



~~Foreign Relations~~
~~Moslems~~
SECRET
~~Central Intelligence Agency~~

RELATIONS BETWEEN MOSLEMS AND AMERICANS IN NORTH AFRICA.

Colton S. Don

May 21, 1943.

The Moslem population of North Africa is important to our war effort only in Morocco and Tunisia. In Algeria where the French have been installed for over one hundred years, the Moslems have either been reduced to a politically impotent servile class, as in the rich farming areas, or have assumed the role of Indians on reservations, as with the mountain Berbers.

MOROCCO:

In Morocco a division exists between the French and Spanish Zones, the latter now including the former International Zone of Tangier.

FRENCH ZONE:

In the French zone the Moslems as a whole were delighted to see our landing. Americans had always enjoyed a fabulous reputation among them and they thought that we had come to set them free. The President's Day speech, which adapted itself so readily to translation into Arabic, sounded like a new chapter of the Koran, whereby men might abandon injustices and the world be free.

Several events helped maintain our reputation. One of the Sultan's ministers picked a copy of our manual for soldiers entering North Africa (an OSS product) from an American corpse, and brought it to the Sultan. When it had been translated to him, the Sultan wept, and exclaimed:

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"Praise Gpd it is men like these who have landed on our shores! They even think to instruct their men how to behave toward Moslems! They must be indeed fine people!"

Again, a Syrian Moslem U.S. soldier named Siblani was seen praying in a mosque, in U.S. Army uniform. He was led before the Sultan, whom he delighted, and whom he then served as liaison and interpreter.

In general, the Americans give the Arabs whom they see cigarettes, candy, chewing-gum, and clothing. They are kind to children; they knock down their vehicles rather than run over sheep. They are good humored and generous and treat the Arabs like human beings. They do not, like many of the French, always shout at them, but they speak to them in a moderate tone of voice. The Arabs appreciate this and wish to associate with our soldiers. In many Army messes one finds Arabs working in the kitchen, some in G-I uniforms. In petrol dumps the same is true. Most outfits have adopted Arab mascots in one capacity or other, and many of these have learned English since November 8th.

Of course but a small proportion of the Moslems have seen or dealt with Americans.----only those living in cities or along the roads, and near the bivouac areas, where they congregated to sell oranges and eggs. But all of them know about us, and despite the malicious propaganda against us, spread by enemy agents and, in some cases, almost certainly, by French as well, we are still popular among the average illiterate Arabs.

However, the Arab intelligentsia, including the survivors of the suppressed Nationalist party, feel let down now that they realize that we are not going to change their status and that they will remain at

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the mercy of the French government. It does us no good to tell them that such matters must be deferred until after we have won the war, if we meddle in their affairs at all. Furthermore the failure of our goods---cotton, tea, sugar, shoes, etc.----to be distributed quickly or equably has reduced our strongest asset in establishing good relations to a small compass. The French, who insist on taking charge of the distribution, have kept most of the cloth themselves---in Fez they handed out cheese cloth to the Arabs---and while French children get all the American milk they can drink, the Arab babies get little or none. At Khemisset the Controleur Civil and the Kaid worked a mutual racket. They kept the tea given them by the Americans to distribute among the natives, and sold it on the black market. At Berkane a month ago American shoes were sold in a shop with this in the window: "Vente libre des souliers Americains. Interdit aux Israélites". If the Jews were forbidden to buy, it is easy to imagine how many pair of shoes the Arabs got.

Aside from casual and normal personal contacts, the relations between Moslems and Americans pass almost entirely through the French, who watch us jealously and try to prevent us from dealing with natives directly, especially with tribal leaders and other politically important individuals. In Fez the French police keep observers posted to see what natives enter and leave Captain Holcomb's (our OSS representative) house; they view with alarm our friendship with el Hajj Abd el Kadher el Elj, a Nationalist whom they have, on several occasions, jailed.

In April I made a trip in a jeep to the Northern Gzennaya, where I knew many Rifians of old. Here I found the French posts in a bad state for want of transport---food was short, the soldiers had no cigarettes, and

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morale, in this ticklish border area, was low. Upon my return to Oujda I told General Clark about this, and he ordered an American truck and driver put at the disposal of these outposts. The commanding officer of the region, located at Taza, refused General Clark's offer, on the grounds that I had a bad record as a native agitator and had engineered this deal so that I could have a truck to ride in, to get back to the Gzennaya and stir up revolt among the natives. So the soldiers continued to go without cigarettes.

We have neither the personnel nor the local knowledge to police Morocco. We must, whatever our policy, leave this business largely to the French. Among the French officials, a number of the younger officers of the Bureau des Affaires Indigenes are on our side politically, and are kindly disposed to their native charges as well. (The situation is parallel to that of the contrast between the younger and older men in our Indian service). If the French political madhouse in Morocco can be cleaned out, and if these younger officers can be given a free hand with native affairs, our relations with the Moslems away from the towns and roads will increase in volume and improve, and the lot of the natives under the French must inevitably improve as well. If the older men, who are anti-American and unsympathetic to natives are left in power, no progress will be made in this direction.

SPANISH ZONE: In the Spanish Zone the majority of the natives favor us and ardently wish that we would step in and oust the Spanish whom they detest. This is true despite the intensive German propaganda.

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campaign against us and despite the activities of the German-controlled local branch of the Nationalist party under the traitor, Abdel Khalek Torres.

The Germans, whose local propaganda chief is Sonnenhol, are spreading the rumors that Americans are always drunk and habitually rape Moslem women and even rape donkeys. Natives who profess to be eye witnesses of these things walk from village to village spreading this filth and the Arab press, German controlled, is violently anti-us.

A month ago the Germans asked the Nationalists to spread the rumor that they were going to sabotage our transport and communications in French Morocco and then enter in force by air and sea. The Germans have also approached a number of native Kaids to accept arms shipments and to fight against us. In Melilla, Alcazar, and Tetuan they are enlisting natives to attend their sabotage schools, to blow up rails and bridges in the French zone and in Algiers. So far they have been completely unsuccessful, and we have been able to penetrate these schools with double agents.

The natives in the Spanish zone still remain largely on our side despite the propaganda to which they have been subjected which proves that with them as elsewhere the most effective propaganda is that of deeds and works, not words.

TUNISIA: In Tunisia the Germans had a great advantage over us. We were identified with the French whom the Arabs distrusted and disliked. The Germans said we had come to support the French and Jews, which was not untrue. All hope of Tunisian nationalism would vanish were we to win. The Germans gave them oil, taken from them

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earlier through the French, and cloth. The Germans let them loot French farms.

In the 5th Corps Area we tried to combat this by distributing cloth, tea, and sugar through our SD posts (an OSS-SOE project) and by establishing new weekly markets with American and British goods to replace the markets, such as Mateur, in German hands (a Psychological Warfare project). We tried to prevent the French in our area from abusing the natives and removed from the combat area Frenchmen who mistreated Arabs.

In the 2nd Corps area we did not get started in time to do much good. American soldiers were already shooting Arabs and Arabs were guiding German patrols against us, when the SD got started in that area at the time of the Kasserine Pass retreat. I was recalled from Tunisia at that time and as far as I know no one attempted to straighten out American-Arab relations in that area afterward. It was probably too late in any case - the damage had been done.

Now that the Germans are out of Tunisia and the Arabs will have a chance to see American troops on a non-combat basis, we have reason to hope that a situation similar to that in Morocco will arise and our relations with Arabs will improve.

On the whole, I think that the American Army has set an example in dealing with Moslems which may well affect the whole Islamic world.

SECRET

REC 17 REC'D

To: General Magruder

Would you make such notes
from this as you wish and then
have copy of it made and sent to
SI. After you have finished with
this paper please return to me.

WJD

Director's Office

(3908)



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN LEGATION

SECRET

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I returned to Tangier on 25th March. Everything goes well here. There is a little conflict between my orders from Colonel Eddy and A.F.H.Q. to withhold from Booth any operational information. This conflict occurs because a great deal of our Moslem information comes from our operational D. group (Strings group) who cannot separate it themselves. I take out the occasional operational item and turn the information over to Booth. When I am away, as on this last trip, Booth believes that he should do the sorting, while I believe that to follow out my orders from A.F.H.Q. it should be done by Lt. Hoskinson, appointed my assistant in . . . by Colonel Eddy. This sephyr in a teapot, I believe will cause no difficulty unless Booth chooses to take an issue of it. Outside of this present complication we cooperate well and all information supplied by our Moslems is turned over to him. There is a lot of it as may be noted from his reports.

I have been ill, but I'm now back to normal again. Coon was suffering from fatigue after his Tunisian experiences, but was visibly improving daily when I last saw him and should be all right now.

I am enclosing a booklet "Plan de Reformes Marocaines", which should be of extreme interest to those Americans interested in Moroccan native affairs. It is the official platform of the Nationalist Party and represents, aside from its anti-berber paragraphs, the political feelings of most Moslems in Morocco. Its circulation and possession is forbidden by the French. I would appreciate it if you would see that it reaches the hands of those interested in the native problem in Morocco.

Very sincerely yours,

Radu Brown

Special Agent in Charge, Foreign Services,
Washington, D.C.

SIR: Dear Col. Donovan,

On January 3 I went to Casablanca at the request of G-2 to discuss with one of their officers a plan of the Spanish-German threat to the Spanish Zone. The Army was changing from an Expeditionary Force to their present base. I went to Fes for four days primarily in a vain effort to get released from jail a Moslem who had been of help to us in that city. With me was Randolph Mohammed Gusus, originally from Fes, employed by the Legation at Tangier as interpreter but actually the invaluable contact man of Coon and myself, who have been his close friends for many years in Morocco and America. The following report is the result of the four day stay, the information being obtained largely from my friends and acquaintances in that native city. At the same time we set up for Mr. Williamson at Colonel Eddy's request an information service designed to give to Vice Consul Reid direct contact with the center of Moslem thought in Morocco. It will also cover Meknes and Casablanca, and can be extended to Marrakesch if desired. The Moslems providing this service are well known persons of substance, serving without pay as a patriotic duty as Moroccan Arabs, except for one whose main job is acting as messenger and who receives pay.

Everything is going well on the surface in Tangier. There has been a noticeable change in the last few days. Moslems who were formerly afraid to speak to myself and Gusus now walk up to us freely and are glad to see us. Relations between Moslems and Spanish are changed too. The Moslems are not as scared and the Spaniards not as arrogant. I am not sure of the reason, but I think that our troops and equipment in the French Zone are the cause - a few Moslems have got down and back - some Spaniards also. This is a minor matter but perhaps important. The German effort at the Morocco area, where efforts had been made to get the tribes to accept arms deliveries has broken down.

In accordance with Colonel Eddy's instructions to me, one of our two Moslem SO organizations is now doing a good job of intelligence work in the Western Spanish Zone. This is the large group headed by Mr. D. The identity of the group together with operational information is withheld, but all intelligence is turned over to Waller Booth. He has expanded its intelligence work and improved it by pertinent suggestions. The second "Tassels" group has a different set up and cannot be used for intelligence work.

I hope that it is correct that Government Life insurance is now available for us. I called you today about this on the suggestion of Mr. Hughes, whom I met in Fes.

Very sincerely yours,

Gordon H. Browne
Gordon H. Browne

1. Fez, January 13. The Moslems of Fez believe that the American troops are using Moroccan food causing a scarcity of flour and meat since November. Shortage of flour expected until June. Medicines also scarce. It was suggested that to be broadcast in Arabic that Americans brought their own food including oranges, which are now on market in quantity for first time. An article on this matter in the Arabic paper Basda was also proposed.

GMB

2. Fez, January 13. The Fez Moslems believe that there is a constantly increasing difficulty between the British and Americans. It was thought this could be counteracted by news paper articles and radio broadcasts in Arabic.

GMB

3. Fez, January 13.

A) The Fez Moslems desire the entry of American soldiers into the native city, but fear that soldiers, whom they have seen under the influence of liquor in Casablanca and Rabat, will forcibly enter mosques.

B) They also fear that Moroccan Jews may intensify their efforts to associate themselves with American troops and equipment, particularly in joining groups of Americans in native cities where they are not welcome.

It was suggested that A) could be arranged by posting Moslem and American M.P.'s at or near mosques - with signs in English or by allowing officers only to enter native city freely, enlisted men in small escorted groups. B) could be arranged by providing licensed Moslem guides.

GMB

4. Fez, January 13. Seventy to eighty percent of people in Fez believe that we will win the war. This is their own figure.

5. Fez, January 13. Moslems in Fez believe there are at present no German propaganda agents among them, or that if there are, they are so inactive that they cannot be recognized.

6. Fez, January 13. German propaganda listened to on radio by Fez Moslems. Anti-Semitic and food shortage lies are the only ones taking hold. German broadcasts on Moroccan events that they know to be untrue have weakened German propaganda.

GMB

7. Fez, January 13. It was suggested by Fez Moslems that the American backing of the Moroccan franc by the dollar be emphasized in Arabic radio broadcasts and newspapers. The transformation of the Moroccan franc from a practically worthless legal currency to a strong currency realized by business men, but not by the masses of the people.

GMB

8. Fez, January 13. Distribution of sugar and textiles fairly honest in Fez. Well known people get "bons" directly from Contrôleur Civil. Mass of people get goods by going to wholesaler with ration cards, get a "bon" to draw goods from small retailers, but there is little remaining. Mass of people have received two issues of cotton goods since January 1940 of 1 meter per person. Sugar, 700 grams per person per month. Everyone wants distribution of goods directly through Americans. Europeans get much more in goods, etc. than Moslems and this is resented.

GHB

9. Fez, January 13. In country region around Fez there has recently arisen a complete corruption of system through Caid, Khalifas, Sheiks and Contrôleurs Civils working together. People go to Caid or Sheik or Khalifa, give him money to get goods to sell in the black market. Caid, etc. give some of cash to contrôleurs for protection. Court decisions are now almost entirely bought - previously some corruption but not complete.

GHB

10. Fez, January 13. It is forbidden by Dahir since 1941 for a Moslem to buy property from a European, except for special purposes with permission which is rarely granted. American and British semsars not allowed to buy from Europeans because Moslems, nor from Moslems because protégés.

11. Fez, January 13. CONFIDENTIAL. Taxes. Country near Fez. A man has two mules - his annual tax on tax is 500-1000 francs. In addition, starting a year ago, man with two mules must deliver to government 700 kilos wheat for which he is paid amount that is about 1/2 market price. Sheep - Government takes 20% paid last year 1/2 market price. In El Atar area near Fez, Government tells sheik man must pay sheep tax - sheik tells him three sheep - man bribes sheik to reduce to one sheep.

GHB

12. CONFIDENTIAL. In Riff (French) annual tax is higher. If a man has 20 sheep or goats - 1 out of 20 taken by government, which last year paid 1/2 market price. In addition, every three men who have twenty sheep or goats or cow must sell a cow to government which last year paid 1/2 market price. If they have no cow, they must buy one to sell to Government. (last year price of cow 7,000 francs, government paid 3500). In Riff - man who has mules required to work on road without pay and feed mules for two week periods. Riffian informant, close friend, said it took nearly one quarter of his time to he sold his mules.

GHB

13. SECRET. Reaction of tribe of Gzenneya to American occupation.

This tribe, especially one clan, has had close relations with Gorn and Browne for many years, though only secret contact was made 1942. On D day Gzenneya were mobilized at Bouard asked if they would fight enemy not stated, and given guns. Next day they were told they were to go to Casablanca to fight the Americans.

10. continued. At that our friends, also Said Said Bukkeish (an old friend whom we had not directly contacted, went through the assembled fighters, telling them to cross over to our lines. Next day the contrôleur civil said "the Americans are everywhere like fleas, at Oran, Algiers, Casablanca, Safi, everywhere. You had better go to the Spanish border to protect your country from the Spaniards". Two days later they were called back - told to surrender their arms. The contrôleur said "Thank God the Americans are here. Now we are all together in the fight against our real enemy Germany. You Riffians are new in the war and the French and the Americans and our allies - all together against the Germans. Praise be to God!" Then they all went back to their farms. The friends of Coon and Browne then had many Riffians come to see them to ask/ them and everyone congratulates each other and said "Send the message to the Americans that we will fight for them any place any time, in their company. This is a great marvel. Everyone was pleased, including Coon and Browne at a later date who were not completely sure of Said Said Bukkeish because they had not seen him personally for several years and had not dared to take the chance of doing so.

GIB

14. Fez. January 13. The President's flag Day address in Arabic put out by the American Legation, Tangier, was shown to several important Fezis who were very much delighted. Distribution by mail and secretly by hand had been carried out in the Spanish Zone but Coon and Browne had not distributed it in the French Zone at the request of Mr. Phillips, Chargé d'Affaires. Every reader said "this must be published here." Several said "this is our religion". Two said "put this out and Berlin radio will have no effect". One man said "this is worth 50,000 American troops, spread it everywhere in the Moslem world".

This speech is in my opinion the finest propaganda we have in the Moslem world, especially since no one except our enemies, can take offense at it. This was brought to attention of Mr. Jay Allen, OWI, Casablanca who requested copies. They have been printed and delivered to OWI, Casablanca.

15. Fez, January 13. Mention was made of the heavy taxes and the hope that some reduction could be made. GIB

16. Fez, January 13. From various informants came the statement that the Moroccan Jews were identifying themselves with Americans and American equipment spreading slander against the Moslems, aggravating a situation already delicate and kept so by German propaganda. GIB

17. Fez, January 13. American troops have made a favorable impression among the Moslems around Fez, some of whom travel to Casablanca. Relations (in general) are very good, in spite of German propaganda and radio Rabat former efforts. We were asked to remember that a certain amount of theft will occur from the troops in a country where a shirt is worth about eight dollars. It was stated leniently will cause trouble and so will too much help.

GIB

18. Casablanca and Fez. French radio propaganda to the troops is the effect that with the Americans arrived a shortage of food and clothing and the situation is dangerous. The Moslems

Algeria North 10,439
R's Stabilization
R FRENCH
XFRANC

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel Donovan

DATE: February 12, 1943

FROM: W. L. Rahn *W.L.R.*

SUBJECT:

While I know it is the policy of our Treasury to depreciate the dollar, this strikes me as an extraordinary effort to appease the French Governor of Algeria.

Attachment

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Lieut. Col. W. L. Rehm

DATE: February 11, 1943.

FROM: Emerson Bigelow *Rehm*

SUBJECT:

Up to the time of our invasion of North Africa, the North African and West African francs were becoming cheaper and cheaper and the exchange rate went from 43.70 francs to the dollar to more than 250 francs to the dollar. Immediately following the invasion and as a result of pressure by the French Governor of Algeria upon our State Department, who, in turn, brought pressure to bear upon the U. S. Treasury, our Treasury agreed to stabilize the Algerian franc at 75 to the dollar. This rate was fixed at that time until February 1. Similar steps were taken successively to stabilize at the same rate the Moroccan Franc and the West African Franc. On February 9, we were informed by one of our men who had just returned from North Africa that the dollar rate for North African francs had again been lowered by the U. S. Treasury to 50 francs to the dollar. This report has since been confirmed by the Treasury, effective February 2, 1943.

With prices rising rapidly in North Africa, a cut in the rate will be a real hardship for any one receiving dollars.

Handwritten notes:
X Transportation
X [unclear]
X [unclear]

April 24, 1945

SECRET

SUBJECT: Request for Transportation

TO: The Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division,
War Department General Staff, Room 3 H 800,
Pentagon Building, Arlington, Virginia

THROUGH: Brigadier General John R. Deane

1. It is requested that transportation to Algiers be provided by first available sea passage for the OGE personnel listed below:

Rudolph August Wimmerker

2. We are advised that by cabling dated April 22, 1945 (OH-11-13401, April 22, 1945) to the War Department, the Theater Commander has approved the dispatch of the foregoing personnel.

William J. Donovan
Director

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL DONOVAN CONCERNING ACTIVITIES BEFORE AND
AFTER THE ARRIVAL OF COLONEL W. A. EDDY IN TANGIERS.

Previous to Colonel Eddy's arrival my work consisted mainly in collecting military and naval information for the War and Navy Departments, and answering any questions put forth by these departments. We filled out questionnaires on all the principal towns in Morocco. This included such things as electric power plants, water works, cold storage plants, railroad and road transportation facilities, docking and port facilities; also fortifications, troops, armaments and other specific military information. In this work I was particularly fortunate in making close contact with several members of the French S.R. and O.B. service, who had gone to ground when the Second Bureau was officially abolished by the terms of the German Armistice. From these men I was able to obtain considerable information concerning German Intelligence activities, and concerning even such matters as French battle order, fortifications, morale and army politics. From another source (after two months work) I was able to obtain all the official figures concerning French aviation: number of planes in stock, their condition to fly, the number under repair; plans of all fields and secondary fields; disposition of all French squadrons in case of an alert, plans for the defense of the air fields, the safety channels for the approaches to the fields, and the recognition signals.

Upon the arrival of Colonel Bday I was put at his disposal. I concentrated on such activities as sabotage, resistance groups, and the arranging for the clandestine departures of men who had rendered service and were in danger, or who were needed for technical consultations in the U. S. or England.

The first sabotage group with which I dealt was a British S.O. organization, whose objective was the destruction of 5000 tons of rubber on the docks at Casablanca. Unfortunately the time fuses and incendiary bombs did not arrive in time to operate on the main stock, but 200 to 300 tons were destroyed en route in freight cars. This incident showed the weakness in the British system, for they depended largely on French and Moroccan Jews. These Jews had proven themselves excellent for distributing propaganda tracts and had given fairly accurate service in the M.I. but failed utterly when it came to more active duties.

Upon our entrance into the war, I began to form resistance groups and definite sabotage groups. The resistance groups were to counteract the activities of the S.O.I. and P.P.F. Other groups were organized among the railroad men with the purpose of putting the railroads out of action temporarily should they be used to bring up troops to resist us. At the same time these men were to protect such railroad bottlenecks as tunnels, bridges and switching cars. Similar groups were organized among the telephone.

telegraph and power stations. At Rabat it was arranged that the radio station transmitters could be cut off from the studios and connected with a secret studio, so that if the chiefs of "Radio Maroc", who were hostile to us, began to broadcast, they would speak into a dead microphone and our men could issue proclamations from the secret studio. The chief technician of the telephone company had the wiring plans of all wires between the posts of commandment and all batteries; these wires were to be cut. In case of necessity the power plants were to be sabotaged, rendering useless electric trains, radios and most of the search lights. Over and above these groups, local strong-arm squads were organized; for instance in Casablanca we had a group of twelve men, all of whom had bicycles. Each of these men commanded a group of ten, for whom we smuggled in arms, hand grenades and explosives. Their object was to seize or eliminate the German Armistice Commission after having created the necessary commotion by the use of explosives. (Not one of these men had served less than three years in a German concentration camp.) Besides these active resistance groups there was a corps of six to ten men in each port where we expected to land who were to serve as guides to our men. A certain amount of work also was done to persuade various batteries and battalions to come over to our side without firing. Also a car was provided for Dr. LeDuc who, in cooperation with Col. Guillaume of the Service of Native Affairs at Rabat, was to visit various officers of the Berber in the interior with instructions to wire General Nogues if an American landing was attempted. These wires were to say that

if resistance to the Americans continued they would not be able to control the tribes under their jurisdiction.

So much for the actual plans and preparations. I will now give some idea of what happened from November 1 to November 11, 1942:

After many unsuccessful attempts I found a fishing boat that was willing to stand off shore and receive a load of arms from a British gun-runner from Gibraltar. Pinpoint position, time and signals were arranged with the British for a moonless period in the month. These plans were carefully gone over with the French captain. Two trucks were procured for the handling of the cases, which had been carefully limited to the strength of a man over 100 yards of sand. The chief of the French road police, who was working with us, had taken precautions that there would be no interference. The officer commanding the native troops along the coast was approached and squared. Some of my best men in the port had arranged that the coast patrol boat would not go out that night. Two days before the rendezvous the captain of the fishing boat was arrested on a charge of smuggling which had occurred two months previous, and his boat was impounded. We called upon our friend, Col. Herviot, Chief of the "Surete" to clear him, but before this could be done the moon was in a stage that would make the attempt too risky. So the arms had to be smuggled through by courier.

We had already smuggled the chief pilot of Port Lyatney to Tangiers in the trailer of a car, from whence he made his way to Gibraltar and the U.S., so we knew that the problem of landing

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was amply provided for. We had two clandestine wireless sets at Casablanca and were thus able to communicate with Gibraltar and Tangiers. Also we had two operators, in case one should be arrested. Thus we were reasonably sure of maintaining contact with Colonel Eddy at Gibraltar, but we were never able, at any time during the operations, to contact the fleet direct.

On November 4 Major Rigaud who had come down from Algiers got a final decision from General Bethouard who decided to risk his career and make every effort to receive us without resistance. On November 5 I was summoned by General Bethouard for a conference. At this conference he asked me the exact points at which we intended to land, and what precautions I had taken to keep myself informed of any postponement. I replied that I had expected the arrival of one of our staff officers but that this officer had failed to materialize. As far as points of debarkation were concerned, I could tell him only that I had received instructions to prepare guides and resistance groups at the following places: Port Lyautey, Sale-Rabat, Fedalla and Saff. As far as the numbers of troops involved were concerned, I could say only that I had heard mentioned that there would be some two hundred thousand men used along the whole coast. General Bethouard then asked me to urge our task force commander to land a light mobile force at both Sale and Massagan. This message I sent immediately by wireless to Colonel Eddy at Gibraltar, pointing out that there were no defenses at these points.

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On the morning of November 6 I sent messages to my various chiefs of the groups along the coast telling them to hold themselves in a state of alert, and to carry out my previous instruction if they heard firing. At three o'clock in the afternoon of November 7, three of General Bethouard's younger staff officers borrowed my car and proceeded to Meknes to arrest General Lasroux that evening. I asked General Bethouard if he did not wish me to accompany him to Rabat when he presented his ultimatum to General Nogues, but he said that he was leaving General Desre, who had given his word of honor that if Bethouard failed, Desre would carry on. He was also leaving his chief of staff, Colonel Kalle at Casablanca. He wanted me to remain at my post in order to maintain wireless communication between our army and his staff. For this purpose he provided me with two liaison officers, Captain Reifel and Michel Despax. He left for Rabat at 8:30 and presented his ultimatum to General Nogues sometime around eleven o'clock. The last news we had from him was that he had not arrested Nogues but that he was in the Post of Commandant of the "Residence".

Meanwhile Despax, who had gone to make sure that the strong arm group designated to take care of the Armistice Commission was in place, failed to reappear. About 12:30 I told Mr. Mayer, one of our vice-consuls, that he had better proceed to Rabat if he was going to hand over the President's letter to Nogues or Bethouard, if Nogues refused to join us. During the evening we got the secret signal over the radio that the landing would be delayed by two hours, and I became

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apprehensive as to whether Bethouard had acted too quickly. About two o'clock I sent Reifel to Casablanca divisional headquarters to find out what had happened to Bethouard and Despax. He did not return until 4 or 4:30 A.M., when he spoke to me at the gates of the annex. I asked him what had happened to the native constabulary which Bethouard was supposed to have put over the consulate as a guard. He told me that something had gone radically wrong; that Admiral Michelliet had taken over control of the city and that a Guard Mobile was being sent to watch over the consulate; that Despax had been arrested, and that the night before he disappeared.

Just before dawn I slipped out of the annex and across the square to the consulate before any of the gendarmes could make up their minds to stop me. I shouted to Mr. Berr, the consul-general, to burn all codes, as we were under attack and might be searched. Then they grabbed me and took me back to the annex.

At 5:30 I could hear the sound of increasing artillery firing at Fedala, and at dawn our bombers began. French aircraft opened up in earnest and the streets were full of shrapnel and shell fragments. In the early part of the day Commandant Sourd, whom I had met in conference with General Bethouard, appeared with an officer and several men of the Guard Mobile and told me in a rasping voice that he had been sent to hunt for wireless installation at the annex. I said that I could not

* He also told me that General Berra had turned his coat and threatened to shoot anyone who did not resist us to the street.

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allow him to enter without authorization from Mr. Russell. When he produced this authority I offered to show the men around, hoping to divert their attention from three suitcase wireless sets which were stacked in my office. He told me in a tone of biting sarcasm that he would not trouble me to do so, that they would make their own search, and that I would oblige him by remaining with him. The minute the Guard Mobile had entered the building to search, however, he began talking to me out of the side of his mouth, asking me if I really had any sets, where they were, and what news had I of the landing. Presently one of his men appeared and asked if he should search through the drawers and cupboards. Major Soudard almost bit his head off, telling him that his instructions were merely to search for wireless installations on the roof. He then saluted formally and withdrew, after telling me that someone would doubtless come to search for weapons later on. I took the hint and locked all the remaining hand grenades, incendiary bombs, and steyn guns in the safe and hid the wireless sets in the court room containing British furniture. (Our annex had previously been the British Consulate.) In the afternoon Lt. Merglin appeared, made a further search for arms, and requisitioned the car I had in the garage. He asked me in a perturbed manner, after consulting a list, what had happened to my own car, and seemed much relieved when I looked him straight in the eye and told him that it had been stolen while left in front of the consulate.

The bombing ceased at sundown. On Monday, November 9, the bombing continued, and our Navy shelled the Jean Bart and other

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French warships. At just about dusk, the French Guard Mobile appeared and told us we were to be taken to Kauba Tadla for safekeeping. We were given an hour in which to get together our things, and were escorted to our various houses by the police to throw some things into a bag. I was taken to the consulate to join the others. There I found M. Boyer, deputy police commissioner, in charge. About 7:30 he drew me aside and told me that there would be a car waiting around the corner with some of my friends in it in 10 minutes. He said he would try to divert the attention of the Guard Mobile, and that I should attempt to slip into the car. I did this without being noticed and found Commandant Breitel of the S.R., Capt. Doudet of the G.M., and Lt. Merglin waiting in the car. We drove to the home of Lt. Merglin, where I was bedded down for the night.

During the day of Tuesday, November 10th, I had to remain in hiding, and Mme. Merglin stalled off several inquiries from gendarmes as to who was in the house. About five o'clock Major Breitel and Despax appeared. (Despax had been released by M. Boyer on his own authority.) They informed me that General Patton had served an ultimatum on Admiral Micheliet that if resistance did not cease he would bomb and shell the town. I realized that this would be a fatal psychological error, though possibly an immediate military necessity. I told my friends that they must get me through the French lines so that I could get to our headquarters. They came back about dusk and said they had arranged for the only possible way to do so: to disguise me as a French stretcher-bearer

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and send me through in an ambulance. The doctor they trusted, and a false pass was made out by the "Surete". They produced a uniform, I quickly changed, and they drove me to the divisional headquarters from where the ambulance was to start. They told me they would know if I was caught and would not leave me to be shot, even if they had to gather together a strong-arm squad and shoot my way out. At this moment the ambulance trip was cancelled by the authorities. We returned to Merglin's house where I changed back to civilian clothes. We then decided to take a car and try to contact American troops who had landed at Safi, and who were reported to be between Mazagan and Casablanca. The group consisted of Lt. Merglin, Major Breitel, Despax and myself. We discovered that there were absolutely no French troops on the western side of the town except for a few sentinels at the various barricades. The latter warned us that the road was mined and I took careful note of the position of these mines as we threaded our way through. We were halfway to Mazagan without making contact, when a staff officer, on whom we called while on the way, informed us that the "cease fire" had been agreed to. I then returned to my own house and went to bed. At 6:30 I was waked by Despax, Merglin and Doudot who told me that the Admiral had not bothered to send an officer to confirm the "cease firing" orders so it was believed that the bombardment by the Americans would begin at 8:30. I decided that my only chance was to drive to the southeast, trying to get around the left flank of the Americans, and report to headquarters.

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Meanwhile the others in our group were preparing to shoot Admiral Michelliet and General Deere if they continued resistance. In order to avoid French patrols, we drove the car across country and in doing so bogged down. In retracing our steps to get on a road we found a French staff officer who told us that the truce had been arranged and that the Americans were just about to enter Casablanca.

I then proceeded to French Divisional Headquarters where I was just in time to meet General Anderson, General Eagles, and (then) Colonel Wilbur. We picked up Admiral Michelliet and General Deere and escorted them to American Headquarters at Fedala. There I found Mr. Gilbert who took me in to see General Patton and Admiral Hall. I reported to them on the events of the last forty-eight hours.

Late that afternoon I received news that General Bethouard and all those who had accompanied him, also Colonel Malle, were prisoners somewhere near Meknes. I obtained an audience with General Patton and explained the danger in which these men were and the possibility of a secret execution. He first notified the French Headquarters that he knew that General Bethouard was a prisoner, and had a list of those accompanying him. Then he authorized me to proceed the next morning, accompanied by General Eagles, Colonel Roper and several other officers, to warn Admiral Banchard, Admiral Michelliet's deputy, that we would hold them responsible for any executions which we had not approved. The Admiral, after telephoning, informed me that no execution had taken place or was contemplated in the division of Casablanca-Meknes.

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But I insisted that he notify Meknes, Fes and Marrakech on this subject, stating that we would hold him responsible should he fail to do so.

Mr. Russell and the entire consulate staff returned to Casablanca about one o'clock on November 11.

About sundown on November 11, I managed to obtain a wreath. Colonel Black gathered together a guard of honor and we placed it on the monument to French troops who had been killed in the last war. This gesture was ignored and censored by the local papers, which were still controlled by pro-Vichy Frenchmen.

As G-2 got in touch with their opposite numbers in the French service my active duties became less and less. I proceeded to Algiers to consult with Colonel Eddy regarding future activities. It was decided that I should return to the U.S. and report, leaving Mr. Gray to keep contact with my own special group. I took the necessary steps to do this.

I should mention here that one of the most important of these groups is at Rabat, M.Loix, of the Belgian office had put me in touch with them. These men worked in the wireless office, receiving and decoding German messages; we had the full benefit of their services, unknown to their chiefs. During my last days there I was able to work on the sidelines through M.Loix, advising various French officials not to try us too sorely, and explaining to them that it would be better for all concerned if they would iron out the bumps in the road themselves before we were forced to bring in a steam roller.

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At one time M. Loix brought to me H. Picard, over whom we had great influence. Picard was Chief of the S.O.L. in Morocco, a well-meaning but weak man - and had been badly directed. I received him coldly at first, then called on reminiscences of the last war. I pointed out the damage his party was doing to France, and finally obtained a tearful promise from him to dissolve the S.O.L. in Morocco. We parted staunch friends, and he has kept his word.

Dorothea King

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SUMMARY

Our mistakes were as follows:

1. The failure to send a staff officer to give the French staff officer precise details.
2. The attempt to switch from locally organized resistance groups to a purely military arrangement at the last minute.
3. That I had only 48 hours notice before we landed in which to put my groups from Port Lyautey to Safi in a state of alert. It must be remembered that train service is almost non-existent and gasoline almost unobtainable. Naturally the telephone and telegraph were out of the question.
4. The preparation to replace various doubtful officials by loyal ones was insufficient.
5. For some reason our troops had not been informed that the guides chosen to meet them would have the password written on a piece of paper in their caps. They released the civilians who met them, some of whom spread the alarm.
6. As planned, the commanding officer at Port Lyautey received orders not to resist, and the controller at Port Lyautey (one of our men), on consultation, advised him to obey them. But the friendly military neglected to cut the wires, so the commanding officer was able to telephone General Nogues for confirmation. The result was obvious.
7. Last but not least, at 00.30 hours on November 8th, the American radio via London announced the landing of U.S. troops at Oran and Algiers. As our troops did not land at Fedala and other ports until 05.00 hours, this radio announcement did not help matters.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: COLONEL DONOVAN
FROM: WILLIAM A. KEMBLE
SUBJECT:

DATE: JANUARY 27 1943

The attached copy of despatch addressed to Secretary Hull by Minister Robert Murphy on political conditions in North Africa was secured, subject to assurance that it was for Colonel Donovan's use with very restricted distribution.

I have handed copies to Colonel Buxton and Mr. Rogers.

A parallel cable with essentially the same facts in so far as they applied to publicity interpretation, was also sent to OSI by Mr. Murphy.

W. A. K.
W. A. K.

Attachment

cc: Colonel Buxton
Mr. Rogers



PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM: Algiers
 TO: AGWAR and USFOR
 DATED: January 23, 1949
 NUMBER: 6774

SECRET

To AGWAR For Combined Chiefs of Staff Pass to Hull and Davis from Murphy signed Eisenhower and to USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff cite NAFU 119.

I wish to state that it is clear to me that the unfavorable press comment reference news summary no. 3 and message 1292 from Davis flows largely from the fundamental mistake of interpreting events of French Africa in terms of Metropolitan France of other days. I may say that this is not France but it is a Colonial area which religiously, racially, psychologically and socially has always been entirely dissimilar to France. Concerning the political situation here, it has never been comparable with that of the Metropolis and in the light of events since 1940 even less susceptible today of being understood by the ones who attempt to do so in terms of the France of 1914-1918.

Henceforth Tunisia, Algeria, French West Africa and Morocco, it should be remembered, were separate political entities with the line of authority running from each one to Paris independently. It has been found necessary to create a central authority which did not exist previously. Although some progress has been made in this direction, mistakes have been made and there remains much to do. Such age-old inflammable problems exist such as complex economic questions, the relations between Arabs and Jews, delicate situations which arise out of the heterogeneous, social and religious structure which require handling by able administrators of experience in this area.

We feel that it should be borne in mind that a continued orderly administration is essential to our military operations; that there is a great paucity of men who are qualified to fill the specialized positions in Algeria and Morocco; and that abrupt and radical changes, especially if little known or unqualified personnel were introduced, would bring about consequences that would be serious. If we were

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suddenly to disrupt the professional, trained French administration, we should find it utterly impossible to cope with the Arab situation.

On the part of critics there is a failure to understand first: our objective here, and second: the problem which confronted us upon our arrival here. The military operation in which we are engaged is one whose purpose is to secure the Southern shore of the Mediterranean and also North Africa. In order to accomplish that purpose we dealt with those Frenchmen whom we found here and who were willing to help us by maintaining order, lines of communication and putting into the fight the Armed Forces at their disposal. The ideal Frenchmen which our critics see from the heights of their ivory towers, we did not find. We found Frenchmen who have changed and who do not think as Clemenceau did. We found Frenchmen who had been defeated by Germany and who had undergone two years of German propaganda and pressure. We worked with them making one condition, that is, that they wanted to fight Germany. Apparently our critics are interested primarily in an ideological return to the France which they see in their memory and not in the military operation. In this colonial area, that simply cannot be done as it must wait until such a time as the people of Continental France are free again. Pressure to accomplish the impossible in French Africa has only one result: To embarrass the military operations and make our task more difficult. A regenerated France can only be brought into being in France itself and any attempt to set the pattern for that regeneration before France is liberated is doomed to utter failure and is not consistent with the declared policy of the President. Such regeneration must perforce come from within inspired by what influence we may exert. If we tried to impose it prematurely from without it would be fatal.

With regard to the appointment of Peyrouton dissatisfaction has been expressed. We have consistently refrained from assuming the responsibility of forcing officials of our choice on the local authorities here. It is deemed wiser by us to hold the local authorities responsible for what they do with regard to the war. Admiral Darlan, before his death, offered to discharge any official if we could offer a substitute who would be acceptable to the Allies and the American and British press provided only that he be acceptable to the local public and also that he be qualified. Useful suggestions could not be made by us. It would have been impossible to suggest a De Gaulle as the De Gaulleists are considered by the vast majority here to be extremists especially by the Armed Forces. Let us take the example of the appointment of Peyrouton: In this connection there were three choices. (1) Retain

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Chatel with his heritage of weakness and political harlotry, (2) Insist upon a DeGaulle candidate which would have been completely unacceptable to the French Armed Forces and would have brought on trouble of a serious nature; (3) Accept the appointment of Peyrouton, a man of demonstrated administrative capacity, who has shown his knowledge of and ability to deal with the complicated Arab problem. Locally this appointment has been well received not only by the radio and press but by solid patriotic elements which have been consistently pro-Ally including judges, businessmen and others as well as the Army, Navy and Air Force. Nowhere have we heard Peyrouton's patriotism questioned and his knowledge of French North African problems, including that of the Arabs, is given great weight. His antagonism toward Laval is cited and his anti-German sentiments are universally recognized. The State Department knew of Peyrouton's intended appointment and consented to his coming here.

The organized Degaullists, who are a very small minority, show the only dissatisfaction. With regard to Chatel's dismissal, universal satisfaction is expressed. This is generally considered to be a first step toward housecleaning.

We believe that there is a very evident tendency on the part of many to divide all Frenchmen into sheep and goats. All Frenchmen, for these people, must be pro-German or pro-Ally and anyone who held office after the Armistice as "Willy" which is considered to be equivalent to pro-German. That is not the case. Many a patriotic Frenchman, who holds the post as much as ever did Foch, has considered it his duty to stick to his government in adversity and has done his best to resist Germany from within. It is about time to stop theorizing. It should be remembered that there is a desperate fight to win and allow the light of realism to penetrate the obscurity of ignorance about the fundamentals of problems at this place.

No political censorship has been imposed by this Headquarters for more than two weeks. There are imposed restrictions: On operational military information and on reports which might give the completely erroneous impression that in this theater of war there is a divergence in aims and viewpoints. There exists no such divergence. To show the attitude of the CINC toward political censorship, I have been informed by him that he would welcome here a representative group of press and radio editors and columnist to visit this theater if there is an earnest desire to find and print the facts that exist. They could see for themselves and write their stories or comment after their return home where local censorship would be no question. He states that as your judgement may dictate you can make us of this invitation.

SECRET 10117

FACTUAL ACCOUNT OF THE NIGHT OF NOVEMBER 7 - 8, 1942

AT ALGIERS, ALGERIA

As seen by one witness

When all preparations had been completed in the late afternoon of Saturday, November 7, the group to which I belonged repaired shortly after nightfall to a clandestine operative headquarters in the heart of Algiers on the main street on the second floor. Here our adherents had established one of the W.T. sets which had theretofore been in use with Gibraltar and London. Reports from the members of the dissident group with whom we were working were brought in and orders sent out from this apartment. Shortly after nine or ten o'clock at the suggestion of Mr. Murphy, our Chief, certain of us moved two doors up the street to the apartment of a Mr. Alexander where the various chiefs had gathered. We remained here until one o'clock when we watched from the balcony the departure of the automobiles carrying our armed adherents in various directions to their appointed stations for 2:00 a.m. Mr. Murphy was present there until Colonel Chretien, who had been in the know, appeared from General Juin's headquarters at about 2:00 a.m. to escort Mr. Murphy to General Juin's villa to meet Admiral Barlas and endeavor to have the Admiral rescind the orders which had been given for resistance to the American landings.

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It was understood that Colonel Chretien was guarantee that Mr. Murphy would not be molested and would be free to leave the villa whenever he cared to do so.

I remained here for the greater part of the next twelve hours, according to Mr. Murphy's instructions, with occasional visits to the operative headquarters previously mentioned. At one time, while at this headquarters, Mr. Pendar, who had driven Mr. Murphy to Admiral Darlan's, passed through bearing messages for telegraphic transmission to various destinations.

What happened between roughly 2:00 a.m. (H hour) and Sunday afternoon, the eighth, at about 2:00 p.m. is not given as seen by me but as what I learned from various members of our American organization.

The progress of the dissidents in seizing strategic points in the city between 2:00 a.m. Sunday morning and dawn was constantly reported to both the headquarters as these seizures occurred. In this way we learned that the central Commissariat of Police, the Post Office, containing the central telegraphic office, the Algiers Radio bureau in the building of the Government General, the headquarters of the General commanding all troops in Algeria, the Divisional headquarters, and other similar points were taken with little or no resistance. The Admiralty

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"Island" which was the headquarters of the naval forces in Algiers (not the staff for all of Africa) was never taken. On the contrary we learned early that the youths who had been sent there to seize it had themselves been made prisoners by the French Marines who were quartered there in the rather extensive premises of the "Island". During the late hours of before dawn quite a bit of fighting took place along the waterfront, plainly visible from the balcony of the second hideout where I was principally supposed to remain. This included before dawn the rapid entry of an Allied small destroyer under heavy fire and its retreat in a smoke screen. There was considerable anti-aircraft fire along the harbor front throughout and the bastion of the North Mole near the Admiralty "Island" was constantly under the light of a powerful searchlight placed on the hills to the south of the city which for some reason or other had not been successfully taken by our adherents as planned. Shortly after dawn some American or British planes, about five in number, flew over the Admiralty and the Admiralty bastion and dive-bombed these places.

Before dawn Monsieur Lemaigre-Dubreuil, in his uniform of a French major, left for Blida to greet General Giraud who was supposed to land there at dawn. He left and did not return before my departure.

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In the course of the morning the main street of Algiers was plainly visible from the balcony of Mr. Alexander's apartment and as the light increased it became evident that the normal life of the city was resuming. Women with children in their arms were purchasing the morning bread, forming lines in front of groceries, and so on. Groups of people were standing at the head of the cross streets that led down hill to the harbor watching the progress of the fighting which was apparently going on along the waterfront. Sounds of machine gun firing and occasional heavier reverberations were audible. In the early morning several very large French tanks painted yellow (Armistice colors) went down the street towards the Post Office. These tanks were of very evidently ancient vintage. Automobile circulation commenced and among the cars I recognized the beige sedan with red license plate belonging to the German Vice-Consul, Mr. Schwarzmann. As the morning wore on Mr. D'Astier de la Vigerie, one of the chiefs of the dissident movement, went out and returned a number of times bringing back each time more and more discouraging reports of the melting away of our control over the various strategic points which had been seized the night before with such surprising ease.

The resumption of control over certain key points by the unfriendly forces is exemplified by the breaking of a phonograph record of a proclamation by General Giraud. The Vichy

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director of Press and Propaganda was under restraint but his wife was present at the transmitting station and smashed the General's announcement while it was being broadcast.

Towards 2:00 p.m. Sunday the eighth, as no American troops had yet made their appearance in the heart of the city (other than one American commando man who had been brought in from some distance down the seashore to the west by one of our guides) our uneasiness increased rapidly.

Mr. Boyd then came in searching for Mr. Murphy and as we had had no direct news of him whatsoever since two o'clock the preceding morning we decided to go to the west in search of him and his party or to find American troops. We drove without the slightest difficulty through the streets, which had their usual Sunday appearance, out through the city to the west through the suburbs of El-Biar, passing on the way five French soldiers only who were loafing along the side of one of the streets towards the periphery of the city.

Just after we had passed El-Biar and were emerging into the open country we encountered the first American troops. They were moving towards the city along the road and over the fields in a very methodical, leisurely manner. At the same time other troops were coming up to them but not passing beyond them

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in jeeps and trucks. The further one went to the westward the more such troops one saw. On foot, marching along the side of the road were many British soldiers moving eastward. We proceeded straight west toward Sidi-Ferruch, one of the main landing points. Not far from this place we found a temporary headquarters and General Porter. While we were inquiring there General Mast, the Commander of the Algiers division, drove up unaccompanied except by his chauffeur. He was also inquiring both for Generals Ryder and Clarke and for Mr. Murphy.

One of the purposes also of my trip had been to request the American commanders to have the bombing of the Admiralty "Island" stopped, as twenty-five of our young adherents were imprisoned there and were in danger of being killed should the bombardment continue. It seemed useless to continue also as the Admiralty quarters were well isolated from the rest of the city, if the city streets were under our control. I later returned to the city and went out to this same headquarters again, as I recall, and eventually on the road we found Mr. Pendar and later Mr. Murphy who was on his way to General Ryder's temporary headquarters near Cheraga.

Shortly after dusk I decided to visit my office, but not knowing whether it was in friendly or unfriendly hands I

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drove slowly past the entrance. The doorway was guarded by a number of Admiral Darlan's special naval police easily recognizable by their white Sam Brown belts. I therefore proceeded to my residence. On the way up I was stopped at a small police station near my residence and given the clothing and equipment other than arms of Colonel Donnelly who had been killed at that corner earlier in the afternoon upon appearing in advance of a few American commando men proceeding toward the Governor General's summer palace.

It was evident on Sunday evening that the actual physical control of the city had passed entirely away from our adherents and yet no American troops, so far as I am aware, had appeared in the town. I have been told that one of the causes of this lateness was an error in landing due to a British Naval commander's having mistaken a beach and put our men ashore twenty kilometers west of the chosen spot. Principal among the armed forces under the orders of Admiral Darlan were the Gardes Mobiles, an organization of well-disciplined and capable police troops.

During all this time Mr. Murphy was again in negotiation with Admiral Darlan in regard to a cease-firing order.

My understanding, gained from the words of others, of what happened at the Juin villa was that Mr. Murphy found upon

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arrival there that the villa had been surrounded by our youthful and half-armed adherents. This made Admiral Darlan and General Juin for a time prisoners of our "forces", but the situation apparently changed rapidly. During the time that Mr. Murphy and Mr. Woodruff were at the villa our boys outside were either quietly dispersed or withdrew, and the Gardes Mobiles and regular troops took their places. The tables were thus completely turned and Mr. Murphy was himself a prisoner. In the meantime, some of the advance American troops (which I saw later in the day) had advanced close to the villa and were met by gun fire which Mr. Murphy was able to stop at personal risk to himself.

It is believed that the Army's instructions were to surround the city on all the heights to the west and south of it, occupying them solidly and then to send parliamentarians to demand the surrender of the city. I cannot give a specific hour for the first appearance of American troops in the city itself but I saw none at any time on Sunday the eighth.

The result of the time sequence of the foregoing events was that the initial control of the city which our dissident bands had obtained during the night of Saturday to Sunday was completely lost in the course of Sunday morning and afternoon except at the Central Police Commissariat.

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One of the very potent factors making for the strong retention of power by Admiral Darlan in the first days after the landing, was the non-arrival of General Giraud. His arrival at the first moment our airfield was safe to receive him was a key-element of the whole plan. He did not, in fact, turn up until D+2 or D+3, if I recall correctly.

Arrangements had therefore to be made both as regarded the city of Algiers as well as other parts of North Africa where active resistance was in progress, to obtain a cease-fire order from Admiral Darlan who was in supreme command throughout. The loss of control resulted in the arrest of numbers of our adherents and indeed the twenty-five young men in the Admiralty were not finally released for some number of days afterward. Naturally the terms of the cease-fire order were very summary and indeed the modus vivendi which was agreed upon by the American commanding General, Mr. Murphy, and Admiral Darlan a day or two later could not in detail specify who should be released or from where. These releases had therefore to be obtained piecemeal and as knowledge of the whereabouts of individual persons was brought to the attention of those concerned.

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(From French)

Africa
 v. approach
 7. 1943
 v. Dubouché

January 3, 1943

Memo for the Office of Strategic Services on the questions concerning Africa.

The French Mission sent by General Girsud to the United States seeks to determine the most favorable material and morale conditions for permitting France to participate with maximum effectiveness on the side of the other United Nations, in the total war against the Axis Powers.

Moreover, the material and morale conditions can scarcely be treated separately when one studies them from the psychological warfare angle.

It is evident for example that the immediate shipment of material necessary to equip the French African troops is indispensable if the French Army is to fight its best. But at the same time, the arrival of this material and its quality will produce a considerable effect on the morale of the soldiers' families. And the sending of foodstuffs to civil populations will have repercussions on the soldiers concerned with the material welfare of their families. It will assure, in addition, calmness in the interior, will encourage the population to bring its products to market, which they will not do when they can buy nothing in exchange; when the markets are provisioned, the requisitioning of agricultural products, disliked by the population, is no longer necessary: all of which adds to domestic tranquility. In addition, the imports from Spanish Morocco will be withdrawn from the French and American regions if it is seen that the people of French Morocco are well nourished and clothed. Without delay, then, the arms and provisions requested must be sent.

From the moral viewpoint, it is clear that everything that attacks the authority and prestige of France and its representatives of every rank, risks compromising internal peace and nourishing the Army's good morale. North Africa will become extremely hard to govern if intrigues are given a basis for development. France has succeeded in making itself loved and respected in Africa, the proof of which is that the population remain faithful to her even after the defeat she suffered in 1940. It is, then, indispensable not

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to allow any attack on the authority and prestige of France.

The Mission sent by General Giraudi would therefore be grateful to the OSS to accomplish the following:

1. To send its Algiers representatives, if possible, to General Eisenhower in order that the latter may request President Roosevelt to send him at once a supplementary armed force, of the materiel and the civilian provisions already asked for, because of the importance of these requirements from the point of view of psychological warfare.
2. Next, to take similar measures with President Roosevelt.
3. To give instruction to its Algiers representatives to contact the Secretariat of Foreign Relations and through him, with the Information Service.
4. To establish regular contact with General Giraud's Washington Mission through the agency of M. Georges-Picot, Chargé of such liaisons, so that suggestions may be presented, and advice given on questions concerning Africa and assurance of complete collaboration.

M. Lemaigre-Dubreuil and M. Georges-Picot would be glad to see Colonel Donovan again in order to discuss this program with him.

Le 3 Janvier 1948

**NOTE POUR L'OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
SUR LES QUESTIONS INTERRESSANT L'AFRIQUE**

La Mission française envoyée par le Général Giraud aux Etats-Unis cherche à réaliser les conditions matérielles et morales les plus favorables pour permettre à la France de participer avec le maximum d'efficacité à côté des autres Nations Unies, à la guerre totale contre les Puissances de l'Axe.

Les conditions matérielles et morales ne peuvent d'ailleurs guère être traitées séparément lorsqu'on les étudie sous l'angle de la guerre psychologique.

Il est évident par exemple, que l'envoi immédiat du matériel nécessaire à l'équipement des troupes françaises d'Afrique est indispensable pour que l'Armée Française se batte avec le meilleur rendement. Mais en même temps, l'arrivée de ce matériel et sa qualité produiront un effet considérable sur le moral des familles des soldats. De même l'envoi de ravitaillement aux populations civiles aura une répercussion sur le moral des soldats préoccupés de la situation matérielle de leurs familles. Il assurera, d'autre part, la tranquillité intérieure, incitera les populations à apporter leurs produits

sur les marchés, ce qu'elles ne font plus lorsqu'elles ne peuvent rien acheter en échange; dès que les marchés sont approvisionnés, les réquisitions de denrées agricoles mal vues de la population ne sont plus nécessaires, ce qui contribue à la paix intérieure. Enfin les tribus du Maroc espagnol seront attirées du côté français et américain si elles voient les populations du Maroc français bien ravitaillées et bien vêtues. Il faut donc envoyer sans délai les armes et le ravitaillement demandés.

Du point de vue moral, il est clair que tout ce qui porte atteinte à l'autorité et au prestige de la France et de ses représentants à tous les degrés de la hiérarchie risque de compromettre la paix intérieure et de nuire au bon moral de l'Armée. L'Afrique du Nord devient extrêmement difficile à gouverner dès que l'on fournit aux intrigues un prétexte à se développer. La France a réussi à se faire aimer et respecter en Afrique, la preuve en est que les populations lui sont restées attachées même après la défaite qu'elle a subie en 1940. Il est donc indispensable de ne porter aucune atteinte à l'autorité et au prestige de la France.

La Mission envoyée par le Général Giraud serait donc reconnaissante à l'Office of Strategic Services de bien vouloir:

1°) - Faire intervenir, si possible, ses représentants d'Alger auprès du Général Eisenhower pour que ce dernier demande au Président Roosevelt l'envoi immédiat à titre de contingent supplémentaire des armes, du matériel et du ravitaillement civil déjà demandés, en raison de l'importance de ces envois du point de vue de la guerre psychologique.

2°) - Faire ensuite une démarche analogue auprès du Président Roosevelt.

3°) - Donner instruction à ses représentants à Alger de se mettre en rapport avec le Secrétariat des Relations Extérieures et par lui, avec le Service d'Information.

4°) - Etablir un contact régulier avec la Mission du Général Giraud à Washington par l'entremise de M. Georges-Ficot, Chargé des liaisons de cet ordre, pour que des suggestions puissent être présentées, des avis donnés sur les questions concernant l'Afrique, et une collaboration complète assurée.

M. Lemaigre-Dubreuil et M. Georges-Ficot seraient heureux de revoir le Colonel Donovan pour s'entretenir avec lui de ce programme.

MEMO FOR THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
ON QUESTIONS CONCERNING AFRICA

ERRORS TO AVOID

First Error

Since the beginning of operations in Africa the tendency of the American Military has consisted in declaring that they had occupied French North Africa, that they had penetrated French West Africa.

But, it would have been preferable to recall that since 1940 conversations had been held between the American Delegate General, Mr. Murphy, and a group of Frenchmen envisaging under what form America would bring to the French in Africa her material and military aid to allow France to reenter the war. Moreover, some agreements, in the form of letters, were consequently exchanged between General Giraud and Mr. Murphy indicating before the operation of the eighth of November what would be the form of the collaboration of the two countries.

In appearing to give to their penetration into the French Empire an aspect of victory, the Americans no longer benefit vis-a-vis the world, - and that is of an extreme importance - from the glory which they could acquire in flying to the aid of the oppressed peoples who, immediately after the armistice, had asked them for aid in again taking up the struggle. This attitude has thus distorted the truth and seems contrary to the initial desires of the Americans.

Second Error

The American Military having actually, contrary to the Murphy-Giraud agreements, the direction of operations in French Africa, and the French High Commissariat in Africa not yet being recognized, either as a temporary or as a provisional Government, Axis propaganda had the game in its hands to tell, through the medium of Vichy, that French Africa had become an American protectorate. Besides, the American military, operating directly with the civilian population, notably for all questions of requisitions, contribute to give the impression that France no longer exists. But, all the African population, Mohammedan, Jewish, or French, had, despite the defeat of France, remained faithful to the Mother Country. It is feared that in diminishing the

- 2 -

prestige of France, the Americans experience the gravest repercussions if military failures at all complicate the situation.

Third Error - Darlan Affair

President Roosevelt having taken, at the time of Admiral Darlan's coming into power, an attitude which fettered the position adopted in Africa by General Eisenhower and Mr. Murphy, the latter have insisted that he modify it. It is certain that as long as Admiral Darlan had believed that the Americans were incapable of bringing tangible aid to France, he had practised the policy of collaboration. Being accidentally in Africa on the eighth of November, he could declare American aid effective. He thus thought, with, moreover, a great satisfaction, that France could henceforth count on American cooperation. Unfortunately for him, public opinion was furiously against him, both in Africa and in France, for having been a collaborator. This is certainly the reason which provoked the assassination: the assassin, as many other men actually in France, had the impression that Admiral Darlan betrayed the Americans. This proceeded from his previous political bent. It is thus wrong to say that this assassin represents antipathy unfavorable to America: it proves on the contrary how men compromised by the policy of collaboration are considered by the immense majority of French people as traitors to their country.

4. 5. 65

**NOTE POUR L'OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
SUR LES QUESTIONS INTERESSANT L'AFRIQUE**

ERREURS A EVITER

Premiere erreur - Des le debut des operations en Afrique la tendance des militaires americains a consiste a declarer qu'ils avaient occupe l'Afrique du Nord francaise, qu'ils avaient penetre en Afrique Occidentale francaise.

Or, il eut ete preferable de rappeler que des 1940 des conversations avaient ete engagees entre le delegue general americain, M. Murphy, et un groupe de Francais envisageant sous quelle forme l'Amerique apporterait a la France en Afrique son aide materielle et militaire pour permettre a la France de rentrer dans la guerre. Des accords, sous forme de lettres, ont d'ailleurs par la suite ete echangees entre le General Giraud et M. Murphy indiquant avant l'operation du 8 novembre quelle etait la forme de la collaboration des deux pays.

En ayant l'air de donner a leur penetration dans l'empire francais une allure de victoire, les Americains ne beneficiaient plus vis-a-vis du monde, - et cela est d'une importance extreme - de l'aureole qu'ils pouvaient acquerir en volant au secours des peuples opprimes qui, tout de suite apres l'armistice, leur avaient demande leur aide pour reprendre la lutte. Cette attitude a donc deforme la verite et semble contraire aux desirs initiaux des Americains.

Deuxieme erreur -

Les militaires americains ayant actuellement, contrairement aux accords Murphy-Giraud, la direction des operations en Afrique francaise, et le Haut-Commissariat francais en Afrique n'etant pas encore reconnu, ni comme Gouvernement interimaire ni comme Gouvernement provisoire, la propagande de l'axe a beau jeu pour raconter, par l'intermediaire de Vichy, que l'Afrique francaise est devenue un Protectorat americain. En outre, les militaires americains, agissant directement aupres de la population civile, notamment pour toutes les questions de requisitions, contribuent a donner l'impression que la France n'existe plus. Or, toute la population africaine, musulmane, juive ou francaise, etait, malgre la de faite de la France, restee fidele a la mere-patrie. Il est a craindre qu'en diminuant le prestige de la France, les Americains n'en eprouvent eux-memes les plus graves repercussions pour peu que des insucces militaires compliquent la situation.

Troisieme erreur - Affaire Darlan

Le President Roosevelt ayant pris, lors de la venue au pouvoir de l'Amiral Darlan, une attitude qui a gene la position adoptee en Afrique par le General Eisenhower et M. Murphy, ceux-ci ont insiste pour qu'il la modifie. Il est certain que tant que l'Amiral

....

- 2 -

Darlan avait cru que les Américains étaient incapables d'apporter à la France un secours tangible, il avait fait la politique de la collaboration. Se trouvant accidentellement en Afrique le 8 novembre, il a pu constater l'aide effective américaine. Il a donc pensé, avec d'ailleurs une grande satisfaction, que la France pouvait désormais compter sur la coopération américaine. Malheureusement pour lui, l'opinion publique lui en voulait furieusement, soit en Afrique, soit en France, pour avoir été collaborateur. C'est donc certainement la raison qui a provoqué l'assassinat; l'assassin, comme beaucoup d'autres hommes actuellement en France, avait l'impression que l'Amiral Darlan trompait les Américains. Ceci provenait de sa politique suivie antérieurement. Il est donc faux de dire que cet assassinat représente une tendance défavorable à l'Amérique: il prouve au contraire combien les hommes ^{qui ont fait} la politique de collaboration sont considérés par l'immense majorité du peuple français comme des traîtres à leur patrie.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Algeria, N. 9977
* Algeria
* French
* Government
* Vignaux, Prof.*

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel Donovan
FROM: Major Doering
SUBJECT: Professor Vignaux's Theory re French North Africa

DATE: March 11, 1943

1. You requested my view regarding Mr. Belin's memorandum to you of January 13, 1943 (attached file).

2. Pvt. Pugliese has prepared a memorandum which is attached, in which I believe you will be much interested and with which I concur.

Encs.

[Signature]
O. C. D. Jr.

CONFIDENTIAL**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES****INTEROFFICE MEMO**

TO: Major Doering **DATE:** March 11, 1943
FROM: Pvt. P. F. Pugliese
SUBJECT: Prof. Vignaux's Legalistic Theory Regarding French North African Government.

1. I have read Professor Vignaux's memorandum, all the available articles in the New York Times to which he refers, Varian Fry's article in the New Republic, and various background material in current issues of the Washington papers.

It is my opinion that Professor Vignaux's theory appears to be legally correct according to the Law of February 15, 1872. From a practical standpoint, however, the weakness in the theory is threefold. First, it appears to run counter to the United States policy as enunciated by President Roosevelt who believes that the expression of French sovereignty has been temporarily suspended by German occupation and regards the entire set-up in Africa as being determined by military expediency. Second, it ignores General Giraud and would appear to satisfy solely the demands of De Gaulle, because it would replace Giraud's civil administration with that of the "conseils generaux" of the various North African départements which were in existence at the time Marshal Petain in effect suspended the French National Assembly in July, 1940. Third, the theory partially ignores the immediate critical demands of military necessity for the present unified governmental set-up would be replaced with decentralized administration by départemental Councils General at a time when proper effectuation of military offensive plans demands quick responsive action.

Particularly, in view of the probable strenuous opposition by General Giraud, I doubt very much whether the practical benefits which the Professor envisions, i.e., harmony and unity among French political leaders with regard to North African administration, would be forthcoming if the theory is put into effect.

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2. The base of Professor Vignaux's legal theory is the Law of February 15, 1872, which provides that where the National Assembly of France is illegally dissolved or prevented from assembling for any reason, the General Council in each departement shall "provide without delay for the maintenance of law and order and legal administration" until such time as an Assembly of delegates of Councils General can be constituted.

From this Professor Vignaux argues that any provisional government, such as Giraud's "Imperial Council", which may be set up is without legal foundation since the Act provides for the exercise of only local power, and that therefore the presidents of the Councils General in North Africa have the right to claim for their Assemblies the power to govern their respective departements. The constitution of such civil power would minimize "the political pretensions" of Giraud and De Gaulle and would limit the activities of both Generals solely to military matters regarding the conduct of the war. At the same time, restoration of the "conseils genereaux" on the basis of the Law of 1872 would "legitimize" the French Government in North Africa and would be a means of continuing there the French sovereignty which President Roosevelt recently declared had been suspended in France by German occupation.

3. In considering the practical soundness of Professor Vignaux's theory, the views of other political writers, French political leaders, and the present policy of the United States with regard to French North Africa may be helpful. These are summarized briefly.

A. Political Writers

(1) ARTHUR KROCK, in the New York Times, January 3, 1943, theorized that at least the figment of French sovereignty must be maintained in North Africa if a "holy" war with Islamic tribes is to be avoided there. He seemed to feel that this chain of continuous French sovereignty could be maintained by Giraud's then governmental set-up, i.e., Imperial Council, etc. In his opinion, any institution of direct military rule by the Allies would be catastrophic.

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(2) VAREAN FRIT, in the New Republic, January 11, 1943, pleaded for a return to the status quo ante July, 1940 ("suspension" of the National Assembly), arguing that the French Government in Africa was not a legitimate government in a legal sense for it was based upon Laval's coup d'état by which the French Assembly ceded its powers to Petain. In effect this was an attempt to abolish the Republic and that power the Assembly did not possess.

Former presidents, Herriot and Jeanneney, as well as Professor Vignaux, are in agreement on this last point.

B. French Political Leaders

(1) The three Presidents of the Councils General of Constantine, Algiers, and Morocco (two of whom were deputies in the republican French National Assembly) wrote Admiral Darlan asserting that his government had no legal basis. They maintained that under the French Constitution of 1875 only a meeting of the three Councils General could provide the necessary legal authority (November 24, 1942; see N.Y. Times, December 31, 1942, p. 7, col. 6). On December 16, a similar letter was sent to President Roosevelt urging that since the Allies had come to North Africa as liberators of French territory rather than as an Army of Occupation they had no right to be an apparent party in imposing on the French people a form of government that many might regard as nothing but military despotism.

(2) ADMIRAL DARLAN, in November, 1942, in declaring himself Protector of French interests in North Africa and appointing Giraud as his Commander-in-Chief, based his authority to do so on that originally received by him from Marshal Petain whom he now considered to be in the clutches of the Germans and unable to exercise any free will. (New York Times, Nov. 13, 1942, p. 4, col. C).

(3) GENERAL GIRAUD, on February 6, 1943, assumed the title of French civil and military Commander-in-Chief, abolished the name and political characteristics of the North African Imperial Council, set up an Advisory War Committee and a high economic council with native representation. The whole question of a permanent political constitution was referred to the decision of France when her liberation is achieved.

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(4) GENERAL DE GAULLE believes that the entire new Giraud set-up is "baseless and artificial" and has reiterated that the only basis on which complete fusion of French interests is possible is the complete restoration of the laws of the French Republic in North Africa. (Washington Post, Feb. 10, 1943). His organic declaration of November 16, 1942, not only attacked the French National Assembly's mandate to Petain, but also specifically referred to the Law of February 15, 1872.

C. United States Policy

(1) PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT in his speech of February 13, 1943, declared that French sovereignty rests with the people of France, that its expression had been temporarily suspended by German occupation and that after a United Nations' victory, the French people would be represented by a government of their own popular choice.

In an earlier statement to the press subsequent to the time Admiral Darlan was recognized by the Allies as French leader in North Africa, President Roosevelt referred to the whole Darlan set-up as determined by "military expediency", and he did not attempt to justify it from a legal standpoint.

(2) SECRETARY HULL believes that there is no single sovereign government of the French people as far as the United States is informed, that such a sovereign government will have to await liberation of the French people at which time they will be able to choose their own leaders as indicated under Article III of the Atlantic Charter.

4. Professor Vignaux's theory appears to be legally correct, assuming that the Law of 1872 was never subsequently repealed or superseded. For since the National Assembly's mandate to Marshal Petain in July, 1940, no subsequent Assembly has been convoked and, therefore, the Council General in each département of metropolitan France was legally empowered to maintain law and order and legal administration.

From a practical standpoint, however, the weakness in the theory is threefold:

- (1) It appears to run counter to the United States' policy with respect to North Africa;
- (2) It ignores General Giraud and would appear to satisfy solely the demands of Gen. De Gaulle;

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(5) It ignored the immediate critical demands of military necessity.

With regard to (1), President Roosevelt, as noted above, regarded the Darlan set-up in North Africa as one determined by "military expediency". Upon Darlan's assassination, General Giraud was designated as his successor in office, so that the line of authority recognized by U.S. military leaders at the time of the invasion remains unbroken. Then, too, President Roosevelt has declared that the expression of French sovereignty has been temporarily suspended by German occupation and both he and Secretary Hull have taken the position that any French sovereign government must await liberation of the French people.

With regard to (2), the De Gaullists would no doubt support the theory since in the past they have in several instances called attention to the Law of 1872, and they have continually objected to the legitimacy of the present French administration in North Africa. General Giraud would undoubtedly strenuously oppose the theory because it would replace his own civil administration with that of the Councils General. Thus the division between the two French military leaders would probably only be accentuated. Furthermore, application of the theory would adversely affect our present friendly relations with General Giraud. He could reasonably regard our support of that theory as a gesture of recognition of De Gaulle as the leader of the French people. We could not very well argue that the "cousins généraux" actually were the chosen representatives of the French in North Africa for those elections had occurred over two years ago, and there appears no present indication that the French people still prefer them as their leaders. An election to determine that fact is obviously impractical.

With regard to (3), from a military standpoint, to encourage Giraud's present unified governmental administration containing elements of active representation would appear more desirable than to decentralize the administration of North Africa pursuant to the provisions of the Law of 1872. In a "theater of operations" prompt responsive action on the part of civil authorities is essential if proper effectuation of military offensive plans is to be accomplished. This unity of action would be impeded in French North Africa if the U.S. military authorities had to contact the Council General in each département as well as the French military authorities every time internal administrative action was needed.

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Because of the above-discussed weakness, I doubt very much that the theory could be soundly applied from a practical standpoint. On the other hand, under the present Giraud set-up, the "figment" of French sovereignty, which Arthur Krock believes so essential, is preserved, while the above-discussed weakness is to a great extent lacking, particularly as to (1) and (3). With regard to (2), there still remains a substantial hope that Giraud and De Gaulle will reconcile their differences.

Pvt. P.F.P.
Pvt. P.F.P.

Alpha N. 1951

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

X Government
X Belin, F. S.

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel Donovan
FROM: F. L. Belin *FLB*
SUBJECT: SI File #14468

DATE: JAN 13 1943

The attached memorandum presents an interesting theory, on a legalistic basis, of a method by which Algeria might be governed according to the Law of February 15, 1872.

Mr. Hyde has called our attention to the fact that an article in the NEW REPUBLIC of last week raised this same question.

Attachment

*Captain [unclear] -
I would like
your view
D*

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
638 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y.

January 8, 1943

MEMORANDUM

TO: HENRY B. HYDE
FROM: H. GREGORY THOMAS

CONFIDENTIAL

Attached hereto is a copy of a memorandum prepared by PROFESSOR VIENNAUX on the law of February 15, 1872, which I believe you will find of interest. Should you desire it, he will be glad to enlarge on any of the points.

(Handwritten initials)

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THE LAW OF FEBRUARY 15, 1872 AND THE ALGERIAN PROBLEM

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The New York TIMES of Dec. 31 reported that, on Nov. 24, the three presidents of the Councils General (Conseils Generaux) of the three départements in Algeria, affirmed their exclusive right to constitute provisional legal authority.

This pretension is evidently founded on the law of Feb. 15, 1872, of which a copy is attached herewith.

We believe that we might seek in that law a solution to the irritating question of the legitimacy of French power (linked to the question of the continuity of French sovereignty invoked by Arthur Koock in the N.Y. TIMES of Jan. 3).

This question is of immediate interest; as long as it remains unsolved a door is open to any and all competitions, intrigues and adventures, and the spirit of discipline among the populations is thereby weakened.

At the present time, the only legitimacy in the powers of General Giraud and of the Imperial Council which appointed him lies in the link with the Marshal, head of the Vichy State, the intermediary being the late Admiral Darlan.

The weakness of this legitimacy appears to be twofold:

- in our opinion the legitimacy would only be insured if the Marshal, considering himself a prisoner, had since the total occupation, confined himself to the same political silence and passivity as King Leopold of the Belgians; but the Marshal considers that he has power of government, enough at least to disavow those who claim to be his representatives in Africa.
- on the other hand, for all those who have not the mysticism to believe that the Marshal resists and wants the French to fight Germany, the very legitimacy of the Vichy regime is shaken.

either by radical criticisms which attack the very validity of the mandate entrusted to the Marshal by the National Assembly, (such as the criticism contained in the organic declaration of the de Gaulle movement, Nov. 16, '42).

or by the different but doubtless less debatable argumentation contained in the letter from Presidents Herriot and Jeanneney under date of Aug. 21, 1942, with this fundamental phrase:

"It is to the Government of the Republic that the National Assembly has given authority. This authority is violated whenever anyone undertakes to eliminate from our institutions the essential features of the Republic."

The conclusion is obvious: one should seek a source of legitimacy, a legal basis, with deeper roots than the power claimed by Vichy. This legal basis can only be a basis of national sovereignty since the Marshal acquired his mandate from the National Assembly and again recognized the fact in his speech of Feb. 25, 1942.

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But in France, today, no National Assembly can be called.

The law of Feb. 15, 1872 provides that, in such a case and until such time as an Assembly of Delegates of Councils General can be constituted, then in each Département, "the General Council shall provide without delay for the maintenance of law and order and legal administration." There is no question of having a provisional government, speaking in the name of the whole country but only local power. This local power, however, is not simply a de facto power but is also legally founded upon national sovereignty.

The presidents of the Councils General in Algeria therefore have a right to claim for their assemblies the right to constitute a provisional administration of the Algerian départements.

Vainly would the ex-Vichy authorities object that the Marshal has "suspended" (but not dissolved) the Councils General; the latter, according to the law, "have the right to assemble".

As to the de Gaulle movement it could not but recognize such a power, since its own organic declaration attacks the Vichy Government for the suspension of the Councils General and refers specifically to the law of Feb. 15, 1872.

The constitution of such civil power would at least minimize the political pretensions of the military chiefs and the intrigues around them, all the more so as the problem of a provisional government for France would be postponed until the liberation of the territory when it could be solved according to this same law of 1872.

The "legal administration" (ordre légal) would, in principle, be the Republican Administration as it existed prior to the Armistice, but for reasons of public law and order, the existing legislation might not be completely upset; in any case, these questions would be settled by men elected by, and in contact with, the population.

The restoration of "legal administration" in Algeria would include the restoration of all the organisations which include representation of the natives.

Although this solution only applies to the Algerian départements its adoption would have consequences upon the remainder of French Africa: no Imperial Council could play at being the provisional government of France; any organism of this kind, even extended to all the French territories overseas would necessarily be merely a defense council with exclusively military functions, limited to the conduct of the war. The legitimacy of the powers exercised by the members of this Council would also be founded upon the "maintenance of law and order and legal administration", which cannot be assigned to organisms such as the Councils General wherever there are no elected Assemblies of French citizens. (At this time we are examining only Algeria and not the General Councils or Colonial Councils of other territories)

In regard to public opinion in metropolitan France, such a solution would satisfy the Republican sentiment which has been growing stronger as June 1940 recedes further into the past. Moreover, we consider that the attitude of the Presidents of the Algerian Councils General is but another proof of the vitality of this Republican sentiment.

January 5, 1943

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du 15 février 1872, relative au rôle éventuel des Conseils Généraux dans des circonstances exceptionnelles.

1. Si l'Assemblée nationale ou celles qui lui succéderont viennent à être illégalement dissoutes ou empêchées de se réunir, les conseils généraux s'assemblent immédiatement, de plein droit, et sans qu'il soit besoin de convocation spéciale, au chef-lieu de chaque département. -- Ils peuvent s'assembler partout ailleurs dans le département, si le lieu habituel de leurs séances ne leur paraît pas offrir de garanties suffisantes pour la liberté de leurs délibérations. -- Les conseils ne sont valablement constitués que par la présence de la majorité de leurs membres.

2. Jusqu'au jour où l'Assemblée dont il sera parlé à l'article 3, aura fait connaître qu'elle est régulièrement constituée, le conseil général pourvoit d'urgence au maintien de la tranquillité publique et de l'ordre légal.

3. Une Assemblée composée de deux délégués élus par chaque conseil général en comité secret, se réunit dans le lieu où se seront rendus les membres du Gouvernement légal et les députés qui auront pu se soustraire à la violence. -- L'Assemblée des délégués n'est valablement constituée qu'autant que la moitié des départements, au moins, s'y trouve représentée.

4. Cette Assemblée est chargée de prendre, pour toute la France, les mesures urgentes que nécessite le maintien de l'ordre et spécialement celles qui ont pour objet de rendre à l'Assemblée nationale la plénitude de son indépendance et l'exercice de ses droits. -- Elle pourvoit provisoirement à l'administration générale du pays.

5. Elle doit se dissoudre aussitôt que l'Assemblée nationale ne sera reconstituée par la réunion de la majorité de ses membres sur un point quelconque du territoire. -- Si cette reconstitution ne peut se réaliser dans le mois qui suit les événements, l'Assemblée des délégués doit adresser un appel à la nation pour des élections générales. -- Les nouvelles cessent le jour où la nouvelle Assemblée nationale est constituée.

6. Les décisions de l'Assemblée des délégués doivent être exécutées, à peine de forfaiture, par tous les fonctionnaires, agents de l'autorité et commandants de la force publique.

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Guide No. 9259
 Carlton
 Carlton

THE
Carlton
 WASHINGTON, D. C.

Oct. 12, 1942

Memo. for Col. Donovan -

Subject: Proposed establishment of U.S.-North African
 exchange rate at 44 francs to the \$.

It is my understanding that the rate pro-
 posed is that which was established between
 France and the U.S. in September 1939, the
 reason being that such rate would constitute
 a friendly political gesture toward the French
 nation. This would also follow the precedent
 of De Gaulle in French East Africa in 1940.

This rate, from a business angle, appears
 to suffer from the following disadvantages:

1. Allowance has not been made for the
 rise in prices in France and French colonies
 during the 28 months following their armis-
 tice. Strictly speaking the above-mentioned
 precedent therefore does not apply.

2. It is obviously undesirable for us to
 attempt to force the deflation of price levels
 existing in North Africa - whose all prices
 are already controlled by its present govern-
 ment.

3. It is practically impossible to obtain reasonable value for the tremendous dollar expenditure we will make in North Africa without a wide-spread and compulsory inauguration of an unpopular requisitioning system for services and supplies. For instance, many new, unused American cars are available in Morocco, but at two or three times the price paid by the owner two years ago.

4. Recognition of prices such as beef or butter at several dollars a pound in a prosperous farming country where the cost of living was, prior to the French Armistice, hardly half the cost in France, will virtually ruin that country once world trade therewith is resumed on a restricted customs tariff basis.

5. Our American soldiers will, despite their pay scale comparatively high in all other countries, be able to buy in North Africa surprisingly few articles with their spare pay, and will furthermore be continually engaged in argument with shop keepers. The poorest meal

Carlton
WASHINGTON, D.C.

(3)

they will ever have seen, will be obtainable in most ordinary restaurants at a minimum cost of one dollar a head.

6. When France was occupied by the Germans, the rate fixed, of 20 francs for a mark, made the franc worth 82 francs to the dollar (mark at par) or 220 francs to the dollar (mark at New York quotations). French prices rose accordingly. Francs were then commonly sold at 200 to the dollar in Paris. They are now selling around 250 to the dollar in unoccupied France. In Casablanca and Tangiers, as under the American Recaptulation Rights we could legally sell our dollars freely, the rate ran 175 francs to the dollar for several months prior to my departure in September 16.

Respectfully,
J. B. Carlton

PS If I were obliged to establish a suitable rate based on my last few months living in Morocco, I should establish our initial rate at 100 francs to the \$.

V.V.C.

December 21, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL DONOVAN:

The Soviet Government recently made formal diplomatic inquiry of the British Government respecting the latter's position on political developments in North Africa. Last week the British Embassy in Moscow was instructed to reply in substance as follows:

(1) The British Government has no part in the political arrangements made by the American military authorities in North Africa and accepts no responsibility in that connection.

(2) The British Government takes note, however, of assurances given by President Roosevelt that the arrangements have been made with regard only to military exigencies and are temporary in character. It has no doubt that full reliance can be placed on these assurances.

The instructions in this sense which were cabled to the British Embassy in Moscow were repeated to the British Embassy in Washington and the latter was directed to communicate them to the Department of State.

~~SECRET~~

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The foregoing comes from an excellent British source.

DCP
D. C. Poole

TO: [unclear]
x- [unclear]
a. [unclear]**SECRET**

November 12, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL DONOVAN:

Racul Aglion of the de Gaulle mission in New York tells us, very confidentially of course, that in his opinion General Giraud should form a North African Government in North Africa, drawing for this purpose upon the local French officials.

Over and against this Tixier and Andre Philip are plugging hard for de Gaulle.

Aglion fears that the British are now going to support, or at least encourage, de Gaulle as against the support which we are giving General Giraud. He calls attention to the fact (if it is a fact) that de Gaulle was invited to lunch with Churchill last Sunday, and this was the first invitation of the kind for more than a year.

Aglion foresees a conflict between de Gaulle backed by the British and General Giraud backed by the United States.

ACP
DeWitt C. Poole

Africa North 2011
X Propaganda
Summary
X Psychology Division

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel William J. Donovan

DATE: December 7, 1942

FROM: Mr. Carlston F. Scofield *C.F.S.*

SUBJECT: Summary of Radio Propaganda to North Africa

I am forwarding herewith a copy of the December 5 summary of radio propaganda to North Africa prepared for the Psychology Division of OSS by the Federal Communications Commission.

Attach.

Federal Communications Commission
 FOREIGN BROADCASTING INTELLIGENCE CENTER

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CONFIDENTIAL

WHAT THE PEOPLE OF NORTH AFRICA ARE HEARING

In reporting on African events all French stations continue their previous lines. Vichy, as before, follows the Axis line more closely on this front than on any others. No French-language programs from Berlin have been monitored in the past three days.

Radio Maroc continues its pro-United Nations picture of all military operations with emphasis on French participation in Tunisia. It documents its recent calls for unity of all Frenchmen under Darlan's African bloc by citing de St. Exupery's plea for unity in the NEW YORK TIMES.

Radio Dakar is going through somewhat the same changes that took place on Radio Maroc. However, on December 4th it carries a story from Berno that has anti-British implications. Thus London observers are said to believe that there is little likelihood of not bombing Italian "open cities" in view of "the well-known fact that the Allies are determined to annihilate all axis military objectives wherever they be found."

Radio Algiers - no change.

Radio Tunis - still not heard from.

Only Berlin continues to remember North Africa in its anti-Communist program. A dominant theme: "Americans placed French Africa under Jewish control." The Mussolini speech has monopolized Rome's attention during this period. Vichy material in Arabic is too scant to permit a judgment.

RBC programs beamed at North Africa in English seem in the last two days to show more concern over the political than the military situation, particularly over the new turn in the Darlan situation. Men's statement in German, to the effect British would have no dealings with what now looked like a military expedient turned permanent, is reported in every broadcast on the fact. German reinforcements in Tunisia, the announcement of Anglo-American sinkings in the North African campaign tend to mar the placidity of the military picture. This is emphasized by quoting Alexander's statement that "we have very heavy fighting ahead of us."

*Propaganda Summary
Psychology Div*

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO


TO: Colonel Donovan

DATE: November 14, 1942

FROM: Mr. William L. Langer

SUBJECT: "What the North Africans are Hearing"

Please find attached a second issue of "What the North Africans are Hearing" prepared by the Psychology Division.



William L. Langer
Director, Branch
Research and Analysis

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Summary
RESTRICTED
x Psychology Div.

WHAT THE PEOPLES OF NORTH AFRICA ARE HEARING

(Rapid digest and analysis of radio broadcasts
to North Africa from Noon, November 10, to
Noon, November 13, 1942.)

Psychology Division

Nov. 14, 1942

WHAT THE PEOPLES OF NORTH AFRICA ARE HEARING

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Summary

Reports indicate that OWI representatives are broadcasting from the French Empire stations Rabat, Morocco, and Algiers, although little American material has been monitored, and it is not clear to what extent the French still retain control. Darlan's appeals have been broadcast.

Dakar, Tunis, and Vichy broadcasts to the French in Africa have continued emphasis upon the "magnificent" resistance of the French troops against overwhelming forces. Vichy spreads the view that serious resistance is continuing in Algeria and Morocco; the French forces are now withdrawing towards the interior for regrouping. Neither Dakar nor Vichy has yet taken a violently hostile attitude towards the United States, although Vichy has been very careful to point out that France is morally in the right and the "Anglo-Saxons" in the wrong. Tunis has been taking a purely French point of view, neither pro-Axis nor pro-Allied.

Italians in Africa are getting a somewhat more confident picture from the home country, as a result of the occupation of Corsica and Nice and the recent Axis

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air raids in the North African area. North Africa
wasn't so bad after all; maybe it will turn out to
be really a serious United Nations defeat when
Italian propagandists have thought it over a little
more.

If the Spaniards in North Africa are receiving
the same propaganda as the Spaniards in Spain, then
they are now hearing stronger attacks on the Allies
from Falangist sources -- although other Spanish
sources do not appear to be departing from their
reserve on the subject. Spanish claims on North Africa
have been vigorously put forth.

The Axis continues its attempts to stir up the
Arabs against the British and Americans through direct
appeals for revolt, identification of the Allies with
the Jewish cause, and false news information. The
Grand Mufti of Jerusalem is now being used for propaganda
purposes by both Berlin and Rome.

SECRET

I. WHAT THE FRENCH ARE HEARING

A. From the French Empire Stations in North Africa

Very little has been heard from stations Morocco, Algiers, and Rabat from noon November 10 to noon November 13. These items monitored indicate that the stations are under Allied control, but it is not clear whether the French are to be allowed to continue nominal control or divide time with Anglo-American authorities. A press report has been issued (New York Times, November 14) declaring that Rabat and Algiers have been broadcasting "American official programs prepared on the ground by representatives of the Office of War Information". Darlan's statements have been broadcast.

Rabat was heard broadcasting on November 12 and 13 the following message:

General Nogues has had his first long conversation with the American Military authorities. The bases for an arrangement have been traced. The French troops are going back to their garrisons. The political and economic direction of country continues without any changes. The Resident General continues to bear full responsibility for the maintenance of order in the country. General Nogues, after termination of these conversations, has left for Algiers, where he is to meet the Commander in Chief of the American Forces.

On November 13, Rabat denied rumors that Germany has entered Spain and would respect her neutrality.

The Tunis radio station has continued broadcasting

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although the duration of its transmission has been reduced "in order to save electricity consumption." Items monitored have exhorted the people to remain cool and disciplined, reported the landing of American troops at Bougie and Bone, and quoted the declaration of Governor General Chatel on his return to Algeria. Axis propaganda influence has not been perceptible. Many of the news items, which are not commented upon, have actually been taken from Anglo-American sources.

B. From the Dakar radio:

Dakar continues to stress the loyalty of the populations and the stubborn resistance being put up by the French forces, reporting many Allied wounded. American and British statements praising the valor of the French forces are quoted. Other items monitored report "complete calm" in Roulen, deny Axis landings in Tunisia, and describe the restrictions on gatherings, loitering, traffic, theatres, bars and restaurants in Tunis. Dakar still does not appear to be issuing strong denunciations of the Anglo-American action on its own authority, but it does quote from a Bucharest newspaper which follows the German line calling the action "pure robbery" and claiming that the invasion will increase the suffering of the French people. The station insists that the ~~only~~ source for France is to continue to

follow the Marshal and his policy. No mention of the role of Darlan or Giraud has been mentioned.

C. From Vichy

Since noon on November 10 Vichy broadcasts heard in North Africa have continued to stress the "magnificent" attitude of the French troops and have reported "lively" counter-attacks. Although admitting the capitulation of Casablanca "after heroic defense in a disproportionate battle" and issuing the Allied report of the capitulation of the whole of French North Africa, Vichy was still claiming on November 13, that serious fighting continues in the country outside Casablanca. The French forces in Algeria and Morocco are withdrawing toward the interior for regrouping. Vichy has also claimed. Successful Axis air attacks are reported. On the afternoon of November 10, Vichy told of the return of Governor General Chatel to his post "under perilous conditions," and described him as "the soul of civilian resistance."

Vichy describes the situation in Tunisia as one of "absolute calm": "The defenders are ready....the population is going about its affairs normally." Prefectorial edicts restricting gatherings, public performances,

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restaurant operations and the like have been issued. An Allied air attack on the airbases at Tunis is acknowledged. However, Vichy denies that Axis troops have landed in Tunisia. A telegram from the provincial inspector of Constantine is reported, declaring, "We remain faithful to our traditions, believe the Marshal, for our France."

The Vichy radio is still not displaying great indignation, and seriously attempting to arouse hatred of Americans, although the few propaganda items broadcast have been definitely anti-Ally. One of its prime purposes seems to be to show that the Vichy government has acted honorably and is not responsible for what has happened. "At the time of the affair of the Antilles, President Laval made known to the American government that nothing would ever come from the French side which might create an irreparable situation. The Anglo-Saxons have the full and entire responsibility for the tragic events which we are witnessing." Vichy comments further that the motives the "Anglo-Saxons" invoked are lying motives, that they struck at the point of least resistance, and "If we wish to live and resume the place which is ours in the world, we must do everything possible to save our empire."

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D. From Berlin and Rome:

There has not been sufficient monitored material from the German and Italian broadcasts in French heard in North Africa to indicate the themes that are being featured. However, the general Berlin and Rome line in foreign propaganda can be found in the PCG Weekly Review, November 14. Of special note is Berlin's denunciation of Darlan, and the Axis urging for the continuation of French resistance in North Africa in spite of Darlan's treachery.

E. From London:

From London the French in North Africa can hear full news on battle developments and diplomatic developments.

F. From Fighting French Stations:

Fighting French Stations in Casablanca and Beirut give news and repeat their appeals to Frenchmen in North Africa to throw off the Axis yoke. Beirut, for example, "Frenchmen, Mohammedans, soldiers, and officers of North Africa -- throw yourselves immediately and unreservedly into this battle of liberation..."

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It is up to you... History will praise and honor you."

The Brazzaville radio has not acknowledged Giraud as the leader of the French anti-fascist, and has in fact mentioned him only infrequently. De Gaulle, on the other hand, is mentioned even more frequently than usual. On November 10, Brazzaville announced that, "Fighting France is ready to welcome with glory all Frenchmen who want to fight under the tri-color flag and under French leadership."

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II. WHAT THE ITALIANS ARE HEARING

A. From Rome:

While Italian propaganda to the Mediterranean Basin continues to admit that Italy is confronted with "one of the great trials of history which our people must face in order to achieve justice," nevertheless, with the occupation of Corsica and Nice, its tone has become more confident. Italy still controls the Mediterranean and its important supply lines. Axis air attacks on Allied ships and airdromes in the North African area have been highly successful. Occupation of Corsica and the coast of France has strengthened the Axis position. In fact, it is a serious set-back for the Allies who planned to establish bridge-heads there. In general, then, Italians are hearing that things are not as bad as they seemed at first. The Allies were successful in North Africa only because of Axis respect for the armistice with France. Special emphasis is placed upon the calmness with which the French population received Italian troops. Criticism of France has diminished. The report is spread that the English and Americans, dissatisfied with de Gaulle, are planning to remove him.

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Psychology Division
November 14, 1942
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III. WHAT THE SPANIARDS ARE HEARING

A. From Spain

Spanish domestic propaganda from Falangist stations has veered to a more anti-United Nations and pro-Axis position in its treatment of the African situation, but has not as yet indulged in consistently all-out condemnation of Anglo-American actions. Nor is it clear whether Franco's policy is identical with that of Falangist propaganda.

(The following analysis is made on the basis of Spanish broadcasts to Spain, in the absence of any monitoring of Spanish broadcasts to North Africa. There is little reason to believe, however, that there would be important differences in general line in the broadcasts beamed to North Africa.)

The most severe criticism of the United Nations appeared in a broadcast November 10, from the strongly pro-Axis Radio Falange at Valladolid:

"The forces of good, the people who are fighting, the spirit of aggression, the men who are de-
feating the independence of Nations and their
right to direct their own destinies in their
own fashion, the State which promised never to
mix in the affairs of other continents, the
man who swore not to send his armies outside
of American territory, have landed troops in Africa
to destroy the sovereignty in the Pro-
vinces of Africa.

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"Thus does the United States return good services France rendered to her during the last war. Never in the whole course of the war has there been such an extraordinary example of cold calculation."

"In the future, it will be a cruel mockery to talk of the principles of the Atlantic Charter, which was definitely destroyed when the first guns were fired (in North Africa.)"

The commentary goes on to deny the Axis threat to North Africa, ridicule the U.S. explanations, protest that the Allied move was no surprise to Hitler, and promise that "at the right time Roosevelt will learn the answer of Europe's defenders."

Another anti-American broadcast declared that "in view of the American plans, in full agreement with the Soviets, for future organization of the world, and in the face of the apparition of Roosevelt's forces in the Latin Sea cradle of civilization, a profound shiver must have been felt by the whole of Europe."

Other Spanish broadcasts, however, are more reserved. A Barcelona commentator declares, "We are not going to give much space in our chronicle to comment on the landing of Anglo-American Troops on the North African Coast, because, if our commentary were of political character, we should have to start from the Doctrine of Monroe, and if it were of military character we would have to come to the very difficult

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proclamation that the experience has shown to us that it (the landings) can be effected without great sacrifice in lives and war material."

Spanish concern for Spanish rights in North Africa has become more aggressive and ambitious. At first, Spain merely repeated without comment the British and American assurances of respect for Spanish territorial integrity. On November 11, however, a Spanish commentary declared that the assurances "are not to be considered as gracious confessions of what the countries concerned intended to do. They are rather to be regarded in the light of an unconditional surrender before the existence of a moral right....Spain's attitude (toward the North African issue) has always been clearly revisionist....the situation created by military operations in French Morocco can only be considered by us as a series of events which have no juridical importance, and no influence whatever on the future status of the Moroccan Empire. We continue to maintain our claims..."

(Vichy has reported that the Spanish High Commission of Spanish Morocco issued a proclamation to the population

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of the protectorate in which he observed, "with satisfaction," that world attention has been focussed on northwest Africa; that the status quo in the Spanish zone has not been changed but consolidated; and that rumor spreading and other activities capable of making the people nervous would not be tolerated).

B. From Berlin and Rome:

The F.C.C. Weekly Review of November 14 contains a report of German and Italian broadcasts to Latin America in Spanish, which can also be heard in North Africa.

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IV. WHAT THE ARABS ARE HEARINGA. From Berlin:

German attempts to incite the Arabs to revolt against the Allied forces have continued with broadcast of the following appeal from Haj Amin Al-Husseini, "the Grand Mufti of Palestine":

"The Anglo-American occupation of the Arabian lands, after 25 years of Balfour's Declaration, was prompted by the Jewish interest in the colonization of the Arabian lands and the founding of a Jewish State there.

"Arabs, rest assured, that the American Army is the sword in the hands of the Jews, who are coming to enslave you."

"Arabs, trust not in Anglo-American promises. The Anglo-Americans are the protectors of the Jews."

Berlin has also reported in Arabic that Petain has sent reinforcements to French Africa and that new British and Greek armies have reached Cyprus.

B. From Rome:

Rome, like Berlin, has exploited the appeals of the Grand Mufti.

Other Rome broadcasts have declared that "American occupation of Africa is a Jewish victory over Arabs... Americans, like the British, are protectors of Jews, colonizers of Arabian lands, and exploiters of Arabian oil. Solidarity with the Axis means freedom. Union with Anglo-Americans means slavery." Rome also declares that fighting in French North Africa has not been officially ended, since Vichy has refused to confirm Berlin's appeal.

Office File 949:

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

A Propaganda
Summary
Research

TO: Colonel William J. Donovan


DATE: November 11, 1942

FROM: Mr. William L. Langer

SUBJECT: Propaganda Summary on North Africa

Please find attached a summary of the propaganda situation in North Africa prepared by the Psychology Division and based on a special coverage requested by us from the FCC.

This summary was originally requested by Mr. Howes-Lyon.



William L. Langer
Director, Branch
Research and Analysis

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WHAT THE PEOPLES OF NORTH AFRICA ARE HEARING

**(Rapid digest and analysis of radio broadcasts
to North Africa up to Noon, November 10, 1942)**

Psychology Division

November 11, 1942

Psychological
Invasion

WHAT THE PEOPLES OF NORTH AFRICA ARE HEARING

Algeria

Vichy and the French Empire stations in North and West Africa, in official broadcasts to Frenchmen in Africa, have been noticeably restrained about the Allied invasion. They have not attempted to arouse indignation and hatred of Americans, nor promised victory through German aid. Their appeals for assistance have been made only in the name of French "honor." Repeated directions have been given to civilians in order to insure as calm and normal behavior as possible. Stress has been laid upon the "loyalty" of the population and the "noble" resistance of the troops, who are doing their duty to France.

The Arabs in North Africa, on the other hand, have been subjected to extremely emotional appeals from Axis radios. They have been urged to revolt in the name of their religion, their families, their womanhood, their freedom, their property, their health, and their struggle against the Jews. Allied promises and propaganda have been repeatedly condemned.

North African Italians have been informed by Rome of the seriousness of the situation, but urged to buck up and take it as the English did in defeat. Rome has featured the "villainy, hypocrisy, and unscrupulousness" of the Americans and the British, yet has also openly condemned the Vichy officials in North Africa, attempting to turn Italian despair into anger at the Vichyites.

North African Spaniards have heard the subject of the American invasion treated with the greatest reserve from their home country. The American and British assurances that Spanish sovereignty will not be violated has been repeatedly broadcast.

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I. WHAT THE FRENCH ARE HEARING

A. From the French Empire Stations in North Africa
(Morocco, Rabat, Algiers, Tunis):

Such broadcasts as are available from French Empire stations in North Africa (1) give directions to the population as to how to behave; (2) emphasize the "significant" behavior of the "calm" population; (3) praise the "noble" and "fierce" resistance put up by French troops; (4) protest loyalty to France and Petain.

The general strategy appears to be to give the impression that everything is well in hand, the social services proceeding normally, the population loyal, and resistance whole-hearted. North Africans are urged not to listen to foreign broadcasts. Specific directions concerning evacuation, billeting, transportation, and the like are given, apparently to avoid such confusion as took place in France proper with the German invasion. Warnings against food hoarding are broadcast. Announcement of restrictions in withdrawing money indicates fear of bank panics. Legionnaires are asked to report to permanent headquarters. All firearms possessed by citizens must be turned in.

Unlike the Vichy short wave to non-African audiences and the Vichy home radios, the French Empire radios give

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their audieness very little indication of the strategy being achieved by U.S. occupying troops or the gravity of the situation. This also is apparently designed to reduce confusion and disaffection. However, it is admitted by Radio Maroc that the Americans have "considerable means" and "very important" artillery.

Positively, the Empire radios give little reason for fighting beyond the maintenance of French "honor." There is also relatively little display of indignation and little condemnation of the United States. There have been no magnificent gestures of defiance, nor promises of victory with German aid. The general impression is that the French in North Africa are orientated toward an "honourable" defeat.

The following is a summary of a typical broadcast:

"The population of Morocco is conducting itself magnificently everywhere. It has taken its place for resistance... The population received a message from Marshal Petain exhorting its loyalty. General... responded to the message, declaring that he gives assurance of perfect loyalty."

The Minister of Information communicates: This is the information that can be issued. The disembarkations of British troops have been repulsed at (sounded like Bizerte, but probably Algiers-Ad.). Calanese reigns in the city. Other disembarkations took place, especially at Oran. Coastal defenses went into operation. Admiral Dorian and General (Nogues?) of Algiers have taken necessary measures.

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The government encourages further. We ask the French people not to let themselves be misled by foreign messages. Discipline and valiant devotion to duty are necessary. Admiral Darlan is at the scene of action, France has had other trials. Honor demands that we defend the truth.

Here in another message to the civilian population. Railways and roads must be reserved for military operations, therefore traffic between different cities must be restricted. Economic life will continue normally. Schools will continue to operate normally, except near the coast where traffic must be restricted."

B. From the Dakar Radio in West Africa:

The few items monitored from Dakar indicate that this radio differs from those in North Africa in making more references to revolts and in admitting more serious military losses. It reports that rebellions have taken place, but have been put down, and quotes Laval's telegram urging that all attempts at rebellion be energetically suppressed. Like the North African stations, however, Dakar emphasizes that "all our troops are doing their duty and are offering fierce resistance."

C. From Vichy:

Reception of material from Vichy to Africa has been poor -- London possibly has been jamming this transmission. Those items monitored carry Petain's answer to Roosevelt, stress the loyalty of the populations, cite Hungarian and Swiss papers condemning "aggression" and expressing sympathy for France, and appeal to the French "not to

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not themselves be deceived by certain foreign ~~radio~~ broadcasts.
One remarkable broadcast from Vichy dwells upon the horrors of war.

D. From Berlin:

Reception of Berlin and Rome broadcasts in French to Africa has been practically negligible. However, knowing the line that Berlin is taking to France and other areas, we may assume that Berlin has been emphasizing the following themes in propaganda to North Africa: the attack is upon metropolitan France, not just the French Empire; the Anglo-American goal is to take over the French Empire; the attack will result in serious food shortage for France; the Vatican condemns the attack; Doriot and other French patriots have demanded a declaration of war against Britain and the United States. Berlin continually stresses British involvement in the attack, exploiting anti-British sentiment.

E. From London:

The London radio in broadcasts in French heard in Africa repeat Giraud's appeal, give news of the progress of the fighting, point to feeble resistance and lack of hostility, and describe Italian machinations in Tunisia in an attempt to turn the North African French against the Italians. The French resistors are called "Vichy naval forces" and "Vichy troops" by London.

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P. From Brazzaville:

Fighting French broadcasts to the French in Africa
make direct appeals for aid in liberating the Empire.
Marshall Petain is declared to be "a creation of the
Axis," who led France on a path neither of honor nor of
the welfare of France. Frenchmen are urged not to be
"instruments" of the Axis.

II. WHAT THE ITALIANS ARE HEARING

A. From Italy:

Two important reactions have been noticed in Italian
radio propoganda to home and empire. First, Rome has
shown considerable concern for morale, as evidenced in the
following quotation from a talk by Mario Appellus: "To
tremble in public is a crime against the community and
country. Those who are afraid, let them be so in private,
for fear is an organic device...the world is looking at us
and it is our duty to be worthy of our armed forces. We
will ride this storm as we have ridden all others." There
are numerous protestations that Italians can "take it"
just as the English could. Secondly, Rome has expressed
open dissatisfaction and even threats against Vichy
officials, apparently seeking to curb Italian despair

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into anger against Vichy. The following is a quotation from a broadcast on November 8 for home and empire:

"Admiral Darlan's recent visit to North Africa was to be a kind of encouragement to all French in North Africa to support and defend their empire. But to what extent is this Vichy attitude supported by the men who are effectively in command of the French forces in North Africa? This is the kernel of the situation. Where in Morocco and Algiers are there men of sufficient resolution to carry out these orders?"

"Nothing is easier than that, despite all the pious intentions of the Vichy Government, all officials and Generals, who are probably now glued to the telephone, don't really give a damn for Petain's message and even ferment a dissident movement throughout North Africa."

"One thing is certain in this event: There would be the gravest repercussions on the relations between the Axis powers and the Vichy Government."

The general tenor of these comments possibly betrays the line of action presently to be taken by Rome. If France can't look after her own, the Italian circles who have been long shouting for Tunisia and Corsica may now try to make most of their opportunities.

Other themes in Italian propaganda concerning the North African situation have been as follows:

- 1) Italian sources have known for two weeks of the Allied preparations to attack North Africa with American men and material, augmented by British naval resources. The fact of the actual attack was therefore not a surprise to Italians.

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RESTRICTED

2) The African landings are designed to create the "second front" with Italy as the objective.

3) The British are abdicating in favor of the Americans from all post-war influence in international, economic, and political fields.

4) The British will have a hard time evicting the Americans from the British Isles after the war is over.

5) The British and Americans are villains and bandits, who have one sole purpose: "to make of Italy their scullery maid, and if the Italian people should refuse to wash the dishes in the kitchen in behalf of the English and North American masters, they will be handed over to Russian Bolshevism and imperialism."

In general, Italian propaganda to home and empire has freely admitted Axis setbacks in Africa.

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III. WHAT THE SPANISH AIR BROADCASTS

RESTRICTED

A. From Madrid

Spanish broadcasts to North Africa are so far very reserved. For the most part, they have done little more than re-assure Spanish subjects that the United Nations will respect the territorial integrity of the Spanish Colonial Empire. The following official statement issued by the Minister of Foreign Affairs has been repeatedly broadcast:

"The Head of State and Minister for Foreign Affairs have received a written guarantee from the President of the United States and His Majesty's Government of Great Britain assuring that Spain and her island territories as well as her colonies and the Moroccan Protectorate will be respected and will not be the object of any attack or any other act contrary to the sovereignty, integrity and independence of Spain. Spanish interests in general, the situation established in Tangier and the validity of commercial treaties will be respected in the same way."

B. From Berlin

In Spanish language broadcasts heard in North Africa, radio Berlin quotes Radio Vichy and Navy dispatches extensively for news of the action. Roosevelt's message to Petain is labeled an attempt to justify aggression, but is not quoted. His message to the French is not even mentioned. Petain's reply to Roosevelt is quoted in full. Berlin quotes a German denial of the demand

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every. As for the significance of the new American
 Berlin finds that it fits very properly into what one
 might expect of the avidly imperialistic U. S. "We
 have always respected these French territories.
 Roosevelt the imperialist occupied them, and of course
 solely out of friendship for France, as was the case with
 Liberia, which was occupied only out of friendship,
 naturally. To satiate the imperialist Roosevelt there
 is no difference. He is trying to establish himself in
 every place where he expects to encounter only feeble
 resistance. After the English, South American, and
 Dutch possessions, he decided to occupy Liberia. Why
 should he treat French North Africa any differently?"

0. From Rome:

Radio Roma also declares that the Axis never had
 any intention of invading Northwest Africa. Rome
 reports a strong French resistance everywhere, saying
 that all Allied landing attempts were repulsed. The
 attack is called ridiculous and it is predicted that
 it will have no effect on the Egyptian campaign, which
 is so far removed.

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IV. WHAT THE ARABS ARE HEARING

RESTRICTED

A. From the Axis:

The Axis broadcasts to the Arab World contain direct appeals to revolt and exhortations to the Arabs not to believe Allied propaganda. Rome strongly condemns the U. S. invasion and goes so far as to claim that "germ diseases are given to arrested Arabs". Berlin, likewise, condemns the immorality of the U.S. action, and also attempts to defend the Axis against the U.S. allegations. Vichy's broadcasts in Arabic are confined to brief communiques of developments on the war front in North Africa. Paris broadcasts in Arabic appeal to the Arabs to revolt and paints the revolt as a sacred war of Mohammedanism against Imperialism and the Allied criminals. There were no Allied broadcasts in Arabic available.

Verbatim excerpts of Axis transmissions in Arabic follow:

1. Rome

"Believe not the propaganda of the Allies; trust not in their empty promises. The Treaty of Versailles gave the Arabs freedom and independence which has never been kept. They exiled our King Hussein. They were the cause of the death of Feisal, his son; and they are the ones who are imprisoning his grandson, King Ghazi of Iraq. Tear the Treaty of Versailles to pieces, it is nothing but a cheap piece of paper. With the lulling words Roosevelt is coming to protect us. He will protect all our oil wells of Iraq and Iran to make sure that no one uses them except Americans. He will protect all of our girls and women to make sure that no one abuses them except Americans.

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He will collect all of our wheat and store it in American granaries, to make sure that Americans are fed first. Tear the Treaty of Versailles into pieces. Believe not in the promises of Americans, protector of the Jews, ally of the Bolsheviks and enemy of the Arabs.

"Are you going to stand for all of this, O Arabs? Are you going to allow your fatherland to be invaded by your enemies? Have you forgotten Roosevelt's promises to the Jews -- to give them Palestine and neighboring states? Have you forgotten Churchill's protection of the Jews? Have you forgotten the Balfour declaration? Have you forgotten Ben Gourion and Weizmann's threats?..."
(Bari in Arabia to the Near East 11/8, 17:00)

2. Berlin

"The American invasion of North and West Africa is against International Law, against decency and war honor. The Americans stabbed France in the back. Such is American gratitude to Lafayette who saved them from British tyranny. Americans fight disarmed nations instead of fighting Germany and Japan. American authorities invade peaceful nation in order to show victories to their people. These are false victories." (B-Near East, 11/8).

"Germany had no intention of attacking French Africa. American imperialism is attacking where no Axis army is fighting."

"American invasion of French Africa is no threat to Germany or to Rommel."

"We tell you the truth and the Allied radios deceive you."

3. Paris (In Moroccan)

"Rise, Moroccans and protect your fatherland. Petain urges you to save French honor by your courage and heroism against the criminal invader."

"You are peace-loving people. The criminal Roosevelt brought war into your midst. Show the invader how well Moroccans can protect their honor and that of France."

"Religion urges you to shed your blood for your country. For the sake of your liberty and for the love of your children oppose American imperialism, now colonizing your fatherlands as the British have colonized all other Mohammedan states."

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with the Americans, Sovietists, and Jewry
will invade your lands and your institutions and ruin
the mosaic of your sacred families.

"This is a sacred war of Mahomedanism
against imperialism and Allied criminals."

4. Voice of the Free Arabs (Axis clandestine station):

"Germany will soon counter-attack American
invasion of French Africa. Vichy has already ordered
resistance and may soon declare war on the United
States."