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SOVIET UNION MILITARY-ECONOMIC REPORT

Survey for the 2nd Half of 1943

Translated from the German Report

Dated: 31 March 1944

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P R E F A C E

During the Second World War the German Signal Intelligence Control Center of the Staff of the Chief of Army Signal Service (HNW, LNA) issued a series of reports to show the USSR military-economic situation as reflected in Russian internal plain language traffic. A total of 145 reports, [redacted] appeared at short, irregular intervals, usually six per month, for the period October 1942-March 1943. [redacted] include mostly daily reports for March 1943 as well as a few monthly reports covering the latter part of 1942 and the early part of 1943. The last four reports, [redacted] summarize Soviet economic activities for periods of three to nine months in 1943 and 1944.

FOIA b3a three of these reports have been translated and issued by [redacted]. One hundred reports, [redacted] are being translated and issued by Strategic Division of the Office of Research and Reports (OSR) (FOIA b3a). The series will be completed with the publication of [redacted].

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Military-Economic Report

(Based on domestic radio traffic)

31 March 1944

FOREWORD

The following report summarizes the military-economic reports for the second half of 1943 and is based entirely on reports from domestic radio traffic. The report gives only a sector of the economic life of the Soviet Union. The statistics are therefore not absolute but only indexes of the economic development.

1 . General Survey

(1) Intercepts from domestic radio traffic resulted in the following picture:

(2) Increased military operations and an economic rehabilitation of the recovered areas resulted in stresses during the second half of 1943 which permitted the economy of the Soviet Union to improve only slightly.

(3) This was indicated in particular in the transportation field. Owing to the steady movement of the fronts to the West, the military made increasing demands on the transportation system. The proportion of the transportation system available to the economy decreased steadily. The railroad system was able to place at the disposal of the economy only about half of the required cars in the second half-year (against about 2/3 in the first half-year). Only about two-thirds of the transportation plans of the River Fleet could be fulfilled (against about 3/4 in the first half-year).

(4) The personnel situation formed a grave concern to the responsible authorities, since the front placed increasing demands on the economy. At several important plants the remaining personnel were frozen until the end of the war. To compensate, another part of the economy had to bear a correspondingly higher load of military recruitments. The only reserves worth noting not yet incorporated into the economy are youths under eighteen years and women with small children. During the second half year these groups had to be called upon on a large scale by means of service drafts.

(5) In spite of the shortage of young workers the Soviets attempted to increase technical training. Many new technical schools in various regions were established. These schools are an indication that the Soviets want systematically and with all energies to reach or surpass the prominence of the old industrial state insofar as technical and special workers are concerned.

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(6) The transfer of military conditions to civilian life through the introduction of military disciplinary regulations and ranks (uniforms) served to direct the mobilization of the working force.

(7) The reconstruction of the re-occupied region was carried out with greatest energy. In some cities the economic life was pursued with amazing speed. The metal and timber supply could only partially meet the requirement of the reconstruction.

(8) The food situation was affected by the apparently only average harvest. As a result of deficiencies of transportation, a part of the harvest spoiled. Only about three-quarters of the expected amounts of potatoes and vegetables were harvested. 1944 must therefore reckon with increasing food problems. As a result of the poor supply, the unofficial prices were increased perceptibly. The official purchase price for a hundredweight of rye amounted to 8.05 rubles and for wheat, 12.75 rubles. In the black market 1 kg. of flour cost 110 rubles, 1 kg. of potatoes, 50 rubles, and 1 kg. of butter 400-500 rubles. The average hourly rate of a worker amounts to 0.90 ruble.

(9) An acknowledgement of the unsatisfactory food position of the Soviet Union is to be seen in imports from Iran. Imports increased considerably in comparison with the first half year and these imports consisted of about two-thirds of food. The imported materials could not, however, cover the shortage.

(10) The raw material supply problem was by and large a transportation problem. An example indicative of this situation is in the supply of scrap iron. While the scrap iron processing schedule was almost 100 per cent fulfilled, the transportation system could handle only about half of this amount.

(11) The petroleum and coal supply, which had reached serious proportions already in July, by November/December had reached a critical position. During these months there were numerous interruptions and shut-downs at the plants. The situation prevailed both in electrical plants and munitions works.

(12) The increasing difficulties led to more and more drastic measures. The Soviet administration demanded the expansion of industry within the framework of new output competitions. They comprised the "voluntary conscriptees", to do additional work in spite of, in many cases, the already existing 12-hour work day. The yearly plan had to be fulfilled by 5 December. A new production plan which was above all to increase ordinance and aircraft production, was provided for the winter. Although the existing plan figures--they were purposely high--had not been met in general, these "voluntary production competitions" combined with brutality in the execution were the handles used by the government to gain by force higher outputs.

(13) The economy of the Soviet Union in general maintained the production level during the second half-year of the previous period. As a result of increased military requirements and the demands of reconstruction, output however fell short of the requirements. Whether and to what extent the increasing reconstruction

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of the reoccupied areas will make possible an increase of the productivity of the Soviet Union cannot at present be foreseen.

2. Personnel Situation

(14) During the second half of 1943 in all aspects of the economy there was an unalleviated shortage of skilled labor brought about principally by the extensive military draft. This shortage grew with the increasing occupation of large industrial and agricultural areas in which extensive reconstruction was necessary. The plants in the unoccupied regions had to give up workers during this reconstruction in spite of their own strained labor situation.

(15) The NKRF plants had to transfer its reconstruction staffs for the Dnepr Steamship Agency. Consequently, there was a large shortage of labor for ship repair and also travelling personnel. As a result of the shortage of office personnel, the monthly accounts were considerably in arrears.

(16) Agriculture suffered under a shortage of tractor and combine drivers. Difficulties resulted in those aspects of agriculture which had a high proportion of manual labor, as for example, in transportation and timber working. From West and Central Siberia and the Caucasus there were numerous announcements that the timber quotas could not be fulfilled.

(17) With the increase of foreign supply through Arkhangelsk, Murmansk, and Iran, large stocks of imported goods accumulated because of the shortage of transportation workers.

(18) By means of large-scale drafts, the work difficulties were to be alleviated. As a result there was a re-allocation of skilled workers from industries having little importance to the war to industries of greater importance. Additional workers were obtained by extending the labor draft to include women and youths. By a decree of 7 August 1943 it was ordered that women with children between 4 and 8 years could be drafted. War wounded, the aged, and sick were called up to work. Labor was drafted from the reconquered areas for other regions. Thus, so far as can be determined from radio traffic, more than 100,000 laborers were obtained, as can be deduced from the following examples. There were drafted:

- 55,000 men for the reconstruction of the iron industry in the Don Basin
- 10,000 men for the reconstruction of the "Stalin" Works in Novokramatorskaya and the "Ordzhonikidze" Plant in Starokramatorskaya
- 15,000 men for the ship repair works in the Middle and Lower Volga Steamship Agency
- 10,000 men for the railroad repair shops in the area of the south and southwest front

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- 4,000 for the North Caucasus Surface Construction and Underground Construction Industry
- 3,000 men for the Turkmen Petroleum Industry
- 2,100 men for the Azov-Black Sea Plant in Rostov
- 1,500 men for the NK for Building Projects in Rostov

Youths less than 18 years old were drafted:

- 4,000 youths for the reconstruction of the railroad in the Krasnodar district
- 150 youths for the metallurgical plant in Novotagilsk in September
- 60 youths for the Chelyabinsk Steel Works

(19) Likewise, a large number of youths were supplied for the metallurgical works in Sulin and Taganrog.

(20) The drafts are operating under great difficulties. In the Voroshilovgrad region, the NK for Heavy Machines was ordered to draft an average of only 5 workers per day in August. Several enterprises of NKRF were not able to obtain sufficient workers. Molotov-NKRF needed about 1,000 men; Gorkij-NKRF, about 300 men; Kujbyshev-NKRF, about 200 men.

(21) The method of carrying out the drafts may be seen from a pronouncement of the Chief Directorate of the NKRF in Moscow to the office in Gorkij:

"There is only one explanation for the fact that you have not obtained sufficient personnel. You do not have sufficient tenacity and moreover, your connections with the local organizations are inadequate. I suggest that you get in touch with the regional organizations. I make you personally responsible for the carrying out of the drafts."

(22) The carrying out of the draft often resulted in frictions. Employees of the River Fleet, again and again, in spite of all orders which should have guaranteed the stability of its labor force, were drafted for other organizations. This could often only be cancelled after a protest. For certain munitions industries, drafts were carried out without regard to the relationship of the draftees to other enterprises and agencies. Excluded from this were only the members of the Coal, Tank, and Aviation Industries.

(23) For seasonal work, school children and students were called up. For the autumn harvest school children of the upper class were utilized. The populace of the cities were also used for this purpose. There are messages from the regions of Aktyubinsk, Akmolinsk, Alma-Ata, and Karaganda. Students were obtained for timber processing installations.

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(24) Within certain aspects of the economy, a re-allocation of the labor force was carried out.

(25) At the beginning of the season when navigation must stop (usually in October), travelling personnel were utilized within the NKRF for ship repairs, production of spare parts for ships, and for wood-processing work.

(26) Ufa-NKRF distributed its travelling personnel of 1,133 men as follows during the winter:

- 205 men for special repair
- 450 men for ships' guards
- 245 men for NKRF Industry
- 85 men for timber procurement
- 30 men for construction work
- 20 men for training
- 109 men to the technical or factory schools

(27) Irkutsk, river port, allocated 1,300 men as follows:

- 150 men for repairs
- 320 men for canal construction
- 60 men for general overhauling
- 220 men for timber procurement
- 300 men for other work
- 120 men for the Angara Steamship Agency
- 140 men for NKRF Industry

During the winter period, transportation workers from the River Fleet were made available to the Merchant Fleet in Arkhangelsk and the transshipment points of Iransovtrans.

(28) In spite of all these measures, the labor force was not adequate. How extensive the labor force was at the end of 1943 is indicated in the following table showing the unemployed persons in large cities (including women with children under 8 years):

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Rostov	11,280 persons	including	5,279 women	
Taganrog	4,744 persons	"	1,423	"
Shakhty	2,266 persons	"	1,842	"
Novocherkassk	417 persons	"	394	"
Novoshakhtinsk	503 persons	"	503	"
Sulin	1,212 persons	"	1,212	"
Kamensk	---	"	96	"
Millerovo	1,127 persons	"	897	"
Bataisk	301 persons	"	184	"
Azov	874 persons	"	175	"
Salsk	303 persons	"	303	"
Morozovsk	401 persons	"	330	"

Thus it is seen that future labor drafts can no longer rely on free available reserves but must be filled at the expense of those industries of little importance.

(29) In radio traffic, abnormalities have often been announced concerning personnel adjustments and welfare. The non-fulfillment of the labor draft plans, lack of satisfactory quarters for the draftees, inadequate supply of food, special clothing and bed-linens were the most frequent bottlenecks.

(30) Often a large proportion of the draftees were sick, another proportion deserted, and only a fraction of the assigned personnel were useful to the plants. Two-hundred draftees were assigned to a plant of the NK for the Merchant Fleet in Baku. Only 77 men actually worked; 81 had deserted, the rest were either sick, assigned to schools, discharged for various reasons, or transferred to other plants.

(31) Anyone who refuses to accept a work position, must be turned over to the authorities. Disciplinary action of this type appears to be frequent because a radio message stated that on the basis of an order of the highest court all penalties against employees of the River Fleet who have not yet reached their sixteenth birthday were to be re-examined. If necessary, a modification or complete acquittal of the sentence was to be uttered.

(32) Non-fulfillment of work quota subjected the worker to severe punishments based on disciplinary regulations instituted in the middle of 1943. In such cases investigations were to be carried out and notification given that non-fulfillment of the work quota was not to be tolerated.

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(33) Exceeding the work quota by workers in the war industries called for special prizes to be conferred upon them. Transport workers received for supplementary labor devoted to loading of export materials and fuels special allotments of bread, tobacco, rice, meat products, and dried fruits. Many prizes were also bestowed through Socialist competitions.

(34) Personnel problems existed because of the induction into the military of the young classes. Up to 15 November 1943 the members of the class of 1926 should have been called into the service. Of the members of this class employed in industry, however, only those of the two lowest categories (1 and 2) were to be excluded. Furthermore, all students in this class at NKRF technical schools were to be exempt from military draft. A renewed report of the industrial employees in the classes 1922/25 followed and specifically of those in the higher categories which was to stop further extraction of the labor force from the economy. Members of the class of 1920 in agriculture were not exempted. As a result of this, members of this class who were attending agricultural schools were made available for military service.

(35) From radio traffic, it appeared that mainly agriculture had to give up labor to the military. In order to guarantee essential workers for agriculture, certain categories of workers were deferred. The sovkhoses could apply for skilled laborers (tractor and combine drivers), of the three higher categories without regard to age. In spite of this, there were frequent drafts of tractor and combine drivers for military service.

(36) In the enterprises of the food industry, deferments were not extended beyond 1 September. Thus, because of this ordering, qualified workers, engineers, and technicians were drafted.

(37) In the motor repair plants, engineering-technical personnel, except those belonging to the officers' corps of the Red Army, and workers of the fourth and higher categories were deferred without regard to age.

(38) The deferments of the workers of the Coal Industry were extended to 1 July 1944.

(39) The workers of the River Fleet were, in accord with an order of 20 June 1943, deferred from military service until the end of the war. The workers of the Petroleum Industry were likewise deferred until the end of the war.

(40) Under certain circumstances, all personnel of an enterprise were deferred. Thus the total personnel engaged in the construction of a soda plant in Slavyansk were deferred indefinitely from military service.

(41) From the deferments announced during the second half year, it was apparent that in certain war industries, such as the Petroleum Industry, further military drafts are impossible.

(42) This resulted in increased conscription from other branches of the economy, as is shown, for example, by conscription from Agriculture and the Food Industry irrespective of office.

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(43) Paralleling the reconstruction of industry there was an intensive expansion of technical schooling. Both in the reoccupied regions and in other regions, during the second half-year many new technical schools in all branches of the economy were established. From radio traffic, newly established technical schools for about 12,000 students have been identified as follows:

Maritime Schools in Batum for 300 men;

NKRF Technical School Krasnoyarsk for ? men;

4 craftsman schools for the Metal Industry in the Stalingrad Oblast' for 2,000 men;

2 craftsman schools for the Metal Industry in Rostov Oblast' for 200 men;

3 technical schools for the Metal Industry in the Stalingrad Oblast' for 3,000 men;

1 craftsman school for the Metal Industry in the Voroshilovgrad Oblast' for 300 men;

Technical school for the Mortar Industry in Leningrad (?) "Vulkan" Works for 3,000 men (?);

Technical School for Communications in Voroshilovgrad for 200 men;

Craftsman School for Construction Workers in the Rostov Oblast' for 750 men;

Craftsman School for Construction Workers in the Azov Oblast' for 200 men;

Craftsman School for Construction Workers in the Kamensk Oblast' for 250 men;

Technical School for the Shoe Factory "Mikoyan" in the Rostov Oblast' for 300 men.

(44) More than 10,000 technical students attended these schools during the second half-year. Also during the winter half-year numerous courses for agriculture were conducted. In the Stavropol region alone, during this period the following were trained:

Tractor drivers	-	6,000 men
Combine drivers	-	1,200 men
Assistant combine drivers	-	80 men

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Mechanics	-	180 men
Foremen for tractor brigades	-	300 men
Repair technicians	-	200 men

(45) In addition, in the course of the winter in 2-month long instruction periods, 200 tractor drivers and 500 combine drivers should be given advanced training. Employees capable of work of both sexes of the population from sovkhozes and kolkhozes from age 16 upwards were obliged to attend these courses.

(46) The plan for increasing technical instruction met with difficulties, however, because not enough technical students could be obtained. Therefore, there were drafts made for technical school instruction. In the Vladivostok rajon there were drafted, for example, 1,015 youths for the technical schools and 820 for the Maritime School. The method of drafting did not seem to be adequate, however, since the NKRF conducted a recruiting campaign among urban and rural youth for its technical school.

(47) To what degree the training plan was realized is indicated by the following examples:

	<u>Training Plan</u>	<u>Actual Training</u>	<u>Fulfillment in per cent</u>
NKRF Plant "Zhdanov" in Gorkij	54	17	30.2
NKRF Plant "Karl Marx" in Gorkij	63	26	40.1
NKRF Plant in Astrakhan	650	367	56.5
Technical Schools in North Ossetia	650	469	72.2
Craftsman Schools in North Ossetia	500	153	30.6
Technical Schools in Azerbajdzhan	2,300	1,685	73.2
Technical Schools in Khabarovsk	2,217	1,721	77.5

3. Transportation Situation

A. Railroad

(48) During the second half-year there was no significant improvement in the transportation situation. As a result of the heavy requirements of the front, the railroads were strained to the utmost.

(49) They lacked rolling stock and transportation workers. There were also stoppages as a result of deficient organization. The raw material supply was therefore bad. This led to stoppages in the economy. This also resulted in economic loss as

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a result of long storage of perishable goods in the economic stations, as for example, food, textiles, and leather.

(50) How strained the transportation situation was is demonstrated by the extension of the state of emergency on the railroad during the first half-year. During July transportation difficulties seemed to increase. At the beginning of the month, coal loading in Likhaya (Rostov Oblast') had to be temporarily suspended as a result of lack of coal. Shakhty received during the first days of July cars for the transportation of coal from the mines. The NK for Ferrous Metals obtained from Voroshilovgrad in July only 36 per cent of the planned 12,000 tons of coal.

(51) Millerovo announced great hold-ups of petroleum transport for the front.

(52) During August only about half of the transportation program was fulfilled, as is indicated in the following examples taken from the radio traffic:

	<u>Planned Amount</u>	<u>Actual Amount</u>	<u>Fulfillment in %</u>	<u>Period</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
NK for Ferrous Metals	600 tons	231	38	10-15 Aug	Anthracite from Donbass to Sulin
NK for Ferrous Metals	200	96	48	10-15 Aug	Anthracite from Novoshakh- tinsk
Kutaisi, Lithopone Works			50	1-10 Aug	-

(53) During August the NK for Ferrous Metals should have received 23,800 tons of coal (16,000 tons from the current plan and 7,800 tons residue from July). From 7 to 14 August, however, no coal was delivered.

(54) In Makhachkala 19,000 tons of freight arrived, about 8,500 tons were shipped. On 1 September 4,600 tons had not been shipped.

(55) Frequently there were complaints on trans-shipping difficulties as a result of the shortage of transport workers. In Semipalatinsk only about 40% of the cars could be loaded, in Kineshma about 31%.

(56) According to an order of 5 September 1943 new ranks and rank designations were introduced for the workers of the Soviet railroads. In an explanation of this order, it said that it was intended to improve discipline and to introduce a uniform command authority.

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(57) The ranks are:

- I. General Director of Transportation
Vice General Director of Transportation, First and Second Rank
General Director for Transportation, First, Second, and Third Ranks
General Director for Mechanical Engineering, First, Second, and Third Ranks
General Director for Roads and Buildings, First, Second, and Third Ranks
General Director for Communications, First, Second, and Third Ranks
General Director for Administration, First, Second, and Third Ranks
- II. Director - Colonel
Director - Lieutenant Colonel
Engineer - Major
- III. Engineer - Captain, one for each of following:
traffic, mechanical engineering, roads and buildings, communications, administration.
- IV. Engineer - Lieutenant
- V. Technologist - Lieutenant
- VI. Traffic Technician, First, Second, and Third Ranks
Machine Technician, First, Second, and Third Ranks
Roads and Building Technician, First, Second, and Third Ranks
Communications Technician, First, Second, and Third Ranks
Administration Technician, First, Second, and Third Ranks
Supply Man and Foreman, one each for Traffic, Waterway, and Buildings, Communications, and Administration.

(58) During September, as a result of the harvest, grain shipments were of great importance. These transportation plans were fulfilled only about one quarter.

(59) RAILROAD CAR ALLOCATIONS

<u>For</u>	<u>Amount Planned</u>	<u>Actual Amount</u>	<u>Fulfillment in %</u>	<u>Period</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Krasnodar Kraj	6,540 cars	1,780 cars	27.5	During Sept.	Grain transport
				(Actual period 1-25 Sept.)	

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<u>For</u>	<u>Amount Planned</u>	<u>Actual Amount</u>	<u>Fulfillment in %</u>	<u>Period</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
---	7,554 cars	1,835 cars	24.1	1-20 Sept.	Grain transport by the Northern Caucasus RR.
---	300 cars	76 cars	25.3	Daily, 1-15 Sept.	Grain transport by Voroshilovgrad RR
Baku, Rear Area of the Red Army	64,000 cars	9,700 cars	15.2	During August	Grain transport
"	57,000 tons	1,100	10.9	1-25 Sept.	Grain transport
Baku Harbor	1,792 cars	749	41.6	1-10 (?) Sept.	Residue 24,000 cargoes

(60) As a result of the inadequate supply of tank cars, by the middle of September the storage facilities of the petroleum plant in Groznyj were completely used. As a result there was a production stoppage.

(61) During the month of October the situation was unchanged. The Stalingrad Railroad ought to have supplied during that month 1,927 cars for grain transport. Up to 12 October only 114 cars equal to 6% were shipped. Also the Stalingrad Railroad was not able to fulfill the coal plan. They should have placed 45 cars daily at the disposal of the "Rostov-Ugol" Combine. Up to 27 October (?) there was a backlog of 5,656 tons.

(62) On the North Caucasus Railroad, from 16 October onward, the Petroleum Supply Office in Armavir should receive 125 tank cars. In the period from 22 to 24 October, however, no cars were made available.

(63) On 24 October the Transcaucasus Railroad exceeded the monthly transportation plan for manganese ore and it was foreseen that by late October 30,000 tons would be transported. By 24 October 30,457 tons or 101% had been shipped.

(64) During November and December the situation was unchanged. To carry out the urgent grain transportation, horse-drawn wagons and trucks, had to be utilized, for example, in the Krasnodar district. A truck regiment shipped up to 10 November 29,000 tons of grain for the Directorate of Rear Services.

(65) RAILROAD CAR ALLOCATIONS

<u>For</u>	<u>Amount Planned</u>	<u>Actual Amount</u>	<u>Fulfillment in %</u>	<u>Period</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Boguraev, Coal Trust	124 cars	155 cars	48.	27 Nov.	--

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<u>For</u>	<u>Amount Planned</u>	<u>Actual Amount</u>	<u>Fulfillment in %</u>	<u>Period</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Boguraev, Coal Trust	124	66	55.	28 Nov.	--
Rostov	354 cars	184 cars	52.	In Dec.	For sunflower shipments from the Voroshilov- grad Railroad
Rostov, Scrap Depot	253 cars	70 cars (1-15 Dec.)	60.8	During Dec.	
Armavir, Petroleum Supply	--	--	36.	1-22 Dec.	--
Shakhty, Rostov-Ugol	371	315	85.	15 Nov.	--

(66) The coal combine "Rostov-Ugol" in Shakhty announced that the deficient loadings were mainly due to the lack of transport workers. On 15 November only 190 cars, equal to 60% of those allocated, had been shipped. On 4 December "Rostov-Ugol" obtained 305 cars of which 148, or 42%, were shipped. Thus the railroads fulfilled only about one-half of their transportation program. Concerning the difficulties resulting in the economy, see the various specific paragraphs in this report.

(67) In evaluating the transportation situation it must be considered that we are dealing here only with the condition of the civilian sector of the economy, in which the Munitions Industry is also included. In addition there is the military sector. Military operational and freight shipments had unconditional priorities.

B. Inland Waterways

(68) The strain on the Inland Waterway transportation system appeared in July to have reached a new high point. The majority of installations of the NKRF could not carry out their transportation programs. The most important inland waterway effort which is on the Volga fell short of its plan, as did the Kama Steamship Agency and several other shipping agencies in European Russia. The West Siberian Steamship Agency also did not fulfill its transportation quota. As can be seen from radio messages, the docking facility of the Upper, Middle and also Lower Volga were clogged. These stoppages resulted from the shortage of transport workers. Saratov requested blanket authority to mobilize the population and to draw upon local military units. On the Moscow-Oka Canal there were even greater stoppages because in Gorkij and Rybinsk ships could not be dispatched for the same reason.

(69) Often there were shortages of barges and above all of tugs. According to messages, there were shortages of tugs at the Lower Volga and

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Kama Steamship Agencies. The West Siberian Steamship Agency also had a bottleneck. These regions also did not have sufficient barges. Part of this barge and tug shortage was due to the backlog of repair work and the non-fulfillment of new construction plans. There were often also complaints concerning the bad state of repair of the ships.

(70) As far as can be determined, the following Inland Shipping installations could not fulfill their transport program:

Ust-Usa	<u>West Siberian Steamship Agency:</u>
Sokolki (Ki rov Oblast')	Ilijsk
	Tomsk
<u>Volga Steamship Agency:</u>	Omsk
Rybinsk	Semipalatinsk
Gorkij	Krasnoyarsk
Stalingrad	
Vladimirovka	<u>East Siberian Steamship Agency:</u>
	Khabarovsk

(71) The Upper Irtysh Steamship Agency remained continually under its assigned norms. Semipalatinsk should have transloaded 2,000 tons every 24 hours. Only the following amounts were, however, dispatched:

11 July	700 tons or 35%
12 July	800 tons or 40%
13 July	500 tons or 25%
14 July	900 tons or 45%
15 July	800 tons or 40%

Thus, in 5 days instead of 10,000 tons only 3,700 tons or 37% were dispatched.

(72) Ust-Usa fulfilled 61% of the monthly plan as of 20 July. Up through 22 July Omsk completed only 30% of salt shipments from Pavlodar. In Zemska 42% of the transloading plan was fulfilled. As a result of the steady failure of the port of Tomsk, the matter was to be investigated by the government. Good information concerning execution of the July transportation plan was reported by the following:

<u>Office</u>	<u>Fulfillment</u>
Saratov	176 %
Omsk	111%
Ulan-Ude	108%
Lower Irtysh Steamship Agency	107%

(73) The increased output of the Lower Irtysh Steamship Agency resulted from raft operations as is apparent from the following review:

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<u>Freight</u>	<u>Plan</u>	<u>Fulfillment</u>	<u>Per cent</u>
Grain	54, 400 tons	55, 403 tons	101.2
Steel	150, 000	151, 000	100.7
Coal	5, 000	5, 815	106.4
Timber on Ships	91, 000	86, 036	94.5
Timber on Rafts	79, 600	107, 765	137.0
TOTAL	380, 100	406, 019	106.8

(74) During August there was a complication in Inland Shipping as a result of the lowering of the water level. In a message from the Central Directorate to all NKRF offices it was ordered that suitable measures were to be taken to guarantee the necessary depth of water in the channel passages. As a result of inadequate preparations, the depth of water was inadequate at many locations, and especially at the following:

Upper Kama
Vytegra
Vyatka
Usa
Upper Pechora
Upper Volga
Irtysh
Upper Ob

(75) In the regions of the Upper Kama and Volga ship traffic was possible in only one direction. In these regions the fulfillment of the transport plans was not possible.

(76) Furthermore, the old problems, as well as the shortage of transportation equipment and workers, remained unsolved so that the progress of transportation dragged along.

(77) The situation was aggravated by the bad condition of the ships which became worse and worse toward the end of the navigation period as a result of the general wear and tear. Novosibirsk, for example, reported increasing damages to ships' boilers and machines. Uralsk reported that as a result of the degenerate condition of the ships the August plan could not be fulfilled. For cargoes which were dispatched from the region of the Upper Volga Steamship Agency for Moscow, oftentimes ships in such poor condition were used that during the trip a transloading into another ship was necessary. Vladimirovka complained that it had received barges in such poor condition from the Upper and Lower Volga Steamship Agencies for use in transportation of salt that further shipments were no longer possible.

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(78) In the case of many cargoes the packing was in such bad condition, as for example in the case of cotton, that before transloading the cargoes had to be completely repacked.

(79) In a message from the Central Directorate of the NKRF to all installations, the unsatisfactory operation of all shipping lines was censored. This message specified the disorganization of dock work, unsatisfactory utilization of loading capacity and non-fulfillment of the transportation plan.

(80) In August transportation backlogs were found at the following offices of the River Fleet in addition to those cited in the previous month:

Kujbyshev
Astrakhan
Ufa
Yakutsk
Lower Irtysh Steamship Agency

(81) The backlog in fulfillment of transportation plans was as follows:

<u>Installation</u>	<u>Amount Planned</u>	<u>Actual Amount</u>	<u>Fulfillment in %</u>	<u>Period</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Upper Irtysh Steamship Agency	4,350 tons	3,100 tons	70.	1-16 Aug.	Salt from Pavlodar
Lower Irtysh Steamship Agency	7,500	5,500	73.	1-16 Aug.	Salt
Semipalatinsk	--	--	88.	1-16 Aug.	Salt transport
Vladimirovka	7,000	5,700	81.4	23 Aug.	--

(82) In Astrakhan oil shipments had ceased. Kujbyshev and Ufa were in arrears mainly with lumber shipments and Stalingrad with salt shipments. In spite of the fact that there were adequate tugs, there remained in Vladimirovka loaded barges past the prescribed delay time because work was so poorly organized.

(83) A good work record was reported, however, from the following:

<u>Office</u>	<u>Amount Planned</u>	<u>Actual Amount</u>	<u>Fulfillment in %</u>	<u>Period</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Uralsk	350,000 tons	378,250 tons	108.	August	General transport
Novosibirsk	9,700	8,000 " (from 1-20 August)	82.4	August	Coal

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<u>Office</u>	<u>Amount Planned</u>	<u>Actual Amount</u>	<u>Fulfillment in %</u>	<u>Period</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Ulan-Ude	--	--	98.4	1-7 Aug.	General transport

(84) As a result of the low water level, considerable transportation problems existed throughout the entire USSR in September. The Chief Directorate of the NKRF complained about the low cruising speed of the Middle Volga Steamship Agency. It amounted to only 160-200 kilometers per day. More and more River Fleet Offices announced non-fulfillment of transport plans. Among others are the following:

Saratov	Semipalatinsk
Kujbyshev	Krasnoyarsk
Rostov	Novosibirsk
Uralsk	Irkutsk
Blagoveshchensk	Aralsk
Ilijsk	Chardzhou
Rybache	Khabarovsk

(85) The fulfillment of the transportation plan by NKRF offices was as follows:

<u>Office</u>	<u>Amount Planned</u>	<u>Actual Amount</u>	<u>Fulfillment in %</u>	<u>Period</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Novosibirsk	--	--	81.	1-10 Sept.	Transportation plan in ton-kilometers 89% fulfilled
Uralsk	--	--	71.	1-18 Sept.	Principally grain and building material transported
Saratov	14,600 tons	6,140 tons	42.	1-14 Sept.	Grain transport
Kujbyshev	5,000	2,900	58.	1-14 Sept.	Grain transport

(86) Blagoveshchensk did not fulfill its transportation plan for raft timber, salt and vegetables; Rostov and Stalingrad did not fulfill their plan for coal.

(87) Only Omsk announced the fulfillment of the September transportation plan and that was by 110.1%. Details of this fulfillment follow:

<u>Product</u>	<u>Plan</u>	<u>Actual Output</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Grain	43,000 tons	37,500 tons	87.3
Coal	40,000	44,700	111.8
Salt	91,000	98,000	103.0
Timber on ships	40,000	26,750	66.4
Timber on rafts	41,500	84,800	201.0
TOTALS	255,800 tons	291,750 tons	110.1

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(88) In October navigation on most river waterways was stopped. Shipping reports from the river systems of the Kama and Upper Volga were received only up to 8 October. At the southern River Shipping offices operations ceased somewhat later.

(89) River navigation during the navigation period of 1943 was quite inadequate. On the basis of messages it can be assumed that the transportation plan was only about two-thirds fulfilled. In spite of this fact, the actual output, considered absolutely, was significant. The transportation plans which are consolidated in Appendix 2 give an idea of the size of the transportation output.

C. Civil Air Fleet

(90) The Civil Air Fleet (Aero-Flot) was utilized not only for the transportation of passengers and post but also for the shipping of valuable or urgently required goods.

(91) According to radio messages, gold transport from Siberia was carried out. Frequently medicines were transported by air both for the front and to counter-act epidemic outbreaks in the epidemic areas. Important imports were also shipped by air. Each flight from Baku to Moscow had to carry at least 100 kilograms of air cargo from the branch office of Iransovtrans in Baku. Most of these cargoes were goods important for munitions. There were also cargoes for the NK's for Heavy Industry, Machine Industry and Tank Industry. The transportation of replacement parts for tanks was the most important. The airport at Kujbyshev, for example, was reported to have been used during the last ten days of December by transport planes solely for the shipping of repair parts. The centers for airborne supply of tank replacement parts were Kujbyshev, Saratov, and Gorkij. Monthly transportation plan for these airports during the first 20 days of September was fulfilled as follows:

Kujbyshev	68%
Saratov	37%
Gorkij	16%

(92) From June on there were also large sulphur shipments from Ashkhabad Rajon (Darvas).

(93) In Darvas the following shipments of sulphur were made:

On 1 August	10.2 tons
On 2 August	6.9 tons
" 11 August	20.5 tons
" 14 August	14.5 tons

For entire month of August 504.5 tons

(94) The Air Fleet had certain problems to cope with. From time to time, for example, fuel and lubricants were very scarce. Also the transportation of cargoes to the airports was not always punctual. Darvas reported that the local

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Ore Directorate was not punctual in delivering its cargoes so that the dispatch of these cargoes dropped about 50% in 3 days. All in all air transport appeared to operate better during the second half-year than the first half-year. The airport at Saratov reported that the September transportation plan had been fulfilled by 110%.

(95) As could be determined from messages, air traffic was to be expanded.

(96) The following airlines were identified in the second half-year:

Chelyabinsk - Salsk - Stavropol - Krasnodar

Baku - Alma-Ata - (For special sanitary purposes)

Kujbyshev - Kursk

Irkutsk - Moscow

Stalingrad - Astrakhan - Baku - Teheran

Tikhvin - Leningrad

Baku - Stalingrad - Saratov - Moscow

Pensa - Saratov - Astrakhan - Rostov - Krasnodar

Voronezh - Rostov - Krasnodar

Astrakhan - Groznyj - Baku

Tbilisi - Astrakhan - Tashkent - Zlatoust

Tikhvin - Khvojnaya

Stalingrad - Rostov - Stalino

Mineralnye Vody - Makhachkala - Baku - Tbilisi

Moscow - Saratov - Stalingrad

(97) All of the known lines of the Civil Air Fleet are indicated on the enclosed map.

4. Food Situation

A. Food Production

(98) The food situation in the Soviet Union was desperate during the first half-year of 1943. Since this year's harvest was only average, as could be determined from domestic radio traffic, a prompt, complete processing of the harvest was necessary. There were, therefore, great efforts made by the state

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to safeguard this harvest. By a decree of the Peoples' Commissariat of 18 July concerning the bringing in of the harvest and the procurement of agricultural products in 1943, these efforts were spelled out. First of all it was stated that the guarantee of food for the front and the home would be of maximum importance. State and party organs were strictly warned against repeating the previous year's errors in handling the harvest. Plans concerning the harvest and the delivery of the harvest were to be worked out. Labor forces, agricultural machines and fuel were to be available punctually. The problem of the labor force appeared to be the greatest difficulty to be overcome.

(99) The entire population capable of work was to be drafted for the harvest work; furthermore the personnel of branches of the economy other than agriculture were to be utilized as far as they could be withdrawn from their own agricultural work. The required number of technical personnel from the industrial plants were to be made available to the Machine-Tractor Stations (MTS) for the harvest. Any further shortage in the labor force required to bring in the harvest was to be made up by mobilizing the population of the cities. The city people were to give 45 to 50 days of work in the sovkhoses and 50 to 60 days in the kolkhozes. School children and youths were to give 15 to 20 days respectively to the sovkhoses and 20 to 30 days for the kolkhozes.

(100) In order to alleviate the shortage of agricultural machines, the exigencies of the harvest of grains and oil crops necessitated an intensive machine operation. The machines were to be operated not less than 16 hours a day during the harvest time. Threshing machines were to be operated at least 20 hours per day.

(101) In order to guarantee the processing of the grain and oil crops, the proper authorities were authorized to confiscate 50% of the trucks of civilian industry and 30% of the trucks of the war industry in order to transport the grain.

(102) The hay harvest should have been completed before the beginning of the grain harvest. The closing date for the grain harvest was set at 20 October. The potato and vegetable harvest was to be completed before the fall frost. 15% of the potatoes were to be used as seed potatoes. In many regions this figure was increased to 18% because the land sowed with potatoes was to be increased.

(103) To bring in the harvest, mainly women, Komsomol members and school children were utilized. Still the labor force was not adequate; oftentimes the military had to be utilized. Also the number of agricultural machines was not adequate as could be determined from the radio. Therefore, tractors and tractor drivers who had been sent into the liberated agricultural areas had to be recalled for harvest work. A shortage of fuels likewise often existed (See Oil Supply).

(104) Owing to numerous delays during the hay harvest, it overlapped the grain harvest which led to further difficulties. The following NKRF installations, among others, were behind schedule in the hay harvest:

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Blagoveshchensk	Gorkij
Yakutsk	Kirov
Omsk	Krasnodar
Novosibirsk	Zvenigovo
Uralsk	

(105) The following had good harvests:

Alma-Ata
Kustanaj
Rostov Oblast'

(106) An unsatisfactory grain harvest was reported by:

Aktyubinsk Oblast'	Kujbyshev-NKRF
Armavir	Majkop
Blagoveshchensk NKRF	Novosibirsk-NKRF
Kirov-NKRF	Saratov-NKRF
Krasnodar Kraj	Uralsk-NKRF
Leningrad Oblast'	

(107) In Leningrad the harvest was so poor that the entire product had to be used for seed purposes. In Krasnodar Kraj the same was true of the rice harvest. The millet harvest appeared to be especially bad; for example in Rostov Oblast' much of it was lost.

(108) The potato and vegetable harvest also did not appear to be especially good. Various NKRF installations reported poor harvest, e.g.: Gorkij, Irkutsk, Korenovka (sugar beets), Novosibirsk, Saratov.

(109) The poor harvest yields were in part due to the delay in harvest operations. In certain places the crop died in the fields. Progress at the secondary agricultural industries appeared to be especially poor such as at the sovkhoses of the NKRF. In a message from Moscow Central at the middle of September to all NKRF installations it was stated that the orders concerning the bringing in of the harvest were not being followed. The installations received the order to supervise their agricultural auxiliaries most strictly. The poor yields of the NKRF operations were due in part to faulty cultivation. The seeding plan for the harvest was only three-quarters fulfilled according to radio messages.

(110) There were increasing backlogs in the further processing of the harvest as a result of shortages in labor, machines, and fuels. The sovkhoses of the following NKRF installations were in arrears by the end of October by about 20% with the threshing: Gorkij, Ilijsk, Kirov, Krasnodar, Kujbyshev, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Saratov, Semipalatinsk, Stalingrad Oblast', Uralsk.

(111) Grain procurement suffered delays primarily because of a lack of transportation as there was a lack of trucks as well as railroad cars. The Red Army, therefore, had to supply itself with trucks. In Krasnodar, for example,

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the truck reserve of the NK for Defense and trucks belonging to the North Caucasus front were requisitioned. By the end of September and the beginning of October grain procurement had been fulfilled by only a third and in individual cases by one-half. Deliveries in September became less from week to week because of transportation difficulties. In Rostov Oblast' grain procurement was so deficient that grain for the supply of the civilian population had to be diverted from military supplies. Delays occurred in the following:

Blagoveshchensk	Omsk NKRF
Gorkij NKRF	Upper Volga Steamship Agency
Kujbyshev	Rostov Oblast'
Krasnodar Kraj	Stalino Oblast'
Makhachkala	Stavropol Oblast'
Molotov NKRF	Checheno Ingush
Novosibirsk NKRF	

(112) Ashkhabad Oblast' fulfilled its plan ahead of schedule. In Stavropol 700 railroad cars for the procurement of oil grains were lacking. Hay deliveries in Azerbajdzhan were 66 percent fulfilled by 15 September.

(113) Delivery of grain at the end of October was only fulfilled by 50 to 60 percent. A shortage of railroad cars was particularly noticeable here. In October the Stalingrad railway was to have furnished 1,927 railroad cars but by 12 October only 114 cars had been shipped. Since tens of thousands of tons of grain had been left at stations in the open, it was exposed to the danger of spoilage.

(114) The same difficulties existed in vegetable procurement as with grain. The following NKRF offices were behind schedule:

Gorkij	Novosibirsk
Kujbyshev	Omsk
Molotov	Upper Volga Steamship Agency

(115) In general, vegetable deliveries were better than grain deliveries. Vegetable deliveries from Armenia by the end of October had been fulfilled by about 75 percent, i. e., about 11,400 tons had been delivered against a plan of 15,400 tons. 1,600 tons of this was to be used for cultivation. Moreover, Armenia had not consumed quite so many potatoes, about 10,800 tons. The Vegetable and Fruit Trade Office of Turkmenistan fulfilled deliveries through the beginning of October by 85 percent, i. e., about 14,900 tons had been delivered instead of 17,100 tons. The Vegetable and Fruit Trade Office of Azerbajdzhan by the beginning of October had fulfilled the plan by 115 percent, i. e., 14,000 tons (?) had been shipped.

(116) The Georgian Republic fulfilled the yearly plan for vegetables and potatoes as follows:

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Commodity	Tonnage	Percent of Plan
Fresh potatoes	8,916 tons	81.
Fresh vegetables	10,797	63.
Dried potatoes & vegetables	898	51.
Dried fruits	186	46.
Salted tomatoes	814	148.
Salted cucumbers	543	194.

(117) The consumers' union of Dagestan had not adequately fulfilled established deliveries of potatoes and vegetables for the Red Army. 44 percent of the potato deliveries and 32 percent of the vegetable deliveries had been made.

(118) Procurement of oil grains also suffered under the general difficulties. For example, in Stavropol through 5 November the following percentages of plan had been achieved:

24 percent	Sunflower seeds
26 percent	Castor seeds
28 percent	Mustard seeds
18 percent	Flaxseed
5 percent	Soybeans

(119) In several oblasti government reserve funds were established. About 10 percent of the grain procured, mainly wheat, barley, millets, and oats were to be transferred to these reserves. Because of the grain shortage, difficulties often arose. Thus, Rostov, where 184,000 tons of grain had been prepared by the middle of October, was to deliver 18,400 tons to these reserves. They could deliver, however, only 14,300 tons. Fulfillment of the planned delivery was possible only if reserves on hand for the army were drawn upon. Similar reserves of fodder, preserved fish, and other foods were also set up.

(120) Because the harvest was behind schedule, delays also resulted in autumn deliveries. There were also not enough serviceable agricultural machines because after the harvest many tractors and agricultural machinery had to be repaired. In the sovkhozes of the Krasnodar Rajon 409 tractors had to be overhauled out of a total of 593. The NK for the Meat and Dairy Industry in Rostov announced at the beginning of November that the unsatisfactory deliveries from its holdings were caused by a lack of tractors. Only 7 to 10 out of a total of 25 were in service. Repair of the others was impossible because of a lack of spare parts. There seemed to be no exception to this because, according to radio-press reports, large quantities of spare parts for agriculture machines had been ordered. Fulfillment of this order was given a military priority. Plowing the fields was accordingly in arrears. For example, by the middle of October in the Krasnodar Kraj instead of 1,300 hectares only 154 had been plowed, and in Rostov-on-Don instead of 3,000 hectares only 2,000 had been plowed. According to the press, as reported by radio, Novosibirsk, Kujbyshev and Kirov Oblasti, as well as the Bashkir Republic were particularly behind schedule.

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(121) As a result of the only average harvest, a widespread lack of seed grain arose. Thus there was a lack of seed grain in Krasnodar Kraj, in Armavir and in Rostov. For example, the Sovkhoz Directorate in Rostov required 2,000 tons of seed grain, but could receive only 155 tons from the Grain Directorate and 1,100 tons from government reserves, so that Rostov Oblast' (?) required 3,000 tons but could receive only 2,000 tons.

(122) According to a press report, sowing winter grain was accelerated in the rajons of the liberated oblasti of Kharkov, Sumy and Poltava. The grain was said to be growing well.

(123) Fishing was also emphasized in the second half year. There was an attempt to utilize even more extensively this food reserve. The Azov-Black Sea Fishing Industry was to increase its catch in November from 70 tons per working day to 100 tons (in September the catch was about 1,750 tons). Inasmuch as fishing was undertaken as an auxiliary function by the NKRF, results were poor. In the first 8 months of 1943 NKRF offices fulfilled the yearly plan as follows:

8% Khabarovsk	50% Ust-Usa
15% Gorodets Mechanical Plant	5% Raznezhe
28% Gorodets Shipyard	11% Chkalovsk
11% Water Transport Base, Gorodets	6% Yakutsk
	67% Molotov

B. Food Processing

(124) Flour and food production could not be accomplished on the planned scale. As a result of transportation difficulties particularly in the case of wheat, the necessity arose to utilize other grain for baking bread. In the Checheno-Ingush Republic millets had to be processed for flour instead of wheat. The grain mills in Millerovo and Tarasovka which were to produce 500 tons of flour monthly from wheat and millets received only barley. More often there were production standstills at the grain mills because of a lack of sacks. Thus, the grain mill in Rostov lacked 25,000 sacks, so that flour could not be shipped. Millerovo required 100,000 sacks and Tarasovka 80,000 sacks. The latter mills had to cease operations because of a lack of twine and sacks.

(125) A small mill in Nikolaevsk (Rostov Oblast') reported fulfillment of the monthly plan for flour production as follows:

In October	363 tons flour	=	186 percent
In November	229 tons flour	=	121 percent

(126) Because of the flour shortage, macaroni production was beset with great difficulties. Conditions were especially difficult in the period before flour from the new harvest was ready. Many plants had to cease operations in August, September and December because of insufficient flour deliveries, as for instance, the Macaroni Industry in Krasnodar and Armavir. Nevertheless, an increase in production was ordered by the government.

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(127) Potato and vegetable storage by the NKRF did not correspond to plan. Molotov had stored only 300 tons of potatoes instead of 3,000 tons, Omsk instead of 1,400 tons only 100 tons, and the Upper-Volga Steamship Agency instead of 1,500 tons only 500 tons. Gorodets and Raznezhe also had stored too few potatoes for the winter. The NKRF Chief Directorate in Moscow threatened serious measures.

(128) The Food Industry seemed to be better supplied with vegetables because fulfillment of the planned amounts of preserved vegetables were often reported; for instance, in the Preserves Industry, Derbent, Krasnovodsk and the NK for Trade in Erevan.

(129) Vegetable conservation suffered particularly a lack of containers at the agricultural sub-enterprises of the NKRF. Uralsk NKRF expected a harvest of 200 tons of cucumbers, but had the capacity to salt only 25 tons. Saratov NKRF, Stalingrad NKRF and the Sovkhoz "Vodnik" at Balakhovo, as well as the Food Industry in Baku urgently required barrels. The Preserves Trust of Dagestan in Makhachkala also was very badly supplied with barrels. In the barrel factories only 20 barrels were produced daily instead of 200. Through September the Preserves Industry in Krasnodar had received barrels for only 500 tons instead of 3,700 tons. As the production of vats, barrels, and other tools for purposes of the Preserves Industry progressed very slowly, part of the vegetables procured were lost or had to be sold on the free market.

(130) The Vegetable and Fish Preserve Industries also suffered a partial lack of salt. This was caused by the great needs of the Food Industry after the harvest which the Transportation Industry could not keep up with. For this reason, shipments of salt in excess of plan had to be made.

(131) The Salt Industry otherwise fulfilled its work according to plan. From the seas of Manych 6,130 tons of salt were extracted through 20 October. This was the largest extraction in years. An overall shortage of salt did not exist as it did in the case of sugar which had to be imported in large quantities (see Foreign Trade). At the end of November and the beginning of December the sugar factory in Gulkevichi was forced to cease operations because of a lack of sugar beets. The sugar factories in Rostov were also forced to close down operations in November because of a lack of sugar. Thus, supply of sugar to the miners and to the Armaments Industry was placed in doubt. In December several food enterprises in Groznyj also had to cease operations.

(132) According to an order the production of dried vegetables was to be greatly increased. Workers needed for this production increase were to be trained.

(133) The production of fruit preserves suffered difficulties as a result of the sugar shortage. In September, for example, the Preserves Trust in Oktembryan was forced to cease production, while at the same time deliveries of fruit increased. Likewise, the Preserves Industry in Khachinsk lacked sugar.

(134) Production of fat largely did not keep up with requirements. In Armenia, there was apparently a regression compared to the previous year. The Armenian NK for the Meat and Dairy Industry in Erevan had purchased 1,250 tons

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of milk in the year 1942 for the production of butter and cheese. In the first 9 months of 1943, only 180 tons (about 20 percent) had been received. In the liberated territories production of butter and cheese actually rose, but still did not meet needs. A production increase was therefore ordered for the fourth quarter. The offices of the NK for the Meat and Dairy Industry in Krasnodar and Pyatigorsk did not provide sufficient butter. Instead of 500 tons of butter, they could deliver only 250 tons to government reserves in Rostov. The Meat and Dairy Sales office in Pyatigorsk did not even approach completion of delivery contracts for fat. The Preserves Factory in Makhachkala ceased operations because of a lack of fat. However, the three dairies in Leningrad fulfilled the plan.

(135) Salad oil plants primarily processed the following as oil grain:

Sunflower seeds
Flax seeds
Mustard seeds
Castor seeds

(136) Vegetable fat production was more unsatisfactory than production of animal fat. The Fat Combine in Leningrad produced only 70 percent of plan during the second ten-day period of October and the Fat Combine in Krasnodar only about 50 percent (80 tons of oil grain processed daily). Many plants such as the plant in Belorechenskaya had to cease operations because of a lack of raw material. The oil factories in Krasnodar Kraĭ, for example, in Novomikhajlovsk and Nikolaevsk ceased operations. The inadequate production was caused by a lack of oil grain. Sunflower seeds seem to be especially scarce. In Krasnodar, the target of grain procurement for delivery to Stavropol was reduced from 10,000 tons of sunflower seeds to 5,000 tons. The NK for Agriculture in Rostov reported in November that it had a total of 524 tons from the year's harvest and from stocks, but required 4,200 tons (in the case of Rostov it must be considered that it is a military region).

(137) As a result of the fat shortage, new methods for obtaining salad oils had to be developed in the Soviet Union. In margarine factories, cotton oil was widely processed. In Georgia, production of salad oil from peach pits was begun. The pits were delivered in large quantities from the preserves factories. According to a radio message from Leningrad, the Northwest Fisheries there had undertaken experimental work on the derivation of vitamin-containing cod liver oil from sticklebacks. Industrial production of 30 tons yearly was to be achieved.

(138) The limited vegetable fat production resulted in a shortage of oil cakes. The oil plant in Rostov could not deliver the required 600 tons of oil cakes to the sovkhozes of the Oblast'. If they were not delivered in January or February, it was expected that cattle would die in large quantities.

(139) As a result of general transportation difficulties, large quantities of oil grain and oil cakes were stored in the open air. They were therefore exposed to the danger of spoilage.

(140) Meat production was likewise inadequate. Whether the principal

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reason for this was the shortage of cattle or the transportation difficulties was not apparent because there were as many reports about insufficient production as about insufficient stocks.

C. Food Supply

(141) Food rations for the period from 1 November 1943 to 1 May 1944 were announced to plants. Compared to the preceding period, allocations were not basically changed. Apparently the Soviets had two basic categories and several special categories. Rations for the first worker category (?) were as follows: (by man and month)

2,200 grams meat or fish
600 grams fat
500 grams sugar or sugar goods
1,500 grams peeled grain or macaroni
800 grams bread (daily)
500 grams bread (in liberated regions)

(142) An addition for a second warm meal for workers (per man per month) is as follows:

1,500 grams meat or fish
300 grams fat
1,500 grams peeled grain or macaroni

(143) These food rations were given to heavy workers, engineers and all workers engaged in reconstruction work. Included, moreover, were war wounded from the "War of the Fatherland" who were at home. Workers in the Felt-processing Industry also received this ration.

(144) Workers in the second workers category received the following (per man per month):

1,800 grams meat or fish
400 grams fat
400 grams sugar or sugar goods
1,200 grams peeled grain or macaroni
600 grams bread (daily)
500 grams bread (daily in the liberated territories)

(145) This amount of food was the normal allotment for industrial and transport workers and for leaders and teachers in children's homes. It applied also for workers in all NKRF offices and for students in technical and specialized schools. Workers in the second category also received a warm lunch.

(146) Workers in the Oil Industry who were engaged in drilling operations received the following (per man per month):

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- 4,500 grams meat or fish
- 900 grams fat
- 500 grams sugar or sugar goods
- 3,000 grams (?) peeled grain or macaroni
- 12,000 grams potatoes
- 1,000 grams bread (daily)

(147) Food rations for the second warm meal are apparently included in these figures.

(148) Workers in the Meat Industry received an additional ration of 1,500 grams meat and 2,000 grams of other foods per man per month. Workers in dairy enterprises received an additional ration of 300 grams of animal fat and 3,000 grams of milk products per man per month.

(149) The following food norms were established for engineers who were engaged in especially heavy work (per man per month):

- 3,200 grams meat or fish
- 900 grams fat
- 2,000 grams peeled grain or macaroni

(150) The extent to which vegetables were to be stored may be understood from a message from Kujbyshev NKRF in which it was stated that 60 kilograms of potatoes and 100 kilograms of vegetables per worker were to be stored for the winter.

(151) From 1 September on, pupils in all children's homes and boarding schools received the following food rations (per child per month):

- 1,500 grams meat or fish
- 500 grams fat
- 200 grams cheese
- 300 grams cream
- 500 grams sugar or sugar goods
- 1,500 grams peeled grain or macaroni
- 750 grams flour
- 60 grams tea or coffee
- 60 grams chocolate
- 400 grams salt
- 300 grams dried fruit
- 7,500 grams potatoes and vegetables
- 500 grams bread (daily)
- 3 liters milk
- 15 eggs

(152) In spite of the unchanged food rations, bread supply in the second half year seemed to be shorter than in the first half year. Many workers did not receive the allotments to which they were entitled. The workers of the Oil Industry who were entitled to 800 grams of bread daily received only 700 grams. Workers

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in shipyards who received 600 grams of bread had to be refused an authorized increase. The extensive bread shortage resulting from continually unsatisfactory deliveries was a phenomenon which existed in all regions. The situation in the re-occupied territories was even worse - the bread ration there, as far as could be determined, was set at 500 grams daily. Transport difficulties increased the shortage considerably. A special problem was the supply to the large cities in the liberated territories. This question was to be considered in July at a conference called in Alma Ata.

(153) In the North and Transcaucasus a pronounced bread shortage existed. Communications indicated this from the Georgian, Armenian, North Ossetian, Dagestan and Checheno-Ingush Republics as well as from Rostov Oblast'. In October North Ossetia was provided with only 365 tons of flour by the Grain Delivery Office in Stavropol instead of 700 tons. In October Rostov was to have baked 8,050 tons of bread. Flour stocks, however, were sufficient for only 6,000 tons. The Wine Sovkhozes in Rostov Oblast' in November received a flour allotment for their workers of only 60%. Flour deliveries to the open market in November were reduced despite the shortages as follows:

Georgia (Tbilisi)	to 825 tons
Checheno-Ingush (Groznyj)	to 135 tons
Dagestan (Makhachkala)	to 205 tons
Armenia (Erevan)	to 345 tons
North Ossetia (Ordzhonikidze)	to 980 tons

(154) These quantities did not afford full supply. North Ossetia required an additional 320 tons since their authorized 980 tons had not materialized. Tbilisi also required large additional amounts. At the Oil Industry in Groznyj great difficulties in supplying bread to the workers arose since the local grain procurement offices had no stocks of wheat or barley. Erevan was directed to purchase sufficient bread grain to cover their own needs at cotton sovkhozes. Difficulties had not reduced by the end of the year--they seemed to have become even greater. For half a year offices of the Stalingrad Railway in Salsk had received allotments of flour very irregularly because Rostov could not meet its supply obligations. For this reason families of the personnel were no longer issued bread after 21 December. In Groznyj great difficulties existed in supplying the population with bread. In December bread ration cards for 3,600 persons were not issued. In Tbilisi even the children's schools did not have sufficient bread. Supply was even worse in the recently liberated parts of the Ukraine.

(155) In order to alleviate the bread shortage, other kinds of grain were used as bread grains, or were supplemented by, among other things, potatoes. In Checheno-Ingush in October and November bread was produced from flour ground from millets and corn. The quality of this bread was poor. Therefore, some wheat and barley was included. A great deal of bread was baked with flour ground from millets and barley. In Georgia and Dagestan bread from flour and potatoes was produced. The Dagestan Republic announced in October that even potatoes for bread baking and as a substitute for the missing bread as well as peeled grain were not on hand. Conditions were similar in Checheno-Ingush since Groznyj received an order in December to produce bread from flour and potatoes for the

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Red Army also with the note that if there were not enough potatoes on hand, bread from pure flour was to be produced. In Krasnodar Krai large amounts of sunflower stalks were ground up to be used as an additive in the production of bread. All NKRF offices and enterprises were ordered that in the allotment of 800 grams of bread 100 grams of potatoes were to be mixed in. From this it seemed that there was a wide shortage of potatoes but grain was even scarcer.

(156) Foods such as macaroni and groats were likewise scarce as was reported in radio messages from Moscow, Tbilisi and Rostov. Peeled grain was especially scarce so that often only a third of the expected quantity could be allotted.

(157) As a result of a lack of railroad cars or a cessation of operations of the River Fleet, large quantities of shipments piled up in the fall. They were exposed to danger of frost and spoilage. Even shipments for the front were included here. At plants and offices of the Upper, Middle and Lower Volga Steamship Agencies, for example, there was a great lack of potatoes which made import from other regions necessary, such as from Novosibirsk. Leningrad received from Penza only about 60% of the expected 5,000 tons of potatoes in October. Rostov Oblast¹ required import of at least 10,000 tons of potatoes for workers in enterprises important to the war effort. As a result of difficulties in transporting fresh potatoes, harvested potatoes had to be partially dried. Ashkhabad also reported that in Turkmenistan there were no potatoes on hand.

(158) Supply of vegetables to NKRF personnel in the fall was very insufficient.

(159) According to radio messages, planned meat supplies were imperiled by insufficient imports. The supply to the liberated territories was progressing particularly badly. Mainly preserved meat was sent into these regions for supply. In Kharkov and Rostov, for example, there was a lack of meat. According to Rostov, from 1 through 20 October 15 tons of cattle were delivered, whereas for the fourth quarter 1,100 tons were expected. Supplies for the miners were therefore endangered. Rostov requested permission to draw 30 tons of beef from the reserve fund. In spite of these difficulties, the Livestock Procurement Office in Rostov was to make 900 pigs available to the kolkhozes in the liberated territories.

(160) As a substitute for meat, the Meat Combine in Rostov undertook successful attempts to produce meatless cutlets from albumen-containing plants with a mixture of 30% to 50% grape husks. Mass production of this article was immediately undertaken. In November and December 200,000 pieces were produced. Ten tons of grape husks were required for December.

(161) Fish Supply exhibited the same difficulties. In the third quarter (?) Krasnodar was to receive 100 tons of fish products to supply coal workers, but up through 5 September only 10 tons had been shipped. The trust of the Tea Sovkhoz in Tbilisi was to receive 96 tons of fish in the third quarter, but by 5 September only 29 tons had been shipped. In Kislyar, where at the beginning of December food difficulties had occurred, 50 tons of fish were urgently needed.

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(162) The tobacco harvest in Krasnodar Kraj was 44% completed by the planned deadline of 10 October. Up to this date, 13.3% or 800 tons had been procured. Trucks had to be obtained from the Army for transport from the kolkhozes. In Georgia the harvest was 84.4% fulfilled by 1 November; by that date 5,700 tons or 36.3% of the plan had been procured. There was an effort to complete the harvest and procurement operations by the end of the year. The lack of trucks made sufficient supply to the tobacco factories impossible. The Tobacco Industry in Tbilisi, for example, had received no raw tobacco and therefore, in the first ten-day period in December could make no shipments to the Army. As a result of a lack of raw tobacco, the tobacco factory in Erevan ceased operation in October. Finished products could not be shipped.

D. Reconstruction of Agriculture in the Liberated Regions

(163) Agricultural reconstruction in the parts of the Ukraine liberated during the second half of 1943 produced new problems for the government. In a decree of 22 August 1943 on the "reconstruction of agriculture in the liberated regions" these questions were considered. The following measures were to be taken:

1) Return of evacuated livestock to the re-established kolkhozes in the oblasti and kraï in which reconstruction was to be undertaken. In detail, the following were to be received (by head):

	<u>Horned Cattle</u>	<u>Sheep & Goats</u>	<u>Horses</u>
Kalinin Oblast'	36,573	31,144	8,454
Smolensk Oblast'	48,349	31,413	6,907
Orel Oblast'	21,399	39,668	8,375
Kursk Oblast'	2,529	5,492	1,182
Voronezh Oblast'	9,539	20,228	3,774
Stalingrad Oblast'	14,530	34,379	1,749
Rostov Oblast'	51,506	143,188	17,229
Stavropol Oblast'	12,741	35,909	5,269
	197,166	341,421	52,939

(164) The evacuated livestock was located in the following oblasti and republics:

Yaroslavl Oblast'	Mordvinian Autonomous Republic
Gorkij Oblast'	Mary
Vologda Oblast'	Dagestan
Kirov Oblast'	Kazakhstan Republic
Ryazan Oblast'	Azerbajdzhan
Tambov Oblast'	Armenia
Saratov Oblast'	
Chkalov Oblast'	
Kujbyshev Oblast'	

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(165) The NK for Agriculture was charged with the responsibility for return of the livestock. Livestock was to have arrived in the Kalinin, Smolensk, Kursk, Orel and Tula Oblasti by 1 October 1943 and in the other parts by 15 October. Through trains for livestock transport, measures for foddering, water supply and veterinary services were determined and the construction of river fords and the furnishing of the necessary number of herd drivers, as well as milkmaids, were provided for. To meet the costs, 11.5 million rubles were authorized. Construction of winter quarters for the cattle had to be carried out. Moreover, in the freed territories, schools for training cattle breeders and veterinarians had to be set up.

2) Increase in numbers of livestock at kolkhozes:

(166) The oblasti and republics listed above were permitted to increase their numbers of livestock by purchase. The following purchase plans were established (by head):

	<u>Calves</u>	<u>Lambs</u>
Kalinin Oblast'	20,000	30,000
Smolensk Oblast'	3,000	3,000
Orel Oblast'	5,000	10,000
Kursk Oblast'	7,000	5,000
Voronezh Oblast'	15,000	5,000
Stalingrad Oblast'	20,000	15,000
Rostov Oblast'	15,000	20,000
Stavropol Oblast'	6,000	10,000
Krasnodar Oblast'	<u>15,000</u>	<u>10,000</u>
	99,000	113,000

(167) The livestock was to be purchased in the years 1943 through 1945 from the NK for Agriculture and placed at the disposal of the liberated territories. According to an order of 15 September 1943 from the Council of Peoples' Commissars, by 1 November 1943,

55,000 Pigs
165,000 Sheep
17,000 Goats

were to have been delivered to the kolkhozes in the liberated territories for the purpose of increasing the raising of pigs, sheep and goats. This livestock was to be delivered as follows:

	<u>Pigs</u>	<u>Sheep</u>	<u>Goats</u>
Kalinin Oblast'	10,000	20,000	1,000
Smolensk Oblast'	15,000	30,000	2,000
Orel Oblast'	9,000	20,000	2,000
Kursk Oblast'	5,000	25,000	2,500

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	<u>Pigs</u>	<u>Sheep</u>	<u>Goats</u>
Voronezh Oblast ¹	10,000	25,000	2,500
Stalingrad Oblast ¹	-	15,000	2,000
Ukraine Republic	6,000	30,000	5,000

(168) In order to avoid further transport and to accomplish the transfer of livestock as quickly as possible, the NK for the Meat and Dairy Industry as well as the NK for sovkhoses were to furnish 25,000 pigs and 115,000 sheep from their own economy and stocks. This livestock was to be replaced later from that purchased.

(169) The kolkhozes were to pay for the livestock received in agricultural products in the years 1943 and 1944 and in exceptional cases in 1945.

(170) The Georgian NK for Agriculture and the offices of the NK for Agriculture in Krasnodar reported the following total numbers of livestock by 1 January 1945:

The Georgian NK for Agriculture:

29,300 horses	
650,000 horned cattle	including: 100,000 cows 365,000 working oxen
1,400,000 sheep and goats	including: 825,000 breeders
66,000 pigs	including: 20,000 breeders
300,000 head of poultry	

The NK for Agriculture in Krasnodar Kraj:

64,900 horses	
256,600 horned cattle	including: 51,000 cows 49,500 working oxen
1,120,000 sheep and goats	including: 635,000 breeders
1,100,000 head of poultry	
95,000 pigs	including: 29,000 breeders

(171) The estimate of livestock raising requirements in Rostov Oblast¹ had to be changed because the number of livestock returning from evacuation had been computed too high. Moreover, the difficult fodder situation had to be considered more than before. The new plan calls for the following large livestock, small livestock and horses to be reached by 1 January 1945:

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including: 44,000 head of horses
230,000 head of large cattle
35,000 head of cows
60,000 head of working oxen

including: 480,000 head of sheep and goats
250,000 head of breeding sheep

including: 40,000 head of pigs
9,000 head of breeders

1,000,000 head of poultry
4,000 head foals
38,000 head of young bulls

3) Re-establishment of poultry raising in kolkhozes:

(172) In the years 1943 and 1944 all former poultry farms of the kolkhozes are to be re-established. By 1 January 1945 numbers of poultry were to reach the following levels (by head):

Kalinin Oblast'	400,000
Smolensk Oblast'	150,000
Orel Oblast'	150,000
Kursk Oblast'	250,000
Voronezh Oblast'	800,000
Stalingrad Oblast'	550,000
Rostov Oblast'	1,000,000
Stavropol Oblast'	1,100,000
Krasnodar Oblast'	<u>1,100,000</u>
Total	5,500,000

(173) In order to facilitate the re-establishment of the poultry farms, the NK's for Agriculture, for Sovkhozes and for the Meat and Dairy Industry were obliged to deliver 500,000 head of poultry in September and October 1943. Moreover, the NK for Agriculture was obliged to deliver 9,600,000 chickens in the year 1944 as follows:

Kalinin Oblast'	400,000
Smolensk Oblast'	70,000
Orel Oblast'	80,000
Kursk Oblast'	150,000
Voronezh Oblast'	1,800,000
Stalingrad Oblast'	1,100,000
Rostov Oblast'	2,000,000
Stavropol Oblast'	2,000,000
Krasnodar Oblast'	2,000,000

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(174) The kolkhoz farmers were permitted to purchase young fowl from the poultry farms after the latter had been completely supplied. By the end of 1944, 55 brooding houses were to be re-established as follows:

	<u>1943</u>	<u>1944</u>
Kalinin Oblast'	-	3
Smolensk Oblast'	1	2
Orel Oblast'	-	7
Kursk Oblast'	-	13
Voronezh Oblast'	6	-
Stalingrad Oblast'	6	-
Rostov Oblast'	2	2
Stavropol Oblast'	6	-
Krasnodar Kraj	5	2

(175) 200 brooders each with a capacity of 30,000 eggs were to be established for the first half of 1944. The NK for Agriculture was to receive 16,000,000 eggs, broken down as follows:

7,000,000 eggs from the NK for the Meat and Dairy Industry
5,000,000 eggs from the Central Union
4,000,000 eggs from poultry farms

The kolkhozes were authorized to accept chickens on the condition that in 1945 eggs would be returned.

4) Allowances in deliveries.

(176) Kolkhozes, kolkhoz farmers, individual farmers, workers, temporary workers and craftsmen who had been injured by the German occupation could be released from all agricultural deliveries to the State in the year 1943. Otherwise, kolkhozes of oblasti liberated after 1 July 1943 were to furnish the following amounts of grain and sunflowers to the Red Army Bread Reserve (per hectare):

	<u>Grain</u>	<u>Sunflowers</u>
Kalinin Oblast'	40 kg	-
Smolensk Oblast'	50	-
Orel Oblast'	70	-
Kursk Oblast'	70	120 kg
Ukraine Republic	90	150

(177) Kolkhozes of oblasti liberated in 1943 had to deliver potatoes and vegetables from that year's harvest to the Red Army as follows (per hectare):

	<u>Potatoes</u>	<u>Vegetables</u>
Kalinin Oblast'	0.6 tons	1.2 tons
Smolensk Oblast'	0.7	1.0

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	<u>Potatoes</u>	<u>Vegetables</u>
Orel Oblast'	0.7 tons	1.6 tons
Kursk Oblast'	0.6	1.2
Voronezh Oblast'	0.7	1.4
Stalingrad Oblast'	0.4	1.0
Rostov Oblast'	0.4	1.4
Stavropol Oblast'	0.6	1.6
Krasnodar Kraj	0.7	1.8
Ukraine Republic	0.5	1.8

Hay also had to be delivered to the Red Army Reserve.

(178) Kolkhoz farmers, workers, temporary employees and organized artisans in the oblasti concerned had to deliver 10 percent more than the kolkhozes. As far as they possessed livestock, each also had to deliver 15 kilograms of meat (liveweight) and 50 to 60 liters of milk to the Red Army. Individual farmers and non-organized artisans had to deliver 30 percent more of everything than the kolkhozes (30 percent more meat and milk than the quantities cited above).

(179) As a result of the lowered delivery quotas, the kolkhozes of Kursk Oblast', for instance, had to deliver only 66,000 tons from the 1943 harvest instead of the 148,000 tons grain expected. Old delivery debts were cancelled.

5) Auxiliary Measures for the Kolkhozes with Respect to the Seed Supply.

(180) In order to guarantee the winter sowing plan, the kolkhozes were to receive 174,500 tons of seed grain from government stocks itemized as follows:

Smolensk Oblast'	3,000 tons
Voronezh Oblast'	26,000 tons
Stalingrad Oblast'	29,000 tons
Rostov Oblast'	20,000 tons
Stavropol Oblast'	46,000 tons
Krasnodar Kraj	33,000 tons
Ukraine Republic	12,000 tons
Kursk Oblast'	5,000 tons

(181) Radio messages on the return of livestock indicated that the return of herds in some instances was progressing well. For example, in October 122,900 head of livestock were to be driven from Zhanybek towards Rostov. By 16 October 118,800 head of livestock had actually been driven including:

32,200 head horned cattle
79,000 head sheep
7,600 head horses

By the end of October the herds were approaching West Kazakhstan.

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(182) The livestock herds were to reach the Volga before the beginning of winter so that they could be transported further by water. However, long delays resulted en route at various river-crossing points. The scale of these crossing operations may be understood from the following reports:

The Lower-Volga Steamship Agency had constructed four crossing-points in September, the largest at Kamyshin. On 14 September the following were ferried across there:

1,200 head horned cattle
8,100 head sheep
2,400 head horses

From 1 to 7 October the following were ferried across at Stalingrad:

6,500 head horned cattle
22,900 head sheep
3,800 head horses

(183) By 1 November Baku had completed delivery of livestock to the assembly points. Further transport, however, was progressing very slowly. The following were transported further by rail or by towboat:

<u>Rostov Oblast'</u>		<u>Stavropol Oblast'</u>
1,100 head	horned cattle	7,100 head
1,500 head	sheep and goats	4,200 head
400 head	horses	250 head

(184) The plan for Rostov was fulfilled by 100 percent. The following were procured for Stavropol:

1,000 head horned cattle
1,400 head sheep and goats
400 (?) horses

There were no railroad cars for further transport of this livestock.

(185) The slaughterhouse in Krasnodar announced that the assignment for delivery of 1,200 pigs for the liberated regions had been fulfilled. 1,230 head of sheep had been procured for shipping. As a result of a shortage of railroad cars, only 460 head of sheep could be shipped to the Ukraine through 28 October. On 9 October 6,800 head of livestock, including 2,000 head of goats were to be shipped from the Armenian NK for Agriculture to the liberated regions. As a result of the railroad car shortage, however, the goats could not be shipped.

(186) As a result of these difficulties, not only delays occurred but also actual loss of livestock. At the Kyudamir station the assembled livestock had to be left in the open in the rain because there were no railroad cars. Both men and livestock became sick; many calves died. In the Elton rajon in Stalingrad Oblast' 8,000 head of sheep had to be placed in quarantine; 300 head of horned

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cattle were already in quarantine. At many railroad stations in the Azerbajdzhan Republic many shipments of livestock were held up. Because of the cold and a shortage of fodder, additional loss of livestock resulted. The accompanying personnel also became sick.

(187) The following reports give information on the construction of other agricultural buildings and installations:

Offices of the NK for Procurement in Krasnodar Kraj and Voroshilovgrad Oblast' were given reconstruction assignments for the year 1944 listed below. The following were to be prepared:

- Krasnodar Kraj:
- 1) 2 mills each with a production capacity of 40 tons flour daily, 1 mill of 50 tons capacity and 1 mill of 30 tons capacity;
 - 2) Grain silos in:
Kurganaya of 0.9 ton storage capacity,
Grechishkino of 0.9 ton storage capacity,
Kushevskaya of 4.0 tons storage capacity, and
Ust-Labinskaya of 4.0 tons storage capacity,
and others.
 - 3) Larger grain storehouses, some with a capacity of 40,000 tons.

- Voroshilovgrad:
- 1) 1 mill with a production capacity of 50 tons of flour daily.
 - 2) Grain warehouses with a storage capacity totalling 48,000 tons.
 - 3) Grain storehouses with a storage capacity totalling 50,000 tons.

(188) For the construction of tractor workshops, tractor stations and tractor repair shops in the liberated regions of the Ukraine, the following construction material was procured:

1,100 cu. meters	round timber
1,100 cu. meters	cut timber
25 cu. meters	plywood
7,000 sq. meters	glass
180 rolls	roofing board
34.0 tons	cement
7.0 tons	nails
1.8 tons	varnish
1.3 tons	red lead
0.5 ton	ground chalk

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(189) The Oblast' Consumers Union in Poltava was to receive 1,026 tons of cement for the construction of warehouses. The Baku Cement Plant was to deliver about 1,300 tons of cement to the Central Union for construction of grain warehouses by the beginning of December.

(190) The North Ossetian Republic was contracted to procure 60,000 tons of coarse livestock fodder. By 30 November 1943, 40,000 tons had been prepared, including 34,450 tons of hay and 5,650 tons of straw. The livestock on hand at the kolkhozes had a requirement of 3,200 tons of coarse livestock fodder. 3,400 tons had been procured on winter pastures.

(191) Livestock quarters were required for the following:

4,800 head of horses
8,700 head of large cattle
35,500 head of sheep
800 head of pigs
6,600 head of poultry

Winter livestock quarters at the kolkhozes either already existing or furnished for the following:

4,540 head of horses
8,200 head of large cattle
33,000 head of sheep
760 head of pigs
6,600 head of poultry

(192) The Oblast' Agricultural Supply Office in Rostov received the following in December:

120		reapers
128		mowers
87		sorting machines
200		horse-drawn plows
50		tractor-drawn plows
2	railroad cars	asbestos sheets
2	railroad cars	cement
23	railroad cars	cut timber
14	railroad cars	round timber
2	railroad cars	glass
1,400	kilograms	varnish

(193) Many radio messages indicated that during agricultural reconstruction in the liberated territories, the re-establishment of the food industry was likewise ordered (for further details see Reconstruction).

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SECURITY INFORMATION**5. Metal Supply**

(194) Iron supply in the economy during the second half year was very short. Conditions at the NKRF as well as in the economy of the Trans-caucasas, Donbas and Leningrad Oblast' were about the same. As far as can be determined from internal radio traffic, during the third quarter wide scale cessation of operations at industrial enterprises had not yet occurred. In the fourth quarter, however, a larger number of plants were forced to cease operations because of a lack of raw material.

(195) In detail the supply of metals and metal products was as follows: In July Kujbyshev NKRF urgently needed cast iron and ferrosilicon for its foundries which were charged with important contracts. The rolling mill of the Heavy Machine Industry in Irkutsk had ceased operations because it had no raw material. There was also a partial lack of tools. Hatchets and saws, which could not be delivered, were needed at Omsk NKRF. There was an attempt to produce these items on the spot, as well as to rebuild files.

(196) In August the Ship Repair and Shipbuilding Industries (see corresponding sections) were plagued by the iron shortage. The NKRF workshops in Alekseevka did not receive the iron which had been ordered for repairs. A dock was also to be constructed there for which the required steel plates were missing. As a result of a lack of wire rope, the Manganese Trust in Chiaturi had to cease construction of a funicular railway.

(197) In September a rapidly increasing lack of cast iron was noted. In Leningrad it was so serious that even armaments contracts suffered; in Baku and Tbilisi also there was a shortage of iron. The iron works in Novotagil and Novotulsk did not fulfill their deliveries.

(198) In October radio traffic revealed a pronounced worsening in supply compared to the preceding months so that many plants had to cease work, including the metal plant "Oktyabr" in Krasnodar, the plant "Krasnyj Metallist" and "Dzerzhinsk" in Baku. At the beginning of October the copper rolling mill in Tbilisi had to interrupt its operations. The plant "Novikov" in Leningrad could not fulfill its contract because of a lack of copper and the light industry plants in Baku could continue operations only with interruptions because of a lack of brass wire. They were to receive brass wire imported from Iransovtrans (see Foreign Trade).

(199) The metal shortage was also expressed in the lowered allotments for the fourth quarter. The Agricultural Raw Material Supply Office in Georgia was allotted such small amounts that not even the fulfillment of special contracts was assured.

(200) The following were allotted:

	<u>In the Third Quarter</u>	<u>In the Fourth Quarter</u>
Steel plate	245 tons	200 tons
Spring steel	105 tons	60 tons

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(201) Steel tubing, high-speed steel and other important materials were not allotted at all. An additional 465 tons of various steel products and 1,150 tons of iron products were necessary for carrying out the most important work.

(202) In November this situation continued. The iron works in Nalchik was inoperative because of a lack of raw materials. Plant 428 in Blagoveshchensk could not fulfill special contracts because there was no zinc. The NK for Oil did not receive enough tubing from Taganrog "Trubostal". Magnitogorsk could not deliver cast iron in October and November because there were no railroad cars. The shortage of railroad cars was often the reason for the bottleneck in metal deliveries.

(203) In December the Metal Sales Office in Baku and the plants in Ordzhonikidze did not receive the expected 1,000 tons of cast iron because of transportation difficulties.

(204) In the case of scrap collection and shipments it is especially clearly seen that supply in the Soviet Union was not a raw material question but a transportation problem. Radio traffic showed that deliveries of iron scrap were always much lower than collections.

(205) The following shows conditions in July:

	Procurement:			Shipped:		Remarks:
	Planned	Actual	%	in tons & % of actual procurement		
Groznyj (Iron)	-	290 t	-	130 t	= 44%	(through 19 July)
Gorkij NKRF (Iron)	860 tons	-	-	170		(through 1 July)
Kirov NKRF (Iron)	60	-	-	45		(through 1 July)
Kujbyshev NKRF	-	625	-	525	= 84	(through 10 July)
Rostov (non-ferrous metals)	-	1300	-	50	= 4	(through 20 June)
Rostov "	-	160	-	40	= 25	(through 20 June)
<u>August</u>						
Rostov (non-ferrous metals)	-	420	-	240 t	= 57	(through 10 Aug)
Tbilisi (Iron)	-	3500	-	2000 t	= 57	(through 15 Aug)

(206) Shipments were delayed by lack of railroad cars.

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(207) The result of these inadequate deliveries was a continual scrap shortage in the industry. For example, Frunze ordered the quickest possible shipment of scrap from the scrap assembly point in Voroshilovgrad, because otherwise munitions production would be paralysed.

(208) In the scrap collection drive war booty also played a role. Of about 31,000 tons of scrap which the Voroshilovgrad Oblast' had shipped in August about 14 percent originated from booty.

(209) In September the situation was unchanged. Procurement often corresponded to or exceeded the plans but shipping remained inadequate. Results of the third quarter show this clearly:

	Procurement:			Shipped:	
	Planned	Actual	%	<u>% of Actual Procurement</u>	
Ordzhonikidze	1700 t	1832 t	= 108%	1553 t	= 86%
Shakhty, Rostovugol	-	2410	-	360	= 15
Consumer's Union, Novokuban	60	100	= 165%	-	
Consumer's Union, Ladoga	450	650	= 145%	-	
Groznyj	-	7300		2100	= 29
Donbas Coal Combine	-	8000		4400	= 55
Kabardino-Balkar	-	2000		1100	= 55
Georgia	6000	7500	= 125%	6500	= 87

(210) Non-delivery of railroad cars was given more and more often as the cause of shipping bottlenecks.

(211) The growing importance of scrap from booty was expressed in a radio message from Leningrad. According to this, in August and September the iron works in Leningrad shipped about 44,400 tons while in the third quarter the local Booty Collection Office shipped about 15,000 tons of booty scrap.

(212) The same situation prevailed in October also:

	Procurement:			Shipped:	Remarks:
	<u>Planned</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>%</u>	in % of actual <u>procurement:</u>	
Rostov (Iron scrap)	-	5068	-	1894 t = 37%	(through 15 Oct)
Metal Supply (non-ferrous metals)	-	701	-	432 = 62	(through 15 Oct)
Krasnodar (Iron scrap)	-	233	-	152 = 75	(through 1 Oct)
Metal Industry (non-ferrous metals)	-	19	-	14 = 74	(through 1 Oct)

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	Procurement:			Shipped: in % of actual procurement:	Remarks:
	Planned	Actual	%		
Leningrad (Machine Industry)	-	9700	-	15000	(from beginning of year)
Bataisk	-	1254	-	-	

(Of the 1,254 tons of scrap collected in Bataisk 900 tons originated from booty).

(213) In November scrap collection exhibited the following picture:

	Procurement:			Shipped: in % of actual procurement:	Remarks:
	Planned	Actual	%		
Rostov NK for Iron	7460	7917t	106	1652 t = 21%	(Oct/Nov?)
Rostov NK for Cooperative Industry (Iron)	-	324	-	187 = 62	1.-10.10
Rostov NK for Cooperative Industry (non-ferrous metals)	-	19	-	4 = 21	"
Tbilisi (Iron)	-	1983	-	1266 = 63	
Tbilisi (Non-ferrous metals)	-	94	-	69 = 73	

(214) With respect to the scrap supply, it is thus apparent that only about half the planned amounts were shipped, although collection corresponded to the planned goal.

(215) In December the following scrap deliveries were announced:

	Procurement:			Shipped: % of actual procurement	Remarks:
	Planned	Actual	%		
Ashkhabad	3300	1975	60	1970 = 100%	For the 4th quarter
Iron scrap					
Non-ferrous metals-scrap	50	31	60	-	
Rostov-on-Don Oblast ¹	14,990	22,332	149	13,383 = 60	Collected by the Komsomol Org. in the 4th quarter

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	Procurement:			Shipped:	Remarks:
	Planned	Actual	%	% of actual procurement	
Tbilisi Scrap Collection					
Office for Steel scrap	2132	2132	-	1365 = 65%	(through Dec. 1943)
Non-ferrous metal scrap	-	114	-	73 = 64	(through Dec. 1943)

(216) Manganese ore supply was of great importance for armaments. As a result of transportation difficulties supply delays often occurred. In order to guarantee supply of manganese ore, Stalin issued an order on 23 July 1943 by which a shipping plan for manganese ore from Chiaturi principally to Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk was established for the months of July through October. Because of their importance, they were to be shipped directly to these two places by existing means of transport. 145,000 tons were to be shipped by direct rail lines as follows:

10,000 tons in July
45,000 tons in August
45,000 tons in September
45,000 tons in October

(217) 125,000 tons were to be shipped by water and rail with transshipment at Baku-Krasnovodsk as follows:

15,000 tons in July
35,000 tons in August
45,000 tons in September
30,000 tons in October

(218) The extent to which this plan was fulfilled may be realized from the following messages intercepted on the domestic radio links:

The Manganese Trust in Chiaturi shipped 15,600 tons of manganese ore from 1 through 27 July; on 1 August 920 tons were shipped.

(219) In the first half of July the Transcaucasus Railway had shipped 10,539 tons of manganese ore (presumably from Chiaturi); on 13 July 720 tons were shipped to Magnitogorsk. From 1-20 September the Baku Metal Sales Office had received about 21,200 tons of manganese ore and had dispatched about 21,800 tons. Stock on hand amounted to about 14,400 tons. In September the danger arose that because of a lack of explosives, the manganese mines in Chiaturi would have to cease operations. From 1-25 October the Metal Sales Office in Baku had received about 24,200 tons of manganese ore, had shipped about 30,600 tons in the same period and the stock on hand amounted to about 9,000 tons. Thus manganese ore shipments fairly well met the planned objectives.

(220) Production at the copper rolling mill in Tbilisi during the second half year was at about the same level as in the first half year and in detail was as follows:

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<u>First half year</u>		<u>Second half year</u>	
March	70 tons	July	48 tons
April	45 tons	11-20 Aug	18 tons
May about	60 tons	September	60 tons
1st ten-day	26 tons	11-20 Oct	27 tons
per. in June		1-19 Nov	29 tons

(221) From 2-5 August there was no production because of a lack of mazut. The highest single day's production of 5 tons was not exceeded in the second half year. Daily production averaged out as previously to about 3 tons daily. In detail the development of daily production and stocks was as follows:

<u>Day:</u>	<u>Daily Production:</u>	<u>Stock:</u>
28 July	5 tons	69 tons
29 July	4	73
30 July	4	77
5 August	-	64
20 August	3	-
14 September	3	98
27 September	3	-
29 September	3	-
30 September	-	127
19 November	2	167
4 December	2	160

(222) In the second quarter stocks amounted to between 150-190 tons. At the beginning of June and during July and August large shipments were made whereby stocks were reduced to a normal amount. From the middle of September onward greater transportation difficulties again seemed to appear. This was expressed in the increase in stocks and in supply difficulties at plants.

6. Oil Supply

(223) From June onward a shortage of oil supplies was noted in all branches of the economy, despite the growing delivery capabilities of the Caucasian oil region as a result of progressing reconstruction of oil lines. This lag in supply was probably due to preparations for the July offensive. The course of military operations was probably also the reason that in the following months a relaxation did not occur. Oil supply in July was very strained. Radio traffic revealed that by the beginning of July allotments for that month to the NKRF had not arrived. Since notification about them had been given before the beginning of the month it must be assumed that by the beginning of the month there was something amiss in the supply situation. Until the establishment of the July allotments, the River Fleet received fuel advances amounting to 15 percent of the allotment of the second quarter. Deliveries of fuels and lubricants to NKRF enterprises was in some cases very poor. Many delays in allotments resulted. This had a worsening effect in transportation and other forms of work. By the middle of July a cessation of shipping threatened in Gorkij and Molotov. In Molotov the danger also existed that loading operations would have to be stopped.

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(224) As in the first half of 1943, the NKRF strove to conserve fuel. For example, a comparison was to be made between all river ships to determine which ships were using the most fuel. These ships probably would be rebuilt. As a result of the great shortage, water was to be added to fuels. For example, the Oil Combine in Baku was to deliver 90,000 tons of oil to Groznyj to which 6 percent of water had been added. From August onward, the percentage of water added was reduced to 4 percent.

(225) Reconstruction operations also suffered from the oil shortage. Since these operations were of the greatest importance, the main Oil Supply Office in Rostov issued an order that fuel allotments for military reconstruction of Don-Kuban Oblast¹ were to be completely fulfilled.

(226) Agricultural enterprises were refused large amounts of fuel and lubricant deliveries. Uralsk also refused a supply to agriculture. This resulted in extensive delays in agricultural operations.

(227) In order to improve the oil transportation system, in July the oil pipeline from Groznyj to Armavir was repaired. From 11 July onward, it was to transport 2,200 tons daily; that is, 1,000 tons from Makhachkala to Groznyj, and 1,200 tons were to come from production at Groznyj. (See the month of November.)

(228) In August all oil supply bases received an order based on a government decree to deliver fuel to agricultural enterprises of the NKRF as well as to other NKRF offices before the end of the shipping period. Nevertheless, delays in allotments occurred.

(229) The Reconstruction Directorate of the Don-Kuban Oblast¹ did not receive the required quantity of fuel in August despite this order.

(230) In August the River Fleet also did not receive sufficient oil. Detrimental effects occurred in all regions. In the regions around the Water Transport Bases of Astrakhan, Kujbyshev, Saratov and Stalingrad, tractor fuel was sent to illuminate shore installations and to fuel navigation lights because of a lack of illuminating oil. As a result of its poor illuminating power, the performance especially of the red lighted buoys was poor. Fueling the navigation signals in Kujbyshev was likewise in doubt because the local CD for Oil Enterprises had refused to deliver illuminating oil to the Waterways Directorate. The Waterways Directorate in Gorkij, Ilijsk and Semipalatinsk could not carry on work in the waterways because there was no fuel. From August onward they were to be supplied in the same way as the River Fleet.

(231) The shortage of railroad cars was one of the principal difficulties in sufficient supply. Thus, the Oil Industry in Rostov was to have received 65 tank cars of avtol from Batumi during the first half of August, but not a single tank car was shipped. Reflecting the general situation was a message from Moscow to Uralsk NKRF, by which their mazut requirement was to be satisfied in unlimited amounts by Gurev without special allotment by August and September at the latest. Gurev was to utilize this opportunity to charter shipping space for partial shipment of the mazut to Uralsk.

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(232) In September reconstruction and construction of oil pipelines made further progress. In September 1,200 tons of oil was shipped through the pipelines in Makachkala and Groznyj. Work was proceeding on the pipeline from Groznyj to Armavir. By extending another pipeline to Chalysh, it became possible to supply the NKRF there with a capacity quantity of 360 tons daily.

(233) In spite of the increasing delivery potentialities, there occurred no improvement in supply to the civilian sector of the economy. According to radio messages intercepted from domestic radio traffic in September, it was severely strained both in transportation (NKRF) as well as in industry and in agriculture.

(234) Kamuste NKRF was directed to issue motor fuel to the motor ships only in the most urgent cases and then only in limited quantities.

(235) In industry even armaments plants often did not have ample supplies of fuel and lubricants. In September the Russian Tank Industry was to receive 164 tank cars of diesel oil. Since nothing was delivered, tank production was imperiled. The steel industry in Penza could deliver no armaments materials because of a lack of motor lubricating oil. The Oil Supply Office in Krasnovodsk had delivered no gasoline to Trust #1 of the NK for Munitions. Combine #179 received only 100 tons of gasoline instead of 150 tons.

(236) As a result of the oil shortage, plants of the Machine Industry in Stavropol ceased operations. The Highway Construction Directorate in Tbilisi could not keep up with their construction plan because of a lack of fuel. At the Azov-Black Sea Power Plant fuel was scarce. The same was the case at the coal mines of Rostov Oblast' ("Rostov-and Voroshilovgrad-Ugol"), as a result of which coal shipments were in danger of stopping.

(237) With the beginning of harvest work the oil requirements in agriculture became urgent. They could, however, be met only inadequately, as a result of which, harvest was delayed. (See Food Situation.) Machine and Tractor Stations in Krasnodar Oblast' ceased operations at the middle of September because of a lack of fuel, because Makachkala had not made delivery of 73 tank cars. Groznyj also had not received the planned ten tank cars of avtol from Makachkala. In Georgia the situation was similar. In order to carry out harvest operations, Tbilisi was therefore forced to borrow 750 tons of oil from government reserves on the account of the fourth quarter. The Grain Procurement Office in Rostov had no gasoline for transport of grain. The grain mills in Nalchik and Prokhladnaya had ceased operations because of a lack of fuel. Interruptions in production threatened at the Preserves Industry in Erevan and the Food Industry in Rostov. In Krasnodar shipments of timber and procurement of vegetables could not be made.

(238) Civilian supply suffered particularly as a result of the general oil shortage. In the Azerbajdzhan Republic civilian requirements in September were met by only 40 percent.

(239) The seriousness of the situation in October is indicated by the following radio report:

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The Oil Supply Office in Groznyj was to deliver 1,000 tank cars of mazut to Krasnodar Kraj according to the October Plan for Oil Supply. However, only 95 tank cars were dispatched by 19 October. A number of important plants were faced with the necessity of ceasing operations.

(240) At the beginning of October the River Fleet was issued only a provisional allocation amounting to 20 percent of that issued in September.

(241) Industry likewise received only inadequate allotments. The Plant "Andreev" in Taganrog received an allotment of 1,000 tons of mazut for October and the Metal Plant in Sulin, an allotment of 350 tons. The requirements of these plants were satisfied only by one-half of these allotments. Many of the already inadequate allotments were often not delivered. The furnaces of the Sulin Metal Plant therefore had to be converted to use illuminating gas. The Combine "Rostov-Ugol" received only three-quarters of the gasoline necessary for shipping their products.

(242) As a result of decreased allocations and insufficient shipments serious production difficulties developed in October. For this reason, fulfillment of the production plan for October and November at the plants of the Machine Industry in Tbilisi was questionable. In the coal mines of Rostov Oblast' current supply was interrupted because the Azov-Black Sea Power Plant lacked fuel.

(243) The amounts of oil required by agriculture are indicated by deliveries in August and September to Rostov-on-Don Oblast'. According to them, about 3,000 tank cars (60,000 tons) were received. Nevertheless, these amounts were not sufficient. In some cases, therefore, agricultural work could not be carried out. Agricultural enterprises on the average received scarcely more than one-half of the required amounts of fuel. Nevertheless, they were to set aside fuel reserves for spring activities. In detail, the following quotas were taken from radio traffic (Percentages of fourth quarter allocations):

Petroleum		15% (?)
Gasoline		10%
Ligroin		10%

(244) How inadequately requirements were being met in general is indicated from a report in which fuel supply in Rostov Oblast' during October was fulfilled as follows:

Petroleum	by	44%
Gasoline	by	68%
Diesel Oil	by	18%

As a result of these inadequate deliveries, the oil storage depots of the oblast' had no gasoline and ligroin. Petroleum was scarce.

(245) In November the oil supply in industry and agriculture seemed to have reached a crisis. Even the oil pumping stations on the oil pipeline in

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Stavropol lacked lubricants and oil. In messages at the beginning of November, Armavir, Groznyj and Tuapse were criticized because of their complete refusal to deliver fuel to industry. They were ordered to ship 8,300 tons of oil within 7 days and to report absolute compliance.

(246) The Armaments Industry was no less affected than other industries. In Baku plants of the Tank Industry had received no diesel oil for 2 months. The truck plant in Gorkij could not guarantee delivery of tanks and also the Tank Industry in Mariupol had an urgent need for lubricants and fuel. The NK for Armaments in Krasnoyarsk as well as individual plants of the other armaments industries, for instance the Plant "Krasnyj Aksaj" of the Mortar Industry in Rostov and the offices of the Armaments Construction Industry of Rostov Oblast¹ were in a difficult situation. In Krasnovodsk also supply to the Armaments Industry halted. In November the Oil Supply Office in Groznyj was to deliver 6,150 tons of mazut to plants of the NK for Iron. Since only 3,200 tons were delivered through 21 November, production interruptions arose at several plants. The Metal Plant "Andreev" in Taganrog ceased operations for three days because of the lack of mazut. The Glass Plant in Rostov likewise ceased operations. The Metal Plant "Stal" in Krasnyj Sulin received only two-thirds of their allocation of mazut. The Tungsten Combine in Tyrnyaus had received only one quarter of their allotment of gasoline during the third quarter. Allotments were often measured much too small. The Plant "Stal" in Leningrad received an allotment for November which met only half of its requirements. The offices of the NK for Construction Materials in Baku received an allotment which covered only 30 percent of their need. Enterprises of the Rubber Industry were likewise inadequately supplied.

(247) The Food Industry also suffered under the oil shortage in November which reduced production. In October only 25 tons of oil were allotted to grain mills in Rostov Oblast¹ for the fourth quarter to cover a requirement of 3,000 tons. Grain processing for the Army was therefore placed in question. In Elista not enough bread could be baked for the civilian population because of a lack of mazut. The Preserves Factory in Ordzhonikidze lacked fuel at the beginning of November. At the middle of November the Alcohol Plants in Khutorok, Kuban, Ordzhonikidze, and Krasnodar were forced to cease operations. In Krasnodar the plant was inoperative 120 hours. The Cotton Trust in Karasu had to cease operations.

(248) The Electrical Generating Stations in Ordzhonikidze and Taganrog were considerably affected in their work by the oil shortage.

(249) Pumping petroleum from Makachkala to Groznyj was carried out only unsatisfactorily. The following quantities were pumped through the oil pipeline:

On 22 November	52 tons
On 23 November	450 tons
On 24 November	528 tons

(250) The daily pumping capacities from Makhachkala to Groznyj of 1,300 tons and from Groznyj to Armavir of 2,000 tons were to be used immediately.

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(251) Oil supply by rail was even worse. In December Makhachkala could not fulfill its delivery plan because of a lack of tank cars. Instead of 5,565 cars, only 1,398 or 25 percent were shipped. Only 99 tank cars were delivered to the NK for Agriculture instead of 743. Orders for increased delivery of tank cars had no effect. In December the Chief Directorate for Oil Supply in Baku as well could not comply with its delivery obligations because of non-delivery of tank cars. By 27 December only 6 tank cars had been shipped to the NK for Coal instead of 58. Moreover, December deliveries of oil had not been carried out to the following:

To the NK for the Aviation Industry
 To the NK for the Tank Industry
 To the NK for Armaments
 To the NK for Munitions, and many others

(252) According to a Government order, motor oil was to be shipped only to the Ukraine and heavy machine oil only to the NK for Munitions.

(253) The Plant "Instrument" in Taganrog, which had not received planned shipments of mazut for October, November, and December, had to halt production of munitions. The Electrical Central and the Plant of the Shipbuilding Industry in Makhachkala received scarcely a third of their monthly requirements. Both of them, therefore, had to cease operations on 1 December. The electrical plant in Kislovodsk which had received no heating mazut from 1 through 20 December had to stop production of electric power. Reconstruction work in Rostov also could not be continued because Makhachkala had delivered no motor oil for a quarter-year. Apparently by the end of 1943 oil supply had again reached a critical stage.

7. Coal Supply

(254) In July the coal supply situation was the same as had been described for it for the first half year. That is, there were ample supplies of hard coal and it was only a question of transport capabilities whether sufficient supplies could be guaranteed. Railroad cars, however, were scarce. The coke supply on the other hand was not sufficient because of the occupation of the Donets Basin. The NKRF Plant in Uralsk, for example, had received no coke for a quarter of a year. The carbide plant in Erevan had ordered 120 tons of coke for the second half year but likewise it was not received, so that in June the plant had to cease operations.

(255) In August also orders far exceeded supply as may be determined from one radio report. According to this report, Voroshilovgrad-Ugol and Rostov-Ugol had fulfilled the plan for the first ten days of August as follows:

	<u>Coal Orders</u>	<u>Coal Shipments</u>
Voroshilovgrad-Ugol	84%	45%
Rostov-Ugol	88%	54%

(256) In August according to plan 182,400 tons of coal were to be dispatched in Voroshilovgrad. Actually, 164,557 tons or about 96.2% of plan were dispatched.

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(257) Supply suffered heavily under the transportation difficulties. The Coal Supply Office in Voroshilovgrad was to ship 12,200 tons of coal to plants of the NK for Ferrous Metallurgy in July; however, only 4,400 tons or 36% of plan were shipped. In August 16,000 tons were to be shipped (plus the amount not shipped in July, 7,800 tons, or a total of 23,800 tons). By 15 August only 6,000 tons had been shipped, that is, only 37% of the monthly plan.

(258) The anthracite supply also suffered the same difficulties. The mines at Sulinsk and Novoshakhtinsk delivered only 231 tons (38%) and 90 tons (48%) respectively instead of 600 tons and 200 tons to the Plants of the NK for Ferrous Metallurgy from 10 through 15 August.

(259) As in all fields, untouchable reserves of coal were also to be set up. Thus, untouchable reserves at the various steamship agencies were to be set up before the beginning of shipping in 1944 as follows:

Kujbyshev NKRF	1,000 tons
Saratov NKRF	700 tons
Ulyanovsk NKRF	500 tons

(260) Strenuous efforts to open new sources of coal were urged. The Coal District in the region of the Polar Circle, for example, sent increased quantities of coal to Leningrad.

(261) The Coal Shipping Plan in September was not fulfilled by the Combine Rostov-Ugol. The principal reasons for production arrears seemed to be shortages of material and personnel. One radio message indicated that the lack of mine timber at Rostov-Ugol made coal shipments at the beginning of September impossible and delayed reconstruction. On 20 and 21 September production interruptions occurred at Rostov-Ugol because of insufficient supply of electricity. The coal mines in Tkvarcheli were threatened with flooding because of shortages in manpower, timber, cement, iron, and concrete.

(262) In order to meet the coal requirements of the liberated territories, coal shipments from the Combine "Stalin-Ugol" were increased in September. Shipment from the pit heaps was to be accelerated. From the beginning of October 5,000 tons of coal were to be shipped daily.

(263) Coal shipments from the Combine "Rostov-Ugol" did not reach the planned scope. From 1 through 20 September an average of only 3,484 tons were shipped daily, compared to a goal of 9,154 tons, only 38%. Shipments were less than in August: For example, daily shipments had decreased from the preceding month's average daily shipment of 805 tons for the NK for Transportation and 165 tons for the NK for Iron. Likewise the Chief Directorate for Coal Supply in Rostov could not carry out its deliveries because of a lack of railroad cars; on 9 September only 3,000 tons were shipped instead of the planned 9,900 tons.

(264) Intercepted radio traffic indicated that in September more than 900,000 tons of coal had accumulated in pit heaps at the Combines "Rostov-Ugol" and "Voroshilovgrad-Ugol" because of insufficient deliveries of railroad

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cars and trucks. In order to expedite dispatch of the coal to the camps of the NK for Coal, a truck battalion of 200 trucks was assigned to the two combines; an additional 200 trucks were placed at their disposal.

(265) The deficient supply of coal in September resulted in interruptions in production in the iron industry, in transportation, and at electrical generating stations. During the last months the Donbas Coal Supply Office in Krasnodar had not furnished sufficient supplies to enterprises of the NK for Armaments. Therefore, at certain plants interruptions in production occurred.

(266) In the last months Erevan had received only 200 tons of coal from Tkivbuli and Tkvarcheli instead of 5,000 tons. As a result, enterprises important to the war effort ceased operations.

(267) A message to Molotov NKRF revealed that for the foreseeable future there was no possibility of furnishing coal to the Kama Steamship Agency. As a result this steamship agency was to convert their ships to wood firing. The coal supply in Western Siberia seemed to be better, as deliveries to the Upper Irtysh Steamship Agency in Semipalatinsk in August showed:

	<u>Delivery Plan</u>	<u>Actual Deliveries</u>
Kuznetsk Coal	6,000 tons	6,400 tons = 105%
Caucasus Coal	2,100 tons	900 tons = 43%
Cheremkhovo Coal	<u>1,800 tons</u>	<u>2,300 tons = 128%</u>
	10,000 tons	9,600 96%

(268) According to the plan, Baku was to ship 108 railroad cars of oil coke in September but instead only 41 cars were shipped. As a result, so much coke accumulated at the oil enterprises of Azerbajdzhan that production had to be halted. Instead of the 111 cars which were planned in October, during the first 10 days of December none were shipped.

(269) The Oil Supply Office in Groznyj had delivered only 300 tons of oil coke for the aluminum plants instead of the required 1,200 tons. Plants in the Rubber and Non-ferrous Metal Industry were primarily affected by the lack of oil coke.

(270) In October the supply generally seemed to have become worse. Difficulties occurred widely in the Armaments Industry. Because of the lack of coke, the foundry at a mortar plant in Rostov had to cease operations in October. A second foundry in Rostov was likewise threatened with cessation of operations. The Chemical Factory in Kirovakan could not fulfill armaments contracts because of a lack of anthracite. The plant "Trubostal" in Taganrog had a coal reserve for only two days at the end of October. The Food Industry also suffered a lack of coal. In September and October the Bakery Combine in Taganrog had received no allocations. Production of bread was therefore jeopardized. The Preserves Factory "Smychka" in Rostov had received only a quarter of the required amount of coal in October (50 tons). As a result of insufficient coal supplies the Fat Combine in Voronezh could not maintain operations. At the end of October

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schools, hospitals and other enterprises in the Armenian Republic were insufficiently supplied with fuel. From stock reports intercepted in radio traffic it was apparent that coal stocks at most plants were hardly sufficient for a month and in most cases for only 10 days.

(271) In November, as previously, orders were much higher than shipping capacity. Pit heaps continually grew.

(272) In Tkivbuli conditions were as follows:

	<u>Orders</u>	<u>Shipped</u>
31 October -	896 t	460 t = 51%
1 November -	762	507 = 64%

(273) A shipping bottleneck was also reported from Stalino. As a result of a lack of shipping space Rostov could not deliver 4,500 tons of coal to Taganrog. This coal was divided among the cities in the vicinity of the mines.

(274) Shipping difficulties greater than in the Caucasus were reported by radio in Shakhty (in tons) as follows:

	<u>On 1 November</u>	<u>14 November</u>	<u>17 November</u>	<u>18 November</u>
Coal stocks	-	376,700	361,700	364,000
Total shipped	-	5,300	4,800	4,200
Shipped by rail	4,100	4,300	4,700	4,100
Shipment arrears	-	9,800	4,400	5,100
Railroad cars required	6,900	7,100	7,600	8,100
Railroad cars furnished	5,500	4,800	4,900	4,300
Railroad cars loaded	4,800	4,300	4,700	4,100
Railroad cars not furnished	1,400	2,300	2,600	3,800

(275) Thus, only about half of the expected quantities were shipped. Shipments themselves decreased primarily because of a shortage of gasoline for trucks and the falling off of river fleet operations as winter set in. During the navigation period, for example, total shipments in Shakhty had been higher. On 12 August they amounted to 11,110 tons.

(276) In November also plants of the Armaments Industry lacked coal. There were interruptions in operations at Plant 543 in Kazan and Plant 614 of the NK for Armaments, because by the end of November they had not yet received their monthly deliveries. Shakhty was to make immediate delivery. Plant 264 of the Tank Industry in Stalingrad had not received the authorized 2,000 tons by 22 November. This plant did not even have 1 day's supply of coal. Rostov was to expedite delivery.

(277) The Plant "Krasnyj Kotelshchik" in Taganrog had to cease operations. Stalino was to send 400 tons of coal immediately. The Preserves Plant in Rostov also ceased operations for 5 days because of a lack of coal. A

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Plant in Novocherkassk was on the brink of halting operations. The Leather Factory in Taganrog had received no supplies of coal during the last two months.

(278) With the reoccupation of the Donets Basin the important cokeries also became the property of the Soviet Union, production from which was to partially alleviate the serious coke shortage in the first half year. According to plan the cokeries in Stalino were to produce 60,000 tons of coke in November. Production apparently was not satisfactory because the Coke Chemical Plant in Kemerovo still had to deliver coke to Rostov in November.

(279) The unsatisfactory development of coal supplies led to an investigation of the causes producing it. According to a report from authorities on the State Committee for Defense, from the beginning of December stocks were not sufficient for fulfillment of the shipping plan. From 1 through 5 December Shakhty, "Rostov-Ugol" had been able to ship only 25,000 tons instead of the planned amount of 42,500 tons (59%).

On 11 December 4,324 tons were shipped
On 15 December 8,700 tons were shipped
On 17 December 3,600 tons were shipped
On 25 December 4,222 tons were shipped

(280) On 5 December the Combine had a coal supply of 371,000 tons and on 17 December a supply of 396,000 tons including 16,000 tons and 19,000 tons respectively stored in heaps on railway branch lines and 28,000 tons and 17,000 tons respectively in heaps on narrow gauge branch lines. The remaining stocks of coal of 327,000 tons and 358,000 tons respectively were in heaps which were 60 to 180 kilometers from the railway. Because of the poor shipping conditions at the time, transport was impossible. In order to fulfill the coal shipping plan the following measures were adopted:

- 1) Increased production at mines which were supplied by railway branch lines. The Combine in Shakhty had 30 such mines. At the beginning of December its daily production amounted to 400 tons compared to 2,800 tons in November. The mines could increase their production to 1,500 to 2,000 tons daily if they could have been supplied with mine timber, machines, electric mine locomotives and other transportation equipment.
- 2) Delivery of 10 small gauge locomotives in order to make complete use of 80 kilometers of narrow gauge line.
- 3) Delivery of spare parts for trucks. The Combine operated 140 trucks of which 60% were not serviceable because no spare parts had been on hand for 10 months.

(281) In December the coal supply situation seemed to have reached a critical point. The electrical generating stations in Stalingrad, Voronezh, Kharkov, Moscow, Saratov, Kujbyshev and at other locations were not able to supply adequate power to industry because of deficient coal deliveries at the

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middle of December. Rostov, Voroshilovgrad and Stalino were to ship 3,500 tons of coal to them daily. On 17 December the Plant "Krasnyj Kotelshchik" in Taganrog was forced to cease operations because it had no coal. On 20 December the munitions plant "Instrument" in Taganrog ceased operations for the same reason.

(282) At the beginning of 1944 the coal situation in Rostov Oblast' was critical, because according to a report of 5 January six principal mines belonging to the coal combine "Rostov-Ugol" had been under water since 4 January 1944. Work of the combine had, therefore, almost ceased. The cause of this was a damaged boiler at the power plant in Artemovsk.

(283) It was determined from domestic radio traffic that an operation was started to transfer small mines to trusts or other organizations for their own management. The combine "Rostov-Ugol", for example, had to transfer a small mine of about 30 tons daily capacity to the NKVD storehouse in Shakhty. Likewise the Bakery Trust in Rostov was to receive two small coal mines near Shakhty for their own use; the NKRF workshops in Pavlodar were to take over the local coal mines and cokeries.

8. Timber Supply

(284) The timber requirements of the Soviet Union had risen even higher in the second half year because of construction of industry, conversion to wood fuel in transportation, especially in the river fleet but principally by the growing needs for reconstruction. Continuing difficulties in timber supply resulted from the lack of manpower and of transportation. Therefore plans were set up by which the river fleet would obtain timber by themselves from the NK for Timber. Radio traffic indicated that the NKVD also received this right. For example, in order to obtain 10,000 cubic meters of timber, the Directorate of Military Supply for the NKVD in Stavropol was provided with a plot of forest in the second half year. Similar measures by which sources of raw material were placed directly at the disposal of the consumers were also undertaken with coal supplies (see Coal Supply.)

(285) In July timber allotments to several NKRF enterprises encountered difficulties because of insufficient serviceable supplies. The timber allotment for the second quarter to Kujbyshev Oblast' was postponed and not noted for the third quarter. An allotment was refused for the Gorkij, Ivanov and Chkalovsk Oblasti and the authorized allotment of 2,000 cubic meters of timber for Uralsk was not carried out. The result was that Kujbyshev for example had no timber for its river fleet and was forced to obtain it themselves.

(286) In August larger authorizations of shipbuilding timber were noted. They were intended both for shipbuilding as well as for repairs. It was partially a question of authorizations for the construction and repair period of 1943-44. Fairly extensive shipbuilding activities for the river fleet may be concluded from this. In the procurement of shipbuilding timber the usual transportation difficulties occurred. Thus, Omsk-NKRF received only 3,000 cubic meters of

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the 14,000 cubic meters of shipbuilding timber expected in the shipping period through 1 July.

(287) Horses to be used in timber procurement operations were widely lacking. Floating equipment was also scarce.

(288) In September the same difficulties in procurement and shipping were noted. Khabarovsk and Ufa-NKRF were behind schedule on the timber procurement plan for the third quarter. In September and October no railroad cars for timber shipment were furnished to the Georgian NK for the Textile Industry in Tbilisi. How great these arrears were in some cases is shown by the timber trust of Checheno-Ingush where, according to the yearly plan, 25,000 cubic meters of timber were to be shipped. In Stalingrad and Sarepta large amounts of mine timber were stored which could not be shipped. As a result of this situation "Rostov-Ugol" in Shakhty suffered a lack of mine timber. In order to avoid a complete cessation of operations in coal delivery and reconstruction, the most rapid possible delivery of the September allotment was demanded.

(289) In September a greater need for timber to be used in reconstruction became apparent. For example, the Rostov-on-Don Rajon was to receive 100,000 cubic meters for reconstruction of buildings to be used in livestock raising. In order to meet this additional requirement Komsomol members were conscripted to undertake voluntary procurement of timber for reconstruction work.

(290) Nevertheless, the timber supply was not sufficient. In Rostov, for example, reconstruction of fruit and vegetable processing enterprises had to be halted. As a result of a lack of boards the necessary roofs could not be constructed at the grain procurement office in Mozdok.

(291) As a result of deficient timber supplies the coal mines of the Donets Basin encountered difficulties in October. At all trusts of the combine "Stalino-Ugol" in Stalino there was a lack of mine and construction timber. At the combine "Rostov-Ugol" in Shakhty reconstruction work at the coal mines as well as the coal deliveries had to be halted because of a lack of timber.

(292) Insufficient manpower and shortage of railroad cars and river ships were given more and more often as the reason for the transportation difficulties. For example, the timber industry of the Gorodets and Ust-Alekseevsk Rajons could not meet their deliveries for the fourth quarter because of a lack of manpower. As before, the river port of Groznyj was congested because of a lack of shipping space. In the harbor of Baku barrel staves remained more than a month because of the lack of railroad cars. Plant 182 in Astrakhan was to receive 3,000 cubic meters of round timber and 2,300 cubic meters of shipbuilding timber from Saratov for 1943. By the beginning of October, however, no delivery had been made. The Bridge Building Directorate in Krasnovodsk received only half of the required construction timber.

(293) The amounts of timber required for reconstruction of mines, factories, and agricultural enterprises may be partially computed from the following message:

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Consignee	Amount	Remarks
Rostov Oblast', Machine Tractor Stations	10,000 cu. meters	
Stalingrad Oblast', Agricultural Organizations	40,000	For reconstruction of stalls.
Astrakhan Oblast'	10,000	"
Rostov Oblast', Agricultural Organizations	100,000	"
Sulin, Plant "Krasnyj Sulin"	3,000 pieces of timber	For reconstruction
Taganrog, Plant "Instrument"	600 cu. meters	" "
Taganrog, Boiler Plant	35 railroad cars	" "

(294) With the cessation of river fleet operations NKRF offices transferred their activities to the procurement of timber for the winter half year of 1943-1944 which apparently lasted from 1 October 1943 through 31 March 1944. Quotas for procurement and shipments were announced to the individual offices.

(295) The NKRF offices below had to fulfill the following timber shipment quotas in the winter half year of 1943-44:

Office and Oblast' of Procurement	To be Procured	To be Shipped
<u>Gorkij</u> , Water Transport Base from the Tatar Republic; Gorkij	7,400 sq. meters	7,800 sq. meters
Water Transport Base of Saratov Oblast'	3,600	5,300
<u>Gorkij</u> , Water Transport Base of Ivanovo Oblast'	6,100	4,500
<u>Yakutsk-NKRF</u>	75,000	50,000
<u>Kirov</u>	51,000 cu. meters	55,000 cu. meters
<u>Molotov</u>	175,000	154,000

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(296) The Rostov-on-Don Forest Directorate was to procure the following amounts from 18 November through 10 April 1944:

Total: 65,000 cubic meters of timber

Including: 5,000 cu. meters of fuel timber
10,000 " " timber for
other uses.

Included in the 4th quarter: 25,000 " " fuel timber
5,000 " " timber for
other uses.

(297) According to the December plan Kujbyshev-NKRF was to procure 7,500 square meters as follows:

1,500 cubic meters timber for general use
6,000 cubic meters firewood

(298) The following timber procurement plan was established for the region of the Upper Volga for the winter half year 1943/44:

<u>Oblast'</u>	<u>Total Quantity</u>	<u>Timber for General Use</u>
Yaroslavl	19,000 sq. meters	4,200 sq. meters
Ivanovo	21,000 " "	3,500 " "
Gorkij	50,000 " "	17,000 " "
Mary	11,000 " "	5,000 " "
Chuvash	7,500 " "	1,500 " "
Tatar	15,000 " "	4,500 " "

(299) In November the situation was unchanged. On one hand, there was a shortage of timber so that even deliveries to the Army were delayed and on the other hand additional quantities of timber were ordered procured for reconstruction work.

(300) In December great difficulties also prevailed at the coal mines in Shakhty because of a lack of mine timber. Shakhty could erect no community dwellings for the 33,000 conscripted workers. Above all, timber was lacking for reconstruction. The oblast' procurement office in Rostov received the allocated 50,000 cubic meters of timber from the Oblast' Forest Directorate for repair of livestock stalls. By the beginning of December about 13,500 cubic meters had been felled and 11,000 cubic meters had been shipped. In November the NK for Agriculture in Krasnodar was to receive 887 railroad cars of construction timber. The contract was not fulfilled, however. In Krasnovodsk, especially important work had to be suspended because of a lack of timber. For the same reason the setting in operation of plants was often delayed. The continual requirements of the economy were met only with great delays. Thus, the railroad car repair plant in Ordzhonikidze had received no cut timber for repair work in September and October.

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(301) In the Caucasus timber supply was apparently better in the regions not contiguous to the war. The Azerbajdhan Republic had procured 76,000 cubic meters of timber by 20 September against the yearly timber procurement plan of 96,000 cubic meters. The NK for the Meat and Dairy Industry in Erevan had received an allotment for 1943 of 1,650 cubic meters of firewood, of which 1,083 cubic meters had been delivered by 1 October.

(302) Yearly allotments for individual NKRF offices have been determined as follows:

Quantity	Commodity	Consignee	Consignor	Remarks
10,500 cu. meters	Shipbuilding timber	Kujbyshev-NKRF	Kama Timber Industry	To be delivered during the 1943 navigation period.
700	"	"	Middle Volga Timber Industry	"
10,000	Firewood	Ufa-NKRF	- - - - -	For the 1943 navigation period.
20,000	Shipbuilding timber	Novosibirsk-NKRF	- - - - -	Allotment during shipping period.
105,000	Firewood	"	- - - - -	" "
60,000	"	Omsk-NKRF	- - - - -	Allotment in the shipping period of 1943.
14,000	Shipbuilding timber	"	- - - - -	Allotment in the shipping period of 1943, including 3,300 cu. meters received by 1 July.
135,000	Firewood	Novosibirsk-NKRF	Novosibirsk Chief Timber Supply Office	Total

(303) As far as could be determined from radio traffic, during the third quarter a total of 1,850,000 cubic meters of timber were to be procured by the NKRF. In the fourth quarter this figure dropped to 520,000 cubic meters. Procurements determined in the first half year are totalled as follows:

1st quarter	887,000 cu. meters	1st half year	2,362,000 cu. meters
2nd quarter	1,475,000 " "	2nd half year	2,370,000 cu. meters
3rd quarter	1,850,000 " "		
4th quarter	520,000 " "	Total for	
	<u>4,732,000 cu. meters</u>	year	<u>4,732,000 cu. meters</u>

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(304) By a rough computation based on this table a yearly procurement of from 12 to 15,000,000 cubic meters of timber may be inferred.

9. Shipbuilding

(305) Of 154 establishments identified in the NK for the River Fleet (NKRF) there were 75 shipyards and 35 ship repair yards. Often shipyards and repair yards were included together. 42 plants were not clearly identified. Often auxiliary enterprises and spare part plants were included with the shipyards and repair plants. The highest plant numbers encountered in the NKRF lay in the 600's. According to this, the NKRF probably had slightly more than 700 plants. It is considered that at the beginning of 1943 almost half of the river shipping capacity in the European part of the Soviet Union was lost through military action or had been heavily damaged (for example, the Dnepr, Dnestr, Bug, Don, Kuban and Donets Steamship Agencies) and that not all the plants of the numbering system repeatedly referred to in radio traffic were in operation, so it is probable that about one third of the NKRF plants have been identified.

(306) By construction of new shipyards and new dock installations the NKRF strove to increase productivity in the river fleet. In the second half of 1943 construction of new shipyard equipment was noted in Cherdyn. In Omsk also the construction of a new shipyard was planned. In Igarka the construction of tow barges was to be undertaken. New docks were under construction in Gorkij and Kujbyshev. In August a new dock was completed in Alekseevka which was apparently destined for the shipyard in Raznezhe. Chistopol was to receive new dock installations from Krasnoarmejsk. In Krasnoyarsk the construction of a wooden floating dock was to begin in August.

(307) Domestic radio traffic indicated that the construction of river shipping had to cope with a shortage of material and manpower in the second half year also. Bobrovka reported, for instance, that in the third 10-day period of July no work was being carried out on the motor ships for the Fishing Trust because of a lack of workers and material. At the beginning of August construction work on two barges in Molotov had to be halted because there were no nails and other construction materials. In Novosibirsk work was delayed because there was no red lead or canvas. The order from Kujbyshev for long timber to be used in constructing wooden flatboats was refused with the notification that flotsam timber should be used for this purpose. At the shipyards of Astrakhan in July only work on wooden ships was to be carried out and the construction of motor ships was postponed until August and September. At the shipyard in Cherdyn considerable interruptions in work occurred in July.

(308) As a result of these conditions, shipyards were far behind their work schedules. Intercepted reports revealed that conditions in July had not improved over the preceding month. In August even greater arrears were noted. In Kostroma, for example, only 80 percent of the shipbuilding program was fulfilled in the first 20 days of August compared to that in July. At the shipyard in Zurazhevka the arrears likewise increased. In the first two 10-day periods in August only 53 percent of the plan was fulfilled. The following shipyards were behind schedule:

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Astrakhan	Novosibirsk
Baturino	Orel
Bobrovka	Zurazhevka
Khabarovsk	Cherdyn
Kostroma	Ufa
Kujbyshev	Molotov

(309) On the other hand, several NKRF organizations and spare part plants reported overfulfillment of the production plan, as follows:

Plant "Krasnoarmejsk'"	139%	in October
Plant "Stalingrad"	140%	"
Plant "Uritskij"	109%	"
Vladimirovka Workshops	112%	"
Sergeev Workshops	133%	"

(310) The critical situation at NKRF plants was also shown by an order in August which stated that work on all contracts which were not issued by the State Committee for Defense was to be halted.

(311) In addition to planned shipbuilding, the shipyards had to carry out additional construction. In Cherdyn, for example, during 1943 a tow-barge was produced above plan. In September, Borovaya was to produce the sixth 1,700-ton tow-barge above plan.

(312) At the beginning of 1943 an extensive construction program was established for the Fish Industry. In the first half year construction of about 250 fishing boats was noted, and in the second half year a construction program by Irkutsk NKRF for the NK for the Fish Industry of over 50 motor ships and 3 tow-barges was identified. Delivery deadlines had to be extended to 1 July 1944. It was notable that 20 motor ships were to have wooden hulls.

(313) Reconstruction of river shipping in the re-occupied territories constituted an additional burden. The scope of this work is shown by the following excerpt. On 1 October 1943 the Don-Kuban Steamship Agency had the following ships:

- 3 Freight-passenger ships
- 69 Motor cutters
- 7 Tugboats
- 100 Tow-barges (wooden)
- 16 Tank tow-barges (metal)
- 4 Dredges
- 27 Other craft

According to the reconstruction plan, this inventory was to be increased by almost 100 percent in July 1944, that is by 165 ships as follows:

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6 Freight-passenger ships totalling 900 tons
 30 Motor-cutters totalling 1,207 tons
 9 Tugboats totalling 2,015 tons
 106 Tow-barges (wooden) totalling 19,100 tons
 14 Tank Tow-barges (metal) " 3,110 tons

(314) Because of the oil shortage at the beginning of the year many ships were converted to wood firing. In the second half year Kujbyshev intended to re-convert their river ships from wood to oil firing because wood procurement operations had encountered serious difficulties. This conversion (to mazut) was, however, strictly forbidden. Nevertheless, Kujbyshev received permission to convert some ships from coal to oil firing. This was considered only a temporary measure.

(315) In the second half year NKRF shipyards were to carry out the following construction (figures for December not available):

	July	August	September	October	November	Total
Steamships	-	4	-	-	-	4
Motorships	25	10	-	10	-	45
Motorboats	-	-	-	-	-	-
Motor cutters	-	2	-	5	-	7
Tug boats	3	3	-	-	-	6
Tow barges	21	15	9	8	1	54
Flat boats	75	17	3	26	5	126
Small boats	15	55	-	-	-	70

(316) The amount of planned new construction in the third quarter amounted to approximately that of the preceding quarter and in the fourth quarter indicated a seasonal decrease. The following numbers of motor-driven ships were identified:

In the 1st quarter	89	In the 3rd quarter	49
In the 2nd quarter	9	In the 4th quarter	15

The following numbers of non-motor-driven ships were identified:

In the 1st quarter	265	In the 3rd quarter	216
In the 2nd quarter	180	In the 4th quarter	40

(317) The total amount of new construction from December 1942 through December 1943 was as follows:

	<u>Dec. /June 1943</u>	<u>July/Nov. 1943</u>	<u>Dec. 42/Nov. 43</u>
Steamships	8	4	12
Motorships	10	45	55
Motorboats	30	-	30
Motor cutters	12	7	19

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	<u>Dec. /June 1943</u>	<u>July/Nov. 1943</u>	<u>Dec. 42/Nov. 43</u>
Tugboats	40	6	46
Tug barges	160	53	213
Flat boats	82	126	208
Small boats	223	70	293

(318) For motor driven ships further details were lacking. In one case only the size of a motor ship was given as 1000 tons and the power of barges given as 400 horsepower.

(319) In the months of July through November there were 54 barges under construction totalling 82,100 tons compared to 160 barges totalling 95,600 tons in the period from December 1942 through May 1943. The average weight thus increased considerably, reaching 1,500 tons compared to 500 tons in the preceding half year. More vessels were built of 1,700 tons than of any other weight - 19 tow barges of this weight were built. Barges were built of tonnages ranging from 200 to 3,000 tons. The individual tonnage groups are broken down as follows:

<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>Number of Vessels</u>	<u>Total Tonnage</u>
200 - 250 t	3	650
500 - 600	3	1,740
1500 - 1700	42	65,225
2500 - 3000	5	14,500

(320) The increase in the number of flat boats constructed was also remarkable. In the second half year 126 vessels were under construction compared to 82 in the period from December 1942 through June 1943. Also many larger vessels were identified: flat boats up to 750 tons compared to a maximum of 200 tons in the first half year. The average tonnage was 186 tons. The most vessels constructed of any one weight were of 40 tons - 14 vessels of this tonnage were constructed. Individual tonnage groups are broken down as follows:

<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>Number of Vessels</u>	<u>Total Tonnage</u>
40 - 50 t	16	660
100	8	800
200 - 250	7	1,650
700 - 750	4	2,850
not given	91	(16,930 ?)

If we assume the average weight of 186 tons for the 91 flat boats for which the tonnage is not given, a total tonnage for these 91 vessels of 16,930 tons is arrived at. The tonnage of all flat boats can thus be computed at 22,900 tons.

(321) New construction plans for tow barges and flat boats in the first as well as in the second half year amounted to about 100,000 tons each. The actual new construction program can thus be computed at 600,000 tons in the year 1943, (see Foreword). At any rate, the new construction plans were not fulfilled.

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According to repeated reports on the progress of the work intercepted from domestic radio traffic, the plan was only about two-thirds fulfilled.

10. Ship Repair

(322) A government decree in July to all NKRF offices ordered that the scale of preparations for carrying out ship repairs for the year 1943-1944 be not less than that in the preceding year. During the winter all ships which had been damaged and which were therefore of limited serviceability were to be completely overhauled.

(323) During the summer all ships were to be supplied with available spare parts. During the interval between the navigation seasons it was forbidden to transfer specialists in ship repair to other types of work.

(324) As early as July a number of repair yards reported that they were behind schedule in preparations for ship repairs and procurement of fuel because great difficulties had to be surmounted. The following shipyards were included:

Gorkij
Ilijsk
Kirov
Kujbyshev
Molotov
Uralsk

(325) The repair work underway also progressed very slowly. At the beginning of July ships which had been damaged as the ice broke up in the spring were still under repair in Yakutsk. The following were behind schedule in repairs:

Kazan
Molotov
Morkovka
Ufa

(326) At the drydock of Morkovka (Novosibirsk Oblast') 19,240 tons of shipping were to be repaired in July, however, only 16,170 tons or 84 percent was actually repaired. In Borovaya, on the other hand, work was progressing well.

(327) Since the repair work was taking longer than foreseen, many more ships than planned were not placed in service. The administrative personnel and engineers at the shipyards were personally directed to speed up the working tempo. Deficient organization was widely blamed for this situation. Kujbyshev reported that at several offices under their jurisdiction there were over 30 tow barges which were half-sunken and dried out and the technique of repair was not known. In this way, the most important contracts assigned to the Middle-Volga Steamship Agency were neglected. The administrative personnel were charged with lack of foresight and flexibility. The personnel shortage also delayed repairs.

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(328) Several NKRF offices had large numbers of immobilized ships which were to be repaired in August and put in service. Thus, the plan called for repairs as follows:

Gorkij	30,000 tons
Stalingrad	20,000 tons
Kujbyshev	3,000 tons

(329) Domestic radio traffic indicated that some tow barges were contracted to other organizations for repairs.

(330) It was widely reported that NKRF plants, for example, Gorkij, Uralsk and Kujbyshev, were behind schedule in the assembly of spare parts. Since this endangered the ship repair and construction plan, there resulted increased control over the production of spare parts by introduction of daily accounting of hourly work production.

(331) Bottlenecks also resulted from the slow progress of the acceptance tests on repaired ships. In Kujbyshev and in Ulyanovsk the plan was only 20 percent fulfilled in June. In Stalingrad also, the tests were proceeding unsatisfactorily.

(332) In August there was an increase in reports of arrears in preparations for the approaching ship repairs. The following ship repair plants may be added to those listed in the preceding month:

Aralsk
Krasnoyarsk
Pavlodar
Zvenigovo
Chistopol
Chardzhou
Ust Ussa

(333) In Aralsk and Chardzhou preparations had completely stopped. In Zvenigovo the repair of installations for production of ships' spare parts was behind schedule, and in Chistopol the construction of a foundry for ship repair purposes was also behind schedule.

(334) In August the Kama and Middle-Volga Steamship Agencies were behind schedule in current repairs. At the Kama Steamship Agency many instances of damaged inventory were noted. The Middle-Volga Steamship Agency was forced to halt ship repairs because of a lack of available spare parts. Chkalovsk and Ulan Ude were also behind schedule in repairs. The following were behind schedule in production of ship components:

Kujbyshev
Pavlodar
Chistopol

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(335) In connection with the approaching repair period, NKRF offices were to draw up plans by 1 September for a modernization of the river fleet during 1944. Measures were to extend to improvement of utilization of fuel and motors as well as to an increase in motor power.

(336) At the end of September there was a conference in Kujbyshev attended by steamship company officials and directors of all NKRF shipyards and workshops. Questions were discussed there concerning preparations for the winter ship repairs and the production program for the next eight months.

(337) Headquarters of the NKRF in Moscow ordered all offices to eliminate arrears in preparation for the winter repairs. It was especially important that sufficient tools and heating material be on hand.

(338) Many NKRF plants had to undertake production of tractor spare parts in order to meet the urgent needs of agriculture (see Agriculture). Radio reports indicated that for this reason preparations for the imminent ship repairs were often considerably behind schedule. Some NKRF plants protested this obligation. Of all enterprises subordinate to the Kama Steamship Agency the NKRF plant at Zaozere was the farthest behind schedule in preparations for winter repairs.

(339) In October the oblast' committees and the governments of the autonomous republics were obliged to furnish vehicles and drivers for ship repair work for two months.

(340) In September the Omsk-NKRF Plant "Stalingrad" had fulfilled current repair work very unsatisfactorily. Chistopol, on the other hand, conformed to the current program. Work on "Volgatanker" ships was to be given top priority.

(341) As a result of shortages of metal and special work, Chardzhou was not in a position to produce the ship components which had been ordered.

(342) The extent of ship repairs in Ust-Usa during 1942-43 gives an idea of the scope of the repair work. 363 vessels totalling 174,440 tons were repaired there. During 1943, 327 vessels totalling 154,550 tons were to be repaired.

(343) Appendix I presents the budget plans of the River Fleet intercepted from radio traffic, from which the significance of the individual shipyards is apparent. The construction and repair costs of river ships presented in the following table may serve as a scale for judging the amounts in the budget plans allotted for construction and repair purposes:

Production costs for tow barges:

<u>Shipyard</u>	<u>Vessel</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>Cost</u>
Gorkij	Coal Tow Barge	1,700	288,000 Rubles
"	Grain " "	1,700	325,000 "
Raznezhe	Coal " "	1,700	229,000 "
Sokolskoe	Coal " "	1,700	195,000 "
"	Grain " "	1,700	250,000 "
"	Tow Barge	1,700	276,000 "

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(344) Repair of a steamer in Rybache cost 10,000 rubles.

11. Reconstruction

(345) With the continuous re-occupation of larger areas, more important to the economy, reconstruction became a more and more important task.

(346) Next to the first assignment of re-building Stalingrad and the North Caucasian region, in the second half-year the reconstruction of the Donbas was given top priority. As early as July, reconstruction of industry in the Don Basin was in full swing. With the continuous expansion of the area to be re-built, increasing difficulties occurred; before the end of the year there was an increasing lack of construction materials, such as timber, glass, cement, roofing paper, building blocks, nails, etc. Transport difficulties also played an important role in this situation. Nevertheless, progress was achieved in all areas. In the North Caucasus and in the Ukraine extensive re-establishment of agriculture was undertaken (See Food Situation). In the Donbas the Coal and Iron Industries were rebuilt. Moreover, living quarters and phases of the economy important to life, such as electrical generating stations, water-works, transportation, and the news services, were reconstructed and economic life slowly was brought back into operation. In this program economic organizations in regions untouched by the war assumed "sponsorships" over the enterprises in their branches of the economy to be rebuilt.

(347) Details taken from radio traffic and presented below give an insight into the progress of the reconstruction program.

(348) Many plants of the Food Industry were repaired or newly rebuilt. As of 1 September, Krasnodar had repaired 85 mills and had newly rebuilt 29 mills. In October, however, these mills could not be put in operation because of a lack of drive belts. In the fourth quarter a mill with a production capacity of 100 tons daily was to be put in operation in Taganrog. A flour production quota of 2,500 tons was set for the mills in Taganrog. The reconstruction of a mill was also reported from Prokhladnaya.

(349) Before the war in Voroshilovgrad Oblast¹ daily capacity of bakeries was 1,254 tons, including 242 tons in Voroshilovgrad. By 10 September the following had been repaired:

in Voroshilovgrad	100 bakeries
Krasnodar	78 "
Bokovo-Anthracite	13 "
Sverdlovsk	62 "
Rovenkij	16 "
Total:	<u>269</u> bakeries

(350) By 1 October an additional 80 bakeries had been placed in operation as follows:

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in Voroshilovgrad	20 bakeries
Sergo-Parizhskaya-Kommuna	15 "
Bryanka Settlement	20 "
Kamenka	5 "
Other Places	20 "

(351) By 20 August in Rostov and Krasnodar Oblasti a large number of macaroni plants had been placed in operation. Daily production from these plants amounted to:

Armavir	5 tons
Krasnodar	3 tons
Maikop	10 tons
Rostov	15 tons

(352) The following sugar factories were under reconstruction in October:

Plant Pervokhimsk	Station Kenig
Plant Sumsko-Stepanovsk	Station Toropilovka
Plant Kalininsk	Station Tetkino
Plant Rakityansk	Station Sinajdino
(All Stations above lie on the Southeast Railway)	
Plant Kollektivist (Dzerzhinsk Railway)	Station Blokhino

(353) In Korenovskaya a sugar factory was put in operation in November. In Voroshilovgrad as early as September a plant for non-alcoholic drinks with a daily capacity of 2400 liters was in operation. The plant for liquor production was to be rebuilt with a daily productivity of 10,000 liters.

(354) According to a report in October the refrigeration installation from the Fish Trust in Mariupol which had been evacuated to Baku was returned to Mariupol and re-set up.

(355) Large reconstruction orders were placed by the two largest branches of industry in the Donets Basin--the Coal Industry and the Iron Industry. Ten small-gauge locomotives were delivered to the Combine "Voroshilovgrad-Ugol" in June. In July two railroad cars of window glass were delivered to this combine for reconstruction and three railroad cars of window glass were delivered to "Rostov-Ugol". In September they received an additional 5 railroad cars. In September "Rostov-Ugol" was to receive 9 railroad cars of cement for reconstruction operations. Because this shipment did not arrive, operations had to be interrupted. In November all trusts of the Coal Combine "Stalin-Ugol" in Stalino lacked construction and mine timber. The Coal Combine "Rostov-Ugol" in Shakhty also had to cease both reconstruction operations at the coal mines and production because of a lack of timber.

(356) The Mine "Smolyanka" in Stalino Oblast' reported at the middle of December that reconstruction of mines was halted because of a lack of

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construction material. The following construction material had been authorized for the fourth quarter:

800 cb.m..	Mine Timber
1000 "	Construction Timber
570 roles	Roofing Paper
7000 sq. m.	Glass
450 tons	Cement
75 "	Section Iron
10 "	Girders

The following were actually delivered:

550 cbm.	Mine Timber	=	79.0%
21 roles	Roofing Paper	=	3.6%
300 sq. m.	Glass	=	4.3%
50 tons	Cement	=	11.1%
60 tons	Section Iron	=	80.0%

(357) Reconstruction of shelter rooms was completely interrupted.

(358) The reconstruction plan called for extensive repair of the Iron Industry before the end of the year. The Steel Plant "Krasnyj-Sulin" was to set its Martin furnaces in operation as follows:

6 Martin furnaces	in September
1 Martin furnace	in October
3 Martin furnaces	in November

(359) On 15 October the first Martin furnace at the Plant "Andreev" in Taganrog was fired and 13 tons of steel were produced. A rapid increase in production was indicated because "Andreev" proposed a receipt of scrap of about 8,600 tons for the fourth quarter and 44,000 tons for the first quarter of 1943. In December the Plant "Andreev" reported that the deadline set for the reconstruction of the Mannesman Department could not be met because construction material had not been received.

(360) At the Plant "Ilich" of the Tank Industry in Mariupol, a blast furnace was placed in operation. Its current needs for gas coal were computed at 4,000 tons monthly.

(361) The boiler factory "Krasnyj Kotelshchik" in Taganrog was insufficiently supplied with construction material such as timber, glass, and roofing paper. At the beginning of December work had to be completely stopped because of the cold. The Plant "Sedina" in Krasnodar which was to produce lathes for agricultural enterprises was rapidly reconstructed in October. 1.6 million rubles were authorized for the reconstruction. In Rostov the Plant "Instrument" was rebuilt.

(362) The Trust of the North Caucasus Heavy Machine Industry reported

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that the reconstruction plan in October had been over-fulfilled by 10 percent. Dozens of destroyed plants and buildings were reconstructed. First priority was given to the setting in operation of electrical generating stations including the Electrical Plant at Rostov, plants of the Agricultural Machine Industry and the blast furnaces of the NK for Ferrous Metallurgy. Even during reconstruction, production for the Front valued at about 600,000 rubles was turned out.

(363) By the end of October the Tank Industry in Stalino had been repaired. Aircraft of the Civil Air Fleet supplied spare parts to the Tank Industry in Stalino.

(364) In the fourth quarter a magnesium plant was rebuilt in Rostov.

(365) By the middle of September, a shoe factory in Taganrog was already fulfilling orders for the Army.

(366) The State Committee for Defense demanded in July the reconstruction of the Oil Industry in Groznyj in the shortest possible time. Work was delayed, however, because there were no heavy trucks available.

(367) In October a Solidol Plant was to be put in operation in Rostov which was to produce solidol from either emulsion or fat. At the Oil Storage Base in Taganrog two metal tanks with a capacity of 100 tons were repaired in September. In addition there is an underground tank there of 106 tons capacity.

(368) In Krasnodar Kraj cement plants were reconstructed. On 23 June a cement plant resumed operations in Voroshilovgrad.

(369) A large amount of material and a large working force were required for reconstruction of railroad lines. Thus Rostov Oblast' placed 81,000 tons of lime and 1 million bricks at the disposal of the North Caucasus Railway.

(370) In Stalingrad Harbor electro-technical and drainage operations were carried out in July. Reconstruction here also was subject to delays. The Kuban Steamship Agency also was reconstructed (See Shipbuilding).

(371) In September a reconstruction staff for the Dnepr Steamship Agency was set up. The following NKRF offices were to furnish personnel for this purpose:

Gorodets	Rostov
Gorkij	Semipalatinsk
Kujbyshev	Saratov
Kirov	Svenigovo
Molotov	Ufa
Omsk	Ust Ussa

(372) The NKRF Offices at Kujbyshev, Omsk, and Rostov were to furnish administrative personnel to set up reconstruction staffs for the Desna and Dnepr Steamship Agencies. Personnel from the NKRF offices in Irkutsk, Novosibirsk, and Uralsk were conscripted for reconstruction of the Dnepr-Duna Steamship Agency.

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(373) In August reconstruction work was carried out in Krasnodar on the electrical generating station and on the city street-car line. At the end of October the electrical generating station in Artemovsk urgently required construction material because freezing of the station was imminent. The following were still required:

200,000 bricks
 2 railroad cars of roofing tin
 2 railroad cars of glass
 10 railroad cars of construction timber

(374) Through 24 October 1,900 sq. meters of horizontal window area were framed. 1,000 sq. meters still remained to be framed and 1,250 sq. meters in the boiler and turbine house were to be glassed-in.

(375) The following reports pertain to the reconstruction of communications: As of 1 August Krasnodar had reconstructed and put into operation 895 kilometers of telegraph and telephone lines consisting of 5,289 kilometers of cable. 35 telephone centrals (47% of plan), 12 telegraph and telephone offices (59% of plan) and 23 radio centers (30.5% of plan) were put into operation. Reconstruction continued on 12 other installations.

(376) Through 1 August 812 kilometers of telegraph and telephone lines consisting of 4,626 kilometers of cable had been re-strung in Voroshilovgrad Oblast'. 580 kilometers consisting of 3,932 kilometers of cable had been put in operation.

(377) Through the middle of October in Rostov Oblast' the following enterprises of the NK for Trade had been re-established:

Salesbooths	298
Restaurants	60
Sales outlets	91
Bakeries	27
Industrial enterprises of the NK for Trade	31
Storehouses	40

(378) Radio messages indicated that reconstruction of living quarters was far behind construction in the armaments field. Significant in this respect was a report from the region of North Osetia, according to which, many houses, schools, hospitals, and public buildings were without windows at the beginning of winter because of the German occupation as well as aircraft activity and artillery fire. In order to reconstruct living quarters for workers' families in the liberated territories, each family was granted a government loan amounting to 10,000 rubles with a 7-year repayment period.

12. Imports (from Iran)

(379) Imports from the Anglo-Saxon countries afforded essential

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economic assistance to the Soviet Union. Of the three principal import routes to the Soviet Union via the North Arctic Ocean, the Far East, and Iran, imports via Iran from September 1943 onward were most widely covered in radio traffic. This discussion is limited therefore to the last country during the months of September through December 1943.

(380) Radio traffic indicated that administration of imports was handled by "Iransovtrans" which operated in conjunction with the specialized organizations in the NK for Foreign Trade (for example, Promsyreimport, Eksportkhub, Eksportlen', etc.) The organization "Vostokintorg" was also involved in imports via Iran. The representative of "Iransovtrans" in Iran was General Milovskij.

13. Transportation Routes

(381) As a result of inadequate railroad connections with the Soviet Union the sudden and great increase in the goods to be transported across Iran produced great difficulties. It was necessary therefore to utilize all possible means of transportation and ship a large proportion of the cargoes by highway and the Caspian Sea. This involved increased trans-shipment operations and the concomitant delays; for example, cargoes which were going from Teheran to Baku via Naushahr had to be trans-shipped from the railroad to the highway, then to ships and then for further transport had to be again trans-shipped to the railway.

(382) The relatively limited transportation capacity at individual locations made it necessary to set up many trans-shipment bases. Even small ports without railroad connections were utilized. (See Map: Foreign Trade Routes, Iran-USSR, Appendix 4.)

(383) The following Iransovtrans trans-shipment bases have been identified:

	<u>In Iran</u>		<u>In the Soviet Union</u>
(Railway)	Teheran Kazvin Tabriz Bender Shah	(Railway)	Dzhulfa Erevan Leninakan Tiblisi Astara
(Shipping)	Bender Shah Nakhmudabad Naushahr Shakhsevar Pekhlevi		Baku Makhachkala Astrakhan Krasnodar Krasnovodsk Kizyl Arvat Ashkhabad
(not located)	Khorosan Chanshar	(Shipping)	Baku Makhachkala Astrakhan Krasnovodsk

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(384) Import of goods proceeded over the following import routes:

(Shipping)	Bender Shah -- Baku
	Nakhmudabad -- Baku
	Naushahr -- Baku
	Shakhsevar -- Baku
	Pekhlevi -- Baku

(385) The Iranian points of departure for the cargoes arriving in Makhachkala, Astrakhan, and Krasnovodsk were not given in the reports. They probably are the same as for Baku.

(Railway)	Tabriz -- Erevan
	Dzhulfa -- Erevan
	Dzhulfa -- Tbilisi
	Dzhulfa -- Moscow
(Highway and Mixed Trans- port)	Teheran -- Astara
	Kazvin -- Astara
	Pekhlevi -- Erevan
	Naushahr -- Tbilisi
	Pekhlevi -- Tbilisi
(not located)	Chanshar -- Tbilisi
	Khorosan -- Ashkhabad

14. Trans-shipment at Individual Bases

(386) Next to Bender Shah, Pekhlevi was the most important Caspian port in Iran. In one 5-day period, from about 2,900 tons (20-25 December) to 7,200 tons of goods (1-5 December) arrived there for further shipment. Daily shipments ranged from about 500 tons (30 December) to 900 tons of freight (31 December). As a result of insufficient means of transportation, by 6 December about 31,800 tons of cargo had accumulated there, i. e., turnover for about a month. Offices of Vostokintorg in Teheran reported that shipping was needed in Baku to transport about 1,700 tons of agricultural products in November and 1,400 tons in December. The goods were to be shipped from Pekhlevi, Naushahr, and Bender Shah.

(387) There was a general shortage of railroad cars and ships, both in Iran as well as in the Soviet Union. For example, at the beginning of November, 26,350 tons of straw had arrived in Bender Shah from Southern Iran which could not be shipped because of a lack of shipping space.

(388) In Baku about 1,700 railroad cars of imported goods were dispatched in September. Assuming an average load of 18 tons per car this amounts to 30,600 tons. On 1 October, 56 railroad cars of imported goods were shipped from Baku, about 1,000 tons.

(389) On 21 November about 2,500 tons of imported goods arrived in

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Baku and 1,200 tons were shipped on. From 1 through 5 December about 7,100 tons of freight arrived there. According to this about 1,200 tons on the average arrived in Baku and about 1,000 tons could be shipped on (daily). Trans-shipment reports pertaining to the other bases were less informative. From 1 through 20 October about 1,900 tons of flour and beans arrived in Erevan.

(390) In November livestock imports to Astara were on the following scale:

<u>Arrived</u>		<u>Dispatched</u>
5,800 head	Large cattle	7,100 head
22 tons	Small cattle	27 tons

Stock on 1 December:

300 head	Large cattle	--
--	Small cattle	--

Increase during the 1st 10 days of December:

2,400 head	Large cattle	--
--	Small cattle	--

(391) On 12 November 420 tons of military supplies arrived in Leninakan.

(392) At Iransovtrans offices large stocks were piling up which could not be shipped further because of a lack of transportation; for example, at the beginning of October 3,400 tons of preserves were stored in Makhachkala and at the end of October, 5,400 tons.

(393) On 22 September there were 1,980 tons of flour, 7,590 tons of beans, 360 tons of peeled grain, 1,400 tons of rice ready for shipment in Baku. At the beginning of November there were 400 tons of vegetable fat stored in Baku. On 1 October Baku had 900 tons of brass in storage, and at the end of November, 70,000 meters of fabric. An additional 100 tons of steel including special steel was also stored in Tbilisi.

(394) In Baku harbor about 31,700 tons of freight had accumulated by 5 December. In order to fulfill the transport plan for January 1944 the Trans-caucasus Railway was to furnish:

- 1) Daily for imported goods only 100 open freight cars
- 50 closed freight cars
- 2) Trucks in lieu of railroad cars 500 tons daily;
- 3) 8 Shuttle trains, each of 20 cars,
- as follows:

2 Shuttle trains for transport to the Chief Directorate for Metal Sales in Kishly of 10,000 tons steel alloys;

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- 2 Shuttle trains for transport to Kishly of 4,000 tons of flour and beans;
- 2 Shuttle trains for transport to Kishly of freight for Engineering
Directorate Offices at the Karada,
Sumgait and Kishly Stations;
- 2 Shuttle trains for transport of rails and railway equipment to the store-
houses of the NK for Transportation.

(395) The compilation of individual deliveries from Iran indicates that the major portions of deliveries passed through Baku, Makhachkala, Erevan, Dzhulfa, and Krasnovodsk. The following table summarizes imports through these points:

	<u>October</u>	<u>November</u>	<u>December</u>	<u>4th Quarter</u>
Baku	3,200 tons	14,000 tons	7,900 tons	= 25,100 tons
Makhachkala	8,000	450	5,500	= 13,950
Erevan	2,600	700	300	= 3,600
Dzhulfa	100	100	1,200	= 1,400
Krasnovodsk	70	620	200	= 890

15. Total Imports

(396) Compilation of all imports, reports of which were intercepted from radio traffic, results in the following quantities:

September	18,700 tons	included here are certain quantities of goods for which the weight varies-- primarily textiles, leather, and rubber. (See below)
October	14,300	
November	20,000	
December	18,100	

(397) Radio messages on the delivery of railroad cars to Baku for imported goods indicated that reports of only about a quarter of the actual deliveries were intercepted. This probably was true in the case of the numbers of radio reports intercepted concerning the other locations. The actual monthly imports from Iran therefore probably amounted to about 80,000 tons.

16. Details of Imports

(398) Imports consisted primarily of foods and metal products; textiles, chemicals, rubber and leather were also imported in smaller quantities. In detail they were as follows:

	<u>Foods</u>	<u>Metals</u>	<u>Textiles</u>	<u>Leather</u>	<u>Chemicals</u>	<u>Oil</u>	<u>Others</u>
September	11,900 tons	6,000 t	--	100 t	300 t	300 t	100 t
October	9,700	4,500	--	--	100	--	--
November	13,800	3,900	400	300	900	--	1100
December	11,100	5,400	100	100	700	--	700
	46,500	19,800	500	500	2000	300	1900

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(399) Imports of goods for which the weight was not specified were reported as follows:

	<u>Foods</u>		<u>Metals</u>		<u>Chemicals</u>
September	4,000 head of livestock		10 motors for 1.1 million rubles for machine tools		--
October	--		12 kilometers of wire 38 drums of cable		344 barrels of toluol and phenol
	<u>Textiles</u>		<u>Leather</u>		<u>Rubber</u>
September	50,000 meters of fabric		Shoes (no quantity given)		Automobile tires (no quantity given)
October	47,000 "		500 pairs of shoes		" " "
November	80,000 "		5000 " " "		125 railroad cars, cars, auto- mobile tires
					35,500 sets of automobile tires
December	3,000 "		900 " " "		12 kilometers of hose
November	53 railroad cars of fabric				
	500,000 bags				
December	2,000 sheets of linen 600 special suits 500 rugs				

(400) Percentages of weights of imported goods were as follows:

Food	65.0%
Metals	27.7
Textiles	0.7
Leather	0.7
Chemicals	2.8
Oil	0.4
Other	2.7
	100.0

(401) Consequently, food occupied the largest percentage. Included here were principally beans and flour making up about two-thirds of the food imports. Next came preserved meat, rice, sugar and fat.

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(402) Breakdown of the individual foods was as follows:

Beans	16,500 tons	35.5%
Flour	12,700	27.3
Preserved meat	5,500	11.8
Rice	3,800	8.2
Sugar	2,500	5.4
Fat	1,000	2.1
Other	4,500	9.7
	<u>46,500</u>	<u>100.0</u>

(403) Included in the 19,800 tons of metals imported from September through December were about 55% ferrous metal products, 25% non-ferrous metal products, and 20% mixed metal products which are broken down as follows:

<u>Non-ferrous Metals</u>		<u>Ferrous Metals</u>	
Brass	4,470 tons	Cast iron	370 tons
Brass Wire	70	Sheet iron	2,120
Copper	20	Iron wire	<u>1,320</u> 3,810 = 19.3%
Copper Wire	20	Steel	1,210
Telephone Cable	360	Sheet steel	1,980
Aluminum	5	Steel wire	<u>410</u> 3,610 = 18.2%
Nickel	<u>2</u>	Tubes	860
	4,947 = 25.0%	Iron hoops	360
		Nails	150
		Cables	160
		Slip rings	450
		Railroad materials	<u>1,570</u> 3,450 = 17.4%
			10,870 = 54.9%
<u>Mixed Metal Products</u>			
Munitions	3,130 tons		
Armored trucks	180		
Miscellaneous	<u>670</u>		
	3,980 = 20.1%		

(404) With the exception of motors and machine tools (See Table in Paragraph 403 of Imports of Goods for Which Weight is not Given) metal deliveries consisted primarily of raw materials and semi-finished goods.

(405) Brass made up the largest portion of non-ferrous metals (91.2% of non-ferrous metals and 22.6% of all metal imports); apparently production of brass in the Soviet Union was inadequate. Telephone cable, copper wire, and other deliveries were consigned for reconstruction of the communication system in the re-occupied regions.

(406) A report on brass imports in October lists imports of 3,070 tons as follows:

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Baku	781 tons
Makachkala	1995 "
Astara	231 "
Krasnovodsk	63 "

(407) A large part of the ferrous metal products was composed of iron sheets and wire as well as steel and steel sheets. Many special steel alloys were also noted. The portion of railroad material was also high. Rails and switches were most widely referred to as needed for reconstruction work.

(408) Finished war material was delivered via Iran in only limited quantities; with the exception of some armored vehicles, munitions (3,130 tons) were most frequently referred to.

(409) For almost all types of goods, Baku was the most important trans-shipment base. A large portion of metal products, food, and chemical imports went via Makhachkala and many food imports went via Iran, while rubber was principally routed through Dzhulfa.

(410) Caustic soda and urotropin were the most important chemicals. 2,000 tons were delivered as follows:

Urotropin	800 tons
Caustic soda	560 "
Explosives	216 "
Trinitrotoluol	111
Graphite products	103
Ethyl alcohol	100
Others	110

Among the other chemicals were deliveries of the following: Sodium nitrate, phenol, ethylene trichloride, sulfides, castor oil, and soap.

(411) Textile deliveries were made up primarily of uniform material: (180,900 meters) and bags for transport of flour, etc. With the exception of shoes, leather shipments were primarily of sole leather. Rubber shipments were primarily of automobile tires.

(412) The delivery of 300 tons of gasoline is surprising. Apparently it was a special mixture.

(413) Under other deliveries were noted 1,014 tons of palmolive oil, 73 tons of cigarette paper, and 54 tons of plexiglass.

17. Imports from the Far East

(414) Only a few messages refer to imports from the Far East. Trans-shipment bases for imported goods were established at Nikolaevsk, Vladivostok, Komsomolsk, Khabarovsk, and Blagoveshchensk. The scope of this operation

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cannot be determined. In a message to Khabarovsk-NKRF it was ordered that in the first ten-day period of July 10, 000 tons of imported goods were to be loaded to eliminate arrears. In the fourth quarter imports of steel, angle irons, preserved meat, leather shoes and rubber boots (6, 000 pairs) were noted via Vladivostok. These imports thus are qualitatively similar to those via Iran.

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APPENDIX I

Budget Plans of the River Fleet(415) NKRF enterprises in Stalingrad for July:

General repairs	300,000 rubles
Current repairs	580,000
Other operations	280,000
New projects	120,000

(416) Uralsk NKRF for July:

Shipbuilding	30,000
General repairs	15,000
Current repairs	65,000
Other operations	55,000
Orders	10,000

(417) Ust-Ussa NKRF for September:

Shipbuilding	140,000
General repairs	60,000
Current repairs	85,000
Other operations	45,000
Industrial operations	1,270,000
Administration & economic projects	265,000

(418) Plant "Molotov" for November:

Shipbuilding	250,000
General repairs	50,000
Contracts for the NKRF	190,000
Contracts for other organizations	210,000

(418) NKRF Plant "Gorodets" for November:

Contracts for the NKRF	40,000
Contracts for other organizations	630,000

(420) Gorkij:

	<u>November</u>	<u>December</u>
Shipbuilding	275,000 rubles	250,000 rubles
General repairs	300,000	300,000
Current repairs	550,000	670,000
Other operations	525,000	450,000
Operations for external orders	280,000	270,000
	1,930,000	1,940,000
Additional contracts	400,000	450,000

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(421) <u>Ufa:</u>	<u>November</u>	<u>December</u>
Shipbuilding	135,000 rubles	120,000 rubles
General repairs	35,000	20,000
Current repairs	150,000	250,000
Other operations	70,000	60,000
Operations for external orders	<u>110,000</u>	<u>100,000</u>
	500,000	550,000
Additional contracts	15,000	25,000
 (422) <u>Molotov:</u>		
Shipbuilding	60,000	30,000
General repairs	28,000	140,000
Current repairs	470,000	850,000
Other operations	330,000	180,000
Operations for external orders	<u>700,000</u>	<u>700,000</u>
	1,850,000	1,900,000
Additional contracts	250,000	300,000
 (423) <u>Kirov:</u>		
Shipbuilding	90,000	77,000
General repairs	15,000	10,000
Current repairs	45,000	88,000
Other operations	30,000	30,000
Operations for external orders	<u>40,000</u>	<u>45,000</u>
	220,000	250,000
Additional contracts	15,000	25,000
 (424) <u>Shipyard in Rybache for the third quarter:</u>		
Shipbuilding	100,000 rubles	
General repairs	100,000	
Current repairs	35,000	
Other operations	<u>35,000</u>	
	270,000	
 (425) <u>Shipyard in Ufa for the third quarter:</u>		
Shipbuilding	400,000	
General repairs	485,000	
Current repairs	250,000	
Other operations	240,000	
Allied operations	<u>325,000</u>	
	1,700,000	

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(426) Shipyard in Orel (150 km north of Molotov) for the third quarter:

Shipbuilding	20,000 rubles
Assembly operations	<u>20,000</u>
	40,000

(427) Shipyard in Cherdyn for the third quarter:

Shipbuilding	150,000
Assembly operations	<u>50,000</u>
	200,000

(428) Budget plans for the third and fourth quarters

Office	Amount	Remarks
Aral Sea	44,000 rubles	Construction in the 3rd quarter
Aral Sea	43,000	Repairs " " " "
Astrakhan	4,640,000	Construction & Repairs in the 3rd quarter
Kirov	130,000	Repairs in the 3rd quarter
Kujbyshev	1,020,000	Repairs " " " "
Kujbyshev	597,000	" " " 4th "
Molotov	106,000	" " " 3rd "
Molotov	383,000	" " " 4th "
Chardzhou	220,000	Construction in the 3rd quarter
Ufa	180,000	Repairs in the 3rd quarter
Ufa	348,000	" " " 4th "
Blagoveshchensk	655,000	" " " 3rd "
Blagoveshchensk	230,000	" " " 4th "
Khabarovsk	448,000	" " " 3rd "
Yakutsk	187,000	" " " 3rd "
Yakutsk	370,000	" " " 4th "
Semipalatinsk	142,000	" " " 3rd "
Semipalatinsk	80,000	" " " 4th "
Uralsk	185,000	" " " 3rd "
Uralsk	13,000 (?)	" " " 4th "

(429) The plan called for 2,100,000 rubles worth of production to be turned out by the NKRF Plant in Saratov during the fourth quarter, but an additional 350,000 rubles worth of production was ordered to make up for under-production in preceding months.

(430)

Office	Amount	Remarks
Kirov NKRF	3.6 million rubles	For production in 4th quarter
Kujbyshev NKRF, Middle Volga Steam- ship Agency	20.6 " "	"

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Office	Amount	Remarks
Zurazhevka, Ship-yard	1.5 million rubles	For production in 4th quarter
Stalingrad, Lower Volga Steamship Agency	34.4 " "	" "

(431) Arkhangelsk for the 4th quarter:

Shipbuilding	750,000 rubles
General repairs	600,000
Current repairs	1,100,000
Other operations	880,000
Contracts for other organizations	<u>1,840,000</u>
	5,170,000
Above-plan authorization for repairs on their own equipment	1,045,000

(432) Vologda NKRF for the 4th quarter:

Shipbuilding	580,000
General repairs	200,000
Current repairs	450,000
Other operations	220,000
Contracts from other organizations	<u>100,000</u>
	1,550,000
Supplementary authorization for repairs on their own inventory	210,000

(433) Uralsk NKRF for the 4th quarter and October:

	<u>4th quarter</u>	<u>October</u>
General repairs	65,000 rubles	30,000 rubles
Current repairs	275,000	20,000
Other operations	170,000	60,000
Allied operations	165,000	50,000

(434)

Office	Contract	Remarks
Blagoveshchensk NKRF, Upper Amur Steamship Agency	2.8 mil. rubles	For winter ship repairs: Current repairs: 1.5 mil. rubles Minor repairs: 1.0 " " Other repairs: 0.3 " "

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Office	Contract	Remarks
Khabarovsk NKRF, Lower Amur Steamship Agency	5.6 mil. rubles	Winter ship repairs: Current repairs: 3.0 mil. rubles Minor repairs: 1.7 " " Other repairs: 1.5 " "
Krasnoyarsk NKRF, Upper Enisej Steam- ship Agency	5.5 " "	Winter ship repairs: Current repairs: 3.2 " " Minor repairs: 1.8 " " Other repairs: 0.5 " "
Ulan Ude NKRF, Selenga Steamship Agency	1.8 " "	Winter ship repairs: Current repairs: 1.0 " " Minor repairs: 0.6 " " Other repairs 0.2 " "
Ust-Ussa NKRF, Northern Steamship Agency	2.0 " "	For 4th quarter: Repairs: 1.3 Heating materials: 0.7

(435) The Water Transport Base in Omsk was authorized 1.6 million rubles for ship repairs during the winter half year 1943/44.

(436) The Water Transport Base in Molotov was authorized an additional 250,000 rubles for ship repairs.

(437) Gorodets NKRF production plan for the year: 8,000,000 rubles
Zvenigovo production plan for the year: 11,720,000 "
Baturino shipbuilding plan for the year: 90,000 "

(438) For repairs at River Fleet Bases in 1944:

Ulan Ude	100,000 rubles
Blagoveshchensk	700,000
Krasnoyarsk	200,000
Khabarovsk	300,000
Irkutsk	75,000

For current ship repairs in 1944:

Gorkij	15,000,000
Kirov	1,600,000
Kujbyshev	8,000,000

(439) Stalingrad NKRF has received the following monetary authorizations for 1944:

1) Fuel	205,000 rubles
Ship repairs	6,668,000

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2) Winter wages for operating personnel	1,628,000 rubles
Bonuses and salary increases	106,000
Other purposes	366,000
3) Wages for shore personnel	1,037,000
Bonuses and salary increases	67,000
Materials	40,000
Training	207,000
Amortization	660,000
4) Wages for communication personnel	150,000
Bonuses and salary increases	10,000
Materials	65,000
Other purposes	104,000
5) Community lodgings	200,000
Wages for administrative and working personnel	311,000
Bonuses and salary increases	20,000
Other purposes	50,000

(440) Following are the production plans for 1944 at the Astrakhan and Kujbyshev NKRF offices:

<u>Astrakhan NKRF</u>	<u>1944 Plan</u>	<u>Plan for the 1st quarter</u>
Shipbuilding	575,000 rubles	50,000 rubles
Major repairs	7,695,000	970,000
Current repairs	11,090,000	5,490,000
Kujbyshev NKRF		
Shipbuilding	3,219,000	350,000
Major repairs	5,770,000	1,550,000
Current repairs	8,917,000	440,000

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APPENDIX II

Transport Plans of the River Fleet

(441) Transport plans for individual steamship agencies have been confirmed as follows: In July Chardzhou-NKRF was to load 48,200 tons of freight as follows:

2,300 tons	Grain
300	Fish
1,150	Timber
1,000	Chemical products
8,900	Fibrin
3,000	Raw materials
6,900	Seeds
5,000	Imported goods
5,150	Other cargoes
5,800	Oil
<u>8,700</u>	Special cargoes
48,200 tons.	

The unloading plan for the same month was set at 46,200 tons.

(442) In July Aralsk-NKRF was to load 22,000 tons of freight as follows:

2,000 tons	Grain
1,200	Fish
1,000	Chemical products
8,200	Fibrin
2,100	Seeds
3,000	Imported goods
4,000	Special cargoes
<u>500</u>	Other cargoes
22,000 tons.	

(443) The following transport plan was set up for Ulan Ude-NKRF in August:

1,300 tons	Salt	(0.5 million ton/kilometers)
1,400	Timber aboard ship	0.6 " "
400	Coal	0.1 " "
400	Fish	0.2 " "
6,500	Live livestock	1.2 " "
4,200	Other cargoes)

(444) The transport plan for the third ten-day period of August for Ust-Ussa is as follows:

8,000 tons	Coal	
1,000	Timber	
6,000	Floated cargoes	
<u>3,500</u>	Miscellaneous	
18,500		(6.7 million tons/kilometers)

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(445) Ilijsk-NKRF was to ship 13,000 tons of freight (3.6 million tons/kilometers) by the end of August.

(446) Timber transport plan for August:

<u>Office</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	
	a) Planned:	b) Above-plan shipments voluntarily proposed:
Ulan-Ude	100,000 tons	30,000 tons
Krasnoyarsk	30,000	75,000
Irkutsk	---	10,000

(447) The following shipments were to be carried out in September:

<u>From Yakutsk</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Millions of ton/kilometers</u>
Grain	2,000 tons	2.9
Salt	1,100	1.0
Coal	4,000	5.3
Minerals	1,500	0.1
Other cargoes	800	1.4
	<u>9,400</u>	<u>10.7</u>

From Semipalatinsk-NKRF

Grain	10,000 tons	3.6
Salt	5,000	2.8
Coal	3,100	1.1
Timber	9,700	2.1
Clay	15,000	4.0
Livestock	4,000	1.5
	<u>45,800</u>	<u>15.1</u>

From Ulan-Ude-NKRF

Salt	800 tons	0.5
Timber	100	?
Livestock	4,000	0.8
Fish	1,400	0.6
Freight from the NK for Foreign Trade	4,500	0.1
Other cargoes	15,000	2.0

(448) In September Kujbyshev-NKRF was transport 401,900 tons of freight or 242.3 million ton/kilometers. Included in this assignment were 97,900 tons of bread grain (48.8 million ton/km) and 5,600 tons of timber aboard ship (4.7 million ton/km).

(449) In order to catch up on arrears, the following NKRF offices had to carry out the following shipments during the first ten-day period of September:

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- A. Blagoveshchensk, a total of 26, 000 tons of freight (15 million ton/km) including:

300 tons	Bread
6, 000	Salt
500	Coal
1, 500	Timber aboard ship;

- B. Khabarovsk, a total of 53, 000 tons of freight (38 million ton/km) including:

20, 000 tons	Oil
1, 500	Salt
2, 000	Coal
1, 500	Timber aboard ship
28, 000	Other cargoes;

- C. Krasnoyarsk, a total of 38, 000 tons of freight (30 million ton/km) including:

6, 000 tons	Bread
500	Salt
5, 000	Coal
2, 000	Timber aboard ship
18, 000	Timber in rafts;

- D. Irkutsk, a total of 20, 000 tons of freight (3. 5 million ton/km) including:

2, 000 tons	Bread
5, 300	Salt
10, 000	Coal
2, 000	Timber aboard ship
3, 500	Timber in rafts.

(450) In order to eliminate arrears in the second ten-day period of September, Novosibirsk was to ship 120, 000 tons of cargo (30 million ton/kilometers).

(451) In the third ten-day period of September the Enisej Steamship Agency at Krasnoyarsk was to ship 54, 000 tons of freight (40 million ton/kilometers).

(452) Offices of the NK for the River Fleet had to make grain shipments in September as follows:

<u>Office</u>	<u>Amount</u>
Molotov-NKRF	6, 900 tons
Molotov-NKRF	14, 540
Kirov-NKRF	11, 000
Kujbyshev-NKRF	38, 000

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<u>Office</u>	<u>Amount</u>
Saratov-NKRF	31,400 tons
Ilijsk-NKRF	700
Omsk-NKRF	22,000
Omsk-NKRF	12,000
Gorkij-NKRF	2,000
Belaya Steamship Agency in Ufa	4,100

(453) Third quarter transport plans for various NKRF offices:

A. Gorkij-NKRF	Cement	30,000 tons	(5 ton/km
	Minerals	200,000	50
	Coal	25,000	13.2
	Metals	60,000	36
	Timber	300,000	72
	Chemical products	32,000	16.6
	Other cargoes	792,000	9
	Floated cargoes	1,100,000	161
B. Kujbyshev-NKRF	Grain	180,000	101
	Cement	45,000	23
	Minerals	100,000	20
	Coal	10,000	0.6
	Metals	30,000	18
	Timber	100,000	33.4
	Chemical products	22,000	9.2
	Floated cargoes	900,000	660
C. Stalingrad-NKRF	Other cargoes	200,000	90
	Grain	50,000	17.5
	Salt	440,000	450
	Minerals	30,000	4.5
	Coal	30,000	21
	Metals	25,000	15
	Timber	40,000	35
	Chemical products	12,000	6
D. Ust-Ussa-NKRF	Other cargoes	125,000	87.4
	Floated cargoes	0	0
	Grain	11,000	3.6
	Salt	1,000	0.3
	Minerals	3,000	1.2
	Coal	42,000	24.8
	Metals	1,000	0.4
	Timber	15,000	5
	Other cargoes	15,000	?
	Oil	500	0.4
	Floated cargoes	200,000	49

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E. Molotov-NKRF	Grain	18,000 tons	62 ton/km
	Salt	85,000	66.7
	Cement	20,000	15
	Minerals	30,000	9
	Coal	45,000	16.5
	Metals	120,000	62
	Timber	45,000	13.5
	Chemical products	45,000	34.6
	Other cargoes	200,000	86
	Floated cargoes	2,600,000	900
F. Uralsk-NKRF	Grain	15,000	3.8
	Salt	2,000	0.6
	Minerals	3,000	0.8
	Timber	16,000	4.4
	Chemical products	9,000	2.7
	Other cargoes	8,000	2.7
	Oil	2,000	1.3
		Floated cargoes	4,000
G. Ufa-NKRF	Grain	62,000	16.8
	Salt	6,000	1.3
	Cement	5,000	1.4
	Minerals	40,000	5.6
	Coal	2,000	0.6
	Metals	8,000	3.8
	Timber	60,000	10.8
	Other cargoes	45,000	18
		Floated cargoes	150,000

(454) In the third quarter NKRF offices were to transship cargo as follows:

<u>Office</u>	<u>Cargo</u>
Kirov-NKRF	40,000 tons
Gorkij-NKRF	620,000
Ufa-NKRF	60,000
Molotov-NKRF	300,000
Stalingrad-NKRF	300,000
Kujbyshev-NKRF	350,000
Uralsk-NKRF	10,000

(455) The barge towing plan for certain offices was reduced as follows:

Molotov	to 290,000 tons	=	80,000,000 tons/kilometers
Khabarovsk	15,000		2,500,000
Krasnoyarsk	48,000		45,000,000
Yakutsk	15,000		13,700,000

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(456) During the first half of October Blagoveshchensk-NKRF and Novosibirsk-NKRF were to make the following shipments:


Blagoveshchensk	27,000 tons	=	0.8 million ton/kilometers
Novosibirsk	135,000		42.0.

(457) In the second half of October Stalingrad-NKRF was to ship 2,000 tons of gravel to Astrakhan. During the fourth quarter Stalingrad-NKRF was to transship 182,000 tons of cargo, 91,000 tons by aid of mechanical equipment and 91,000 tons manually.

(458) During the fourth quarter NKRF offices were to transship cargo as follows:


<u>Office</u>	<u>Cargo</u>	<u>Mechanically</u>	<u>Manually</u>
Molotov-NKRF	217,000 tons	119,000 tons	98,000 tons
Ufa-NKRF	35,000	20,800	14,200
Kirov-NKRF	24,000	7,900	16,100.

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**IDENTIFIED AIR LINES OF THE CIVIL AIR FLEET
AS OF 15 DECEMBER 1943**

14168 CIA, 4-53



14167 CIA 453