only 161 tons of tubing were delivered compared to the production plan of 967 tons. Because of the shortage of sheeting a very serious situation had arisen. Reconstruction of mines in the Donbass was delayed.

September

(216) The plant of the NK for the Merchant Fleet in Makhachkala had to cease production of ship components because of a lack of cast iron. The plant required a shipment of 40 tons of cast iron.

(217) The ship machine plant "Gadzhiev" in Makhachkala had not received 220 tons of steel in August and September from the foundries in Magnitogorsk. Contracts for the NK for Defense could not be carried out.

COAL SUPPLY

I. Coal Deliveries

(218) In internal radio traffic only messages from limited coal regions were intercepted concerning the coal supply situation, principally messages concerning the "Rostov/Ugol" Combine at Shakhty and the coal supply office in Rostov, concerning the "Tkvibuli" and "Tkvarcheli-Ugol" Combines in Georgia and

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

individual messages concerning the "Voroshilovgrad-Ugol" Combine. They presented the following picture:

a) The "Rostov/Ugol" Combine at Shakhty and the Coal Supply Office in Rostov

(219) Since 4 January 1944, 6 main lines of the "Rostov/Ugol" Coal Combine were under water. For weeks no assistance could be obtained and the loss in working hours was estimated at 15 hours daily for the month of January. The Power Directorate in Rostov Oblast¹ was held responsible for the flooding of the mines and was charged with negligence in administration.

(220) In February the mine damage seems to have been at least partially eliminated and coal production was taking its normal path. Nevertheless, prescribed deliveries could not be fulfilled. On 10 February 1944, the State Committee for Defense set daily deliveries from the "Rostov/Ugol" Combine at 6,174 tons of coal and 285 railroad cars and for the Coal Supply Office in Rostov at 4,000 tons and 186 railroad cars. These obligations were not met. As early as the first 12 days in March, the "Rostov/Ugol" Combine was 7,750 tons of coal behind their shipping schedule. The relationship between actual and planned shipments is apparent from the following table:

Date	Rostov/Ugol Planned Delivery	Rostov/Ugol Actual Delivery	Coal Supply Office Planned Delivery	Rostov/Don Actual Delivery
10/12/43	6890 tons	4297 tons	--	--
15/12/43	--	--	--	8666 tons
17/12/43	--	--	8640 tons	3609 "
25/12/43	--	--	--	4222 "
30/12/43	5800 "	5164 "	--	--
29/1/44	--	--	6234 "	4567 "
In the period from 21 thru 30 January	62294 "	--	--	--
18/3/44	--	3735 "	--	--
22/3/44	6428 "	5584 "	1571 "	892 "
29/3/44	6584 "	5195 "	--	--
1 thru 30 May	199640 tons	163911 "	--	--
21/6/44	8597 tons	4052 "	5745 "	1091 "
23/6/44	8553 "	5882 "	5601 "	1728 "
26/6/44	8396 "	5100 "	7626 "	1570 "

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

(221) Work was proceeding especially poorly at the following:

Boguraev/Ugol
Gundorovskaya
Nesvetaj-anthracite

(222) In March troubles continued at individual mines of the "Rostov/Ugol" Combine. According to a report of 18 March the main shaft of the mine Artem had been flooded with water and was expected to be unusable for 4 months. The local party official indicated that the shaft would be under repair for about 3 years.

(223) A serious shortage of construction timber was also noted. This delayed reconstruction of the cokeries at the Boguraev mine.

(224) A serious problem was posed in the transportation of coal from coal mines. Large heaps of coal had piled up at the coal mine mouths because of a lack of trucks. For instance, according to a report from 2 January, at the mine mouths of the "Rostov/Ugol" Combine in Shakhty 400,000 tons of coal had piled up. The Coal Supply Office in Rostov could carry out shipments of the coal only very slowly. The danger of spontaneous combustion was increasing.

(225) The following two messages give fairly accurate information on conditions at the "Rostov/Ugol" Combine:

"To the People's Commissar for Coal, Comrade Vakhrushchev, and to the Chief of the Chief Coal Supply Office attached to the Council of People's Commissars, Comrade Kumashev. I question the accuracy of the telegram from Comrades Gridijko and Kagan. Coal stocks at the mines amount to 310,690 tons and not 187,812 tons. Comrade Gridijko was incorrectly informed. He has not included the entire stock of coal in his report and has completely overlooked a stock of 80,000 tons of coal in the mines. 6,000 tons of coal are shipped daily. I request expedited shipment of the coal in July and August. Signed Karchev"

"To the Council of the People's Commissars of the USSR, Comrade Beriya; copy to People's Commissar for Coal, Vakhrushchev; copy to People's Commissar for Transportation, Comrade Kaganovich Lazar Mojseevich. The coal shipping plan in all months previously has not been fulfilled by the "Rostov/Ugol" Combine. Responsibility for this is laid on the railroad which has not provided enough railroad cars. All storehouses at the mines are overflowing with coal. For this reason many mines are unable to increase coal production. Since 20 June the delivery of railroad cars has become much worse. In 26 days of June only 6,906 railroad cars with a capacity of 144,933 tons of coal have

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

been provided instead of 7,826 railroad cars with a capacity of 169,200 tons of coal as planned. Railways are behind schedule in deliveries of railroad cars as follows:

Stalingrad Railway	172 cars	=	3,717 tons
Southeast Railway	52 cars	=	? tons
The North Donets Railway	27 cars	≠	1,966 tons
The North Caucasus Railway	252 cars	=	7,126 tons

(conclusion of message missing)"

b) Tkvibuli-Ugol, Tkvarcheli-Ugol

(226) The following messages reporting plans and shipments are our only source of information concerning the combines Tkvibuli-Ugol and Tkvarcheli-Ugol:

Tkvibuli-Ugol

Total shipments in the first quarter of 1944: 75,200 tons including: by railway 73,200 tons and by their own transportation facilities 2,000 tons

Daily average of 805 tons in 36 cars. By their own transportation facilities 22 tons.

January 1944:

By railway 25,000, by their own transportation facilities, 700 tons.

Daily average of 805 tons and 36 cars. By their own transportation facilities 22 tons.

Tkvarcheli-Ugol

Total shipment in the first quarter of 1944: 54,000 tons including: by railway 21,000 tons and by their own transportation facilities 33,000 tons.

Daily average 594 tons of coal, by railway 231 tons in 10 cars, by their own transportation facilities 363 tons.

January 1944:

By railway 6,300 tons, by their own transportation facilities 10,800 tons.

Daily average of 552 tons, by railway 204 tons, by their own transportation facilities 384 tons.

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

(127) Tkvarcheli-Ugol and Tkvibuli-Ugol shipped the following quantities in February 1944:

Tkvarcheli	17,582 tons
Tkvibuli	21,000 tons, distributed as follows:
	"Lenin" mine 5,623 tons; "Stalin" mine 4,884 tons;
	the Western mine 9,408 tons and the "Galati"
	1,085 tons. Total 21,000 tons.

(128) A report of 13 September indicates daily deliveries from the Tkvibuli-Ugol Combine. The following were shipped.

<u>Mine</u>	<u>Ordered</u>	<u>Shipped</u>
Lenin	346 tons	388 tons
Stalin	550 "	699 "
Galati	75 "	--
	971 tons	1087 tons

(129) In September the coal production plan for Galati Ugol was set at 24,700 tons.

c) Voroshilovgrad Ugol

(230) Only five day reports from 1 thru 5 May and from 5 May thru 10 May were available. They provided the following information:

(231) In the first five days of May the Voroshilovgrad Ugol Combine shipped 23,179 tons of coal (= 1,165 railroad cars). 26,668 tons were shipped by truck (= 1,176 cars per day). In the period from 5 thru 10 May 13,460 tons of coal in 683 railroad cars were shipped. A total of 21,974 tons were shipped by truck (= 819 cars per day).

II. Coal Supply

(232) The following was determined in detail:

January

(233) In the Caucasian and East Ukrainian regions a serious situation with respect to coal supply was noted. Examples follow:

(234) The Ingush Paper Combine had not received the December delivery of 300 tons of coal by January.

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

(235) Shipments of coal to the Plant "Instrument" in Taganrog were far behind schedule: 827 tons in December and 680 tons in January.

February

(236) The critical situation continued and seemed to become even more threatening. A serious shortage of coal seemed to be prevailing not only in the regions mentioned above, but also in the entire Soviet Union. At any rate, the State Committee for Defense was forced to prohibit all deliveries of coal which were not expressly authorized. This order was issued on 14 February. However, coal shortages continued.

(237) The chemical combine in Dzhulfa has no heating material; neither the factory nor the living quarters were heated.

(238) Plant 572 of the NK for Munitions in Zatvor (Chelyabinsk Oblast') had not received the allocation of 400 tons of coal for January and February.

(239) The shoe factory "Mikoyan" in Rostov/Don was forced to cease operations because of a shortage of coal.

(240) The meat combine in Leninakan had not received the coal allocation in February.

(241) The Lithopone Plant in Kutaisi was shut down because of a lack of coal.

March

(242) A change in the coal supply situation was not noted.

(243) The Bakery Trust in Leningrad did not receive its coal deliveries in March.

(244) The alcohol plant in Petrovsk was forced to shut down on 10 March.

April

(245) The power plants at Stalingrad, Voronezh, Kharkov, Moscow, Saratov, Kujbyshev and Rostov/Don were suffering particularly as a result of the shortage in coal supplies.

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

(246) The Azov-Black Sea power station received only 16,700 tons of coal instead of the 26,600 tons authorized.

(247) The Stalingrad tractor plant required 300 tons of coke for April. However, only 45 tons were authorized.

(248) The coal supply office in Shakhty delivered only 180 tons of coal to the NK for Sovkhozes instead of the planned 320 tons. As a result, the repair of agricultural machinery was greatly delayed.

May

(249) In the first 20 days of May only 109,800 tons of coal were delivered from the Coal Supply Office in Donbass to the coke chemical plants instead of the planned 187,220 tons. The shipments were made by the following:

<u>Office</u>	<u>Planned Delivery</u>	<u>Actual Delivery</u>
Stalino "Snab Ugol"	108,220	61,531
Voroshilovgrad "Snab Ugol"	64,000	40,809
Rostov/Ugol	15,160	7,540

(250) Great difficulties had arisen at the coke chemical plants in Ruchenkovo, Starokramatorskaya, Stalino, Khanzhenko, and Konstantinovka. Reports were also intercepted concerning shut-downs of munitions plants as a result of coal shortages. For instance, Plant 558 of the NK for Munitions in Gorkij was forced to cease production of munitions.

July

(251) Plant "Instrument" in Taganrog was beset with great difficulties because of the coal shortage.

(252) As a result of the serious coal shortage, several hospitals of the NK for Health in the Caucasus were made unsuitable for patients.

(253) In the months of June, August and September there were very few messages concerning the coal supply situation. As far as could be determined the situation remained the same as in the preceding months.