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APPENDIX
A

U.S.S. PLAN FOR ORGANIZATION
OF HEADQUARTERS INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES IN THE FAR EAST

"DRAGON PROJECT"

It is proposed that the Office of Strategic Services would establish in China with the knowledge and consent of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and General Stillwell an undercover intelligence system to operate in China, in Tibet, and in Japanese occupied territories, making available to General Stillwell and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington the results of their operations.

Attached is a copy of a general directive which it is proposed to give to the head of our organization in China, should this project meet with your approval.

Chief of the Office of Strategic Services Organization in China

Subject: General Instructions

1. You are directed to proceed to Chungking, China, by the earliest available transportation to establish an undercover organization to obtain, evaluate and furnish information of military interest concerning Japan and Japanese-occupied territory, and to make this information available to the Commanding General, U. S. Forces in China, and through him to the Office of Strategic Services.

2. You will take with you, or arrange to have follow you at the earliest practicable moment, those of the American personnel for the Office of Strategic Services organization in China who have been selected in this country; and will arrange to have those already in China report to you upon your arrival.

3. On arrival in Chungking you will report to the Commanding General, U. S. Forces in China. You will secure the initial approval and subsequent coordination of the Commanding General, U. S. Forces in China, and the acquiescence of the Generalissimo, which should be obtained through the Commanding General.

4. You will follow general directives given you by the Office of Strategic Services for carrying out your task. In following the general directives of the Office of Strategic Services, however, you will bear in mind that orders

from the Commanding General will, of course, take precedence.

5. You are designated the head of the Office of Strategic Services organization in China. You will make your headquarters in Chungking or wherever the Commanding General, U. S. Forces in China, may designate.

6. The American personnel accompanying you, or which is to follow immediately thereafter, or which will report to you in China, will be assigned as supervisors with headquarters in other key cities in free China. These supervisors will organize and direct the work of the regional or local agents, under your general direction.

7. Local agents will be selected by you from among these or others in whom you have confidence. While complete discretion is left in your hands for the selection of such agents, you will be expected to use every means possible and reasonable for protecting their identity, their persons, and the information which they may gather.

8. Sources of Information -- The occupied areas in China offer great opportunities for securing information of military value concerning the Japanese. These areas contain thousands of Japanese civilians in addition to the Japanese military personnel. Constant streams of civilians and military personnel proceed to and from Japan. Many of these Japanese are corruptible. Japanese militarists in

have long been powerful in their home governments and often are well informed concerning its plans. Inevitably the Japanese in China are in contact with the Chinese population.

9. Another great reservoir of information concerning occupied China, other territory under Japanese occupation and Japan itself, is to be found in printed matter available within the lines of occupation-- newspapers, magazines, pro- [illegible] items, the Japanese official gazette (some copies of this probably find their way into occupied China), and [illegible] means of publicity and propaganda.

10. Types of Information to be Sought -- Information concerning maritime activities in Chinese ports and along the China coast: Vessels in port; types of cargo which they are loading and discharging; the speed with which the stevedoring is handled; the types of material on docks and in warehouses; the extent to which the capacity of docks and other storage space is being used; and so forth.

11. Information concerning the movements of enemy naval vessels in and out of ports and up and down the coast.

12. Information concerning the enemy forces of occupation: Troop movements; quality of troops; the military organizations represented; and so forth.

13. Similar information concerning enemy air forces; aircraft; production plants, air fields; and so forth.

14. Economic information of a military value, such as the extent to which given industrial plants are in operation; the quantity and the quality of their products; labor problems; the establishment of new industrial enterprises or the expansion of old ones; financial operations and situations.

15. It is to be hoped that eventually military information can be secured from the Japanese Empire itself.

16. Communications -- You will establish a system of communications to make possible the proper transmission of information from its source to the local or regional representatives and thence to Chungking. In your discretion you will use and are authorized to purchase shortwave transmitting and receiving radio sets. You are authorized, in your discretion, to employ couriers. You will be expected to endeavor to arrange with the Commanding General, U. S. Forces in China, for such mail facilities and plane service to supplement the above as may be considered necessary by you for the efficient carrying out of your task, and as the Commanding General, U. S. Forces in China, may find it practicable to provide.

17. You have been provided with an Office of Strategic Services code which you will use wherever practicable for transmitting cable messages from Chungking or wherever your headquarters may be to the Office of Strategic Services in

Washington. Before messages are coded you will furnish complete and accurate paraphrases thereof to the Commanding General, U. S. Forces in China, or, if he so desires, the complete message. The Commanding General has been instructed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to transmit your messages through military channels.

18. You will use your discretion as to the ways in which -- whether by code or otherwise -- messages between yourself and your supervisors, between supervisors, and between agents and supervisors shall be sent.

19. Every effort must be made to see to it that codes do not fall into the hands of the enemy. In the event of danger of their doing so, codes and all messages made up thereof should be burned.

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APPENDIX
B

PLAN FOR SUBVERSIVE
OPERATIONS AGAINST
JAPAN

AREA

The practical areas for operations of a subversive character against Japan are the occupied territories of the mainland stretching from Manchuria and Korea to the Malay Peninsula, including Burma; the islands of the Dutch East Indies, Philippines, and other Japanese owned, mandated, or occupied islands. (more specific. (as for assumptions!) include classification)

OBJECTIVES

The broad objectives in this territory are to interrupt, impede, or destroy transportation of materials, supplies, troops, and all commodities helpful to Japan's war effort; the disruption of transportation facilities in occupied areas, the destruction of power plants, docks, oil-storage facilities, etc., used by Japan; the organizing and equipping of guerilla bands where appropriate in occupied territory.

[illegible]

A regional office will be established in Chungking, China, and another in Melbourne, Australia. Operations from Chungking will be under the general direction of General Stilwell and in Melbourne under General MacArthur. We already have in China a number of specially trained and equipped men. These and others, as we send them out, will train Chinese and other nationals in sabotage methods. There are colonies

of Chinese in all the territory to be covered. We have now in training here a group of Thai citizens for operations in Thailand. Individuals will be brought out to Unoccupied China, trained, and sent back. Radio communications by means of small portable sets will be established between occupied territory and Chungking.

Information received indicates that many strategic points, both on the mainland and in the islands, are very lightly held and poorly guarded, thus offering excellent opportunities.

In the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines agents will be landed to conduct sabotage operations where possible and to reinforce with men and equipment the guerilla bands still remaining on some of the islands. On the smaller islands, agents will be landed for the destruction of Japanese installations. In all the islands a certain number of agents will remain temporarily dormant to establish their cover, and make preparations to render assistance to "commando raids" or occupation forces.

Both on the mainland and in the islands considerable sums will be needed for the payment of native agents, and, in some cases, bribery. Money needed for these operations will be transferred to Chungking or Melbourne as the case may be.

Where appropriate, all SA/G agents will also be used as distributing points for word-of-mouth and printed propaganda.

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Appendix C

PLAN FOR PROPAGANDA OPERATIONS AGAINST JAPAN

I. Propaganda Plan for Occupied Territories of Asia.

1. Objectives.

a) The primary objective throughout the whole area is to cause Japanese military and civilian authorities to divert forces for unnecessary police duty, take repressive steps calculated to increase the hostility of the local populations, augment the strain on Japanese counter-espionage services and adopt excessive security measures likely to impede the economic exploitation of the occupied territories, by creating in their minds an exaggerated fear of subversion and rebellion among the local populations.

b) A second objective closely related to the foregoing is actually to increase active and passive resistance of all types in the occupied territories.

2. Means for Attaining Objectives:

a) Creation of whispering campaigns in the occupied territories stressing and exaggerating the danger of local riots and rebellions. Who does it honor?

b) Frequent references to acts of resistance in the

Japanese-occupied territories in open shortwave broadcasting from the United States both in Japanese language and other programs. (This calls for coordination of intelligence, S.O. activities and propaganda so that acts of resistance whether spontaneous or provoked by S.O. agents in enemy territory can be publicized in broadcasts as rapidly as possible.)

c) Intense propaganda activity by radio, leaflet and all other means in the occupied territories even in regions where no great results can be expected. Though the chief importance of this propaganda activity will be to alarm the enemy authorities, the propaganda should obviously attempt to make the most effective appeal to the local populations, adapting the overall themes of resistance and approaching liberation to local conditions.

II. Plan for Front-Line propaganda against Japanese combat forces. (To be prepared)

Objective:

To strengthen front-line propaganda operations aimed at undermining the morale of Japanese combat forces by linking these operations with the operations outlined in the foregoing section, when so directed by the theater commanders.

III. Plan For Propaganda into Japan.

Objectives:

1. To increase distrust by the Japanese in the official statements of their government and other lawful news sources within Japan.

2. To maintain between Japan and the United States civilized standards of war conduct.

3. To convince the Japanese people that their interests are not served by the present administration so that the common people will not consider a defeat of that administration to be a defeat of themselves.

4. To convince the Japanese leaders and people that lasting victory is unattainable.

5. To promote cleavages between Japanese classes and groups.

6. To exploit anxiety concerning internal treason and subversive activities.

7. To split Japan from her Axis associates and to promote difficulties between Japan and neutral powers.

8. To exploit the present economic difficulties of the Japanese.

Recommendations:

That the objectives listed in sections I and III of this appendix be communicated in a suitable form to the OWI with the indication that they are desirable from the strategic point of view; and that the background material taken from the Japan Plan prepared by the Army Psychological Warfare Branch be communicated to the OWI for the implementation of these objectives; and that further material on directives which may assist the OWI in propaganda operations aimed at these objectives be communicated as occasion arises.

Dragon Plan 6540 326
X Stann, C.V.
X Japanese P.W.
X J.I.S.
X Intelligence

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
WASHINGTON

July 13, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL SOLBERT:

Subject: The Dragon Plan

I. Comment

1. The Chinese have developed to a point of very sensitive independence. They have their own precarious domestic unity to maintain. As a general rule, nothing should be attempted in China which would not be equally feasible within Britain or the Soviet Union. The Chinese do not wish to be placed in a category of inferiority or dependence. American action which suggested this would strengthen the position both of the Chinese Reds and of Wang Ch'ing-wei.

2. Chungking's intelligence system has two functions. First, it functions as a sort of domestic OGPU-- but in milder forms-- to repress subversion and maintain the regime. Secondly, it operates against Japan. Undercover American intelligence runs the risk of disturbing this working arrangement.

3. Subversive operations against Japan-- which are closely linked with intelligence-- are carried out in part by the Chinese guerrillas and Communists, between whom and the Chungking regime there exists a state of hostility which occasionally involves reciprocal assassination or local warfare. Americans contacting these people would disturb the Chinese government very seriously.

4. General Magruder has stated that American intelligence agents could scarcely survive in Occupied China, and that Japanese counterintelligence is effective. The only places where agents might operate are the major cities of the Occupied area, where Chiang already has men.

5. General Chu Shih-ming stated several weeks ago that the Chinese are so disappointed about American failure to deliver

sufficient planes that, for the time being, additional American non-combat personnel would be unwelcome. Experts after planes and artillery-- this was his summary.

II. Recommendations

1. The intelligence problem of the United States in China is two-fold at the present time:

a. The Chinese do not release sufficient information, or transmit information which is timely enough for modern warfare.

b. The Chinese do not gather the types of information (Dragon Plan, par. 10-15) which the United States needs.

2. The main problem is therefore one of persuading the Chinese intelligence agencies to get more information for us, to get it more promptly, and to get the types we want.

3. Independent American action can not obtain this information. It might well lead to the sort of fiasco which the British S.O. enterprise came to in China.

4. American subordination to full Chinese command would probably mean a waste of personnel, materiel, and funds. The Chinese would presumably let the Americans remain as a matter of prestige but would not be apt to give them scope for action.

5. An increased number of Americans working under the direct, current instructions of General Stilwell could offer the Chinese intelligence agencies aid in money or materiel in exchange for information needed by the United States. These Americans should make it plain that they plan no independent action in China, that they are interested in Japan and not in China, and that they will not permit themselves to be duped by adventurers, subversive elements, or traitors.

6. Along with this suggested increase of G-2 and ONI personnel to work under General Stilwell through Chungking's intelligence, supplementary intelligence agencies could consist of:

a. Open listening post and inquiry facilities, staffed by American civilians (businessmen or scholars) for the

purpose of covering local newspapers, interviewing travellers, etc. The staffs could operate as philanthropic or research agencies if necessary.

b. Further intelligence activities through the structure of American commercial firms in China, working under the supervision and command of General Stilwell, but financed and staffed by OSS. These firms should in no instance exercise the authority or use the name of the United States, but should in essence supply information under private contract.

Subject: [illegible]

3. The Military Services from the Joint Staff and the Far Eastern Commands in [illegible] have [illegible] organizations are [illegible]. All are of the opinion that the vital need for information of military values from every country is worthy of every consideration and encouragement. The nature of [illegible] the expenditure appears to be the area of [illegible].

4. The Joint Staff will approve the plan provided it is approved by:

(a) The Navy and Army Departments
(b) The Executive Council of the Armed Forces for Cuba (General Gilland)
(c) The Chinese government
(d) Provided no intelligence organization is set up in Latin America.

5. The Navy Department (Mr. Dennis Brady, [illegible]) comments as follows:

(a) Approval of the Chinese government and the Commander General of the area should be secured prior to establishing this group.
(b) If this organization were run by independently of the organization now operating in China, it is felt doubt that considerable confusion would result. The present organization is headed by the Ambassador, and it is believed that any organization operating in the same area should come under the same head. This will avoid duplication of efforts and will allow for evaluation and collation of the information to determine its importance prior to dispatch, and will allow a certain amount of control to be exercised by an existing agency.

Subject to the considerations mentioned above, it is recommended that the Navy Department offer no objection to the implementation of this plan.

6. The Navy Department (Mr. Thorton Dodge, [illegible]) comments as follows:

It is understood that the Coordinator of Information has been given responsibility of organizing and operating agents and activities outside the Western Hemisphere. The provisions of a plan covering the organization of his agencies and the means to be employed in obtaining information does not appear to be a function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It would only be necessary for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to issue a single

[illegible]

June 5, 1942

Brigadier General William E. Smith,
The Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Washington, D. C.

My dear General Smith:

I am enclosing a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff relative to an organization to obtain intelligence from Japan. I would appreciate very much your bringing it to the attention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

June 5, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

FROM: William J. Donovan

Herewith is submitted the outline of a plan for obtaining intelligence from Japan and Japanese occupied territory. The proposal has been approved in principle by the Department of State and the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is respectfully requested.

The plan contemplates the utilization of an American business organization which is well established in the Far East. Its activities have extended into every province in China and its agents are still in business over a considerable part of that country and in the Philippines. The officials of the organization are Americans of recognized loyalty and integrity. They are relatively young, and still possess the energy, drive and imagination which have made their business successful. They are widely

known among Chinese, and are believed to possess the confidence of the Chinese Government. They also have contacts with centers of business and information concerning China in England, Switzerland and South America. These gentlemen and their associates are available for immediate service. Despite war-time conditions, they are in touch with their organization in China, and are in a position to obtain results quickly and from a wide area.

In the event that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approves the plan in principle but would like to see how it can be made effective, I would be glad to have those of my colleagues who are working on it discuss the plan with any officers whom the Staff might designate.

[illegible]

[illegible]

Project to be undertaken by an enabling
American Regional Specialist

The Task

To collect information relative to the intentions of the Japanese.

Field of Operation

Primarily China, both occupied and free.

The occupied areas in China provide a great [illegible] at present largely wasted leakage of information which the Japanese cannot plug because these areas contain thousands of their own civilians and military forces, frequently corrupt and inevitably in contact with the Chinese population. Also because the Japanese must direct a great deal of propaganda based on some facts towards the subject population in occupied areas in an effort to keep them subdued. Japanese militarists in China and Manchuria have long dominated their home government and often know much of its plans.

Besides China there are other points where information about Japan and the zones occupied by the Japanese military may be obtained. In London, efforts of private entrepreneurs to communicate with associates in occupied areas will be continuous and in some instances probably successful. In Zurich, a considerable channel of information and transactions may be tapped. In Calcutta, many refugees and travellers from Japanese war fronts may be found, many of whom will never reach or report to the United States. In South America speedy exchange of telegrams with occupied China is still possible and large communities of Japanese still try to maintain contact with Japan.

Organization

The organization will be specially designated the Counter-Japanese Division of the Coordinator of Information.

1. In China the main headquarters would be at Chungking, with regional agents in Kunming, Kukong, Kewilin, Yen Ping, Kin Hwa, Chengchow and possibly at Sui Yuan.

2. In the United States agents will work in Washington, New York and San Francisco.

3. In Europe agents will be stationed in London and Zurich.

4. In South America (subject entirely to the approval of the State Department) American businessmen could act to relay telegrams and establish contacts with Japanese communities. Their objective would be confined to information regarding the Far East.

Every employee wherever he may work, must have a first-hand acquaintence with Japanese-occupied China, Manchuria or Japan itself. To carry on this work properly it will be necessary to have priorities on all forms of communication and use of diplomatic pouch.

Not less than ten field organizers would be sent to Chungking by air at an early date.

As regards the local or regional agents:

New York - Must maintain closest check on travellers to and from Orient, Chinatown, Chinese institutions such as Bank of China, Universal Trading Company, head offices of American enterprises with personnel or interests in Japan or China, relatives of people known to be in occupied areas, mission headquarters, leading news agencies (for unpublished items).

San Francisco - Roughly the same as New York, and in addition contact with the O.O.I. radio propaganda office and all short-wave receiving stations, including amateur.

London - Maintains closest contact with Reuters, Jardine Matheson, Butterfield & Swire, Lloyds, as many insurance men as possible, British intelligence agents, Chinese Embassy, Hongkong & Shenghai Bank, China Inland Mission - send all information via Embassy pouch.

Zurich - Closest contact with reinsurance companies, newspapers, correspondents, Reuters Swiss subsidiary, send telegrams to Shanghai to elicit replies which may yield information, send all information via diplomatic pouch.

Buenos Aires - or some other city in South America - Telegraphic center to and from occupied areas, with use of anti-militarist Japanese assistance. The purpose here is to obtain information, not about South America, but from combat and occupied areas.

Calcutta - The purpose is information from combat and occupied areas not information about India. Agent must be experienced in Japan and China - preferably also in Malaya, Indo-China.

China - Every American agent must be:

1. Thoroughly experienced in dealing with Chinese.

2. Have fair knowledge of the language.

3. Physically fit and know how to "live on the land" in the interior of China.

4. Entirely acceptable to Chinese authorities and to guerillas.

5. Accustomed to handling substantial sums of money.

6. Willing to go into occupied areas himself where necessary.

Native agents to work in occupied areas must be organized, with special attention to Shanghai, to obtain a steady flow of information including daily newspapers, proclamations, notices, reports on economic conditions, reports reaching Shanghai from Japan, Foochow from Formosa, etc. This can be done under cover of tobacco dealers, oil dealers, insurance agents, etc., and also through already established Chinese underground channels.

Members of the Chinese "Special Service" must be cultivated as well as former French Concession "politicos" now in Chungking. (They both still maintain their own organization in Shanghai.)

To do this right, the greatest facilities will be needed from the State Department for the mail and cables of each agent.

May 19, 1942

Mr. Stanley Hornbeck
State Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hornbeck:

I am sending you herewith a copy of a letter which I sent to the Secretary of State yesterday, together with the copy of the memorandum mentioned in that letter. I should be glad to arrange a meeting with our people who are familiar with this at any time you suggest.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

May 18, 19[illegible]

The Honorable Cordell Hull,
The Secretary of State.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

You will recall that I discussed with you the matter of establishing intelligence from the Far East. I told you at the time of that discussion that we were working with a group of well qualified people in order to meet that deficiency. This group is part of a well organized business in the Far East. [illegible] submitting the plan to the President, I would be very grateful if you would take the time to [illegible] it and see if it would meet with your approval. You know that any criticism or suggestion of yours would be of value to us.

I am attaching an outline of the plan. In the event that you approve it in principle but would like to see how it would be made effective, I would be glad to have those of my colleagues who are working on it

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sit down with Mr. Hornbeck or anyone you might designate, to decide as one just as about be of the greatest use to your Department.

Sincerely

William J. Donovan

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[redacted]

Trained to be undertaken by an unpublished American business organization.

The JOBS

To collect information relative to the intentions of the Japanese.

Field of Operation

Primarily China, both occupied and free.

The occupied areas in China provide a great and present largely wasted leakage of information which the Japanese cannot plug because these areas contain the nationals of their own civilians and military forces, frequently confined and inevitably in contact with the Chinese population. So because the Japanese must direct a great deal of propaganda based on some facts towards the subject populations in occupied areas in an effort to keep them subdued, Japanese officials in China and Manchuria have long contact with their home Government and often know much of its plans.

Besides China there are other points where information about Japan and the zones occupied by the Japanese military may be obtained. In London, efforts of private entrepreneurs to communicate with associates in occupied areas will be continuous and in some instances probably successful. In Zurich, a considerable channel of information and transactions may be tapped. In Calcutta, many refugees and travellers from Japanese war fronts may be found, many of whom will never reach nor report to the United States. In South America speedy exchange of telegrams with occupied China is still possible and large communities of Japanese still try to maintain contact with Japan.

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Organization

The organization will be specially adapted to the Counter-Japanese Division of the Coordinator of Information.

1. In China the main headquarters would be in Chungking, with regional agents at Kunming, Kweilin, Yen Lee, Sin Hwa, Chenghow and possibly in Hsi Kang.

2. In the United States agents will work in Washington, New York, and San Francisco.

3. In Europe agents will be stationed in London and Zurich.

4. In South America (subject entirely to the approval of the State Department) American businessmen would act to relay telegrams and establish contacts with Japanese communities. Their objective would be confined to information regarding the Far East.

Every employee wherever he may work, must have a clear-head acquaintance with Japanese-occupied China, Manchuria or Japan itself. To carry on this work properly it will be necessary to have priorities on all forms of communication and use of diplomatic pouch.

Not less than ten field premises would be used for shuttling by air at an early date.

Planning Group

To aid the active full-time staff, it is proposed to set up a Planning Group of resourceful, competent people now in the United States and lately in charge of large enterprises with widespread connections over China and in the occupied areas, such as Dr. Searle Bates, Vice-President of the University of Nanking; John Curtis, manager of the National City Bank in Japan and Manchuria; L. C. Goodding, Director of the British American Tobacco Company; Gill Lefevre, China manager for the Texas Company.

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As regards the local or regional agents:

New York - Must maintain closest check on travellers and from Orient, Chinatown, Chinese institutions such as [illegible] of China, Universal Trading Company, head offices of Chinese enterprises with personnel or interests in Japan [illegible] America, relatives of people known to be in occupied areas, [illegible] in [illegible] matters, leading book agencies (for unpublished [illegible]).

San Francisco - Roughly the same as New York, and in [illegible] contact with the C.D.I. radio propaganda office and [illegible] short-wave receiving stations, including amateur.

London - Maintains closest contact with Reuters, Jardine [illegible] Matheson & Swire, Lloyds, as many Assurance men [illegible], British Intelligence agents, Chinese Embassy, [illegible] Bank, China Inland Mission - controlled [illegible] in Embassy pouch.

Manila - Closest contact with reinsurance companies, [illegible], correspondents, Reuters Swiss auxiliary, send [illegible] special to affairs replies which may yield [illegible] all information, via diplomatic pouch.

[illegible] - [illegible] in South America - [illegible] number [illegible] from occupied areas, with use of [illegible] Japanese assistance. The purpose here is [illegible] for China, not about South America, but from [illegible] occupied areas.

[illegible] - The purpose is information from combat and [illegible] not information about India. Agent must be [illegible] in Japan and China - preferably also in Malaya, [illegible].

China - Every American agent must be:

1. Thoroughly experienced in dealing with Chinese.
2. Have fair knowledge of the language.
3. Physically fit and know how to "live on the land" in the interior of China.
4. Entirely acceptable to Chinese authorities and to guerrillas.
5. Accustomed to handling substantial sums of money.
6. Willing to go into occupied areas himself where necessary.

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Native agents to work in occupied areas must be organized, with special attention to Shanghai, to obtain a steady flow of information including daily newspapers, publications, notices, reports on economic conditions, reports reaching Shanghai from Japan, Foochow from Formosa, etc. This can be done under cover of tobacco dealers, oil dealers, insurance agents, etc., and also through already established Chinese underground channels.

Members of the Chinese "Special Service" must be [illegible] as well as former French Concession "politicos" [illegible] Chungking. (They both still maintain their contacts in Shanghai.)

If this right, the greatest facilities will be needed from the State Department for the mail and cables [illegible] ent.

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Subject: The Dragon Project

DETAILS

The Task -- To obtain, evaluate, and furnish to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the Commanding General, U. S. Forces in China, information of military interest concerning Japan and Japanese-occupied territory.

The Field of Operation -- Assuming permission of allied and neutral countries to carry on operations within or from their territories, the field of operation would be China, Mongolia, Japan, and Japanese-occupied territory within the theatre of operations of the Commanding General, U. S. Forces in China.

Coordination -- In the event that a Coordinated Intelligence Center is established in the theatre of operations of the Commanding General, U. S. Forces in China, composed of the intelligence units of all U. S. agencies within that theatre, the organization envisaged in this project would be an integral unit of the Coordinated Intelligence Center. Until such Intelligence Center is established, the China organization of the Office of Strategic Services would be coordinated as an integral

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unit within the existing Intelligence Service of the Commanding General, U. S. Forces in China.

Relations with the Chinese Government -- It is recognized as essential that the approval of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek should be secured for this project. Working relations between the members of the organization and Chinese with whom they may come in contact would have to be established with the rentest care along lines regarded as sound by the Commanding General, U. S. Forces in China.

Sources of Information -- The occupied areas in China offer great opportunities for securing information of military value concerning the Japanese. These areas contain thousands of Japanese civilians in addition to the Japanese military personnel. Constant streams of civilians and military personnel proceed to and from Japan. [illegible] are corruptible. Japanese [illegible] powerful in their [illegible] concerning [illegible]. [illegible] Japanese in China are in [illegible].

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Another great reservoir of information concerning occupied China, other territory under Japanese occupation and Japan itself, would be found in printed matter available within the lines of occupation. Newspapers, magazines, proclamations, the Japanese official gazette (some copies of which probably find their way into occupied China), and other means of publicity and propaganda must contain a great deal of information of military value, no matter how carefully the Japanese may seek to conceal such information.

Types of Information to be Sought --

1. Information concerning military activities in Chinese ports and along the China coast. An organization would be set up to report the vessels in port, the types of cargo which they were loading and discharging, [illegible] with which the shipping was handled, [illegible] of material [illegible] the extent to which [illegible] capacity of [illegible] storage [illegible] cranes, [illegible] etc.

[illegible] the movements of enemy [illegible] the rail.

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3. Information concerning the enemy forces of occupation: Troop movements, quality of troops, the military organizations represented, and so forth.

4. Similar information concerning enemy air forces, aircraft, production plants, fields, and so forth.

5. Economic information of a military value, such as the extent to which given industrial plants were in operation, the quantity and the quality of their products, labor problems, the establishment of new industrial enterprises or the expansion of old ones, financial operations and situations.

6. It is believed that eventually military information could be secured from the Japanese Empire itself.

Organization and Personnel -- It would be the function [illegible] of the Office of Strategic Services to organize and maintain a system which could [illegible] for the purpose of obtaining information [illegible] mentioned.

[illegible] Office of Strategic Services [illegible] the Director

of the Office of Strategic Services, after approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The head of the organization would make his headquarters in Chungking, or wherever the Commanding General, U. S. Forces in China, might designate, and would operate under the direction of the Commanding General. All information gathered by the organization would be made available to the Commanding General. (Appended is a list of possible American personnel for the organization.)

2. The field organization would be locally directed by supervisors with headquarters in other key cities in free China, such as Kunming, Kukong, Kweiling, [illegible] Pingi, Kinwha, Chongchow. The field supervisors as well as the head of the organization and his staff in Chungking would be especially chosen American officers or civilians, thoroughly experienced in dealing with the Chinese, possessing a working knowledge of the language, physically fit and capable of "living on the land" in the interior of China, acceptable to the Chinese Government, accustomed to handling subordinate [illegible] of agency, and willing to go into occupied areas if necessary. Before undertaking their duties [illegible] receive instructions in intelligence work and special training in the procurement of the types of military information required.

3. The regional or local agents, operating principally from unoccupied China, would develop an espionage organization within occupied China. In this task, so far as possible, initial reliance would be placed upon Chinese living in both unoccupied and occupied China, who are personally known by the organizing agents through past business or other connections, or whose usefulness and willingness to serve could be ascertained from the representatives of American business and other organizations long established in China.

4. An important aspect of intelligence operations in China is the critical evaluation of information received as to its reliability and significance. The personnel of the proposed China organization and of the Far Eastern desk of the Office of Strategic Services who would immediately receive reports from the field organization would be thoroughly competent to interpret the intelligence gathered in the field.

5. Communications -- A system of communications to make possible the rapid transmission of information from the agents to the local or regional representatives and thence to [illegible] would be established. Radio and

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court ra within occu; ied China, and radio and a plane a rvice between the regional centers and Chungking would be required.

This sketch of the information available in occu ied China and procedures for securing it is necessarily in general terms. The plan would be elaborated in detail in conjunction with the military [illegible] in Washington and Chungking.

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APPENDIX

Possible American Personnel for the China Field Unit

Starr, C. V. - 49 years old. 24th M. G. Battalion World War I. Resident of China 1920 to 1940. Travelled in all provinces. Speaks fair Shanghai dialect and rudimentary Japanese. Name widely known among Chinese. Owned insurance business with agents in all provinces. Published Ta Mei Wan Pao, largest Chinese language paper and Shanghai Evening Post (English language) until December 8, 1941. Has dealt with all classes of Chinese. Believe trusted by Chinese Government. Intimate friend of Chinese Ambassador Hu Shih and Christopher Chancellor, General Manager Reuters New Agency, London. Married, no children. Wife - British, born in China, speaks fluent Chinese.

Park, A. B. - 42 years old. U. S. Navy World War I. Resident of China 1920 to 1933 and 1935 to 1937 (alternate periods in 1941 in Manila and London). Was President of American Asiatic Underwriters (insurance) in Shanghai and Director of Shanghai Evening Post. Close relations with Pan American Airways, China National Aviation Company, Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, Lloyds and other insurance interests in London, Swiss Reinsurance Company, Zurich. Unmarried.

Gould, Randall - 43 years old. Until early 1941 Editor Shanghai Evening Post & Mercury and Supervising Editor of Ta Mei Wan Pao. Chief Far East correspondent Christian Science Monitor till 1941. Worked in Japan 1923-4. Represented United Press in Peking, Shanghai, Manila from 1925 to 1931. Trusted and liked by Chinese. Friend of T. V. Soong, Hu Shih and leaders of Chungking, which visited 1939-40-41. Many years experience in appraising reports about the Orient from Caucasion, Chinese and Japanese reporters. Married, two children.

Freeman, Mansfield. - 47 years old. Base Hospital # 1, Vichy, France, World War I. China 1920 to September 1941. Formerly taught philosophy at Tsinghua University (U. S. Boxer Indemnity College). Later president of Asia Life Insurance Company. Has travelled most of China, Manchuria, Japan, Philippines, Malaya, Indo-China. Speaks, reads, and writes Chinese (Mandarin). Is recognized Sinologue, wide acquaintance in missionary circles but is also practical, seasoned business man. Married, one son now in U.S.N.

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Rosse, Horton - 51 years old. China 1919 to 1941. Formerly with Chinese Post Office. Latterly with William Hunt & Company, Merchants. Speaks good Chinese. Studious, orderly, well-informed.

Duff, J. Arthur - 42 years old. Born in China of Canadian missionary parents. Speaks perfect colloquial Chinese. Popular, good-humored, shrewd, active. Has great courage and is able to work effectively in primitive Chinese surroundings. Escaped Hongkong early this year after Japanese occupation. Trusted by all classes of Chinese. Married, five children. Family lives at Ridgecrest, N. C. Eldest is 14.

Carson, L. D. - 31 years old. American. Born in China. Speaks fluent Chinese. Athletic. Recently President Reliance Motors Federal Inc., U.S.A. in Shanghai. Caught in Manila on December 7th, assisted organize motor transport for Bataan, escaped to Cebu on own initiative and thence to Australia on Australian freighter. Arrived San Francisco late April.

LUCEY

Lugey, A. E. - 37 years old. Worked in China 8 years, newspaper, advertising and radio. Has many friends among Orientals, resourceful news-gatherer and rapid in preparing facts. Already in China, carrying on operations for F.I.S. and O.S.S.; of which valuable reports have already been turned in.

now in NY

This is not Arthur Lucey now with OSS

Larsen, Emmanuel - age about 40. Lived in China from early age until return to U. S. for education. Went back to China where spent many years with Chinese Postal Service, in which capacity served in many parts of China, including Manchuria. Speaks, reads and writes Chinese as second language. Now civilian employee of O.N.I., Washington. Married, one child.

Lee, Michael - Born in Harbin, Manchuria, of Russian parents. Obtained education through Bachelor's degree in Chinese educational institutions. Also studied at the Sorbonne, France. Came to U.S. where became naturalized American citizen and obtained law degree. Partner in Chinese Import business under firm name of Kwan Li -- offices in Chicago and New York. Speaks, reads and writes Chinese, Russian, French. Currently economic analyst, Board of Economic Warfare, Washington.

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Drummond, William M. - Age 32, graduate of University of Illinois. Spent many years in North China as buyer of curios and objects of art. Travelled extensively North China. Speaks, reads and writes Chinese.

Tashiro, Isamu - age about 33. Born Hawaii of Japanese parents. Has always held himself out as American citizen. Practicing dentist in Chicago. Believed to have been thoroughly investigated by F.B.I. Speaks, reads and writes Japanese.

The first eight individuals mentioned in the above list of possible American personnel are members of the "Starr Group" of companies which has operated a large insurance, finance, newspaper, and automobile sales business in China and the Philippines. The "Starr Group" is regarded as one of the most active and successful American business organizations in China. Mr. Starr and his associates are persona grata with the Chinese. The organization has agents and other contacts throughout large parts of China. While the members of the organization would be taken into the O.S.S. individually, it is believed that their experience in working as a team and their established contacts in China would greatly increase their value in the intelligence operation under consideration.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100450002-3

WAR DEPARTMENT
Military Intelligence Service
Psychological Warfare Branch.

JAPAN PLAN (FINAL DRAFT)

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WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
WASHINGTON

June 5, 1942.

Colonel William Donovan,
The Coordinator of Information,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

The Joint Psychological Warfare Committee, under its charter from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated March 3, 1942, to 'initiate, formulate and develop plans for psychological warfare in conjunction with the government agencies and to coordinate the same in accord with approved strategy', has been working with these government agencies on a propaganda plan for the Japanese empire to assist military strategy.

The third revision of this Japan plan, which has been prepared with the assistance of officers from agencies, is enclosed. Mr. Sherwood, Mr. Hayden, Mr. Romer, Mr. McEvoy and others of your staff have very materially assisted in the formulation of this plan.

It is requested that you send your representative to a final conference to be held on this plan on Wednesday June 10, 1942, at 2:00 P.M. at the Combined Chiefs of Staff Building (19th Street and Constitution Ave., N.W.)

Yours very sincerely,

O. N. Selbert,
Colonel, G.S.C.
Chairman, Joint Psychological Warfare Committee.

1 copy Japan Plan (Final draft)
1 copy Japan Plan Digest

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1 copy Japan Plan (Final draft)
1 copy Japan Plan Digest

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P.W.B., N.I.S.
June 3, 1944.

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DIGEST OF THE JAPAN PLAN (FINAL DRAFT)

Propaganda into the Japanese Empire, to assist military strategy, has the following Policy Goals, which have been agreed upon, in the light of our naval and military strategy, by the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee:

1. To interfere with Japanese military operations and to injure Japanese morale;

2. To weaken and slow down the Japanese war effort;

3. To discredit and overthrow the Japanese military authorities;

4. To split Japan from her allies and from neutrals.

The following Propaganda Objectives have been stated, as points to be conveyed to and fixed in the enemy mind as a means of assisting the achievement of the Policy Goals:

1. To increase distrust by the Japanese in the official statements of their government and other lawful news sources within Japan.
2. To maintain between Japan and the United States civilized standards of war conduct.
3. To convince the Japanese people that their interests are not served by their present administration, so that the common people will not consider a defeat of that administration to be a defeat of themselves.

4. To convince the Japanese leaders and people that lasting victory is unattainable; that Japan cannot enlist and hold the necessary aid of other Asiatic peoples.
5. To promote cleavages between Japanese classes and groups.
6. To exploit anxiety concerning internal treason, subversive activities, violent or covert incidents by minority groups within Japan; and therewith to increase the Japanese burden of counter-espionage.
7. To split Japan from her Axis associates, and to promote difficulties between Japan and neutral powers.
8. To exploit the present economic difficulties of the Japanese, and to emphasize Japan's progressive economic deterioration as war continues.

Propaganda Themes are enumerated in detail, as suggested means whereby the Propaganda Objectives are to be attained. Some of the more important of these, listed without reference to the particular Propaganda Objective to which each is attached, are the following:

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(a) To convey trustworthy and timely news.
(b) To avoid sending atrocity charges concerning Japanese into the Japanese Empire, except under specific conditions.
(c) To censor all American threats against Japanese--whatever the source--unless the threat is official in nature or is compatible with international law.
(d) To use the Japanese Emperor (with caution and not by name) as a peace symbol.
(e) To point out the illegitimacy and arbitrariness of the present military government, and the fact that this government has wantonly endangered all Japan, including the Emperor and his House.
(f) To use American and other well-disposed Japanese as propagandists and as propaganda themes.
(g) To promise Japan post-war prosperity and happiness, if we win.
(h) To show that Asia will not be neglected by the United Nations, that our war aims apply to Asia, and that--as the Undersecretary of State has said--"The age of imperialism has ended."
(i) To show that the American, British, and Dutch record in Asia is not one of which to be ashamed; that the Filipinos are loyal; and that, as Generalissimo Chiang pointed out, Korea has no Gandhi.
(j) To suggest to the Japanese that the Germans in Japan may either be American agents in disguise, or else German fifth columnists preparing for their Fuehrer a Japanese version of Der Tag.
(k) To attempt to launch rumors of underground troubles in Japan, and to reach the attention and interest of maritime wireless operators.

Some Relevant Characteristics of the Japanese emphasizes particular points in Japanese behavior or thought which should not be overlooked by American propaganda. Among these are Japanese attitudes concerning:

1. Disease.
2. Fire.
3. Espionage.
4. Resentment against "Inferiority".
5. Fondness for slogans.

Operations and Techniques presents brief comment on:

A. Propaganda Classified as to Contents. (News and Rumor are stressed.)
B. Propaganda Classified as to Medium. (Shortwave radio and news "planted" in neutral sources seem to be the chief present media.)

C. Propaganda Classified as to Group Addressed.
D. Propaganda Liaison with Allies. (The necessity of cooperation with the Chinese propaganda agencies and machinery is made plain.)

Special and Cautionary Suggestions

I. Function of the Theater Commander. His relation to psychological warfare is made plain.
II. Shintoism. Religious questions, even of Emperor-worship, are to be avoided altogether for the present.
III. The Emperor. Cautious but persistent reference to the Emperor, (but not by name) is recommended.
IV. The Imperial Tradition. A similar treatment is to be accorded the Imperial Tradition of Japan.
V. The Race Issue. It is regarded as urgent that the race problem be fought on all propaganda fronts, domestic as well as foreign, for the purpose of forestalling the Japanese attempt to launch a racial war in Asia.

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JAPAN PLAN

(FINAL DRAFT)

June 5, 1945.

Psychological Warfare Branch
Military Intelligence Service
WAR DEPARTMENT

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WAR DEPARTMENT
Military Intelligence Service
Psychological Warfare Branch

June 8, 1942

The enclosed JAPAN PLAN (FINAL DRAFT) has been developed through conferences of the governmental agencies interested. The JAPAN PLAN (FINAL DRAFT) supersedes the JAPAN PLAN (First draft) of May 13, 1942, and the JAPAN PLAN (first revision) of May 23, 1942. If necessary, this FINAL DRAFT will be subject to further revision before acceptance for concurrent action, but if possible and convenient it will--in the interest of swift action--be supplemented by a Memorandum of Corrections and Changes to bring into alignment with military strategy the policies of each agency concerned.

It is further understood that the several agencies, military and civilian, concerned will pool and circulate such research data and other findings as may assist in the general implementation of this plan. Background data or reference material, to be annexed to this plan, are especially desirable.

O. N. Solbert

O. N. Solbert,
Colonel, G.S.C.

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JAPAN PLAN

PROPOSAL

It is proposed:

(1) That a general plan for propaganda into the Japanese Empire, which will assist our military strategy and operations, be adopted:

(2) That the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee, together with the various government publicity agencies concerned in the operation of such a general plan, draw up and agree on a detailed plan.

This detailed plan will then serve as a basic guide until a subsequent overall plan is adopted. It will be modified as events require by periodic changes issued by proper military authority to maintain synchronization with military strategy.

DISCUSSION

In order to increase the effectiveness of our total propaganda effort into the Japanese Empire, and above all to increase the degree of correlation between propaganda and military operations, it is necessary that agreement be reached among the various government agencies concerned about the kind and methods of propaganda to Japan.

Propaganda into Japan proper has four main present objectives:

(1) To interfere with Japanese military operations and to injure Japanese morale;

(2) To weaken and slow down the Japanese war effort;

(3) To discredit and overthrow the Japanese military authorities;

(4) To split Japan from her allies and neutrals.

There is appended, for use as a basis for discussions with the various government agencies involved, a list of subordinate objectives to be achieved if possible in the Japanese Empire. Comments on the conditions and methods of achieving each subordinate objective are made.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee place before the Joint Chiefs of Staff the completed and agreed-on plan for adoption as a guide, until a subsequent plan is drawn up.

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THE JAPAN PLAN

Although propaganda into Japan will not proceed under the most favorable conditions until the United Nations have achieved military victories, it is necessary to establish a plan for interim operations. Once propaganda objectives are stated and agreed upon, channels for action may be discovered by practical application and experience.

Political aims condition propaganda objectives. To date, these aims are documented in the speeches of the President, or speeches such as that of the Undersecretary of State on May 30; in political instruments (such as the Atlantic Charter and its application to Asia, the United Nations Declaration, to which the United States is committed; and in other political speeches and acts of high officials of the United States and the other United Nations.

The following JAPAN PLAN consists of six portions:

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POLICY GOALS

The following immediate objectives or policy goals have been agreed upon, in the light of our military and naval strategy, by the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee:

1. To interfere with Japanese military operations and to injure Japanese morale.

2. To weaken and slow down the Japanese war effort.

3. To discredit and overthrow the Japanese military authorities.

4. To split Japan from her allies and neutrals.

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PROPAGANDA OBJECTIVES

1. To increase distrust by the Japanese in the official statements of the government and other lawful news sources within Japan.

The Japanese news, radio, and propaganda system is insulated against outside interference by the difficulty and peculiarity of the Japanese language to Westerners. This makes it all the more necessary to penetrate the defenses which the language and the national thought have provided, and to cause the Japanese to heed United Nations news. ~~(Distrust of the official news sources can only be developed by creating trust in United Nations sources.)~~ Once preliminary obstacles begin to disappear, the vulnerability of the Japanese news sources may be found enhanced by their consistent understatement of Japanese losses.

2. To maintain between Japan and the United States civilized standards of war conduct.

The Japanese people and government constantly face adjustments of standards from their own past and of standards adopted from European civilization. It is possible for war against Japan to be conducted with considerable propriety and humanity on both sides, but the maintenance of such conduct requires nicely gauged appraisal of Japanese mentality. Brutalization of American-Japanese warfare would be a disservice to our armed forces and our nationals in Asia. It might render achievement of victory more difficult. Correct behavior should be encouraged; cruelty and reprisals, discouraged and postponed.

3. To convince the Japanese people that their interests are not served by their present administration, so that the common people will not consider a defeat of that administration to be a defeat of themselves.

Japan's war policy is based on two concepts, first, that the Japanese people, by history and ability, have a special mission of Asiatic leadership, and second, that the present is an age of world anarchy in which every nation is in real danger of attack and in which no nation will long survive which does not secure and develop an economic sphere adequate to support large

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mobile military forces. These two concepts have been thoroughly sold to the Japanese people. Our task is then a very difficult one of counter-propaganda. We must convince the Japanese people that their real interest lies, not in squandering their resources in a futile struggle for power, but in the renunciation of aggression and in cooperative creation of a world in which both they and their neighbors can have a secure and honorable position. We will fail if our propaganda is not prepared in full awareness of the psychological obstacles in Japanese minds which must be overcome, obstacles which are in some cases based on very real grievances against the international system of the last decades or against the United States.

4. To convince the Japanese leaders and people that lasting victory is unattainable, that Japan cannot enlist and hold the necessary aid of other Asiatic peoples.

Japan's continuing difficulties in Korea, Manchuria, and China should be emphasized. Her successes with the Thai and the Burmese must be minimized as only temporary. Germany's failure to rouse anything but sullen hatred from the enslaved populations of Europe shows the impossibility of consolidating military victory by force. To convince a people that their war effort is futile is an established psychological warfare technique for promoting defection.

5. To promote cleavages between Japanese classes and groups.

Many potential cleavages can be discovered by careful study of Japanese social, political, economic life prior to December 8, 1941. Where Japanese are known to have entertained distrust, that distrust should be nourished. Since the war effort and its initial successes have undoubtedly shifted alignments of opinion, however, every effort should be made to secure intelligence reports giving reliable evidence as to cleavages which may now be vulnerable to our propaganda.

6. To exploit anxiety concerning internal treason, subversive activities, violent or covert incidents by minority groups within Japan, whether native or foreign, and thereby to increase the Japanese burden of counter-intelligence.

Here full advantage should be taken of the Japanese fear of espionage, sabotage, and of all hidden acts and conspiracies. Life in Japan, even in peace, is seriously complicated by the incessant activities of a vast domestic espionage. To increase this anxiety and distrust will further complicate the ordinary processes of living, transportation, and trade. It will also lower morale, if the Japanese are made to believe that traitors, fifth columnists, and agitators are working undetected in their midst. It is a function of psychological warfare to create and foster this.

7. To split Japan from her Axis associates, and to promote difficulties between Japan and neutral powers.

Japan's close association with Germany rests chiefly on one very strong common war aim--the defeat of the United Nations--and only slightly on other common interests, on political theory, or on mutual respect and sympathy. We should emphasize the arrogance of the Germans, their historic contempt for the Oriental, their racial theories, their distrust of the Yellow Peril, as well as their insatiable ambition for world rule and a monopoly of world trade

8. To exploit the present economic difficulties of the Japanese and to emphasize Japan's progressive economic deterioration as war continues

War, pestilence, and famine go hand in hand. We know that the Japanese have made and are making extraordinary sacrifices for what they believe to be their duty. But, hungry and ill-clad as they may be today, their lot will be infinitely worse if their insane policy of war and conquest is continued. Temporary successes may provide them with raw materials of military value, but they cannot eat rubber or drink oil. Prosperity belongs only to nations enjoying a free economy, peace, and the ability to trade anywhere in the world. Japan is bound to lose its temporary gains.

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PROPAGANDA THESES

1. To increase distrust by the Japanese of the official statements of the government and other lawful news sources within Japan.

The basic elements in any modern propaganda system are those which apply to the unbiased, peacetime dissemination of news: Timeliness and truth. This objective is accordingly the application to Japan of a policy basic to all United States propaganda--transmission of the truth, presentation of worthwhile news along with our statement of the case, and discrediting of the enemy news sources.

To do this it is essential:

a. To keep United States and United Nations news of high news value pouring in on Japan from all sides.

1. An increased timeliness of United States news is strongly to be desired. If the Japanese have the first telling of a news event, it is far more difficult to undo the damage than it is to present our version from the start.

b. To counter all Japanese lies or exaggerations whenever it is strategically possible to do so.

c. To reiterate the fact that only democracies can endure to be told the truth, and that enemy censorship is a sign of the enemy government's fear of its own people.

d. To show that racial and political minorities enjoy a freer press in the United States and United Kingdom--even in wartime--than anywhere else in the world.

e. To make all news so interesting or palatable that every shortwave set will become a source of rumors.

1. It is vitally necessary that news be transmitted in correct Japanese, and that no blunders--like Berlin's humorless reference to Shangri-la--be committed.

2. It is also necessary to assess the propaganda effect of each news item before sending it, to ensure smooth operation of propaganda programs.

2. To maintain between Japan and the United States civilized standards of war conduct.

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This objective is, of course, subject to the general adoption of a Federal propaganda policy for all atrocities. In Japan's case, it is essential:

a. To protect Japanese under the authority of the United States, to wage war in accordance with a strict interpretation of the formally applicable international rules, and to give the United States government and people fully publicized credit for such action.

1. The obligation of the military and political officers of the United States to maintain the honor of this nation is, of course, beyond considerations of immediate situation or strategy. Owing, however, to the federal character of this government, and to the irresponsibility of some portions of the press, there is a danger that the Japanese will believe Japanese internees or prisoners to be mistreated.

2. Japanese sensitiveness is such that, despite their own laxities in proper legal behavior, they will expect the United States to fulfil its obligations. Evidence of such fulfilment will counteract the Japanese propagandist allegations that the Americans are barbarians.

b. In atrocity reports (whenever publication of authenticated cases is agreed upon by the War and Navy Departments) to complain against specific Japanese persons or units, not against the Japanese Empire as a whole.

1. The criticism of all Japan would have no valuable results in Japan. The other nations of the world do not need to be told that the Japanese are atrocious and inhumane conquerors; but this should not exclude detailed indictment of the methods of exploiting the conquered areas.

2. Criticism of individual Japanese, or of specific Japanese military or naval units, would have the advantage that it would facilitate correction, and--by discrediting the enemy in a concrete and believable form--might have a chance of being believed by some Japanese.

c. Compliment Japanese civilization in its non-military aspects.

1. Compliments to Japanese civilization might help keep temper, assist in making other propaganda palatable,

and would have a slight, indirect, but cumulative effect of helping the Japanese think of themselves and the Italians as civilized peoples in contrast to the third partner of the Axis, barbarized Germany.

3. Such compliments should be paid carefully, and should not encourage the Japanese to regard us as milksops or to feel they have a Kultur to impose on the world. It should be kept in mind that such material will be transmitted throughout Asia.

d. Meet improper or savage Japanese threats with ridicule which will embarrass the Japanese officer or agency issuing the threats. Censor similar American threats, and prevent their transmission overseas.

1. Stupid or ill-timed threats from the American side may lead to immediate reprisals upon American prisoners or internees. This is enough to justify censorship. A statement in a prominent newspaper that the Japanese people should be massacred or sterilized might contribute toward unprintable horrors to the Americans under Japanese control.

e. Leave to the Chinese the conduct of atrocity propaganda directed toward Japan; if necessary, establish contact through official channels to this end.

1. Chinese propaganda is not going to improve or worsen the savagery of Japanese war conduct. Chinese prisoners will be butchered, tortured, subverted, or prostituted, no matter what Chungking says.

2. Disappointment in Chungking would be avoided if a separation of tasks were effected between the two nations, and the United Nations would then have the benefit of two mutually complementary propaganda campaigns, each adapted to the needs of the country of issue.

3. Chinese propaganda may appropriately derogate the Japanese Emperor, and touch on the dangerous theme of Japanese republicanism, whereas ours could not. The Chinese, because of the long Far Eastern past which they share with the Japanese, could find the appropriate political terms for such themes while Westerners--analyzing Japanese political experience, rather than feeling it--might make serious errors of taste or judgment.

5. To create a schism between the government and the common people of Japan, by showing the people that their interests are not served by the present government, and that defeat of the present military government will not mean defeat of the common people or the frustration of Japanese culture and ideals.

To do this it is essential:

a. To point out to the Japanese that their present militant leaders have gone far astray from the path of conduct set forth by the Meiji Emperor (ruled 1867-1912) and are acting contrary to the desires of the present Emperor. The Meiji Emperor's sense of honor, his quasi-constitutionalism, those policies of his which were Anglophile, and so forth, should be stressed--not his expansionism. In connection with indicating the real desires of the present Emperor the following points (suggested by officers of the State Department) might be used:

1. The Emperor was on the point of issuing an Imperial Rescript in November 1931 to halt the Army's depredations in Manchuria but was afraid that issuance of the Rescript would result in widespread assassination by the chauvinistic military of leaders close to the throne who held ideas different from the chauvinists;

2. That prior to Matsuoka's departure for Geneva in 1933 the Emperor informed him that the last thing which the Emperor wanted was any break with the democratic powers but as Matsuoka was a tool of the militant leaders Matsuoka did not carry out the wishes of the Emperor; and

3. That the Emperor was opposed to the Tripartite Agreement prior to its consummation and that, when he could not prevent its consummation, he emphasized his desire for peace. (Published data are not available for documentation of these points, but they have been obtained from sources considered reliable; use of them cannot expose the United States to the charge of employing deliberate lies in propaganda).

b. Show that the President's message, sent December 6, 1941, to the Emperor was improperly delivered, if at all.

1. It may be noted that the State Department received a telegram, purportedly from Ambassador Grew at Tokyo dated Dec-

ember 8, 1 P.M. Tokyo time (December 7, 11 P.M., Washington time) quoting an oral statement which the Foreign Minister said he had been instructed to make by the Japanese Emperor. The Emperor was reported by the Foreign Minister to have expressed his desire that the memorandum delivered by Ambassador Nomura to the Secretary of State on December 7 be regarded as the Emperor's reply to the President's message. In view of the statement by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, it would probably be difficult to substantiate the statement that the President's message sent December 6 to the Emperor was never delivered. However, for propaganda purposes, publicity might be given to the alleged reply by the Emperor through the Foreign Minister with the allegation that the Emperor must not have received the message or, if he did, was not permitted by Japanese militarists to alter the decision already reached by those militarists to attack the United States. (Data supplied by the State Department)

2. Under either of the alternatives stated above, the Emperor was subjected to indignity.

3. Emphasis on the criminality of the Pearl Harbor attack, and on the true stupidity of its superficial brilliance of execution, may be brought out as a related smirching of the Emperor's honor on December 7/8 by the militarists.

c. State that the Emperor is still victimized by the military leaders. (At this point of propaganda, particularly close correlation of combat and psychological warfare is necessary, since the military leaders of Japan will be most vulnerable to criticism on militarily adverse occasions. Uninformed timing in use of this theme could be damaging to the issuing agency.)

1. As the Emperor is regarded by the Japanese in much the same way as the national flag is regarded by Western nations, the statement that he helped to cause the war is of adverse propaganda effect. Hints that an intra-government Japanese anti-war group does exist would undermine Imperial prestige while seeming to show proper respect and concern for the Emperor.

d. Our Chinese or Japanese collaborators might add comments on the Emperor which would not be accepted from Westerners.

1. The Meiji Emperor was the only Emperor of recent centuries to possess true qualities of leadership. His son, the Taisho Emperor, was insane, and his grandson, the reigning

Showa Emperor, is pretty much of an ineffectual. Consequently, appeals to Meiji are appeals to a figure beyond criticism and reproach, and can be used against the regime.

e. Quote the provisions of the Imperial Japanese Constitution of 1889.

1. Provisions concerning personal rights.
2. Provisions concerning quasi-parliamentary government.

f. Suggest that the Japanese military have duped the Japanese people, and that the German Nazis have duped the Japanese military.

g. The traditional, pre-1931 friendship of the American people for the Japanese people could be described.

1. Interruptions to this friendship could be ascribed to the ambitions of the Japanese military in general and of specific, named persons in particular.

2. This theme is worthy of strong emphasis.

h. Create a general picture of Japanese well-treated and happy under pre-war and current American rule.

This theme should not be employed until the American-Japanese situation has settled down and a broad unquestionable background of fact exists.

1. Such a picture would help offset Japanese popular fears of the Americans, without making the military feel any better. It would facilitate the spread of Japanese defeatism.

2. Action taken within this country to improve the conditions of the American Japanese would correlate admirably with propaganda into Japan. The appropriate domestic propaganda agencies might draw the attention of both public and private welfare agencies to this point.

3. The happy life of the Japanese at home before the coming of military rule might also be described, coupled with the statement that persons under democratic, non-agressive government still enjoy the blessings of personal freedom and relative prosperity.

i. Employ the factual, honest theme that the democratic world is a prosperous, humane world which the Japanese may rejoin on the basis of the United Nations declaration, if they make themselves worthy candidates for readmission.

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1. It is recommended that in praising the democratic world it be pointed out to the Japanese how many contributions the United States has made in a friendly and helpful manner to Japan, thereby assisting Japan to become a great power, pointing out at the same time the falsity of the propaganda of their leaders that we have attempted to impoverish Japan and weaken her. In this connection, evidence might be included along lines as follows: An impoverished country could not have become so great industrially as Japan has become and have had its standard of living increased as Japan's standard of living increased during the peaceful early 1930's. This was effected largely through American financial and technical aid.

2. It is usually advisable to pass over the dissimilarities of ideology among the common peoples of the world, and to point out similarities. All United Nations propaganda will, of course, point out that the common men of all countries hate militarist aggression, and love peace. It might be added that Americans and Japanese are particularly similar in their belief in business enterprise, in international trade, and in industrial progress.

j. Persuade the Japanese that a democratic peace will bring them comfort and prosperity. (Caution: It is necessary to avoid naivete in this matter, since a materialistic dollars-and-cents approach to holy patriotism can be very offensive, most of all to the Japanese. The implication should never be made that the Japanese might accept a peace which was not just to all, purchasing comfort with dishonor. Rather, it should be stressed that comfort, individual happiness, and prosperity will be the concomitants of the peace which is going to be brought to Japan by the inevitable democratic victory. All that the Japanese common people can do now is to wait for liberation from our common enemies, the aggressive militarists, and move when the final hour is at hand. This would supplement the propaganda themes concerning class cleavages and counterintelligence.)

Particular emphases are:

1. The burdensomeness of rationing and the wartime restrictions should be brought forth whenever the common Japanese can be reached by standard-wave radio or other means.

2. Since Japan is in the fifth year of war, and nearing the sixth, and is in the eleventh year of operations in China, emphasis on peacetime comfort is worthwhile. Good cloth instead of the Ersatz sufu, good rice, real money instead

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of inflationary chinplasters--such detail could lend vigiseos to current propaganda.

3. Loss of the valuable tourist trade, and the opportunities for small independent shopkeepers should be emphasized.

4. Show that democracy is economic as well as political, and that the plain Japanese can make a free, honest living when the militarist-monopolists are overthrown, and free commerce and tourism is restored.

5. Pleasure and comfort should be presented as artistic, beautiful, dignified, and having their own spiritual and moral worth in terms of humane civilization. The Japanese is contemptuous of what he conceives to be American hedonism.

4. To convince the Japanese leaders and people that victory is unattainable. That Japan can not enlist and hold the necessary aid of the other Asiatic peoples.

It is necessary to exploit to the fullest the psychological warfare advantages offered by the humane political aims of the United Nations, as these may be expressed (e.g. in the Atlantic Charter and official pronouncements) from time to time by the United Nations leaders, as well as to employ other appropriate themes. It is particularly essential that every political thesis be stated in a way appealing to Japanese thought.

a. To convey to the Japanese the message of world democracy and freedom, transposing these concepts into concrete terms familiar to Japanese, making plain the fact that the Axis leaders are waging a foredoomed struggle against worldwide forces of progress and freedom.

1. The application of the United Nations war aims to Asia, and not merely to Europe, must be underscored.

2. It must be made plain that the United Nations, composed of free peoples, are unable--by the nature of their own institutions--to hold other peoples in degradation and bondage. (The statement of Generalissimo Chiang, that Korea could have no Gandhi, is worth citation.)

3. Aggression, fascism, and militarist imperialism--and their Japanese equivalents--must be condemned as outdated and doomed. The irreversible progress of freedom--in Asiatic as well as Euro-American settings--must be shown as the

true course of the future, and "newness" or "futurism" in fascism shown to be false. The Japanese are sincerely anxious to keep up with and adopt the best new features of civilization outside Japan. Today Britain and America seem diehards; Germany and Italy, fresh and new. This attitude must be combatted by putting United Nations war aims as new, good, progressive in Japanese terms.

The political directive contained in the speech of the Undersecretary of State on May 30, 1942, should be brought forth clearly: "The age of imperialism is ended. The right of a people to their freedom must be recognized, as the civilized world long since recognized the right of an individual to his personal freedom. The principles of the Atlantic Charter must be guaranteed to the world as a whole--in all oceans and in all continents."

4. To show that China, the land of the ancient sages (such as Confucius, Mencius, or the military writer, Sun Tzu, who are still as highly esteemed by the Japanese as they are by the Chinese) has remained wholly oriental while adopting democracy.

   (a) Show that Japan's ally, Wang Ch'ing-wei, has to follow the teachings of Sun Yat-sen in form, because the Chinese of all groups have accepted democracy.

   (b) Describe modern democratic leaders of Asiatic race.

5. Further political directives shall be exploited as they are put forth.

b. To show American mobilization for war and war production. (The living standard of the United States should not enter into propaganda against Japan as an evidence of our economic superiority. To do so would only encourage the Japanese in feelings of the patriotic self-righteousness of their own enforced sacrifices. American productive capacity for civilian use should be mentioned only to show what we are abandoning, and converting for war. Use of this theme in any emphatic way while United Nations defeats continue would be useless if not damaging. ***Production becomes significant only when its application at the fronts has been demonstrated by victories.)

1. Comparative figures on the productive capacities of the United States versus Japan and the United Nations versus the Axis with respect to:

   (a) Airplane, tank and truck motors.
   (b) Shipping.
   (c) Steel, machine tools, and dies.
   (d) Foods for our armies and those of our Allies.
   (e) Weapons of war of high quality by mass production

methods. (Extremely simple graphs showing the relative production might be used.)

h. The high degree of United States industrial development and agricultural mechanization permits us to release for military service an even greater proportion of the male population than countries which can exploit subject people. Machines are our ceolies.

c. To show American superiority in technical knowledge and equipment. Japan is cut off from the Western sources of technical training while training of the United States for war and war production is reaching its highest level.

1. An attempt should be made to turn the Japanese admiration for American inventive genius into a fear that we will produce more and more effective weapons while Japanese war technology will cease to grow.

d. To explain the physique, hardihood, and health of the American people.

1. Show that American sportsmanship has engendered an invincible will to win.

2. America's frontier heritage is not unknown abroad, and may be developed as a subsidiary theme in explaining the toughness of Americans.

e. To persuade the Japanese government group, who are the ones most likely to be reached by shortwave radio propaganda, that consolidation of victory is impossible because of the incredible hostilities and non-cooperation of the Asiatic nations Japan has conquered.

1. The fact that Japan cannot trust the Nanking and Peking traitors may come in for comment at this point.

2. Point out that some of the traitors, disillusioned with Japan, may be working in secret for free China.

3. The Japanese home public should be informed of all instances of Asiatic resistance to Japan which the United Nations news and intelligence services may bring to light.

f. To persuade the common Japanese people that after thirty-seven years of Japanese domination, Korea is still a potential menace to Japan.

1. This point may usefully be coordinated with plans for American propaganda through and among Koreans.

2. Timing should be devised to prevent miscarriage of potential Korean aid.

3. Korea and the Philippines may appropriately be contrasted.

g. To show the Japanese people the ineffectuality and corruption of their present exploiting methods throughout Occupied Asia.

h. To attack the entire concept of Pan-Asianism as a justification for the false and pretentious Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

1. True intra-Asiatic cooperation may be presented as unobjectionable to the Americans and the other Western peoples of the United Nations.

2. Chinese attacks on Pan-Asianism may be usefully and properly quoted.

i. To show the true meaning of America's Monroe Doctrine in contrast to the violent and fraudulent "Asiatic Monroe Doctrine" of Japan.

5. To promote cleavages between Japanese classes and groups.

To do this it is essential:

a. To apply intelligence and research activities to the psychological situation within Japan.

1. The impact of war has undoubtedly led to new alignments in Japanese society, economics and politics. Current information is essential to the exploitation of new cleavages, and to the propaganda avoidance of old fissures which might incorrectly be presumed to exist.

2. Full utilization of cleavages which exist in fact will be of the highest propaganda value.

b. To create divisions and conflicts among the ruling classes, the different types and grades of the legislative, the administrative, and police bodies, and within the regime in general. Some possible lines of difference which have been suggested are the following:

1. The army extremists v. big business.
2. The army extremists v. the Court circles.
3. The army v. the navy (particularly on the issue of pay, procurement, supplies, and also with respect to world-wide reputation.)

4. Intra-army cliques.
5. Labor v. employers.
6. Tenants v. landlords.
7. Bureaucrats v. people.
8. Expeditionary Forces v. men who stay safely at home. (See also Propaganda Objective #6, on minorities. Both these groupings will require to be brought down to date.)

c. Attack individuals by name.

1. Rumors spread best when there is foundation in fact; research will disclose a sufficient number of illustrations in the case of the Japanese. Such attacks might be libel in time of peace, but the existence of a state of war qualifies the legal nature of the case. Rumors about intimate personal traits or habits (among which sex and drink rarely lead to the discreditable) should be confined to whispering campaigns; stupidity, bad manners, personal feuds, laziness, cowardice and dishonesty may be charged on the radio.

d. Corruption should be charged against the Japanese civilians in broadcasts which reach the military, and vice-versa.

1. Broadcasts beamed at the N.E.I. and F.M.S. (but intended for interception by Japanese) might properly include accounts of Japanese corruption in "Manchoukuo", broadcasts beamed at Japan might stress the furthest periphery of the occupied area, and so forth. (Data concerning this corruption may be obtained from the Department of State, other official sources, and private persons from the Far East.)

2. Supplementary to this, items concerning the German leaders could be gathered from the European Leftist press of pre-1940 days, and sent along to Japan.

3. The reaction to be expected and cultivated is one of embarrassment that corruption should exist, and in the case of corrupt persons, one of envy and anger that the hearer is not in on it.

e. Threaten Japan with revolt of the Japanese workers and farmers. (Note the particularly strong connection between the two.)

Data on the Japanese domestic situation should be gathered as a preliminary to use of this theme.

1. Until further information from Japan is available, the farmers might be stressed more than the workers, in view of the fact that urban labor is relatively well paid at

present.

2. This fits in with the Japanese dread of the class war, and also with directives #8 and #7 following. Hints as to radical lower-class organizations are appropriate.

6. To exploit anxiety concerning internal treason, subversive activities, violent or covert incidents by minority groups within Japan, whether native or foreign, and therewith to increase the Japanese burden of counterintelligence.

To do this it is essential:

a. To use the following minorities in a manner suitable to the immediate occasion, properly timed and with appropriate safeguards for the preservation of potentially friendly groups:

1. Radicals. The Japanese government has a great fear of radicals and of radicalism. The "proletarian" influence of labor, literary groups, and students has been tremendous in the recent past.

2. Intellectuals. Professors and students even in the government colleges, are largely suspect in the eyes of the authorities. Experts of all kinds, particularly those who have lived abroad, are likely to antagonize the chauvinists either intentionally or accidentally.

3. Koreans. Most educated Koreans speak Japanese. They have to. Many live in Japan, and are not assimilated. Military directives as to timing are especially important in this instance. Premature action might frustrate potential Korean aid.

4. Overseas Japanese. Overseas Japanese, assimilated to other loyalties, could be used as bogies within Japan. Their value to the United Nations could usefully be exaggerated. American Japanese might be used immediately for broadcasts in Japanese wherein they stated that Japan's aggression earns Japan universal dislike, that they themselves prefer American citizenship, and so forth. The propaganda aim would be to strike at Japanese sensitiveness to world opinion.

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5. Unspecified (non-existent) Traitors. An adaptation of the British Colonel Britton campaign would consist in conveying coded or plain messages to Japanese traitors who may or may not exist.

(a) If the Japanese could be made to suppose that our Japanese language broadcasts contained items of immediate naval interest, the wireless operators of Japanese ships would be more likely to receive instructions to listen to KGEI and other United Nations stations, with a consequent leakage, through them, of rumors or news from our sources.

(b) It would be preferable to use much imaginary groups, even with a sacrifice of some propaganda results, than to invite persecution of potentially useful minorities (such as Koreans, Chinese or neutrals in Japan.)

6. White Men. German technicians, civilian and military, are of material aid to the Japanese war effort. These Germans enjoy considerable freedom of movement.

(a) It is no less difficult for Japanese to distinguish between various White nationalities than it is for the average American to tell Chinese from Japanese. Therefore, it will be possible to impede both the Germans' freedom and their aid to the Japanese war effort, by circulating rumors and in other ways suggesting to the Japanese that American spies are to be found in Japan, disguised as Germans and equipped with all the apparently proper official credentials.

(b) A second approach to the problem of Germans in Japan would consist in showing that these Germans amount to a German Fifth Column in Japan, designed to further Japan's interests insofar as they may coincide with Germany's, but to subvert Japan when Germany's world strategy shifts. The Japanese could be shown that between themselves and the Reichswehr there is nothing but the Red Army, and between their Navy and Germany's nothing but the British and American fleets. Therefore, if Japan and Germany begin to win, Japan will be left alone in the Old World, face to face with a victorious German power, and with a German fifth column which can strike at the core of Japan's war effort. If Japan and Germany lose, Japan will have played Germany's game in vain.

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(c) On the simple, practical level of personal antagonism, Japanese could be shown that the Germans in Japan are enriching themselves and profiteering, while the poor Japanese pay for the war.

7. Fanatical groups (either real or imaginary). The Japanese fear of underground action might be played upon by the use of fanatical groups as a theme. Since the present military regime owes much to the aid of once-underestimated nationalist secret societies, the regime would not be likely to underestimate such groups again.

b. To launch rumors concerning the extent and usefulness of United Nations espionage in Japan.

1. Probable Japanese credulity would be amply facilitated by Japanese traditions of American devilry and cleverness.

c. To demonstrate the effectiveness of United Nations intelligence.

1. The technique and appropriateness of such an action is, patently, a matter for the operating agency to decide. If KGEI could ever broadcast, "Takahashi-san, of the War Office, lunched at the Imperial Hotel one hour ago, and picked his teeth while he left the building," the effect of the report--if true--would be serious. This is a mere instance, of course.

d. To jest about the inoptness and comedy of Japanese counter-espionage.

1. Propaganda of this type could be beamed to occupied Asia, as a means of thwarting the Japanese strategy of terror.

e. To damage public morale and increase bureaucratic counterintelligence by the instigation of actual sabotage within Japan.

1. Such sabotage will await the development of military operations, and the coming of a generally worsened Japanese will-to-fight.

7 To split Japan from her Axis associates, and to promote difficulties between Japan and neutral powers.

To do this it is essential:

a. To emphasize utterances of the Japanese which are offensive to her allies or to neutrals, and to forward Axis or neutral utterances which offend Japan.

1. The very best propaganda of this kind cannot originate in the United Nations, but must spring from the actual antagonisms of the Axis powers for one another, and of the neutrals for the Axis.

2. In neutral countries, although scarcely in Axis areas, it will be possible to cause utterances which--when brought to the attention of the Japanese--will elicit Japanese replies which will thereupon antagonize the neutral involved. These offensive Japanese replies should then faithfully be forwarded to the neutral concerned.

b. To stress the potentialities of a German-Japanese split.

1. To indicate the historical truth that Hitler's Germany is a faithless ally. The Soviet Union was treated as a quasi-ally by the Germans, but betrayed at the opportune moment. German quotations concerning the "Yellow Race" or the "Yellow Peril" (both by the Kaiser and by Nazi leaders) could be used to show German contempt for Japan and the probability of a German betrayal.

2. To make plain to the Japanese the world-wide extent of Hitler's aims.

3. To show the long-range incompatibility of the National-socialist ideology and Japanese Kokutai.

4. To show that Germany's practical aims include much of the area claimed by Japan. German title to the N.E.I. through the conquest of the Netherlands, German aspirations in Wang's China, German interest in the Indian Ocean can be used. The Transocean-D.N.B. representative in Chungking in August, 1940, stated categorically that Germany would, after conquest of Russia, do what the Russians had failed to do, and acquire the hegemony of East Asia, starting with Siberia.

5. To show, in cold-blooded and realistic studies of power-politics and world strategy, that German-Japanese cooperation is realistic now, but will not continue to be such for long. The partnership of Germany with Russia and France to deprive the Japanese of the fruits of victory following the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895, and also the fact that Japan fought Germany in 1914-1918 might be recalled to the Japanese. (This type of formal argument may perhaps await the development of standard-wave transmission, with quasi-educational features, into Japan.)

c. To develop specific plans for the alienation of given countries particularly Vichy, France, and Japan.

8. To increase the economic difficulties of the Japanese and to emphasize Japan's progressive economic deterioration as the war continues.

The creation of economic difficulties is primarily a subject for economic warfare, rather than for psychological warfare. Propaganda appeal to subject peoples for such economic warfare may, as occasion arises, be extended along the lines indicated below, although the entire problem of implementation is more difficult and extensive than in the employment of purely psychological or political themes. Upon indication by the appropriate economic-warfare authorities, or the presentation of suitable combinations of events, it will be useful to exploit by propaganda the following themes:

a. To increase the difficulties of exploitation by Japan of the resources acquired by conquests.

b. To increase the strain on Japan's external and internal communications and transportation.

c. To increase the consumption, hoarding, dispersion, and wastage of Japan's resources.

d. To reduce production in and for Japan.

e. To discourage non-Japanese workers from going to or working for Japan.

f. To confuse and depress the Japanese monetary and credit systems at home and in the occupied countries.

g. To hamper or destroy Japan's economic relations with her allies and the neutrals.

h. To provoke or exploit commercial rivalry between Germany, Italy, and Japan in the Far East.

OPERATIONS AND TECHNIQUES

The following outline of operations and techniques covers the general field of propaganda, irrespective of source, target, or purpose. The appended comments reflect special conditions which apply in the particular instance of Japan.

A. PROPAGANDA CLASSIFIED AS TO CONTENTS

1. NEWS

In the instance of Japan, as in the case of most other enemy areas, the dissemination of honest, factual news is a major function of propaganda. The clarity, trustworthiness, and impartiality of the news will enhance its value as a "carrier" for other forms of propaganda. It has been pointed out that timeliness is of high value in the news distributed for propaganda purposes, and the United Nations news which is many days tardier than Axis news loses most of its propaganda value.

2. Official Statements

3. Official Communiques

Propaganda of the two foregoing types should avoid the appearance of propaganda, particularly in the Far East. Imputation that an enemy government is using high, honored, official channels for propaganda strategems is—when demonstrable—of high counterpropaganda value.

4. Rumor

Liaison with Chungking should be continued for this purpose.

5. Emotional or Rational Debates and Appeals

The value of these depends in direct measure on their palatability to the receiving audience. In the instance of Japan, this requires the appropriate utilization of a large fund of Japanese information, and a willingness to pay a propaganda price for a specific appeal—that is, to concede something to the enemy's vanities or foibles in order to engage his attention. Like all other propaganda, this should never be hostile, didactic, or superior in tone.

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6. Propaganda "Events" or Incidents

Non-verbal propaganda of a very effective sort may be developed through the creation or incitement of events which will cause the enemy to announce news or show reactions which amount to propaganda favorable to our cause.

B. PROPAGANDA CLASSIFIED AS TO MEDIUM

1. Short-wave Radio

Shortwave radio is the chief present means of reaching Japan. It is essential that the audience for shortwave radio be kept in mind. This audience will consist almost entirely of persons trusted by the Japanese government; hence such propaganda should be of a kind palatable to Japanese official circles. On the other hand, the mere fact that this audience is restricted does not necessarily imply that the ultimate dissemination of news transmitted by shortwave will be narrow; it has been pointed out that the "scarcity value" of shortwave news gives the hearer an almost irresistible temptation to distribute the choicer items he has heard. Shortwave propaganda can thus become rumor.

Furthermore, it is to be noted that the Japanese place special value on news which they do not think is addressed to them. Therefore, propaganda in reality addressed to Japan should on occasion be beamed to other areas of the world and in languages other than Japanese. Such propaganda attacks may be routed through the various Occidental countries, particularly Germany and the Spanish-speaking nations, as well as India, China, and the Netherlands East Indies.

Japanese sensibility includes swift reaction to what the Japanese regard as the public opinion of the world. Propaganda ostensibly from neutral sources would accordingly carry weight.

2. Standard-wave Radio

Experts on Japan have agreed that standard-wave broadcasts, which could reach the many home radio sets operated in Japan, would be of immense value to the United Nations cause. Obstacles to the initiation of such a standard-wave propaganda program are chiefly of a technical and geographic nature.

3. The Domestic Press

The domestic press of Japan, which is excellent and includes some of the finest newspapers in the world, may at the present time be presumed to be almost completely beyond the reach of United Nations action.

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Japanese correspondents in neutral countries (e.g., Domei men in Switzerland) are as fond of scoops as are other reporters, and may be made the victims of "plants".

4. The Neutral Press

The neutral press is, like the neutral radio, of genuine importance in reaching Japan. The press of those neutral nations still in contact with Japan would be particularly valuable in this respect. The Japanese abroad can then transmit home material covertly inserted in the neutral press by us.

5. The Subversive Enemy Press

This may be omitted from consideration at the present time in view of difficulties of distribution and of liaison. It is highly probable that virtually no subversive printing operations are carried on within Japan. At a later date, depending upon a change in the international situation, Soviet channels might be employed to reach this press.

6. Military Agents

Intelligence difficulties of United Nations agents within Japan are presumably sufficient to prohibit their undertaking any non-essential auxiliary activities—such as propaganda—for the present.

1. Pamphlets (Surface Distribution)

Chinese and Korean channels may perhaps be exploited for the purpose of developing programs for the distribution of pamphlets within Japan. Japanese pelagic fisherman constitute a possible although difficult channel of communication.

3. Pamphlets (Aerial Distribution)

Within such limits as the tactics of air warfare may permit, the use of pamphlets as an accompaniment to bombs is strongly to be desired. It has been agreed that the Japanese would not be impressed by pamphlets unaccompanied by bombs—as in the instance in the Chinese raids on Nagasaki and Taiwan, or the British raids on Berlin in the autumn of 1939—but that pamphlets could powerfully reinforce the effects of actual bombardment.

C. PROPAGANDA CLASSIFIED AS TO GROUP ADDRESSED

The following list of groups has already been covered in the discussion of Propaganda Objectives, above, and is here repeated simply for the purpose of providing a check-list.

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1. Distinct groups within Japan

2. Subversive groups within Japan

3. Japanese leaders

4. Neutral groups (i.e., groups of neutrals within Japan, as well as neutral groups outside of Japan which might effect Japanese opinion.)

5. Domestic (American groups affecting Japan)

D. PROPAGANDA LIAISON WITH ALLIES

For the purpose of implementing this JAPAN PLAN, propaganda liaison with the Chinese National Government is most essential. The following implementing policies are to be recommended:

1. To effect contact with the appropriate Chungking authorities for the purpose of launching and maintaining whispering campaigns in Northeast Asia.

   a. General contact in Chungking, through the proper and elaborate Chinese channels, would not be as effective as direct, informal contact with the Military Affairs Commission (Political Department), the Kuomintang Party-Ministry of Publicity (also termed Central Publicity Board), and the Party and Government War Area Affairs Commission.

2. To carry out psychological warfare operations within Japan through the medium of Chinese, Korean and other agents contacted through the Chungking authorities. (See Korea and China Plans.)

   a. Separate American propaganda through Korean channels would presumably duplicate the facilities developed by Generalissimo Chiang. Operations within Japan can in most instances be effected through the Chinese.

3. Association of Chinese, United States, and other agencies (to the degree requested by Chungking) to operate upon and against Japanese personnel in Occupied /Wang Ch'ing-wei/China.

   a. Some of the "traitors" in the puppet governments are undoubtedly in contact with Free China authorities, and to that extent afford us a channel direct to the Japanese military.

4. To employ the Free Japanese in China, and under Chinese authority, as a propaganda topic.

Propaganda association of the United States and Great Britain is proceeding satisfactorily.

Liaison with the Soviet Union for psychological warfare against Japan, with which the Soviet Union is not at war, is a difficult question.

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SOME RELEVANT CHARACTERISTICS OF THE JAPANESE

The Japanese Government's system of thought control, built up over many years, has provided effective defense against enemy propaganda. Under this system, Japanese thinking has developed a set of values that is different from our own. We place great emphasis upon freedom of speech and upon individual liberty. To the Japanese these concepts are not of prime importance. They put the emphasis on the importance of the State.

In a few instances, Japanese thought patterns are by their own nature vulnerable to attack. It is these particular patterns which ought to be exploited in our propaganda, because once touched they provide the network by which the propaganda spreads.

1. Disease.

A potentially vulnerable point in Japanese thought is the fear of disease, which may or may not be deeper than that in other countries, but which is made real by the fact that Japan is relatively much cleaner and healthier than the areas now invaded.

Japanese care is obvious: Large numbers of people on the streets of Japan wear masks over their mouths and noses against infection by cold or other germs. Intensive search is made of family records in all marriage arrangements for any traces of insanity or tuberculosis. Japanese regulations in China for passage on Japanese ships or entry into Japanese occupied cities are very severe. These regulations require much more frequent vaccination and cholera inoculation than is considered necessary by Western doctors; passengers on ships coming into Japan from China undergo very careful examination, and have at times been required to take rigid cholera tests before the ship could be cleared from quarantine. Japanese army regulations have required people debarking at railway stations to walk through an antiseptic bath, and those going to the Japanese consulate to wash their hands in an antiseptic solution before being admitted. This intense nervousness about disease could be fed by rumor. For example the following news items might be broadcast repeatedly with slight variations.

a. "Reliable reports show that the naturally endemic plague is spreading and attaining the proportions of an epidemic in Java and South China."
b. "Cholera has been reported spreading in Burma and South China."
c. "Malaria is rampant in the Singapore area."

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d. "Amoebic dysentery is spreading rapidly in the Shanghai area, and smallpox has broken out again."

2. Fire

Fear of fire is deep-rooted. Japanese houses are extremely inflammable, being built for the most part of wood and paper. Disastrous fires whether as a result of earthquakes or less spectacular causes, are not infrequent. A large section of the city of Shizuoka was razed in 1940 by a fire which started in a private house and quickly spread through the city. The Japanese are constantly aware of the fire hazard. Over generations there has been developed a communal system for the control of fire which calls for participation by each household in nightly patrol. On windy nights extra precautions are taken and the patrol calls out, "It's a windy night, take care of fire."

Fire control is the most emphasized part of the air-raid drills. This fear of fire could be exploited by spreading rumors among the soldiers in China and elsewhere concerning the damage done by Allied air-raids by fires. It could be stated that new and terrible bombs which acted too quickly for control had been used and had caused damage much more severe than officially admitted.

3. Espionage

A further attack is through the awareness of espionage which is common among the Japanese. (See Objective #6) It is related to the belief that the individual is unimportant and that the State is all important. Almost every Japanese is a willing unofficial espionage agent for the State. This attitude provides a mechanism for propaganda spreading. By permitting ostensibly confidential information to reach Japanese nationals in this country, it may be expected that they will find a means to pass it on to the officials of the State.

4. Resentment against "Inferiority"

In a loose, broad sense of the term, the Japanese people are frequently said to have a "sense of inferiority"--the sense of smallness as a people and as a nation surrounded by the great and large Russian, Chinese and American nations. As a psychological problem, this is controversial. The reality of their resentment of race discrimination and ridicule is unquestionable. This sensitiveness should be watched lest offenses against it damage our propaganda.

Fear of failure, sensitiveness to ridicule, lack of a Chinese-type or Western-type sense of humor are related features which might be utilized. Belief in the "manifest destiny" and divine right of the Japanese to rule the world has been fostered in the thought control system to offset the sense of inferiority which many Japanese may feel the Chinese and Westerners to be imposing on them. When defeats occur they should be exploited to the fullest to counteract the "manifest destiny" view point.

6. Fondness for Slogans.

All ideographic languages are far more compact than languages based on the mere transcription of sound. The Chinese ideographs which the Japanese and Chinese both use--with general but minor variations in meaning--lend themselves to the pithy statement of political, military, or social ideals. Many such statements, which are explicable in English through circumlocution or lengthy analysis, are untranslatable in any real sense, because the compactness--which is the heart of the meaning--is lost. Thus, the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (Dai Toa kyoei ken) looks like humane common-sense in the original, whereas the English translation is not only obscure but silly.

It is necessary to render United Nations slogans in forms which will go across with the Chinese or Japanese. Proverbs, definitions, epigrams, condensations--these are far better than statements of logic or argument. The mere fact that our own slogans, translated back into English, might seem awkward or obscure is no obstacle to their use in the Far East.

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SPECIAL AND CAUTIONARY SUGGESTION

I Function of the Theater Commander.

In a theater of war, the conduct of psychological warfare is a function of command. The theater commander has on his staff officers responsible for its conduct. The psychological warfare activities of all government agencies operating in a theater will be coordinated with military operations by the theater commander. The Joint Psychological Warfare Committee is responsible for furnishing any assistance to the theater of operations that is requested by the theater commander, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Since Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek is the Chinese theater commander, any psychological warfare program to be conducted by United States agencies in his theater takes the form of assistance to the Generalissimo. Such aid should be offered to him through military channels.

II Shintoism.

It is understood that for the present no religious questions are to be raised with the Japanese. State Shinto is to be subverted only insofar as it may constitute an element of some specific point which is under attack.

III. The Emperor.

The Emperor Hirohito (properly referred to as the Emperor of Japan) should not be mentioned by his given name of Hirohito; when referred to by title he should be presented as an unhappy friend of peace and constitutionalism.

Since the Emperor is the focus of Emperor-worship, he is a symbol--honored as are national flags in the West--which can be used to justify political and military action. In the past, the military leaders of Japan have exploited the symbolic aspect of the Emperor for their militaristic schemes. Nevertheless, it is possible to use the Emperor-symbol (not his name) in justifying criticism of the military authority, and in strengthening the case for a return to peace. If this is done, it will also have the partial effect of causing widespread skepticism about the godhood and infallibility of the Emperor, which in itself will damage the political stability of Japan.

Use of the Emperor in connection with the several Propaganda Objectives stated above may be found most useful.

SECRET

Occasional attacks on the Emperor might be requested from the Chinese, to the end that the Japanese would not find their Emperor-Concept invulnerable. Such attacks--allegations, for example, that the Emperor is nothing but a plain, rather stupid human being--would come better from a Far Eastern people than from Westerners.

IV. The Imperial Tradition.

Occasional valuable reference may be made in an informed, sophisticated way to the fact that the Japanese militarists are jeopardizing the Imperial Tradition which--objectively considered--has been a distinguished national asset to the Japanese people. By their rash war against the United States, Britain, and China--and the impending war with the Soviet Union--the militarists have risked the ruin of this tradition, and face interruption of the undisturbed growth of Japanese political culture.

V. The Race Issue.

It is essential to avoid giving unwitting aid to the Japanese propaganda attempt to convert the Pacific war into a racialist, Pan-Asia war.

It is therefore advisable to institute a program of propaganda directed toward people in this country to lessen the strong racial prejudice existing in white Americans toward colored races, including the Negro. Such propaganda could not take the form of direct statements regarding this racial prejudice, but could be done indirectly by telling of the accomplishments of colored races For example, publicity could be given to valuable work being done by Americans of Japanese ancestry.

This policy respecting race might be followed throughout the implementation of the Propaganda Objectives enumerated above.

It is obviously essential to avoid reference to such terms of racial opprobrium as "little", "yellow", "slant-eyed", "natives", etc.

Within limits of considerable care, it will be possible to meet Japanese anti-White propaganda with the utterances of American Negro leaders The following suggested theme has been transmitted by officers of the Department of State:

"Our colored people have gone into the war with a splendid spirit. The skill which Negro officers are showing in leading their men is of a high order. The leadership of Negro officers has proved to be a source of strength Negroes are enthusiastically supporting the United

States and the war for many reasons, among which is the important reason that the Negroes feel that the Japanese have become traitors to the colored peoples of the world in their treatment of Koreans and Chinese.

The suggestion is made that Dr. Joseph L. Johnson, colored, former United States Minister Resident to Liberia, might be a valuable speaker in this connection."

PROJECT FOR CHINA

IT IS PROPOSED TO FACILITATE THE SHOWING OF AMERICAN MOTION PICTURES IN CHINA AND THE SELECTION AND MANUFACTURE OF SUITABLE FILMS FOR THAT PURPOSE.

I. Objective:

The general propaganda objectives of the entire Far Eastern campaign, plus the capitalization on the well-known Oriental preference for American motion pictures.

II. Specific Targets:

All Chinese.

III. Content:

1) General American films, both news and entertainment. These should be carefully scrutinized so as to prevent specific references to China that might prove offensive. Collaboration with Chinese persons in the United States in this field is imperative. Such opera as the 'Shanghai Gesture', 'Shanghai Express' and 'Dr. Fu Manchu' and their long and dishonorable progeny have propaganda value best estimated as the square root of minus one. Similarly, the overly-lush Hollywood should be restricted wherever possible.

2) Films pertaining to China made in the United States that do not have the pseudo Chinese atmosphere should be widely distributed. So far, their number is small but there are a few cinema jobs that have a Far Eastern angle that is accurate and reproducable.

3) Films made for China. There are many phases of the relationship of the United States to China that can be suitably dramatized for distribution in the Chinese market. This will require study of available materials and available talent. The very fact, however,

that a film was made in Hollywood, particularly for the Chinese, could be advertised, provided the film were good enough.

4) The long range news and feature sequences should be available for foreign distribution. Spot news reels will be badly dated, but news features that trace the development of an industry, that show methods, that bring together a pattern of thought, are highly desirable.

IV. Implementation:

1) Preparation.

a) Cooperation with private companies through suggestion and consultation is obviously a most desirable method. It may not be easy to persuade them that they have a good market if they make the proper films, but it can be done.

b) Selection of materials. It is suggested that the office of the Coordinator of Information establish the closest possible relationship with the International Board of Review and make it plain that there are peculiar reasons why films to be shown in the Far East must undergo a more than ordinary scrutiny. It may be possible to carry out this function more effectively through the Hays office, but in any case it is imperative that the general level of the export product be sharply raised.

c) Manufacture. It may be necessary to make up the necessary amount of footage that has specific objectives in mind in respect to Oriental films, dramatizing the phases of Chinese-American relationships, for example. It may be desirable to employ groups of Chinese resident in the United States. An example of how this can be done effectively is the use of Chinese school children in the March of Time feature 'China Fights Back'.

2) Distribution.

a) It is presumed that the normal channels of commercial distribution in China are closed and will remain so for some time. Whenever and wherever they are open, this will be the best channel for operations. In the meantime, Chinese sources of distribtuion can be employed. This can be carried out through cooperation with the Chinese Ministry of Information in so far as it has available resources.

b) It will be necessary to effect important improvements in Chinese motion picture facilities. It will be necessary to supply a considerable number of motion picture projectors, and in some cases to adapt these to battery operation where wire current is not available.

c) Recommendations will be made from Chungking as to the extent of this field and the desired quantity of the equipment.

SECRET

PROJECT FOR CHINA

IT IS PROPOSED TO ESTABLISH A MICROFILM SERVICE IN CHINA AS WELL AS FROM IT.

I. [illegible]

1) To increase the library facilities in China particularly with respect to basic documents.

2) To transmit conveniently and rapidly materials that would otherwise be too bulky.

[illegible]

1) Research documents originating in the United States are of first importance in China and may not otherwise become available. This is particularly true of magazine material and periodicals not normally transmitted to the Far East.

2) Specific materials requested at different times in the Far East can be transmitted by microfilm in response to direct requests.

3) Established works, copies of which are not otherwise available in quantity can, in this fashion, be put at the disposal of Chinese libraries.

[illegible] Implementation:

1) The work that has already been done in this field or planned for the future to be coordinated with a view to avoid duplication of efforts.

2) It is desirable to establish a microfilm section for outgoing materials in the Washington office.

3) It will be necessary to initiate the procurement of supplies for shipment to China to [illegible] use of microfilm materials when they are [illegible] out.

4) Hongkong should make a prompt report on library needs in China that can be supplied by microfilm and advise as to what materials are most urgent.

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PROJECT FOR CHINA

IT IS PROPOSED THAT THE OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION COLLABORATE WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF CULTURAL RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES STATE DEPARTMENT IN THE EFFORT TO EXTEND ALL OF ITS FACILITIES ON A LARGE SCALE TO THE FAR EAST IN GENERAL AND TO CHINA IN PARTICULAR.

For the preliminary development of this project it is suggested that our Far Eastern News Section establish immediate contact with the Bureau of Cultural Relations of the State Department, explain to them in general terms our program and ask their cooperation in furthering it. As one example, there are a number of Chinese students in this country who are supported by U. S. Government funds. The Bureau of Cultural Relations undoubtedly can suggest methods by which the COI could use the services of this group.

NORMAND PLANS FOR FAR EASTERN PROPAGANDA

PROJECT RELATING TO JAPAN

IT IS PROPOSED TO ESTABLISH LONG-WAVE BROADCASTING TO JAPAN AND TO THE JAPANESE FORCES IN CHINA.

I. Objectives:

1) To slow down the production of food and war materials in Japan.

2) To weaken the morale of Japanese military forces in the field and thus accelerate their defeat.

3) To capitalize, if possible, on the chance of a split between army and navy in Japan and thus prevent effective military cooperation.

4) To pave the way politically for the return of representative constitutional government in Japan.

II. Specific Targets:

1) Politicians - particularly those with so-called liberal leanings. (At present our only audience in Japan is a small number of selected officials and monitoring clerks. Some of these undoubtedly are out of sympathy with the military clique and also with the German advisors in Tokyo. Until we have access to the people of Japan by medium wave, our propaganda efforts should be chiefly directed at this small group of diehards on the theory that it thus gets on the Japanese "grapevine" telegraph and seeps out to the so-called liberals and others who are greatly concerned over the adventure into which their war lords have plunged Japan.)

2) Workmen and farmers in Japan.

3) Business men and the merchant class.

4) Men in the ranks - particularly noncommissioned officers and enlisted men.

The junior officers in the Japanese army are at the present time probably not an effective target for ordinary propaganda broadcast. They are the most loyal and fanatical of any of the groups in the army or navy; the least knowledgeable in respect to the world at large and the least susceptible to the suggestion that their leaders may possibly be wrong. It is advisable, therefore, to concentrate the bulk of the propaganda effort directed at the Japanese army on the lower grades. Higher officers in the Japanese army may be reached, however, with a different type of propaganda. They must be reached through distrust of one another; that is, distrust of the army for the navy, and vice versa, and their distrust of Germany.

5) The Japanese abroad. There are Japanese colonies in most of the areas of southeastern Asia and the establishment in their midst of the conviction that their mother country is facing a disastrous defeat may reduce their effectiveness in the fields of sabotage and espionage.

III. Means of Action

1) Japanese public at home should be reached by broadcast radio. There are not three dozen short-wave radios in the whole of Japan and their use without permission is forbidden by law. They are in the hands of the semi-official service and . On the other hand, the Japanese have a large proportion of long-wave radio sets and although it is going to force a crackdown in strictly forbidden, their own news bulletins and normal channels can be used to get it on long-wave. (There would be

technical consultation at this point with the Chinese, the British, and the Russians, on the possibility of jamming.)

2) The Japanese armies in the field can be reached by long-wave broadcast in China. There will be receiving sets to which they will listen in every troop concentration.

3) Japanese abroad can be reached by every means of radio broadcasting; all of the secondary stations throughout all of southeastern Asia should carry some materials directly designed to influence this group.

IV. Content:

A. For Japan proper:

1) First important group of broadcasts must stress the fact that Japan cannot possibly win. All available material on the resources of the United States and its Allies should be poured into the Japanese. Whenever possible, it should be phrased in terms of contrast to Japanese resources.

In this connection, it should be observed that Japan aligned herself against the most potent group of war material producers in the world, has made herself friendless and is obliged to stand alone.

a) The impotence of Japan's allies is an important field for broadcast. German and Italian military defeats should receive great emphasis as further evidence of the fact that Japan cannot be assisted by either of her so-called allies. This should be repeated throughout most of the material that will be subsequently presented here.

b) To this should be added the attitude of Japan's allies toward Japan. The most fruitful field here is the German theories of "race" and their application to the Japanese. There is a large body of German writing which deals directly with this point and it should be expounded to the full by the Research Department and put into the hands of the Foreign Information Service.

c) Axis propaganda has duped home populations into believing that the Allied superiority in industrial potential is neutralized by the courage, fanaticism, discipline, dynamism and ruthlessness of the Axis. Our propaganda must proclaim and lock up by evidence that we are not soft and fluffy but just as determined, dynamic and implacable as the Axis. It is not so much the courage and doggedness of our armed forces which should be stressed as their audacity and ferocity.

2) The Japanese at home should have a series of propaganda broadcasts designed to instill distrust in Japan's leadership. Broadcasts should be careful not to attack popular idols but they can concentrate on figures who have aroused suspicion in Japan.

a) The degree of German influence in Japan should be emphasized. Germans are not popular and it would be good tactics to attribute every Japanese defeat in part to German influence and to the willingness of Japanese leaders to accept bad German advice.

b) There is a fruitful field for exploitation in the popular Japanese distrust of the Black Dragon Society. The opera-

tions of this organization have always been mysterious and broadcasting should make a point of demanding that the persons who have influenced Japanese policy come out in the open. It will be wise to recall the terrorism of 1934, the plots against various popular leaders, and the wave of assassinations. It should be pointed out that these lawless acts are the fruit of an organization that does not dare to show its face. Individuals such as Hashimoto, Doihara, and Nishio can be named. Other Secret Societies, of later origin, should be similarly exploited.

3) The Japanese people should be told also that they should distrust their army leaders.

a) The army has consistently lied to the people about the campaign in China and promised them that it would be over in three months. It is continuing and the little boxes of ashes still pour into Japan. The army has lied about military successes in China. It has announced one great victory after another but it is farther from winning the war than it was when it started the shooting at Marco Polo Bridge. The army and politicians who have supported it have also lied about the political conditions in China. They have said that they set up a new government in China friendly to Japan that was stable and secure and that deserved the high honor of Japanese ambassadors and advisors. Actually, they have taken a cheap traitor who does not govern so much as a village and called him the premier of China.

b) The army leaders are lying about this war just as they did about the war in China. They have told great stories of tremendous victories but the war goes right on. Premier Tojo said that the U. S. Fleet had been destroyed and then warned the people of Japan to prepare for a war 10 years long. If he has destroyed his enemy, why does he have to take ten years fighting him?

Reports of great Japanese victories can also be treated with some humor. There can be sarcastic and derisive comment on enormous claims of victories and a reminder of the established falsehood of the Japanese claims in respect to the incidents on the Russian border in 1938.

c) People in Japan should be reminded that many army leaders are waxing fat in China while the people at home are suffering. It will be easy to get the names of officers who have made and laid down substantial amounts of money in the opium trade, prostitution, gambling, and the squeeze. These names should be broadcast to Japan and to them should be added all the suitable suspects. The high living of Japanese officers in Shanghai should be contrasted with stringency in Japan proper.

(A word of warning at this point about the use of the dope trade for propaganda purposes may not be amiss. It will be impossible to arouse any feeling in Japan that there is anything immoral about selling opium to the Chinese. It can be pointed out, however, that there is something immoral about making hundreds of thousands of yen in China while the people at home are suffering to enable officers to fight for their country and not peddle dope for their own profit.)

d) It should be pointed out that Japan's real prosperity in the past and for the future lies in trade with all the world and not in a program of conquest in Eastern Asia. In this connection it can be pointed out that before the militarists came into control Japan enjoyed the greatest period of prosperity in her history. Her ships went to every country in the world, her silk was in demand, her cotton mills were booming; there was enough rice for everyone; rationing was unheard of. Then the army took

control and destroyed this whole method of living. The mulberry trees were cut down, the cotton mills were closed, and the people of Japan were forced to make munitions for the army instead of the materials that brought prosperity in world trade.

It is at this point that the best use can be made of sufferings within Japan because it can be suggested, at least inferentially if not positively, that whenever Japan chooses to return to a world of trade instead of a world of conquest, her prosperity can and will return.

NOTE: Great caution should be exercised in broadcasting anything about shortages in Japan to find out beforehand if the shortages actually exist. This will have to be done by under-cover agencies. It stands to reason that a broadcast about a shortage of rice in Japan a week after an immense shipment has arrived would have a very bad boomerang effect. Similarly, it will be unwise to tell the Japanese that they don't have enough fish to eat if our broadcast happens to get there the day after the fish ration was doubled.

5) Position of the Japanese Emperor and the great Japanese traditions. Any tendency to attack the Emperor should be steadfastly resisted. There is no possibility of getting a break in Japanese morale by any dirty cracks about the Son of Heaven. It is possible, however, to suggest that he has been badly advised by cunning men who wished to turn his great patience, generosity and intelligence to their own ends. The Japanese people know, for example, that the Emperor earnestly desires peace just as they earnestly desire peace. It should be

suggested, therefore, that they have a community of idea with their Emperor but that this community has been interpreted by the scheming designs of men who want to make a business and profit out of war.

Similarly, the classical Japanese traditions ought to be invoked. It should be pointed out that Bushido and Yamato have been obviously violated. It can be alleged that Japan has substituted a mass of German ideas for principles of living that have been characteristically Japanese for many centuries. The Research Department can supply the necessary material on this point.

II. Or military groups:

1. Distrust of the Germans.

a) Germany's ambitions should be played upon relentlessly. It is not to be supposed that the Germans will be willing to give to the Japanese an equal share in the division of the spoils when the Germans have always treated the Japanese with so much contempt. It is known that the Germans desire world domination and that one of the obstacles to their domination is Japan. It should be suggested, therefore, that the Germans deliberately embroiled the Japanese in a war with the U. S. and Britain for the purpose of destroying Japan.

b) This can be implemented by great emphasis on Germany's unfulfilled promises to Japan. Germany promised Japan that Moscow would fall before the Japanese ever got into the war. Actually, at the time Japan was risking her national existence in a war against the United States and Britain, the Germans were already in full flight on the Russian front.

c) This can be pointed up by the comparison of Japan to Italy. Italy, it will be observed, also went into the war at the insistence of the Germans at the time when the Germans promised the immediate collapse of Great Britain. Actually, Britain failed to collapse and the Germans were unable to deliver on their promises, and the pitiable Italian Empire is the best possible witness to German perfidy. All of Africa has been lost to Italy. The peninsula itself has been over-run by Germans. The navy has disappeared. Stores of food and oil have been carried off to Germany. Germans at the present time are forcing the Italians to do manual labor in Germany on their behalf. This is what Germany also plans for the Japanese.

2) The futility of the war in China should be stressed to all Japanese troop contingents on the Continent. Four victories at Changsha but the Chinese still hold the City. "Marching up and down again". The futility of Japanese attempts to set up a government in China can also be emphasized to the occupying troops. The body guards of Wang Ching-wei, for example, know the extreme limitations of his sovereignty and how far the establishment of that puppet government comes from solving the problem of setting up a stable regime in China.

3) It may be fruitful to give the Japanese troops in China a little brass work on the Japanese navy. They can be told that the navy lay back in fat and plenty for four and a half long years and let the army take it. The navy fought none of the battles in China,- they were on practice cruises. That the navy won a couple of minor victories by treacherous attack on the United States and promptly declared that it was the navy and not the army that saved the Empire. The navy forgot all about the years of struggle that the army had put in in China and acted as if its few

little minor victories were more important than the army's four years of terrible campaigning. The navy also blundered, the army can be told, by choosing the way they did to attack the United States. The United States should have been kept out of the war so as to let the army continue to clean up on China. There were many persons in the United States who wanted to do just that but the navy had to have some great victory about which to boast so it attacked the United States and combined the United Britain and China for an all-out war against the Japanese.

4) This gives the lead into the next large section of propaganda for Japanese forces in the field. That is, emphasis on the overwhelming American military strength that is on the way. This should take the form wherever possible of the demonstration of American production in relation to the limited resources of the Japanese. Troops in the field should be told, for example, that if they had America's war machine back of them every man in the field would have seven automatic rifles. They should be told that Japanese airplane production is running around 250 planes a month and the U.S. is producing 5,000 a month. Troops should be told that they have been trapped into a hopeless war, by the bad judgment of their leaders.

5) Troops at the front should get a tremendous dose of the suffering of the people at home. The effect of the blockade of Japan should be hammered on broadcast after broadcast. Naval operations in the south China Sea, for example, should be presented as covering the rice lind between Indo-China and Japan. It should be pointed out that the gunpowder in the Japanese bullets took charcoal away from the stoves at home; that his wife and children are cold and hungry to keep him in the field.

6) This, in turn, should be tied up with the fact that neither the political nor the military

leaders want the Japanese soldier to go home. There is no room for him in the economy that has been set up. The politicians are afraid to have him come home because they know there will be a revolution if he went back to the island empire, so they intend to keep him in the field in one campaign after another till he and all his fellows have been exterminated.

V. Implementation:

(Note: It should be recognized that short-wave broadcasts beamed at the Japanese public are a waste of time, effort, and money. Facilities for reception are not available. Mass broadcasting therefore, will have to employ long-wave and long-wave sets are abundant.

1) For broadcast to Japan, the best available stations are the Russian stations at Vladivostok and Khabarovsk. If their facilities can be employed for our propaganda purposes, it will be relatively easy to blanket Japan with long and medium wave broadcasts on several different lengths.

   a) The Soviet Government can be approached directly through Ambassador Litvinov in Washington for the purpose of obtaining permission to use the necessary facilities. It is not suggested that this is likely to be successful.

2) Chinese broadcasting facilities in China can be used to reach some of these Japanese groups. The Chinese can be asked to put these facilities at our disposition for specified intervals for our own broadcasts, but even more important we can supply materials to Chinese for their broadcasts.

3) Adequately to reach Japan from a mainland of Asia other than Siberia will require a substantial improvement in the existing facilities of transmission. It is possible, however, both to improve the facilities in Chungking and to establish new transmitters nearer to northern China that will eventually reach Japan. Chinese facilities can also be used in detail for reaching Japanese troops in the field. This will probably involve the setting up of small transmitters nearer Japanese troop concentrations. It may be possible even to use trench-to-trench loud speaker equipment in some sectors.

4) Existing or improved facilities in each of the Far Eastern cities of importance can be used directly for propaganda aimed at the overseas Japanese group.

5) With the eventual swing northward and the recapture of all of the Philippines, there should be speedy rehabilitation and improvement of long-wave transmission facilities in Manila. Under normal conditions, a substantial part of Japan can be reached by Manila long-wave subject to some atmospheric disturbance. Increase in power and quality of transmission, plus direct beaming on Japan, can improve this broadcast possibility. If there are still Japanese troops on Hainan Island and in southeastern China after the recapture of Manila, they can be reached easily by Manila long-wave.

6) Japanese in the United States should be used for the making of broadcasts in Japanese that can be recorded and re-broadcast for the benefit of the Japanese in Asia. (The actual message content of such broadcasts as emanating from

Japanese in the U. S. will be less important than the fact that by the use of Japanese it will be possible to get Japanese diction on the records that is authentic and intelligible.)

7) Japanese in China can be used similarly. There is a considerable group of Japanese prisoners violently opposed to the Japanese regime and its services are available through the Chinese. This group should be particularly effective in the making of records for broadcast to Japanese troops in the field.

8) The Research staff of the Coordinator's Office should be used to the fullest degree in the consultive capacity and in the preparation of materials. The analysis of the various Japanese psychologists noted above would fall within their province. It is also suggested that one of the most effective means of reaching the Japanese will be through the use of Japanese proverbs. Some of them should be included on most of our broadcasts and they can be analysed and supplied by our research staff.

Our research staff will also be in touch with individual Japanese and Japanese groups in the U. S., such as the Nisei on the West Coast and Japanese professors and editors who can render great assistance as consulting psychologists and social science analysts. Their work as translators should be supplemented by this more important phase.

9) In order to provide adequate monitoring service for propaganda directed against Japan and the Japanese army, it will be necessary to make use of under-cover services, both Chinese and our own. They will provide necessary reports on the effectiveness of the lines of propaganda taken and should make suggestions as to how these can be modified and timed to get better results.

SECRET

WORKING PLANS FOR FAR EASTERN PROPAGANDA

PROJECTS FOR PHILIPPINES

A. IT IS PROPOSED TO INITIATE THE SELECTION AND MANUFACTURE OF MOTION PICTURES SUITABLE FOR WIDE DISTRIBUTION IN THE PHILIPPINES IMMEDIATELY UPON OUR REOCCUPATION.

I. OBJECTIVE

1. The stabilization of Philippine political and social conditions.

2. The restoration of confidence in the United States.

3. To spur the rebuilding of the Philippines both physical and political.

II. OUTLINE

1. Entertainment. The Filipino is accustomed to American pictures on a large scale. There has been wide distribution in the islands for more than fifteen years, and the American motion picture scene is entirely familiar. The rapid return to it will do much to convince the Filipinos that normal conditions have been re-established.

2. News pictures. It is unlikely that transportation will be such that spot news reels will have much value in the Philippines. The longer range news pictures, however, in which industrial operations are presented and characteristic phases of American life set forth will be entirely suitable.

3. Work should be started immediately on a group of specially made features adapted to our purposes in the Philippines. Dialogue should be planned in two languages, English and Tagalog. These specially made features should center around both American and Philippine subjects. Titles such as "The Path to Freedom", "The Calvacade of Peace", "The United States Redeems its Pledges" and "Philippine History in the Making" would suggest some of the appropriate subject material. The actual news reel shots of important advancement in the Philippines in the past ten years should be dragged out and furbished for reshowing.

In addition to this material it should be possible to use the motion picture medium for a series of short messages to the Filipinos from their own leaders and from their friends in the United States. A complete news record of the President's pledge to the Philippines directly adapted to Filippino use should be prepared for the widest possible distribution.

III. IMPLEMENTATION

1. Work should start on some of these pictures immediately, probably in Hollywood.

2. Much new projector equipment will be necessary to replace that that has been destroyed or taken by the Japanese. It should be assembled either on the west coast or in Australia ready to be moved into the Philippines immediately upon reoccupation.

3. Commercial companies should be used as far as possible for both production and distribution in the Philippines. Prior to the Japanese invasion, they had a large and efficient organization. It should be ascertained if they plan the immediate rehabilitation of that organization as soon as the United States moves back in. If not, other means of distribution will have to be provided. Similarly, producing commercial companies should be approached immediately in relation to their production schedules, and if they do not plan such materials, and if they cannot be persuaded to plan such materials, direct action for purpose of manufacture should be taken. It should be noted in this connection that there are 70,000 Filipinos in the United States. Many of them are in and around Hollywood, and some of them have not only cinema experience but cinema ability. With a little consultation, it ought to be easy to fake the settings with a sufficient degree of accuracy that the Filipinos would find them entirely satisfactory.

SECRET

WORKING PLANS FOR FAR EASTERN PROPAGANDA

PROJECTS FOR PHILIPPINES

IT IS PROPOSED TO PREPARE PAMPHLETS FOR LEAFLET RAIDS OVER THE PHILIPPINES.

I. OBJECTIVE

1. Bolster Philippine morale, and aid in keeping resistance alive on any island where organized or guerilla warfare is continuing.
2. To promise speedy relief.
3. To promote future stability in Philippines.
4. To counteract Japanese propaganda.

II. SPECIFIC TARGET

1. All Filipinos

III. PROPAGANDA CONTENT

1. Promise of protected independence contained in the message of the President shall form the basis for pamphlets prepared for this purpose. The history of American-Philippine relationships can be traced in detail with emphasis on the part that the Filipinos have played in establishing their new status among nations.

2. Much of the leaflet raiding should be addressed to countering Japanese propaganda. It is particularly important to recall the status of colonials in Formosa, Korea and Manchuria under Japanese domination. The condition of the natives of those countries should be directly contrasted with the conditions that were achieved in the Philippines under American sovereignty and under the autonomous commonwealth. The most difficult thing to combat will be Japanese appeals to race prejudice. This can be done only by using materials directly from Asiatics themselves and preferably the Filipinos themselves.

IV. PRODUCTION

1. These pamphlets will be printed in the United States by our own service in consultation with our Research Division in the preparation of materials.

3. The armed services will be consulted immediately for advice on form in relation to distribution and on the adaptation of content to the military program.

objectives of other countries, it is insistently urged that every effort be made to dovetail our program with that of other countries wherever and whenever it is possible. To do that a first requisite is the maintenance of a high degree of confidence in us in those countries. Without that confidence we will be hamstrung at every turn. Fortunately, that confidence already exists in respect to the Chinese, and we have already their pledge of the utmost cooperation. Presumably, that confidence can be sustained in respect to the British. In regard to the Dutch, it will be necessary to act wisely and speak discreetly. In each case, a large step toward obtaining that confidence can be made by our insistence upon the necessity of learning from others what we need to know. Both the Chinese and the British, for example, have had long experience in propaganda, and they have already shown a willingness to put that experience at our disposition.

It should be our purpose, likewise, to cooperate with the allies, not merely in a program of propaganda, but in the achievement of political aims that we hold in common and through the interchange of experience to assist in accomplishing that stability to which reference has already been made.

II. THE APPRECIATION

Manifestly in dealing with the whole of Eastern Asia as a unit, we are faced with a target that has extremely wide range. It embraces everything from Chinese Mandarins to Australian sheepherders, and from Buddhist priests in Burma to peanut growers in Bali. In this vast and varied target there are few elements common to all of its subdivisions. In the main, however, it is to be observed that the vast majority of persons to whom we appeal are Asiatics. There are two outstanding exceptions to this--the Australians, and the Dutch in the Netherlands East Indies. They are considered separately in our working plans. Likewise we are dealing in the main with social structures that are very old and political structures that are very young. The vast majority of the Asiatics are developing into one type or another of self-conscious autonomy, ranging from the establishment of a new and vigorous Chinese Republic to a new self-confidence on the part of the Japanese Volksraat. Obviously under these conditions, we will be obliged to designate specific targets such as will be indicated in the case of some of our objectives and group or class targets that will be indicated in our working plans.

OBJECTIVES

(A) Immediate Objectives.

(1) Our first objective is the establishment of the consciousness that we are engaged in a global war. What we say to Asia, as well as what we say to ourselves, must necessarily be determined by the concept that we are fighting one war all over the world and not a war at one point, and three skirmishes on the side. As we are to assist in sustaining the ability of Asiatic troops to carry on that war, we must ourselves be convinced--and let them know that we are convinced--that a victory on the Asiatic front is a victory in the total war of all the allies and that a defeat in Asia is a defeat in the total war. In this connection, it is important to remember that the war will have to be fought on all fronts. This is especially applicable to the Asiatic sphere since it has sometimes been suggested that if we do away with the fountain head of aggression in Nazi Germany, the Japanese will fall of their own weight. That is in itself a large assumption, and its repercussion on Chinese, Netherlands East Indies and Australian morale will inevitably be serious. For that reason in our propaganda thinking, we cannot minimize the vital importance of the Far Eastern front--while recognizing, of course, the coordinate importance of the other fronts.

(2) It is of immediate military importance to sustain the morale of Chinese troops in the field and the morale of the Chinese Government. The Chinese armies in the field are the largest force of infantry directly allied with us in the battle against both Germany and Japan. The maintenance of that force is a military objective of the first importance, and the sustaining of its morale is a propaganda objective of the first importance. Similarly the effectiveness of troops in the field will depend upon the

fashion in which they are allocated and used by determined leadership. The Chinese government has been and will continue to be subjected to continuous peace overtures from the Japanese. For this reason the morale of the government no less than of its troops must be vigorously sustained.

(3) It is necessary to sustain Philippine resistance, both regular and irregular, in order to reduce the effectiveness of the Philippines as an operating base for the Japanese. Our obligation to the Philippines is an unescapable one, and the immediate objective must be kept in mind not only for its possible military significance, but for its importance as the basis of long range objectives in relation to the Philippines.

(4) An immediate objective is the promotion and maintenance of close friendly relations with China, Netherlands Indies, and the British possessions--Australia, Malaya, Burma, and India--so that military movements may not be impeded by mistrust or lack of cooperation. A coordination of propaganda effort is immediately necessary in the same way that the establishment of joint military command under a centralized head, and a joint allocation board for the handling of materials are essential. It is not suggested that there should be a joint propaganda board for Asia. It is suggested that skillful coordination with the efforts of other countries can multiply the propaganda impact of each wherever they work toward common goals.

(5) It is imperative to counteract Japanese propaganda in all of the threatened and occupied countries in Eastern Asia. The immediate danger to military operations through the defection of local populations is readily recognized. The present propaganda efforts of the Japanese, moreover,

are directed toward making it impossible for us to reassert our authority and leadership. In this field the most specific danger is the Japanese propaganda based on the issue of race with its effective slogan, "Asia for the Asiatics." It is therefore an immediate strategic objective to counteract this propaganda, both with the assurance that the presence of the Occidental in Asia is helpful rather than hurtful to the Asiatics, and with emphasis on the danger to the Asiatics in the acceptance of a slogan that really means "Asia for the Japanese." The exclusive character of all Japanese policy must be fully set forth.

(6) It is necessary to direct propaganda at Japan proper and at Japanese troops in the field. The immediate objective is to undermine the effectiveness of the fighting forces in the field, through the destroying of confidence, to slow production of food and materials of war at home through dissatisfaction and mistrust and to inhibit military operations and domestic support for them through capitalizing on possible dissension.

(B) Long Range Objectives.

(1) It is the purpose of the United States to contribute to political stability in eastern, and particularly southeastern Asia. This involves our relationship to Western powers holding colonial dependencies, to independent states, and to movements for a greater degree of autonomy among the nationals of political dependencies. Our own position in respect to our own dependency, the Philippines, is clear. We are pledged to the defense of an independent Philippine Republic. In that pledge we recognize the ability of an Asiatic people to set up its own independent government, and our correlative responsibility to assist in protecting that government from predatory neighbors. This involves the continuing presence of

United States armed forces in southeastern Asia, but puts their presence on a different basis from the political point of view. That changed relationship puts emphasis upon United States policy, in the Asiatic mind, and gives us an opportunity to exert our influence on behalf of stability through the confidence that Asiatic peoples repose in us. Manifestly we do not propose to go over the heads of other Western powers in the recognition of native nationalist movements in colonial dependencies as the rightful governments of those dependencies. We do propose to recognize the right of such movements to exist, and indeed, to go much further and to hold that their very existence is guaranteed only by the continued exercise of sympathetic protection by the Western powers. Obviously the most important exercise of our influence in this field will be through our own example in the Philippines. Our deeds have given weight to our words. In dealing with this problem, however, we shall recognize that we are dealing with a variety of political movements in different stages of development. In respect to both the British and Dutch any positions that we take must be in harmony with their long-range objectives.

(a) Britain has formally declared, for example, that Dominion status is the objective for India as soon as the Indians themselves can achieve its machinery. Our expressed attitude should be in harmony with that declaration.

(b) The Dutch have approached their problem on an entirely different basis, making no suggestion that an autonomous government will be recognized in the Netherlands East Indies, but granting full Netherland citizenship to the large class of mixed parentage, of whatever degree, and of throwing increased responsibilities, in respect to the Empire, upon the colonial government structures.

It should not be overlooked, at this point, that the Dutch have occupied their Far Eastern colonial position to a greater degree than any other Occidental power and that at the present time the Dutch population of the Netherlands East Indies is the largest concentration of European population in Eastern Asia.

(c) Burmese nationalism is likewise moving toward Dominion status, and while it is no less self-conscious than Indian nationalism, it appears to be in a different stage of progress. Our expressed attitude toward it will have to be established in close collaboration with the British with the addition of the element of confidence that can be reposed in us because of our Asiatic record.

(d) In respect to Thailand we are dealing with a sovereign Asiatic state. Our policy is one of respect for that sovereignty and of the promise, both implied and expressed, that our victory will assist in reestablishing it.

(e) In respect to Indo-China we are faced with the momentary complication of our official relationship to the Vichy government, which is still nominally the repository of the French protectorate over Indo-China. Since this country is occupied by the enemy, however, it seems likely that our policy will be to drive out the invader and to use native nationalism as one means of doing so. It seems extremely unlikely that the French protectorate, in its previous form, will be reasserted in Indo-China after the war, and our long-range program should take account of the fact that new political structures will be evolved.

The stability of southeastern Asia will depend in part on the confidence reposed in the good faith of the Western powers

as they assume individual and joint responsibilities. Since we have enjoyed that confidence to a higher degree than have the other Western powers, it is urged that we sustain that confidence by every means in our power, both on our own behalf and in the belief that some of it will be transferred to our allied efforts in both war and peace.

(2) As a part of this program it is a long range objective of the United States to contribute to the political stability and political growth of the Republic of China. This involves sympathetic cooperation with the Chinese government in our joint efforts, the recognition that China is truly our ally and emphasis upon that recognition, and the presentation of materials and points of view that emphasize our joint confidence in the institutions of representative democracy.

(3) It is our purpose to promote long-range friendly relationships with all the states of Eastern Asia.

(a) China. In no other Asiatic state, except, perhaps, the Philippines, has the basis for enduring friendship been more truly laid. Our efforts must contribute to sustaining that friendship.

(b) Australia. There are many indications that the United States will be more closely associated, both economically and culturally, with Australia than it has been in the past. It should be our purpose to assist in the establishment of these closer relations on a firm basis, a major part of which must be the interchange of more information between the two countries. Two large problems present themselves in the Australian objective. First is the problem of adapting our points of view to the British-Australian relationship so that we will

not appear in the guise of trying to wean Australia away from her British Empire ties. The British should be fully informed of what we propose to do and how we propose to do it. The second is the adaptation of some of our material to the American Expeditionary forces that will be based on Australia. This will require no small amount of tact, in relating it also to Australia.

(c) Netherlands East Indies. The shift in the economic center of gravity of the Netherland Empire from Holland to Java, and the increase in the European population of the Netherland possessions in Asia, have already been expressed in closer economic ties between the Indies and the United States. Military ties have supplemented those. Our ties of friendly political and social intercourse with the Indies, however, are still in their infancy and these must be built up as a contributing factor in our co-operation for long-range stability in southeast Asia.

(d) The British Dominions and possessions other than Australia. Friendly American relations with India, Burma and Malaya will be of importance not only in the political stability of southeast Asia, but will also afford a means for closer cooperation and better understanding with Great Britain, itself.

(4) It will be necessary to repair the damage that has been done to our prestige in the Philippines and to assist the Philippines in the work of rehabilitation.

(5) It will be desirable to use our propaganda influence to promote representative, non-military government in Japan.

IV. METHODS

(1) Through our own organized services, such as radio broadcasts, news reports, pictures and publications, we propose to present our

point of view and to play upon certain psychological themes. These themes will embrace our confidence of victory, our essential good faith, our solidarity with our allies, and our liberating mission for the future, both economic and political. Conversely they will play upon the weaknesses of the enemy, his bad faith, and the dangers that he presents to all Asiatic peoples. (Manifestly in a field as large as Asia it is impossible to detail all these themes at this point. They are elaborated in respect to each specific objective, in the working plans for each country.)

(2) We can exert influence through direct contacts with government officials and public agencies in other countries. There will be an interchange of facilities with similar organizations in other countries and direct relationships set up between members of our organization and their "opposite numbers" in the organizations of other countries. This can be a method of exerting direct influence through the personnel of the Coordinator's office and its importance and the responsibility it imposes should be borne in mind.

(3) Our long range program will be greatly facilitated by an interchange of cultural missions and institutional activities. In respect to China, for example, the establishment of American educational institutions in China and the education of Chinese in the United States have formed the strongest cultural tie between the two countries. These ties must be multiplied, not only in respect to China, but in respect to other Asiatic countries as well.

(4) There will be, in approaching both immediate and long range objectives, a necessary coordination of our efforts with other services, secret, economic and military.

(5) It is of the utmost importance that our

means of acquiring and coordinating information about the foreign field be greatly improved and enlarged. Our effectiveness will be influenced by the accuracy and volume of incoming information. This involves the necessity for an effective monitoring service on our own activities and the correlation of information from many other sources inside and outside the government.

V. CHANNELS

(1) Radio. As a part of our entire propaganda program for Asia the radio will play an increasingly important part. Programs will be initiated in the United States having both news and specialized feature operation. These will be received where possible by local means and where this is not possible there will be redistribution through arrangement for the use of already existing facilities or the creation of new ones. This involves the necessity for improvement in the facilities of both transmission and reception and the supplying, where necessary, of actual equipment to foreign governments and their nationals, through lease-lend or other arrangement. The goal of the broadcasting program should be a 24-hour covering broadcast for every part of eastern Asia, clearly allocated to each state in question and covering specific objectives in each, as well as our general purposes for all.

(2) News Service. It will be necessary in some cases to supply a news service by means other than radio broadcasting, such as cable or commercial wireless.

(3) Publications. It will be our purpose to increase by every means available the production and distribution of printed matter, bringing our points of view to bear on the Asiatic scene. The forms in which this is done will include:

(a) Pamphlets. These must be prepared for

both military and civilian objectives and must include leaflets for air raids ing operations.

(b) Posters.

(c) Library facilities. This involves the wider distribution of American books and magazines throughout all of Asia, the interchange, where possible, of such facilities and if necessary, subsidies to proper groups for purchases and administration.

(d) Microfilm. This medium can be used to advantage to supplement the library exchange. Reading apparatus must be supplied, where necessary.

(e) Picture transmission. This will be coordinated with news and feature service primarily, but can also be used independently.

(f) Local printing. A substantial part of the work of publications can be done on the ground. In some cases this will involve the installation of new facilities such as offset printing presses to take advantage of picture and copy transmission by wireless.

(4) Motion pictures. In countries where projection is available this has already proved the most effective single propaganda weapon. Motion picture projection will increase enormously in all of Asia at the end of the war and even during the war it is available at many points. As a part of both our immediate and long range strategic plans therefore, we must make provision for the selection and production of suitable motion pictures and for increase and improvement, by furnishing materials, if necessary, in the facilities for their distribution and projection.

(5) Use of facilities of other countries. From

the military point of view our first objective is to get into action as quickly as possible. Obviously this can be better done by the use of facilities already established than by the attempt to supplant them with entirely new ones. This means the use of local broadcasting stations, local announcers, and materials supplied for local program use. It means that in some cases we act as a supplementing rather than an originating agency. It means the immediate use of the Ministries of Information of Britain, China and the Netherlands Indies for the dissemination of materials that we wish to put out. It means also the use of the overseas Chinese as a major transmission belt for information outgoing and incoming, both secret and otherwise.

VI. TIMING

The broad pattern of timing for this strategic plan falls naturally into the periods of "during the war" and "after the war." This distinction is indicated in part by the separation of "immediate" and "long range" objectives. It will be recognized, however, that "immediate" preparation should be made for some of the "long range" objectives. We will be obliged to initiate now, the preparation of some materials that we expect to use a year or two years from now. The question of "immediate" timing, moreover, is determined in part by what facilities are available and how they can be used. Strategically, it might be more important, for example, to work on the Philippines than to work in China, but the actual putting of materials into operation must depend in part upon our ability to make them effective. In connection with timing it should also be stressed that the use of some psychological materials depends directly upon our physical performance. Propaganda based on victories must be timed in accordance with our winning of those victories. Propaganda that notes our aid to China or the Netherlands Indies must be timed to correspond to the actual arrival of such aid, not to precede it.

APPENDIX

(1) Physical staff required. This will be worked out in detail with the administrative and technical branches, but a few suggestions are made here as they relate that physical problem to the strategic plan.

(a) To carry out this program a central staff for Asia will be required. It will embrac both administrative and operations personnel and will need to number between 25 and 50. These will be Americans sent out from the United States and Occidentals employed locally. Under present conditions Chungking is the best available place for this central staff. After the war, Chungking will not be the best available place. Manila will be far superior, and it is therefore suggested that long range planning look toward an eventual Manila office for some of the broader aspects of this program.

(b) Control of liaison positions. Under the direction of the central staff it will be necessary to set up local positions at key points with perhaps two or three persons on the ground. These will be required in most of the cities of eastern Asia where broadcasting and printing facilities are available. In China it will be advisable to have operations at Kunming, second only to those at Chungking, while Chengtu, Sian, Kweiyang, Kweilin, and possibly Hengyang are likely to prove desirable location. Liaison points will be needed in Rangoon, Calcutta, and at Batavia or Bandoeng in Java. The Australian office should be more than a liaison point. It should be a major operation, coordinated with the Far Eastern office but capable of acting independently in the solution of its special problems.

(c) Use of other nationals. In the central office and the liaison and control positions it will be necessary to employ natives of the country in which we are operating. In

addition it may be advisable to use other foreign agencies for services of distribution and monitoring, such as, for example, the representatives of the British American Tobacco Company or of Royal Dutch Shell. Natives of the country will be required not only in dissemination of materials, but also in the effective monitoring of them. Our work must be judged in the field and must be judged by representatives of the groups to which it is addressed.

(2) Cooperation with other departments.

(a) It is of the utmost importance that the activities of the Foreign Information Service be more closely tied up to the work of the Research and Analysis branch. Especially in respect to Asia it is important that specialized knowledge be brought to bear and that the resources of our own organization be fully employed. It is also important that the activities of the Foreign Information Service and the Research and Analysis branch be coordinated in the field as well as at home.

(b) It will be necessary to make fuller use of the services of the Department of State. A part of our program should be coordinated with the division of Cultural Relations in the State Department since we have projects that can be complementary. Similarly our service will require as much information from the Department of State as can be supplied.

(c) Other executive offices must be called upon. The Board of Economic Warfare, for example, can supply the proper advice as to the propaganda use of material shortages in Japan.

(d) The War and Navy Departments must be used both to obtain information and to coordinate our activities with military needs and operations.

(3) Cooperation with agencies of other governments.

(a) In this country. It is of the utmost importance to employ all contacts with other countries through agencies in this country, both official and unofficial. In the case of China, for example this means working with the Embassy, the Foreign Minister, China Defense Supplies, Inc., the Chinese News Service, Central News Agency, United China Relief, the various mission boards and the university groups.

(b) In the field. It will be necessary to establish the closest liaison with the Ministries of Information of China, Britain and the Netherlands Indies, with all branches of government that can be approached, with chiefs of state, and with individuals who have some special knowledge of the field or of the relation of their country to the United States.

SECRET

WORKING PLANS FOR THE FAR EAST

PROJECT FOR THE PHILIPPINES

IT IS PROPOSED TO INITIATE BROADCASTING SERVICES FOR THE PHILIPPINES IN THE FORM OF SHORT-WAVE FROM THE WEST COAST OF THE UNITED STATES AND LONG-WAVE BROADCASTS FROM SUITABLE STATIONS IN THE FAR EAST.

I. Objective:

1) It is necessary to bolster the morale of whatever Philippine and American troops are still in the field at any point. Even if organized resistance ends, there will be guerrilla activity directed against the Japanese and the pacification of the country will not be accomplished at any time in the near future. The will to resist must, therefore, be played on.

2) The promise of relief must be reiterated and believed. The Filipinos must be told that the forces of the United States are being steadily mobilized to come to their aid. It is desired to reassure the Philippines in order to promote future political stability. The prestige of the United States has suffered some damaging blows and the authority of the United States was an important factor in the degree of political progress that had been made in the Philippines. It is of the utmost importance to reassert this influence as speedily as possible in the interest of the future independent Philippine republic.

3) It is necessary to counteract Japanese propaganda based on race prejudice, false promises, and false declarations of victory.

II. Specific Targets:

All Filipinos.

III. Contents

1) News service. The same general pattern can be followed for the news service to the Philippines as that for China, with the exception that the Filipino is much more receptive to American news and much more highly trained in evaluating it. He understands American political news, for example, and takes a keen interest in American sports news.

Hilena in the News Division in Washington has had first-hand experience on the presentation of news for Filipinos and he will be able to judge competently the exact character that the report should take.

It should be emphasized, however, that news broadcast to the Philippines should be identified as closely as possible with the counteracting of false news disseminated by the Japanese. For this reason, it is necessary that the Philippine news report be coordinated as closely as possible with the [illegible] service.

2) Features. The field for features that are of particular interest and importance to the Philippines is very large. Statements directed to the Philippines by Filipinos and Americans have already been employed to good effect. This can be expanded to take in a wide range of topics. Comment on Philippine political structures is always necessary with the constant reiteration of the pledge of the United States to establish and to restore an independent Philippines.

It is important also to stress the fact that American soldiers have already given their lives in the defense of Philippine soil and that as we debut they have fought side-by-side with Filipinos and thus sealed a blood [illegible] with them.

The religious angle in both news and features directed to the Philippines should not be neglected. Messages from Church dignitaries will be well received.

5) Anti-Japanese propaganda. It is necessary to counteract some of the attempts of the Japanese to enlist the Filipinos by a large scale campaign directed at Japanese mistreatment of all peoples who have come under their sway. The conditions in Korea and Manchuria should be contrasted with those that existed in the Philippines prior to the Japanese invasion. Particular emphasis should be given to the fields of political freedom, wide-spread education, and a relatively high standard of living. In each of these cases it can be shown that the extension of Japanese sovereignty or influence is fatal to those things which the Filipinos have held to be of most importance.

The Japanese should be quoted against themselves in their exposition of the "new order" and it should be rubbed in that the prosperity of the Philippines has always depended upon its relation to the markets of the rich United States instead of to the poor Japanese empire.

6) Preparation should be made for a change in content in the feature material coincident with the American re-occupation of the Philippines. It should be made plain that this re-occupation is the part of a military movement and in no sense an attempt to re-establish American military rule.

It should be stressed also that the Filipinos face an important problem in rehabilitation and they can count upon the United States to assist in the solution of that problem.

IV. Implementation:

1) Preparation. Most of the materials for the Philippine broadcasts will be prepared in the United States and transmitted by short-wave to suitable reception points in the Far East. Some things, however, can be handled locally. Some Chinese news, for example, that will be particularly of interest to the very large colony of overseas Chinese in the Philippines can be sent in directly from China. Similarly, messages from our Allies can be directed to the Philippines from their point of origin rather than from a relay through the United States.

g) Distribution. Short-wave broadcast from San Francisco intended for the Philippines can be picked up in Chungking and transmitted on improved transmitters capable of reaching the islands. Prior to that improvement, however, it is suggested that we obtain time on radio stations in Batavia, Singapore, and Rangoon, and that where their facilities are not adequate to reach the Philippines, these facilities be improved.

Time can be obtained on these stations for special broadcasting to the Philippines and the character of these broadcasts should have a good effect from a propaganda standpoint if they are accidentally heard locally.

When broadcasting facilities at Burma are suitably improved, it will be possible to cover the islands satisfactorily with radium-wave broadcasting.

Preparation should be made immediately for the re-establishment of broadcasting on a large scale in and from the Philippines from the beginning of the re-occupation.

Under normal conditions, the Philippines has adequate radio reception throughout the Islands and can be made the most important center of broadcasting for all southeastern Asia. Programs and facilities alike, therefore, should be planned now with a view to this move, so that when the time comes there will be a stock-pile and a back-log available.

SECRET

[illegible] RELATING TO JAPAN

[illegible] PARTICIPATE INTO JAPAN, [illegible], AND [illegible] THE JAPANESE [illegible] CHINA.

[illegible] Objectives

1) Propaganda objectives are those outlined in the plan for radio broadcasting.

2) A specific objective should be the fomentation of resistance and possible revolt in Korea, Manchuria, and occupied China.

[illegible] Specific Targets

1) The same groups as specified in the plan for radio broadcasting.

2) Groups not able to be reached by radio, particularly army groups in the field.

3) Koreans, Manchurians, and Chinese in occupied areas.

[illegible] General

1) The same general propaganda content as contained in the plan for radio broadcasting but condensed and sharpened for pamphlet propaganda.

2) Pictures wherever possible,- particularly those that show American production on a very large scale.

3) Direct appeal to Koreans, Manchurians, and Chinese to revolt against the remaining [illegible], and to carry on acts of sabotage.

[illegible] The phases of this campaign that relate specifically to subversive activity must be carried on in close coordination with the Chinese. The Chinese have already had large experience in pamphlet warfare and

their experience can be used to good advantage in determining the most effective content. It is also desirable that this content should follow a correct political line in relation to long-range objectives of both the United States and China.

IV. Implementation

1) Preparation.

a) A majority of these pamphlets will be printed in China in close consultation with the Chinese and with Japanese there.

b) Some of this pamphlet material can be printed in the United States in consultation with Chinese, Japanese, and the Chungking office.

c) When suitable equipment is provided, some of these pamphlets can be prepared to advantage by the mimeo-graph and off-set printing processes. This may be, eventually, the most effective means for production on a large scale.

2) Distribution.

a) By all means, the most effective agency for the distribution of this material is the Chinese guerrillas. They have had hundreds experiences with it and with the proper approach in Chungking, that experience can be put at our disposal.

b) The Korean will prove an effective agency for pamphlet distribution. Some Korean groups are already operating in the field and others have volunteered their services. Some of our divisions and some parts of the armed forces of the United States are already in touch with these agencies.

[illegible] material can be supplied and to what groups it should be made available.

[illegible] - [illegible]

[illegible] the movement in our air pump in the Pur Zone, it is inevitable that leaflet mailing will be the most effective means of distribution. It may be carried on to some degree and under favorable conditions, the provisions should be made for it through close liaison with Vulcan and American naval forces.

SECRET

PROJECT FOR CHINA

IT IS PROPOSED TO SET UP A PICTURE SERVICE FOR CHINA.

I. Objective:

1) To provide pictorial materials for distribution in the Chinese press and in Chinese fabricated pamphlets and to insure their distribution in order to:

a) Support our general propaganda aims;

b) To assist the Chinese propaganda effort when and where it is thought advisable.

II. Specific Target:

The objective for this picture service is the Chinese press and whatever supplementary facilities, pamphlet and magazine, the Chinese can provide.

III. Propaganda Content:

1) News pictures of the United States in relation to the allied war effort will be of first importance.

Emphasis should be laid at this point on the matter that has been taken up in respect to radio broadcasting. News pictures of U. S. war equipment should not be displayed in China unless equipment of that sort, or a similar sort, is actually being supplied to the Chinese. The timing of news pictures is just as important as the timing of news releases.

2) Pictures that emphasize the relationship between the United States and China should receive particular emphasis. In this category will fall the pictures of distinguished Chinese in the United States, their activities, honors paid to them in this country, and especially

reproductions for publication abroad of prominent picture display that has been received by them in this country.

3) There is a category of pictures that should show the unity of the allied cause. Pictures of Chinese in staff consultation with British and American officers are of particular importance. The Chinese themselves will go further than we should in publishing pictures of the allied leaders without relating them to China. A current Chinese publication, for example, has a very vigorous life of Churchill in pamphlet form. We will be well advised, however, if in our picture work we seek for the Chinese connection at every possible opportunity.

In this connection, it is suggested that we seek the advice and collaboration of Chinese news services in the United States and urge them to suggest to us what picture material will be most acceptable in China.

4) In relation to our long range political effort in China, it may be possible to offer to the Chinese certain pictures that show functioning democracy; groups of school children following out political patterns will probably be the most effective and least dangerous in this pattern. It should be borne in mind that a part of our function is to assist in the political education of the Republic of China and suitable pictures with a political background, sympathetically displayed, can play an important part in this field.

IV. Implementation:

1) Temporarily, selected pictures should be transmitted as soon as possible by airmail to Chungking. Not less than three master copies should be sent and they can be reproduced and distributed there.

2) Permanent radio photo equipment, both transmitting and receiving, should be set up both in the United States and in China. It will

be possible by this means to transmit spot news pictures, whereas until that takes place we must necessarily be limited to photographic material that has continuing value.

It is suggested that the necessary receiving apparatus be started for Chungking as soon as possible and that further technical work be done on the problem of transmission and circuits.

WORKING PLANS FOR FAR EASTERN PROPAGANDA

PROJECTS FOR CHINA

IT IS PROPOSED TO ESTABLISH A POSTER AND PAMPHLET SERVICE FOR USE IN CHINA.

I. Objective:

To use eye-appeal as a means of furthering our propaganda aims. There are groups in China that can be reached by direct pictorial methods that are not susceptible either to the aural method involved in broadcasting or to more detailed pamphleteering service. For them the poster is extremely significant. Similarly, a pamphlet can do work impossible by any other means.

II. Specific Targets:

1) The Chinese middle class. Posters are designed particularly to reach this group and can be adapted in part to the Chinese love of decorating the home by any sort of pictorial material.

2) The Chinese Army. This group can be reached particularly by pamphlets that can be passed from hand to hand when troops are on station or in the field.

III. Content of Posters and Pamphlets:

A. Posters.

1) Solidarity with the Chinese war effort should be the main theme of the majority of the posters produced. From this point of view, it is important that these posters emphasize in the simplest possible terms that the United States honors the Republic of China and has the same domestic and international aims in view. In this respect it will be well to observe that

such posters should carry [illegible] for both the American and [illegible] sets. It is suggested that whenever [illegible] photograph of President Roosevelt is employed for decorative purposes a corresponding photograph of either Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, or of Dr. Sun Yat-sen be employed. Similarly, when the United States flag is used for decorative purposes, the flag of the Kuomintang should be similarly displayed.

Our Research Department should be closely consulted as to the most effective symbols to be used and their reduction to the simplest and most intelligible form. The Research Department also points out that the great mass of illiterate Chinese will attentively study a "poster" consisting of a large number of detailed pictures or sketches. Posters aimed at the lower brackets of the Chinese therefore ought to be designed with this fact in mind and will represent a wide departure from the conventional American poster idea which attempts to convey its message by merely one "smash" drawing.

2) Posters should be employed to designate American aid that will be at the disposal of China. In this connection, the posters covering American airplane types, ships, and productive enterprises can be successfully employed.

3) Posters can be used also as a means to direct attack upon Japan in the counter-propaganda field. The Chinese have had long experience in the preparation and distribution of this material and their advice should be sought and followed as to content. In the main, it is suggested that counter-propaganda content should follow the general pattern of the U. S. approach as it will be modified by consultation with the Chinese.

II. Pamphlets.

Pamphlets produced for use in China should be for distribution both among the armed forces and among the civilians. Their objective, therefore, will be the presentation of American points of view in the attempt to bolster Chinese morale. Naturally, therefore, they will contain:

1) Emphasis upon the unity of the United States and China in the present war effort. This will involve stress upon the solidarity of war aims, the story of the traditional friendship between the two countries and the degree to which each is suffering from the invasion of the "marauding barbarians."

2) An excellent field exists for pamphlets as a means for presenting messages from the U. S. to China and the Chinese people. This should be done with the collaboration and consent of the Chinese authorities. It is not suggested, for example, that we "go over the heads" of the Chinese officials and attempt to reach directly civilians and Chinese armed forces.

It is suggested that messages addressed to the Chinese people by the President of the United States, the American Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, the Chinese Ambassador in the United States, and the Chinese Foreign Minister, can suitably be used as material for pamphlet distribution both among the armed forces and among Chinese civilians.

3) The pamphlet can be used as a means of counter-propaganda and can be identified in some cases as an exact retort to similar methods employed by the Japanese. The content of such counter-propaganda will be in the main similar to that of the counter-propaganda in our radio projects but, in addition to that, it can be modified in part by suggestions from the Chinese. Naturally, it will stress two phases of the present war of ideas as well as the war of arms. First of all, it will deal with the Japanese assault upon China and the attempt of the Japanese to reduce China to a Nipponese dependency. This will involve also the second phase - an attack upon the counterfeit slogans of the Japanese - such as the "new order" and "co-prosperity sphere", and their lack of applicability to the realities in China. The Chinese have made their pamphlets effective by the use of caricature. This has been the most deadly weapon employed against Wang Ching-wei. It is extremely doubtful that American caricaturists

can reach the Chinese as effectively as can their own countrymen. Nevertheless, it may be possible through superior printing techniques to give a better set up to what the Chinese want to do.

IV. Implementation:

A. Preparation

1) Posters

a) Posters for the time being should probably be prepared in the United States. Stocks of suitable paper are more available here and in general the quality of the work is likely to be better.

b) Durability of material should be emphasized and if weight in shipping can be disregarded a sufficiently heavy stock should be used that a reasonable resistance to weather can be insured.

c) All posters should have a highly decorative character. The amount of ideograph in proportion to the amount of illustration should be strictly limited. Those traveling in the Far East are familiar with the customary practice of using advertising material, magazine covers, and indeed almost any type of material that bears bright colors and some recognisable design for wall decoration. It should be our objective in this matter to replace the advertising calendars, cosmetic advertisements and cigarette ads as the typical middle class Chinese wall paper.

d) Consultation with our own Research Department and with all available Chinese sources is imperative in order to obtain the highest degree of simplicity and effectiveness.

2) Pamphlets

These will necessarily be produced both in the United States and in China. The time lag works against the American production though undoubtedly larger stocks of material and better work can be done here. Wherever possible, these pamphlets should be prepared either by Chinese or by persons

closely identified with the Chinese cause. The quality of authenticity will be greatly increased if they are associated in the Chinese mind with messages from Chinese to Chinese rather than from Americans to Chinese.

B. Distribution

It is recommended that for the distribution of both pamphlets and posters Chinese sources exclusively be employed.

SECRET

WORKING PLANS FOR FAR EASTERN PROPAGANDA

PROJECTS FOR CHINA

IT IS PROPOSED TO ESTABLISH A NEWS AND FEATURE BROADCASTING SERVICE FOR CHINA.

I. Objectives.

1. The first objective is to sustain Chinese military morale, and the obvious purpose in this is to promote the efficiency of the Chinese fighting forces in order to bring the war to a speedy conclusion.

2. The next objective is to promote Chinese-American political relationships in general and friendship in particular. This is political rather than military in its purpose. It looks forward to the period after the war in which the stability of Chinese-American friendship will be a part of the basis on which Far Eastern peace is built. Mutual confidence must be a part of this basis.

3. It is the purpose of the United States to aid the development of democracy and representative government in China by both education and example.

4. It is necessary to counteract Japanese propaganda in China.

5. To support in every possible way the stability of the present Chinese government.

6. To counteract German propaganda and defeatest elements in Chungking.

II. Specific Targets.

1. Chinese officials. Officers of the Chinese government themselves are susceptible to influence by the United States. They will be the first to receive American broadcasts, and the first to be influenced by them.

2. The Chinese army. This is the obvious target of direct morale building. Officers and especially non-commissioned officers are the groups most readily reached through broadcasts.

3. The Chinese middle and merchant classes. They are susceptible to American influence if properly exerted, and the future of democracy in China will necessarily depend upon their ability to assume positions of responsibility in the society.

4. The overseas Chinese. This group is of immense importance in the Chinese war potential. They have been large-scale contributors to the war effort, and they are a transmission belt, to and from China, for ideas and influence.

5. Chinese farmers in the villages.

6. Chinese laborers. Farmers and laborers will be reached by word of mouth; dissemination of materials previously broadcast.

7. The Chinese cooperatives.

III. Means of Action.

It is necessary, therefore, to plan means of execution that will take into account the possibility of translating short-wave broadcasts into long-wave broadcasts.

Specific, heroic action must be taken immediately to improve receiving facilities, if short-wave broadcasts from the United States are to have general influence anywhere in free China.

1. The Chinese officials referred to above are the one exception to this generalization. Short-wave broadcasts will reach them through their own immediate monitoring service. Provincial officials can also be reached through Chinese short-wave, in some cases.

2. The Chinese public will also be reached by long wave broadcasts through Chinese channels.

This broadcast service will be immensely extended in all China by the famous institution known as the bamboo telegraph. Word of mouth is still by far the most im-

portant means of communication throughout the Chinese Republic. It is possible, therefore, to multiply the listening audience almost indefinitely if we can be sure that one group of listeners is originally reached in each locality toward which we strike.

IV. Propaganda Content.

1. News.

(a) Military. The imperative need in China at the present time is an adequate and reliable news service such as the Foreign Information Service has already undertaken to set up. The back-bone of its reports will necessarily be news of military operations. These need not be distorted nor falsified, but correct emphasis can slant them in the direction that we want. That emphasis should be placed upon the certainty of an eventual allied victory; on the fact that China cannot possibly lose; and on the fact that every allied victory is a Chinese victory and every Chinese victory an allied victory. It should be carefully noted, however, that news on American production sent to China must positively be timed so as to coincide with the arrival of actual American aid. Under the existing conditions it will prove to be dangerous folly to tell the Chinese what marvellous producers we are and invite the question from the Chinese as to why they have seen so little of the fruits of our production. It is suggested at this point that the closest possible liaison be maintained with the State and War Departments so as to time our news releases on American production to correspond with the actual delivery of specific items of aid to China and the promise of more.

(b) News that relates China to the United States. In news broadcasts from this country to China, it should be possible to keep the emphasis on China to a fairly large degree. In this connection, it will prove advisable to consult Chinese news agencies in the United States for direct advice as to what constitutes news in China. Mr. David Lu at the Chinese Embassy in Washington

is the representative of the official General News Agency in China, and is therefore in the business of filing news from the United States to China. He should be asked to report in detail what his agency regards as material most suitable for consumption in China, and his advice should be followed. A similar course of action should be taken in regard to Dr. Hale, who is the head of the Chinese News Service in New York. The Chinese press in the United States should be closely monitored by our own research bureau so as to see what news actually appeals to Chinese editors. Naturally, there will be more emphasis here on strictly local news than would be suitable for a foreign broadcast, but the general pattern should be suggestive.

(c) News that relates China to the world pattern. Emphasis should be placed upon every field in which the Chinese are actually collaborating with their allies. It will be wise in this connection to use every opportunity to recall the Chinese declaration of war upon Germany and Italy. That declaration at no time received adequate attention in the American press, and the Chinese are somewhat resentful of the attitude that has been taken. That resentment should be corrected. In this connection also, news that relates to the German-Japanese military and political movements should receive emphasis in respect to China. Every news story that identifies China as one of the allies opposed to Germany and Italy as well as Japan is of the utmost propaganda importance. The best story that can be obtained in this field has not yet been verified. When the United States or any other ally has indisputable evidence of the actual service of Germans in the armed forces of Japan, the stories should be thrown into China with all possible emphasis. It should be possible to intimate that some German influence has been responsible for a part of the Japanese campaign against China. It is necessary at this point to counteract some pro-Nazi elements in China, and to get away from the hangover of German military influence on the Chinese. Obviously, the German association with Japan is the best possible way to do this.

2. Features.

(a) Non-news broadcasts. The start that has already been made on these programs needs careful check and probable revision. It also needs monitoring in China, and a report on it. A program such as "Victory for China", for example, is a waste of time on the air unless the Chinese are picking it up and rebroadcasting it. It is possible, however, that the non-news division will be the successful point at which to include much solicited comment material and editorial material that could not otherwise get out through channels.

(b) Editorials. Work is already being done on combing the American press for suitable editorial material in respect to China. Some discretion should be exercised in the choice of editorials, but especial attention should be paid to those that emphasize Chinese contributions to the united war effort. Likewise, editorials that urge upon the United States courses of action favorable to China should be as fully quoted as possible.

3. Solicited stories. These should take the form of actually created news stories. In respect to China, there should be interviews, broadcasts for special occasions, interpretations of the news by both Chinese and Americans, and the very extensive use of spokesmen of the Chinese in the United States. These Chinese should include all officials in high position, but may also embrace the simple Chinese resident in this country who may have something to say to their home country. Similarly, publications in the United States must be combed for materials that have an especial appeal to China. These can be used in the form of excerpted quotations and of synopses. The publication of a special article related to some phase of the Chinese problem by a well-known American or Chinese writer is news in itself. Our Research Department will be able to identify most of the important publications in this field, but some expert advice should also be taken from men who have been in the news field actually filing such excerpts as part of a commercial news service. It is suggested, for example, that Harry Frantz, who had just such a filing job for the Far East for many years on behalf of the United

Press be called upon for expert advice on the setting up of the excerpted publication story.

4. University connections between China and the United States working both ways should be exploited to the full. Chinese university students in this country can be called upon for reaction and comment, while news of university operations in China can be developed in this country from the point of view of comment through the interested groups here.

5. Interpretive political stories. Every military operation in China should be the subject of comment from a competent and interested source in the United States. The Battle of Changsha, for example, could be analyzed by such a person as George Fielding Eliot, and the analysis sent to China. Apart from spot news, moreover, there are many phases of the Chinese-American relationship that can be developed from a feature point of view. It might be possible indeed to do some of those in dramatic or dialogue form. The landmarks in Chinese and American policy should be highlighted. Elements such as the application of the Open Door principle to China should be hauled out and dusted off for reconsumption. There should be repeated emphasis and comment upon the exchange of correspondence between Mr. Hull and Dr. Wu on the question of extraterritoriality. The Washington Conference, the Nine Power Treaty, the return of the Boxer Indemnity should all come in for quotation from time to time. Anniversaries and national holidays fall in this feature category and should be made the occasion for broadcasts of celebration. There is a place also for some expository work on the actual political program of the United States. In this connection, it is suitable to emphasize to China the willingness of the United States to defend the Philippines, while the grant of Philippine independence can be used as further example of the generally non-predatory character of American policy. This is of the utmost political importance in China because the Chinese do have more confidence in the integrity of the political ends of the United States than in those of any other western power. This must be done from the point of view of similarity of aims and unity of purpose. Wherever Chinese political or military forces are acting in conjunction with those of the United States special attention should be given to them. At the moment the

outstanding example of this is the Tiger Squadron. Its exploits should be sent in detail to China and it should be described at all times as a Chinese and American joint enterprise.

In all of the news broadcasts, but particularly in the feature broadcasts, it will be wise to study the idiomatic turns of phrase. The use of proverbs is particularly advisable, and in the case of China the sayings of Confucious are widely known. Our Research Department should assemble a suitable collection of such material that is available for application to different situations. It should be noted, however, that care must be taken in translation so that the end product will correspond with the original proverb.

6. Counter-propaganda.

1. The issue of race.

(a) It is obviously the purpose of Japanese propaganda in China to indicate that the present war is being fought against whites on behalf of Asiatics. This is the most dangerous propaganda that we have to combat. In the case of China, the counter-technique is relatively simple. Repeated emphasis must be placed upon the Japanese attitude toward and treatment of Chinese. The Chinese will cooperate in our desire to tell the story of Nanking again and again. We will do well to back up the actual atrocity stuff with the statements of the Japanese, indicating their own belief in their unshakable superiority to other Asiatics.

(b) German race theories should be identified with those of the Japanese at this point, and full attention given to the writings of Haushofer and Friedrich Scheunemann in respect to the Chinese, and to "geopolitik" and its relation to world domination by non-Asiatic powers.

(c) Emphasis on victories. There is no question of the fact that the white man has lost prestige immeasurably by military defeats in the Far East. That prestige can be regained only by military victories. In respect to the Chinese, it will be wise to associate them with the

allied victories so that they feel that in a sense the initial allied defeats are a part of their cause as well as ours. It can be pointed out in this connection that in the initial stages of the war the Chinese also suffered reverses, but that these reverses did not influence the issue of final victory. The position of the whites in Asia, therefore, is somewhat like that of the Chinese at the very beginning of the war, and the Chinese are sympathetic toward it.

2. The issue of Japanese planning.

(a) The Japanese are using the alleged "New Order" as a part of their propaganda arsenal. There are several ways to meet this propaganda in respect to China. The first is that the Chinese themselves have already had intimate experience with the practical Japanese application of high-sounding and flowery phrases. The Japanese announced that they were coming to China to establish peace and stability. Instead of that they burned Chinese cities, made scores of thousands of Chinese homeless, looted, raped, slaughtered, with no suggestion of any attempt to establish order in China. They have undertaken to undermine the authority of the regularly constituted forces of law and order. They set about systematically sabotaging Chinese revenues by their smuggling in North China, and by their use of fiat currency. This certainly is not order by any definition. From that it will be possible to go much further, however, and quote the Japanese themselves in proof of the thesis that what the Japanese really propose under their "New Order" is an order in which the Japanese get all of the cream and the Chinese do the dirty work. If the Japanese wanted a free, independent and strong China, they could have had it. It was precisely because they did not want it that they set out to destroy it in the name of the "New Order". A further effective means of attacking the "New Order" is the Japanese assumption that Japan must necessarily be the "stabilizing factor" in

the Far East. The Chinese can be called upon to suggest that the Republic of China has just as much right to be the central power around which any "New Order" could be built as has Japan. It can be pointed out that the Japanese have laid claim to a position of leadership to which they are not entitled by history, geographical position, or basic objectives.

(b) The Co-prosperity sphere. The Japanese are particularly vulnerable on this ground in China because, actually, they have already taken wealth away from China to divert it to Japan. Our Research Department should supply materials on the means by which the Japanese have looted China through the technique of forged currencies, taking over of banks, and seizure of raw materials.

(c) Wang Ching-wei. The Chinese themselves have done a fairly effective job of brushing Wang's ears back, and we can learn something from them. There are, however, a few nice bits that can be added from our own vocabulary. The Chinese seem to believe that the best way to deal with Wang in his relation to the Japanese is ridicule. They always caricature him as a dog and frequently licking the boots of his Japanese master. We need not hesitate to refer to him as a renegade, traitor, or with any other nice adjectives and nouns that happen to come up. One of the best phrases is the "traitor who ran for the presidency of China on the Japanese ticket". We can also refer to the fact that "he has not attracted any reputable fellow countryman to his cause", and he is "afraid to come out from behind his protective ring of Japanese bayonets". His status should be compared frequently to that of Henry Pu-yi in Manchuria. If that comparison is made, it might be well to point out that Henry has the edge on Wang in the matter of self-respect, and that both of them have devoted their lives to doing what the Japanese tell them. It will be of service in Chungking if the analysis of the

position of Wang Ching-wei places emphasis also on the German connection with his puppet government. It can be pointed out that the so-called "peace overtures" that previously emanated from Wang were all planted by the Japanese to be carried by German emissaries. There were two reasons for this, it can be alleged. The first is that the Germans are fundamentally sympathetic with Wang, since they have had long experience in dealing with Quislings. The second is that only a German would be willing to soil his hands by dealing with so malodorous a bit of offal as Wang Ching-wei. Playing that angle will hurt both the Germans and Wang.

5. Japanese aggression. The immediate story of the current aggression should be told for propaganda purposes in direct collaboration with the Chinese. They probably know better how to reach their people with it than we do. There are a number of ways, however, in which we can back them up. We can indentify the Japanese, for example, as the "barbarian" invader, and thus call to mind some of the earlier Japanese attempts at conquest of the continent. We ought to dig out the story of the Hideyoshi conquests and apply them as precedent for some present occurances. In this connection, it can be noted that the marauders have always been driven back.

6. Japanese claims of victory. There are two ways of offsetting the impact of Japanese propaganda claims of victory. The first is the emphasis upon the falsity of many of the claims and repeated ridicule of them. The second is emphasis on all allied victories. The Chinese know this technique to perfection, and will expect us to use it. They can undoubtedly help us in fashioning the best means of so doing. In addition, a constant picture of growing allied strength can be used to offset some of these claims. But here again attention must be paid to the possible unfortunate timing of too great claims of what we are going to do at a time when we are suffering reverses.

7. Direct anti-Japanese broadcasts. It should be possible to extract our materials aimed directly at Japan [illegible] are particularly suitable for propaganda [illegible]. Among these will be emphasis on shortages in Japan, emphasis on Japanese weaknesses, and emphasis on the degree in which Japan is under the

domination of China's enemy, Germany.

IV. Implementation.

1. The first factor in the broadcast pattern is the establishment of solid and reliable short-wave transmission from the Pacific coast to Chungking.

2. In Chungking there must be set up adequate reception in addition to the monitoring service already operated by the Chinese, whereby our programs can be received and transcribed for distribution and recorded for rebroadcast.

3. Facilities at both ends require improvement. Transmission will have to be stepped up on the west coast and better apparatus installed for reception in Chungking. Good recording apparatus in Chungking with competent technicians to operate it is also imperative. In China also there must be an improvement of the facilities of retransmission. This must obviously be done in collaboration with the Chinese. The power of the Chungking radio station must be increased to cover operations in China proper, the Kunming station also must be stepped up to cover South China, Burma, Thailand, and Indo-China. It should be possible also, in cooperation with the Chinese, to put facilities for both transmitting and receiving at given points in the Chinese military operations so that the Chinese army can be more directly reached through the broadcasting medium.

4. Monitoring service. This will have two phases. First, is the accurate and comprehensive monitoring of foreign news broadcasts in China. Presumably, this has already been done by the Chinese, and if their facilities are not adequate we must give them assistance. In addition, we must establish a monitoring service covering our own materials, so that we have a constant running check on their effectiveness.

5. Preparation of materials.

(a) The basis of the news service is already set up. Its improvement is a matter of experience, getting rid of the "bugs" and attaining a higher degree of flexibility. More desk men with a knowledge of the Far East must be employed.

(b) The use of our Research Division must be emphasized in its relation to news and feature broadcasts. The use of the Confucian language, for example, is the type of thing that can be done to excellent effect.

(c) Chinese in the United States must be widely used in a cumulative capacity.

(d) The offices in the United States should prepare feature materials on a large scale and get them into the field so as to act as a back-log.

(e) Materials originating in China.

1. The first thing of importance that will originate in the field is tipping the play of the news. This will be a reflection in turn of the monitoring service in the field.

2. There will be direct operations in the field, particularly in the handling of joint programs such as the exchange of greetings on national holidays, felicitations, and collaboration with the Chinese in the preparation and handling of their own programs.

3. There will be translations in the field, as well as here. It should be borne in mind that for Chinese purposes at least two dialects must be used constantly. That will not always be possible, nor indeed economical from the point of view of speed and materials originating in the United States, and therefore in many instances it will be much better to transmit in English and do the translating on the ground.

4. The overseas Chinese outside the United States can be employed for a broadcast to China. There are important groups in Burma, Thailand, Malaya, the Netherlands Indies, and the Philippines. The feasibility of such broadcasts will depend in part on military operations.

(f) Entertainment. Over a long period of time, effectiveness of propaganda broadcasting will depend in part upon its entertainment value.

At the moment, its news feature can carry it, because of the intense interest in active military campaigns. There will be periods, however, when additional entertainment factors, particularly the use of music, will be feasible. Before plans are made for this, however, it is imperative to consult the Chinese here about the character of such entertainment factors, and consultation will be made at Chungking concerning the type and desirability of the entertainment content.

(6) The implementation of this entire project depends obviously on the provision of an adequate technical staff in China. Some of the technicians can be sent from the United States, some will be acquired on the ground, and the widest possible use will be made of Chinese technicians already in the Chinese services.

/S/ Robert A. Smith

SECRET

SYNOPSIS OF WORKING PLANS FOR FAR EASTERN PROPAGANDA

I. Projects for China

1. It is proposed to continue and expand news and feature broadcasting for and in China.

(a) Objectives
(b) Targets
(c) Materials

This divides into news, features, and counter-propaganda.

(d) Implementation

It is proposed to use available facilities for the time being, to improve those facilities by supplying equipment, and to adapt their use to local conditions and needs. It is proposed to supplement materials originating in the United States with materials originating in the field. It is proposed to provide a sufficient technical staff in the field to carry out these operations.

2. It is proposed to establish a poster and pamphlet service for use in China.

(a) Objectives
(b) Targets
(c) Content
(d) Implementation

It is proposed that posters be prepared in the United States; that pamphlets be prepared both in the United States and China. It is proposed that the Chinese be used for distribution.

5. It is proposed to set up a news and feature picture service for China.

4. It is proposed to facilitate the showing of American motion pictures in China and the selection and manufacture of suitable films for that purpose.

5. It is proposed to establish a microfilm service to China as well as from it.

6. It is proposed to collaborate with the Division of Cultural relations in the State Department to help extend its facilities to China.

II. Projects relating to Japan and the Japanese

1. It is proposed to establish long-wave broadcasting to Japan and to Japanese forces in China.

   A. Objectives
   B. Specific Targets
      (a) Civilian
      (b) Military
   C. Propaganda Content
   D. Implementation
      (a) The use of the Russian stations in Eastern Siberia.
      (b) The use of facilities to be set up and improved in China proper.

2. It is proposed to introduce pamphlets into Japan, Korea, and Manchuria, and behind the Japanese lines in China.

   A. Objectives
   B. Targets
   C. Content
   D. Implementation

   It is proposed to distribute this material by:

   (a) The Chinese guerrillas
   (b) The Koreans
   (c) Leaflet Raids

III. Projects for the Philippines

1. It is proposed to sustain and enlarge broadcasting programs to the Philippines, both from the United States and from adjacent Asiatic stations.

   A. Objectives
   B. Targets
   C. Content
   D. Implementation
      (a) Materials to be prepared in the United States and short waved to the Far East.

      (b) Some materials to be originated locally.

      (c) Time to be obtained on stations in Java, Burma and China for broadcasts to Philippines.

2. It is proposed to prepare pamphlets for leaflet raids on the Philippines.

3. It is proposed to initiate the selection and manufacture of motion pictures suitable for wide distribution in the Philippines immediately upon our reoccupation.

IV. Projects for Netherlands Indies

1. It is proposed to procure time on the Batavia or Bandoeng radio for broadcasts of materials prepared by the F.I.S. and designed primarily for the Philippines, but suitable for general Far Eastern broadcast.

2. It is proposed to offer a news and feature service to the Netherlands Ministry of Information and to local publications.

3. It is proposed to supply to the Netherlands Indies suitable posters for general distribution.

V. Projects for Australia

1. It is proposed to set up a news and feature broadcasting service for Australia.

   A. Objectives
   B. Content
   C. Implementation
      It is proposed to short wave the materials to Australia, to edit them locally, and distribute them through Australian channels.

2. It is proposed to set up a news and feature picture service for Australia.

3. It is proposed to establish a branch of our publications service in Australia.

VI. Projects for Burma

1. It is proposed to obtain time on the Rangoon radio for broadcasts directed especially to the Philippines but suitable for general distribution.

2. It is proposed to prepare posters suitable for use in Burma.

VII. Projects for India

1. It is proposed to obtain time on the Indian radio for the broadcast of materials originating in the United States and those developed locally.

2. It is proposed to prepare suitable posters for distribution in India.

SECRET

SECRET

STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE FAR EAST

I. STRATEGIC AIMS

United States policy in respect to the Pacific is clearly defined. This country is committed to the principle of equality and freedom in the intercourse, political, and commercial, of sovereign states. That principle is embodied not only in the Open Door policy as it was applied by John Hay, but in the Nine-Power Treaty and other commitments to Asiatic States, both bi-lateral and multilateral. In respect to China, this involves our commitment to the ending of extraterritoriality as soon as the Chinese Government is prepared to undertake the functions that we have sustained. In respect to the Philippines, we are committed to the establishment and protection of an independent Philippine Republic without the exercise of corresponding authority on our part. In Asia, as elsewhere, we are pledged to the non-recognition of political structures set up by conquest.

In respect to all of Asia, our policy has been marked by the fact that we have established a non-predatory basis for dealing with all of the political subdivisions of Asia and their respective mother countries. We are the one nation of the Western World whose political and military motives are under the least suspicion by Asiatics. Our goal, from the policy point of view, is to take advantage of this confidence so as to use our influence on behalf of the highest possible degree of political and military stability. It will be recognized, however, that the achievement of this stability must be a joint operation of Britain, the United States, the Netherlands, China, and Australia, working in cooperation with the nationals of the various political subdivisions of Eastern Asia. We are in a literal sense Allies not merely in a military operation, but Allies in a long range political development, and Allies upon the solidarity of whose cooperative efforts will depend the achievement of their aims.

It cannot, therefore, be emphasized too strongly that the carrying out of this strategic plan will depend for its effectiveness upon our ability to coordinate our efforts with those of our allies. While it is not suggested that our purposes be distorted in order to make them conform to the

Inland Sullen J. Dulles March 10, 1948

F. H. Bayeux

Plan for propaganda in the Far East

1. This plan was prepared by Mr. Robert Aura Smith, in rough discussion with him by members of the Far Eastern Section of the Research and Analysis Branch and myself, about December 16, 1947, and also subsequently discussed at length in the Planning Committee (Smith and Bayeux).

In my opinion, the plan is good and should be used as a point of reference in drawing propaganda in the Far East. It should, however, be reconsidered in the light of the changes in the Far Eastern situation which have occurred as the result of military events beginning with the fall of Singapore.

2. The document consists of two principal parts

(a) A strategic plan for the Far East as a whole.

(b) Detailed working plans for particular areas in the Far East, as follows: China, the Japanese Empire, the Philippines, Australia, Burma, and India.

3. Strategic Plan -- The basis of the "strategic plan" is that our propaganda in the Far East should reflect or implement the United States policy in respect to the Pacific

Plan for Propaganda in the Far East

area. Briefly, this policy is our:

(a) Maintain the principles of equality and freedom in the interconrse, political and commercial, of sovereign states.

(b) Deal with all the political sub-divisions of Asia and the "nation countries" on a non-predatory basis.

(c) Establish and protect an independent Philippine Republic.

(d) Withhold recognition of political structures set up by conquests.

The United States is the one nation of the Western world whose political and military motives are under the least suspicion by Asiatics. Our goal, from the policy point of view, is to take advantage of this confidence so as to use our influence on behalf of the highest possible degree of political and military stability. This stability, however, can be achieved only by a joint operation of Britain, the United States, the Netherlands, China, and Australia working in cooperation with the nationals of the various political sub-divisions of Eastern Asia. Mutual confidence between these several units is a prerequisite to successful cooperation.

Plan for Propaganda in the Far East.

4. The Far East is an extremely wide propaganda target. Few elements are common to all of its subdivisions. We will, therefore, be obliged to designate specific targets consisting (a) of political units, and (b) or group or class units within political sub-divisions. Very little propaganda can be directed to the Far East as a whole. Rather, it must be especially prepared for the several political, group, or class targets mentioned.

5. The objectives of Far Eastern propaganda are divided into two classes - (a) immediate objectives, and (b) long range objectives.

(a) Immediate objectives.

(1) The establishment of the consciousness that we are engaged in a global war. We cannot minimize the vital importance of the Far Eastern Front - while recognizing, of course, the coordinate importance of other fronts.

(2) It is of immediate military importance to sustain the morale of Chinese troops in the field, and the morale of the Chinese Government.

(3) It is necessary to sustain Philippine resistance, both regular and irregular.

Plan for Propaganda in the Far East

(4) The promotion and maintenance of close, friendly relations with the several political units in the Far East. This implies a coordination of propaganda effort.

(5) It is imperative to counteract Japanese propaganda in all of the threatened and occupied countries in Asia.

(6) It is necessary to direct propaganda to Japan proper and Japanese troops in the field.

(b) Long range objectives.

(1) A long range objective is to contribute to political stability in Eastern, and particularly, Southeastern Asia. This involves the difficult problem of encouraging substantial autonomy and nationalistic movements among the peoples of political dependencies in Southeastern Asia, and, at the same time, acting in harmony with the British and the Dutch, who are the sovereigns, respectively, of most of these dependencies. The most important source of our influence in this field will be our Philippine policy. In dealing with this problem our

Plan for Propaganda in the Far East

propaganda must vary with the variety of political movements in different stages of development in the several units concerned.

(d) As a part of this program, it is a long range object of the United States to contribute to the political stability and growth of the Republic of China.

6. Methods -- The following methods of operation are suggested: Radio broadcasts, news reports, pictures and publications, direct contacts with Government officials and Government agencies, and an interchange of cultural missions and institutional activities.

In both immediate and long range objectives there must be a coordination of our efforts with other services: Secret, economic, and military.

7. Timing -- The broad pattern of timing for this strategic plan falls naturally into the periods of "during the war" and "after the war". "Immediate" preparation should be made for some of the "long range" objectives. Propaganda should be timed in accordance with events.

8. Physical Staff Required --

(a) A central staff for Asia embracing both

administrative and operations personnel, numbering between twenty-five and fifty Americans. Under present conditions, Chungking is the best available location. Later, Manila would be far superior. It will be necessary to set up small local groups at key cities in Asia.

(b) Cooperation with other departments.

(1) It is of the utmost importance that the activities of the Foreign Information Service, particularly in respect to Asia, be closely tied up with the work of the Research and Analysis Branch, both in the field and at home.

(2) Full use should be made of the services of the Department of State. Particularly, our program should be coordinated with the Division of Cultural Relations in the State Department.

(3) The work should be closely coordinated with the other appropriate agencies of the United States and foreign Governments.

Colonel William J. Donovan March 18, 1942

F. R. Hayden

Plan for Propaganda in the Far East

1. This plan was prepared by Mr. Robert Aura Smith. It was discussed with him by members of the Far Eastern Section of the Research and Analysis Branch and myself, about November 24, 1941, and also subsequently discussed at length in the Planning Committee (Radio and Pamphlets).

In my opinion, the plan is sound and should be used as a point of reference in directing propaganda in the Far East. It should, however, be reconsidered in the light of the changes in the Far Eastern situation which have occurred as the result of military events beginning with the fall of Singapore.

2. The document consists of two principal parts:

(a) A strategic plan for the Far East as a whole.

(b) Detailed working plans for particular areas in the Far East, as follows: China, the Japanese Empire, the Philippines, Australia, Burma, and India.

3. Strategic Plan -- The basis of the "strategic plan" is that our propaganda in the Far East should reflect or implement the United States policy in respect to the Pacific

Plan for Propaganda in the Far East

Briefly, this policy is to:

(a) Maintain the principles of equality and freedom in the intercourse, political and commercial, of sovereign states.

(b) Deal with all the political sub-divisions of Asia and the "mother countries" on a non-predatory basis.

(c) Establish and protect an independent Philippine republic.

(d) Withhold recognition of political structures set up by conquests.

The United States is the one nation of the Western world whose political and military motives are under the least suspicion by Asiatics. Our goal, from the policy point of view, is to take advantage of this confidence so as to use our influence on behalf of the highest possible degree of political and military stability. This stability, however, can be achieved only by a joint operation of Britain, the United States, the Netherlands, China, and Australia working in cooperation with the nationals of the various political sub-divisions of Eastern Asia. Mutual confidence between these several units is a prerequisite to successful cooperation.

Plan for Propaganda in the Far East

4. The Far East is an extremely wide propaganda target. Few elements are common to all of its sub-divisions. We will, therefore, be obliged to designate specific targets consisting (a) of political units, and (b) of group or class units within political sub-divisions. Very little propaganda can be directed to the Far East as a whole. Rather, it must be especially prepared for the several political, group, or class targets mentioned.

5. The objectives of Far Eastern propaganda are divided into two classes - (a) immediate objectives, and (b) long range objectives.

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(1) The establishment of the consciousness that we are engaged in a global war. We cannot minimize the vital importance of the Far Eastern Front - while recognizing, of course, the coordinate importance of other fronts.

(2) It is of immediate military importance to sustain the morale of Chinese troops in the field, and the morale of the Chinese Government.

(3) It is necessary to sustain Philippine resistance, both regular and irregular.

Plan for Propaganda in the Far East

(4) The promotion and maintenance of close, friendly relations with the several political units in the Far East. This implies a coordination of propaganda efforts.

(5) It is imperative to counteract Japanese propaganda in all of the threatened and occupied countries in Asia.

(6) It is necessary to direct propaganda to Japan proper and Japanese troops in the field.

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(1) A long range objective is to contribute to political stability in Eastern, and particularly, Southeastern Asia. This involves the difficult problem of encouraging substantial autonomy and nationalistic movements among the peoples of political dependencies in Southeastern Asia, and, at the same time, acting in harmony with the British and the Dutch, who are the sovereigns, respectively, of most of these dependencies. The most important source of our influence in this field will be our Philippine policy. In dealing with this problem our

propaganda must vary with the variety of political movements in different stages of development in the several units concerned.

(2) As a part of this program, it is a long range object of the United States to contribute to the political stability and growth of the Republic of China.

5. Methods -- The following methods of operation are suggested: Radio broadcasts, news reports, pictures and publications, direct contacts with Government officials and Government agencies, and an interchange of cultural missions and institutional activities.

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(3) The work should be closely coordinated with the other appropriate agencies of the United States and foreign Governments.

Plan for propaganda in the Far East

6. The strategic plan which has been outlined above is contained in pages 1 to 16 of Mr. Smith's memorandum. Pages 17 to 65 contained detailed working plans for propaganda in particular areas of the Far East.

MEMORANDUM

TO: Colonel Donovan March 24, 1942

FROM: Carl Crow

In formulating and carrying out our strategic plans for the Far East we have only to follow the fundamental governmental policies. The implementation of these policies may be expected to gain popular and governmental support for our war effort and therefore constitute an effective and consistent line of attack against the Axis powers, and especially Japan. These policies may be summarized:-

1. Protection of weaker nations accompanied by encouragement and practical assistance.

2. Insistence on equal rights for all in the field of foreign trade.

3. Recognition of the right of self-government, as indicated by our Philippine policy and non-recognition of political structures set up by conquest.

4. Recognition of the rights of minority groups and independence movements to exist and to be heard.

This policy of encouraging the peoples of Asia in the fullest possible development of their individual and national lives has been implemented by a series of treaties and also by the volunteer efforts of millions of Americans who have taken active part in, or have contributed to the support of schools, missions, and hospitals. While the implementation of our foreign policy in other parts of the world may have been solely the concern of officials that has not been true in the Far East.

Our policy there has engrossed a happy combination of American ideals as well as ambitions, and has given us a cultural interest as well as financial.

Our primary task is to convince the people of the Far East of their community of interest with us, that our program for the future produces their children a greater measure of peace, happiness and prosperity than the program of the Japanese. As we succeed we not only help our armed forces to achieve victory but also prepare the way for an enduring peace.

Changing conditions change the details of our problem which at the moment centers on sustaining the morale and encouraging the continued resistance of people in Japanese-occupied territory. Since the Chinese comprise the largest body of armed forces fighting against the Japanese it is of primary importance that we do everything possible to:-

a. Insure the political stability of the Chinese government.

b. Promote the spirit of resistance and,

c. Block the continued peace efforts of the Japanese.

Of equal importance though a less difficult objective is to maintain the fighting spirit and continued resistance of the Filipinos.

A third and general objective is to arouse distrust of Japanese aims in all Far Eastern areas.

We may take full advantage of the fact that our political and military motives are under no suspicion. However we must work in close cooperation with others of the United Nations. Each political unit in the Far East represents a specific problem with only a few general points applicable to all. Each must be studied not only from our point of view

also with intelligent and sympathetic consideration for the interests of all the other United Nations.

In order to avoid irritations and to present a solid propaganda front it is of great importance that we keep well informed as to the work of the other countries.

U. S. officials who are in direct contact with officials of other governments can do a great deal either to help or to harm our work. In view of the new problems which they face and the new objectives which they must pursue, it is suggested that a review might well be made of the entire official personnel at present in the Far East, and that steps be taken at once to replace those who have been unable to adjust themselves to face new and essentially changed conditions. This is of special importance in China where officials whose first duty has been to protect and promote American trade should be replaced by those who appreciate the momentary importance of our trade to any part of the Far East and realize that at the moment the task of first importance is to encourage Chinese resistance.

***

Far East

MEMORANDUM

TO: Colonel Donovan

March 24, 1942

[illegible] and carrying out our strategic plans for the Far [illegible], to follow the fundamental governmental policies.

[illegible] of these policies may be expected to gain popular [illegible] for our war effort and therefore constitute [illegible] coordinated line of attack against the Axis powers, [illegible]. These policies may be summarized:-

1. Protection of worker nations accompanied by encouragement and practical assistance.

2. Insistence on equal rights for all in the field of foreign trade.

3. Recognition of the right of self-government, as indicated by our Philippine policy, and non-recognition of political structures not [illegible] by consent.

4. Recognition of the rights of minority groups and independence [illegible] to be heard and to be heard.

This policy of encouraging the peoples of Asia in the fullest [illegible] of their individual and national lives has been implemented [illegible] the volunteer efforts of military [illegible] have taken active part in, or have contributed [illegible] of records, standards, and morale. While the implementation of our foreign policy in other parts of the world may have been [illegible] it has not been time in the Far East.

[illegible] combination of American ideals [illegible] political interest as well as [illegible]

[illegible] to convince the people of the Far East of their [illegible] the real criteria, that our program for the future promises [illegible] permanent peace, happiness and prosperity [illegible] the defeat of the Japanese, we can expect to not only help our [illegible] to achieve victory, but also prepare the way for an enduring [illegible]

[illegible] conditions change the details of our problem which at the [illegible] on sustaining the morale and morale, the combined [illegible] of people in Japanese occupied territory [illegible] the Chinese [illegible] the Korean body of armed forces. It hits actual the Japanese [illegible] important that we do everything possible to

[illegible] the political stability of the Chinese government,

[illegible] the spirit of resistance and,

[illegible] the combined psycho efforts of the Japanese.

[illegible] our ultimate objective is to maintain [illegible] the unbiased resistance of the Filipinos.

[illegible] our ultimate objective is to promote distrust of Japanese [illegible]

[illegible] of the fact that our affiliated and will [illegible] be a million. Endeavor to attack sent in [illegible] the allied bulletins. Both political and [illegible] problem without a fear, concept is into [illegible] should be tested not only from our point of view

but also with intelligent and sympathetic consideration for the interests of all the other United Nations.

In order to avoid irritations and to present a solid propaganda front it is of great importance that we keep well informed as to the work of the other countries.

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[illegible] PLANS FOR FAR EASTERN PROPAGANDA

PROGRAMS FOR NETHERLANDS INDIES

IT IS PROPOSED TO PRODUCE TIME ON NEW BATAVIA RADIO [illegible] BY FOURTEEN [illegible] - WITH.

1. OBJECTIVE

   1. To obtain facilities for direct long wave broadcast to the Philippines.

   2. To promote friendly relations between the United States and the Netherlands Indies.

   3. To offer our point of view, politically, in Southeastern Asia.

   4. To offset Japanese propaganda.

   5. To initiate the steps whereby we can work in conjunction with the Information Services of our allies in the Far East. In other words, to get our foot in the door.

2. [illegible]

   1. [illegible] broadcasts will be most important. These will be selected primarily for the Philippines but can have general applicability to the other Far Eastern states.

   2. Features prepared especially for the Philippines.

   3. Broadcasts devoted to the increasing United States war potential and to the degree to which American materials will be put at the disposal of our allies in the Far East.

   4. These materials aimed directly at the Netherlands Indies. These will concentrate particularly on the United States' reaction to the magnificent defense job that has been done by the Indies. Official comment on the character of these Dutch [illegible] Indian victories should be supplied freely.

   5. There should be abundant opportunity to tell the story of Japanese misrule of all Japanese possessions as an offset to Japanese propaganda.

6

[illegible] of this will be aimed ostensibly at the [illegible]ches, and undoubtedly this will be the [illegible]le from which to present it, but if some [illegible] village happens to hear our broadcast, [illegible] our fault.

[illegible]ice or control point in the [illegible] for the necessary news, ad- [illegible]ludical men.

[illegible] with the Netherlands [illegible]th in the United States [illegible] point of contact in this [illegible]tomaker de Bruine in the [illegible] The contact in Batavia is [illegible] of the Netherlands Informa- [illegible]. The Chungking section has [illegible]de preparation to establish these [illegible].

[illegible]l be necessary to prepare some special [illegible]ams for a short wave broadcast aimed [illegible]ectly at Batavia. This can be done in [illegible]sultation with Dr. Slotemaker's office.

In order to carry out the broadcasting program from Batavia, it will be necessary to effect an improvement of local facilities. It may prove advisable to build up some station better than the one in Batavia. A long wave transmitter, for example, might be established at Bandoeng in collaboration with the Dutch authorities.

WORKING PLANS FOR FAR EASTERN PROPAGANDA

PROJECTS FOR NETHERLANDS INDIES

IT IS PROPOSED TO OFFER A NEWS SERVICE TO
INDIES MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND TO LOCAL PU

I. OBJECTIVE

1. To cement friendly relation
States and the Netherlands

2. To obtain an opportunit
from our point of view

II. CONTENT

1. News broadcasts
fr Chungking,
pecially for

2. Feature-mate
Netherland
and com
veloped
betwee
Indie
oper
Am

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[illegible]tion.

[illegible] a program should be shortwaved from the [illegible] coast of the United States and transcribed [illegible] recorded at suitable receiving stations in [illegible] Netherlands Indies. At that point it should [illegible] edited for distribution to the proper Netherlands Indies agencies. It is suggested that we may get better results if we do our own transcribing rather than leaving it to the service of the [illegible]. That was our experience with the service [illegible] when Anita [illegible] Rotterdam [illegible] served) was first [illegible] shortwave in the New [illegible] not know much of it whatever. [illegible] transcribed it, got it up in [illegible] on the teletype, it [illegible] the Times every night. It is reasonable to suggest that a similar fate would befall [illegible] service that we offered, for example, to [illegible] in Batavia.

[illegible] project like the project for obtaining time on the Javanese radio will have to be worked out in close collaboration with Dr. Zimmermann in New York and Dr. Sigmes in Batavia.

[illegible]OR ING PLANS FOR FAR EASTERN PROPAGANDA

PROJECTS FOR NETHERLANDS INDIES

IT IS PROPOSED TO SUPPLY TO THE NETHERLANDS INDIES [illegible] POSTERS FOR GENERAL DISTRIBUTION

I. OBJECTIVE

1. To give a picture of the American war potential and of the assistance that is to come.

2. To promote friendly relations with the Netherlands Indies.

II. CONTENT

1. The general type of posters that have been prepared for the European countries showing American strength.

2. Posters specifically prepared for the Netherlands Indies in which the customary designs of crossed flags and the President juxtaposed to foreign sovereigns aresupplemented by patterns peculiarly representative of the Netherlands Indies.

III. IMPLEMENTATION

1. These posters will be prepared by our own division in consultation with the Research Department.

2. Distribution will be carried out through cooperation of the Netherlands Ministry of Information.

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WORKING PLANS FOR FAR EASTERN PROPAGANDA

PROJECT - FOR AUSTRALIA

II AS INCIDENT TO SET UP A NEWS SERVICE FOR AUSTRALIA

I. [illegible]

1. To provide a volume of American news in Australia not at present available.

2. To provide American news for American forces whose concentration in large numbers in Australia now appears likely.

3. To promote friendly relations between Australia and United States.

II. [illegible]

1. General news material relating to the United States should be used in large quantities. The Australians will get a glimpse of the American war effort in action as Australia becomes an increasingly large base for our operations.

2. Feature material. The relationship of Australia to the United States, commercial, political, and military, should afford a background for much effective material for feature service. A great deal of this is virgin soil since the exchange of information in the past has been trifling. We are fortunate in the fact that Australians have more interest in us than we have in them. They are familiar with American motion pictures and the American modes of living. Most of them feel, however, will have to be in the nature of developed news. We will have to create that news by means of excerpts from presidential addresses on special occasions and the reprinting of much of the material that has been passed over lightly in the course of the last few years.

III. [illegible]

1. The sections of the news service will necessarily [illegible] must have broadcast from the west coast of

-70-

[illegible] to proper receiving stations in the [illegible]. In the beginning such a news report could consist of three to five thousand [illegible] of news, weather and at least one [illegible] feature a day especially designed for [illegible].

[illegible] will be prepared largely in the Washington and New York offices and transmitted [illegible] the usual channels.

[illegible] will be necessary to improve facilities both for transmission and reception. Improvement of reception facilities will necessitate the establishment of an Australian office of the Foreign Information Service. That office will require [illegible] recording apparatus, desk work and [illegible] men. Since it will be obligatory in the beginning the facilities of [illegible] radio stations for re-broadcast purposes and contacts with the Australian press [illegible] distribution purposes, it is not asked that the best available men be placed now at the disposal of the Australian [illegible] the necessary [illegible]. That [illegible] be further discussed. Mr. Scatter [illegible] about Australia [illegible] and will be asked [illegible] the [illegible] any other man who could be spared. The [illegible] be employed in our [illegible] [illegible] work in the information field, and [illegible] should be persuaded to [illegible] in our office. If it is possible [illegible] of the Philippines [illegible] will be advisable to [illegible] Australia as a [illegible]. [illegible] has much [illegible], but he knows a great deal about [illegible]. Other personnel should be [illegible] from the United States, and some [illegible] employed locally.

[illegible] will be necessary to [illegible] improve [illegible] [illegible] equipment for Australian stations through loans [illegible].

2. All of this work requires close collaboration with the Australians, and contacts should be made both with the Australian minister and the Australian news services in the United States. Steps have already been taken to facilitate these contacts by the Chungking office.

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[illegible] FOR PAN AMERICAN PROPAGANDA

PROJECTS FOR AUSTRALIA

[illegible] TO ESTABLISH A BRANCH OF OUR PUBLICATION [illegible] AUSTRALIA.

I. OBJECTIVE

1. To provide a larger distribution of printed material in Australia than is now available.

II. [illegible]

1. Pamphlets and brochures dealing with the United States and its relation with the Pacific should be extensively circulated.

2. Special editions of American magazines that will have a particular appeal to Australia should be promoted and distributed.

3. Large scale addition should be made to Australian libraries. At the present time Australian library facilities are less developed than are many other elements of living in Australia. This has been recognized by the Australians, and they are eager to improve these facilities. The office of the Coordinator of Information will find a warm reception to any efforts to help at this point.

III. [illegible] DISTRIBUTION

1. A volume of materials published in the United States should be shipped to Australia.

2. The necessary printing plants should be set up in Australia for production of materials designed especially for that market. Eventually this can probably be carried out advantageously by offset printing operations in conjunction with our radio photo service. For the time being it may be wise to utilize Australian printing facilities as backed up by any means of printing that we can put into Australia.

[illegible] PLAN FOR FAR EASTERN PROPAGANDA

PROJECT FOR INDIA

[illegible] PROPOSED TO OBTAIN TIME ON THE INDIAN RADIO [illegible] BROADCAST MATERIALS FROM THE UNITED STATES.

I. OBJECTIVE:

1. To emphasize the solidarity of the British and American alliance in the war effort.

2. To use that solidarity as a means of encouraging the war effort of Indians who may possibly have more confidence in the political purposes of the United States than in those of Great Britain.

3. To tell our news story to advantage in India.

II. METHOD:

1. Straight news broadcast of the American materials. It will be necessary in the beginning to study the program pattern of the Indian radio to avoid overlapping, but undoubtedly there are [illegible] of the United States war effort that will not be presented, and we can present them.

2. Feature material dealing with special phases of American-Indian relations such as the revival of the Indian Commissioner in the United States, anniversaries of special significance such as, for example, celebrations of the [illegible] institutes in the United States, etc.

3. Direct anti-Japanese propaganda as seen from the American point of view. The Americans, for example, can tell in India the story of Japanese [illegible] in the Philippines and [illegible] means of putting the Indians on their war against the Japanese.

[illegible] INFORMATION

1. [illegible] will have to be worked out in the element of Uniformity of with the British and Indian broadcasting systems. It is suggested that in the beginning we supply the copy and let the British do the basic on announcement later on, it may be possible to make a direct request for time and put our own men into the picture. In special occasion broadcasts, for example, Americans actually in [illegible] war zone could participate to good effect. In the beginning this should be a subject of inquiry. Later on, it may [illegible] to establish a control point, [illegible] our responsibility in Africa Calcutta [illegible].

[illegible] FOR FAR EAST RN PROPAGANDA

PROJECTS FOR AUSTRALIA

IT IS PROPOSED TO SET UP A PICTURE SERVICE FOR AUSTRALIA.

I. THE OBJECTIVES

1. To present the United States war effort in pictorial form in Australia for general distribution.

2. To obtain a friendly approach to the Australian press with a larger volume of American material than is now in use.

II. [illegible]

1. Straight news and feature pictures dealing not only with the war effort but with all phases of American life will be acceptable in Australia. Use should be made of the materials already supplied by the United States press and picture services, and an effort made to supplement them with materials more directly in line with our general propaganda.

2. Special emphasis should be placed upon pictures that deal with the relationship of Australia to the United States. Undoubtedly these will consist about Australians in the United States or material in the United States destined for Australia.

III. I[illegible]ENTATION

1. For the time being selected pictures for Australia should be dispatched by air mail. Subsequently, when radio photo facilities are set up, there can be direct transmission. Proper receiving apparatus for radio photo work should be dispatched to Australia.

WORKING PLANS FOR FAR EASTERN PROPAGANDA

PROJECTS FOR INDIA

[illegible] TO SUPPLY POSTERS SUITABLE FOR DISTRIBUTION IN INDIA.

I. OBJECTIVE

1. To present the picture of American war potential.

2. To present the United States and Great Britian as the hope of all persons who expect to achieve true freedom.

II. CONTENT

1. This material must be worked out in close collaboration with the British. It will follow the general pattern of our other foreign posters, but extreme caution should be exercised to avoid materials that might not prove acceptable.

III. [illegible] ATION

1. These posters will be prepared in the United States with the usual consultative resources.

2. Distribution will be in the hands of the British and Indians.

[illegible] PLANS FOR FAR EASTERN PROPAGANDA

[illegible] FOR BURMA

[illegible] TIME ON THE RANGOON RADIO FOR [illegible] TO THE PHILIPPINES BUT ACTUALLY [illegible] ASIATIC ASIA.

[illegible]

[illegible] reach the Philippines with a general propa- [illegible] pattern as outlined in other projects.

[illegible] present to the Burmese and the Thai the [illegible] implications of the United States alliance [illegible] remain an the stabilizing factor in [illegible] Asia.

[illegible] counteract Japanese propaganda.

[illegible]

[illegible] material will have to be worked out on [illegible] ground in connection with the programs already being presented. If direct time [illegible] can be obtained, our programs can be made [illegible] the United States and short waved either [illegible] or through the Chungking office. [illegible], however, only spots in the British [illegible] are available, they will have to [illegible] on the ground.

[illegible] Rangoon radio, from the American point [illegible], ought to be a point from which some [illegible] concerning American shipment [illegible] materials to the Far East, since Rangoon [illegible] point at which these shipments are [illegible]. Obviously military information will have to be avoided, but at the same time, [illegible] be effective to tell part of our war [illegible] from one of its more strategic positions. [illegible] is a job calling for the common sense and discretion of the men on the ground.

[illegible]

[illegible] program will have to be worked out in [illegible] collaboration with British both [illegible] United States and in Burma. It will [illegible] necessary, in all probability, to establish [illegible] point or a liaison station in Rangoon.

WORKING PLANS FOR FAR EASTERN PROPAGANDA

PROJECTS FOR BURMA

1. PROPOSED TO SUPPLY POSTERS PARTICULARLY SUITABLE TO [illegible] IN BURMA.

I. OBJECTIVE

1. To present the picture of the American war potential and thus to bolster native morale.

2. To present Britain and the United States as the stabilizing factors in Southeast Asia.

II. CONTENT

1. These posters will follow the general propaganda pattern for foreign countries, but their detail should be closely worked out in collaboration with our Research Department. It is suggested that the key to our approach to Burma will probably be through the Buddhist faith. In this connection it may be possible to address messages to the Burmese from the Buddhists in Ceylon.

III. IMPLEMENTATION

1. These posters will be prepared by our poster division in the United States, subject to the usual plan of action for the Far East. There should be consultation with the British on their preparation.

2. These posters should be distributed in Burma through British agencies.

NOTE

The O.S.S. submits the attached draft of the Proposed Basic Estimate for Psychological Warfare Against Japan in the Far East, prepared in accordance with the request from the Joint Psychological Warfare Subcommittee, September 15, 1942, for consideration by the Joint Psychological War [illegible] committee.

COPY NO. 1

PROPOSED BASIC ESTIMATE
FOR
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AGAINST JAPAN
IN
THE FAR EAST

O.S.S.

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SUMMARY OF BASIC ESTIMATE

FOR

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AGAINST JAPAN IN THE FAR EAST

I. Objective: to develop an overall strategic plan for secret intelligence and subversive operations against Japan in the Far East.

A. The plan is designed to prepare the way for American troops by weakening the will and capacity to resist of defending Japanese and by strengthening the will to revolt in occupied areas.

B. The plan encompasses the training and direction of:

1. Agents who are to collect necessary information.

2. Operatives who are to carry out sabotage aimed at inducing confusion and fear; and encouraging incitive, deceptive, and persuasive activities among natives in such fashion as to facilitate our military operations.

II. Characteristics of the theater of operations

A. The Far Eastern theater is divided into 16 sub-areas included in the principal mainland areas under General Stilwell, the island areas under General MacArthur, and the naval sphere under Admiral Nimitz.

B. The varied topography and ocean features create a high degree of vulnerability to the infiltration of agents engaged in espionage and sabotage against the Japanese.

C. Australia, New Zealand and Ceylon present excellent bases for the training and direction of agents.

D. Many of the peoples under Japanese dominance, though long exposed to Japanese psychological warfare, proffering them "Asia for the Asiatics,"

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freedom from "white imperialism," a "Greater Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere," are nevertheless anti-Japanese and can be used in secret activities.

III. Survey of the present situation

A. To a limited extent, secret operations have been instituted in the area under the command of General Stillwell. In this area plans are under way to coordinate United States secret operations with those of the Chinese.

B. Similar operations in the area under command of General MacArthur are planned, but have been held in abeyance for lack of his approval.

C. The Dutch possess organization and equipment for secret operations in the Netherlands East Indies which might be coordinated with the planned United States activities.

IV. Proposed Courses of Action Discussed.

V. Recommendations

1. That the JPWC recommend to the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Joint Staff Planners that the attention of each Theater Commander be called to the necessity of the establishment, within his theater, of the agencies of psychological warfare in accordance with global strategy.

2. That the JPWC recommend to the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Joint Staff Planners that representatives of JPWC be attached to the staffs of the theater commanders; such representatives to act in collaboration with and under the orders of said theate commanders; and that further since the functions of secret intelligence often exceed the scope of those of the theater commander, such JPWC representatives shall maintain communication, with the cognizance of the theater commander, with their headquarters in Washington.

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3. That the JPWC recommend to the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Joint Staff Planners that the O.S.S. expand and expedite the selection, training, and directing of special agents for the purpose of carrying on espionage, sabotage, and subversive propaganda in the Far East under directives from the J.P.W.C. and supplemented by advice from G-2, A-2, and ONI.

4. That, as provided in the Dunio Estimate, Sec. 4, after the Joint Chiefs of Staff have informed the Office of War Information of their wishes, the JPWC, on behalf of the JCS, will request the OWI to submit plans for general propaganda in the Far East to be reviewed for their suitability from the viewpoint of strategy and for coordination with subversive operations and combat propaganda plans.

5. That the JPWC instruct OSS to prepare specific plans for psychological warfare on each area in the Far East, and with respect to those areas in which the Dutch secret organization may be employed, to investigate the advisability of collaboration.

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O.S.S. 2/3

October 20, 1942

PROPOSED BASIC ESTIMATE
FOR
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AGAINST JAPAN
IN
THE FAR EAST

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BASIC ESTIMATE FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AGAINST JAPAN IN THE FAR EAST

I. THE OBJECTIVE

A. Assigned Objective

To develop for use against Japan in the Far East overall strategic plans for intelligence and "subversive operations including the integrated use of sabotage and demolition work, organization and direction of underground political groups, whispering campaigns and other forms of fifth column activity within the target area, supported by appropriate secret activities in other areas likely to have direct influence upon the target area."

B. Appreciation of the Assigned Objective

The assigned objective concerns one aspect of total psychological warfare. It does not directly encompass general propaganda activities by radio, press, and film; or combat psychological warfare services. The very topography of the area invites subversive operations; its almost complete inaccessibility by way of the ordinary media virtually excludes general propaganda.

The basic aim of psychological warfare against Japan must be the destruction of the Japanese will and capacity to resist. Since there are insurmountable obstacles to reaching Japan directly, the order of objectives must

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of necessity be: first, the undermining of her control in the conquered and occupied territories of southeast Asia and the southwest Pacific; second, from these territories as bases of operation, the attack upon Japan itself.

If we are to destroy the Japanese will to resist, her prestige and control in the occupied territories must be effectively undermined and the sympathetic support of the conquered or occupied peoples won. Confusion must be created in the minds of her people and leaders at home, group must be set against group, the confidence of people in their leaders must be violently shaken.

But the warfare must not all be destructive. One essential part of our psychological strategy must be the selection and support of those groups in the areas Japan controls who may be persuaded to contribute toward the overthrow of the present Japanese government, and who may form the basis of a post-war Far East.

C. The Mission

The immediate and special mission of psychological warfare in the Far East is to prepare the ground for the approach of American troops wherever and whenever they may attack by weakening the will to resist of the defending Japanese and by strengthening the will to revolt of the native peoples.

The principal vehicle of this aspect of psychological warfare must be agents operating in the field. Such agents will, when successful in establishing themselves in the area, carry on three kinds of activities:

1. Intelligence. Information for the military services, and for other Government information services will be secured and by secret short-wave radio or other means communicated to appropriate bases.

2. Sabotage. Enemy communications and installations will be destroyed in such fashion as to induce confusion, uncertainty, and fear in Japanese military and civil authorities.

3. Propaganda. The propaganda activities of agents in the field, particularly in an area which is for the most part closed to the ordinary media of general propaganda, is of the utmost import. In function they will be:

a. Incitive. They will be directed toward encouraging guerilla resistance and sabotage on the part of the native peoples.

b. Deceptive. They will be aimed at misleading or confusing the enemy. Rumor can be a particularly effective weapon of warfare in the Far East.

c. Educational and persuasive. Agents will spread among the native peoples information concerning the

United States and the United Nations and their war aims; they will attempt to build up anti-Japanese sentiment; they will lend stimulation and encouragement to groups already sympathetic to our cause.

II. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS

A. Divisions of the Theater

1. Japanese controlled areas:

   a. Japan Proper
      Formosa

   b. Philippines

   c. China -- occupied
      Korea
      Manchuria

   d. French Indo-China
      Malaya
      Thailand
      Burma

   e. Netherlands East Indies
      Islands of Melanesia
      Islands of Micronesia

2. Pertinent United Nations Areas:

   China -- unoccupied
   Eastern Siberia and Outer Mongolia
   Australia and New Zealand

B. The Theater Commands

Three United States theater commanders divide responsibility in the Far East.

General MacArthur commands most of the vast island areas.

General Stilwell commands the principal mainland areas.

Admiral Nimitz commands the fleet operations in the Southwest Pacific.

C. Pertinent Characteristics of the Area

1. Nowhere are the enemies of the United States so vulnerable to espionage and sabotage.

a. The very nature of the terrain, particularly in the islands of the Southwest Pacific, creates a vulnerability to the infiltration and operation of agents which is unexcelled.

b. Although the population is dense in some regions, its sparsity in others contributes to the ease of concealment and subversive operation.

2. Five major groups of people must be dealt with in the area.

a. The enemy Japanese and their European collaborators.

b. The large half-caste groups whose resentment of their treatment under British, Dutch, and French control led them to welcome the Japanese.

c. The great variety of native peoples, including an enormous number of relatively friendly Chinese.

c. The small groups of native "intellectuals" who formed the bases of nationalist movements in some regions and severely resent their suppression and bad treatment by the European rulers of the area.

e. The few remaining Europeans who may be carrying on guerilla activities in the more remote interior regions.

3. The area presents enormous complexity in race, language, religion, social attitudes, and customs and manners.

D. Past and Present "Pressures" upon the Area

1. Japanese psychological warfare in Southeast Asia paid big dividends in Japan's southward drive and is, no doubt, continuing to do so. It has been based principally upon the appeal of

a. "Asia for the Asiatics"

b. Freedom for the native peoples from "white imperialism"

c. The lure of the "Greater Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere".

2. All the islands and parts of the mainland now controlled by the Japanese have at some time in the past been under European control. These controls have varied in their degrees of enlightenment and have left upon the native peoples corresponding favorable or unfavorable impressessions. In most regions they have not been favorable.

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3. Among some of the peoples, notably the Burmans, the Malians, Filipinos, and Chinese, nationalist movements of varying degrees of vigor existed prior to Japanese conquest.

4. Japan's conquest has been followed by a draining of the area's resources which has tended to precipitate economic crises.

E. Current Opinions and Attitudes Pertinent to Psychological Warfare

1. Widespread Anti-Japanese Sentiment in Occupied Areas. It is highly significant that these areas where the Japanization policy has been longest at work are those where anti-Japanese sentiment is strongest-- especially in Formosa and Korea. The island peoples, except in the Philippines, have little political consciousness and no military potential. None of the peoples of Japanese-occupied areas appear to have any love for their rulers, collaborating, when they do, out of fear or hope for personal gain rather than from any genuine loyalty to the Japanese Emperor.

While the populations of Japanese-occupied areas are by and large passive and indifferent, and while there are only small minorities of politically conscious "collaborators" at one extreme and of active saboteurs and underground workers at the other, the masses could readily be swung over to the side of the United Nations by a skillful combination of political commitments and military exploits.

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2. Pro-Japanese Factions. The most active "collaborationists" are:

Pro-Japanese Koreans and Chinese in Manchuria
Pro-Japanese Chinese in Occupied China
" " Burmese in Burma
" " Thai in Thailand

There is no evidence that any of these pro-Japanese factions [illegible] any real power in its own right. They are essentially "puppet" groups which, for the time being, enjoy special privileges of power and income because they are supported by the occupation authorities.

3. Pro-United Nations Groups. Finally there are important groups representing every one of the territories occupied by Japan, either now in existence or ready to be formed, who would willingly collaborate with United Nations forces in ousting the Japanese. These potential allies of the United Nations are in a state of doubt and uncertainty concerning the future policy of the Western Powers toward the peoples of Asia. While many of these peoples would fight merely to eliminate the Japanese, many others would hesitate to do so, if it meant only their return to some other [illegible] of alien control thereafter.

III. SURVEY OF THE SITUATION

A. Summary of the Situation

1. Effect desired. Ideally, it is desired to place trained agents in each of the Japanese and Japanese-

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occupied territories, such agents to comprise:

a. Intelligence agents to carry on espionage and, having established communications, to report, first, enemy military and naval operations and, secondly, information concerning the peoples of the area -- their attitudes, their strengths and weaknesses, and the probabilities of their cooperation with raiding or invading United States armed forces.

b. Operative agents to engage in sabotage aimed at disrupting enemy communications and creating confusion, at assisting native guerillas, and at preparing the ground for commando raids or more extensive armed invasion.

2. Current U. S. and Allied psychological warfare activities.

a. Organizational.

G-2, A-2, ONI--focused primarily upon military and naval intelligence.

State Department--focused on political observations.

OWI--focused on dissemination of public American propaganda through radio, publications and graphics, and on outpost activities intended to facilitate such dissemination and to collect information on the efficacy of it. (See Exhibit No. 1)

BEW--in the psychological warfare aspect of its activities, focused on preclusive buying which prevents the enemy from receiving desired commodities, and on licensing U.S. products in such a fashion as to effect support by the Far Eastern peoples for the war effort. (See Exhibit No. 2)

OSS/SI-SO--training and directing of agents for general espionage and sabotage; conducts training schools in the United States for both intelligence and operative agents; has formulated plans which envisage bases in Australia, India, and China; maintains close liaison with G-2, A-2, and ONI, and with OSS/R&A and OSS/FN as intelligence sources.

British Political Warfare (Japan) Committee--drawing plans for operations, and to a limited extent at present executing political warfare in nine Far East areas. (See Exhibit No. 3)

Australian organizations--through the Allied Intelligence Bureau, and the Australian Political Warfare Committee, engaging in special field intelligence and operations, and in propaganda. (See Exhibit 4)

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b. Operational

(1) Operations are already under way in Southeast Asia with the approval of the theater commander.

(2) Operations in the Southwest Pacific have not yet been instituted.

(3) Plans for further operation are in the process of formulation. Such plans encompass:

(a) Extensive cooperation with the Chinese. This is of the utmost importance. Not only can the Chinese be of inestimable assistance in operational activities in Southeast Asia, but their cooperation can also be very useful in the islands of the Southwest Pacific. In the former sphere, and in many of the latter islands, only Chinese agents can feasibly be used. Moreover, the freedom with which the Chinese continue to move back and forth between occupied and unoccupied areas facilitates their infiltration as agents throughout enemy zones.

(b) Relatively independent action by the U.S. in the Japanese mandated islands. Here access is more readily achieved from Australia or from the east, and coordination with Chinese efforts need not be so complete.

(3) Specific preliminary plans already under way provide for operations in:

Thailand } already approved by theater
Burma } commander
Philippines
Bali
New Guinea

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3. Current Problems

a. For operations in the Southwest Pacific Islands the theater commander has given no consent to intelligence operations within his area except those set up and operated under his own G-2.

His attitude raises in sharp outline the question of whether intelligence operations are to serve merely the needs of the theater commander or are to serve as well the needs of other theater commanders, the home authorities, and the commander in chief. Unless the Joint Chiefs and the commander in chief have in their possession thoroughgoing information from all parts of the world they cannot make decisions on broad strategy of war with adequate knowledge of the facts. In other words the United States is condemned by this process to fight a series of separate wars and the possibility is impaired of waging a unified and purposeful war.

The area of the Southwest Pacific Islands raises this basic problem in such a way that it must be confronted.

b. The Dutch possess an organization for secret intelligence and operations in the Netherland East Indies. The Dutch state that their facilities have not been adequately utilized and coordinated with American

secret intelligence and operations. The desirability of collaboration with the Dutch organization should be examined.

B. Factors Available--United States Strengths and Japanese Vulnerabilities

1. The large number of the southwest Pacific islands and the vast area over which they extend, together with the sparsity of population in many parts of them, afford unusual opportunity for the entry and concealment of subversive agents.

2. The proximity of Australia, New Zealand, and Ceylon to the areas provides adequate bases for training and the direction of operations.

3. The advantageous position of unoccupied China affords extensive opportunity for the infiltration of agents throughout the Japanese occupied areas of the mainland. In certain regions Chinese circulate freely between occupied and unoccupied areas.

4. The rather generally favorable attitude of most of the peoples of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific toward the United States, as contrasted with their attitude toward the British, the Dutch, and the French.

5. The existence in many areas, notably Korea and Formosa, of a long tradition of dislike for the Japanese.

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6. Japan's bad behavior since her conquests. Her arrogance, her brutality, her oppression of native peoples seem to be winning her accumulated hatred wherever she has gained control. Those peoples who were, at first, inclined to welcome the Japanese as liberators, appear now to be growing equally anxious to be free from the Japanese yoke.

7. Our alliance with China. There are several million Chinese throughout the area who wish to see Japan defeated.

8. The existence of native groups resisting the Japanese in many parts of the area.

C. Factors Opposed--United States Vulnerabilities and Japanese Strengths.

1. America's distance from the field of operations.

2. Japan is in control of the area and is currently strengthening her foothold.

3. The Japanese have for centuries been subjected to a "thought control" which has implanted in them those attitudes upon which the government of Japan is capitalizing today.

4. The peoples of the area outside Japan Proper have long been subjected to Japanese propaganda, preferring them independence and the benefits of a "Greater Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere".

5. The area is inaccessible by medium-wave radio from the United States. Short-wave broadcasts can reach only the government radio monitors and the armed forces. The peoples of the area, therefore, are for the most part excluded as a target for general propaganda.

6. The widespread resentment in Southeast Asia of the white man as "ruler and exploiter".

7. The loss of prestige the United Nations have suffered by virtue of their succession of defeats in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific.

8. The ignorance which prevails among large numbers of the people of some of the islands and parts of the mainland concerning the United States, and among those of most of the area concerning the war aims of the United Nations. For many of the natives the approach of American forces would mean little more than the attempt of some new white people to drive out the yellow people who had but recently driven out the other whites.

9. The United States alliance with Great Britain. During her years of domination in certain regions of the Far East Britain has succeeded in arousing the wrath of many of the peoples. Friendliness toward us, therefore, has to some extent been confused by the widely heralded Anglo-American accord.

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IV. PROPOSED COURSES OF ACTION

A. General

1. To prepare the way for future military operations in the Far East by the immediate extension of psychological warfare in the form of espionage and other appropriate subversive operations to those particular regions of the Far East theater deemed most strategic.

2. Such psychological warfare operations to comprise the selection, training, and direction of:

a. Intelligence agents who will so establish themselves in the area as to enable their securing and reporting:

(1) military, naval, and air intelligence--dispositions and movements of troops, ships, and planes,

(2) psychological intelligence--disposition and shifting of favorable and unfavorable attitudes and behavior among the peoples of the area.

b. Operative agents who will engage in sabotage, demolition, rumorespreading, and subversive propaganda (cf. Sections I.C. and III.A.1., above).

3. Such psychological warfare operations as described in b. above to be coordinated with military plans

and operations. (Native revolts successfully instigated by agents in the field, but occurring prematurely, could damage future operations. Dislike of the Japanese is increasing throughout the areas she controls, but as a result of her repressive measures those who would resist are also increasingly hesitant to risk life unless there is certainty of sufficient United Nation forces in the offing.)

4. Such psychological warfare operations to be conducted by OSS representatives acting in collaboration with and under the supervision of the theater commander.

5. Subversive propaganda conducted by agents in the field to be supplemented and reinforced by the general propaganda services of radio, press, film, etc.

6. U. S. psychological warfare activities in the Far East, particularly on the mainland, to be closely coordinated, and in some cases jointly executed, with the Chinese. (The Chinese know and understand the area; all parts of the area have large Chinese populations; our own subversive operations will of necessity work with and through Chinese residents.)

7. In view of the fact that the United States is everywhere in the Far East looked upon more favorably than is any of her allies, and assuming that the U. S. will be the primary power in warfare in that area, the U.S. to

take the initiative in subversive operations in the area.

D. Specific

1. Sabotage

a. To be directed toward:

(1) destruction of Japanese military naval, and air installations and communications;

(2) disruption of Japanese economy, both at home and in the areas she controls;

(3) creating confusion, fear, demoralization among Japanese armed forces, Japanese civilians, and those natives or Europeans who are her collaborators.

(Destruction of local record offices in Japanese towns and villages would represent an effective combination of activities. In such offices are kept all community vital statistics--records of residence, of conscription, police records, etc. The destruction of such an office would so disrupt official control in the region as to induce widespread confusion, and, if accompanied by appropriate rumors, even panic.)

b. To exploit Japanese superstitions and symbols--the effectiveness of violent acts of sabotage is likely to be enhanced if they occur upon certain days, or are related to certain symbols; advantage should be taken of the superstition concerning the northeast as the "devil's direction."

2. Subversive propaganda, inclusive of rumor, to be directed at demoralizing the Japanese and undermining their control, encouraging resistance to their rule, and creating

belief in a United Nations' victory. Certain particularly potent points of attack to be used:

Japanese promises of liberation to the peoples of the Far East, contrasted with her acts of conquest and exploitation.

United States' record of enlightened rule and faithfully fulfilled promises of independence in the Philippines.

Japanese attitudes toward the Eta and the Koreans, as contrasted with her propagandizing for "Asia for the Asiatics."

Japanese use of narcotics and organized vice as a weapon of demoralization against the people she has conquered.

Japanese cooperation with Germany, whose avowed racial doctrines proclaim such a friendship to be only opportunistic.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the JPWC recommend to the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Joint Staff Planners that the attention of each Theater Commander be called to the necessity of the establishment, within his theater, of the agencies of psychological warfare in accordance with global strategy.

2. That the JPWC recommend to the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Joint Staff Planners that representatives of JPWC be attached to the staffs of the theater commanders; such representatives to act in collaboration with and under the orders of said theater commanders; and that further since the functions of secret intelligence often exceed the scope of those of the theater commander, such JPWC repre-

sentatives shall maintain communication, with the cognizance of the theater commander, with their headquarters in Washington.

3. That the JPWC recommend to the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Joint Staff Planners that the O.S.S. expand and expedite the selection, training, and directing of special agents for the purpose of carrying on espionage, sabotage, and subversive propaganda in the Far East under directives from the J.P.W.C. and supplemented by advice from G-2, A-2, and ONI.

4. That, (as provided in the Basic Estimate, Rec. 4,) after the Joint Chiefs of Staff have informed the Office of War Information of their wishes, the JPWC, on behalf of the JCS, will request the OWI to submit plans for general propaganda in the Far East to be reviewed for their suitability from the viewpoint of strategy and for coordination with subversive operations and combat propaganda plans.

5. That the JPWC instruct OSS to prepare specific plans for psychological warfare on each area in the Far East, and with respect to those areas in which the Dutch secret organization may be employed, to investigate the advisability of collaboration.

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Exhibit No. 1

OWI Far Eastern Activities

The OWI has a Far East regional desk in Washington which prepares general directives for public propaganda to the Far East. This desk operates under the aegis of an operations, planning and intelligence board of the Overseas Operations Branch of OWI. This board includes representatives of the War, Navy and State departments and of the New York and Washington offices of OWI.

Specific daily radio directives and operations are executed in the San Francisco office of OWI through the two government-controlled stations, KWID and KGEI. Programs are presented in English and in Japanese, Chinese, and other Far Eastern languages.

Current intelligence on which San Francisco operations are based is primarily derived from FCC monitorings of short-wave broadcasts emanating from the Far East.

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Exhibit No. 2

BEW Far Eastern Activities

Far East activities of BEW having psychological warfare aspects are at present limited. BEW makes analyses on the basis of which the United States performs some preclusive buying in European and South American markets -- a course of action which prevents the Japanese from receiving some commodities desired by them. The assistance of BEW in United States blacklisting operations in South America further facilitates the blockading of the Japanese.

The export licensing operations of BEW, effective in other theaters as a psychological warfare tactic of selecting for export those consumer goods which create in foreign people sympathy and support for the United States, are in the Far East theaters of little psychological effect, the reason being that the United States exports to these latter areas are military supplies and basic economic goods.

Indirectly BEW plays a role in radio propaganda to the Far East. BEW regional men read FCC summaries, intercepts and other confidential materials, noting economic items of use in propaganda. These men consult with OWI regional men on such matters, who in turn seek advice from the BEW specialists on propaganda directives having an economic slant. These arrangements are, however, informal.

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Exhibit No. 3

British Political Warfare (Japan) Committee

In London, British Far Eastern psychological warfare centers in a Foreign Office Committee which is a policy board that includes representatives of MOI, PWE and SOE.

The British psychological warfare activities in the Far East, operating under general directions from London, are at present confined largely to radio, the principal operating center being located in New Delhi. At this place, staffs engage in monitoring Far East radio stations and in broadcasting to the Far Eastern theaters, principally to Burma and the peninsular area. No broadcasts to Japan or China have yet been instituted. Activity in Chungking is largely that of supplying news to the Chinese stations.

A British Political Warfare Mission is located in the British Embassy in Washington. Its main function is that of liaison and collaboration with American psychological warfare agencies. The Mission reports that the main principles guiding collaboration are, with respect to the Far East: (1) British willingness to play a role subsidiary to the United States in this theater, and (2) the recognition and resolution of a critical need for British and American agencies operating on the same target area to agree upon general and specific directives before they are put into

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execution in these areas, and a resolution to make the agreement effective.

OWI submitted its statement of over-all Far East general propaganda policy to the British, whose London office agreed to it with minor changes. Negotiations on this document have not been completed.

British plans in the Far East are largely in the formulation stage. The area is divided into nine theaters: India, Burma, Japan, Occupied China, Free China, Indo-China, Thailand, Malaya, N.E.I. Specific plans for India and Burma are now available; for the other areas, they are being drawn. The channels for operations against enemy and enemy-occupied areas are to include: radio, black methods, leaflets, personal infiltration and action through neutral countries.

(N.B. The above information was secured from the British Political Warfare Mission in Washington.)

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Exhibit No. 4

Australian Organizations for Psychological Warfare

Upon General MacArthur's arrival in Australia, he set up an Allied Intelligence Bureau having the following sections: A (Special operations), B (secret intelligence), C (combined field operations) and D (propaganda).

Recently, General MacArthur separated the section D on propaganda from the AIB and it has become attached to the Political Warfare Committee under the Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs. This committee's public propaganda policy and operations through radio and other means, and the degree of its collaboration with OWI have not been ascertainable.

The section C (combined field of operations) of AIB, of especial importance in psychological warfare activity, is divided into subsections for the Netherlands East Indies, the Philippines, and the North-Eastern area. The NEI subsection was originally a separate Dutch S.I. organization. The Dutch report that much of its activity, being of a psychological warfare and not of a strictly military character, and requiring close collaboration with activities outside the province of the South-West Pacific Area Command, have proven unsatisfactory because of the restrictions placed on its operations.

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MOST CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible] 1944

[illegible] have made and must continue to [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] irreplaceable losses. It was [illegible] in the air, a country [illegible] through sheer force of numbers, that the Japanese were able to [illegible] victory in the [illegible] and in the [illegible] [illegible], however, there has been a great [illegible] [illegible] apparently ill numbered.

[illegible] and Central Pacific the United States [illegible] [illegible] should stress the fact that [illegible] [illegible] will.

[illegible] all indications to the Japanese of American superiority in the air [illegible] along the following lines:

[illegible] would emphasize that American aircraft production has already [illegible] figures set by President Roosevelt and [illegible] [illegible] in excess of the [illegible] [illegible] can be [illegible].

[illegible] the [illegible] ship-building program, control of the air [illegible] the eventual destruction of the Japanese Navy. [illegible] in the directive immediately previous to this one, the significance [illegible] catastrophe was elaborated in some detail.)

[illegible] The Japanese will no longer be able to maintain their lines [illegible] Japanese troops will be cut off from their bases [illegible] reinforced or supplied.

[illegible] Allied armies eventually take the offensive [illegible] positions occupied by the Japanese, [illegible] Japanese soldiers [illegible] and they will [illegible].

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[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

c. The fully [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

b. Lack of technicians and [illegible] specialists.

c. Concealed and [illegible] investigations on the part of the [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

FIB DIRECTIVE JAPAN 2 June 1-8, 1942

No. 73

1. All previous directives are still in force and should be consulted.

2. There has been a considerable slow-down in the Far Eastern theater of war. The Japanese may possibly be gathering their forces for a major attack either in Chekiang or against Australia.

We should take the line that the Allies are losing no time during this lull to increase their preparedness. Australia is rapidly filling up with airplanes, bombs, guns and men, and we should not lose the opportunity to reiterate official statements to the effect that the President's astronomical figures of our war production this year are actually under-estimates.

3. The Japanese have made much of their drive to wipe out so-called American air bases in western China. We should take the line that the Chinese have many secret air bases well behind Japanese lines as well as in territory as yet unconquered, and that the new Japanese drives will only result in more losses of men, and material, for the Japanese. In this connection we can revive the stories of Japanese control extending only as far as a Japanese bullet can reach. We should tell the Japanese again of the passive resistance of Chinese farmers and the highly

successful warfare behind the lines conducted by Chinese partisans.

4. A broadcast in Dutch originating from Tokyo recently stated that plans were under way to conscript Koreans for military service. One can be sure that even the Japanese could not commit such an act of lunacy. Once before, a few years ago, the Japanese attempted to conscript the Koreans in large numbers and the result was described in newspaper headlines as "strong action taken against 800 Koreans because of their deplorable attitude". Apparently when given guns, the Korean conscripts had turned them in the wrong direction. We should use this incident to taunt and mock the Japanese, and in this connection we should elaborate on all past incidents of Korean opposition. There have been innumerable political assassinations by Koreans in Japan proper, there was the bombing in Shanghai when Admiral Nomura lost his eye and a distinguished Japanese diplomat lost a leg, and numerous "sit-down strikes" on the farms and in the factories of Korea itself. It should be made clear that the difficulties which Japan has had with Korea is only a minor indication of the difficulties she will experience in all the areas she has occupied. No amount of precautions will stay the hands of the avengers. Just as the Germans were unable to protect Heydrich in Czechoslovakia so the Japanese will be unable to protect their dignitaries and police officials in the much louder-policed areas of the South Pacific.

5. When General Doolittle's statement to the effect that Tokyo will be bombed again and often is used, we should sympathize with the Japanese people on their lack of air-raid shelters. We should say to them: "Why haven't your officials given you any air-raid shelters

- 4 -

beyond the few for demonstration purposes in Tokyo?" "It is diffcult that they have neglected your welfare to this extent. Ask your government for air-raid shelters now, you will need them very badly."

Approved:

D. M. E.

June 1, 1942

Cleared:

WRD

[redacted]

FIR DIRECTIVE JAPAN X June 1-8, 1942

No. 70

1. All previous directives are still in force and should be consulted.

2. There has been a considerable slow-down in the Far Eastern theater of war. The Japanese may possibly be gathering their forces for a major attack either in Chekiang or against Australia.

3. We should take the line that the Allies are losing no time during this lull to increase their preparedness. Australia is rapidly filling up with airplanes, bombs, guns and men, and we should not lose the opportunity to reiterate official statements to the effect that the President's astronomical figures of our war production this year are actually under-estimates.

4. The Japanese have made much of their drive to wipe out so-called American air bases in western China. We should take the line that the Chinese have many secret air bases well behind Japanese lines as well as in territory as yet unconquered, and that the new Japanese drives will only result in more losses of men and material for the Japanese. In this connection we can revive the stories of Japanese control extending only as far as a Japanese bullet can reach. We should tell the Japanese again of the passive resistance of Chinese farmers and the highly

successful warfare behind the lines conducted by Chinese partisans.

4. A broadcast in Dutch originating from Tokyo recently stated that plans were under way to conscript Koreans for military service. One can be sure that even the Japanese could not commit such an act of lunacy. Once before, a few years ago, the Japanese attempted to conscript the Koreans in large numbers and the result was described in newspaper headlines as "strong action taken against 800 Koreans because of their deplorable attitude". Apparently when given guns, the Korean conscripts had turned them in the wrong direction. We should use this incident to taunt and mock the Japanese, and in this connection we should elaborate on all past incidents of Korean opposition. There have been innumerable political assassinations by Koreans in Japan proper, there was the bombing in Shanghai when Admiral Nomura lost his eye and a distinguished Japanese diplomat lost a leg, and numerous "sit-down strikes" on the farms and in the factories of Korea itself. It should be made clear that the difficulties which Japan has had with Korea is only a minor indication of the difficulties she will experience in all the areas she has occupied. No amount of precautions will stay the hands of the avengers. Just as the Germans were unable to protect Heydrich in Czechoslovakia so the Japanese will be unable to protect their dignitaries and police officials in the much looser-policed areas of the South Pacific.

5. When General Doolittle's statement to the effect that Tokyo will be bombed again and often is used, we should sympathize with the Japanese people on their lack of air-raid shelters. We should say to them: "Why haven't your officials given you any air-raid shelters

MOST CONFIDENTIAL

F.I.S. DIRECTIVE - JAPAN - May 28, 1942

No. 79

All natural calamities in Japan should be treated as a form of "Scourge of the Gods" visited upon the Japanese for their sins. This theme has been emphasized in previous directives but it is felt necessary to issue a special note on the subject in order to re-emphasize its value.

In 1939, at the time of a disastrous fire and earthquake, the newspapers referred to the calamity as a "Shin-sai" (the Shin being the character used in reference to deities rather than the Shin of earthquake, and some use the term "Ten-sai" or "Heaven-disaster.") So deeply rooted is this idea that disasters are the result of deviations from the way, that the Home Ministry ordered the newspapers to stop using the terms "Shin-sai" and "Ten-sai". We should take the line that the militarists have usurped power and led the Japanese people away from Kodo and that these calamities constitute abundant proof. Of course these calamities should be tied in with the far greater destructive power that the United States will eventually bring to the homeland of the Japanese.

Approved:

May 28, 1942

E.I.S. DIRECTIVE JAPAN VIII May 20, 1942

No.72

I. In Japan, as in other countries, there are those who struggle to establish a truly representative form of government and to create a domain of rights which that government is not entitled to invade. By definition, these men are liberals. They have fought a losing battle over a period of years and all attempts to achieve their ends have been met by political suppression, parliamentary "gag" rules and systematic terrorism. But thus far they have constituted a force, however small.

Today, from Tokyo, comes news of a political move designed to block the few remaining outlets for any form of liberal expression within Japan. A news dispatch, apparently authentic, tells of inauguration of a national service political council pledged to support the government's war policy and to "consolidate the national political power". The personnel of this new council reads like a Who's Who of militant, reactionary, extremist leaders. All the old names are there, the names of the men who have shoved the Japanese people into a world war. The platforms of this new council indicate that parliament has been reduced to the status of a melancholy debating society.

We should take the line that once again there has been violation of a sacred trust.

We should say that the militarists have desecrated the spirit and the letter of the constitution promulgated by the Emperor Meiji. This constitution embodied totalitarian principles under the guise of a framework for the establishment of a liberal constitutional monarchy. However, the framework was there and it is this structure which the militarists and extremist civilians have undermined and destroyed. There is an abundance of material along these lines.

In developing the argument that the militarists have betrayed a sacred trust, we should not pay too much attention to formal reasoning. The Japanese language is such that there can be no accurate translation of western political terms and ideologies and the Japanese mind is not attuned to the rigid ordering of western logic.

We should say that it is not so much a question of the document itself which has been violated but the name of Meiji himself. And we should reinforce our appeals with constant references to the Imperial Rescripts which the army has ignored. Special reference should be made to Meiji's emphatic dictum that the army should never be in politics.

III. The religious systems of the Far East pay special attention to the question of defilement. Many of the practices of these religions are interlaced with

purification rites, and in Shinto these rites play an extremely important role. (Actually Shinto shouldn't be called a religion since there are no sacred books nor dogmas nor moral codes.) Since disease is a form of defilement, we should make much of the fact that Japanese armies in Burma are today fighting in the heart of one of the world's worst malarial areas. Many, if not most, of the soldiers who are not killed by the Allied armies will probably come down with malaria and a large proportion of these will certainly perish from the disease.

We should emphasize that Japanese soldiers will bring many new diseases back into Japan when they go home on leave. The Japanese press, until warned by the Home Ministry, were particularly sensitive on the subject of diseases which the soldiers brought back from China.

III. There has been news lately of epidemics in areas near large scale Japanese troop concentrations in northern Indo-China and southern Yunnan. We should give these epidemics the fullest possible publicity in order to increase the strain upon the Japanese medical administrative authorities -- to force them to use more medical personnel in the respective areas.

And we should say that the epidemics in areas long occupied by the Japanese are due to the Japanese policy of withholding medicines from the Chinese, of taking their food and forcing them to labor to the point where resistance

breaks down and the spread of such disease is made possible.

It should be pointed out that the Japanese armies themselves do not have immunity from the epidemics which they help to bring about.

IV. The Japanese are very proud, and with some justification, of their intelligence service. The last air raid on Tokyo can still be used as a source for belittling and mocking Japanese espionage. No people in the world are more concerned with espionage than the Japanese and no people are more susceptible to mockery. We should say that the complete surprise and lack of preparedness which greeted our flyers and which enabled them to successfully bomb at will is an indication of how poor the Japanese are at gathering military information. We should say other attacks will be carried out with increasing intensity in the future and that it is impossible for the Japanese to know when or how those attacks will take place.

APPROVED:
D.McE.

CLEARED: W.R.D.
May 25, 1942.

CONFIDENTIAL

F.I.S. Priority JAPAN XXX May 1944

No.4

1. The persistence with which Americans who had business connections with Japan tell us that the Japanese businessman did not want this war suggests that this may be a studied plan of propaganda designed by the Osaka capitalists. The idea is that of escaping responsibility and of preparing the way for a resumption of the very profitable business relations they had with the United States in the past.

2. This gives us an opportunity to drive a wedge between the businessmen and the military party, and perhaps give the thought police some additional work to do. We should accept this statement of opposition to the war at its face value and not only play it up in a general way, but also make specific references to individual businessmen now living in Japan who presumably would be opposed to the war. This would include the directors of all the big companies, especially those who have business connections in the United States. We might pay particular attention to leading businessmen who have visited the United States in recent years on their "good will missions". Quote, if possible, the statements they made while here, and say there is every

reason to believe, or in fact that we know that these still hold the same opinions expressed years ago. They actually are opposed to the war and are trying secretly to undermine the power of the military leaders of Japan and bring about early and profitable peace. My suggestion is that we needle Japan with this idea rather steadily for a week and then stop and see what the reaction may be.

3. The propaganda objective to be accomplished is to arouse in the minds of the war leaders distrust of the Osaka capitalists. The truth of the matter is that the Osaka capitalists gave the military party the green light on the "China incident" hoping to get rich from the loot, but the army officers have kept most of the swag themselves. The businessmen are now opposed to the war not on moral grounds, but because it has not proven so profitable as they anticipated.

APPROVED: May 10, 1942

D. McE.

CLEARED:

WWD

CONFIDENTIAL

FIGO DIRECTIVE - JAPAN VI - [illegible]

No. [illegible]

1. All previous directives are still in force and should be consulted. During the recent volcanic eruptions in Japan the writers should have referred to general comments on the effect of the natural disasters on Japanese morale as indicated in previous directives for Japan. For the sake of emphasis we repeat that all natural calamities along with bombings should be played to the fullest along the lines of "The Scourge of the Gods visited upon the Japanese for having deviated from true Shinto, or "Kodo", the Imperial Way." See the directive on bombings of Tokyo.

2. We should continue to emphasize that Japanese naval losses in the South Pacific have been so extensive that replacement is impossible. In the first test on a fairly even basis the Japanese emerged with disproportionate losses. We should tell the Japanese that it is safe to assume the same results on all future occasions and we should constantly emphasize that vast numbers of ships are being built in this country. The figures should be placed in juxtaposition to the meager productive capacities of Japan.

3. There is no way to "needle" the Japanese more effectively than through mockery. The vanity of the Japanese male is something out of this world. With reference to sea battles and Japanese losses, we should emphasize that the only real naval battle the Japanese ever won was the battle of Tsushima at

the time of the Russo-Japanese War. We should say that this battle was won because the Japanese fleets were guided by British officers and that during the battle itself there were some British officers on the bridge of Japanese warships. Although this example itself is not very important, it is material which can be used to mock the Japanese. Ridicule should be used often and lavishly.

4. For the benefit of the Japanese we should begin to disparage the coming German offensives. We should talk of tremendous amounts of supplies that are reaching Russia, of the many factories that have begun operations within the country after having been moved lock, stock and barrel from the occupied territories, of the great reserve armies, and of Russian morale which is now higher than it has ever been. BUT, all talk of Russia should be in connection with the war in Europe and there should be NO reference made to Russian Japanese relations. If we build up the strength of Russia with respect to Germany, the Japanese will be able to infer therefrom the possible strength of their potential enemy in the North.

The frequent mention of Russia would have a salutary effect upon the Japanese. Russia is the traditional enemy of Japan, not only ideologically, but militarily. Then there is the Japanese fear of bombings from Russian soil -- a theme which has been played with variations for a long

side in Japan proper. However, for reasons which cannot be disclosed here we must confine all materials dealing with Russia to the war in Europe and the strength of the Russians as an indivisible unit.

APPROVED:
T.P.M.
May 12, 1942



F.I.A. DIRECTIVE - JAPAN V - May 4-11, 1943

No. 83

Previous directives are still in force and should be observed. On the Burma operations:

I. We should emphasize the fact that whatever takes place in Burma will not have a decisive effect upon Chinese resistance and that the reasons which explain the Japanese inability to conquer China after more than four years of mutually destructive warfare are still valid. These reasons are:

A. The unification of the Chinese peoples and their determination not to lay down arms until they, together with the allied nations, emerge victorious.

B. The phenomenon of guerilla warfare developed to the highest point possible in the course of the Sino-Japanese war. In this connection we should emphasize that guerrilla warfare needs primarily small arms and explosives both of which China can produce herself in abundant quantities.

C. The terrain of China, especially in the provinces of Yunnan in the south, Szechuan and Kiangsi can be best described as some of the most mountainous area in the world. Japanese who attempt to invade this area will die by the hundreds of thousands as they have already done in other areas of China to no avail whatsoever.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100450002-3

II. On the Closing of the Burma Road.

A. We should take the line that the closing of the Burma Road will not affect the resistance of China because:

1. American transport planes arriving daily in increasing numbers in India, produced by the thousands in America will more than make up the tonnage lost by the fall of Lashio.

2. We should emphasize that smuggling will continue. Previously the ventality of Japanese army officers in China has enabled Chinese during some periods to receive more supplies from smugglers than they received over the Burma Road. A large bribe would be paid to a Japanese army officer in the field and coolies would carry sections of trucks on their shoulders to an assembly point well in front of the Japanese lines. We should emphasize that corruption among the Japanese army officers themselves has played a large part in enabling China to keep supplied over the past four years and to build up large reserves.

III. The corruption in the Japanese Army. Hammer away at this theme and build it up with all available evidence. Unfortunately books on Japan do not deal with this subject in any great detail. Writers should consult American journalists recently returned from Japan, and with the Army, Navy and State Department. The F.I.S. newsroom in Washington is in a special position to do this sort of

work. A Japanese should never be allowed to forget that he is dying to make rich a few generals either on the active or retired list who are sitting comfortably at home in Tokyo and letting junior officers administer newly-gained spoils for the personal profit of the stay-at-homes.

APPROVED

J. P. M.

May 5, 1942

FIB DIRECTIVE - JAPAN IV - April 25

No. 40

Toyohiko Kagawa, evangelistic labor leader and Tolstoyan pacifist, is apparently being used at this time as the spearhead of a Japanese peace offensive. On Wednesday, April 22, the Associated Press carried a news dispatch based on Japanese broadcasts of the previous day and a careful reading indicates that it is not quite what it appears to be on the surface. It says:

> "The Tokyo radio broadcast today a Domei dispatch quoting Toyohiko Kagawa, most famous of Japanese Christian leaders, as asserting that among Japanese Christians 'prayers are being said daily for an early conclusion of the war and the restoration of peace throughout the world.'"

Now, these sentiments are in line with Kagawa's character, as the writer of this directive knows from first hand experience and acquaintance with the evangelist, but the propaganda plan is revealed by the fact that Kagawa was jailed shortly before this war began for lending his name to pacifistic utterances, such as the content of the news dispatch above.

Our line in broadcasts to Japan should be to ignore completely this feeler, along with any others which may come along. The problem of setting a peace offensive on the domestic front is being exceedingly well handled by the OWI and does not concern us. Together with ignoring peace feelers, we should consistently reiterate that we are preparing for a long, long war, that there is great unity and enthusiasm behind our war effort, and that we shall not lay down our arms until we have emerged victorious.

APPROVED, April 27, 1945

B.P.M.

CONFIDENTIAL

P.I.S. DIRECTIVE - JAPAN XVI - April 24, 1942

No. 40

(All previous directives and guidances are still in force and should be consulted and followed.)

I. On the special problem of separating Japan from her allies.

A. There has come word from White Sulphur Springs of trouble between the German and Japanese diplomats there, and we should make the most of it. The Germans are apparently snubbing the Japanese on all possible occasions, and although rules of protocol have thus far been fairly well observed, they have been calling each other nasty names in studiously polite language. We should, perhaps, begin sending out material along the following lines, written in tones of anxious concern:

"American authorities charged with looking out after the welfare and comfort of the Axis diplomats now quartered in luxurious hotels at White Sulphur Springs -- one of America's most famous resorts which compares with Miyanoshita and Karuizawa -- are disturbed over the rapid degeneration of relations between the Japanese and Germans under their care.

"The Germans have behaved very badly. They have openly insulted the Japanese nation and its people, and have cast slurring remarks on the quality of the Japanese leadership.

"The Germans claim that they are responsible for the few successes that the Japanese have had thus far. As one Nazi official put it: 'German staff work took Malaya, Singapore,

and the Dutch East Indies. Without German technicians in Japanese factories, you would still be cutting out paper dolls and parasols instead of planes and tanks. The minute we Germans decide to take away our help, you will disintegrate like a staple-fibre kimono at the laundry."
A bit paraphrased, but then.....

B. To the businessmen and the commercial-minded in the army overseas.

Recall to them the German policy of systematically swindling the Japanese businessmen during the days of the "Great Friendship and Trade Agreement." Show how the Japanese sent valuable high grade manufactured goods and valuable soy beans to Germany and received, in return, rolling machines that didn't roll, hoisting machinery that didn't hoist, and ersatz lubrication oil which lubricated in the manner a handful of sand lubricates a Swiss watch. Once a shipment of over 600 German trucks were received by the Japanese and these trucks are on the scrap heap today having broken down after only a few hundred miles of travel. Germany unloaded her shoddiest, cheapest goods upon the Japanese and her commercial policy is an adequate indication of the political treatment the Japanese can expect at German hands. Also we should play up any evidences of commercial conflicts between Germans and Japanese in China. A special directive on this latter point will soon be forthcoming.

9. Recall all the insulting mention of Japan and the Japanese in German official literature, especially "Mein Kampf" and tell the Japanese that their version of the Nazi Bible (which has sold by the millions within Japan) has been edited so as to leave out the insulting materials. Continually demonstrate to the Japanese the implied insult in the official German term for their Asiatic brethern: "Ehren Aryan" or Honorary Aryans. Can there be room for both the Divine Yamato race and the Godlike Aryans together on the Globe? The Germans are sworn enemies of Shinto and all other organized religions.

We should predict a decisive German defeat to the Japanese and drive home the thought that once that defeat occurs the full strength - naval, air, and military, of the United Nations will be loosed upon Japan. The Atlantic Fleet will be brought into the Pacific where it will be joined by the full British fleet and the American Pacific forces already there. More and more aircraft carriers are being built, more and more airplanes, and soon the skies over Tokyo will be dark with allied planes and the ground below will be swept clean by flames. In this connection, we should continue the line of terror propaganda blocked out in the directive for Japan immediately previous to this one. There should be no limit placed upon the degree to which writers can develop terror propaganda. The Horror that will befall Japan and the Japanese should be described vividly, imaginatively and with a great wealth of gruesome detail. There will be further directives on the subject of splitting the Japanese and Germans.

CONFIDENTIAL

FIS DIRECTIVE - JAPAN II - April 30-47

No. 41

All previous directives are still in force and should be consulted and followed.

BOMBING BY TOKYO:

If this story is confirmed we should take the line that this is only the first and the least of a long series of bombings which will eventually reduce Tokyo, Osaka, Kobe, Nagoya, and Yokohama into irrecognizable masses of charred wreckage. In this connection writers should develop a good line of terror propaganda -- and this could best be done by recalling, in great and grim detail, the horrors of the 1923 earthquake and fire (the vast majority of the hundreds of thousands of casualties were the result of fire rather than due to the earthquake itself). Point out that the 1923 earthquake will not compare with the loss of life, damage to military property and fires which will be caused by mass bombardments of Japanese cities. Tokyo is not an open city.

DO NOT MENTION any possible damage to the Imperial Palace located in the heart of Tokyo -- in fact, omit any references to the Emperor's personal safety or the Imperial Palace in any bombing stories.

The Japanese have come to look upon great natural calamities as a form of "The Scourge of God" visited upon them

for their sins. We should revive the volcano-bombing story and show how all the methods of modern warfare will be used in conjunction with natural forces (reference: American Weekly piece by prominent geologist on destroying Japan by bombing her volcanoes and causing great eruptions) to liquidate Nippon and the Yamato peoples -- unless they realize their mistake and overthrow their corrupt military leaders.

We should begin telling the little people of Japan and the soldiers in the armies that they are not dying for the benefit of their country but for a few power and money mad militarists. In this connection point out:

a. The retired Generals and other high-ranking officers who have been given profitable concessions in Japanese-occupied areas. Show that they have brought their families into these concessions (Japanese family system is never stronger than when someone in the family has money and others do not) and turned over the plums they did not keep for themselves to civilian relatives who give them cuts on all profits.

b. The ashes of the little soldier who dies abroad on some battlefield are NOT SACRED. The enlisted men did not die for the Son of Heaven but for the officers in the Special Service section of the Army and those on the retired list who have grabbed off the best concessions, and who are getting fatter and fatter as more Japanese blood is spilled over new

ADDENDUM TO FIS DIRECTIVE - JAPAN II - April 20 - 27

No. 41

Under the heading "Bombing of Tokyo", we should emphasize strongly the fact that destiny (i.e. the gods) has decreed that America, the first nation to come to the rescue of the Japanese people after the earthquake of 1923, is now the instrument of direct retribution for the sins of the war lords.

This suggestion, which comes from Mr. Sherwood, is of particular value not only for reasons indicated under the heading "Bombing of Tokyo", but also because the Japanese are possessed of a strong sense of gratitude and an even stronger sense of ritual reciprocity. We should lean heavily on the ingratitude of the Japanese people and in this connection we should bring out that America was the first nation to extend the hand of friendship and of cooperation to Japan. This hand of friendship has now become a fist which will be used to answer the treacherous attack on Pearl Harbor, to return like for like. The doctrine of "turning the other cheek" is a strange doctrine to the Japanese. The diplomatic back peddling engaged in before Pearl Harbor served only to arouse contempt.

The above, in conjunction with FIS Directive, Japan II, April 20-27, should be referred to whenever there are bombings of Japan.

APPROVED - April 30, 1942

W.R.M.

CONFIDENTIAL

FIS DIRECTIVE JAPAN I

No. 31

Continue to emphasize suggestions which have appeared under the heading of "Japan" in the directives of the past two weeks.

a. Make much of the continued resistance against Japanese in isolated sections of Celebes, Sumatra, the Philippine Islands, and particularly Bataan Peninsula.

b. Since the Japanese appear at this moment to be concentrating on an all-out attack on India and apparently circumventing Australia, we should follow the line that the Japanese are afraid to go after MacArthur, the General who stalemated them in the Philippines. We should plug this line systematically until further information reaches us that the Japanese have ideas with respect to Australia. If, in the future, it would appear that they are planning an all-out attack against MacArthur and his men, we should immediately swing into action along the lines indicated in FIS Directive IV, March 23-30, paragraph 5.

c. Despite all indications of increased Japanese-Russian tension, avoid any mention of any Russo-Japanese relations. A full anticipatory directive has been drawn up to cover any contingencies which may arise as a result of the Russo-Japanese situation.

APPROVED, April 2, 1942

ECRET

The following plan [illegible] of its kind [illegible] primarily because here we are dealing with an entire country and an entire people; [illegible] with Japan and the Japanese.

Our enemy in Asia has acquired most of the [illegible] of the East [illegible] and although the [illegible] against us are [illegible] "New Order" [illegible] Japan [illegible] "New Order". [illegible] it means the setting up of a completely [illegible] with Japan drawing upon [illegible] (nearly one billion people) and [illegible] the greatest potential market in the world today. [illegible] culturally, it means the [illegible] although [illegible] such as the nature of the "New Order" which [illegible]

[illegible] plans of this type [illegible] the most difficult [illegible] which we have been

SECRET

[redacted] PLAN FOR JAPAN

INTRODUCTION

The following plan differs from others of its kind primarily because here we are dealing with an Asiatic country and an Asiatic people, but here especially because we are dealing with Japan and the Japanese.

Our enemy in Asia has acquired most of the mechanical techniques of the West and a thin veneer of Western culture; but although the weapons now being used against us are turned out on a mass production basis, the minds behind them are the minds of Medieval Japan. The "New Order", as far as Japan herself is concerned, is actually the "old order". Politically, it means reversion to the isolation in which Japan lived for centuries--only this time an isolation embracing the entire Far East. Economically it means the setting up of a completely self-sufficient unit with Japan drawing upon vast resources of labor (nearly one billion people) and abundant raw materials in an effort to dominate the greatest potential market in the world today. And, culturally, it means the uprooting of imported institutions--the "purifying of those native forms which have been contaminated by exposure to the West". Although over-simplified, such is the nature of the "New Order" which is not new.

Previous plans of this type addressed only to European occupation have been directed towards peoples reared in somewhat the same cultural heritage in which we have been

ground, trained to think somewhat as we think, and familiar with institutions which are at least recognizable and understandable to our people.

But the thought of Japan, her cultural heritage and her institutions could not possibly be more different from our own. Thus, a departure must be made in procedure of drawing up plans of this kind. Chapter I deals with Policy Goals, Propaganda Objectives and Themes to Accompany Objectives. Chapter II deals with Techniques, Handicaps and Characteristics of the Japanese People.

CHAPTER I.
POLICY GOALS

I. To win the war

II. To deprive Japan of all the fruits of aggression, to liberate the oppressed peoples in the Far East, and establish the four freedoms.

III. To take such measures as may be necessary to prevent a recurrence of aggression.

IV. To encourage and maintain a truly representative government in Japan with which the other nations may deal with confidence.

II. Propaganda Objectives and Themes to Accompany Objectives.

Goal A. To convince hitherto undefeated Japanese that they can and will be defeated.

Themes to accompany objectives.

1. This is a many front war and there will be other fronts soon.

2. MacArthur the General they couldn't defeat at Bataan is now in command of the entire allied forces in Southwest Pacific.

3. The weakness and impending defeat of Japan's allies.

4. The array of strength, in terms of numbers of men and quantity of materials--for all the allied powers--presently against the Japanese. Figures for Japanese losses should always be placed in juxtaposition to resounding totals for British and U. S. War production.

5. Arouse distrust in the leadership of the Army and Navy.

6. Point out that German staff work is responsible for the heavy losses of the Japanese, and Germany can be beaten as has been indicated in Russia.

7. Point out the failure of the army to end the war in China and emphasize that they embarked on a suicidal war against the greater part of the world in order not to admit the failure which would have meant their finish as a political power within Japan.

8. Point out that all previous Japanese wars have been fought against inconsequential foes and that at last they are up against a combination of first class powers, that their early successes were due only to superior numbers and that we have more men, better equipment than they--and that eventually the allies are bound to win--it's inevitable.

Goal B. To convince the Japanese that although "to die for one's Emperor is to live forever" actually their sons who die on the battlefields will not become kami (the nearest Japanese equivalent for the word "god" although it actually means "superior being") since they are not sacrificing for the son of Heaven but for the benefit of a

(continued)

Goal B.

few peace mad militarists. Note: Any attacks along this line must be based upon a thorough knowledge of Shinto and the more military sects of Buddhism.

1. The Emperor did not want this war has been indicated by his refusal, up to the time of the 1936 revolution, to appoint known extremists to the Presidency of the Privy Council.

2. There exists in Japan the concept of a "just" war, one in which the Imperial Armies go out and die for the sake of the Emperor who is actually the symbol of the Japanese people. Point out that this is not such a "just" war and that the present army leaders can be compared with some of the rebellious Clansmen, of the transition period, in that they put their own interest above those of the country.

3. The ashes of your sons which come back in white vases are not sacred, because your sons were murdered by their army leaders who are attempting to tell you that they died for the Emperor.

Goal C. To convince the Japanese that the army leaders have led them into a disastrous war against the wishes of the present Emperor and point out direct violations of previous Imperial Rescripts—documents which carry more weight among the Japanese than Divine Laws carry among Christians. THE FACT THAT THE ARMY HAS VIOLATED IMPERIAL RESCRIPTS SHOULD BECOME AS MUCH OF A BY-WORD AS THE GERMAN SLOGAN THAT THE VERSAILLE TREATY WAS UNJUST. This should be our central theme in attacks aimed at undermining the confidence of the people in the military leaders.

1. Cite the Rescripts of Emperor Meiji especially those which maintain:

a. The army should never be in politics.

b. There should never be any European entanglements which would commit the Japanese to any harmful line of action.

c. When the army commits atrocities they have leveled themselves to the status of beasts.

(Continued Goal C.)

2. Quote the present Emperor's pronouncements on peace especially the Imperial poem written on National Poetry Day which expresses the pious hope that there will be peace. Emphasize that the word Showa which is the dynasty name of the present Emperor means "era of radiant peace" and point out that ever since 1931 the army has taken the complete initiative in bringing war to the Japanese people against the Emperor's stated wishes.

3. Show the many instances in which the Emperor tried to restrain extremists from coming into power for example, Baron Hiranuma, one of Japan's best known extremists and reactionaries, was Vice-Minister of the Privy Council from 1928 to 1936 during which time he should, upon many occasions, have become President of the Council. He didn't because of liberal Count Makino, friend and adviser to the Emperor and the last of the Genro, Prince Saionji, another liberal and close adviser of the Son of Heaven. On February 26th, 1936 Hiranuma's army friends staged a rebellion which was put down. The liberal advisers to the Emperor were put on the assassination list. Early thereafter Hiranuma became President of the Privy Council, later Premier. The revolution had succeeded, the implication was: "Next time we will call out ten times as many." Since that day the Emperor has been a virtual prisoner of the military and civilian extremists. EMPHASIZE STRONGLY that the men around the Emperor have been giving him bad advice and that through terroristic societies and political oppression they have prevented the Emperor from hearing the voice of his peoples. This "bad advice" theme is an extremely powerful one to Japan since many assassinations of political leaders have been carried out for just this reason. The manifesto of the February 26th, 1936 revolutionaries used this theme to justify the mass murders they committed. The younger officers and men believe this apology to be true although the older ones used it as an excuse.

Goal D. To convince the Japanese that Shintaisei (The New Order concept) is built upon misconceptions and that it is impossible to achieve. All attempts to set up Shintaisei can only end in increased suffering, misery, poverty and the useless deaths by the millions of Japanese boys.

1. The army is not freeing Asiatic peoples since it has plundered occupied areas for its own advantage. Show how the Special Service Section of the Japanese Army has gone into business for its own profit citing such examples as the turning over of the very profitable Szechen-egg market in China to retired Major-Generals, etc.

(Continued Goal D)

3. The so-called "free governments", such as that of Wang Ching Wei in China, have no popular support, are peopled by rascals and notorious crooks and that they are the laughing stock of the world. "You Japanese, a great people, do not want to lose face by association with such frauds", etc.

4. Recall all the army promises (especially those of General Araki) since the invasion of Manchuria and point out that the lot of Japan has grown worse and worse instead of better as promised. That Manchuria has become a lucrative plum for the Kwantung Army while the people of Japan receive only the ashes of their sons in little white vases.

4. Show that the scorched earth policy means that they will get little or nothing from the areas they have occupied.

5. Show that continued resistance by Chinese "irregulars" has been responsible for the failure to end the China war and that now Japan has millions more of these "irregulars" throughout Southeastern Asia who will continue to kill the missionaries of the New Order and destroy their equipment.

6. The necessity of keeping a permanent army of occupation means that you will never see your sons on the farms again. Instead, you will get thousands of Korean laborers (already the influx has started.)

7. Show that the attempts to build up the New Order and the refusal of the Army doctors to give adequate medical care in occupied areas has caused wide-spread plagues and that Japanese soldiers are bringing back disease from the Co-prosperity sphere".

Goal E. To convince Japan there will never be peace under her present government.

1. Show how the army leaders have been promising peace ever since 1931 and instead there have been eleven years of continual hostilities culminating in the present war which will go on for even more years to come.

2. Show how the greatest period of peace and prosperity in Japan occurred under civilian governments and that Japanese-United Nations relations have been wrecked systematically by the militarists.

3. Show that the mission of Kurusu was not an indication that the militarists wanted peace with America since the nature of their initial attack, from a military standpoint, indicated that preparations were under way to launch war on America even before Kurusu left Japan.

(Continued Goal E)

4. The army can only keep in power as long as there is a crisis or a war so they have kept Japan at war for eleven years simply to maintain and perpetuate themselves in power and to make large personal profits from occupied areas.

Goal F. To convince Japan that the United States has no territorial ambitions on Japan itself nor any wish to interfere in Japanese internal politics once the war is over and the Emperor is restored to his rightful position as the head of a constitutional monarchy--and a nation willing to live at peace with its neighbors. This "restore the Emperor theme" is perhaps the strongest line we can take.

1. America protected Japan in the early days of her career as a modern state from being partitioned as China was partitioned. Show that Germany has always been on the other side.

2. Our only interest in the Far East, the Philippines represented an area which we had promised to set free, and had actually set the date of freedom.

3. America's entire Far Eastern policy has been based upon the principles of territorial integrity, freedom for all who trade on equal footing, and recognition of the fact that free peoples should be free to govern themselves.

4. The United States recognized that the Emperor as the rightful leader of the Japanese people and that if he were in power, actually restored to his throne, Japan itself would again be a great nation living in peace with its neighbors, once again prosperous.

Goal G. To take full advantage of the many cliques and factions within the country and to drive these dissenting groups even further apart. This would be done in the interests of national disunity. These are the

Specialized Targets.

1. Army vs Navy.

a. Recall all the Admirals which the Army extremists have murdered especially those killed in the February 26th revolution when there was nearly civil war between the Army and Navy.

(Continued Goal G.)

b. Point out to the Army that the Navy has been sitting back growing fat while the Army has been going through great sufferings and sacrifices in China.

c. Point out to the Navy that the Army through its own actions has forced them into a war with the two greatest naval powers on earth, England and the United States against the wishes of the intelligent, travelled naval commanding officers, against the best interests of the country and against the wishes of the Emperor. (The extremist group in the Navy has always been a small and comparatively insignificant clique.)

d. Show that Lt. General Oshima, Ambassador to Berlin and Mr. Shiratori, extremist pro-Army Ambassador to Rome in 1939, committed the Navy to a military alliance with the Axis that has brought about this war, without benefit of previous consultations with the Navy.

e. Tell the Navy that the Army has always had the lion's share of the budget and that large sections of the fund listed "for unspecified purposes" have gone to the pockets of Generals in the Special Service Section of the Japanese Army and that the Japanese Navy cannot outbuild the United States and British Navies because of the greedy self-seeking policy of the Army and their civilian friends in the Diet.

2. Army vs Business man.

a. Show that the national mobilisation bill not only has put the Army in control over Japanese business but has put the Army actually in business. Show all the techniques that Army has used to gain control over all business within Japan for example the Nissan Company, headed by the Army's friend, Mr. Aikawa, which received direct subsidies and indirect subsidies through being released from payment of land taxes, capital taxes and other impositions upon the rest of Japanese business.

b. Make comparisons between the German business man who supported Hitler and the Japanese capitalists who supported the Army and show that their fate will be the fate of the Thyssens.

c. Show the violations of Army promises to business men and how instead of giving them the concessions they promised in occupied areas the Army has turned over special plums to Generals on the retired list and to active officers in the Special Service Section of the Army.

(Continued: Army vs Business men)

-3-

c. Tell the soldiers of the Army overseas that their leaders and the business men have entered into a conspiracy to prevent them from ever returning to Japan because:

Their return would mean complete dislocation of Japanese economy.

They are needed as a permanent army of occupation.

2. Clansmen Officers versus "Young Officers". (There has been a great change in the class position of military leaders in recent years. Previously, nearly all high posts in the Army and Navy were held by members of the Satsuma and Choshu clans. Since the service schools are open to all, some of the poor farm-families have been able to reach the very top of the ladder and after bitter struggles, these "Young Officers" have been able to replace most of the liberal clansmen. Those young officers are mostly violent extremists. Their political philosophy is strongly socialistic and against the business men whom they hold responsible for the poverty of their home-land and the misery of their families on the farms. The aristocratic clansmen are against business men because "men of steel are superior to men of paper", and in the old days--less than a hundred years ago--the warrior was on the top of the social heap and the tradesman was at the bottom. There are a few clansmen left in the Army and Navy and some of them hold extremely high positions.)

a. Point out to the aristocrats in the Japanese army that the young officers, through atrocities which they have sanctioned and committed, have disgraced the Imperial Armies and have made the word "Bushido", code of the warrior, into a synonym for dishonorable conduct throughout the world.

b. Point out to the clansmen that while they are working for the establishment of Japan as a great state, the "Young Officers" have sold themselves to Germany and are being led by German masters.

c. Compare the struggle between the "Young Officers" and the clansmen to the struggle between the Nazi party and the Reichswehr generals and point out that in both cases a gang of hoodlums has destroyed the honor of the Army. This "honor of the Army" theme is an especially strong one with respect to Japan.

4. Kwantung Army Faction vs Other Factions within the Japanese Army.

a. Point out the autonomy movement among the Kwantung Army Officers.

b. Point out that the Kwantung Army officers have made great personal profits out of Manchuria.

(Continued: Kwantung Army and Other Factions within Japanese Army)

5. Point out that the Kwantung Army wishes to drag Japan into war with the Soviet Union while other armies are fighting for their life in the South Pacific Area.

6. Point out the failure of the Kwantung Army to better the lot of the Japanese people through their failure to make the South Manchurian Railway Company--giant holding company which controls nearly all heavy and light industry in Manchuria--into a paying proposition.

7. Point out other factions within Japan and persecuted groups such as the Christian minority and the Eta. A good study of the Eta and the Hatori (clique) in Japan has been prepared by Dr. Reports research workers.

Goal II. To Separate Japan from her Allies.

1. Show that under the terms of barter agreements which followed pacts of "eternal friendship" between Germany and Japan, Japanese businessmen were systematically swindled by their German counterparts. The Germans sent them rolling machinery that did not roll, hoisting machinery that did not hoist, and crude lubricating oil which ruined many Japanese machines.

2. Point out that German generals are responsible for the heavy losses of Japanese troops in the field and have pushed them into a suicidal war against America and England in the South Pacific.

3. Point out the fact that up till very recently, the Chinese armies were trained by German soldiers and offer General Von Falkenhausen's statement that "with two German divisions, we could clean up all of China".

4. Mention the absurdity of German racial claims and point out the insult to the Japanese in the German sobriquet of 'Ehren Aryan'.

5. Point out that Germany wishes Japan to pull her chestnuts out of the fire by beguiling them into an attack on Russia.

6. Recall all the insulting statements which Germans, including Hitler in "Mein Kampf" have made regarding the Japanese.

7. Point out that throughout Japan's entire history, Germany has always been on the other side of the fence.

8. Point out the clash of interests--in terms of economics--between Japan and Germany as regards markets and the exploitation of occupied areas. Emphasize strongly any evidence of German-Japanese friction within Japan proper--such as the assumption of important jobs in the Japanese government by Germans and German Fifth Column activity in Tokyo and other Japanese cities. This evidence exists and materials along these lines can be well documented.

CHAPTER II

I. General comments concerning Japan

It has been said in the introduction that the thought of Japan, her cultural heritage and her institutions could not possibly be more different from our own. A single example under each of these headings will serve to make the point clear.

A. The Cultural Heritage.

Japanese soldiers, whose fathers were born in the feudal period, always insist they are practising the Code of the Japanese Medieval Knights--Bushido. We are led to compare this with Knighthood of Feudal Europe, but nothing could be further from the truth. Neither God nor Humanity ever inspires any enthusiasm in the breast of the Japanese General. Their idea of gallantry never prevented them from recognizing their legal rights in testing the edge of their swords on the head of an innocent peasant--just as Japanese Soldiers have often done in the course of the present China war.

B. The Thought of Japan.

It is impossible to make accurate translations of Western political concepts into Japanese, and the nature of the language makes futile any syllogistic arguments based upon precise definitions of words. Japanese is, perhaps the most systematically ambiguous language in the world, and its tortuous sentence structure is an adequate graph of the twistings of the Japanese mind. Here's an example of a sentence in Japanese, translated word-for-word into English, and paraphrased roughly--but almost approximating--into understandable language.

1. In Japanese:

Kono goro ni itarimashite bukyo to mosu mono wa tada hato-jimin no shinjiru tokoro to natte shite iji de wa sono dori wo wakimae taru hito ga nukumaku shizen to iwa shoshiki no tokk bakari no mochiiru koto to ye ni omoimasu.

2. In English, word-for-word translation:

This period as having arrived Buddhism that any thing as for merely/lower/class people believing place that having become middle place/therefore/wanting in as-for the reason discerning people for religion's sake if-not-nature funeral rites's time only in only things/ceremony in (they) think.

3. In understandable English, what it means roughly.

"At the present day Buddhism has sunk into being the belief of the lower classes only, and persons in the middle and

never always understand its science (Sects); most of them believe that their religion is a thing which cause lads play only as funeral services."

B. Tendencies.

There is no partial in the mind for the Emperor who is not only the head of the state, but is the state. He is at once the religious and political Absolute.

II. Characteristics of the Japanese people.

A. Nerve, dah nourge.

The distinction is made because the Japanese have shown themselves in the China War and in the Manchurian campaigns to be extremely brave under certain conditions. They will make suicidal assaults upon strongly fortified positions knowing they will be wiped out. But it has been demonstrated time and time again they lack the ability--the courage--to take a systematic pounding over a long period of time. They crack up easily. There are many cases of such among the Japanese army in China and in Japan proper these in almost any otherwise in the world outside of Malaysia. These statements are based upon first hand observations.

B. Honor or "Face".

Although by our standards they have a perverted sense of what constitutes honorable conduct towards other peoples, they have a strong sense of personal honor and are quick to avenge an insult. They will unhesitatingly kill others or themselves, depending on the circumstances, whenever serious loss of "face" is involved. ALL PROPAGANDA TO JAPAN MUST FORMER BE BASED UPON A GOOD UNDERSTANDING OF "FACE".

C. Loyalty and obedience.

No people in the world have a greater sense of loyalty, perhaps, than have the Japanese and they follow orders implicitly. The strongest argument is loyalty to the Emperor. We must never appeal these characteristics but use them for our own ends.

D. Submissiveness and personal vanity.

The Japanese believe themselves to be of Divine Origin, and their Emperor to be a direct descendent of the earliest Gods. Submissiveness is perhaps more or in Japan than in any other country for it has existed longer there and has been systematically encouraged. Personal vanity is everywhere apparent in the customs and dress. Personal vanity is also reflected in the complete and absolute subjugation of women. The women of Japan use a different language, women are rich in heterifine, and they have practically no rights of any kind.

E. Rational "inferiority complex" and belligerency which usually accompanies this state of mind.

F. Susceptibility to fear.

The Japanese are so susceptible to fear that the system of "thought police" has long been used as a weapon by those in power to maintain and perpetuate themselves. Underground liberal and democratic movements have spread like wildfire in the past and despite the most rigorous police suppression they exist there today--and we can use them.

G. There are many other outstanding Japanese characteristics some of them the result of Buddhist and Shinto training and others attributable to the "insular mind". But the above represent the most outstanding.

III. Technique.

A. The "Jiu-do" approach.

Jiudo, once known as Jiu-jitsu, is simply the art of killing and disabling without the use of weapons--a good definition of war propaganda. The theory is that you never win, it is always the other fellow that beats himself. Also, the Jiudo philosophers say, there are two ways of advancing in the world, one going forward and the other is to go backward. A judicious intermixture of the two constitutes real progress.

How does this affect propaganda techniques to Japan? The answer is: We should not waste energy by attempting to destroy through frontal attacks, concepts such as "the Emperor is Divine, we must obey blindly, we can die for a cause, we must never be taken prisoner, etc". Instead, we should play up these issue, agree with the Japanese on all points regarding their own estimates of themselves--then lead them, by skillful methods, to the conclusions and the actions which we desire. This "Jiudo approach" should condition all our materials to Japan.

B. The Moral approach.

This is no time for missionary work to bring the Japanese around to our way of thinking with respect to the intellectual and moral virtues. We should accept the Japanese ideas on these subjects, and fit our propaganda in accordingly.

C. The historical approach.

We should direct all our appeals to the Japanese in terms which they, from their own historical background, can understand. Take it for granted that they know nothing of foreign history and the development of political thought in the western world (although this is not quite true with respect to the students who read widely before the era of Resurgent Nationalism and book-

(Continued 6. The historical approach)

burning out &c). Dig deeply into the rich granary of the Japanese history in order to reinforce our appeals, for the Japanese, like the Chinese are a historical minded people.

IV. Warnings:

1. Do not attack the Emperor.

2. Do not address the Japanese in pidgin English.

3. Do not use examples of former histories of foreign countries to the Japanese.

4. Do not scold the Japanese or speak to them in a patronizing fashion--nothing increases their fighting spirit more than to be talked down to by Occidentals.

5. Always remember that "Face" is everything in the Orient.

End

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GENERAL COMMENTS ON REACHING JAPAN

This plan is based on the assumption that the Japanese can be reached. Although there are a few shortwave sets in Japan proper, there are many radiowave sets which can be reached from powerful stations in Siberia or from the mainland of China. What is more important is that the Japanese throughout China, especially in Shanghai, have many modern sophisticated radio sets at this disposal and that anything that reaches them in Shanghai will eventually reach Japan. Certain Japanese known to be friendly to our cause, or who are against present activities for con-

available numbers, are at present in Shanghai and in Indo-China or other areas where they can be reached by members of the Chinese Intelligence Service with printed materials emanating from us. A list of the names of these people and where they are located is being drawn up. And it must not be forgotten that soon there will be bombing raids and pamphlet raids over Japan itself and that perhaps even before this occurs, United Nations troops will be in contact with Japanese forces in the field. We will be able to drop pamphlets behind the lines, use loud speakers or direct military radios from field headquarters.

D. McF.

EXCERPTS FROM
JPWC SUBCOMMITTEE
MINUTES

Japan Pla
JPWC

August 26, 1942

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN PACIFIC SOUTHWEST THEATER.

COLONEL DONOVAN referred to the message received from GENERAL MacARTHUR pertaining to psychological warfare activities which are presently being conducted in the Pacific Southwest Theater, and the future activities being considered for that theater. He suggested that it might be preferable for the Committee to postpone consideration of such future activities until the Basic Estimate for Psychological Warfare has been submitted to and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In the meantime the Committee can make progress by discussing the memorandum submitted by the O.S.S. which analyzed GENERAL MacARTHUR'S reply.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:-

Agreed,

a. To postpone action on GENERAL MacARTHUR'S message pertaining to psychological warfare until the Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved the proposed Basic Estimate for Psychological Warfare.

b. To discuss at the meeting on Friday, August 28 the O.S.S. memorandum concerning GENERAL MacARTHUR'S message.

Memorandum to PJWC Sub-Committe on Message from General MacArthur

SECRET

Psychological warfare is a special form of strategy based upon the coordinated use of propaganda, subversive operations and other means.

It is perfectly possible for propaganda by radio from transmitters in the United States to give direct support to the operations of theater commanders in the Southwest Pacific; propaganda pamphlets or other propaganda media utilized locally if they are to be effective need to be related in some way to the general propaganda line if they are to be carried to the area.

Propaganda should be used whenever possible to give direct aid to military operations against specific targets.

Psychological Warfare or strategic services will be most vigorously or effectively conducted in the various theater commands when properly qualified officers familiar with either or both of the main aspects of psychological warfare--propaganda and subversive operations--are attached to theater commanders, either to direct local psychological warfare activities under the authority of the theater commander, or to serve as advisors in regard to problems involving the coordination of local and general psychological warfare operations and to supply psychological warfare agencies in the United States with special intelligence and guidance.

Some people feel that some types of subversive operations incident to military operations must be kept separate from other psychological warfare operations for reasons of security. On the contrary, subversive operations constitutes a branch of psychological warfare comparable in every way to the Propaganda Branch.

Psychological Warfare can contribute to the general harrassment of the enemy and support specific military objectives. Furthermore, you must not divorce Psychological Warfare from political operations.

They should adhere to the following rules:

a. Subversive operations must be closely coordinated with propaganda and economic warfare, as well as with military operations.

b. Subversive operations must be conducted on a large

SECRET

scale over a period of time and against the main seats of enemy political and economic power, as well as immediately behind his lines.

c. Must be supported by various forms of secret activity such as foreign political groups in the United States.

d. Subversive operations must be under the theater commander, but to be effective they may involve other theaters.

e. Because it requires skillful manipulation, it must be conducted in accordance with overall plans.

The coordinated use of propaganda and subversive operations integrated with general strategy and national policy is shown by experience to be the soundest and most fruitful one; that it is no wise contrary to American military or political tradition; and that if properly applied on a large scale it offers possibilities of contributing greatly to the success of military operations at an insignificant cost.

JPWC Subcommittee October 27, 1942

Excerpts

BASIC ESTIMATE FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
AGAINST JAPAN IN THE FAR EAST

CAPTAIN CROSSKOPF read the summary attached to this proposal and suggested that because it is an area plan it be integrated with the overall strategic psychological warfare plan. He explained that he had again requested O.W.I. to refer its propaganda plan for this area to this Committee but that Colonel Solbert still believed that his plan should be sent first to the Joint Security Control. COMMANDER MORAN referred to the previous plan for psychological warfare against Japan which had been drawn up by the Military Intelligence Service and suggested that this plan should not be ignored since it did not overlap with the O.S.S. plan as much as appears to be apparent.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE

(A) Agreed to lay on the table this Basic Estimate for Psychological Warfare against Japan in the Far East;

(b) Requested that the O.S.S. incorporate necessary material from it in the overall strategic plan for psychological warfare.

JPAC Subcommittee October 21, 1942

Excerpts

JAPAN PROPAGANDA PLAN

It was reported that the Office of War Information will not submit its plan in the immediate future, as previously understood, for the reason stated by Colonel Seibert that a global propaganda plan is now being prepared for the Joint Security Control, which will include a plan for the Far East. Since, however, the first area plan will be for Europe, it is not likely that the Japan Propaganda Plan will be ready in the near future.

S E C R E T

ANNEX A

STRATEGIC PLAN FOR DEFEAT OF JAPAN

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

I. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BASIS FOR SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM.

A. FORMULATION OF THE MISSION.

1. Summary of the situation.

2. Recognition of the incentive.

3. Appreciation of the designed objective.

4. Mission.

B. FEASIBILITY AND ACCEPTABILITY AS TO RELATIVE FIGHTING STRENGTH.

1. Survey of the means available and opposed.

(a) General factors.

(1) Political factors.

(2) Economic factors.

(3) Psychological factors.

(4) Information and counter information.

(b) Factors directly applicable to the armed forces.

(1) Ground forces.

a. Japan and her Allies in Japanese theater.

1. Strength.

2. Personnel.

(i) Basic doctrines.

(ii) Morale.

(iii) Stamina.

3. Materiel.

(i) Existing Materiel.

(ii) Productive capacity for implements of war.

(iii) Comparative effectiveness.

b. Own.

(Same as above)

(2) Naval forces.

a. Japan.

1. Strength.

2. Personnel.

(i) Basic doctrines.

(ii) Morale.

(iii) Stamina.

3. Materiel.

(i) Existing materiel.

(ii) Production capacity for implements of war.

(iii) Comparative effectiveness.

b. Own.

(Same as above)

(3) Air forces.

a. Japan.

1. Strength.

2. Personnel.

(i) Basic doctrines.

(ii) Morale.

(iii) Stamina.

3. Materiel.

(i) Existing materiel.

(ii) Production capacity for implements of war.

(iii) Comparative effectiveness.

b. Own.

(Same as above)

(4) Shipping and overseas transport facilities.

a. Enemy.

1. Cargo.

2. Transports (passenger).

b. Own.

(Same as above)

2. Survey of the Characteristics of the theater of operations.

(a) Geography and Topography.

(b) Hydrography.

(c) Weather.

(d) Health factors.

(e) Distance tables - sea and air.

(f) Communications.

(1) Roads.

(2) Railroads.

(3) Air bases and air routes.

(4) Radio, cable, etc.

(g) Vital areas.

(h) Ports and port facilities (including repair facilities).

(i) Anchorages and naval base sites.

(j) Basic economy, supplies available locally.

(k) People (psychology, racial and religious factors, extent to which aid may be expected, etc.).

3. Conclusions as to relative fighting strength.

(a) Strength factors.

(1) Japan.

(2) Own.

(b) Weakness factors.

(1) Japan.

(2) Own.

II. DETERMINATION OF SUITABLE, FEASIBLE, AND ACCEPTABLE COURSES OF ACTION.

A. Analysis of the assigned objective.

B. Survey of courses of action.

C. Application of tests for suitability, feasibility, and acceptability.

D. Listing retained courses of action.

III. EXAMINATION INTO THE CAPABILITIES OF THE ENEMY.

A. Survey of the enemy's problem.

1. Summary of the enemy's situation.

2. Analysis of the effect desired by the enemy.

B. Survey of enemy capabilities.

C. Application of tests for suitability, feasibility, and acceptability.

D. Listing retained enemy courses of action.

IV. SELECTION OF THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION.

A. Analysis and comparison of retained courses of action.

B. Determination of the best course of action.

V. THE DECISION.

VI. THE DECISION RESOLVED INTO MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO MEASURES THAT SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN.

SECRET

August 13, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO JPWC SUB-COMMITTEE ON MESSAGE FROM GENERAL MACARTHUR.

(The purpose of this memorandum is to analyze those parts of General MacArthur's message which may reflect attitudes which are general among theatre commanders and which bear, therefore, on relations between the JPWC and theatre commanders.)

1. General MacArthur apparently uses the term psychological (or political) warfare as synonymous with propaganda, whereas in the view of the JPWC, psychological warfare is rather a special form of strategy based upon the coordinated use of propaganda, subversive operations and other means.

2. Referring to a particular plan of psychological warfare, General MacArthur considers that this plan should be coordinated and guided in Washington or London because it involves the social and political policies of the several Allied civil authorities and raises questions relative to post-war settlements. This corresponds to the view of the Committee that psychological warfare, because it involves agencies and forces which are not wholly under the control of theatre commanders, should be centrally planned and coordinated in some degree.

3. Taken in conjunction with the statement in his message that "his headquarters should cooperate with Australian section on political or psychological warfare only to the extent of maintaining liaison, etc.", General MacArthur's view that psychological warfare in his theatre should be coordinated in London or Washington might carry the further implication that it is

not of direct concern to himself. The JPWC, however, considers that any kind of psychological warfare operations likely to produce effects in a territory which is included in a given theatre of command is necessarily a direct concern of the theatre commander. There are several strong reasons for taking this view:

a. Psychological warfare operations conducted from a distant base without the knowledge of the theatre commander responsible for the territories affected by them might, on occasion, compromise military plans of the theatre commander by drawing the attention of the enemy to regions or subjects from which the theatre commander was trying to distract their attention. For example, Mr. Churchill in his speech to the British House of Commons after the occupation of Madagascar, revealed that military authorities had been seriously worried lest the speculations and editorial comments of the British press on the subject of Madagascar arouse the suspicion of the French while the expedition was being prepared. This case is the more remarkable in that the press campaign Mr. Churchill alluded to was not a manifestation of British psychological warfare but was purely spontaneous.

b. Since the space factor has very little bearing on shortwave broadcasting - one of the most important types of propaganda operation today - it is perfectly possible for propaganda by radio from transmitters in the United States to

c. So that theatre commanders will not undertake locally any psychological warfare operations which might jeopardy or impair a general propaganda campaign.

5. General MacArthur feels that it would be inexpedient to send to his theatre personnel for direct participation in psychological warfare. The Committee recognises that there may be special factors in the Australian situation of which it is not aware and that in any case, General MacArthur, as theatre commander, is sole judge of what personnel it is or is not expedient to send there. As a general rule, however, the Committee feels that psychological warfare will be most vigorously and effectively conducted in the various theatre commands when properly qualified officers familiar with either or both of the main aspects of psychological warfare - propaganda and subversive operations - are attached to theatre commanders, either to direct local psychological warfare activities under the authority of the theatre commander, or to serve as advisers in regard to problems involving the coordination of local and general psychological warfare operations and to supply psychological warfare agencies in the United States with special intelligence and guidance.

6. General MacArthur feels that such types of subversive operations as espionage, sabotage and guerrilla activities incident to military operations must be kept separate from all psychological warfare operations for reasons of security

and effectiveness. He states further that the Allied Intelligence Bureau at his headquarters which handles subversive and guerrilla operations incident to military plans has been instructed to avoid "entanglement with political operations". In the view of the Committee, Subversive Operations constitutes a branch of psychological warfare comparable in every way to the Propaganda Branch. Like propaganda, subversive operations can both contribute to the general harrassment and attrition of the enemy and support specific military objectives. Further, the Committee considers that effective subversive operations can no more be divorced from social and political considerations than propaganda. In general, the JPWC feels that subversive operations can be a most important adjunct to military operations when used in accordance with the following rules:

a. Subversive operations must be conducted on a very large scale over considerable periods of time and against the main seats of enemy political and economic power, as well as immediately behind his lines.

b. Subversive operations must be closely coordinated with propaganda and economic warfare, as well as with military operations.

c. All types of subversive operations in a given area should be supported whenever possible by various forms of secret activity outside that area. For example, the manipulation

of foreign political groups in the United States is an almost indispensable adjunct to certain subversive operations in the field.

d. Subversive operations in a given area must be under the control of the theatre commander responsible for that area but an effective SO campaign may involve several theatres and, like propaganda, such SO campaigns should be planned and supervised by a central agency specializing in this work.

e. Because effective SO work requires skillful manipulation and exploitation of social and political forces within the target country, all subversive operations should be conducted in accordance with overall plans coordinated at headquarters with national strategy and policy. The classic example of the harm which can be done by uncoordinated subversive operations conducted solely from the viewpoint of local and immediate objectives is furnished by Lawrence of Arabia. From the point of view of immediate military objectives no operation in the history of psychological warfare was more successful, but because Lawrence in order to obtain these immediate objectives was allowed to make promises to the Arabs which the British Government was not prepared to honor, the British position in the Middle East today is in greater danger than it was a generation ago.

7. The Committee feels that its concept of psychological

warfare based upon the coordinated use of propaganda and subversive operations integrated with general strategy and national policy is shown by British and German experience to be the soundest and most fruitful one; that it is no wise contrary to American military or political tradition; and that if properly applied on a large scale it offers possibilities of contributing greatly to the success of military operations at an insignificant cost.

EXCERPTS FROM
JPWC SUBCOMMITTEE
MEETING

August 18, 1942

JAPAN PLAN

COLONEL DONOVAN stated that this Subcommittee has under consideration the plan for propaganda into JAPAN which had been approved by the J.P.W.C. on June 15, and had been sent to the Joint Staff Planners and held there pending reorganization of the Senior Committee. The plan was later returned to this Committee for reconsideration. COLONEL DONOVAN pointed out that two other plans pertaining to psychological warfare against JAPAN had been under discussion from time to time. It was apparent from messages received from GENERAL MacARTHUR that he has been operating on the basis of one of these plans, probably the one which the Coordinator of Information and the British Political Warfare Executive agreed upon last Spring.

COLONEL SOLBERT said that it was his understanding that the Japan Plan prepared by the M.I.S. and approved by the J.P.W.C. on June 15 had been withdrawn and that it is the intention of the Office of War Information to have its Planning Board evolve a new plan, in conjunction with the State Department and the P.W.E., which would later be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their approval. Following discussion of whether the M.I.S. plan had actually been withdrawn COLONEL SOLBERT requested the Committee to take action to withdraw it.

The HON. MR. BOWES-LYON presented the British point of view in urging that the plan should be a joint Anglo-American one in order that both objectives and operations will be properly coordinated in the Far Eastern theaters. He stated that the plan originated by the C.O.I. last spring to which he had generally agreed about May 6, 1942 had been presented to the British Joint Chiefs of Staff and had been approved by them. However when a copy of the plan being considered at that time by the J.P.W.C. had been received, further consideration by the British of the earlier plan was stopped. As there had been some measure of agreement on the earlier C.O.I. plan the British are now acting on it, and it has also been circulated to the Bovernments of India, Australia and to British authorities at Chungking.

He further stated that the first plan, although only an "Outline Plan" and very general in nature,

covered the whole Far East and had included consideration of both propaganda and subversive activities. The British Chiefs of Staff were disappointed in the second plan in that it was not a joint Anglo-American plan and also on a number of other points.

COLONEL SOLBERT, in answer to the last remark, pointed out that the M.I.S. plan would have become Anglo-American had it followed its normal course of approval by Joint Chiefs of Staff and subsequent submittal to the British for consideration and final approval through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He also stated that this plan was confined to JAPAN instead of covering the Far East because it was considered that psychological warfare in the occupied areas was under direction of the theater Commanders.

The Committee discussed the desirability of formulating a broad basic, "Master" plan as the first step, with plans for individual countries or areas which fitted into the master plan, to follow.

COLONEL BLAKENEY suggested that time would be saved by considering the broad plan which had already been accepted by the C.O.I. and the British. COLONEL DONOVAN presumed that the O.W.I would undoubtedly start in that manner.

MR. McDERMOTT stated that the State Department would be glad to cooperate but that he felt that it must participate from the very roots if it is to take any part at all.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:-

a. Took note,
   (1) That COLONEL SOLBERT, for the O.W.I., requested that the Japan Plan now before the J.P.W.C. be withdrawn.

   (2) That the O.W.I. intends to draft a new plan, in conjunction with the State Department and representatives of the British P.W.E., which will be laid before the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval.

b. Requested the O.W.I. to consider drafting its plan on a broad basis to include the whole Far East, to be followed by more detailed individual plans for various countries or occupied areas.

SECRET

VERBATIM REPORT

Meeting of the Subcommittee of
Joint Psychological Warfare Committee
Held in Room 214, Combined Chiefs of Staff Building,
on Tuesday, August 18, 1942, at 1100.

PRESENT

Hon. W. J. Donovan

Captain H.L. Grossknpf, USN Lt. Col. C. C. Blakeney, USA

Mr. Edmond Taylor

ALSO PRESENT

Hon. David Bowes-Lyon, P.W.E. Mr. M. J. McDermott, State Department.

Col. O. H. Solbert, O.W.I. Mr. L. E. Salisbury, State Department.

Mr. Walter Adams, P.W.E.

Mr. E. A. Hourer, O.W.I.

SECRETARY

Lt. Col. A. H. Onthank

Reporter: Sgt. Foster.

COL. DONOVAN: Gentlemen, there is up for consideration a plan proposed by Col. Solbert called the "Japan Plan," and in considering that another plan had been prepared, and then we understood that Mr. Bowes-Lyon and Mr. Sherwood have been discussing another plan. So we thought it might be well to sit together here and before this Committee made any recommendations to find out just what the exact situation was. It is particularly important because we have received a cable from Gen. MacArthur relative to a plan for that area which had come out to them from the British, and which we think -- although we do not know -- was a joint product of the Americans and the British some months ago.

Is that correct, Mr. Bowes-Lyon?

MR. BOWES-LYON: Yes.

COL. DONOVAN: But there is no certainty about that. We thought at first it was a plan that had been prepared and which I took up with Gen. Marshall and Adm. King back in January, a digest of which they made and sent over to the British. Mr. Bowes-Lyon thinks that is not the fact, that that is not the plan which was sent out to MacArthur. Is that correct?

MR. BOWES-LYON: I think there is only one plan that has gone out there, and that was the subsequent one.

COL. DONOVAN: Colonel, you have already taken up the plan that you prepared back in June before it arose in this Committee prior to your leaving the Committee. Is that right?

COL. SOLBERT: It was held back because of the new committee and because of the new executive order of the O.W.I. As far as we are concerned, that was withdrawn, and will probably come back through the Planners and O.W.I. when

they have met. They have not met as yet.

COL. DONOVAN: Let us get that straight. This plan was prepared when you were a member of the Committee here, and prepared by you.

COL. SOLBERT: Yes, Joint Psychological Warfare Committee.

COL. DONOVAN: Before you left it was discussed in the Committee.

COL. SOLBERT: Yes, discussed, but it was withdrawn.

COL. DONOVAN: When was it withdrawn?

COL. SOLBERT: Onthank can probably tell you that better than I can.

COL. DONOVAN: I didn't know that.

COL. ONTHANK: It went up to the Joint Staff Planners and was withheld. I don't know, Colonel, to be accurate, that it was withdrawn, but it was certainly put in mothballs.

COL. SOLBERT: This didn't go up to them?

COL. DONOVAN: The old one went up and it was held pending the resolution of the Committee.

COL. SOLBERT: Was it passed up to the Planners?

COL. ONTHANK: Yes.

COL. SOLBERT: They themselves held it up pending the new situation with the O.W.I. coming in.

COL. DONOVAN: They sent it back here, and since the O.W.I. was constituted, because I sat with you at the table, there was a reconsideration of your proposal.

COL. SOLBERT: Yes. The feeling was that any new plan of that kind would come from the O.W.I. and be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

COL. DONOVAN: That isn't my recollection. Let us know what we are acting on. Your proposal was discussed here; this Committee had it under consideration. It still has it

under consideration. I don't know of it being withdrawn. I have no objection to it being withdrawn. I just want to have the fact established.

COL. SOLBERT: The Joint Planners held it up because of the O.W.I.

COL. DONOVAN: No. The Joint Planners held it up. The Joint Planners referred it back to this Committee. Since it was referred back to this Committee, you with us have been considering it.

COL. SOLBERT: Yes.

COL. DONOVAN: It hasn't been sent out of this Subcommittee.

COL. SOLBERT: I talked to some of the Joint Planners and I think that is the reason why. They said they held it up.

COL. DONOVAN: That event has passed.

COL. SOLBERT: Yes. Any basic plan now would come, even as suggested by one of your own members, from the O.W.I.

COL. DONOVAN: That is not what I am talking about. Let us get the procedure straight. Your plan is now before this Committee. That is why we asked to meet here. Do you withdraw that plan?

COL. SOLBERT: I think it should be withdrawn and resubmitted again from a new source, from the O.W.I.

COL. DONOVAN: Do I understand now that you are asking that this plan be withdrawn?

COL. SOLBERT: Yes, and passed through the Planners. It may not be changed at all, but I think it should come that way.

COL. DONOVAN: Pass through what Planners?

COL. SOLBERT: The O.W.I.

COL. DONOVAN: You mean your planners?

COL. SOLBERT: Yes, sorry.

COL. DONOVAN: Do I understand, then, that you and the British are to take that up together and submit something here?

COL. SOLBERT: We will submit something very soon.

COL. DONOVAN: Is that quite correct?

MR. BOWES-LYON: Yes, that is right; that is acceptable.

COL. DONOVAN: Have you discussed this? Do you know anything about it?

MR. McDERMOTT: Not at all.

COL. DONOVAN: The State Department sat in on the formation of it.

MR. McDERMOTT: Yes; we are trying to follow it around, going around the table here.

COL. DONOVAN: That is what I understand. As to your question there, this so-called "Japan Plan" prepared by Colonel Solbert was before this Committee, having been sent back by the Planners for reconsideration with a view to the new setup. Now, Col. Solbert wishes that withdrawn for the purpose of reconsidering it with his planners and with the British.

Is that a correct statement of the fact?

COL. SOLBERT: That is right.

COL. DONOVAN: Is there anything, Mr. Taylor? You have been working on that plan. The only thing we can do now, I can see, is whether you get it shaped up, and we can sit down with you on it. Are there any suggestions anyone has to make that might be considered?

MR. BOWES-LYON: I think, Colonel Donovan, generally the view of London is that a plan of psychological warfare to the Far East generally, if it is possible, should be

an Anglo-American one, for obvious reasons, distances, and the fact that it is a form of warfare waged continuously twenty-four hours a day. If we don't get some fairly close measure of agreement, we shall be spoiling each other's efforts all the time, not only strategically. It is for that reason that when I came out I sat down with what was then the Information Service of C.O.I. On the basis of the plan which London had gotten out and two plans which had been gotten out here, one of which was the one you spoke about, and a further one, we did get out an outline plan which was agreed -- at least some measure of agreement on this side -- between yourselves and ourselves. I took that plan back to London and that plan was received, I think, with modifications of three or four words, the approval of the Foreign Office and our Chiefs of Staff.

Then this further plan emerged, Col. Holbert's plan, which prevented anything further coming from this side on the plan which I had agreed upon here, but as there had been some measure of agreement, so far as we had gotten, that there had been no opposition to it here, we proceeded to take that plan and act on it; and we are to this day acting on that joint plan. We circulated it to the Governments of England and of Australia. I think it also has gotten to Chungking. I think probably the way in which it has gotten into the hands of General MacArthur, through the Australian Government. That, I think, is more or less the history of that.

We are more or less agreeable to get out a document which shows a measure of agreement on both sides, because otherwise we shall be crossing each other's paths all the time.

COL. DONOVAN: I take it, too, that it would be important to get this out quickly, because in the meantime MacArthur may have been starting something on that plan

work to try to get a joint plan, we would have to readjust it a good deal.

COL. SOLBERT: It was submitted through the Joint Planners to the British Chiefs of Staff and then to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Then it would have to change through to you. We put up our side, and then you would have to put up your side and get together. We took it entirely from our point of view. It was just propaganda, all psychological warfare. It didn't take in the occupied territory for the simple reason that that was a function of the theater commander. We couldn't do it alone; we had to get together with General MacArthur and possibly General Wavell and General Stilwell. So we took this part of it with an idea, possibly, that there would be another plan which would be worked out with the commanding officers in those theaters.

MR. BOWES-LYON: There was one other point, if I may raise it. It depends on what we decided. When we discussed this in May we agreed that it was best to have an all-out general plan for the whole of that area of the Far East, and subsequently break it down into more defined areas, let us say, Thailand, Malaya, China, as subsidiary plans in more detail, which in turn would come up for submission here. It can be taken the other way, taking the countries and bringing it up to a master plan finally, but we rather favored at that time having a master plan than go into too great a detail at first.

COL. DONOVAN: Have you any other suggestions to make?

MR. BOWES-LYON: I don't think so; no.

COL. DONOVAN: Mr. Adams, would you like to say anything?

MR. ADAMS: I have nothing to comment on.

COL. DONOVAN: Colonel, is there anything you want to suggest to anyone?

COL. SOLBERT: No, just as I have said. It was a propaganda plan for Japan alone, and we didn't take up the occupied territory for the reason that that is a function of the command of General MacArthur and we would have to get in touch with him and work and cooperate with him in any way he wanted.

MR. SALISBURY: May I ask with regard to propaganda in the occupied areas of China, would that require a joint planning with the Chinese authority?

COL. SOLBERT: Yes, indeed.

COL. DONOVAN: Col. Onthank has suggested to me that piecemeal attack is not acceptable to the Staff Planners, through which body the recommendations of the senior Committee of this Committee will go on their way to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. So it would probably be better to work out the general plan for that area.

Mr. Mowrer, do you have anything?

COL. ONTHANK: That has been our experience. Any time we send up a part of a program unrelated to other parts, and without a broad basis having been established first, we get slapped down by the Joint Staff Planners.

COL. DONOVAN: You mean they want to see how the particular thing fits in to the general situation?

COL. ONTHANK: Yes.

COL. SOLBERT: The particular thing, for instance, in England today you have a strategic plan from the Joint Chiefs of Staff here which is rather general, but the particular details of the military operations are under Eisenhower, and psychological warfare as far as propaganda from there and physical activities from there was under his jurisdiction and command, and very much so.

COL. DONOVAN: It is one thing to have it under his command, but the planning in any way, and particularly in a

global war, must be integrated with the other.

COL. SOLBERT: You have to have a general planning.

COL. DONOVAN: Well, that is all the Colonel says.

COL. SOLBERT: We have been slapped down on something in here that had to do with Eisenhower. He simply said, "That planning is mine when it comes to the psychological warfare in the theater of operations." That has been backed up by Gen. Marshall.

COL. DONOVAN: Certainly the theater commander has got to be considered if it doesn't suit the particular problem he has. That doesn't mean it should not be prepared by the general joint staff.

COL. SOLBERT: Any strategic plan should have a general strategic psychological warfare plan as well.

COL. DONOVAN: That is all you had in mind, wasn't it, Colonel?

COL. OSTHANE: Yes.

Mr. Bowes-Lyon"s idea of a general broad plan first into which the individual parts are fitted was it.

COL. DONOVAN: That was the original plan which went in, which I discussed with Gen. Marshall and Adm. King. It was just exactly that.

Mr. McDermott, do you have anything?

MR. McDERMOTT: I feel completely at sea. There have been so many plans I am not familiar with. I think we will have to try to find out which one is the current one.

COL. DONOVAN: Of course, that is the purpose here. All that is to be rubbed out, and we are to start with one plan that will then come up so we don't need to talk about any other Japan plans excepting one that is to be submitted.

MR. McDERMOTT: I take it we are going to start on a new foot with a master plan and fit in all the parts to complete the puzzle?

COL. DONOVAN: That is right.

MR. McDERMOTT: That is all right.

COL. DONOVAN: Mr. Salisbury?

MR. SALISBURY: I have nothing.

COL. DONOVAN: Perhaps you have some suggestions to make as to what should go into the plan now on a general principle?

MR. SALISBURY: No, I have nothing now.

COL. DONOVAN: Colonel, would you like to say something?

COL. BLAKENEY: If we are going to get anywhere, I would suggest the place to start is the one that has already reached some agreement, the one that Mr. Bowes-Lyon's group has accepted and has been accepted by the C.O.I. We might accept that. I believe that is a general plan. Why not take that, look it over, and see what can be done about it?

COL. DONOVAN: I assume they will do that when they sit down and look at all these plans and see what would fit in. That is what I take it would be the practical way of doing that. Of course, there have been some changes, too, in the general situation since then.

MR. BOWES-LYON: Four months have elapsed. I take it that O.W.I. would in the first instance look over these plans and produce a new plan, forgetting all the old ones, which will be submitted to this Committee as soon as possible?

COL. DONOVAN: That is right.

I think it would be very desirable, if it could be done, that in the process the State Department be advised, so when we come here we would know in what particulars they agreed or disagreed.

MR. McDERMOTT: That is quite right. If the State Department is participating at all, it must participate from the very roots all the way up.

COL. DONOVAN: Gentlemen, thank you very much. If we can get that quickly, we will try to do our part in it.

EXCERPT FROM
JPWC SUBCOMMITTEE
MINUTES

August 14, 1942

JAPAN PLAN

CAPTAIN GROSSKOPF reported that he had suggested to O.W.I. at a meeting of the Policy Committee yesterday that an O.W.I. representative attend the meeting of the Subcommittee on Tuesday, August 18, for consideration of the revised Japan Plan. O.W.I. had requested that the invitation be extended officially by the Chairman of this Committee, and had also suggested that a representative of the State Department be present at that meeting. COLONEL DONOVAN agreed to extend an invitation to the O.W.I. representative and requested the Secretary to act accordingly by the State Department.

COLONEL DONOVAN submitted a memorandum which analyzed the message from GENERAL MACARTHUR relative to psychological warfare activities in the Pacific Southwest. After discussion it was decided that it would be undesirable to lay any part of this plan or information regarding it before the Senior Committee at the meeting on Monday, August 17 or until agreement had been reached with the O.W.I., State Department and British Representatives of the Political Warfare Executive.

It was considered to be important that the facts be established as to what psychological warfare plan pertaining to Japan is now in use by GENERAL MACARTHUR, in accordance with the reference in his message of August 5th, as well as when he had begun to work under that plan and whether it was sent to him as a directive. The Subcommittee took note that LT. COLONEL BLAKENEY and the Secretary will ascertain whatever facts are available regarding the plan under which GENERAL MACARTHUR is operating, in order that a discussion of a plan for JAPAN at the Subcommittee's meeting on Tuesday, August 18 may be on a factual basis.

SECRET

August 13, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO JPWC SUB-COMMITTEE ON MESSAGE FROM GENERAL MacARTHUR.

(The purpose of this memorandum is to analyze those parts of General MacArthur's message which may reflect attitudes which are general among theatre commanders and which bear, therefore, on relations between the JPWC and theatre commanders.)

1. General MacArthur apparently uses the term psychological (or political) warfare as synonymous with propagarda, whereas in the view of the JPWC, psychological warfare is rather a special form of strategy based upon the coordinated use of propaganda, subversive operations and other means.

2. Referring to a particular plan of psychological warfare, General MacArthur considers that this plan should be coordinated and planned in Washington or London because it involves the social and political policies of the several Allied civil authorities and raises questions relative to post-war settlements. This corresponds to the view of the Committee that psychological warfare, because it involves agencies and forces which are not wholly under the control of theatre commanders, should be centrally planned and coordinated in some degree.

3. [illegible] in conjunction with the statement in his message that [illegible] should cooperate with Australian section on [illegible] psychological warfare only to the extent of maintaining liaison, etc.", General MacArthur's view that psychological [illegible] in [illegible] theatre should be coordinated in London [illegible] carry the further implication that it is

not of direct concern to himself. The JPWC, however, considers that any kind of psychological warfare operations likely to produce effects in a territory which is included in a given theatre of command is necessarily a direct concern of the theatre commander. There are several strong reasons for taking this view:

a. Psychological warfare operations conducted from a [illegible] base without the knowledge of the theatre commander [illegible] territories affected by them might, on [illegible], compromise military plans of the theatre commander [illegible] the attention of the enemy to regions or subjects [illegible] theatre commander was trying to distract their attention. For example, Mr. Churchill in his speech to the British House of Commons after the occupation of Madagascar, [illegible] military authorities had been seriously worried [illegible] comments of the British [illegible] arouse the suspicion of [illegible] was being prepared. This [illegible] in that the press campaign Mr. [illegible] manifestation of British [illegible] but was purely spontaneous.

[illegible] space factor has very little bearing on [illegible] - one of the most important types of [illegible] today - it is perfectly possible for [illegible] from transmitters in the United States to

[illegible] direct support to the operations of theatre commanders [illegible] the Southwest Pacific, or any other theatre. Conversely, [illegible] other propaganda media utilized locally if they are to be effective need to be related in some way to the [illegible] propaganda line carried to the area in which they are be[illegible] by shortwave radio beams from America.

[illegible]. [illegible] the foregoing and other reasons, the JPWC [illegible] while propaganda may pursue an independent [illegible] of its own, undermining the enemy by psychological [illegible], it can also be used - and should be so used when- [illegible] possible - to give direct aid to military operations [illegible] specific targets.

[illegible]. It is, [illegible], the view of the JPWC that general prop- [illegible], [illegible] when operations projected under them are to be [illegible] from the United States, should be submitted to [illegible] whenever they affect a territory for which [illegible] responsible, for the following [illegible]

[illegible] theatre commanders can request the elimina- [illegible] in such plans that may be deemed harmful from [illegible] of view of local operations.

[illegible] theatre commanders may be informed of the [illegible] which may be counted upon for any local [illegible] under their control.

[illegible] that theatre commanders will not undertake [illegible] any psychological warfare operations which might im- [illegible] a general propaganda campaign.

[illegible] feels that it would be inexpedient to [illegible] personnel for direct participation in [illegible] warfare. The Committee recognises that there [illegible] in the Australian situation of which it [illegible] in any case, General MacArthur, as [illegible] judge of what personnel it is or [illegible] there. As a general rule, however, [illegible] that psychological warfare will be most [illegible] effectively conducted in the various theatre [illegible], and ied officers familiar with [illegible] in aspects of psychological warfare - [illegible] subversive operations - are attached to theatre [illegible] most local psychological warfare ne- [illegible] to rity of the theatre commander, [illegible] regard to problems involving the [illegible] general psychological warfare oper- [illegible] psychological warfare organisation in the [illegible] intelligence and guidance.

[illegible] feel that such types of subversive [illegible] sabotage and guerrilla activities [illegible] must be kept separate from [illegible] operations for reasons of security

[illegible] effectiveness. He states further that the Allied Intelli-[illegible] Fields at his headquarters which handles subversive and guerrilla operations incident to military plans has been instructed to avoid "entanglement with political operations". In the view of the Committee, Subversive Operations constitutes a [illegible] of psychological warfare comparable in every way to the Propaganda Branch. Like propaganda, subversive operations [illegible] contribute to the general harrassment and attrition of the enemy and support specific military objectives. Further, the Committee considers that effective subversive operations [illegible] be divorced from social and political considerations [illegible] propaganda. In general, the J.WC feels that subversive [illegible] can be a most important adjunct to military operations when used in accordance with the following rules:

a. Subversive operations must be conducted on a very [illegible] scale over considerable periods of time and against the [illegible] of enemy political and economic power, as well [illegible] behind his lines.

b. Subversive operations must be closely coordinated [illegible] propaganda and economic warfare, as well as with military [illegible].

c. All types of subversive operations in a given area [illegible] whenever possible by various forms of [illegible] within that area. For example, the mass population

[illegible] foreign politics [illegible]

[illegible] consable adjunct [illegible]

[illegible]

d. Subversive operations [illegible]

[illegible] of the theatre commander [illegible]

[illegible] an effective SO campaign may [illegible]

[illegible] than propaganda, such SO campaigns [illegible]

[illegible] by a central agency specializing [illegible]

e. [illegible] effective SO work requires [illegible]

[illegible] exploitation of social and political [illegible]

[illegible] target country, all subversive operations [illegible]

[illegible] in accordance with overall plans coordinated at [illegible]

[illegible] with national strategy and policy. The classic [illegible] of the harm which can be done by uncoordinated sub[illegible] operations conducted solely from the viewpoint of [illegible] immediate objectives is furnished by Lawrence of [illegible]. From the point of view of immediate military objectives the operation in the history of psychological warfare [illegible] successful, but because Lawrence in order to obtain [illegible] immediate objectives was allowed to make promises to [illegible] which the British Government was not prepared to [illegible], the British position in the Middle East today is in [illegible] worse than it was a generation ago.

[illegible] committee feels that its concept of psychological

[illegible] political groups in the United States is an almost [illegible] assignment to certain subversive operations in the field.

[illegible]. Subversive operations in a given area must be under the control of the theatre commander responsible for that area. [illegible] effective SO campaign may involve several theatres and, like [illegible], such SO campaigns should be planned and [illegible] specializing in this work.

[illegible]. Since effective SO work requires skillful manipulation and exploitation of social and political forces [illegible] the target country, all subversive operations should be conducted in accordance with overall plans coordinated at headquarters with national strategy and policy. The classic example of the harm which can be done by uncoordinated subversive operations conducted solely from the viewpoint of local and immediate objectives is furnished by Lawrence of Arabia. From the point of view of immediate military objectives [illegible] in the history of psychological warfare [illegible], but because Lawrence in order to obtain [illegible] was allowed to make promises to [illegible] which our government was not prepared to [illegible] in the Middle East today is in [illegible] generation ago.

[illegible] concept of psychological

warfare based upon the coordinated use of propaganda and subversive operations integrated with general strategy and national policy is shown by British and German experience to be the [illegible] and most fruitful one; that it is no wise contrary to [illegible] or political tradition and that if properly [illegible] on a large scale it offers possibilities of contributing [illegible] to the success of military operations at an insignificant [illegible].

SECRET

August 13, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR JPWC SUB-COMMITTEE

1. The proposed psychological warfare plan against Japan which is before the Sub-Committee, includes in one of the annexes attached to it a list of general propaganda objectives prepared by Colonel Solbert and condensed from the plan for propaganda to Japan which he had previously submitted. The draft presented by the OSS does not yet include recommendations for the implementation of the plan but it was taken into account that if the propaganda objectives in Colonel Solbert's annex are approved, the JPWC might wish to recommend to the OWI as guidance for its propaganda to Japan the complete plan prepared by Colonel Solbert from which the objectives are taken.

2. Colonel Solbert's Japan Plan, referred to in the foregoing paragraph, is a synthesis of several earlier Plans: the original Japan Plan prepared by the Psychological Warfare Branch MIS, a Plan intended as guidance for its own operations prepared by the Foreign Information Service of the Coordinator of Information last winter, and a Joint Anglo American Outline Plan agreed upon between the representatives of the British Political Warfare Executive, the Honorable David Bowes-Lyon and Mr. Ritchie Calder, and the Director of the Foreign Information Branch of the Coordinator of Information, Mr. Robert Sherwood.

3. The Joint Anglo-American Plan was drawn up during Mr. Bowes-Lyon's earlier visit to this country last Spring and was apparently intended to supersede the Plan prepared for itself by the Foreign Information Branch of the Co-ordinator of Information. The Joint Plan was approved by Mr. Sherwood and Colonel Donoven, then head of the Coordinator of Information, and it was agreed with the British representatives that this Joint Plan would be submitted by them for approval to the British Foreign Office and Joint Chiefs of Staff, and by Mr. Sherwood that it would be submitted for approval by the Coordinator of Information to the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff here.

4. Before the Joint Plan could be submitted to the State Department and Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colonel Solbert invited representatives of the Foreign Information Branch of the Coordinator of Information, and of other Government agencies, to confer with him for the purpose of drawing up a psychological warfare plan for Japan upon which all interested branches of the Government could agree. It was suggested by Colonel Solbert and apparently accepted by the representatives of the Coordinator of Information - Mr. Sherwood and Mr. Dennis McEvoy - that all of the earlier plans, including the Joint Anglo-American Plan, would be merged together into a new Plan. The COI representatives apparently did not raise the question of coordination with the British on the basis of the previously agreed text

nor the question as to whether the Plan proposed by Colonel Solbert was intended to be binding upon the Foreign Information Branch of the Coordinator of Information and to supersede their earlier plans, including the Joint Plan.

6. No objections were raised by the COI representatives to the final draft of Colonel Solbert's Plan during the meeting at which it was presented, but subsequently reserves were entered against it, and it is not clear today whether the Overseas Branch of the Office of War Information is operating in the Far East on the basis of Colonel Solbert's Plan or upon its own earlier Plan which has never been submitted to any other authority for approval.

7. In the meantime, the British representatives, on returning to London, submitted the Joint Plan as agreed to the proper British authorities and obtained their approval with insignificant modifications. They eventually received the text of the new Plan prepared by Colonel Solbert but apparently felt that it differed substantially both in form and content from the Joint Plan which had been agreed upon, and that from the British point of view it is not acceptable.

8. The British representatives in this country are now asking for a clarification of the somewhat obscure status of

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the various psychological warfare plans against Japan, and a message has been received from General MacArthur referring to a Plan apparently submitted to him by the Australian authorities which is believed to be the Joint Anglo-American Plan referred to in the foregoing paragraphs. General MacArthur reports that this Plan involves difficult political problems involving the relationships of the various Allied Governments and recommends that these problems be settled in Washington or London.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

Date 8/14

From Lt. Col. Onthank

To Col. Donovan

Here's a message that will interest you.

McDermott, Dr. Salisbury (State) Sherwood, Col. Solbert, maybe Monroe will be at the Tues. meeting.

Onthank

SECRET

PARAPHRASE OF MESSAGE FROM GENERAL MacARTHUR
No. C-250 August 11, 1942; Incoming No. 4154 (8/12/42)

This message transmitted a request from Stiver to Mr. Guinzburg, Office of War Information. It stated that Stiver understood that the J.P.W.C. had been requested to prepare a plan for political warfare against Japan.

He inquired what relation the O.W.I. function in Australia had with the J.P.W.C. and indicated that it was important to know immediately because he planned to consult on Saturday (August 15) with Dr. Evatt, whose department has set up a committee to produce a political warfare plan.

Stiver also referred to the previous message from General MacArthur stating his views regarding G.H.Q. relationship to the handling of psychological warfare in Australia.

EXCERPT FROM
JPWC SUBCOMMITTEE
MINUTES

August 12, 1942

JAPAN PLAN

COLONEL DONOVAN stated that O.S.S. would prepare an historical summary of this project to bring the Committee up to date.

LT. COL. BLAKENEY suggested that members of the Advisory Committee might be interested in discussing this plan, since they had had a part in preparing the M.I.S. plan. COLONEL DONOVAN agreed, but believed it desirable to get the concurrence of O.W.I. and MR. BOWES-LYON in advance.

S E C R E T

MEMORANDUM RE JAPAN PLAN

PARAPHRASE OF MESSAGE FROM GENERAL MACARTHUR
(No. C 205, Aug. 5, 1942; Incoming 1882 - 8/6/42)

Plan for psychological warfare against Japan, including propaganda, counterpropaganda, subversive and guerilla operations, is apparently counterpart of plan for joint political warfare proposed recently by British government to Australian government. Latter proposes to implement this plan under Evart, Department of External Affairs, in cooperation with London and Washington.

This plan embraces among other things extensive propaganda and counterpropaganda, including creation of conflicting interest between Axis powers, agitation of revolt in occupied territories, jealousy between Japanese services, and exploitation of social, religious, political, and ethnological differences; also economic warfare and sabotage of enemy fiscal system.

Since a large part of such activity will be affected by social and political policies of the several Allied civil authorities and will involve understandings between Allied governments relative to post war settlements, I am convinced that,

1. Civil branches of Allied governments are deeply involved.

2. This plan must be coordinated and guided in Washington or London.

a. Already the possibility of potential friction is indicated here between Dutch and Australians regarding the future of post war Netherland East Indies, resulting in Dutch sensitiveness relative to propaganda relative to the N.E.I.

SECRET

SECRET

3. Military intelligence, and espionage--sabotage--guerilla activities incident to military operations, must be kept separate for reasons of security and effectiveness.

An Allied Intelligence Bureau will operate at this headquarters for military purposes, avoiding entanglement with political operations. It is prepared to handle subversive and guerilla operations incident to military plans. In addition it is prepared to handle limited covert propaganda strictly incidental to military operations.

Facilities required for such missions are available or being manufactured here; any additional will be requested if and when needed.

Essential Naval cooperation in the use of submarines for landing parties in enemy occupied territory has been arranged satisfactorily hitherto. The Dutch have offered one submarine for such use.

This headquarters should cooperate with Australian Section on political or psychological warfare only to the extent of maintaining liaison, supplying necessary military information, and in providing facilities for dissemination of written propaganda and other materiel and personnel when required.

Believe it inexpedient to send here personnel for direct participation in psychological warfare.

MacARTHUR

EXCERPT FROM
JPWC SUBCOMMITTEE
MINUTES

July 29, 1942

JAPAN PLAN

1. COLONEL DONOVAN stated that it would be desirable to have MR. SHERWOOD of O.W.I. attend the meeting of the Subcommittee to which Mr. BOWES-LYON had been invited, next Tuesday.

2. COLONEL CONNOR reported that a message had been sent to GENERAL MACARTHUR requesting a report on what are his activities in the psychological warfare field. In this connection COLONEL BLAKENEY discussed a conversation he had had with MR. VAN der PLAAS, representative of the DUTCH EAST INDIES, concerning subversive operations which had been attempted there. MR. VAN der PLAAS believes that on account of the friendly personality of the Indonesians it will be difficult to recruit a large number of them for agents, and therefore that those agents who do get into the N.E.I. should lay low in order to supplement a later military movement. It was also reported that two agents from CEYLON had been sent through Australia to JAVA and had not been heard from since.

EXCERPT FROM
JPWC SUBCOMMITTEE
MINUTES

July 28, 1942

JAPAN PLAN

COLONEL DONOVAN stated that MR. DAVID BOWES-LYON is in Washington and that since the British had been concerned over certain sections of the original Japan Plan it might be advisable for him to sit with the Subcommittee for consideration of the Plan.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:-

a. Requested COLONEL DONOVAN to arrange for a meeting with MR. BOWES-LYON.

b. Requested COLONEL CONNOR to ascertain what psychological warfare activities are being carried out in the PACIFIC SOUTHWEST THEATRE.

EXCERPT FROM
JPWC SUBCOMMITTEE
MINUTES

July 24, 1942

JAPAN PLAN

CAPTAIN WEAVER and MR. LINEBARGER, of the Military Intelligence Service, G-2, joined the Committee for this discussion.

COLONEL DONOVAN questioned whether the Committee should proceed with this plan until the proposed general plan for psychological warfare is published and approved, unless an emergency condition now exists. CAPTAIN REDFIELD stated that he believed such an emergency did exist and that the Committee should continue work on the plan in order to lay a proper background for aiding the theater commander in the preparation of the territory and people for an eventual offensive, and as means of impairing the Japanese lines of supply. It was agreed that little can be done to soften up Japan itself but much may be possible in Japanese controlled territory.

COLONEL DONOVAN agreed that such an approach is possible on the areas for a step by step advance and posed the question as to what part this Committee can play in aiding such a movement. A discussion ensued as to what steps GENERAL MACARTHUR has taken to initiate psychological warfare activities in this area and it was generally agreed that the first step should be for the J.C.S. to find out what has been done already.

COLONEL DONOVAN stated that in the meantime the Subcommittee should proceed on the assumption that nothing has been done in this area and that it should propose a plan to submit to GENERAL MACARTHUR.

LT. COLONEL BLAKENEY suggested that the three major missions should be:

1. Getting agents into the Japanese controlled area.

2. Operating propaganda machinery in those areas by radio, leaflets and other means.

3. Better contact and coordination between agents in the area.

CAPTAIN REDFIELD suggested that a reserve of subversive agents should be established under GENERAL MACARTHUR

at once to be sent to wherever he wishes them.

MR. TAYLOR raised the question of the timing of such activities as to whether agents should be introduced into the area, lay low and be used in the big offensive later or whether they should be used now for present subversive activities. He indicated the danger, to long term plans if immediate subversive activities are undertaken.

COLONEL CONNOR pointed out that a propaganda plan can not be operated entirely by a Theater Commander without help from the mainland because the Japanese are occupying parts of several theaters of command and the propaganda must be coordinated among these theaters by the J.C.S.

CAPTAIN REDFIELD stated that the mission should be immediate sabotage in all Japanese controlled areas and the disruption of the economic advantages they have gained. COLONEL DONOVAN suggested that this is specifically a problem of GENERAL MACARTHUR'S and the best we could do was to send him the agents who knew the proper methods to use and who could organize proper assistance.

After further discussion,

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:-

Agreed to consider this subject further at its next meeting.

EXCERPT FROM
JPWC SUBCOMMITTEE
MINUTES

July 23, 1942

JAPAN PLAN

LT. COL. CONNOR stated that at the present time, it seemed advisable to confine this plan to propaganda to be operated through O.W.I.

A general discussion took place of the place of propaganda in this plan. COLONEL DONOVAN stated that the President had agreed to confer with the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the method of controlling propaganda especially in theaters of operations. He further stated his belief that the present system should be for the JPWC to work out a Psychological Warfare Plan, including propaganda, and obtain approval from the Joint Chiefs of Staff; that Mr. Taylor, as liaison for JPWC, should take the plan to O.W.I. and further work out details; and finally, that after O.W.I. has completed its detailed plans, the project should be sent back to JPWC for review. In addition, there should be some monitoring agency to see that the plan is carried out and approved. He indicated that it would be advisable for the JPWC to keep the initiative in this respect and send plans to the O.W.I. for execution.

The problem of limiting the amount of Axis propaganda which is presented in domestic newspapers was discussed and it was suggested that at a later date a proposal might be submitted to O.W.I. as to what amount of control should be exercised. It was also suggested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be informed of the situation through a study indicating the amount of Axis material that is now being published in U. S. newspapers.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:-

Agreed to consider the Japan Plan at its next meeting.

EXCERPT FROM
JPWC SUBCOMMITTEE
MINUTES

July 17, 1942

JAPAN PLAN

MR. TAYLOR stated that the O.S.S. had submitted some suggestions for amalgamating the two plans.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:

Agreed to consider this subject at its next meeting.

July 16, 1942

EXPLANATORY COMMENTS FOR THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON REVISED DRAFT OF PROPOSED STRATEGIC PLAN OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AGAINST JAPAN:

In view of our discussions of the Japan Plan, I am submitting to the Sub-committee a revised draft of our proposed Plan embodying fairly substantial changes. The new introductory paragraph sets forth more directly the purposes of the Plan. The section on Objectives is expanded to take account of the feeling of several members of the Sub-committee that long-term objectives should be included. The section on Implementation is omitted entirely and will be replaced by whatever specific recommendations the Sub-committee decides to make. The section on Areas and Timing, both in the body of the Plan and in Appendix A, are left blank in view of Captain Redfield's offer to supply the necessary data for these sections.

The principal changes are in the Appendices. Appendix B (Subversive Operations) in the first draft becomes "A", and Appendix C becomes "B". The last section of the old Appendix C is deleted and replaced by new Appendix C (Colonel Solbert's condensation of his original Japan Plan). The Dragon Plan is listed as Appendix D, though not referred to in the body of the Plan.

In the new draft, Appendices A and B no longer are treated as operational plans but merely as explanatory annexes. The whole plan, therefore, takes on a very general character. In my experience in psychological warfare planning with the British, I have found such broad general plans valuable as a framework into which operational plans can be fitted as they are framed, but if the Sub-committee desires, the present Plan could be greatly developed in detail.

Edmund L. Taylor

SECRET

Appendix A1

O.S.S. PLAN FOR ORGANIZATION OF
UNDERCOVER INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
IN THE FAR EAST

The "Dragon Project"

It is proposed that the Office of Strategic Services should establish in China with the knowledge and consent of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and General Stillwell an undercover intelligence system to operate in China, in Japan, and in Japanese occupied territories, making available to General Stillwell and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington the results of their opera-

Attached is a copy of a general directive which it is proposed to give to the head of our organization in China, should this project meet with your approval.

1. You are directed to proceed to Chungking, China, by the earliest available transportation to establish an undercover organization to obtain, evaluate and furnish information of military interest concerning Japan and Japanese-occupied territory, and to make this information available to the Commanding General, U. S. Forces in China, and through him to the Office of Strategic Services.

2. You will take with you, or arrange to have follow you at the earliest practicable moment, those of the American personnel for the Office of Strategic Services organization in China who have been selected in this country; and will arrange to have those already in China report to you upon your arrival.

3. On arrival in Chungki g you will report to the Commanding General, U.S. Forces in China. You will secure the initial approval and subsequent coordination of the Commanding General, U. S. Forces in China, and the acquiescence of the Generalissimo, which should be obtained through the Commanding General.

4. You will follow general directives given you by the Office of Strategic Services for carrying out your task. In following the general directives of the Office of Strategic Services, however, you will bear in mind that

orders from the Commanding General will, of course, take precedence.

5. You are designated the head of the Office of Strategic Services organization in China. You will make your headquarters in Chungking or wherever the Commanding General, U. S. Forces in China, may designate.

6. The American personnel accompanying you, or which is to follow immediately thereafter, or which will report to you in China, will be assigned as supervisors with headquarters in other key cities in free China. These supervisors will organize and direct the work of the regional or local agents, under your general direction.

7. Local agents will be selected by you from among Chinese or others in whom you have confidence. While complete discretion is left in your hands for the selection of such agents, you will be expected to use every means possible and reasonable for protecting their identity, their persons, and the information which they may gather.

8. Sources of Information -- The occupied areas in China offer great opportunities for securing information of military value concerning the Japanese. These areas contain thousands of Japanese civilians in addition to the Japanese military personnel. Constant streams of civilians and military personnel proceed to and from Japan. Many of these Japanese are corruptible. Japanese militarists in

China have long been powerful in their home government and often are well informed concerning its plans. Inevitably the Japanese in China are in contact with the Chinese population.

9. Another great reservoir of information concerning occupied China, other territory under Japanese occupation and Japan itself, is to be found in printed matter available within the lines of occupation --newspapers, magazines, proclamations, the Japanese official gazette (some copies of which probably find their way into occupied China), and other means of publicity and propaganda.

10. Types of Information to be Sought -- Information concerning maritime activities in Chinese ports and along the China coast: Vessels in port; types of cargo which they are loading and discharging; the speed with which the stevedoring is handled; the types of material on docks and in storehouses; the extent to which the capacity of docks and other storage space is being used; and so forth.

11. Information concerning the movements of enemy naval vessels in and out of ports and up and down the coast.

12. Information concerning the enemy forces of occupation: Troop movements; quality of troops; the military organizations represented; and so forth.

13. Similar information concerning enemy air forces; aircraft; production plants, air fields; and so forth.

14. Economic information of a military value, such as the extent to which given industrial plants are in operation; the quantity and the quality of their products; labor problems; the establishment of new industrial enterprises or the expansion of old ones; financial operations and situations.

15. It is to be hoped that eventually military information can be secured from the Japanese Empire itself.

16. Communications -- You will establish a system of communications to make possible the proper transmission of information from its source to the local or regional representatives and thence to Chungking. In your discretion you will use and are authorized to purchase shortwave transmitting and receiving radio sets. You are authorized, in your discretion, to employ couriers. You will be expected to endeavor to arrange with the Commanding General, U. S. Force in China, for such mail facilities and plane service to supplement the above as may be considered necessary by you for the efficient carrying out of your task, and as the Commanding General, U. S. Forces in China, may find it practicable to provide.

17. You have been provided with an Office of Strategic Services code which you will use wherever practi-

able for transmitting cable messages from Chungking or wherever your headquarters may be to the Office of Strategic Services in Washington. Before messages are coded you will furnish complete and accurate paraphrases thereof to the Commanding General, U. S. Forces in China, or, if he so desires, the complete message. The Commanding General has been instructed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to transmit your messages through military channels.

18. You will use your discretion as to the ways in which -- whether by code or otherwise -- messages between yourself and your supervisors, between supervisors, and between agents and supervisors shall be sent.

19. Every effort must be made to see to it that codes do not fall into the hands of the enemy. In the event of danger of their doing so, codes and all messages made up thereof should be burned.

SECRET

July 16, 1942

EXPLANATORY COMMENT FOR THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON REVISED DRAFT OF "DRAGON" (STRATEGIC PLAN OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AGAINST JAPAN:

In view of our discussions of the Japan Plan, I am submitting to the Sub-committee a revised draft of our proposed plan embodying fairly substantial changes. The new introductory para sets forth more directly the purposes of the Plan. The section on Objectives is expanded to take account of the feeling of several members of the Sub-committee that long-term objectives should be included. The section on Implementation is omitted entirely and will be replaced by whatever specific recommendations the Sub-committee decides to make. The section on Areas and Timing, both in the body of the Plan and in Appendix A, are left blank, in view of Captain Redfield's offer to supply the necessary data for these sections.

The original changes are in the Appendices. Appendix B (Subversive Operations) in the first draft becomes "A", and Appendix C becomes "B". The last section of the old Appendix C is deleted and replaced by new Appendix C (Colonel Colbert's condensation of his original Japan Plan). The Dragon Plan is listed as a paper to, though not referred to in the body of the Plan.

In the new draft, Appendices A and B no longer are treated as operational plans but merely as explanatory annexes. The main plan, therefore, takes on a very general character.

In my experience in psychological warfare planning with the British, I have found such broad general plans valuable as a framework into which operational plans can be fitted as they are framed, but if the Sub-committee desires, the present Plan could be greatly developed in detail.

Edmond G. Taylor

SECRET

THE TEMPORARY PLAN FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AGAINST JAPAN

Pending the completion of a Basic Plan for Psychological Warfare, it is vitally necessary to lay the foundation to assure adequate support for offensive military operations in the Japan Sea theatre.

After realistic appraisal of the psychological factors involved (such as: difficulties of reaching a large audience in Japan by verbal propaganda, Japanese censorship and police system, high degree of indoctrination of the Japanese people), the Sub-committee of the JPWC believes that in the case of Japan psychological warfare should be considered primarily as a weapon of attrition. The attached plan for psychological warfare against Japan is accordingly based upon a strategy of attrition, attacking Japan chiefly through the occupied territories, which can only yield maximum results if executed with maximum intensity in all the areas and supported by general propaganda from the United States. The plan has three broad purposes:

1. To provide the JPWC with a basis for recommendations to the JCS for the issuing of psychological warfare directives to theatre commanders and to psychological warfare agencies in the United States.

2. To make known to Theatre Commanders the various type of psychological warfare operations which in the opinion of the JPWC can attempt to achieve desired overall results; and further, to make known to Theatre Commanders the long-range propaganda support which can be furnished to the psychological warfare operations, as well as the equipment and facilities which the

JPWC, through its supporting agencies, can place directly at their disposal.

3. To establish a foundation for the future elaboration of more dynamic or long term plans of psychological warfare against Japan when and as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

SECRET

1. Objectives:

a. Short-term:

To increase the attrition of Japanese physical and moral resources by:

(i) Stimulating both the resistance of the native populations in the occupied territories of Asia and the Southwest Pacific and Japanese suspicion of the natives in order to impede the military consolidation and economic exploitation of these territories; (See Appendix A)

(ii) Harassing Japanese combat forces in the occupied territories with real and imaginary threats of guerilla attacks.

b. Long-term:

(i) To prepare large-scale uprisings of the subjugated peoples of Asia and the Southwest Pacific in conjunction with offensive operations of the United Nations. (See Appendix B)

(ii) To prepare revolutionary movements against the existing government in Japan or to promote civil war between rival factions. (See Appendix C)

2. Methods for obtaining Objectives:

a. Subversive operations in the occupied territories aimed at stimulating in a systematic manner the resistance of the native populations and directing resistance toward the following ends:

(i) Wastage of Japanese manpower.

(ii) Weakening of Japanese war-economy, particularly transportation.

 SECRET

(iii) Creating a dread of isolation and encirclement of guerillas in Japanese garrison forces.

b. Propaganda operations aimed at:

(i) Assisting the subversive operations outlined in the previous paragraph;

(ii) Preparing the ground for the long-term objectives referred to in paragraph 1b(ii) and developed in Appendix C.

4. Scope and Timing of Proposed Operations.

For subversive operations.

There are now _____ men in Melborne and _____ men in Chungking. It is proposed to increase these to

Melborne _____

Chungking& _____

and to make such funds as necessary available to implement directives.

Preparatory measures should be taken now as personnel becomes available.

Assignments and details of operations and timing are a function of the Theatre Commander.

For propaganda

Proposed directives as hereinafter specified to be forwarded by JCS to O.W.I.

SECRET

APPENDIX
A

SUBVERSIVE OPERATIONS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

1. OBJECTIVES

Specific objectives in each area will be determined by local possibilities and by the strategic requirements of the Theatre Commanders, but the following broad objectives are suggested as likely to contribute to the strategic purposes of the plan throughout the whole area:

To intercept, delay, or destroy transportation of materials, supplies, foodstuffs, and all commodities helpful to Japan's war effort; the disruption of transportation facilities in occupied areas, the destruction of power plants, docks, oil-storage facilities, etc., used by Japan; the organizing and equipping of guerilla bands where appropriate in occupied territory.

2. AREAS COVERED BY SUGGESTED OPERATIONS.

The occupied territories of the Asiatic mainland stretching from Manchuria and Korea to the Malay Peninsula and including Thailand, Indo-China and Burma; the islands of the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines and other Japanese-owned, mandated or occupied islands.

While it is desirable for the purpose of the plan to organize subversive activities wherever possible throughout this whole area, the following regions appear to be particularly important or suitable targets for such operations.

3. SUGGESTED OPERATIONS IN THE SEVERAL THEATRES.

Specially trained secret agents to be sent into the above areas to carry out, lead, or organize with the help of native populations, guerilla activities, sabotage, creation of whispering campaigns, distribution of subversive literature, etc.

4. LONG-RANGE SUPPORT FOR THEATRE OPERATIONS.

In addition to the mutual support which the several Theatre Commanders will furnish one another by carrying out simultaneously subversive operations in their respective theatres, long-range support by radio propaganda can be furnished from the United States. During the period of organization, while secret agents are being established in the occupied territories, short-wave broadcasts from the United States will refrain in drawing attention to the possibility of such operations or engage in any diversionary or cover activities that Theatre Commanders may request. When the underground organization in the occupied territories is ready to go into action, operations will be exploited in shortwave radio broadcasts as set forth in Appendix B.

5. FACILITIES AT DISPOSAL OF THEATRE COMMANDERS.

Subject to the approval of Theatre Commanders, the OSS will establish bases for subversive operations in Chungking, China, and Melbourne, Australia. Operations from Chungking will be under the general direction of General Stilwell and in Melbourne under General MacArthur. The OSS already has in China a number of specially trained and equipped men. These and others, as they are sent out, will train Chinese and other

nationals in sabotage methods. There are colonies of Chinese in all the territory to be covered. OSS has now in training here a group of Thai citizens for operations in Thailand. Individuals will be brought out to Unoccupied China, trained, and sent back. Radio communications by means of small portable sets will be established between occupied territory and Chungking.

Information received indicates that many strategic points, both on the mainland and in the islands, are very lightly held and poorly guarded, thus offering excellent opportunities.

In the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines agents will be landed to conduct sabotage operations where possible and to reinforce with men and equipment the guerrilla bands still remaining on some of the islands. On the smaller islands, agents will be landed for the purpose of establishing communications and for the destruction of Japanese installations. In all the islands a certain number of agents will remain temporarily dormant to establish their cover, and make proparations to render assistance to "commando raids" or occupation forces.

Both on the mainland and in the islands considerable funds will be needed for the payment of native agents and, in some cases, bribery. Money needed for these operations will be transferred to Chungking or Melbourne as the case may be.

SECRET

Appendix

1. Propaganda Operations Directed at Occupied Territories.

A. Principal Objectives.

a) The primary objective throughout the whole area is to cause Japanese military and civilian authorities to divert forces for unnecessary police duty, take repressive steps calculated to increase the hostility of the local populations, augment the strain on Japanese counter-espionage services and adopt excessive security measures likely to impede the economic exploitation of the occupied territories, by creating in their minds an exaggerated fear of subversion and rebellion among the local populations.

b) A second objective closely related to the foregoing is actually to increase active and passive resistance of all kinds in the occupied territories.

B. Suggested Operations in the Several Theatres.

a) Organization by secret agents in the occupied territories of whispering campaigns stressing and exaggerating the danger to Japanese garrisons from local guerillas and saboteurs.

b) Exploitation of the same theme - encirclement by the enemies - in front line propaganda operations aimed directly at Japanese combat forces.

c) Coordination of intelligence de activities and [illegible] in the theatres of Combat so that acts of resistance

in the occupied territories, whether spontaneous or provoked by secret agents, can be made known rapidly at Theatre headquarters and publicized in local or short-wave broadcasts in the Japanese and other languages.

d) Smuggling of subversive leaflets into the occupied territories keeping in mind that even if these leaflets have little effect on the natives, discovery by the Japanese of this activity will increase their sense of insecurity. Broadcasts from local stations under the control of the Theatre Commanders can help achieve the same result by delivering strong subversive appeals to the natives of the occupied territories in their several languages.

3. Long-range Support for Theatre Operations.

A) Activities of guerillas and of other aspects of native resistance to Japanese occupation will be exploited in short-wave broadcasts from the United States to Japan in so far as material is available.

b) Intensification or inauguration of short-wave broadcasts from the United States to occupied territories in all the languages including those which are of little practical value from the point of view of reaching a sizable audience will assist the psychological warfare operations of Theatre Commanders by drawing attention to the Japanese to the effort we are making to promote sabotage and rebellion in the occupied territories.

SECRET

Facilities at Disposal of Theatre Commanders.

a) The JPWC in liaison with the OWI can provide the long-range accompaniment in radio broadcasts from the United States by the local psychological warfare operations described in the previous paragraph and can arrange for the printing and sending to Theatre Commanders of suitable propaganda leaflets in the several languages for distribution by airplanes and in other ways.

b) The JPWC, through its supporting agencies, can [illegible] liaison officers for psychological warfare and technical staff for local radio and other propaganda operations to assist Theatre Commanders in the conduct of psychological warfare in their theatres.

EXCERPTS FROM
JPWC SUBCOMMITTEE
MINUTES

July 13, 1942

JAPAN PLAN

COLONEL DONOVAN introduced a plan for psychological warfare against the Japanese throughout the Far East, and the Committee discussed various parts of it.

CAPTAIN REDFIELD was requested to report on the priority of areas in which psychological warfare should be initiated. This report could then be used as a basis for asking the Joint Staff Planners for either strategical plans or assumptions on which this Committee could formulate detailed plans integrated with military operations plans.

It was agreed that another result of Captain Redfield's report would be the ability of this Committee to recommend the classes of psychological warfare to be carried out in various areas, under direction of theater commanders.

COLONEL SOLBERT and LT. COMMANDER COURTNEY presented statements of the M. I. S. and O.N.I. opinions regarding the "Dragon Plan". COLONEL DONOVAN said that General Magruder had approved the plan with certain changes. The operation would be under the control and direction of General Stilwell, but information would come to Washington as well.

THE COMMITTEE agreed to study further the Japan Plan presented by O.S.S. with the object of knitting this together with the plan previously considered by the J.P.W.C.

EXCERPTS FROM
JPWC SUBCOMMITTEE
MINUTES

July 9, 1942

JAPAN PLAN

MR. TAYLOR submitted on behalf of the O.S.S. comments upon the Japan Propaganda Plan.

COLONEL DONOVAN requested COLONEL SOLBERT and MR. TAYLOR to submit revised and condensed drafts of a Japan Plan for the next meeting of the Subcommittee. COLONEL DONOVAN proposed that the SUBCOMMITTEE consider these two drafts when presented and decide upon the form in which the plan should be submitted to the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee.

COLONEL DONOVAN circulated copies of a project entitled "Dragon Project" for the organization of intelligence sources in Japanese-occupied territory, which has been submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

EXCERPTS FROM
JPWC SUBCOMMITTEE
MINUTES

July 8, 1942

JAPAN PLAN

CAPTAIN REDFIELD noted some points of disagreement with the plan and stated that it is much too long. He suggested that it be revised as a short paper with an appendix containing details. COLONEL SOLBERT pointed out that such had been the intention.

COLONEL DONOVAN requested that the paper be reconsidered to give new members on the Committee an opportunity to contribute to it.

Japan plan 7/15 6840

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

From: J. R. Hayden JRH July 4, 1942

To: Colonel William J. Donovan

Subject: "The Japan Plan"

1. Appended hereto is a revision of the Japan Plan which was presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff before the establishment of the Office of Strategic Services. The plan as revised takes into account the recently established relationship between the Office of Strategic Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The revision was effected after extensive consultation with General John C. Magruder.

2. It is recommended that the revised plan be presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their approval; and that if approval is given that the Far Eastern desk be authorized to proceed at once to put the plan into effect.

3. It is proposed that the directing personnel of the China Field Unit should be initially selected largely from the "Starr organization" as listed in the first part of the appendix to the project. Additional personnel, including persons possessing special knowledge of the Japanese, would be included in the Unit.

4. The problem of coordinating the S.I. project outlined in the accompanying memorandum with the S.O. operation headed by Major Eifler, and any other S.O. projects undertaken in the area in question, has not been dealt with. Two alternative solutions of this problem are suggested for consideration as follows:

A. The S.O. unit might operate simply as a part of the command of the Commanding General of the United States Military Forces in China. The Commanding General would then be in a position to coordinate its operations with those

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100450002-3

APPENDIX

Possible American Personnel for the China Field Unit

Starr, G. V. - 49 years old. 24th M. G. Battalion World War I. Resident of China 1920 to 1940. Travelled in all provinces. Speaks fair Shanghai dialect and rudimentary Japanese. Name widely known among Chinese. Owned insurance business with agents in all provinces. Published Ta Mei Wan Pao, largest Chinese language paper and Shanghai Evening Post (English language) until December 8, 1941. Has dealt with all classes of Chinese. Believe trusted by Chinese Government. Intimate friend of Chinese Ambassador Hu Shih and Christopher Chancellor, General Manager Reuters News Agency, London. Married, no children. Wife - British, born in China, speaks fluent Chinese.

Park, J. H. - 48 years old. U. S. Navy World War I. Resident of China 1920 to 1923 and 1935 to 1937 (alternate periods in 1941 in Manila and London). Was President of American Asiatic Underwriters (insurance) in Shanghai and Director of Shanghai Evening Post. Close relations with Pan American Airways, China National Aviation Company, Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, Lloyds and other insurance interests in London, Swiss Reinsurance Company, Zurich. Unmarried.

Gould, Randall - 43 years old. Until early 1941 Editor Shanghai Evening Post & Mercury and Supervising Editor of Ta Mei Wan Pao. Chief Far East correspondent Christian Science Monitor till 1941. Worked in Japan 1923-4. Represented United Press in Peking, Shanghai, Manila from 1925 to 1931. Trusted and liked by Chinese. Friend of T. V. Soong, Hu Shih and leaders in Chungking, which visited 1939-40-41. Many years experience in appraising reports about the Orient from Caucasian, Chinese and Japanese reporters. Married, two children.

Freeman, Mansfield - 47 years old. Base Hospital # 1, Vichy, France, World War I. China 1920 to September 1941. Formerly taught philosophy at Tsinghua University (U. S. Boxer Indemnity College). Later President of Asia Life Insurance Company. Has travelled most of China, Manchuria, Japan, Philippines, Malaya, Indo-China. Speaks, reads, and writes Chinese (Mandarin). Is recognized sinologue, wide acquaintance in missionary circles but is also practical, seasoned business man. Married, one son now in U.S.N.

Horton Bonne - 51 years old. China 1919 to 1941. Formerly with Chinese Post Office. Latterly with William Hunt & Company, Merchants. Speaks good Chinese. Studious, orderly, well-informed.

J. Arthur Duff - 42 years old. Born in China of Canadian Missionary parents. Speaks perfect colloquial Chinese. Popular, good-humored, shrewd, active. Has great courage and is able to work effectively in primitive Chinese surroundings. Escaped Hongkong early this year after Japanese occupation. Trusted by all classes of Chinese. Married, five children. Family lives at Ridgecrest, N. C. Eldest is 14.

L. D. Gatson - 31 years old. American. Born in China. Speaks fluent Chinese. Athletic. Recently President Reliance Motors Federal Inc., U.S.A. in Shanghai. Caught in Manila on December 7th, assisted organize motor transport for Bataan, escaped to Cebu on own initiative and thence to Australia on Australian freighter. Arrived San Francisco late April.

A. E. Lacey - 37 years old. Worked in China 6 years, newspaper, advertising and radio. Has many friends among Orientals, resourceful news-gatherer and rapid in preparing facts. Already in China, carrying on operations for F.I.S. and O.S.S.; of which valuable reports have already been turned in.

Larson, Emanuel - age about 40. Lived in China from early age until return to U.S. for education. Went back to China where spent many years with Chinese Postal Service, in which capacity served in many parts of China, including Manchuria. Speaks, reads and writes Chinese as second language. Now civilian employee of O.N.I., Washington. Married, one child.

Lee, Michael - Born in Harbin, Manchuria, of Russian parents. Obtained education through Bachelor's degree in Chinese educational institutions. Also studied at the Sorbonne, France. Came to U.S. where became naturalized American citizen and obtained law degree. Partner in Chinese import business under firm name of Kwan Li -- offices in Chicago and New York. Speaks, reads and writes Chinese, Russian, French. Currently economic analyst, Board of Economic Warfare, Washington.

Drummond, William M. - Age 32, graduate of University of Illinois. Spent many years in North China as buyer of curios and objects of art. Travelled extensively North China. Speaks, reads and writes Chinese.

Tashiro, Isamu - age about 33. Born Hawaii of Japanese parents. Has always held himself out as American citizen. Practicing dentist in Chicago. Believed to have been thoroughly investigated by F.B.I. Speaks, reads and writes Japanese.

The first eight individuals mentioned in the above list of possible American personnel are members of the "Starr Group" of companies which has operated a large insurance, finance, newspaper, and automobile sales business in China and the Philippines. The "Starr Group" is regarded as one of the most active and successful American business organizations in China. Mr. Starr and his associates are persona grata with the Chinese. The organization has agents and other contacts throughout large parts of China. While the members of the organization would be taken into the O.S.S. individually, it is believed that their experience in working as a team and their established contacts in China would greatly increase their value in the intelligence operation under consideration.

THE JAPAN PLAN

DRAFT of July 4, 1942

The Task. To obtain, evaluate, and furnish to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and such other Government agencies as they may direct, vital military information from China, Mongolia, Japan, and Japanese-occupied territory.

The Field of Operation. Assuming permission of Allied and neutral countries to carry on operations within or from their territories, the field of operation would be China, Mongolia, Japan, and Japanese-occupied territory within the theatre of operations of the Commanding General of the United States Military Forces in China.

Unit of Operation. The unit of the Office of Strategic Services contemplated by this project would be known as "The China Field Unit of the Office of Strategic Services."

Coordination. It is believed to be highly desirable that there should be established a Coordinated Intelligence Center in the theatre of operations of the Commanding General of the U. S. Military Forces in China composed of the intelligence units of all U. S. agencies within that theatre, and responsible to and operating under the general direction of the Commanding General of the U. S. Military Forces in China. The Unit envisaged in this project would be an integral unit of the Coordinated Intelligence Center. Until such intelligence center is established, the China Field Unit of the Office of Strategic Services should be coordinated as an integral unit within the existing Intelligence Service of the Commanding General of the U. S. Military Forces in China.

Relations with the Chinese Government. It is recognized as essential that the approval of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek should be secured for this project. Working relations between

the members of the Unit and Chinese with whom they may come in contact would have to be established with the greatest care along lines regarded as sound by the Commanding General of the U. S. Military Forces in China.

Distribution of Authority.

1. It would be the duty of the Director of the Office of Strategic Services:

a. To select, train, and equip the personnel of the Unit, and to designate a Chief of Unit, to whom all other members of the Unit would be responsible, and who in turn would be responsible to the Director of the Office of Strategic Services for the carrying out of directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to the Commanding General of the U. S. Military Forces in China for operations in the field. In the event of conflict of interpretation of directives, the matter shall be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for decision. Pending the receipt of

such decision, the decision of the Commanding General of the U. S. Military Forces in China will govern.

b. To prepare a general plan of operations for the Unit, and obtain for it the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

c. To be responsible, on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for salaries, travel and other expenses of the Unit, including those in the equipment and supply of the Unit.

d. To issue general directives based upon the requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the M. I. S., A-2, O. N. I., and any other designated agencies, concerning the types of information to be sought.

e. To make available to the Joint Chiefs of Staff or other designated agencies information gathered by the Unit.

2. It would be the duty of the Commanding General of the United States Military Forces in China:

a. To decide what information it would be desirable that the China Field Unit of the Office of Strategic Services should obtain for the use of the Command, and to issue suitable directives therefor;

b. To decide in what areas the Unit should operate;

c. To furnish the Unit with such facilities in the way of transportation, means of communication, equipment, and the like, as may be possible, having due regard for the other requirements of the Command.

Line of Operation

A. Preliminaries

1. After approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the project would be presented [by a representative or representatives of the Office of Strategic Services] to the Commanding General of the United States Military Forces in China, for presentation to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

5. Should the approval of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek be obtained, the personnel of the Unit would proceed to China as soon as they should have completed their special training, received instructions, and assembled their equipment and supplies.

B. Sources of Information

1. The occupied areas in China offer great opportunities for securing information of military value concerning the Japanese. These areas contain thousands of Japanese civilians in addition to the Japanese military personnel. Constant streams of civilians and military personnel proceed to and from Japan. Many of these Japanese are corruptible. Japanese affiliates in China have long been powerful in their home government and often are well informed concerning its plans. Inevitably the Japanese in China are in contact with the Chinese population.

2. Another great reservoir of information concerning occupied China, other territory under Japanese occupation and Japan itself, would be found in printed matter available within the lines of occupation. Newspapers, magazines, proclamations, the Japanese official gazette (some copies of which probably find their way into occupied China), and other means of publicity and propaganda must contain a great deal of information of military value, no matter how carefully the Japanese may seek to exclude such information.

3. Visual observation.

C. <u>Types of Information to be Sought</u>

1. Information concerning maritime activities in China ports and along the China coast. An organization would be set up to report the vessels in port, the types of cargo which they were loading and discharging, the speed with which the stevedoring was handled, the types of material on docks and in storehouses, the extent to which the capacity of docks and other storage space was being used, and so forth.

2. Information concerning the movements of enemy naval vessels in and out of ports and up and down the coast.

3. Information concerning the enemy forces of occupation: troop movements, quality of troops, the military organizations represented, and so forth.

4. Similar information concerning enemy air forces, aircraft, production plants, fields, and so forth.

5. Economic information of a military value, such as the extent to which given industrial plants were in operation, the quantity and the quality of their products, labor problems, the establishment of new industrial enterprises or the expansion of ~~eff~~ old ones, financial operations and situations.

C. It is believed that eventually military information could be secured from the Japanese Empire itself.

D. <u>Organization and Personnel</u> It would be the function of the China Unit of the O.S.S. to organize an espionage system which could tap the above sources for the purpose of obtaining information illustrated by the types mentioned.

1. A Chief of Unit would be designated by the Director of the Office of Strategic Services, after approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chief of Unit would make his headquarters in Chungking, or wherever the Commanding General of the United States Military Forces in China would have his headquarters, and would operate under the direction of the Commanding General of the United States Military Forces in China. All information gathered by the Unit would be made available to the Commanding General of the United States Military Forces in China. (Appended is a list of possible American personnel for the China Field Unit of the O.S.S.)

2. The field organization would be locally directed by supervisors with headquarters in other key cities in free China, such as Kunming, Kukong, Kweiling, Yen Ping, Kinwha, Chengchow. The field supervisors as well as the head of the Unit and his staff in Chungking would be especially chosen American officers or civilians, thoroughly experienced in dealing with the Chinese, possessing a working knowledge

of the language, physically fit and capable of "living on the land" in the interior of China, acceptable to the Chinese Government, accustomed to handling substantial sums of money, and willing to go into occu ied areas if necessary. Before undertaking their duties this personnel would receive instruction in intelligence work with special training in the procurement of the types of military information required.

3. The regional or local agents, operating principally from unoccupied China, would develop an espionage organization within occupied China. In this task, so far as possible, initial reliance would be placed upon Chinese living in both unoccupied and occupied China, who are personally known by the organizing agents through past business or other connections, or whose usefulness and willingness to serve could be ascertained from the representatives of American business and other organizations long established in China.

4. An important aspect of intelligence operations in China is the critical evaluation of information received as to its reliability and significance. The personnel of the proposed China Unit and of the Far Eastern desk of the O.S.S. who would immediately receive reports from the Field Unit would be thoroughly competent to interpret the information gathered in the field.

E. Communications

A system of communications to make possible the rapid transmission of information from its source to the local or regional representatives and thence to Chungking would be organized. Radio and couriers within occupied China, and radio and a plane service between the regional centers and Chungking would be required.

This sketch of the information available in occupied China and procedures for securing it is necessarily in general terms. The plan would be elaborated in detail in conjunction with the military authorities in Washington and Chungking.

Japan Plan

WAR DEPARTMENT
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
WASHINGTON

June 25, 1945

Colonel William J. Donovan, Director,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

I waited for your return to answer your letter of June 19. I am sorry that you could not have been present at the meeting the last day on the Japan plan, because at each conference I tried to clear up the reasons for the plan as laid down in the functions of the J.P.W.C.

The procedure of synchronizing psychological warfare with our allies is also laid down in the J.P.W.C. charter, and we follow this by submitting the Japan basic plan to the United States Joint Planners requesting transmittal to the British Joint Planners for approval by the C.C.S. In this way, agreement can be had on uniform or parallel propaganda, as well as individual propaganda by the British and by ourselves--all being properly integrated, of course, with military strategy.

There was no mention of the incorporation of your joint proposal with P.W.B., since other government agencies contributed and it was felt best not to mention any agency by name.

This particular general plan is aimed against Japan itself. Psychological warfare in the theater of operations--in the Japanese conquered territories--is a function of command. Plans for propaganda into these territories must also be developed but with approval from the theater commander so that the propaganda from the home base is in keeping with his military plans.

We know, of course, that it is difficult at present to put propaganda into Japan, but there must be a basic plan ready and continuing directives are needed for experience as to techniques and means of putting propaganda into Japan against the time of more favorable reception.

I hope that with a new set-up of the J.P.W.C., we can go after all these basic plans as the first step so that there can be detailed and continuous directives for the proper orientation of propaganda for military objectives.

Sincerely,

O. N. Solbert

O. N. Solbert,
Colonel, G.S.C.

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

SECRET

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: J. R. Hayden

DATE: June 18, 1942

TO: Colonel G. Edward Buxton

SUBJECT: Meeting of the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee on June 10, 1942, attended by Colonel G. Edward Buxton and J. R. Hayden

At the request of Colonel Donovan, Colonel Buxton and Mr. Hayden attended this meeting, which occurred at two o'clock on Wednesday, June 10. Those present were:

Mr. Michael McDermott, Chief of Division of Current Information - State
Mr. Lawrence Salisbury, State
Col. M. W. Pettigrew, Far Eastern Section, Intelligence Group of M.I.S.
Dr. Ralph Turner, Board of Economic Warfare
Lt. Col. Edward H. McDaniel, O.P.D., U. S. Army
Commander A. H. McCollum, O.N.I.
Mr. Edgar A. Mowrer, Office of Facts and Figures
Colonel O. N. Solbert, Major Innes Randolph, Mr. Paul Linebarger } Psychological Warfare Board
Colonel G. Edward Buxton, Mr. J. R. Hayden } C.O.I.
Capt. C. H. Bieri, Office of Chief of Naval Operations

Mr. Hayden presented to Colonel Solbert the letter dated June 10, which you had written him with reference to the Japan Plan. In the course of the discussion, the principal points made in your letter were presented to the Committee. It was generally agreed that synchronization of action based on joint or parallel plans, defining in clear terms the frame within which each party intends to work, should be secured by close working relations between the American and British agencies charged with putting the plan into effect.

With reference to the second main point in your letter; namely, that political warfare against Japan can be better employed in Japan's conquered territories than

in Japan proper, Colonel Solbert stated that the political warfare in the conquered territories was ~~not a~~ function of the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee, but of the commanding officers of the several combat areas, as General MacArthur or General Wavell.

There was a considerable amount of general discussion of the plan. The most important observation (to which there was general agreement) seemed to be that the plan was not static, that there should be weekly directives based upon current intelligence from O.N.I., G-2, C.O.I., etc. The strategy of the plan should be based upon these directives; the tactics upon daily directives from the same agencies. The position was taken that propaganda must be closely related to current military strategy and must have a background of current military intelligence.

The "Japan Plan" (final draft) and accompanying papers are returned herewith.

Attachments

June 10, 1942

Colonel O. H. Solbert, Chairman,
Joint Psychological Warfare Committee,
War Department,
Military Intelligence Division G-2,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Solbert:

I have received your proposed Japanese Plan. I am sorry that owing to my absence from the City I cannot be at the meeting. However, I will give you briefly my impression after a reading of the Plan.

1. Although the Plan refers to the necessity of synchronizing political warfare activities against Japan with those of our allies, no procedure for doing this is expressed. There is no explicit recognition of the principle that such synchronization must be based on joint or parallel plans defining in clear terms the frame within which each party intends to work. This cannot be done through sporadic consultation between the two parties. It was with this in mind that we drew up with the British representatives our joint proposals for political warfare operations against Japan.

These joint proposals were evidently taken into

account by your Committee in framing your Plan, but there is no specific reference to them. Some of the joint proposals have been eliminated and other provisions not obviously mentioned have been added.

I would respectfully suggest that to attempt to obtain agreement for joint or parallel action on the basis of the proposed Plan would involve endless delay. The proper procedure would seem to be to consider the joint proposal, inform the British of any changes decided on and then have a complete plan which would include the joint proposals.

2. As to the Plan itself, the purpose is not clear, although it seems to have for its purpose a propaganda operation within Japan itself. Our experience leads us to believe that this approach is a weak one in general, and particularly weak in the case of Japan. Probably more than any other country Japan is resistant to direct propaganda attack. That does not mean that political warfare techniques cannot be employed to weaken Japan's hold on the conquered territories. Seeking to profit by the ex-

perience of others, we try to envisage the psychological and other means by which the military strength of an enemy can be undermined in countries other than its own. This point is not academic; it is a practical consideration. Knowing that propaganda by radio would have little effect on the Japanese people, we tried to find indirect means of attack. We discovered, for example, that economic propaganda can weaken by Japan by weakening her hold on conquered territories, or that propaganda in Indo-China will increase the military strain. Theinference to be drawn by the Plan drawn by the Committee is that such matters would be dealt with as secondary objectives in separate plans for Latin America, Indo-China, etc. I recognize the answer could be that they would be covered in the end anyway. But it seems to us that there is a difference in perspective which can be very important. We think that we should concentrate our greatest effort on the most promising points.

In short, it seems to us that the weakness in the proposed plan lies in its failure to relate strategic objectives to the conditions of implementation. This means

it a plan in the void. We would suggest, therefore, that if you do not choose to follow the procedure outlined in paragraph 1, it would be better to draw a very condensed over-all plan, merely listing the strategic results required. This could then be supplemented by a series of detailed working plans framed with a view to the specific possibilities and limitations of the various executing agencies: A plan for radio operations, a plan for army propaganda units in the Far East, an S. O. plan, etc.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

270 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK

To: Col. Donovan
From: R.L. Taylor

I am attaching on separate sheets, a) comments on Col. Solbert's Japan plan; b) list of places for which I shall need visas on the W. African trip.

In regard to the point raised yesterday by Maj. Jamond--the question of sending an agent into ~~Kaxxxxxx~~ Dakar to communicate with Accra, he again drew my attention to the importance of this and urged me to take steps to find someone, American or otherwise, who could be sent there under suitable cover. If you have no objections, I would like to explore the possibilities during your absence and try to line up some candidates and discover methods for getting them to the placed which I could submit to you on your return.

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

570 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK

Comments on the Japan Plan.

1. Though the plan refers to the necessity of synchronising political warfare activities against Japan with those of our Allies, no procedure for doing this is suggested, and there is no explicit recognition of the principle that such synchronisation cannot be achieved by vague and sporadic consultations but must be based on joint or parallel plans defining in clear terms the frame within which each party intends to work. It was on this principle that we drew up with the British representatives our Joint Proposals for Political Warfare Operations Against Japan. These Joint Proposals were seemingly taken into account by Col. Colbert in framing his plan to some extent but there is no specific reference to them, some of the Joint proposals have been eliminated from the Japan plan, others not not previously mentioned have been added. If we were now to attempt to obtain agreement for joint or parallel action on the basis of Col. Colbert's Japan plan it would involve endless delay. The proper procedure would be to submit the Joint Proposals to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, inform the British of any changes decided on, then frame a complete plan which included the Joint Proposals.

2. The purpose of the Japan Plan is not clear. It is not well adapted as a plan for military propaganda units because it deals mainly with objectives which must be attacked by civilian agencies. The FIS is the agency mainly concerned in attacking the type of objectives listed in the Japan Plan but though the plan approximates closely the FIS Japanese plan it is less specific and less comprehensive, therefore less well suited for FIS operations. As already stated the Japan plan is not at all suited to serve as a basis for synchronisation of British and American efforts.

3. Whereas most of our plans are plans for political warfare against an enemy, the Japan plan is for propaganda operations aimed at Japan itself. The weakness of this approach is particularly glaring in the case of Japan. Probably no country is so invulnerable to direct propaganda attack, but propaganda and other political warfare techniques can be employed to weaken Japan's hold on the conquered territories with considerable effect. Our approach, based on British experience seems much sounder: We try to envisage all the psychological and other means by which the military strength of an enemy can be undermined, anywhere in the world. This point may seem academic but it is very important. We know that propaganda by radio will have little effect on the Japanese people so we try to find indirect means of attack that will be more effective. We discover for instance that propaganda can weaken Japan economically by troubling her commercial relations with neutral countries or that fifth-column activities in Indo China will increase the military strain. Under Col. Colbert's concept of planning these things will be mentioned as secondary objectives in separate plans for Latin America, Indo-China, etc. Doubtless they are covered in the end anyway but there is a difference in perspective which can be very important. Our planning technique automatically impells us to concentrate the greatest effort on the most promising points.

To sum up: The weakness in Col. Colbert's plan lies in its failure to relate the strategic objectives to the conditions of implementation. It is a plan in the void. It would be better to draw up very condensed, abstract overall plans merely listing the strategic results required, then supplement this by a series of detailed working plans framed with an eye to the

2.

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
270 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK

specific possibilities and limitations of the various executing agencies; A plan for FIS operations, a plan for Army propaganda units in the Far East, an SO plan, etc.

SECRET

J.P.W.C. 15

May 18, 1942

COPY NO. 16

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

PLAN FOR PROPAGANDA INTO JAPAN

Note by the Secretary

1. In accordance with direction of the Committee, the attached progress report on the Plan for Propaganda into Japan has been submitted to the Joint Staff Planners. (J.P.S. 7/14).

A. H. ONTHANK

Secretary.

SECRET

ENCLOSURE

PROGRESS REPORT ON PLAN FOR PROPAGANDA INTO JAPAN

1. PROPOSAL

The Joint Psychological Warfare Committee has initiated formulation of a general plan for sending propaganda into the Japanese Empire, which will assist our military strategy and operations. To accomplish this purpose it has enlisted the cooperation of the several Government agencies which would be concerned in the operation of various phases of such a plan.

2. OBJECTIVES

Propaganda into Japan has four main present objectives:

(a) To interfere with Japanese military operations and injure Japanese morale;

(b) To weaken and slow down the Japanese economic war effort;

(c) To discredit and overthrow the Japanese military authorities;

(d) To split Japan with her Allies and neutrals.

All four objectives are aimed at increasing the degree of correlation between propaganda and military operations, with proper provision for flexibility of military missions.

3. ACTION

A suggested plan for propaganda into Japan was drawn up by the Psychological Warfare Branch, M.I.3., and was laid before a meeting of representatives of other interested Government agencies. The Executive Office of the President, the State Department, Coordinator of Information, Office of Facts and Figures, and the Board of Economic Warfare designated officials to meet and work with members of this Committee and of the Psychological Warfare Branch, M.I.3. The first plenary session, during which the suggested plan was fully discussed, recommended that a smaller work-group combine all ideas into a general plan, in which appropriate missions would be assigned to each of the cooperating organizations.

This sub-committee has met and has framed a tentative general plan which has been distributed to the agencies for further criticism and allocation of tasks.

It is intended that the plan will be checked with the British Subversive Operations Executive and with Chiang K'ai Shek before final approval.

The plan, when approved by the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee, will be transmitted to the Joint Staff Planners with recommendation that it be adopted as a guide until the President has acted to designate one agency to coordinate propaganda activities.

PORTUGAL
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PORTUGAL
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Lisbon 8957
Press Office
OWI
Donovan
State
Mr. Dermott

SECRET

Spain

November 5, 1942

To: Mr. J. H. McDermott

From: Mr. Warren

The following is a report on distribution of publicity material:

General:

The volume of publicity distributed has been somewhat limited in the past by lack of equipment, office supplies, and personnel, but the popular demand for publicity material is great and exceeds available supplies. Having to cope with an unsympathetic press and government, only that propaganda can be carried on which is entirely under our control and which does not rely to any extent on media such as the press.

During October an adequate staff was assembled and a substantial quantity of material was received. Elaborate equipment and photographic machinery awaits the arrival of Office of War Information operating technicians.

Annual expenditures by German propaganda agencies in Spain were estimated at $700,000 not including special subsidies to individuals and newspapers. The staff of Germans engaged in propaganda activities were estimated at 200, while an equal number of Spaniards was probably directly engaged in German propaganda work.

Spanish Bulletin:

This is the most important Embassy publication. It is composed of four mimeographed pages and is issued twice weekly. Circulation of 9,200 copies is restricted to officials following a regulation of June, 1940, imposed by the Spanish Government seeking to limit the scope of

competitive

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competitive propaganda efforts. In Madrid the bulletins are transmitted to officials by commercial distributing agencies. This is necessary because it was found that postal officials occasionally intercepted and disposed of even the bulletins destined for officials. In the provinces and in the Canary Islands the Consulates distribute the bulletins to officials which are more dependent entirely on the mails. Non-officials obtain the bulletins only by calling personally at the Embassy or at the various Consulates. No official distributing agencies will take the risk of carrying the bulletins to non-officials. The British Consulate also distributes the bulletin. The contents consist of straight forward news reporting including the full text of American Communiques. Each issue concludes with a few selections from the comments of newspapers in the United States. Once a month a list of United States broadcasts to Spain is published.

Washington News Letter:

Circulation 11,200 copies issued weekly. The format is similar to the Embassy Bulletin. The method of distribution is similar to that followed in the case of the Bulletin except that larger numbers are distributed through the mails. This is possible because the letter is not considered as propaganda in the terms of the June 1940 decree. The letter is in theory one transmitted directly from the United States and dealing largely with the report of American events and not a publication of the local Embassy issued specifically for Spanish consumption. This fiction has gone unchallenged as evidenced by the fact that the letter is usually successfully carried through the mails while the Bulletin is stopped. The distribution is as follows:

Madrid	3300
Barcelona	1100
Bilbao	350
Malaga	500
Seville	500
Valencia	275
Vigo	75
Las Palmas	100
Tenerife	105
Tangier	150
British Embassy	800
Miscellaneous	725
Total as of September 9, 1942	8,000.

Special issues of the Bulletin are brought out with speeches by President Roosevelt, Secretary Hull and the Ambassador,

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when

when such speeches are particularly significant. An over-size issue was published on the Battle of Midway.

Pictures:

Photographs are distributed by the Embassy in the Madrid area and to agencies for publication in small towns not covered by the Consulates. Pictures are supplied to Barcelona, Bilbao, Valencia, Vigo, Seville, Malaga, Las Palmas and Tenerife. From those offices they are distributed either through a commercial picture agency, or more generally directly to the newspapers themselves. Pictures are also given to the Army, Navy and Air Ministries for publication in service journals.

Before being released, pictures are put through a refining process: those few deemed unsuitable are deleted, English captions are reedited on the remainder, and reedited captions are translated into Spanish. This is an extremely lengthy process and a strain on an over-worked staff. It is suggested that original captions be written in Spanish in New York.

The following over-all statistics indicate the trend in the reproduction of pictures in newspapers throughout Spain:

January 1 to April 21	127
April 21 to May 21	221
May 21 to June 21	329
June 21 to July 21	267
July 21 to August 21	281

An average of about 75 percent of the pictures (American) reproduced were those transmitted through the Embassy, the balance being obtained from independent sources.

Pictures of the conflict in the Far East were considered likely to be received favorably. An editor in Corunna criticized British and American propaganda as not suitably adapted to Spanish psychology as evidenced in a picture of marching soldiers with a caption stating what American proposed to do with these troops rather than emphasizing actual accomplishments.

Articles:

Up to the present they have been used on a limited scale since they depend on the cooperation of newspapers. Only about 12 articles per month receive publication but they are also used as background material for the Embassy bulletin.

Publication

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Publication of American Communiques in Spanish Newspapers:

Keeping a file of communiques printed in Madrid newspapers furnished sufficient concrete evidence for discussion of the treatment of American news with the Foreign Office. NYT has been furnished with the texts of American communiques, they have been printed with substantial thoroughness. On August 18 it was reported that an order had been issued from the office of the Presidencia del Estado, requiring every newspaper in Spain to print the full text of all American communiques.

Magazines:

It was recommended that shipments of any issue of a magazine consist of a minimum of 10,000 copies. It was requested that as many publications pertaining to American Republics be provided as possible as they were said to be of considerable value.

A magazine is being disseminated to persons on the mailing list of the American Consul General in Barcelona by the Axis which attempts to ridicule and offset the effect of En Guardia. Many persons who received the magazine described it as being a case of "sour grapes". It was thought that the issuance of this German issued publication constituted a definite proof of the effectiveness of En Guardia. The only result of this Axis distributed magazine was an increase in the volume of requests for En Guardia.

Magazines have been received in quantities which even despite their increases in volume still fail to meet mass demand. Each issue of Selecciones is received months after the British have distributed it but their distribution is in too small a quantity.

During October 25,000 magazines were shipped to Consulates or distributed in Madrid. These included En Guardia, Selecciones, The Weapon of Ultimate Victory, The United States Navy, and The Four Freedoms. Ratio of distribution was approximately as follows: Barcelona 6,250; Seville 4,250; Bilbao 3,250; Vigo 2,250; Valencia 1,250; Malaga 1,000; Las Palmas 1,000, Madrid 4,000. The present propaganda in Madrid can handle aveverage of 2,000 magazines a day for allocation to Consulates and with a large delivery service can distribute directly in Madrid 10,000 per year (believe per month intended)

Pamphlets:

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Pamphlets:

In a telegram to the Office of War Information, 10,000 copies of the pamphlet, The Hate Was Against the Catholic Church were requested. In a telegram dated November 2 to the Department this request was re-emphasized and this time it was suggested that the earliest and the largest possible shipment of this pamphlet be provided.

The government of Spain objects to controversial types of propaganda material and circulation of this type of pamphlet would not be permitted. The Ambassador particularly requested that care be taken not to supply such material. In Seville there have been comparatively good results from the distribution of propaganda which can be explained as follows:

1. The Catholic press with its predominant monarchist sympathies is exceedingly influential in this area in which the preeminent church leader is Segura, whose hostility to the Falange and whose outspoken monarchist sympathies are notorious.

2. The Falangist ABC is owned by the paper of the same name in Madrid, with the result that propaganda work done in Madrid bears results in Seville.

3. There is a local associated press representative in Seville whose activity is probably most important.

The unusually poor results obtained in the Barcelona area by American propaganda efforts can be explained by the fact that, paradoxically, because of the Catalonian tradition of radicalism, separatism, and progressive political and economic ideas, the present regime has placed the most rigorous censorship in this area.

Dance Music:

A request has been received for sheet music for dancing. Officers in the Department consider this would be a very effective form of propaganda because it is in tune with the Spanish temperament. It was suggested that this music would be made available to the best orchestras and that a notice should be attached on the music stating that this is the latest dance music from the United States and is provided through the courtesy of the American Embassy.

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Motion Pictures

It is highly desirable that a substantial part of the motion pictures furnished by the United States in Madrid embody aspects of American educational, social and historical life while retaining sufficient commercial appeal. In this connection it was suggested that the Hayes organization or some other agency might intercede with motion picture organization in the United States, with a view to persuading them to make outright sales of such films at a price not to exceed $12,000.

Spain is entirely dependent upon foreign sources for raw film stock. Film stock imported from Axis countries may not be utilized for purposes of reproducing British or American film. It was believed that our position would be improved if assurance would be made to the Spanish authorities that either America or Great Britain would make available sufficient supplies of raw film for the reproduction of American and British film and for use in connection with half of the Spanish produced film. It was estimated that six million meters of film would be required for 75 British and American films and for approximately fifteen Spanish films which constitutes approximately one-quarter of the annual production. Although the British agreed to issue export licenses for almost five million meters of film the Eastern Kodak Company cannot deliver more than 380,000 meters each month and they cannot supply any sound film at all.

It is desirable that the Embassy be able to inform the authorities that if the American proposals relating to developed films are accepted that we would make available the difference between British deliveries for the required one million meters each month for the next six months.

A request was made for the motion pictures: "Yankee Doddle Dandy", "To The Shores of Tripoli", "The Mortal Storm", Latin American musicals, (especially in technicolor), newsreels in Spanish if possible, and any forceful shorts on the war effort.

A technicolor film strip showing the American Flag with music accompaniment of the National Anthem, to be used regularly at the end of film showings, was requested.

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Only four motion picture issues consisting entirely of newsreels have been shown at the Embassy and at the Consulate General in Barcelona. Projection equipment had to be borrowed from the British Embassy. Featurd films were entirely lacking. Madrid reports that now these difficulties are being remedied, arrangements having been made to obtain feature films from United States motion picture representatives in Lisbon.

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
COORDINATOR OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

COMMERCE DEPARTMENT BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D. C.

October 29, 1942

The possibilities of getting information from Brazil to Portugal via radio are the following:

The Portuguese Marconi Company operates the point-to-point radio-telephone station near Lisbon, Portugal.

As far as we have been able to determine, they only have three radio-telephone circuits open at this time -- one to New York, one to Berlin and one to Bern, Switzerland.

The AT&T advises that the equipment in Lisbon is rather old and not very powerful so that the circuit from New York to Lisbon is not first-class.

From Buenos Aires CIDRA, the IT&T affiliate, has a radio-telephone circuit to Madrid, Spain. The radio station outside of Madrid is owned and operated by the Spanish Telephone Company (CTNE), a subsidiary of the IT&T.

Telephone calls from Brazil, Bolivia, Paraguay, Peru, Colombia, Chile, Uruguay and the Argentine, destined for Madrid, are relayed through CIDRA at Buenos Aires. Similarly calls for Portugal are relayed through CIDRA, Buenos Aires, to CTNE in Madrid, and from Madrid to Portugal by land-line.

Should it be desirable for direct communication to be established from Rio de Janeiro, Brazil to either Madrid, Spain or Lisbon, Portugal, there is sufficient equipment to do so.

None of the other countries, however, in South America could establish direct service to either Madrid or Lisbon.

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RESUME OF ACTIVITIES OF STATE DEPT. AT LISBON AND MATERIAL FURNISHED FOR LISBON BY O. W. I.

1. Organization. Press Office with Loverich in charge, and eleven clerical employees. Additional personnel authorized.

2. Distribution. Classified mailing list of 16,000 names by end of October; increasing by 1500 monthly.

To Aug. 26, 50 - 60,000 pieces of literature distributed.

Content and presentation of U. S. Material is considered superior to that of other countries.

EM GUARDA especially liked.

3. Photographs

To August 26, 1200 pictures furnished to newspapers and periodicals; 250 had been published. During Sept. - Oct. 21$ press photos published. Demand is constant. Prepared blocks preferred by provincial papers.

4. Articles

To August 26, 100 articles with translations received and distributed; 30 published. In Sept. - Oct., 21 articles published. Demand exceeds supply. Should be accompanied by photos.

5. News

Copies of Weekly News Service furnished to leading newspapers; wider distribution in prospect. Daily radio bulletin sent by State Department to Ministry and is uded in connection with Weekly News Service.

6. Newsreels

United Newsreel with Portuguese narration received weekly and distributed from Lisbon. Reception by Portuguese enthusiastic.

7. Films

State Department has transmitted 35 mm prints of following films in Portuguese to Legation, Lisbon: "Building a Bomber", "Aluminum","Alaska's Silver Millions", "Soldiers of the Sky", "Power for the Americans"; also, in English, "Americans All". - - A 16 mm projector is being purchased for Legation,

and similar machines have been recommended for consulates at Oporto, Ponta Delgada, Funchal and Madeira. Supply of 16 mm films to be provided.

3. Radio

Advertising program of short wave broadcasts in all Lisbon, Oporto and provincial dailies twice weekly, and in each weekly and monthly. Daily announcements over two radio stations and trailer announcements in several movie theatres.

(List of materials furnished by O. W. I. is omitted.)

RESTRICTED

O. S. S. 323

October 28, 1943

COPY NO._____

UNITED STATES PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE ACTIVITIES AND FACILITIES IN PORTUGAL, CONTINUOUS REACTION AND LIMITING CONDITIONS

SECRET

UNITED STATES PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
ACTIVITIES AND FACILITIES IN PORTUGAL,
PORTUGUESE REACTION AND LOCAL CONDITIONS

SECTION ONE: PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

A. [illegible]

1. Four OWI programs are beamed to Portugal in Portuguese each day; two news, two commentary.

2. No special plan or directive is prepared for Portugal.

3. Nine other 15-minute programs are beamed to Portugal by independent broadcasters in America, presumably with some OWI guidance.

B. Other Activities

Other OWI activities in Portugal were, as of August 1943, delegated to the Press Attache of the Embassy. The Press Office was being supported primarily by OWI funds. (See State Department below)

SECTION TWO: ECONOMIC WARFARE

A. Preclusive Purpose

1. To deprive the Axis of potential resources, as tin, sheepskin, leather goods.

2. To obtain for ourselves valuable raw materials such as wolfram (through the U.S. Commercial Corporation, a subsidiary of RFC).

B. Export Licensing

1. To preclude the re-shipment of strategic raw materials from Portugal to the Axis.

2. To provide popular consumers goods such as motion pictures, cosmetics, medical equipment.

Protectionism / Come from us / The British / Dominion were displeased with our actions / [illegible]

3. Through threat of withdrawal of oil and gasoline to prevent the Portuguese Government from collaboration with the Axis.

4. Through threat of withdrawal of news print to influence pro-Axis newspapers to take a more neutral line.

5. Through bargaining with the supply of raw rubber to increase Portuguese usage of American movies.

COORDINATION OF PSYCH-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

A. Portuguese Language Propaganda Materials

Portuguese language magazines, pamphlets, etc. already prepared by CIAA for Brazil are being distributed to some extent in Portugal. Em Guarda is popular.

B. Working on Portugal Through Brazil

Brazilian accessibility to Portuguese audience is somewhat greater than our own. CIAA's contacts with the Brazilian government are potentially usable for getting Brazil to increase its pro-United Nations propaganda to Portugal through such media as press and radio.

STATE DEPARTMENT

A. Location in Lisbon

1. Total staff estimated around 50 persons (as compared with the German staff of 300). It is reported that several of the high officials are bachelors and are thus handicapped in entertaining widely. Few of the staff can be expected to be interested in psychological warfare activities to the extent to which the German diplomatic staff is.

2. Press Office. In August 1940 only three Americans were on the staff. Total expenses at that

time were apparently around $8,000 per month (as opposed to $62,000 for the British and even more for the Germans.)

B. Press Office Activities

1. Advertisements in Portuguese newspapers for American motion pictures and radio programs. Greatest expense in Press Office budget.

2. Weekly news bulletin, distribution of 5,000 copies. This was planned in January and is probably in effect by now.

3. Distribution of Em Guarda, Portuguese Readers Digest, and pamphlets. The Embassy has requested at least 5,000 copies on most such items.

4. Distribution of photographs to the press.

5. Distribution of posters.

6. Window displays.

7. Films. Private showings, and possibly placement in public theaters by now. (An August Portuguese newspaper advertised a picture "Novo Mundo" containing among other things scenes from the battle of Midway).

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES -- S.A.

A. S.O.

S.O. subsidizes in Lisbon a weekly magazine O Sol, nominally Portuguese and neutral. It has met censorship trouble for pro-Allied articles.

B. S.I.

An agent stationed in Portugal who supervises activities, [illegible].

WAR DEPARTMENT, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

Military Attache with the Embassy in Lisbon (Lieutenant Colonel Rodrigo). Limited to intelligence activities although interested in the psychological warfare activities of all parties.

UNOFFICIAL ACTIVITIES AND CHANNELS

A. Motion Pictures

American pictures dominate the market, but are usually very old and grade B or less. (See State Department and BEW Above).

B. News Agencies

American news agencies supply Portuguese papers but according to reports are less used than are German controlled news services. Portuguese radio usage of news services is similarly biased.

C. Comic Strips

The principal Portuguese papers at least do not run American comic strips.

D. Business Contacts

Doubtless these are being utilized by BEW. American-made products have in the past been very popular in Portugal.

E. Independent Short-Wave Broadcasts

See OWI above.

F. American Newspapers and Magazines

According to one report these are unavailable in Portugal because of limitations upon shipping space. They could be influential.

PORTUGUESE REACTION

A. Public Sentiment

Probably favorable to the United States on the whole.

B. Government Sentiment

Authoritarian influence in ideology but admiration for some features of liberal system.

C. Brazilian Influence

Brazil's entry into the war was popular among the people, but may have disturbed Salazar's plan for a Latin-American bloc. Brazilians are to some extent looked down upon as provincial.

D. Integrity of Colonies

Portuguese official protest and public disapproval has been strong at every hint of American protective custody over the Azores. Considerable exchange of notes on this topic in the spring and summer of 1941.

E. American Economic Policy

Portugal feels deprived, and blames the British blockade and U. S. policy. The American authorities are much less considerate than the Germans in meeting specific requests by Portuguese industrialists. The United States are considered to take freely and offer little in return under the present economic policy.

F. Films

Films have been the principal media through which the Portuguese have come to know America. American movies and movie stars are popular; however, many films offend conservative Portuguese morals.

CONDITIONS LIMITING PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

A. Legal Restrictions

1. Considerable freedom is allowed, although the legal situation is complicated.

2. Portuguese press is required to be very neutral.

3. A number of British S. O. agents were arrested and banned from Portugal.

B. Literacy

Very low.

C. Radio Sets

Relatively rare. Estimated less than one radio per 50 persons. Half of the radios are capable of receiving short wave, but probably most are too weak to receive U. S. broadcasts.

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O. S. S. 4/3

October 20, 1943

COPY NO.

A JOINT PLAN FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN PORTUGAL

A BASIC PLAN FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN PORTUGAL

I. Basic Estimate of the Situation in Portugal

1. The importance to the United Nations of a neutral Portugal.

Mainland Portugal is ~~not~~ of primary strategic importance in the European war. But ~~a~~ neutral Portugal is of very considerable importance to the United Nations: (1) as a communications and operational center, as an ideological cockpit and listening post, and as a focal point of espionage and counter-espionage in its most lurid manifestation, (2) as a source of wolfram and other commodities, and a means of pre-emptive denial of these to Germany, (3) as a means of denying to Germany Portuguese ports from which it could more effectively harass Allied shipping lanes to the South Atlantic. For the last-named reason, the Azores, Madeira, and Cape Verde Islands constitute a vital Allied interest, but one which is susceptible of defense by Allied naval power.

2. Political Target.

Portugal is a dictatorship. Salazar founded the Estado Novo which has won prestige at home and abroad for the relative mildness of its rule, its attack on corruption, and its financial achievements. The New State is authoritarian, nationalist, corporative, anti-communist, anti-democratic,

and strongly Catholic in spirit. It is said that only about 40 percent of the Portuguese sympathize with Salazar, and only a small minority of those are determined Fascists or totalitarians. These few Fascists and pro-Nazis are to be found among the (few) wealthy businessmen, among the Police Force, a section of the Army and a few thousand intellectuals and middle class people. Comparatively few determined Catholics are pro-Nazi; they remember the persecution of the Church by the former liberal Governments. While the majority of the Portuguese population believes with unshakable optimism in an Allied victory, the pro-Nazi minority was impressed by Germany's initial great successes. (Even after the defeat of France and during the big German air raids on Britain most Portuguese never lost their confidence in a final victory for the United Nations.

Salazar is pre-occupied above all with the task of maintaining Portuguese neutrality. He sees danger for his regime in a victory either of the Axis or of the Anglo-Saxon powers in alliance with the Soviet.

Recommendation: No good purpose will be served at this juncture by attacks on Salazar or by comparing the Estado Novo with Axis dictatorships. (Salazar may have the support only of a minority, but that minority represents the

effective power in the country today). Such attacks on Salazar would only strengthen the position of the Germans in Portugal. On the other hand, dignified praise of the meritorious accomplishments of the Salazar regime by the press of the democratic states is rapidly reproduced in Portugal with a kind of naive gratitude.

3. Economic Target.

Portugal is not self-supporting. The South is rich and fertile, the North barren. Portugal's national prosperity depends largely on exports of a few widely diversified commodities-- wolfram, tin, wines, cork, sardines. Portugal is likewise dependent on imports for certain key commodities such as coal, oil, and copper sulphate.

Portugal's principal vulnerability lies in her dependence on maintaining overseas communications with her colonies and the Americas. The colonies in particular have become increasingly important both as markets and suppliers of various items (grain, rubber, etc.) Portugal's shipping position is extremely tight. Prior to the war trade with the Americas was carried on chiefly in ships of foreign registry. Now Portugal is largely dependent upon her own inadequate fleet of 50 over-age vessels, aggregating 195,000 GRT. Allied domination of Portuguese overseas shipping routes probably constitutes the most potent bargaining weapon available for use against Portugal.

A factor increasing the relative bargaining strength of the United Nations toward Portugal is the existence of a number of commodities which it is extremely difficult for the Axis to spare. Oil and copper culphate are the principal items in this category.

Pre-war Portuguese oil requirements amounted to about 200,000 tons, all imported; the estimate for 1942 imports is 60,000 tons. The tanker shortage was largely responsible for this decline.

The very existence of Portuguese wines depends on imports of copper sulphate, which have come almost exclusively from the United Kingdom. Almost all of Portugal's coal imports in 1941 came from the United States and the United Kingdom. Finally the physical possession of some $200,000,000 in gold earmarked for Portugal is a potential source of pressure. There is little likelihood that the gold would go to Germany so long as Portugal's present trade position vis-a-vis Germany is maintained.

Portugal is much less susceptible to direct action on the part of the United Nations with respect to food than are other European Neutrals or occupied countries. The pressure that could be exerted by threatening to cut Portuguese food imports is only moderate.

The other side of the picture is the strength of Portugal's economic bargaining position which lies in her ability to supply or withhold certain strategic materials desired by <u>both</u> the United Nations and the Axis.

In 1941 Portugal supplied about one-third of Britain's annual requirement of tungsten and in 1942-43 will deliver somewhat less than one-half of Germany's requirements of the metal. The importance of Portugal's tungsten position is, therefore, not restricted to her ability to withhold it from Germany. A factor reducing Portugal's bargaining power vis-a-vis the United Nations with respect to tungsten lies in the possibility that Germany may meet a large proportion of her tungsten deficiency through imports from the Far East.

Portugal is currently supplying about 60 percent of the Axis requirement of tin. Again Portugal's bargaining position vis-a-vis the United Nations is not as strong as it would be were the Axis completely dependent on Portuguese ores. Imports from the Far East by blockade runners are expected.

In the case of cork, Portugal is the chief supplier of the United States and England, and the alternative sources of supply are insignificant.

Another factor increasing the general bargaining strength of Portugal is the relatively large number of essential commodities which can be supplied by the Axis as well as by the United Nations. For example, Germany may now have a small surplus of rubber, part of which could go to Portugal.

Recommendation: A sound political warfare policy toward Portugal requires that American economic policy be designed to relieve Portuguese economic stringencies in so far as such a program is congonant with other requirements of American policy. It is particularly desirable to relieve stringencies in those areas where the Germans are making significant efforts to influence the Portuguese through "propaganda exports." It is important to meet such demands as those for carbon black for printer's ink where Portuguese need is critical and the danger of re-export to Germany negligible. American policy should exploit fully the possibilities of "advertising" to the Portuguese the origin of American goods.

4. Social Target.

(a) Ruling group.

Salazar's attitude is enigmatic. Earlier in the year he was said to be pro-British but to have little faith in an Allied victory. The course of military events this summer and fall may have somewhat altered his attitude in a direction favorable to the United Nations.

As a group, Portuguese politicians are friendly to the British, an attitude reflecting the centuries-old alliance between the two countries and the reliance of Portugal on British naval power for the defense of both metropolitan Portugal and the colonies. Portuguese politicians are anxious to maintain the Estado Novo which they identify with their escape from communism and the chaotic conditions of preceding regimes.

<u>Recommendation</u>: American propaganda should stress Portugal's interest in an Allied victory and a post-war world in which the two leading naval powers would be profoundly concerned with the maintenance of her independence. It could play tactfully on the historic theme of Portugal's dependence on British sea power.

(b) Business Circles.

The properties classes have benefitted from Salazar's mild dictatorship but have no desire to see Portugal's interests merged in the flux of an anarchic Europe dominated by Germany. The significant dependence of Portuguese economy on that of Britain and the United States disposes businessmen in Portugal to a friendly attitude. The Portuguese, for example, look forward to a great boom in the British wine market after the war.

Recommendation: American propaganda should emphasize the close linkage of the Portuguese economy with that of Britain and the United States and Portugal's interest in the revival of her trade at the end of the war. The vast resources of the United States would then be available to aid in the construction of an economically healthy Europe, whereas an Axis victory would inevitably plunge Europe into a long period of poverty during which small states like Portugal would be made to suffer for the benefit of Germany.

(c) Workers and Peasants.

The growing unpopularity of the Government with the working classes apparently reflects the increased cost of living. The living standard in Portugal is very low; the improvements made by Salazar concern the budget of the Government. Portugal is predominantly a country of peasants who are regarded by the British as "almost fanatically pro-British". Portugal is largely illiterate but the radio (listened to on a communal basis) is of great importance in reaching the peasants.

Recommendation: Workers and peasants can be appealed to on the economic plane; Allied victory will mean a lifting of the economic depression which has settled on Portugal.

Freedom from want should be a favorite subject of propaganda. Vice President Wallace's and other Allied Statesmen's statements about the "century of the common people" will not fail to be effective.

(d) The Military.

The Portuguese Army is small and ill-equipped, the Air Force weak, the Navy small and obsolete. Portuguese military morale, always low, has been further affected by drastic cuts in officers' pay (which have caused ill-feeling against the regime). Most of the Army is now in the Azores; that remaining in Portugal would offer little resistance to a German invasion.

The common soldier, drawn from the traditionally pro-British masses, are more favorably inclined to the Allied cause than are the officers, who come from classes more considerably affected by German propaganda (many senior officers have bitter recollections of the accusations of cowardice levelled against them as a result of their unfortunate participation in World War I).

(e) The Church.

The Catholic Church in Portugal is guided by "one of the wisest and most progressive prelates", Cardinal Patriarch Cerejeira. He is strongly pro-Allied. He realizes

that the Salazar regime is not popular among the masses. Though he is a personal friend of Salazar, he has recently performed a separation of Church and State. It seems to calculate that Salazar will not be able to continue the dictatorship in the case of an Allied victory. Unlike certain Latin American prelates he recognizes that the persecution of the Church by radicals and liberals in Portugal and South America was partly due to the fact that the Hierarchy made common cause with the "vieux regimes." He has recently and on different occasions raised his voice against racism and aggression. He is a strong personality and his influence among clerics and laymen is widely felt. The Catholic milieu in Portugal is consequently easier to approach by propaganda of the United Nations than the Catholic milieu in Spain or Argentina.

Recommendation: Propaganda should stress the liberty enjoyed by the Catholic Church in the democracies, especially in the United States. News items about the development of the Church in the U. S. should be distributed. The fact of the reconciliation between Church and State in Mexico should be underscored. Statements for Christianity by leaders of the United Nations should be circulated. The Christian foundations of the Constitution should be explained.

Anti-Nazi statements of Princes of the Church should be made public and demonstrated by news items about the persecution of the Church. The statements of the Pope against racism and nationalism should be interpreted. As French literature dominates the field, the writings of Maritain, Claudel, etc., should be cultivated. If possible direct contacts between American Catholics and Portuguese leaders of Catholic Action should be arranged.

II. General Plan of Propaganda for Portugal

1. General Aims.

(a) The aim of American propaganda to Portugal should be to associate as completely as possible in the Portuguese mind the American and British war effort and to emphasize how essential to British victory our cooperation is. In this way the United States can capitalize on the widespread pro-British mentality of the Portuguese, which is one of the most significant integrating forces in Portugal today.

(b) A second and parallel aim should be to widen the knowledge of America in Portugal, where an almost complete

(c). Power of U.S. & international writing.

ignorance exists, and to disabuse the Portuguese of the unfortunate prejudices concerning the United States which have resulted, for example, from American films and the attitudes of certain American businessmen.

2. Specific Objectives (for the achievement of the General Aims above).

(a) To maintain the conviction of the Portuguese that their independent existence is bound up with an Allied victory, and that this victory will bring to Portugal economic prosperity and political progress. The Portuguese already believe this, and it is important that they continue to do so.

(b) To maintain the conviction of the Portuguese that the Allies will win the war. The upsurge of American war production should be emphasized above all--as making the race of the Axis with the Allies hopeless in the long run, whatever current reverses may suggest.

(c) To popularize America as an ally of Britain by emphasizing the traditional links between Britain and the United States, their close cooperation in the last war, and America's contribution to the British effort prior to Pearl Harbor.

(d) To undermine Portuguese prejudices toward the United States by revealing the American way of life, as one which, inter alia, guarantees order, respects property, has produced and widely disseminated economic prosperity, and has consistently lent its support to the principle of independence for small nations.

(e) To convince the Portuguese that the United States respects the Portuguese Government, regards it as the expression of Portuguese national consciousness, and does not anticipate that the collapse of European fascism will mean the end of the Estado Novo.

EXCERPTS — O.S.S. SUPPORTING COMMITTEE — PORTUGAL

5th Meeting - 7/16/42

II. SUGGESTIONS FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

MR. TAYLOR reported that Colonel Donovan requested this Committee to furnish material for a plan of psychological warfare in North Africa, and an accompanying plan for Spain and PORTUGAL, in connection with North Africa.

THE SUPPORTING COMMITTEE:-

Agreed to collect material for a North Africa plan and to summarize its findings for presentation at the next meeting.

6th Meeting - 7/20/42

I. PLAN FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN NORTH AFRICA

COMMANDER VANDERBILT stated that a plan for North Africa should embody definite and material propaganda and should be a scheme of action rather than a general theory.

MR. WILSON stated his belief that the different elements in the North African theatre should be broken up into separate problems and treated as such rather than as an integral whole.

22nd Meeting - 8/20/42

III. PORTUGUESE NEWSPAPER

MR. TAYLOR reported that O.W.I. requested information as to what plans the O.S.S. entertained in regard to the purchase of a Portuguese newspaper. He suggested that the matter should be referred to the J.P.W.S.C. so that jurisdiction over foreign powers for special purposes may be cleared with Mr. Elmer Davis.

31st Meeting - 9/7/42

II. PORTUGUESE NEWSPAPER

The Committee discussed a memorandum on the subject of subsidizing the Portuguese newspaper, SOL, with the cooperation of O.W.I. The principle of agreement between O.W.I. and O.S.S. is that O.S.S. will make the arrangements for purchase and O.W.I. will furnish the material and suggestions as to what line the paper should take.

THE COMMITTEE discussed the possibility that O.S.S.

has already made arrangements for the purchase of SOL; in this event, communication should be made with O.W.I. at once, so that they may start the distribution of material

32nd Meeting - 9/14/42

VI. SPANISH AND PORTUGUESE NEWSPAPERS

MR. WILSON reported that he had not received an answer in regard to the purchase of a Spanish newspaper. COLONEL SOLBORG authorized Rodrigo to make a subsidy to a newspaper.

COMMANDER VANDERBILT will inquire into this matter.

34th Meeting - 9/23/42

VI. PORTUGUESE NEWSPAPER
(Ref. - O.S.S. 22nd Meeting, 8/20/42; 31st Meeting 9/7/42)

COMMANDER VANDERBILT reported that Colonel Rodrigo told Colonel Goodfellow that the newspaper in LISBON was worthwhile but that it would fold up unless we continue to contribute.

35th Meeting - 9/24/42

I. PROPAGANDA TO PORTUGAL
(Ref. J.P.W.S.C. 35th Meeting - 9/23/42)

DR. ROGERS asked the Committee for suggestions and comments on the M.I.S. paper on the above subject.

MR. WILEY said that particular names and addresses, on behalf of the Germans, are used in LISBON in order to subscribe to newsletters put out in Washington, such as the Kiplinger News Service. Using this as background he suggested a plan to use LISBON as a way of siphoning false information into Germany by newsletters.

MR. WILSON stated that the truth as published in our newspaper is a drawback to the dissemination of false information and cited the fact that LISBON obtains microfilm copies of our newspapers from Buenos Aires.

MR. DEUEL expressed his opinion that a frontal reputation of veracity must be established before such information would be assimilated by the enemy.

MR. WILSON stated that activities can be divided into (1) Open Propaganda (2) Black Propaganda (planting of

information), which should be coordinated.

THE SUPPORTING COMMITTEE:-

Recommended that an O.S.S. activity be built up of false non-military information to be cleared through the J.P.W.C.

Agreed that the dissemination of false information encompasses the following subjects:

1. Elections in November
2. The Negro Problem
3. Difficulties in production
4. Differences between the Japanese and the Germans.
5. Personal Relationships
6. Statements by experts
7. Economic aspects
8. Secret weapons

Agreed that dissemination of false information should have the following objectives:

1. Creation of confusion in the enemy
2. Discrediting the enemy's vocal propaganda
3. Intimate collaboration with the armed forces - foundation for camouflage of military activities
4. Misdirection - in public statements
5. Spoil enemy assessments of raw material

Directed Mr. Deuel to formulate a project on the method of confusing the enemy, outside of the military, to illustrate the kind of things worth saying and the possible consequences.

II. COMMEMORATIVE MONUMENT IN LISBON
(Ref. - J.P.W.S.C. 35th Meeting - 9/23/42 M.I.S.)

MR. WILSON suggested that the Municipal Government in LISBON be consulted as to its preference in this matter.

COMMANDER VANDERBILT stated his opinion that this action is open to criticism on the basis that it appears to be obvious propaganda.

DR. TRYON suggested that O.W.I. function in the financial handling instead of the O.S.S.

THE SUPPORTING COMMITTEE:-

Took note that DR. ROGERS will bear these considerations in mind when the question comes up for discussion at the J.P.W.S.C.

16th Meeting - 9/25/42

I. PROPAGANDA TO PORTUGAL
(Ref. - M.I.8. Document JPWSC 35th Meeting - 9/23/42)

DR. ROGERS submitted a revised draft, entitled Organization of Psychological Warfare in Portugal, which incorporates the preceding material presented by Lt. Col. Blakeney.

THE SUPPORTING COMMITTEE:-

A. Recommended that, under the heading Suggested Steps, the following changes be made:

1. On page 2, item 2, reading "That an overall plan be approved by the J.P.W.C." be added.
2. On page 2, item 2, become item 3.
3. On page 3, item b under 3 be omitted.
4. On page 3, item c become item b.
5. On page 4, item 3 become item 7 under b.
6. On page 4, item 4 be changed to read:

   4. A That the O.S.S. having already its agency in Portugal should:

      1. Develop plans for the dissemination of false information designed to confuse the enemy intelligence.

      2. That such plans be passed by the J.P.W.C. in advance.

      3. That such plans be coordinated with other centers which may offer possibilities in this sense.

   4. B That the O.S.S. having an influence with the newspapers should use this influence within the practicable limitations of an overall plan.

7. That, on page 4, item 5 be changed to read:

   That the Military and Naval Attaches at Lisbon be instructed to collaborate in this overall plan.

35th Meeting - 9/30/42

III. COMMEMORATIVE MONUMENT TO PORTUGAL
(Ref. - JPWSC 35th Meeting - 9/23/42 M.I.S.)

COMMANDER VANDERBILT reported that the decision of the JPWSC in this matter is that the monument should be handled by the O.S.S. rather than O.W.I. for two reasons:

1. Our contact with Portugal.

2. Necessity for the United States Government to finance this proposal brings it under the O.S.S.

The O.S.S. is requested to explore the possibilities of raising funds from Portuguese-Americans to erect a suitable form of memorial, either in Lisbon or in Horta, the Azores, by the spring of 1944, which is the anniversary of the date of Commander Read's flight. A competition with a prize in war bonds for the sculptor has been suggested.

MR. WILEY suggested that Weston Howland, who has worked with the Portuguese around Boston and Providence might be consulted in relation to a competition and to publicity.

DR. TRYON discussed with the Committee the relative advantages and disadvantages of carrying out this plan through Congress.

THE SUPPORTING COMMITTEE:-

1. Agreed that it was preferable that this plan did not pass through Congress.

2. Recommended that MR. WILEY consult with MR. HOWLAND as to publicity and MRS. WILEY as to the amount of the prize.

VII. PROPAGANDA TO PORTUGAL
(Ref. - M.I.S. Document, 35th Meeting - 9/23/42)

COMMANDER VANDERBILT stated that this portion of the plan for PORTUGAL has been approved by the Subcommittee.

MR. WILSON raised the question of implementation for this plan.

THE SUPPORTING COMMITTEE:

Recommended that the Poison Pen Project could be used in relation to PORTUGAL.

19th Meeting - 10/2/42

II. PORTUGAL

COMMANDER VANDERBILT reported that MR. HOWLAND would be able to collaborate presently in this field.

43rd Meeting - 10/9/42

III. PORTUGUESE MONUMENT

MR. WILEY stated that the usual procedure in a competition is to offer a 1st, 2nd and 3rd prize. If the project is accepted a first prize will include the cost of putting it up and will amount to 35 to 40 thousand dollars; that small scale models are presented in plaster; that the Committee to organize and run such a competition will be drawn from groups of representative Portuguese Americans.

THE SUPPORTING COMMITTEE:-

Directed MR. WILEY through FNB to procure the names of several leading Portuguese-Americans.

45th Meeting - 10/12/42

II. PROPAGANDA PLAN FOR PORTUGAL
(Ref. - O.N.S. Meeting 10/9/42)

In reference to the propaganda phase of a Plan for Psychological Warfare in PORTUGAL, which involves liaison with O.W.I., DR. LANGER raised the question of whether N&A material should be made accessible to O.W.I. MR. WILSON said that if the material is scrutinized and censored there should be no objection to this procedure. MR. WILEY expressed his belief that a commitment in writing stating that the proper security be given to the material, should be obtained.

IV. PLAN FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN PORTUGAL
(Ref. - Meeting 10/9/42)

MR. WILEY presented a paper entitled "Portuguese in United States. Appraisal of their Potentialities." MR. WILSON reported that Colonel Huntington would give the Committee a brief survey of O.O. instructions to O.N.S. operatives.

THE SUPPORTING COMMITTEE:-

Agreed to defer further discussion until the next meeting.

46th Meeting - 10/12/42

I. A PLAN FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN PORTUGAL
(Ref. - O.S.S. Meeting 10/9/42)

DR. TRYON read excerpts from a paper on PORTUGAL prepared by the British Ministry of Information. He suggested that it would be useful for the Committee to read this material.

THE SUPPORTING COMMITTEE:-

Directed that copies of this paper be circulated to the members.

47th Meeting - 10/15/42

V. PLAN FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN PORTUGAL
(Ref. - O.S.S. Meeting 10/9/42)

DR. TRYON reported on the status of the material to be drawn for this plan and listed the various agencies, (Ministry of Information, FCC, OWI, BEW and OSS) which will supply the material.

50th Meeting - 10/21/42

IV. PLAN FOR PORTUGAL
(Ref. O.S.S. Meeting 10/9/42)

DR. TRYON reported on the available materials oriented to psychological warfare, presented at this meeting. After a discussion of this material,

THE SUPPORTING COMMITTEE:-

Agreed that the psychological warfare objectives in PORTUGAL are:

1. Creation of a favorable attitude to the U.S.
2. Use of PORTUGAL as a channel
   a. for material <u>to</u> other countries
   b. for material <u>from</u> other countries

17th Meeting - 9/29/42 Subcommittee Meeting

1. ORGANIZATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN PORTUGAL (Ref. - O.S.S. Memorandum)

LT. COL. BLAKENEY questioned whether the Office of War Information should be made responsible for erecting a monument in PORTUGAL to commemorate the Transatlantic Flight of Lt. Commander Read in 1919. COMMANDER VANDERBILT explained that the O.S.S. Supporting Committee believed that this project pertained more to propaganda than to psychological warfare. General discussion brought out the point that the necessity for the U.S. Government to finance this proposal in part would remove it from the sphere of O.W.I. activities and would naturally place the project under the Office of Strategic Services.

LT. COMMANDER MORAN renewed his suggestion that the most desirable first step would be to offer a prize of about one thousand dollars for the design of a suitable memorial, for which wide publicity could be obtained in PORTUGAL. It might even be helpful to restrict the competition to residents of PORTUGAL and its Atlantic Island Possessions. Such a prize could be financed by O.S.S. LT. COL. BLAKENEY said that the prize might take the form of U.S. War Bonds.

CAPTAIN GROSSKOPF suggested that an alternate place for the memorial might be HORTA, AZORES which was Commander Read's first stop after leaving NEWFOUNDLAND. A suitable time for unveiling the memorial might be the 25th anniversary of the flight which would occur on May 17, 1944. He added that a monument combined with an aviation beacon might be suitable, but that any such decision could well be left to the Portuguese-American societies which would sponsor the project.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:-

a. Directed that the proposal to erect a monument to commemorate the Transatlantic Flight of Commander Read be reworded to invite the O.S.S. to sound out the various Portuguese groups in the United States concerning their sponsorship of such a project.

b. Approved the balance of the general proposal for psychological warfare in PORTUGAL.

c. Directed the Secretary to make the necessary revisions in this paper and forward it to the J.P.W.C. with the Subcommittee's recommendation that it be approved.

- 9/25/42

ANDA TO PORTUGAL
- M.I.8. Memorandum; O.S.S. Memorandum)

DR. ROGERS presented the draft of a report prepared by O.S.S. which incorporated all of the material in the M.I.8. memorandum on this subject and added some new information. It also incorporated part of the material from the memorandum on "Commemorative Monument in Lisbon."

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:-

Agreed to consider the revised memorandum at its next meeting.

15th Meeting - 9/23/42

3. PROPAGANDA TO PORTUGAL
(Ref. - M.I.S. Proposal

DR. ROGERS asked if it would be permissible for the O.S.S. Supporting Committee to make suggestions on the two proposals regarding PORTUGAL which had been submitted by the M.I.S.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:-

Requested that O.S.S. prepare and submit such comments and proposals as it might wish to add.

JPWC

EXCERPTS SUBCOMMITTEE PORTUGAL

24th Meeting - 9/22/43

5. PROPAGANDA TO PORTUGAL
(Ref. - Two Draft Memoranda from M.I.6.)

LT. COL. BLAKENEY presented drafts of two memoranda on this subject, viz. (a) Propaganda to Portugal, (b) Commemorative Monument in Lisbon.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:-

Agreed to discuss these subjects at its next meeting.

JPWC PORTUGAL

EXCERPTS

8th Meeting - 10/5/42

4. ORGANIZATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN PORTUGAL (Ref. - J.P.W.C. 40)

ADMIRAL TRAIN pointed out the desirability of removing any open contacts of psychological warfare agents with the Military and Naval Attaches in PORTUGAL and General Wedemeyer expressed his agreement.

COLONEL DONOVAN stated that great care will be taken on this matter.

Answering a question, LT. COL. BLAKENEY stated that G-2 did not see any need for a clarification of the Brazilian situation before implementing these proposals regarding PORTUGAL. He added that General Strong suggested that the reaction of O.W.I. to the parts of the plan pertaining to that organization should be obtained before the final details of this proposal are determined. COLONEL DONOVAN stated that he would discuss those matters with Mr. Elmer Davis.

THE COMMITTEE:-

(a) Agreed to accept the proposals of this paper in principle.

(b) Requested the Office of Strategic Services to prepare and submit detailed plans to this Committee, for later referral to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.