

IN REPLY PLEASE  
REFER TO:



13/10/43  
Telephone CIRC 6723  
A. G. Cole  
Personality  
Manual

**BRITISH POLITICAL WARFARE MISSION  
NEW YORK OFFICE  
Room 709**

**9 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA, NEW YORK**

October 30th 1943.

My dear Bill:

I am returning to you herewith the most interesting monograph on the personality of Adolf Hitler which you lent me. I have now completed my reading of this but should very much like to go over it again if, therefore, as you very kindly suggested you could let me have a copy myself I should be immensely grateful.

I agree with you that the work does not contain any original material but it is extremely useful to have all the psychological aspects of the case gathered together in one place. There is no doubt that it is a valuable study and I am most grateful to you for letting me read it.

With every good wish,

Yours,

John S. Wheeler-Bennett.

Major General William J. Donovan,  
Office of Strategic Services,  
Washington D.C.

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**  
**WASHINGTON, D. C.**

12932  
HHP, Gately  
x analysis  
x Personal  
x Internal, N/A

27 October 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL DONOVAN

FROM: James R. Murphy *JRM*

The history of the attached is briefly as follows:

Some weeks ago Henry Field stated that the report on Hitler had been prepared and he asked whether we would be willing to pay a relatively nominal sum to cover the expense of typing the report for mimeographing. This I agreed to.

Yesterday he brought up thirty copies of the report, together with a suggested distribution.


First, I do not think the report should contain the name of OSS on the cover nor should it be distributed as an OSS document. If it is distributed by OSS, it should be done on the basis that it was handed us by the author and is simply being forwarded for any possible interest. I understand that Henry has already handed a copy to the President. No other copies have been sent out. Before doing anything further with this I would like to have your comments on how it should be handled, and whether OSS should handle it at all.

*distribution sheet  
not to be used  
will be placed in  
copy to be placed  
in file  
J.R.M.*

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION**

**INTEROFFICE MEMO**



**FROM:** Major Harold A. Jones

**DATE** May 9, 1942

**To:** Col. Wm. J. Donovan

**SUBJECT:** Situation in Hawaii Relative to the Unified Command.

1. Supplementing the conversation between you, John Ford and myself yesterday, I am paraphrasing several interviews between me, Alec Budge and Murry Brophy. I took notes on them and Brophy asked Budge to reduce his comments to writing. Alec Budge is the most influential and powerful capitalist in the Hawaiian territory. He is an intimate of and advisor to General Emmons.

**BUDGE:** The present unified command exists only on paper. We must have a really working, coordinated command by the Army and Navy right down the line, without fear or favor to civilian, Army or Navy personnel, and without sentiment or deference to rank. We must recognize ability and give ability authority to go to it.

**JONES:** I thought there was a unified central command, and that under the agreement between Admiral Nimitz and General Emmons the Army was to take over the civil government under martial law and the defense of the Islands leaving the Navy free to operate as a striking force with Nimitz in supreme command as to defense and offense.

**BUDGE:** Yes, that is true on paper, but it doesn't work. It is just like old times. Emmons wants to get away from this command and doesn't want to get halled up. His Executive Officer, Colonel Green is a fine fellow, but he is not tough enough. Neither Emmons or Green are familiar with civil government. We need somebody tough, with a knowledge of civil government and business methods. Trubee Davidson was spoken of, but some people differed and nothing came of it. We need a man like Hugh Johnson.

Col. Wm. J. Donovan

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May 9, 1942

**SECRET**

JONES: I have read the order invoking martial law and also the agreement between Nimitz and Emmons as to division of powers. Under these, Emmons could make a go of it and do all the things you say he should do.

BUDGE: Emmons should get an order from the President or Marshall to report directly to Nimitz. The streamlining in Washington is also on paper and any action by Emmons goes through the old General Staff procedure. Emmons has made several attempts to get things done and has had his ears pinned down by the General Staff. Now, he hesitates to act because of fear of criticism in Washington.

JONES: How about the civilian government?

BUDGE: That's under the Department of Interior. Governor Poindexter's appointment has expired so he doesn't give a damn. There is no cooperation between the old civilian government and the War Department; no delegation by Emmons of his civil powers as Military Governor. He tries to do it himself and as a result nothing much gets done.

The Military Governor should be given a free hand by the War Department and Nimitz to use his best judgment, and the War Department should back him against criticism by other departments, such as the Interior. But instead of that, the War Department criticizes him every time he steps on the toes of the Interior Department.

From a military standpoint he has done exceptionally well. He is a fine soldier and a good military man. It is only where civilian population and civil matters are concerned that he doesn't do so well. This is due to the reasons I have given above, and to the petty jealousies of the various government departments operating locally.

Another thing, Emmons has no money. He has to get all money relative to civilian government from the Department of Interior and the Office of Civilian Defense. He cannot rent an office building without asking. He cannot even install telephones.



**SECRET**

Col. Wm. J. Donovan

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May 9, 1944

BUDGE: On several occasions he has incurred small (Cont'd) financial liabilities and Washington has given him a bawling out.

JONES: Why does Emmons bother with all these details, such as telephones and rent?

BUDGE: Just because he is Emmons. He should not be bothered with this detail, but it should be delegated to a Deputy Military Governor with the rank of a Brigadier, a man who could devote all of his time to these responsibilities. Emmons could then do what he's best suited to do - defend the Islands.

We must have some individual who is aggressive, will accept responsibility, and with sufficient authority with respect for his position or anyone else's position.

That's a big order. No Army man will take any civil responsibility that he can duck. No Army man will ever initiate anything that will make him more work or create responsibility, and neither Army or Navy will give any civilians authority to do the work which is needed, although there are plenty of good able civilians ready and willing to go to work and get the job done.

JONES: What do you think about the Japanese situation?

BUDGE: I don't like to comment on that. It would seem to me that before there is any talk of isolating the Japanese or moving them to the mainland or another island, we should first find out whether we have the equipment to move them and to feed them if they are moved. If we haven't got the equipment to move them or feed them, why talk about it. It is my opinion that we do not have the ships or equipment either to move them or feed them if they were moved. If we put them in a concentration camp we still have not got the ships to bring food in from the mainland to feed them. This isn't California where the Japs are a small minority. Here the Japanese are a majority and other races are in the minority.

Col. Wm. J. Donovan

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May 19,

**SECRET**

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(Cont'd) I see it, more or less pragmatic. We can't  
move them and we can't put them in concentration  
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or feed them. We've got to keep them here and  
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in case of an attack.

*H.A.J.*

Harold A. Jones  
Major, U.S.M.C.R.

**SECRET**

Major Harold A. Jones

May 9, 1942

Col. Wm. J. Donovan

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Col. Wm. J. Donovan

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**SECRET**

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Col. Wm. J. Donovan

May 9, 1942

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Harold A. Jones  
Major, U.S.M.C.R.

HAJ:hrb



Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1

THIS FILE SHOULD BE RETURNED TO JAMES R. MURPHY

*by courier*

*Secret*

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1

Hawaii 6130  
 x Brophy  
 x Jones

May 1, 1942

MEMORANDUM

TO: Colonel William J. Donovan  
 FROM: Murray Brophy  
 RE: Report on Territory of Hawaii

Major Harold Jones and I arrived in Honolulu on April 21, 1942, Major Jones being en route to Australia. Upon our arrival we paid our respects to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, Rear Admiral David Bagley.

1. An immediate and careful check of radio activities in the Territory of Hawaii, from the standpoint of propaganda and morale, revealed that the situation there required instant attention. Two of the four existing stations in the Territory were off the air. One of these stations is located at Hilo and the other on the Island of Lihue. We learned also that the two important stations in Honolulu (KGMB and KGU) would be forced off the air because of lack of tubes, acetate records and other equipment.

2. We conferred with General Delos C. Emmons, Military Governor and Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. General Emmons was quite frank in stating that he was worried about the morale problem because of the lack of radio entertainment for the troops in the Territory. The Territory, at the present time, is under military government and as a necessary precaution is blacked out, and no individuals are permitted on the streets after 7:00 p.m. It is apparent that with such stringent regulations

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and consequent lack of entertainment the troops are becoming restless and, to be frank, General Emmons was apprehensive concerning the inevitable reaction. Therefore, we were faced with the immediate problem of keeping all stations on the air in order to provide morale building and sustaining entertainment and programs.

3. My first step was to cable our San Francisco office and have shipped by Clipper the requisite equipment to keep the two Honolulu stations functioning, and to obtain additional materiel so that the two smaller stations (on Hilo and Lihue) could go on the air.

4. In order that there be a constant flow of programs from the States for rebroadcasting in the Territory, we arranged with Miss Burke, of our San Francisco Office, to schedule twelve hours' broadcasting of all forms of entertainment to be sent over point-to-point transmission: San Francisco - Honolulu. This will be of the same type of show which was broadcast to General MacArthur and his men on Iatan. The detailed plans for this have been completed and the twelve hours programming will go into effect May 2 and will be received by the two main stations in Honolulu (KGMB and KGU) who in turn will feed the smaller stations. The Honolulu reception and distribution will be under the supervision of G-2. Colonel Kieker, of General Emmons' staff, will be attached to our office here for the purpose of supervising the entire operation.

5. It is obvious that this was a most difficult task to complete on instant notice, and much credit should be given to Miss Burke and her associates for the perfect coordination and functioning displayed in San Francisco.

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6. The special transmission for the Hawaiian Territory will be sent out via one of the RCA transmitters at San Francisco, for which we have contracted.

7. The San Francisco office has arranged with the major networks for permission to use the type of programs deemed most desirable.

8. Details also have been completed for the broadcast of a 15-minute editorial roundup, and in addition we hope to have commentators of the standing of Kaltenborn and Swing provide additional news discussion.

9. So that all of the troops scattered in outposts throughout the Territory may have available these broadcasts, we are arranging at the request of General Emmons to purchase 1250 medium priced portable battery receivers for distribution in the field there.

10. Upon our return to San Francisco we shipped immediately 500,000 copies of our production pamphlet of the President's speech to the Emperor of Japan, issued on December 6, 1941. This speech is in both English and Japanese, and obviously should have excellent propaganda value among the Japanese on the various islands, as well as the Portuguese, Chinese and native Hawaiians.

11. General Emmons was quite pleased with the steps taken towards morale programming, and he advised us that he would write to the Secretary of War, describing our "splendid cooperation", or, as he frankly stated, "without your help we could not get along."

12. I am attaching hereto a list of persons with whom Major Jones and I discussed the details of the overall picture, and who are most grateful and appreciative of the aid to be provided by the CBI. Also attached are secret memoranda from Major Jones which I should like to discuss with you in person.

April 25, 1942

S E C R E T

TO: Colonel Donovan  
 FROM: Major Harold Jones  
 SUBJECT: Organization of office in Hawaii

- i. Murray Brophy will give you a complete verbal report relative to FIS, particularly radio. I believe remarkable progress has been made. Both the Army and Navy were a little hostile in the beginning but very soon began to cooperate 100% and are now very enthusiastic.

In establishing an office in the Islands, the following things should be remembered:

(a) The Islands are under martial law with General Emmons in complete command of the civil population and all political functions but with Admiral Nimitz as supreme commander of the united command.

(b) The Navy, of course, believes that it could run the Territory better than the Army. The Army believes it is running the Territory better than the Navy could do it.

(c) The real civil power in the Islands has been, and still is, the "Big Five," a group of capitalistic interests consisting of:

American Factors, Ltd., dominated by Alexander Walker.  
 Castle & Cooke, Ltd., dominated by A. G. Budge.  
 Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd., dominated by John Waterhouse, with J. Platt Cooke functioning as head, due to sickness.  
 C. Brewer Co., Ltd., dominated by Philip E. Spalding.  
 T. W. Davies, Ltd., dominated by John C. Russell.

Besides these, another powerful factor is the Oahu Railway & Land Company, dominated by Walter Hillingham.

These interests have been running the Islands for the past seventy-five years and no military government can possibly come in and run this place without full cooperation of the Big Five interests.

With the above in mind the organization recommended for these Islands consists of the following:

- (a) Someone from the mainland who is not identified with any of the Big Five or Army and Navy, to act as the representative of the Coordinator in the Territory. This person should

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have sufficient prestige and tact that he can get along with all three factors, i.e., the Big Five, the Army and the Navy, and sufficient ability to, at the same time, oversee all of the functions of the CCX.

(b) A liaison office composed of an Army Intelligence man, a Naval Intelligence man and one other Army or Navy Reserve officer who has lived in Hawaii and is really more representative of the Big Five than the armed forces. In other words, someone of the Big Five in uniform. This man should have to be very carefully picked because there is also jealousy among the Big Five and Walter Dillingham.

(c) One key man representing David Bruce's department. This operation should be rather extensive because Hawaii should be an excellent final training ground for Bruce's man.

(d) One man to conduct a listening post such as Duxton conducts in New York.

(e) A small staff of experts picked particularly with reference to the needs of the Naval Intelligence, G-2 and Fleet Intelligence in the Territory.

(f) An FIS operation such as recommended by Murray Brophy.

All in all the organization here would be fairly sizeable. Brophy and I both think it would be a very important one because eventually this Territory will be the Fleet's springboard for any Pacific war, and of course the crossroads through which practically all supplies and troops will pass to reach the Pacific front. In establishing an office here care should be taken at all times to point out to the Naval and Army authorities that our function is to coordinate and augment and not to depose or dispossess; that we are really a Quartermaster's store for information and assistance and not a super Gestapo which aims to oust all the other intelligence services. Whoever comes out here as Number One man in this office should have a good long talk with Murray Brophy.

We already have some or less lined up who will be the liaison in G-2, to wit, Captain Albright. Suggest that a Fleet intelligence, rather than ONI, name a liaison man for the Navy, or perhaps both would name one. Suggest that Matt Cooke, if he can get away, be recommissioned in the Air Corps in A2 as a major and act as liaison between the Committee, the Air Corps and, indirectly, the Big Five.

Mr. Thacker, selected by Brophy and myself, as Civil Liaison, will do a good job in that capacity.

H. J.



April 25, 1942

S E C R E T

FROM: Major Harold Jones  
TO: Col. Donovan

SUBJECT: Japanese foreign legion for service in middle east.

1. This is a pet idea of General Emmons. He has already presented it to the General Staff without any results. In no way is this memorandum quoting him but I am sure that he would be exceedingly happy if the plan would receive proper attention and be placed into effect.
2. There are in the Islands approximately 3,000 Japanese, or part Japanese, under arms and in the armed services. These are the outgrowth of the old National Guard, draftees and Police Department. A little campaign would probably produce another battalion. At present these armed men are being used as labor battalions. They are under constant surveillance and in case of invasion or outbreak, would be a source of real danger. It is the opinion of most military men that they would all be shot by the white troops the moment there was any threat of invasion. Moreover, they might be a cause of a serious internal trouble if rumour arose that there was an outbreak among the Japanese.
3. Emmons and other men are of the opinion that practically every man of this group would volunteer for foreign service if it were against the Germans or Italians. The 3,000 or 4,000 men recruited in Honolulu could be augmented by perhaps that many more in California. The men here are well trained and properly officered and could probably absorb the California contingent so that within a few months, with training in Arizona or New Mexico, they should be an effective fighting unit. They are used to hot weather and the kind of climate they would probably meet in the middle east, can go long distances without as much food and water as white troops, and would make effective fighting units in the middle east.
4. From a propaganda standpoint it would seem a natural. The idea of native born Japanese fighting the Germans would do much to prevent any psychological union between the Nazi and Japanese military casts. It would also be very helpful in Hawaii where there would still remain approximately 175,000 Japanese. In summarizing, the plan would immediately remove the element of the Japanese who would really be effective fighting men in case of an uprising or invasion. It should have very valuable propaganda usages.
5. It would place in the middle east a well-disciplined and valuable fighting unit, most of it already trained and partially equipped.

H. J.

April 25, 1942

S E C R E T

TO: Col. Donovan  
FROM: Major Harold Jones  
COPY TO: Major Buxton

SUBJECT: An outpost listening post in Hawaii

1. This is a follow-up of the cablegram heretofore sent you. It is the pet idea of General Emmons and would also meet with the highest approval of the Fleet Intelligence and, I believe, Admiral Nimitz.
2. As Emmons puts it, this is the focal point in the Pacific war. People drift in here from the Dutch East Indies, Australia, the southern Pacific islands and elsewhere. It is very easy to know of their arrival and since they have nowhere to go, it is easy to round them up and talk to them under ideal conditions. A clever man, by the judicious spending of a little entertainment money, could interview, or cause to be interviewed, practically every person travelling between the Far East and the Pacific Coast. The operation would be conducted practically the same as Buxton's operation in New York except that it would be a little less obvious and a little more under cover.
3. The work would be done in close cooperation with the office of Naval Intelligence, Fleet Intelligence and G-2.
4. Murry Brophy has memos in his possession from Fleet Intelligence relative to the subject which he will present to you.
5. We believe that this place is of such importance that a topnotcher should be in command, the whole operation here including FIS and all the other functions of the Coordinator's office. This man would probably do a great deal of the outpost listening post work and at the same time supervise the other operations.

H. J.

- Major General David Bagley, Commandant 13th Naval District.
- Capt. Jari, Chief of Staff, 13th Naval District.
1. Commander John Boyd, Aide to Commandant 13th Naval District.
2. Charles Bryant, Assistant to Chief of Staff in charge of air-sea transportation.
3. Capt. J. R. Laughon, Captain of the Yard.
- Major Jones called and paid his respects to General Nichols, commending the Marines in the Territory of Hawaii.
4. Lt. Tolson, attached to Commander John Ford's staff.
5. Lt. Sage of Commander Ford's staff.
6. Mr. Frank Edwards, Manager of H.H.U. Radio Station.
7. J. Platt Cook, Executive Vice President, Alexander & Baldwin, sugar, oil, and pineapple interests. Director of the Bishop First National Bank.
8. Mr. Wiley H. Allen, Editor, Honolulu Star Bulletin. Director of H.H.U. and member of the Executive Committee.
9. Captain Joseph A. Farrington, owner and publisher of Honolulu Star Bulletin. Former Washington newspaper correspondent and personal friend of David Bagley.
10. Delegate to Congress Samuel Rildor King.
11. Paul Pinderson, Radio Critic Honolulu Star Bulletin.
12. Mr. Harry Pilsen, former member of IOWA staff, radio commentator, now civilian engineer Col. Pilsen's staff, G-2 US Army, Offices Dillingham Transportation Building.
13. Col. Fielder, on General Burns' staff, head of G-2, Territory of Hawaii.
14. Capt. Harry Aldright, Assistant to Col. Fielder, in charge of press censorship.
15. Col. Cobb, Aide to General Burns.
16. Lt. Col. A. G. Gentry, Deputy Chief of Staff to General Burns.
17. Lt. Col. Gentry, Command of Signal Corps, Territory of Hawaii.

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19. Capt. George Sampson, Assistant to Major Decker, U. S. Signal Corp.
20. Commander Hedio Dwyer, Charge of Public Relations on General Mitsis staff, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, Supreme Commander of the Territory of Hawaii and Pacific area.
21. Admiral Chester W. Mitsis, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, Executive Offices at Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, Flag Ship U.S.S. Pennsylvania.
22. Edward T. Layton, Fleet Intelligence Officer.
23. Lt. General Dolos C. Knapp, Commanding the Hawaiian Department, Headquarters Fort Shafter, Honolulu, T.H. Military Governor of the Territory of Hawaii with Executive Offices in Iolani Palace, Honolulu, T. H., with Col. Green in charge.
24. Robert L. Shivers, Head of the F.B.I.
25. Mr. Murphy, Assistant to Mr. Shivers, F.B.I.
26. Mr. Alex G. Budge, President of Castle & Cooke; President of Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association, President of Hawaiian Hotels Ltd., Vice President of the Matson Navigation Co., Executive Vice President of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co., and on the Board of Directors of our Banks, Trust Companies, Plantations and other important corporations. Mr. Budge is considered the key man from the community's standpoint as to shipping and is in charge of all priorities. He is the civilian liaison between the Military Governor and the civilian community. His judgement and importance is considered paramount as far as the Territory of Hawaii is concerned.
27. Ray Coll, Sr., Editor of the Honolulu Advertiser, morning newspaper of Hawaii, which owns radio station KGU.
28. Ray Coll, Jr., City Editor of Honolulu Morning Advertiser.
29. Frank Treman, Resident Manager for United Press.
30. George Street, Resident Manager for R.C.A. Communications.
31. Governor Joseph B. Poindexter, Governor of the Territory of Hawaii, and representative of the President of the United States.
32. Col. Walter Dunham, Executive Secretary and Military Aide to Governor Poindexter.
33. Commander B. Wayne Todd, Naval aide to Governor Poindexter.
34. Mr. Frank Leary, Head of Civilian Defense for the Territory of Hawaii. Owner of a large dairy and a successful cattle and swine man here in the Territory.

36. Mr. Herbert E. Hart, Managing Director and Assistant Treasurer of the Hawaiian Hotels Ltd.
37. Mr. Garnet Watson, Manager of the Moana Hotel.
38. Mr. Walter Short, Assistant Manager of the Moana Hotel.
39. Mr. Randolph Aldridge, Manager of the Hawaiian Automobile Transport Co.
40. Mr. Moran, cartoonist on staff of O-2 with offices in the Dillingham Transportation Bldg.

In addition to the above-named individuals we had present at the meeting we held at the Moana Hotel for the radio and broadcast people of the Territory -

1. Mr. Sara Parker, President of Consolidated Amusement Co., largest stockholders in Station KCMR.
2. Mr. Edward Morrell, President and Managing Director of Radio Station KCMR.
3. Mr. H. A. Mulrony, Manager of Radio Station KGU, which is owned by the Honolulu Advertiser.
4. Mr. Mike Fern, son of Charles Fern, owner and publisher of the Garden Island Daily Newspaper and Radio Station. Island of Kauai. Address Lihai, Kauai.
5. Mr. William O. Paine, Assistant Manager of KGU.



April 22, 1948

Col. Harvay  
Major Harold Jones  
Major Buxton

COPY TO:  
SUBJECT:

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The work would be done in close cooperation with the office of Naval Intelligence, Fleet Intelligence and G2.

Murray Trophy has memo in his possession from Fleet Intelligence relative to the subject which he will present to you.

We believe that this place is of such importance that a topographer should be in command, the whole operation here including G2 and all the other functions of the coordinating office. This man would probably do a great deal of the outpost listening post work and at the same time supervise the other operations.

*A.J.*



April 22, 1945

Mr. Murphy  
Director, War Relocation Authority

Dear Mr. Murphy:

My arrival in Washington, will find that he has had some trouble with Mr. Alivara in a clinic. Upon telegraphic suggestion by Murphy and Ginzburg, Alivara and Frank were asked to visit around the various broadcasters, newspaper people, etc. to get a sample of public opinion relative to radio, i.e. what was being done, how it was received and what should be done. General Gurnow gave them letters to General Deane, Admiral Nimitz and Governor Pollock. Riding on these letters Alivara immediately packed into GH, and off with the best intentions in the world but completely forgetting what he was really asked to do.

Upon Murphy's and my arrival we were met at the Clippor by Mr. Carl Hacker who, while like most energetic men, is still very well thought of by some of the more and other responsible people in the community. He was impressed by his ability to get things done and immediately had a check on him by FBI, Military Intelligence and business sources, all of whom reported very favorably. Murphy then permitted Hacker to help me get around and see the persons he had to see, such as General Gurnow, Admiral Nimitz, etc., all of whom I did know personally and well.

He did not appear around to meet these gentlemen and they look offended and became offensive. I did not say much to him to quiet down and take it easy but he would work out but he finally got mad and started shouting it with Murphy, saying that Ginzburg was not his man to be the chief man in Australia and that he was being neglected in not being taken into consideration and all operations in Honolulu.

It is noted that Alivara has made some kick to Ginzburg and I would think you had better have the true

*H.J.*

*I don't think Stevens will play*

*with B. R. W.F.C. Commission*

April 20, 1948.

CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum

From - Murray Brophy  
To - Col. Donovan and Dr. Barber

Subject: The analysis of Martial Law and the Military Government in Hawaii.

- 1 - The Territory of Hawaii is the only large civil territory ever under complete martial law for any length of time in the history of the United States, with the exception, of course, of the Southern States after the Civil War.
- 2 - It is quite likely that before this war is over that other combat areas, particularly the Pacific West coast, will likewise be placed under martial law. It would seem, therefore, that an immediate study should be made of the martial law, its effects and the workings of the Military Government in Hawaii by our research and analysis department. This may impinge upon some other agency but we are best equipped to make it and arrangements should be made.
- 3 - General Emons would greatly appreciate if a thorough study by competent experts be made of the whole situation for future reference and will give every assistance to such experts. Such a study, which would note the good points and bad points of the operations in Hawaii, should be invaluable.

MURRAY BROPHY

April 25, 1943

SECRET

TO: Major Harold Jones  
Col. Donovan

SUBJECT: Japanese foreign legion for service in middle east.

1. This is a pet idea of General Bunker. He has already presented it to the General Staff without any result. In no way is this memorandum quoting him but I am sure that he would be exceedingly happy if the plan would receive proper attention and be placed into effect.

2. There are in the Islands approximately 3,000 Japanese, or part Japanese, under arms and in the armed services. These are the outgrowth of the old National Guard, draftees and Police Department. A little campaign would probably produce another battalion. At present these armed men are being used as labor battalions. They are under constant surveillance and in case of invasion or outbreak, would be a source of real danger. It is the opinion of most military men that they would all be shot by the white troops the moment there was any threat of invasion. Moreover, they might be a cause of a serious internal trouble if rumour arose that there was an outbreak among the Japanese.

Bunker and other men are of the opinion that practically every man of this group would volunteer for foreign service if it were against the Germans or Italians. The 3,000 or 4,000 men recruited in Honolulu could be augmented by perhaps that many more in California. The men here are well trained and properly officered and could probably absorb the California contingent so that within a few months, with training in Arizona or New Mexico, they should be an effective fighting unit. They are used to hot weather and the kind of climate they would probably meet in the middle east, can go long distances without as much food and water as white troops, and would make effective fighting units in the middle east.

3. From a propaganda standpoint it would seem a natural. The idea of native born Japanese fighting the Germans would do much to prevent any psychological union between the Nazis and Japanese military caste. It would also be very helpful in Hawaii where there would still remain approximately 170,000 Japanese. In summarizing, the plan would immediately remove the element of the Japanese who would really be effective fighting men in case of an uprising or invasion. It should have very valuable propaganda usage.

4. It would place in the middle east a well-disciplined and valuable fighting unit, most of it already trained and partially equipped.

*H.J.*

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE: May 3, 1942

TO: Col. William J. Donovan

FROM: Murry Brophy *A.B.*

SUBJECT:

Attached please find a memorandum from Alex Budge. Mr. Budge, I believe, is one of the most influential and biggest men on the Island today. He is President of Castle and Cooke, President of the Hawaiian Sugar Plantation Association, and, I believe, is President of the Matsen Navigation Company.

He has no axe to grind, is just a real patriotic citizen like you and myself, and his criticism is, I believe, quite timely. He, obviously would rather not let too many people know that he has written this memorandum. I thought it should be brought to the President's attention.

There ultimately must be a working central command, coordinated as between the Army and Navy right down the line. This command should act without fear or favor as to civilian, Army or Navy personnel. Such a command must overlook sentiment, must overlook rank, must recognize ability and give that ability authority to go to work.

To be effectively defended, Hawaii must be recognized as a war zone and military and naval precedent and redtape eliminated. The Military Governor should have an able representative in Washington, who can call on any department of the government to aid in clearing problems which arise. The Military Governor should be able to communicate with this individual by telephone at will.

It so happens that because of redtape and cumbersome system, I have done a great deal of telephoning to our offices in San Francisco and Washington on behalf of the Army - particularly with reference to supply and shipping.

It has been apparent during the past few months that while technically under martial law the Commanding General can do whatever he wants to expedite defense, actually Washington has let it be known that he has to be very wary of Federal statutes and normal administrative departments. As a result, there is a hesitancy to act because of a fear of criticism from Washington.

The General in Command under martial law should be advised from the War Department that he is to act in accordance with his best judgment and not have any hesitancy in so doing. He should know that the War Department will back him and his actions as against the criticism of other and possibly more politically-minded departments.

Martial law has carried on exceptionally well, all things considered, in my opinion. However, again we have a residue of civil government which is loath to act, inclined to play politics and by not acting throw a monkey-wrench in the machinery of progress. This must finally be made cooperative with the services, without respect to dignity, title and politics, if we are going to do a job.

There are too many authorities out of Washington operating locally who do not recognize the necessity for coordinating everything through the Military Governor's office. This must finally be achieved.

The Commanding General in Hawaii, from a tactical standpoint, covers a tremendous area. He should not be bothered with the details of administration of the Military Governor's office. This work should be delegated probably to a General with administrative experience, in whom the Commanding General has absolute confidence. The one would then be free to devote his time to the tactical command and its responsibilities, and the other to the administrative requirements of the office, which are many and varied.

All orders issued from Washington to administrative departments of the Territorial or Federal governments located in Hawaii should be issued subject to the approval of the Commanding General.

A definition of the duties of the General Staff and those of the Office of the Military Governor should be made to prevent overlapping and repetition of effort.

Streamlining is a good word.

Army and Navy training and routine does not permit direct line through connections with action. Something will start at the top of the line, a portion of the story may be given to a civilian, then it is taken up by another department and finally there is the probability of a colossal mistake because the whole problem was not placed in any one individual's hands to work out, as it would be in ordinary commercial life.

In other words, a General may carry on so far, then a Colonel picks up, then a Major comes into the picture, then a Lieutenant, and here possibly some ranks from the Navy for good measure - the civilian element answering questions of all sorts but never getting the whole problem from anyone. A decision is then made under pressure that can very well be costly or disastrous. There is a lack of disposition or means in their routine of having the responsibility focus on any one individual and letting that individual get his teeth in the job and carry through to accomplishment. Jealousy, rank, prerogative because of peace time organization, et cetera.

There is far too much in the way of directives, paper work, endorsements and time spent keeping the individual officer's record clean from a stenographic standpoint. The men in both services are masters of the technical art of "buck passing" and the system permits it to the nth degree, particularly as far as any disposition to pin responsibility on an individual. The only time this can occur is when an individual is aggressive and takes the responsibility regardless of results to his person.

There should be real "at the table" cooperation between the services and the civilian community. There should be some over-all authority that can take responsibility and use judgment where a conflict of the services is apparent, or where because of technicalities they must of necessity conflict. In other words, the government inter-departmental routine and safeguards cannot stand up and do an effective job under war conditions. Someone must be in a position to go, make mistakes and even waste money if necessary, yet in an overall position to accomplish the greatest result with the maximum of speed. At the present time, under the present system, there is magnificent waste as compared with what would actually be accomplished if set up in the above manner.



I have often commented that the services were adept at readily finding the hardest way to accomplish a task. There seems to be no basis for believing that an Army officer can step into a civilian job, which has required civilian experience from ten to fifteen years and assume that the Army officer with his background and no experience whatever can do the job satisfactorily on a few weeks experience. Instead of using on their problems men who should know from experience how to accomplish the work, there is almost a policy of putting anyone in with a uniform to solve the problem.

Experienced, tactical Army officers are scarce. Then why take an artillery man and put him in control of food or the securing of materials and supplies, about which he can know little or nothing. Why not endeavor, at least on some basis, to work into these positions civilians who have had experience, who are patriotic and can do the job much more economically and efficiently. This would leave officer personnel for the jobs in which they are supposed to have adequate training.

Army officers as a rule being foggy about how to do a job are prone to hold large meetings - that is, ten or twelve individuals, civilian and Army alike - on very small subjects. As in all large meetings, they don't usually get anywhere and a great deal of time is wasted on the part of those attending. A time rationing department for officer personnel, if it could be accomplished, would be a good thing. Their time and everybody else's time is used up as a matter of fact. This cannot be done if we are going to make a real war effort.

Officer personnel of both services has a very low factor of anticipation, as compared to civilian personnel. This, of course, refers to civilian problems in so far as the writer is concerned.

To the best of my knowledge, the country is very short of cargo ships of all kinds, including tankers. This is likewise true of our allies. It will be some time before the country's building program results in an increase in tonnage, due to the sinkings which have occurred and are still occurring. The utility of any ship is greatly reduced due to the convoy system, which must be enforced. Various figures are given in this respect, but probably considering the entire tonnage it would be optimistic to say that it was sixty per cent as effective as in normal times.

The necessity for ships has increased over and beyond the normal and United States and Britain are having to service the far corners of the earth relatively, when compared with peacetime voyages for the same merchant marine. Ships have to go around the Cape of Good Hope instead of through the Canal. They have to go to ports that are frozen part of the year, as Vladivostok or Archangel. The United States' big problem is to supply Australia, which is a long voyage at best and every time we add troops in that section it means more tonnage necessary to keep them in a combat condition.

In view of the above, it would seem that those ships available should be handled in the most effective manner possible. There can be little argument that when it comes to the dispatching, loading and operation of commercial ships, commercial operators are far more effective than either the Army or the Navy. Considering the same tonnage of cargo ships and the question of unloading and loading, it is probable that commercial operators would at the very least load 25% more cargo into all types of vessels, with the exception of course of tankers.

Sometime ago the President appointed Henry S. Land as head of the War Shipping Administration, with authority presumably over all cargo vessels. Since that time there has been a constant pulling and hauling as to who was going to load and operate the ships. Admiral Land's representative in San Francisco is John Cushing, who operated the merchant marine on the Pacific Coast in the last war. There probably is not a more capable steamship man available in the country. To my own knowledge since his appointment, this same debate has continued as to who actually was to operate commercial vessels, as between the War Shipping Administration, the Army and the Navy. By commercial vessels we might include vessels chartered directly by the Army or Navy to use as supply ships.

There have been moments when it seemed as though a coordinated policy, particularly with the Army, would be worked out; then times of discouragement. At the present moment the battle in this respect has been transferred to Washington. It has been reported to me twice within the last forty-eight hours that this contest as to authority was at "white heat" as between the WSA, the Army and the Navy. It is presumed if the services eliminate the WSA or commercial talent, there will then be a contest as to which of the services is in the ascendancy. It does not seem right that such a condition should exist concerning such an important factor in the whole defense problem.

Locally, the Commanding General I am certain believes that the ships serving Hawaii would do a better job if turned over to commercial operators. I have no basis for an opinion as to the Navy's attitude in this respect. It is probable that this opinion of the Commanding General's would not carry down through his staff and the men who actually operate the ships. I would be confident that if asked for an opinion General Dornen would say that by all means it would serve the defense of Hawaii better if all of the tonnage coming into the territory was operated by civilians and loaded by civilians for the joint benefit of the Army, Navy and so-called civilian needs.

It almost seems to me that if we are to win this war we must finally come to a point, with regard to this particular area, where all of the tonnage coming to the islands is pooled and representatives of the Army, Navy and civilian groups can review the needs of the defense picture as a whole and load each ship or each convoy with the materials that are most needed from the standpoint of the overall picture, rather than as is presently the case - where they are apt to be loaded from the standpoint of the needs of either the Army or Navy, without reference to the other or the broader requirements of the defense picture as it regards the economy, embracing all three of these elements.

I do not believe that any experienced practical shipping man could be found who would say that since December 7th the merchant tonnage of the country has been operated on an efficient basis, including the vessels under the direction of the Army and Navy.

A shipping man is responsible for the following calculation which emphasizes one of the weaknesses in wartime shipping. An even better example is with the "M", a vessel capable of making 14 knots - which since the war started has been traveling in a 7-knot convoy. The "M" was recently scheduled to depart from here on a Monday with her regular convoy. It came to light that a faster convoy was leaving two days later. The proper authorities were requested to allow the "M" to remain over for the latter group. This request was granted and it is expected that the "M" will arrive at San Francisco, her destination, at least two days ahead of her former associates.

"The President has said that lost ground can be recovered but lost time is gone forever. The same is true of lost tonnage.

"Information from San Francisco says that ship hulls are completed laying in the bay waiting for engines to be built. Apparently we are not using the vessels that have engines to the fullest advantage.

"For the purpose of this memo it is assumed that we have many freighters capable of a sustained sea speed of 10 knots per hour loaded. In comparing a freight vessel capable of transporting 10,000 tons of cargo from the mainland to Honolulu at a speed of 10 knots, 9 knots, 8 knots and 7 knots, some surprising figures are obtained regarding unrecoverable lost tonnage. Many vessels on San Francisco-Honolulu run capable of a speed of 10 knots are being operated at 7 knots and some times as low as 6 knots. Taking a 10,000 ton vessel at 10 knots and assuming that the distance run from San Francisco to Honolulu is 2,090 miles, the distance may be more under convoy conditions, but the ratio between time tonnage will remain the same. At 10 knots - 208 hours on the trip - a 10,000 ton vessel will deliver at Honolulu 48 tons for every hour on the voyage. At 9 knots 43 tons for every hour on the voyage. At 8 knots 39 tons for every hour on the voyage. At 7 knots 34 tons for every hour on the voyage.

"Assuming a 10 knot 10,000 ton vessel is dispatched in a 7 knot convoy in 297 hours, she will deliver at Honolulu 10,000 tons or 34 tons for every hour on the voyage. The same vessel in a 10-knot convoy would deliver 48 tons for every hour on the trip. 48 minus 34 = 14 tons multiplied by the difference between 297 hours and 208 = a loss of 1246 tons each trip. If in the 7-knot convoy there happens to be 6 vessels capable of a speed of 10 knots (and there has been) the tonnage loss will equal the capacity of a good size ship.

April 26, 1942

SECRET

TO:  
FROM:

Colonel Donovan  
Major Harold Jones

SUBJECT:

Organization of office in Hawaii

Murray Drophy will give you a complete verbal report relative to PIS, particularly radio. I believe remarkable progress has been made. Both the Army and Navy were a little hostile in the beginning but very soon began to cooperate 100% and are now very enthusiastic.

In establishing an office in the Islands, the following things should be remembered:

- (a) The Islands are under martial law with General Egan in complete command of the civil population and all political functions but with Admiral Nimitz as supreme commander of the united command.
- (b) The Navy, of course, believes that it could run the Territory better than the Army. The Army believes it is running the Territory better than the Navy could do it.
- (c) The real civil power in the Islands has been, and still is, the "Big Five," a group of capitalistic interests consisting of:

American Factors, Ltd., dominated by Alexander Walker

Castle & Cooke, Ltd., dominated by A. G. Budge

Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd., dominated by John Waterhouse, with J. Platt Cooke functioning as head, due to sickness.

C. Brewer Co., Ltd., dominated by Philip E. Spalding

T. S. Davies, Ltd., dominated by John C. Russell

In addition to these, another powerful factor is the Oahu Railway & Land Company, dominated by Walter Dillingham.

These interests have been running the Islands for the past seventy-five years and no military government can possibly come in and run this place without full cooperation of the Big Five interests.

With the above in mind the organization recommended for these Islands consist of the following:

- (a) Someone from the mainland who is not identified with any of the Big Five or Army and Navy, to act as the representative of the Coordinator in the



Territory. This person should have sufficient prestige and tact that he can get along with all three factors, i.e., the Big Five, the Army and the Navy, and sufficient ability to, at the same time, oversee all of the functions of the COL.

- (b) A liaison office composed of an Army Intelligence man, a Naval Intelligence man and one other Army or Navy Reserve officer who has lived in Hawaii and is really more representative of the Big Five than the armed forces. In other words, someone of the Big Five in uniform. This man should have to be very carefully picked because there is also jealousy among the Big Five and Walter Billingham.
- (c) One key man representing David Bruce's department. This operation should be rather extensive because Hawaii should be an excellent final training ground for Bruce's man.
- (d) One man to conduct a listening post such as Buxton conducts in New York.
- (e) A small staff of experts picked particularly with reference to the needs of the Naval Intelligence, G2 and Fleet Intelligence in the Territory.
- (f) an PIS operation such as recommended by Murray Brophy.

All in all the organization here would be fairly sizeable. Brophy and I both think it would be a very important one because eventually this Territory will be the fleet's springboard for any Pacific war, and of course the crossroads through which practically all supplies and troops will pass to reach the Pacific front. In establishing an office here care should be taken at all times to point out to the Naval and Army authorities that our function is to coordinate aid and argument and not to depose or dispossess; that we are really a Quartermaster's store for information and assistance and not a super Gestapo which aims to oust all the other intelligence services. Whoever comes out here as Number One man in this office should have a good long talk with Murray Brophy.

We should have more or less lined up who will be the liaison in G2, to wit, Captain Allright. Suggest that a best intelligence, rather than JMW, name a liaison man for the Navy, or perhaps both or if name one. Suggest that that person, if he can get away, be recommissioned in the Air Corps in AF as a major and act as liaison between the facilities, the Air Corps and, indirectly, the Big Five.

The man, selected by Brophy and myself, as Civil Affairs, will do a good job in that capacity.



OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT  
CONSULTATION OF CHIEF OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D. C.

August 8, 1949

RESTRICTED

7942  
Rosen  
Belmont

MEMORANDUM

To: Colonel Donovan  
From: Arthur H. Richards *AR*  
Subject: CERTAIN IMPRESSIONS CONCERNING THE OUTCOME OF MARTIAL LAW ON THE ISLAND OF OAHU, HAWAII.

A number of impressions derived by the writer from personal contacts and observations, during a stay in Honolulu of ten days late in July, 1949, are outlined herein. No attempt is made to present a legal discussion or detailed study of martial law and its effect. The remarks which follow, relate in most instances to matters concerning the island of Oahu.

Martial law was proclaimed in the Territory of Hawaii following a proclamation issued December 7, 1941, by the Governor of the Territory of Hawaii, wherein he stated:

"I have called upon the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to prevent \* \* \* invasion;

"I do hereby suspend the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus until further notice;

"\* \* \* I do hereby place the said Territory under martial law;

"And I do hereby authorize and request the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, during the present emergency and until the danger of invasion is removed, to exercise all the powers normally exercised by me as Governor;

"And I do further authorize and request the said Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and those subordinate military personnel to whom he may delegate such authority, during the present emergency and until the danger of invasion is removed, to exercise the powers normally exercised by judicial officers and employees of this Territory and of the counties and cities therein, and such other and further powers as the emergency may require; \* \* \*



CONTROL OF MILITARY GOVERNOR OVER CIVILIAN ACTIVITIES

1. Examination of the general orders issued by the Military Governor (up to July 17, 1948) discloses the promulgation of regulations, controlling in major fashion, directly or indirectly, the economic activities and well-being of the entire civilian population. The following matters dwelt with therein are cited as illustrative of the scope of these general orders, and their application to civilian affairs:

a. Civil court activities and authorities are prescribed. All criminal cases, whether affecting the military security of the Territory or otherwise, are handled by prevest courts pre-aided over by service personnel. No jury trials are permitted. Persons have been held in confinement incommunicado, for a number of days, for presumed violation of laws not affecting military security, without preferment of charges.

b. Persons are prohibited from selling, delivering, or receiving any commodity in violation of any maximum price regulation or price schedule issued by the Military Governor.

c. Many civilian wage rates are stipulated. Broad control is exercised over labor even to the extent of prescribing the following:

"Any individual now or hereafter employed by (specified employers) \* \* \* who fails to report within a reasonable time thereafter, to the job to which he is ordered by his employer, shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than \$200 or be imprisoned for not more than two months, or both."

d. Speed laws are established and even bus stops specified for certain streets.

e. Rentals for housing accommodations have been fixed.

f. Rules and regulations have been enunciated covering the sale and distribution of gasoline.

g. A pork center (made up of two private corporations) has been established and designated as the sole distributing agency for the purchase, slaughter and distribution of island hogs and pork for resale in the Honolulu area.

h. A private corporation is designated as the sole supervisory agency for the production and distribution of sea food from Hawaiian waters. (A marked shortage of meat has existed on Oahu and practically all fishing from boats is prohibited except subject to these regulations. A material living cost is thus determined.)

i. The use of pork in any form in preparing hamburgers is prohibited.

2. Consideration is being given to freezing civilian employees to their current positions and rates of pay.

3. The regulation of prostitution in Honolulu has recently been assumed by the provost marshal and military police.

4. The actual administration and interpretation of general orders rests in the hands of those

a. Drawn, in many instances, from civil life (often from business institutions or with affiliations financially or otherwise affected by their decisions and activities)

b. Whose military background has, in most cases, provided little experience to cope with the economic and civilian problems ruled upon.

- - - - -

An analytical review would appear to be warranted to determine whether the all-inclusive military control measures, now operating under the jurisdiction of the Military Governor, may not invite hostile criticism of Army administration in Washington and elsewhere, through

1. Citation of the pattern and outcome of martial law in Hawaii, as a reasonable forecast of what may occur to some other American community, should it chance to come suddenly within the zone of hostilities (a highly elastic area definition when viewed in the light of aerial warfare)

2. Ill-considered action of subordinate personnel

a. Temporarily absorbed into the organization of the Military Governor, and whose financial affairs and future may be influenced by the administration and interpretation of general orders

b. <sup>Imm</sup>Unmatured and inexperienced in economic and civil administrative problems

and might cause inequities of which the Military Governor would be unaware, but for which the Army would be held responsible.

CIVILIAN BUSINESS REACTION TO MILITARY CONTROL AND THE EMERGENCY PERIOD

1. There existed little indication of any desire to question the application or inclusiveness of military control. No evidence was apparent of any group discussion, outlining conditions or future times which might be deemed appropriate for the repossession of civil rights. Many expressed a willingness to forego elections normally scheduled for the near future.

2. By virtue of the rigid military control of all inward and outward freight movement, of local prices and through other all-inclusive regulations, local business is completely under the dominance of the Military Governor and acts accordingly.

3. Large agricultural and corporate business organizations have been outstandingly cooperative in providing personnel, equipment and other facilities, for defense activities.

4. Those small businesses which are not suffering from lack of merchandise through priority scarcities, are enjoying highly profitable operations.

5. Negligible consideration is being given by business leaders to utilize federal agencies and their capabilities, to finance and construct at an appropriate time in the future, facilities for local production of materials and supplies, needed during the current emergency, and potentially of considerable value in coping with anticipated territorial post-war employment problems.

#### PROGRAMS OF PREPARATIONS FOR DEFENSE

1. Casual observation indicated that at least one out of three persons encountered on the streets of Honolulu was a soldier or sailor. Soldiers, even off duty, carried helmets and gas masks.

2. Practically the entire beach area of Oahu is lined with barbed wire and fields of fire are cleared for machine guns and artillery.

3. Army airfields have been tripled. Many are concealed. Mass protective days are afforded in many instances.

4. Hidden and camouflaged artillery posts exist on many of the mountain ridges, commanding bays and beaches.

5. Every civilian home has been required to construct an air raid shelter adjacent to the house. Practically all parks and school ground areas in the City of Honolulu are also provided with extensive air raid shelters.

6. Civilian organizations, made up of many hundreds of individuals, have been developed for the handling of evacuation from congested areas, hospitalization, gas attack, fire emergency, and to provide extra police and accumulate a blood bank.

7. Over 90 percent of a computed six-months' reserve for civilian food requirements has been accumulated. A seed supply has been stored for emergency use, for local production of a number of important food products.

8. Widely scattered depots have been filled with construction supplies and materials for the Army and Navy.

9. The writer was informed that the U. S. Engineers in charge of Army construction activities had currently on their employment rolls over 20,000 persons.

10. Information was received that on other Hawaiian Islands, defense preparations were being rigorously carried on and would soon approximate Oahu's strength.

PERTAINING TO RESIDENTS WHO ARE JAPANESE ALIENS OR ARE OF JAPANESE ANCESTRY, AND ELEMENTS ASSOCIATED THEREWITH.

1. A large proportion (possibly exceeding 50 percent) of common and artisan labor used on defense projects on Oahu, are of this class. Defense work would be seriously hampered if such were not used. From certain jobs, the Japanese aliens are excluded.

2. Hawaiian National Guard units which were on duty, and contained a large number of this group were withdrawn from the seashore and strategic areas during the Midway battle. Approximately 1,000 from this racial group have been sent to the midwest to serve there as a military unit in uniform.

3. A proposal, recommended by Army authorities and G-2 in Hawaii, has been forwarded to Washington to permit a volunteer force from this group to be inducted, for active military service in non-Pacific areas. No rejoinder to this recommendation has been received. It is possible that lack of an answer may arise from the non-desire of Army headquarters to provide a precedent for the handling of special racial groups (which might be embarrassing in view of the request of Jews, Poles, etc.) The transfer from the Territory of this volunteer force (which has been estimated might number 10,000) is looked upon as having major long-range implications in territorial population trends.

4. Conduct of this group has been most circumspect since December 7th. Besides the operation of normal law abiding influences, the group has been constrained by the known inclusion in concentration areas in the Territory, of a considerable complement from their number, the black-out and curfew laws prevailing, frequently repeated comments of recently arrived U. S. troops concerning what they were prepared to do to the group, and the publicized action of sentries, the result of whose unheeded challenges, had brought instantaneous fatal shots.

5. Young members of the group have been organized at the request of local authorities, to assist in evacuating their group from congested areas, and to handle their casualty and indigent cases.



6. Responsible military and civil authorities voice the opinion that the situation pertaining to this group is well in hand and has been effectively handled.

TRUCK CROP PRODUCTION, TERRITORIAL ACREAGE DEVOTED THERETO, AND ELEMENTS INVOLVED THEREIN.

1. Out of approximately 250,000 acres normally devoted to corporate sugar and pineapple production in the Territory, it was reliably reported that less than 1,500 acres were allocated to producing truck crops as of July 1, 1942.

2. Approximately 2,000 acres in addition, as of the same date, is being farmed to truck crops by small growers.

3. The aforementioned acreage in truck crops (approximately 3,500 acres) represents about a one-third increase in acreage as compared with a year previous (pre-war).

4. Using the month of July as a comparison, it is estimated that July 1942 will harvest truck crop production of only approximately 10 percent greater pounds than was estimated was produced for July 1941 (approximately 5,275,000 pounds).

5. While adequate shipping facilities from the mainland are forecasted to be available, military authorities are not pressing for local production. Primary reasons given for this non-stimulation of local truck crop production, are the consequent elimination of demand for the importation of bulky fertilizer and insecticide requirements, and the local shortage of labor.

6. There has been a noteworthy non-coordination of importations from the mainland, with maturing local truck crops.



Market over-supply has resulted, with ruinous prices a consequence, and often a large amount of wastage.

7. There appears to be no forecasting of requirements for truck crop produce by the Army and Navy. No combined purchasing agency was found. Lacking a guarantee of purchase of a given quantity, a specified price, or a period in which delivery of product would be accepted, large agricultural interests are without any incentive for producing truck crops.

8. With no reliable inter-island shipping accommodations or ship schedules afforded, considerable rotting of truck crop produce has ensued in the outside islands (other than Oahu).

9. It was reported that only small growers had the requisite experience to produce satisfactorily, truck crops.

#### GENERAL

1. Indications were received that the U. S. Fleet and Navy Command at Pearl Harbor does not concern itself with the policies or operations of the Military Governor.

2. Unification of the local activities and programs of G-8, G.I. and F.P.I. as they pertain to the Island population, has been provided for under the general guidance of G-8.

3. It was reported that activity towards amplified organization of labor on defense projects had ceased after December 7th.

4. No enthusiasm was shown on the part of citizens contacted, at the announcement of the appointment of the new Territorial Governor, Judge Steinbeck.

5. With the feverish civil construction activity, and organizing of civilians, mainly completed, a new cycle appears to

be approaching where the maintenance of civilian morale in a  
nearly inactive zone, will constitute a considerable problem.  
The outcome of the recent Midway battle brought an immediate  
let-down.

*Headlines 7/21/42  
Army Problems  
Richards*

**COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION**  
**INTEROFFICE MEMO**

*to 6 file*

**FROM:** Captain Doering  
**TO:** Colonel Donovan  
**SUBJECT:** Army Problems in Hawaii

**DATE** July 21, 1942

I have examined with a great deal of interest Mr. Richards' memorandum dated July 6, 1942, which was attached to your memorandum to me dated July 18th.

I have no doubt that the conditions which he describes present very serious problems for the military authorities. However, in my opinion, this subject is not within the scope of the duties assigned to this office, and any suggestions from us, unless carefully handled, might be misinterpreted.

It is my recommendation that if any action is taken in regard to this matter, it should be done on a purely informal basis.

I am returning herewith Mr. Richards' memorandum, together with an article from Harper's Magazine on the Army's future political power.

Encs.

*G. H. D., Jr.*

Capt Fleming



## THE ARMY'S FUTURE POLITICAL POWER

BY HAROLD M. FLEMING

It is likely that the Army will take control of the country after the war? Leaders of our armed forces have, with startling suddenness, become the largest buyers of goods and services in the United States. They are now the largest direct handlers of man power in American history. They are the largest customers American industry has ever had and they are spending the biggest sums of money ever handled by any group in American history. They operate the most extensive mechanical equipment ever seen in any country except in Germany and perhaps in Russia; they have a hand in operating what will soon be the largest merchant shipping fleet in our history.

Only two years ago the Army men were fighting Congress for a couple of billion dollars a year; now they spend that much every twenty days, and the appropriations which are expected this and next year for their maintenance and equipment will run to \$150,000,000,000, or nearly twice the nation's entire income in 1929 and five times its 1932 income. Only three years ago Congress argued over Army and Navy appropriations of a million here and ten millions there. It recently passed an appropriation bill of eighteen billion dollars with no more than a momentary hesitation in order to keep in mind its nominal control over the national purse.

All of this spells unprecedented potential political power for the armed services of the United States. Within the year these services will be the employers, di-

rectly or indirectly, of at least half of America's man power. Thereby they have acquired also a major interest in the methods by which the whole American economy is run: in who gets how much, in the level of prices, profits, and wages, and in who hires, fires, and directs labor. The threat of Army or Navy seizure and operation now hangs over all labor and management, since it was actually exercised last year by the Navy at the Kearney shipyard and by the Army at the North American Aviation plant. Now there is talk of the Navy's taking over our merchant marine.

The "industrial mobilization plan" of the nineteen-twenties and -thirties was a recognition by such farsighted persons as Bernard M. Baruch that for effective war-making the Army and the Navy must take a direct hand in the organization and running of the national economy. "M-Day" never actually came off, but chiefly because the distinction between a state of peace and a state of war had become progressively blurred from 1937 on.

"Beyond a doubt," said Douglas MacArthur seven years ago, "any major war of the future will see every belligerent nation highly organized for the single purpose of victory, the attainment of which will require integration and intensification of individual and collective effort. Economic and industrial resources will have to assure the adequacy of munition supply and the sustenance of the whole civil population. In these latter fields the great proportion of the

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year-old wiper, describes the death of the last man: "It was cold the last night out. I was sleeping under a blanket with Herman. He'd been feeling low for some time. I kept saying to him, 'Give me some of that blanket.' But he wouldn't let loose. Finally I grabbed it from him. He just lay still. I touched his hand . . . It was cold . . . he was dead the whole time."

The patrol system is still not adequate, although vastly improved. In a letter to Secretary of the Navy Knox last March, President Joseph Curran of the National Maritime Union suggested that the large fleets of fishing boats, most of which are now laid up, be fitted out as patrol boats for the Atlantic coast, as was done during the last war. The sooner this is done the better.

There is no doubt about it, the merchant seamen took it on the chin during the first half of this year—with no guns, no patrols, antiquated lifebelts, and practically no safety precautions. They were sent out as helpless targets for the subs; but their morale was as magnificent as it was unheralded. That precautions are now being taken to protect them doesn't detract from their courage.

All the seamen know what they are facing when they ship out. Yet they keep on sailing. Remember, they don't have to. They are in the private merchant marine, and they can quit any time they want to. Most of them could get good shore jobs, working in shipyards as riggers and welders and mechanics and what-not, where the chief worry would be the danger of someone dropping a wrench on their feet. It isn't the money that keeps them sailing. On the coastwise run, from New York to Texas, they get a war bonus which works out to around \$2 33 a day, hardly worth risking your life for. Also the bonus doesn't apply to the Gulf.

As a matter of fact, former seamen who have been working in shore-side jobs are going back to sea. A few months

ago the National Maritime Union issued a call to former seamen. Since then over 2,000 ex-sailors have turned up to ship out again, hundreds of them at the union hall in the port of New York alone, among them men who have been working as firemen, truck drivers, electricians, office workers, actors, construction workers, miners, painters, and bakers.

Those who have been torpedoed and rescued ship right out again as soon as they can get out of the hospital. That takes plenty of nerve, but the merchant seamen have it. They don't get much publicity, and you seldom hear anyone making speeches about them. They don't get free passes to the theater or the movies, and no one gives dances for them, with pretty young actresses and debutantes to entertain them. No one ever thinks much about their "morale" or how to keep it up. It was only recently that a bill was passed to give them medals. And because they wear no uniforms they don't even have the satisfaction of having people in the streets and subway look at them with respect when they go.

It is not that the seamen, themselves, are asking for any special credit or honors. When you mention words like heroism or patriotism to them they look embarrassed. "Listen, brother, there's a war on!" they say. Ashore, they frequently pretend that they are not brave at all. Not long ago I was talking to a man called Windy, who had just come off the Texas run and had been chased by a submarine for three days. "No more of that for me?" he said. "I tell you, any guy who keeps on shipping these days has got bubbles in his think-tank. The only safe run is from St. Louis to Cincinnati. I'm going to get me a shore job. Why commit suicide at my age?" We believed him; and not one of us could blame him.

The next day we heard he had shipped out again. He is now on the high seas, en route to India.

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employable population will find its war duty." Foresighted military men were even then taking an interest in matters once considered purely civilian, such as they had never before taken in peacetime, or even in wartime except during the last war.

If the services took such an interest in hitherto civilian affairs in peacetime before this war, they will take a vastly greater interest in the civilian economy after it ends. This time there may be no disarmament conferences except those caused by the victors for the disarmament of the vanquished. Continued armament for ourselves will not mean simply the maintenance of a large standing army, but also the maintenance of a large degree of supervision over the civil economy by the armed services with a view to continued preparedness for another total war. When economic planning becomes a peacetime habit it may be economic planning for national security under the close supervision of the Army and Navy.

The political wherewithal to support this new economic power will not be hard to find. By the end of this year the Army will have 3,600,000 men and the Navy perhaps 500,000, and the totals are slated to go on up to 10,000,000 or more if the war lasts. This will be a higher proportion of the population under arms than was ever seen before in American history. Those men mean votes, not only of the men themselves but of their relatives and friends. It will be the biggest pressure group we have ever known.

After the war a considerable part of this Army will be demobilized, but it will not cease to be a political pressure group. The veterans' vote is one of the oldest of all social phenomena, long antedating the actual franchise. Only the sociologists seem to have overlooked it. The armed farmers of Athens drove their hoplite formations through the Persians and went home to make new economic gains. Over and over again throughout history, the members of a victorious army have lived up as a pressure group, demanding

and getting advantages, benefits, and securities. More simply put, to the victors belong the spoils, at home as well as abroad. It has been so all through our own history; veterans of the Revolution, of the War of 1812, and of the Mexican War all desired to be looked after.

The Civil War of course produced the G.A.R., one of the biggest pressure groups of modern times. For thirty years after the war the waving of the bloody shirt was deemed indispensable to political success; high and low, the members of the Grand Army of the Republic got theirs in the shape of pensions, land grants, receivership, and offices from that of constable to the Presidency. Indeed, the demands of the Civil War veterans finally outwore the public gratitude, and in the muckraker days the popular magazines ran lurid articles about pension scandals and the burden imposed by those whom "the nation delights to honor." The Spanish War produced a President for us and a pension army of its own. The pensioners of the First World War were most numerous of all and the political influence of the American Legion was feared and courted. One of the most hopeless of Herbert Hoover's political blunders was his ejection of the bonus marchers from Anacostia Flats. There is nothing new for us about a crowd of veterans looking for largesse. Our situation this time, however, is different. For the pressure group of veterans after this war may be so large as to dwarf all other pressure groups.

The civilian's attraction to Army life to-day, for peculiar social and economic reasons, is greater perhaps than it has been in any other time in our history, and is in sharp contrast with the civilian feeling toward Army life twenty-five years ago. Despite the superficial contrast between twenty-one dollars a month in the Army and forty a week in the factory, the financial comparison is by no means as sharp as it looks. But that is a minor factor compared with the lure of security to members of a civilian world which appears to be falling apart.



Twenty-five years ago men looked upon war as a temporary interruption to an established way of life which they expected to find intact upon their return from a purely patriotic interlude. Today there is no such confidence, and the soldier has a feeling of being in a socially safe berth. A younger generation enters the Army feeling that civilian life was never secure anyway. An older generation of men looks for commissions even at financial sacrifice believing that the Army is the safest part of the community to which to belong during a period of bewildering social and economic change.

## II

Though history repeats itself after major wars in one way, in another it changes. Soldiers and veterans exercise great power after each major conflict, but they use it in different ways. The Athenian hoplite farmers wanted relief from debt. The English yeoman archers wanted currency depreciation and the freezing of rents. Grant's veterans wanted homesteads and pensions, and the veterans of the First World War wanted cash subventions. This generation of veterans, it already begins to appear, will want something else. That something will be the future peacetime equivalent of the present soldier's wish for equality of sacrifice.

This wish and its outcome were curiously foreshadowed after the First World War. Getting cash relief out of the federal government was only a part of the organized activities of the veterans of that war. The other part was "law and order" enforcement. The veterans took a conspicuous part in the battles between capital and labor in such ways as the roughing up of the IWW in the Pacific Northwest in the early 'twenties and the quiet preparation for strong-arm moves which helped bring a halt to the syndicalist sit-down strikes in Detroit in the late 'thirties. Somewhat similar feelings grow to-day in the breast of the enlisted man and the commissioned officer.

Army men are already speaking their minds in this direction. "News of high profits," said General Ben Lear recently in Detroit, "of strikes, of stoppages of production over petty quarrels, bluffing and horse-trading, are blows at the bodies of American soldiers."

"There has been a good deal said about labor," remarked General Brehon Somervell a fortnight later. "I'd like to say a word about the officials of big companies who are out playing golf when we try to get them on the 'phone. We've got to have the same devotion to duty from these men as management expects from its employees if we are going to put this thing over."

General MacArthur does not stick to communiqués on traditionally military matters. He follows economic developments here even from "down under." He wires congratulations to men and managements of armament plants that beat their munition-making schedules.

And the voice of the enlisted man is beginning to be heard. He writes to his Congressman, or more often his relatives and friends do so, reflecting his views. He comes into every home through the radio script of "This Is War" and is cited in the President's fireside speech. Shop cartoons remind the factory worker that the soldier walks a long way for his twenty-one dollars a month. And this is only the seventh month of the war.

Meantime the way of the civilian pressure group and special interest gets harder. "Capital" loses ground as taxes cut deeper into the profits and salaries which corporation managements themselves fail to limit. Labor leaders have lost the right or power to call strikes, and the new general price ceiling makes any further lifting of wages unlikely except as sub-standard scales are lifted in an evening-up process. Hence labor leaders have little in the way of inducement to hold their members, and become dependent on awards of the War Labor Board to hold their unions together through "maintenance of membership," maintenance of dues, union security, and



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so on. Price ceilings also jeopardize the position of the farm bloc in Congress, which faces more determined Administration resistance, defection of farm organization support, the conflict of interest between grain and dairy farmers, and adverse public opinion.

More and more also, economic questions once settled by the push and shove of competing legislative blocs are coming to be settled by administrative authority acting on obvious war needs. The sugar-quota system was once an annual political free-for-all among different producing interests for a share in the sugar market; to-day the supply, not the market, is subject to quota and along lines determined by the Office of Price Administration in order to effect the greatest economy in transport. Sectional blocs once struggled over the pork barrel of river and harbor improvement, power dams, and transmission lines. To-day these things are allocated largely on strategic and economic patterns, and Congressmen must go hat in hand to the WPB or the Army and Navy authorities on the shrinking hope of wheedling a war plant into the home bailiwick. Few housing plums remain accessible to political pressure; defense housing must follow the arms plants regardless of votes. This is a one-way trend, and in large part it means steadily more power for the heads of the armed forces.

All these things add up to the probability of frozen wage scales, horizontal price control, rigid profit limitations, and rigorous rationing. Such moves may be only a beginning. The recent sensational letter of William Beveridge to the *London Times* may have meaning for the United States as well as for Britain, where war economy is further developed, with all its wider implications. He called for "the principle that service rather than personal gain should be the mainspring for the war effort in industry as in fighting." Criticizing the whole "system of economic rewards," he said, "If it is true that the output of our factories improved suddenly when Russia came into the war,

this does not mean the workers are stupid, preferring Russia to their own country. It means that in war the most effective spur to heroic efforts is an idea, not hope of personal gain."

"Equality of sacrifice" is likely to mean that the gap between the soldier's twenty-one dollars a month and the workman's forty dollars a week is due to be narrowed in one way or another so that their real wages will be evened up. The soldier may get more money or more payment in kind, or the workman may be able to buy less because of rationing, pay roll allotment, higher prices, or all three. Likewise the gap between the pay of Army and Navy officers and that of men in positions of comparable civilian responsibility is likely to narrow. If the war lasts long enough it is quite possible that, as in Germany, civilian and Army living standards may reverse their present relation, with those in the armed services getting the best of everything.

## III

With such drastic possibilities in sight the position of the Administration may be jeopardized. Its rearguard defense of economically indefensible positions makes it appear to occupy the same position in relation to the war and the public mood that the Hoover Administration occupied in relation to hard times and the public in 1931. Too little and too late has been its program on prices, profits, wages, taxes, rationing, stock piling, and all the other essentials of war economy spelled out by Baruch and the Army and Navy authorities years ago. The attitude of both the services and of the public is likely to get tougher, and a political shake-up in November may be only the first omen of the significance of the new political force now due to be predominant in America.

The armed services can scarcely exercise the economic and political power they seem likely to achieve without feeling and showing a heady sense of power. This is already beginning to appear, not

on the record but in asides and implications. "From here on the public and the government will have to do what we want," is the feeling. Army men have stated, though not publicly so far, that military control of our newspapers is desirable. Stubborn under-cover struggles between the civilian "defense" authorities and the Army and Navy have already occurred, and are likely to increase in scope, as the long-standing American tradition of ultimate civilian control over the Army receives its greatest test in our history.

The structure of military society is usually reflected in civil society. Alfred Vagt, in his *History of Militarism*, traces for the past two hundred years the close connection between the *mores* of the army and those of contemporary civil life in Europe. From the perspective of 1942 it seems to be a story largely of the Colonel Blimps of Europe and Britain in the eighteenth and nineteenth century; the officer caste of the peacetime army was always the custodian of the aristocratic tradition of conspicuous leisure. Now that new equalitarian relations between officers and men are being imposed on modern armies by the nature of modern ultra-open-order warfare, this influence may be reversed in the next era

of American-patrolled world peace, if and when it comes. The social implications of this subject take off in so many directions that more questions are raised than can possibly be answered.

Perhaps a type of civilian or a civilian group will develop, capable, by reason of tough-mindedness, of competing with the new post-war military influence. But that does not mean that such a rival group, a merger perhaps of hard-boiled politicians, labor leaders, and industrialists, might not work closely with the Army and Navy authorities. A group of this character would have to eschew the visible emoluments of power for the inner essence. It would be essentially fascist in nature, but probably would be considered "anti-fascist," confirming Huey Long's prediction that if fascism comes it will be in the name of anti-fascism. It would, however, be essentially radical, in the sense that a man is now radical who puts the war program ahead of every other consideration or tradition.

Periodic upsets in Washington are already weeding out conservatives who still cling to other things than furtherance of the war and of the armed services' interests. Further similar upsets are almost certain, and their significance for the future may be great.





UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT  
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

WASHINGTON, D. C.

July 6, 1942

TO: Colonel Donovan  
FROM: Atherton Richards  
SUBJECT: Two current army problems in Hawaii.

Opportunity has recently been afforded to review general orders issued by the Military Governor of Hawaii and secure some informal reactions to local developments there since commencement of hostilities.

The experience of Hawaii, a U.S. community under martial law, will doubtless be used as an example to the balance of the U.S. of the probabilities inherent in military control. It is likely that considerable publicity may take place in the United States on this subject. Already there has appeared in leading newspapers, discussion as to the dubious legality of the application of martial law to Hawaii.

Of major significance, however, is the possibility that the inclusiveness of Army dominion over all phases of life in Hawaii may be used politically, as a means of creating a highly suspicious and antagonistic public attitude toward Army administration in Washington and elsewhere. A number of illustrations could be drawn from Hawaii under military control which would be irrefutable and might prove embarrassing

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to the Army authorities in Washington. In large measure this condition arises from the comprehensive control which the Military Governor in Hawaii exercises.

An examination of the Military Governor's general orders discloses the issuance of regulations controlling, in major fashion, the economic activities and well being of the entire civilian population. Illustrative of the scope of these general orders are the following matters dealt with therein:

1. Civilian Wage Rates Established.
2. A private corporation is designated as the sole supervisory agency for the production and distribution of sea food from Hawaiian waters. (A marked shortage of meat exists on Oahu and practically all fishing from boats is prohibited except subject to these regulations. A material living cost is thus determined.)
3. Rules and regulations promulgated covering the sale and distribution of gasoline.
4. Rentals fixed.
5. Control of prices of food and feed established.
6. The slaughter of immature hogs prevented.
7. Speed laws established and even bus stops specified for certain streets.
8. Broad control exercised over labor even to the

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extent of promulgating the following:

"Any individual now or hereafter employed by (specified employers) \* \* \* \* who fails to report within a reasonable time thereafter, to the job to which he is ordered by his employer, shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than \$200 or be imprisoned for not more than two months, or both".

9. Civil court activities and authorities prescribed.

From the foregoing can arise a basis for contending that a new form of dictatorship may be in process of establishment. Since much of the activation of these general orders comes through local civilian personnel, temporarily absorbed into the organization of the Military Governor, it is probable that cases of provable inequity may arise of which the Military Governor would not be aware, but for which the Army would be held responsible.

The extent of control over labor is doubtless the feature which has the greatest explosive potential. Despite what might be the local necessity for such action, it can portend baneful interpretations.

Solution of this problem could come with a voluntary differentiation between actions required for the Military exigencies of the situation and the restrictions and control of activities needed, of a purely civilian and economic character. The satisfactory achievement of this can arise with close collaboration between a civil Governor of ability (operating with

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martial law terminated), who has the confidence of the Military authorities, and who could effectively function under the wide latitude of local laws now in effect, which were designed to cope with the type of emergency prevailing.

Another critical problem persists in Hawaii, which also deserves the constructive attention of the High Command. Despite the desirability of securing maximum feasible production of food stuffs in the Territory from which sources the Military forces and local population could be sustained, and the burden on ship tonnage from the mainland be relieved concurrently, negligible progress has been made to achieve the goal.

Lack of provision for inter-island transportation is serving to decrease self sufficiency rather than enhance the possibility thereof. Close coordination between Army and Navy purchase policies, protection for inter-island shipping, utilization of the emergency financing and other Federal facilities such as the Surplus Commodities Corporation, the R.F.C., the Defense Plant Corporation, and a forward looking local governmental set-up, would baget an almost total solution to this problem.

*AK*