

REPORT ON FIELD CONDITIONS

TO

GENERAL WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

Director, Office of Strategic Services

From

Lt. Colonel Sidney S. Rubenstein

X-2 Branch

15 September 1944

ONE

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

15, 287  
F. H. [unclear]  
X [unclear] Lt. Col. Sidney S.  
Y C B I  
X  
DATE: 16 September 1944

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director, OSS.  
Via : Chief, X-2 Branch.  
FROM : Lt. Colonel Sidney S. Rubenstein *S. S. Rubenstein*  
SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions submitted by Lt. Colonel Sidney S. Rubenstein, X-2 Branch.

1. Reference is made to memorandum dated 30 August 1944, from the Secretariat, subject "Reports from Officers Returning from Field".
2. Pursuant to instructions set forth in said memorandum, there is being transmitted herewith, in duplicate, a Secret Report on Field Conditions, dated 15 September 1944, prepared by Lt. Colonel Sidney S. Rubenstein. This report covers X-2 operations and field conditions in the China-Burma-India Theater.

Encl. (2)

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15,287

Field Report

**CONFIDENTIAL**

6 October 1944

X Rubenstein, S. C. (Snyder)  
X Y-2  
X CBI

MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT COLONEL SIDNEY RUBENSTEIN  
SUBJECT: Commendation

1. I have regarded with a great deal of satisfaction the superior manner in which you assisted Detachment 404, OSS, CBI, in solving its security and organizational problems. Your keen interest in the success of that Detachment is characteristic of the conscientious, determined efforts you have always exerted in the performance of your duties as a member of this organization.

2. I have instructed the Secretariat to forward a copy of this memorandum to The Adjutant General for inclusion in your EO1 file.

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN  
Brigadier General, USA  
Director

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OSS Form 4001  
(Rev. 7/27/44)

OSS SECRETARIAT - ROUTE SLIP

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TO	NAME	INITIALS
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<input type="checkbox"/>	J. J. Monigan	
<input type="checkbox"/>	E. J. Putzell, Jr.	P
<input type="checkbox"/>	R. Thrum	
<input type="checkbox"/>	D. C. Lee	
<input type="checkbox"/>	J. W. Auchincloss	
<input type="checkbox"/>	W. B. Kautack	
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2-01 file - Return for  
ammc 20.2 PA*

(23695)

This is the first time in my life I have ever interfered in a matter such as this, and I trust that you will not take it amiss.

I am delighted beyond words that Ed Taylor is coming back as our intelligence officer. A happier choice could not be found.

SINCERELY,



RICHARD F. NEWELL  
Lt. Colonel, FA  
CHIEF, OCS, SEAS


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**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

20 September 1944

MEMORANDUM

**TO:** The Director  
**THROUGH:** Lt. Col. Carl O. Hoffmann  
**FROM:** Jack O. Pamplin  
**SUBJECT:** Report on Return from the Field

1. In accordance with General Order No. 63, following report is submitted:

a. October 1942 to August 1943, in charge of cryptography for Detachment 101, and part time instructor in varied subjects.

From August 1943 to March 1944, in the capacity of assistant to Captain Curl on the "KNOTHEAD" mission in the Kachin Hills of upper Burma. Was later in full charge of this mission.

b. The cryptographic section grew rapidly in volume and importance, and was handling from 40,000 to 50,000 groups monthly, with a staff of three men, when I departed.

The "KNOTHEAD" mission was completed in August 1944. This mission furnished information on the location of numerous concentrations of enemy supplies and personnel, and movements thereof; was of assistance to the forces under General Merrill in their drive southward in Burma, putting the majority of our native army at his disposal, and aiding materially in the drive on Myitkyina.

c. Since Detachment 101 first began to function the cryptographic section has been overworked and understaffed; this is still true, though to a lesser extent. Promotions in this section (for enlisted men) are exceedingly difficult to obtain.

Shortage of supply and of personnel, which were encountered during most of our mission in Burma, does not exist at present, to such a marked degree.

*J. Pamplin*  
JACK O. PAMPLIN  
2nd Lt., A.U.S.

*To Mr. Chestnut*

*Heads Office is looking after this*

*J. Pamplin*

*L. Postelle*

**SECRET**  
**TECHNICAL SERVICES**  
**SECTION**  
**WASHINGTON, D. C.**

*9 Jan*  
*1945*  
*100-100000*  
*100-100000*

20 September 1944

*Please see notation on letter*

Hoffmann

✓

*DMR*

from the Field

(3308)

Director's Office

Order No. 63, following report is submitted:

1943, in charge of cryptography for instructor in varied subjects,

March 1944, in the capacity of assistant "KNOHEAD" mission in the Kachin Hills of upper Burma. Was in full charge of this mission.

b. The cryptographic section grew rapidly in volume and importance, and was handling from 40,000 to 50,000 groups monthly, with a staff of three men, when I departed.

The "KNOTHEAD" mission was completed in August 1944. This mission furnished information on the location of numerous concentrations of enemy supplies and personnel, and movements thereof; was of assistance to the forces under General Merrill in their drive southward in Burma, putting the majority of our native army at his disposal, and aiding materially in the drive on Myitkyina.

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
Shortage of supply and of personnel, which were encountered during most of our mission in Burma, does not exist at present, to such a marked degree.

*10*  
*Mr. [unclear]*

*Please see officer in [unclear] [unclear]*

*J. Pamplin*  
JACK C. PAMPLIN  
2nd Lt., U.S.





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or in the occupied countries as we move in. I still have an extensive acquaintance among Norwegians, Danes, Finns, Flemish, German, Czech people and since 1931 I have met and know by sight, or am personally acquainted with, many of the political leaders of the German Nazi movement. I am also in touch with officials in the Norwegian government in London and members of the Danish and Swedish legations. I submit that these contacts and those I have made in Sweden over a period of years should not be wasted.

Finally, on the advice of Dick H., I believe I shall ask for permission to visit the United States. D. H. seemed to think that the Washington office would like to have me there for extended consultation. It also happens that I am unable to shake off my cold which goes to my chest about every third day and threatens to become pleurisy. A little warm weather would put me on my feet again. But if there is any need for my services here, I could probably manage if I could have two weeks in the hospital. At any rate, as I said before, I place myself at your disposal.

*Roy P. Hill*  
 ROY HILL

*London, March 18, 1944*

*To: Major General Marshall*

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I should now like to add some personal notes which I trust will have general application and serve to guide the central offices in the future conduct of our work.

1. I firmly believe that the State Department and its local representatives should be strongly persuaded to adopt a more cooperative and helpful attitude toward OSS men in the field, particularly those who do not enjoy diplomatic immunity or partial diplomatic protection. The career men in the American Foreign Service, with some notable exceptions, regard themselves as having a monopoly over all kinds of representation by Americans in foreign countries. It is inevitable, I suppose, that any agency which controls one's movements (by passport, extensions and amendments) communications (by the pouch) and prestige (by countless forms of recognition, disapproval, and even blacklisting) will seek to extend these prerogatives to cover most minute supervision and control. I do not think that the Legation authorities in Stockholm ever fully appreciated the value of OSS work and certainly were unmindful of the personal and professional risks involved. The personal risks are of course negligible, but the professional risks are greater for undercover agents operating on their own names and reputations. I think the Minister should treat OSS undercover men of this category with great courtesy, and should publicly recognize them. Most of the time, Mr. Johnson accorded me due recognition. When we met at public gatherings he greeted me warmly and introduced me to other persons standing in the vicinity. During the last six months of my stay he was not particularly cordial but not openly unfriendly. On the whole, I have personally less to complain about than others of my colleagues. I was particularly well received by Harry Carleton, Thorwald Klath, Frans von Schilling, and W. W. Corcoran, not to mention younger men such as Pearson, Lightner, Durrey, et al. Mr. Washington was at first cordial, later cool and correct. Both he and the Minister probably put obstacles in the way of a trip to

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Finland. I am sure this was not personal because very few Americans were helped in their efforts to get over there. But I feel strongly that the State Department has stood in the way of effective OSS work in Finland. I am sure that I could have handled the Finns and have disabused their minds of the opinion and hope that I came bearing good will and concessions. If the State Department and Mr. MacGirtack had not become so agitated when Finns expressed joy at the advent of old American friends I think that misunderstandings would quickly have dissipated.

The undercover agent is more or less at the mercy of those controlling communications via the pouch. Information as to what is in cables should be left with the communications and coordinating officers in Stockholm and London. But I do not think that State Department officials should censor such communications. An agent should have direct communication with his superiors--or he should never be sent to the field in the first place.

There should be no control by the Legation over contact or associations. In my case none has been attempted--to my knowledge. I suspect that it has in the case of others. As far as our own people are concerned, I recognize that the validity and reliability of information must be checked. But often the person reporting information is in a better position to judge of reliability than those in the office. If reliability of an informant or of the information is questioned, the reasons for the low rating given him or it should be made known.

I have indicated above, in the general report, my dissatisfaction with the directives. In Washington, I was given a large number of assignments to obtain information regarding Swedish military strength, naval tonnage and movement, industrial and defense production. Just as I was getting my teeth into this I was told to stop; the explanation being given that the central OSS office did not wish to put OSS men under the suspicion of spying on Sweden. I was also

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told that our military, naval and commercial attaches gathered all the information required along this line. By direction, I kept up the observation of the transit traffic and shipping movements in the Øresund. Later, I began to establish contacts for the obtaining of Norwegian information. I was told then that this was not desired. A suggestion that I systematically extend observations to Denmark was met with the statement that the British covered it adequately. Most of the German refugees I was given letters to had only theories about reconstruction and vague hints as to "conditions" in Germany to report. Many of these reports were passed on anyway until Carl R. arrived, at which time he was given some contacts and left the rest. The assignments on Germany (health), Hungary and Finland were carried out as well as could be done--but, since June 1, I felt that many opportunities to gather information on the following subjects were ignored. Possibly others produced information desired. It still would have profited OSB to get what I was in a position to obtain. These are the subjects I have in mind:

Norwegian information - from refugees.

Danish information - through P. R. or independently through seamen, refugees, visitors, and indirectly through officials and commercial travelers.

German information: bomb damage, industrial production, agricultural production, governmental changes, public opinion and morale, movements of individuals.

Swedish information: industrial production, shipment of goods to Germany, relations between Swedish business men and Germans, military organization.

(Omitted here is information submitted or to be submitted.)

With regard to finances, I have submitted a fairly complete report to Major Alcorn. As stated therein, I was originally given \$500 a month, of which one-half was to be salary and the rest task funds. But it was soon agreed by Dr. H. that I should use the whole \$500 for salary and local expenses and draw on Ty for task funds. Until June 1, this worked out quite well, except

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that sometimes when I traveled such or made my trips to contacts in the Stockholm suburbs, my reserve was used up and the usual thing was for me practically to be without funds at the time for receiving the monthly cable transfer. My finances were somewhat improved by the receipt of "expense and fee" money from the Swedish-American Foundation, Swedish-American News Exchange, the A.D.F. (Workers' Educational Society), and Natur and Kultur publishing house--in all about 800 kroner. I ceased getting task funds in June, except in cases where I paid out certain amounts on behalf of Carl H. or of the fellows in the Stockholm office. I got certain sums for expenses, accounted for in my report to Major Alcorn--or directly accounted for to Ty. I also received a few items of groceries and liquor which either von Schilling or Ty or the "household of the 49 Club" paid for. But my receipts were much less than expenditures.

I shall now discuss these more freely. The first 10 months were on the whole pretty slim. I had only simple rations (newspaper correspondents and legation personnel got double rations) and often I had barely enough for my own needs, certainly not enough to do any extensive entertaining at home. I was forced to do considerable entertaining outside the home. Part of this might be considered "private", even though many of my friends--Swedish journalists, Swedish and Finnish public men, businessmen, and professional people--were also contacts. To some extent I was helped by Ty and Frans, as indicated. But I could not begin to compete with the representatives of our own government who had entertainment funds and full access to the commissary, with its greater range and lower prices of food and liquor. Since the summer of 1943, there have been more generous rations but certain types of foods have been unavailable. (I had about 10 eggs from August 1 to December 1.) Ordinarily, this is not a subject for complaint. But inasmuch as stenographers and clerks at the O.W.I. and certain legation employees were amply supplied with cigarettes

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and liquor, with which they could continuously nourish contacts of doubtful public value whilst I had barely enough for my own needs or had to purchase what I lacked at high prices, I question the efficiency of this method of utilizing the resources of our government. Note that I do not claim that our own men wasted these resources. I know, for example, that Finn J. gave away practically everything of his own--food, liquor, clothing--and refrained from accepting certain supplementary compensation from the State Department to which his position entitled him. But I emphasize that the resources available to me were not adequate to the results expected. I believe that this is also true of certain other undercover agents working without diplomatic protection. At the present time, when my bills for maintenance here in London and my travel expenses, such as fare from Luchary to London, etc. are paid, I shall have remaining only the March payment, which is probably in Stockholm. I have not learned yet where it is.

On the basis of my experience, I would recommend (1) that a salary be paid all adequate for rent, clothing, laundry, medical care and incidentals; (2) that all agents have, in addition, access to the ordinary ex grants of food, liquor and cigarette supplements; (3) that an entertainment and transportation allowance (including taxi-fares on public business) be given each man and accounted for monthly, whereby also the validity and efficiency of the expenditure might be controlled; that bank funds of limited amounts be advanced, to be subsequently accounted for; and that expenditures for travel or meals of sub-agents be included in these allowances. (Some contacts will not accept money, but they will accept "entertainment," and compensation for expenditures incurred by them or by others on their behalf.

I have omitted the question of taxes paid or payable to the neutral country. I have not yet received my bill for taxes, but it is extremely likely that I shall later.

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With regard to the future, I should like first of all to complete my reports desired on any subject where I have information. I would like assistance in getting my notes over here. I have already indicated this desire to Taylor G., Lew, and Mick. The Swedish Legation has promised to obtain for me any public documents that I need. I do not know how soon the Swedes will get this material over here; probably it will take quite a while. In the meantime I will need some materials which, if OSS cannot get them sent over, can, I believe, be obtained through the good offices of the O.V.I. Library and Mr. Heindel. I have been asked to write an article on Sweden for The Political Quarterly, summer issue. To protect my cover, I should do this and will appreciate any help I can get in obtaining materials.

I have already expressed my willingness to perform any task of a hazardous character that needs to be done. I do not think that my knowledge of German is sufficient for me to be dropped now by parachute within the enemy lines. But when the invasion is begun, I would be willing to take a chance and think that I could manage, with the help of others, to carry out a short term assignment.

In the event that Denmark or Norway is thrown into confusion by an invasion attempt, I know of Swedes, or nationals of these countries who would be willing to smuggle me into these countries and accompany me on a short sortie. I would pose as a Swede if needed, allowing my friends to do the talking. I understand these languages perfectly, but do not master the dialects, as no one does who knows one Scandinavian language well. I could even get by on Swedish in Finland, where many Finns do not speak Finnish, but if I can be of any value there, it would be better that I go under my own name and by invitation. I can get an invitation to visit Finland at any time. The only difficulty here is the problem of placing our own State Department.

It also occurs to me that I might be of some value in U. S. work in London



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Hotels which are especially suspicious from our point of view are : Grand, Strand, Reisen, Castle, Continental, Gillet, Eden, ~~Swedish~~, Anten (also their restaurants).

Restaurants where contact be very careful are :

- Maandagen
- Beckensinen
- Sackrahsten
- Aranda Tomlen
- Starehof
- Galerie Moderne (It.)
- San Fransiskoner (Ger.)
- Margaretsbrunn
- Grand and Grand Royal
- Jagen (axis hangout)
- Ein Fjogels
- Bellmanere (axis hangout)
- Hessbarna
- Keebbad
- Operhallaren
- K.B. (all types here)

Canditeris:

Ore  
Wivel

\* all known  
Nazi hangouts

Note: no restaurant is safe; but some are relatively friendly; Swedi is frequented by Norwegians. Richt by ditto and all others. Swedi restaurants are fairly safe. Swedi at Sveavagen and Kungsgatan, although owned by the same firm which owns Swedi is an anti-Axis refugee hangout. Swedi is now owned by some people - but everyone goes there. If visiting a small cafe (Swedi) better talk Swedish.

In Malmö watch out for Hotel Kramer and even Savay. In Göteborg, Grand Hotel Swedi, Swedi and Swedi most often have Axis guests, but in each case the management is not anti-Allied.

On Swedi, contact Swedi Thune (M.I.C. has her father's name) and Swedi Gadelius. These girls are daughters of men who have had business connections in Japan. They are pro-Japanese, but profess also to be pro-American (they could be, they insist majority of Jap legation is pro-Allied); I would suggest that Bill try to reach these girls without introduction. Thune lives near Tegnergatan and N.Jadling. It's in phone book. Gadelius in Saltsjöbaden. Bill could profess an interest in Jap culture. Both these girls know all the Japs. Gadelius especially high-type person. Refined, intelligent. Swedi Valery also knows the Japs and can say who is who.

On Swedi meet them directly, check by such impartial as Swedi sisters (daughters of Brazilian Minister). Dick could get to a lot of these. His cover should be good for contacting Italians. Have Swedi arrange a party and give her the money to pay for it. You can get Italians, Hungarians, Romanians, Spaniards etc. all in the net at once.


For Swedi, check the files first. Then get help of P.K. to follow certain leads he has in Stockholm and elsewhere. He should have some special financing on these jobs. V.V. will bring us up-to-date on recent developments (as also on Italians, Finns, doubtful Danes and Norwegians. After being armed with these new facts, consult Swedi (but for full advantage, the consultation should be in Swedish). Any of the newer OSS men in Sweden might check through the active roster of Swedi contacts, to get fresh light on the situation. One should also make use of persons who have access to Nazi circles. I don't know how far they can be trusted, but the two "wayward" little Americans, Robert Toros and Chester, could be used. In their cases, some are Swedi identified with the legation should contact them.

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as businessmen and engineers with business connections, army officers with professional ties to Germany etc. A fairly large number of business men and some smaller merchants; newdealers, tobacconists, florists, furniture dealers etc., are not precisely pro-German. They consider themselves pro-Swedish and believe that a restored Germany under neither Russian nor Western domination is essential to the welfare of their country. Among the German refugees there are elements which are hostile to "extreme" Allied views concerning the reconstruction of Germany. Included are some of our own contacts.

I shall have to add some comments on the situation in Sweden with respect to Norwegians, Danes, Finns, Estonians, Letts, Hungarians, et. al. in a separate report. At this time, I believe this office has adequate information in the reports of other returning agents.

Mar 15, 1944 Jay W. Cecil



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This story I have covered in a previous communication. Suffice it to say, Sweden was whole-heartedly sympathetic with Finland, but the majority of those active in Finnish relief were also anti-Nazi. Sweden was aware of Germany's preparations to invade Norway. They warned the Norwegians but their warnings were ignored. A wave of sympathy swept the country. At the same time, Swedes were subjected to extraordinary pressure by the Germans at exactly the time that they became convinced of Britain's unwillingness or inability to render adequate assistance to Norway. As I reported earlier, on the basis of Boheman's memorandum, the Swedes protest that they accepted Germany's minimum demands for the transit of "troops on leave", one active division from Norway to Finland, and defense materials (ammunition, tanks, trucks, buses, building materials and machines for fortifications). On this traffic I have fully reported, I have not reported on the reactions of the Swedish press and political groups, since these were presumably covered by the OWI and the Legation. However, these matters will be reported on later. As Sweden's defenses became stronger, her confidence grew and the popular protests became more vigorous. Finally, in the Spring of 1943 the decision was made to stop the troop transit and to diminish the goods traffic. At the same time (summer of 1943) the Swedish government changed the tone of its communications to Berlin. These followed protests over the shooting down of the Oripen and the Gladan, the sinking of the Ulven, the firing upon of the Draken and the sinking of fishing boats. Certain riksdagmen and journals sharply criticized the Lekvattast affair and the Skarpsack Order, as well as the less irritating successors to these episodes. The protest against the deportation of the Oslo students was, it is true, damped down; but the increased assistance given to Danish (after August) and Norwegian refugees and the courtesies shown escaped prisoners from Germany or the German-occupied countries, as well as interned Allied aviators, showed that the government was responding to a more articulate pro-Allied public opinion.

Early in 1944, I would say that 90% of the Swedish people believe in and desire Allied victory. Ten per cent still think that Germany will not be defeated - note the negativeness of the expression. They believe that Germany will fight the Allies to a standstill, that both sides will be so exhausted that their leaders will agree to a negotiated peace. The Swedish intelligence service naturally reports from London that various circles here consider the demand for "unconditional surrender" impractical and even childish. To some extent this reaction even reaches elements in Sweden which are pro-ally. More general is the belief that the Allies could win if they chose to destroy Germany but will not extend themselves to the limit since to do so might cause Germany to yield to Russia in desperation - or that they will not extend themselves for an entirely opposite reason, namely that Russia will threaten to pull out and conclude a separate peace with Germany in order to conserve her own strength. Those who hold to this view know what the Teheran conference was supposed to have settled - they are not disposed to regard the Teheran decisions as really binding. About half the ten per cent of Germanophiles, that is five per cent, are fanatically devoted to Germany's cause. They actually believe that Germany will win the war, that shortly before the end, or immediately after a truce, the western allies and Russia will be at each other's throats, and that the small nations will be so grievously disappointed at their treatment by the United Nations Big Three that they will be happy to turn to Germany to champion their fight for restoration. By small nations, they mean Italy, France, Spain, Portugal and Switzerland, Holland, Belgium, the Balkan, Baltic and Scandinavian countries. The most extreme exponents of this view are the confirmed Nazis; young men of uncertain or lowly-paid employment or who feel insecure because of social class or family reasons, as well

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Comments on P.O.'s chart

Many of the names I recognize as having come in myself, my information having been based on personal observation plus tips from Swedish police friends, newsmen, etc., and stories in the press. Other names I do not know, or they are persons I know about and still consider as relatively unimportant. It seems to me that it would be wise to distribute the names of suspects among all the OHS and thereby get more accurate reports on them. Howie, for example has certainly been sympathetic with the Axis - but has she actually performed intelligence work? I haven't seen any direct evidence of it. W. Thub should not be on the list, since he was, and is, a well-known anti-Nazi.

As soon as my notes arrive, I can write up the Swedish Nazi and related movements which are much less simple than they are shown on the chart. In the propaganda section, I would query Bluck (who has exposed Nazi propaganda), Hottelger (who is an out-and-out Nazi correspondent and who does very little that could be interpreted as propaganda in Sweden. Some of his articles have been menacing but that is often Y.N.'s line), Brilliant, (very close to Grossman but a complicated personality), Miss Press (if you can catch Steinavik you can also catch Y.N. Hearst and Kings Features Syndicate). As to commercial espionage, check with Barrey.

The Gestapo set up looks in part like an - and prepared. But it needs revising and I suggest that Bill G. can do it in the manner indicated, i.e. checking with men in Stockholm, perusing the files there, and then checking with Söderman and Söderström, using P.M. and his contacts, who should not be seen with any of our people as a double check. There are certain others names here which are of value in their connection.

The same procedure can be followed with regard to Abwehr, German agents, suspect German agents and cover addresses. I know that our people in Stockholm keep in close touch with the British and Norwegian and recently Russian, also even Italian agencies. But it might be well for Bill G. to keep away from these, at least from the Russian and Italian organizations and individuals. If Bill's Swedish is fluent enough, he might contact Mrs Birgit Grape-Margström, Tunnelgatan 12, member of the Internationella Klubben - Dr. B. Brilliet's new organization - who had part of her education in Germany and who has many German contacts. She is friendly to the old Germany, not at all pro-Nazi, but somewhat indiscriminating as regards Swedish women, and men, too for that matter. Mrs. G-B had offered on several occasions to arrange a tea or "beer-abend" for me to meet her friends. She may extend a similar invitation to Bill G. She is about 36, short, plump, attractive, and divorced, one son of 12 years to support. Works with her father, who is a good photographer.

Finland.

I am too hurried now to report on Finland. One fairly complete report was made after my September visit. If and when I receive my Finnish notes, I can make a fuller report. I presume that our Stockholm office is covering Finland through local Swedish contacts, (the British intelligence, J. Van der K. and other Helsinki agents and through regular diplomatic channels.) I am certain however, that not enough use is made of Hiltunen Aalto, Ampi, Kalliala, Keto, Nutti (relative of Ty) Hannilainen, Himonen, Nervia, Ervi, Hawell, Lindgren, Englund, Ilmari Valonmaa, and other contacts which I have made, some of them of several years' standing. None of these persons are well known to Ty but disdained by him as having "no standing" e.g. K. Hiltunen, who divorced his Russian-born wife and married a partly-Jewish German refugee actress he had met in Prague. It is possible that the latter is not highly regarded in some circles; he still has the support of Marghal Mannerheim and is very close to Virtanen, Hiltunen and other prominent pro-Axis figures. The report on "German Intelligence Services and Related Organizations in Finland" is quite accurate, as far as I know. I have made an independent study of these matters - but with the help one could expect from pro-American Plans it should not be too

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Foreign Affairs

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difficult a task. Just a few comments - Donald Day and Paul Spilken are known by Jack Fleischner, - U.S. man in Stockholm. Jack could probably learn more about their activities if given a chance. I have seen them but stayed away from them as that I would not embarrass my other contacts during the limited time I had in Finland. I have Swedish contacts who are very close to Godelin. If he is so close to Bross as to be properly suspect, these Swedish connections should be more closely observed. Von Frenskell I have known for years; he may have been pro-German but he is not now. I know that Gripenberg is very close to the appeasement group (pre-ally and not unfriendly to Russia). Hannerhalm as is now generally known, is not determinedly anti-Russian. Frocope, (like Fryts, Swedish Minister to S.S.) is probably regarded as pro-German because his position as minister, more or less shut off from close contact with his people, has forced him to represent an official policy easily interpreted as anti-ally when it is actually only pro-Finnish. Ramsay M, I believe, still pro-ally at heart. He is chargeable with maladroitness in conducting relationships with Germany on the occasions of American pressure on Finland to get out of the war with Russia. Suviranta, Pipping, Jutila, and men of that stamp are still very friendly with America. I do not believe we have fully exploited their friendship. Swedish Social Democrats do not accept the view that Tanner is incorrigibly anti-Russian and vigorously resent the suggestion that he is anti-British. It may still be necessary for the Finns to throw Tanner overboard if they are successfully to negotiate with the Russians. But I do not believe that one should uncritically accept the British (Max Noeloy) view that Tanner is hopelessly compromised. I know the Russians, and their Swedish Communist friends, have assailed Vuori, Labor Union Head, as a renegade Communist and a sort of Wm. Green exponent of the employers' point of view. My own opinion, and that of the British Labor man (Sibson) who talked with him in Stockholm, is more favorable, judging from what I have learned here in London, Finland is not being adequately covered. I believe that now - whether the present negotiations succeed or not, is a very satisfactory time to send several men to Finland. Some should have diplomatic status and protection; others should have the greater freedom - and undertake the risk - of going in without this protection. Some Swedes might be used. Harry Söderman has good connections there, as do certain Swedish engineers and commercial representatives. Finland should be rich in possibilities for discovering movements of troops, shipping, capital, consumer's goods, personnel; forces and tensions in Swedish, Finnish, German Baltic attitudes towards the war and post-war planning; and espionage activities (also counts-espionage) in the entire North.

#### Anti-Allied sentiment

As soon as I get my notes I shall be able to describe the organization and personnel of the pro-Axis groups in Sweden. Now it is sufficient to say that there never was a majority which favored the Axis. Events before and after the 9th April 1940 may be dramatically described. I doubt that anyone can say definitely what the attitude of Sweden was in terms of percentage distribution of the population or of particular days or hours. For years, the vast majority of the Swedes' people had viewed with apprehension and distaste the rise of Nazi power. When the war broke out in September 1939, the one dominant thought was defence - diplomatic and military defence. Swedes realized that they were not prepared in a military way, and they realized that it was too late to try to unite the nations of the North (Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark) against the two most likely aggressors - Germany and Russia. By the time of the Winter War in Finland, they realized that they had gained a brief and precarious respite and they were moving as quickly as they could to repair their defences. Russia's attack on Finland awakened a favorable response. As is well known, thousands volunteered, millions of kroner were raised for assistance, chiefly humanitarian, and some persons even urged active alliance with Finland. Because of their espousal of the cause of Finland, Sandler and Lagerström were forced out of the government and a strictly "neutral" policy (which yet inconsistently supported aid to Finland) was adopted.

United States  
**SECRET**  
 Equals British MOST SECRET & SECRET

-14-

Stockholm, Gertrud. Young girl about 23. Furvanning. 3.  
 Home with American Leg. telephone operator.  
 Knows many Americans but speaks little English. Also  
 meets people of other nationalities. Friendly but  
 not particularly pro-Ally. She seems to be curious  
 about the activities of Americans and may be in  
 contact with Swedish Police; but if so, it is a very  
 loose arrangement. She knows a waitress at the  
 Strand Hotel who was once admired by a R.A.F. flyer.  
 I suggest the waitress be contacted through Gertrud.  
 I am confident that she (the waitress) could be of  
 value. Gertrud has many valuable acquaintances.  
 She herself is probably on the Gestapo black list.

Anita, Inga. 27, Tulag 12<sup>V</sup>, 309095. Knows several  
 Americans. Loves important people and newspapermen.  
 Is an "auditor" for Telegrafstyrelsen, and probably  
 does a little listening to restaurant conversation on  
 the side. Nevertheless, she is truly friendly to  
 the US. She will not reveal anything, but it would  
 pay to look over her present and former friends  
 especially Brita Remstedt, and her friends, with the  
 view of learning what persons have been directed by  
 the Swedes (not the police, but certain private men,  
 Riksdagmen etc. or private individuals) to watch the  
 Americans.

#### Counter-espionage

I have my notes on this work in Stockholm, but most of it was turned  
 in to Ty to be transmitted to the London and Washington offices.

The list of agents arrested for espionage is incomplete. It can be  
 brought up to date and cards prepared on each man from Stockholm data,  
 supplemented by reports from N.Y. P.M. T. Sids, etc. I think it would  
 pay Bill G. to cultivate I. Serd, and get the inside dope on those who  
 had been in the clink, or still are.

I think that all the regular "cocktail-clients" of the legation crowd  
 and the OWI crowd should be put on the suspect list. Next, the  
 employees of the various offices; Nobelgatan 2, Strandgatan 7, and  
 Biblioteksg. 2 are with few exceptions, purchasable. Some of them are  
 the soul of honesty, such as Mabel Albias, telephone operator at 97.  
 are careless and may give things away unintentionally. I would  
 certainly check all of Mabel's friends to see who is trying to learn  
 things from her.

Through Jeppy, (q.v.) one can learn the names of and get acquainted  
 with the models and mannequins who are fondly regarded by some of the  
 Gestapo, and satellite secret services as proper agents. Especially  
 Kim Andersson, who attracts attention wherever she goes. Most of these  
 are pretty stupid and of interest only in that they attract a group of  
 admirers, real and false, who would repay closer study.

The check-up on the nobility in Bill G. is not complete. It  
 it goes. None can be added later when he gets back to Stockholm.  
 believe that too much time spent on this crowd, is pure waste. It  
 make some personally interesting contacts this way - but waitresses,  
 waitresses, taxi-chauffeurs and hall-porters (portiers) in apartment  
 houses, also milk delivery girls, newspaper delivery women, radio  
 repairmen etc. are much more fruitful objects of attention.

*Field Report 107 345*

*Peel, Roy*

**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

September 29, 1944

TO: Acting Chief, SI  
THROUGH: Executive Officer, SI  
FROM: Richard Helms, Lieut., U.S.M.R.  
SUBJECT: Report by Roy V. Peel

Attached is a report on field conditions prepared by Roy V. Peel upon his return to this country from his mission abroad. This is for whatever disposition you choose to make of it.

*AA*  
A.H.

Attachments - T-002-324  
Report dated 9/22/44

GSS Form 2202

FROM: Helms

SECRET  
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

*Full Report 15, 1955*  
*1. Helms, R*

Accession No. ....

Date Rec'd. SA. ....

1.	To	Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
			Rec'd.	Fwd'd.		
	Berke		SEP 23 1955		WTMB	
	O'Hara				J. G. M.	
2.						
3.						
4.						
5.						
6.						
7.						
8.						
9.						
10.						

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.  
 A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.  
 Officer Designations should be used in To column.  
 Each Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.  
 Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.  
 Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.  
 For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

(20640)

SECRET



Director, ONS  
Chief, SI  
Report on Field Conditions  
Submitted by: Roy V. Peel

Attached is a report on field condition, prepared  
by Roy V. Peel.

Appropriate sections of the attached report have been  
referred to X-2 Branch and they have taken action thereon.

John E. O'Gara  
Acting Chief

Attachment

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*Field Reports No. 345*

**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : Director, OPI  
FROM : Chief, BI  
SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions  
Submitted by: Roy V. Peel

DATE: *30 Sept, 1944*

Attached is a report on field conditions prepared by Roy V. Peel.

Appropriate sections of the attached report have been referred to X-2 Branch and they have taken action thereon.

*[Signature]*  
John E. O'Gara 30  
Acting Chief

Attachment

OSS Form 2202

SECRET

*Full Copy 15/11*

PROM:

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. ....

Date Rec'd. SA. ....

To	Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Rec'd.	Fwd'd.		
1. Mr. O'Gara				<i>W</i>	
2. Mail Room					
3. Dir. OSS					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					

*SEP 30 1951*  
*INT*

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.  
 A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.  
 Officer Designations should be used in To column.  
 Each Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.  
 Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.  
 Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.  
 For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

(20646)

SECRET



MEMORANDUM

151389  
**SECRET**

Field Report

x Dodd, Edward Jr.

x Theater Officer

Washington, D. C.

28 September 1944


SUBJECT: Report on Return from the Field  
TO : Colonel Atherton Richards *AR*  
FOR : The Director  
FROM : Edward H. Dodd Jr.

I picked up a large agenda on my summer's trip through the Mediterranean. It was made up of a few very interesting big things and many rather exasperating small ones. Since I have taken these all up directly with the various people who could do something about them, I see little to be gained by reviewing them in a report. The other day we were discussing how the Theater Officer fits and fails to fit into the OSS scheme. You suggested that I set down my observations in my report. With your concurrence I will devote it exclusively to that subject because it was the field which gave me an entirely new conception of it.

It is very pleasant for a Theater Officer to go to the field because there he is considered quite some pun'kins. The Field looks on him as its representative plenipotentiary in Washington. With trembling trustfulness it is ready to put most of its precious fertile eggs in his basket. It expects him to get results, on high levels and low, in Washington. It doesn't expect an unreasonable amount because the Field no longer builds illusions about the effectiveness of Washington's exertions. Nevertheless, Washington is the one place to which it can turn. So it keeps hopefully asking for help and it expects the Theater Officer, the one man in Washington whose interests purport to be identical to its own, to draw forth this help whether it is to come from the lofty realms of the Joint Chiefs or the menial machinery of the Registry.

And so the Theater Officer cruises about the theater gathering big problems from little fellows and little problems from big fellows and once in a great while vice versa.

**SECRET**



DJR/vk

15, 201  
**SECRET**

**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**  
**WASHINGTON, D. C.**

*Field Report*  
*x Roberts, Ft. DeWitt*  
*x Maritime Unit*  
*x MEDTS*

2 October 1944.

**From:** Chief, Maritime Unit  
**To:** The Director  
**Subject:** Report of inspection tour of Maritime Units in the Mediterranean area.

1. On 9 August 1944 departed the National Airport, Washington, D. C. and visited the following places: Algiers, Cairo, Alexandria, Cyprus, Bari, Naples, Siena, Falconara and Rome. In some of the above places I found little Maritime personnel or activity and therefore will devote my report to the locations where Maritime activity was being carried on by personnel of the Maritime Unit.

2. My objective in visiting these places was to explore the possibility of conducting further Maritime Unit activities and ascertaining whether or not additional personnel was needed or whether personnel already there could be made available for SEAC. With that objective in mind I notified the respective Chiefs of the Maritime Units to make available for assignment to SEAC all personnel and equipment not necessary for their activity.

3. Cairo is the administrative headquarters for  Maritime Unit in the Middle East. The personnel in the Middle East consists of the following Officers and enlisted men:

**SECRET**

To: 4 OCTOBER 1944

Meeting with Taylor, Howe, Roberts,  
Raichle and Doering. Decided to  
send all but 9 (now in Nassau) to  
Heppner for use of Heppner and  
Coughlin in Far East.  
Individuals to go as ready.

WJD

Director's Office

(320)





**SECRET**

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
U. S. ARMY FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

*Kable 51405*  
*10/15/44*  
*151*  
*15 September 1944.*

SUBJECT: Report in Accordance with General Order No. 63.  
TO : The Director, Office of Strategic Services, Washington, DC.  
(Thru: The Chief of OSS, Cairo.)

PART I - Service with OSS Turkey in Istanbul.

1. My first acquaintance with OSS was in March, 1943, when I met Lanning MacFarland. He had just arrived in the Middle East from America enroute to Turkey to establish an OSS Mission in that country. At that time I was Regional Communications Security Officer for the Directorate of Communications, Army Air Force Headquarters, Washington, DC., and was assigned for duty with the 19th Airways Communications Squadron covering the area from the Persian Gulf to Tunisia. I had come to that position via competitive examination and appointment in Washington, and several months of active duty overseas. When Lanning MacFarland learned of my background and training in security he asked me to join him in Turkey to serve as his security officer and assistant, for at that time his only assistant was Mr. Arch Coleman, who had come from America with him to SI work. I had always wanted to go to Turkey, so after some weeks consideration I agreed to join OSS to handle security and to assist the Chief of Mission, and application for transfer was made in April, 1943. As transfer could not be effected for some weeks, Lanning MacFarland and Mr. Coleman proceeded to Turkey and it was understood that I should follow as soon as possible after the transfer.

2. Transfer to OSS was accomplished and orders issued on 14 June 1943, and I reported for duty with this organization on 23 June 1943. To my surprise I learned that I had been named a Special Funds Officer, and as such would be responsible for the disbursement of and accounting for unvouchered funds. As I had had absolutely no training or experience in Special Funds this seemed like too big an order when added to the other duties which I was expected to perform, but I was assured that it was only a temporary arrangement and that a qualified Finance Officer was to be sent from Washington. It subsequently developed that none arrived in Istanbul until August, 1944, some fifteen months after the mission was established, and that Colonel Rehm, Chief of Special Funds, Washington, had never been informed that I was to do anything but Special Funds. These circumstances he learned of in September, 1944.

3. I arrived in Istanbul on 13 July 1943, and was immediately put to work to see what could be done with the office facilities and personnel that we had on hand. Lanning MacFarland had first arrived there in May with Mr. Coleman, but had in the meantime made a round trip to Cairo for conference, and had but recently again returned to Istanbul. He had therefore only just moved into an office

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**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
U. S. ARMY FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST**

*File 15,405*  
*Building 151*  
*15 September 1944.*

**SUBJECT:** Report in Accordance with General Order No. 63.  
**TO :** The Director, Office of Strategic Services, Washington, DC.  
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*154*

**SECRET**

/31

15 September 1944.

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- 1 -  
**SECRET**

with the American Military Attache in Istanbul. This office consisted of a flat which had large but few rooms, and it soon became obvious that with the expected arrival of additional personnel for both OSS and the Military Attache, it would be necessary to find larger office quarters. At that time OSS personnel in Turkey consisted of Lansing MacFarland, Mr. Colman, Mr. Sparling, handling Greek Affairs, myself and a part-time stenographer who was American and a resident of Istanbul. Even with such a small staff it was impossible to do business in the small office we had and still maintain proper security. There was also another man, Mr. Brown, but he was entirely apart in operations and cover from close association with the office at that time.

4. In looking for office space or for an apartment for personal use in Istanbul one was confronted in July 1943 with several problems which may not be unique to Istanbul but which nevertheless are time-consuming. In the first place one has to deal with people who are endowed with all the characteristics of greed, trickery, deceit and premeditation that are to be found in the Levant. Secondly, because one is American or is representing an agency of the American Government he is regarded as fair game for any high priced swindle that can be worked on him. A flat that would not command fifty dollars a month in America would be shown at prices ranging from one hundred to three hundred dollars a month, depending upon the greed of the individual offering the apartment. Thirdly, there were at that time still a large number of Germans and other Axis nationals who were competing for the few flats in the market and their security value was further augmented. Fourthly, because the standards of flats and the standards of business dealings are at a low level it is necessary that one personally inspect every place in order to see what one is getting. That is to say, it is impossible to delegate flat or office hunting to a local agent or embassy employee with assurance that one will obtain satisfactory results. And lastly, when one has at last found satisfactory premises he must arrange the taking of inventory of contents, drawing of contracts, etc. himself; for rental agents in Istanbul do not perform all these functions that one normally finds in an American real estate office.

b. The net result of all the foregoing was that I spent, on the average, at least a third if not a half of my time looking either for space for office, for ourselves or for personnel who were arriving. At that time it had been decided that it would be the policy of the office to furnish billets to personnel and their selection was therefore up to the Service Officer or the person who was performing the functions of that office.

c. It was necessary to start apartment hunting all over again in the Fall because of the practice of owners in renting out their flats only for the summer season while they are in the country, although in some rare cases it is possible to secure an extension of the lease.

5. On October 1, 1943 the office was moved to the top floor of an apartment building located in the central business district and convenient to the American and British Embassies and others. We took with us as a colonel the American Military Attache who took several rooms for his office. It was considered desirable to have the Attache with us for the reason that many of our callers were of

such nature that they would logically have occasion to call on the streets, and thereby could enter the building for the purpose of visiting our office without exciting undue suspicion as to the nature of our own activities.

b. As much as possible the existing furniture in the flat was used for our office purposes and only that which was essential was purchased locally. I personally saw or approved the purchase of all equipment before its purchase was completed in order to see that the price was as right as possible and that necessary purchases were not made. Inexpensive office supplies were purchased only in the Middle East. In general, however, such items were purchased locally because of the extreme difficulties and loss of time in getting such things into Turkey. Furthermore, many things were as easily or cheaply procurable in Istanbul as they would have been in the Middle East.

c. The premises rented as an office consisted of two large flats on the same floor, which were connected together. Immediately above them, on the next were several rooms which were used as emergency sleeping quarters for personnel and as a radio room and message center. Before taking this flat it had been necessary to have our beds in a little room up in the attic of the American Embassy, and such time was lost running back and forth between the two. That also was one of the jobs I had to do for some time.

d. With the location of an office all did not thereby become straightforward. While I was in Istanbul Lanning Macfarland was away either in the Middle East or Washington half the time, leaving me Acting Chief of Mission. From the point of personal prestige this would have suited me, but from the point of efficiency it was a poor arrangement for me and for the organization. From the time I joined the organization it was anticipated that this might occur, but not in connection with the delay we experienced in receiving personnel necessary to conduct the necessary functions of an intelligence organization. I therefore found myself having to do to perform all the functions of Chief of Mission with the attendant necessary expenses and liaison with other agencies, but also had to spend much time all day long with the few other members of the organization who were beginning to arrive. I had also to act as Services Officer, Attaché, Finance Officer, Security Officer, Registry Officer, and to keep in order all the scraps of information that would eventually be used to help establish files for SO and SO-2.

e. It became necessary to have the services of someone as expert as possible. Therefore, Jerome Spurling, Captain, A-5, was asked to do reports for the office. His primary function already was that of handling Greek affairs, in addition to which he was also handling liaison with the Turkish Secret Police, and directing the activities of the North Base at Adirampin, Turkey. Although he had not had training in reports, Captain Spurling was compelled to serve in this capacity, as well as handle his other affairs, until the arrival of a Reports Officer, Alfred Hiner, Jr., Lt., USMC, did not arrive in Istanbul until sometime in December 1943, to take over reporting.

f. Since April there had been a base down in Paris under the direction of Captain Caskey. Istanbul was allotted the responsibility of handling Captain Caskey supplied with funds for his operations, and for a long time the channel for

the reporting of SI and operational matters was through Istanbul.

d. Communications and the message center were under the charge of Lt Jesse Mitchell, USA, who arrived about the first of August, 1943. The radio operator, Sgt Charles Isaac arrived in Istanbul about the same time as Lt. Mitchell.

e. Mr. Felix Guepin, civilian arrived in Istanbul about the 15th of November 1943, and in accordance with instructions from Mr. MacFarland, who was in Washington at the time, I turned over to Mr. Guepin all the functions of Chief of Mission which I had been performing. I spent much time introducing him to the outside contacts that we had with all other intelligence groups, and in fully acquainting him with the internal affairs of the office so he could intelligently pick up and perform the duties of Chief of Mission.

f. Likewise arriving about the middle of November was Major Nathan, who came to take over direction of SI activities. He required less of my time, except in my capacity as Services Officer and Assistant to Chief of Mission for by that time I had turned over many functions to Mr. Guepin.

g. On 19 November 1943, Major Charles Edwards arrived from London, where he had been recruited by Lanning MacFarland. My instructions were to turn over to him all the functions of the office which still remained to me, to turn over to him all official funds that I had on hand, and then leave for Cairo at the earliest possible date to assume charge of a Turkish Desk that I was to establish in Cairo. I was supposed also to put my official financial accounts in shape before leaving for Cairo, but no finance clerk or finance officer had ever arrived, and as I know nothing of such accounts I was compelled to go to Cairo leaving them unfinished when I received from Lanning MacFarland an urgent telegram ordering me to leave immediately for the Middle East.

7. The subject of finance is extremely important, and yet it received less attention than probably any other matter did. In the first place, the arrangements for the financing of the mission which had been made in Washington proved to be entirely insufficient. We were confronted from the start with the necessity of supplying large sums of money to Captain Oakley, at Irbid, for his cuique and Greek refugee operations. Shortly we likewise had a similar but smaller funds problem in supplying the North Base.

b. We were compelled to borrow funds on our IOU's from the Office of War Information, the United States Consulate, and the British Embassy, sums as large as ten thousand Turkish liras. Over a period of several months I borrowed all told, about forty-three thousand liras, which I repaid as funds came from Washington or the Middle East. In addition to the foregoing "loans", I had at one time, to draw forty-thousand liras in advance against a cable transfer of funds through the State Department, so that when the official release of the funds was finally authorized there were but some five thousand liras remaining to be drawn out of the original transfer of about forty-five thousand liras.

c. The principle channels through which funds were received were four:

- (1) By cable transfer through the State Department. These funds were

delivered by Special Funds, Washington, to State Department, Washington. They were then cabled to the State Department, Turkey, payment being made to the Department by the Merkez Bank, which in some respects is the Turkish counterpart of our own Federal Reserve Bank. We then drew these funds from the State Department, signing their receipt form for them.

- (2) By delivery from ISID, Istanbul. This was an intelligence agency of the British with which we worked closely in Istanbul. Funds would be given their Middle East Office by OSS-NE, and they then would be forwarded to Istanbul through a transfer or credit on their books, and payment to our office would be in Turkish Liras.
- (3) A fund had been set up with the State Department in 1942, which was disbursed to us by the Embassy at Ankara at the rate of \$1000.00 a month until about July, when the fund was exhausted.
- (4) British Military Attache, Ankara, Turkey. One payment of twenty-five hundred pounds sterling was made to us by OSS-NE through the office of the British Military Attache.

In general, it was a good thing to receive funds through a number of channels, for by that means no one agency could determine just how much money OSS was spending in the country and thereby gauge the extent of our operations.

d. In extenuation of Washington's failure to send out adequate personnel sooner it should be said, in fairness to Washington, that I believe there was an honest desire there to help us, but even with the best of intentions they could not send us help unless they were sufficiently informed of our needs to supply them.

e. A case in point is that of the need for a finance officer. I know that it was not known in Special Funds in Washington that I was doing anything else but Special Funds. It is fair to assume that had they known of that circumstance an experienced Special Funds officer would have been dispatched much sooner than he was. In further explanation of the failure of trained personnel to arrive, there was an admitted positive shortage even in Washington of people for certain key positions in the field.

f. In conclusion, on the matter of finance, I want to emphasize the importance and the necessity of there being a trained and experienced finance officer or hand from the inception of any intelligence operation on a scale such as was started in Turkey. The sums of money handled are too great and the questions of policy too important for any but a person who is familiar with OSS financial methods and policy. Aside from our concern in seeing that over-all objectives were attained, our greatest concern from the outset was over matters of finance, and it was with relief that we saw the arrival of a finance clerk in February, 1944, and a finance officer, Captain John C. Young, in August, 1944. Both were long in arriving, and although there were records on hand from which we were able to construct final accounts in accordance with OSS procedure, still the entire program would have been benefited by their arrival at the start, and Washington would thereby have been better able to read the pulse of the mission and thereby understand and guide it more easily.



8. Much has been said on and off the record by myself and Lanning MacFarland on the subject of personnel, or rather the lack of it. I consider it essential that no intelligence operation of the size contemplated at Istanbul should not be launched without certain key personnel. To send out a Chief of Mission and another man or two is not enough. The following functions, at least should be anticipated and men to handle them dispatched to the field at the outset; Chief of Mission, SI Chief, Services Officer, Finance Officer, and Communications Officer. To conduct intelligence operations and carry them on intelligently and securely without at least that staff is hardly advisable, and irrespective of long hours and application to the job, simply can not be done. I speak from recollection of my own experiences and from the knowledge that Lanning MacFarland put in long hard hours trying to keep the "show going".

9. Unfortunately, time has been short and we were late getting into the field as compared with the early start and the backlog of organization and experience that other nations possessed. I say that time was short because the war could not last forever, and the need for our services was immediate, not latent. It was fully appreciated that it takes time to get personnel into the field once trained personnel has been recruited, but whatever the reason for the lack, it still existed and therefore hampered the scope and efficiency of our operations. We were not in the fortunate position of the British or of the Axis, each of who had large numbers of nationals who had either made their home for years or who for generations had lived in Istanbul. Many of these people had been deprived of their normal means of making a living, or in any case were available to supplement the key men used to set up the intelligence organizations of the respective countries. The Americans were not in that position because our nationals had either been re-patriated or were actively engaged in big business enterprises from which they could not be spared. Our only source of added help of American nationality was from Robert College or the American College for Women, and these institutions do not possess the large number of Americans that might be inferred from their names or background. Their teaching and administrative staffs are to a large extent Turkish for reasons of their own policy of getting along with the Turks and attracting their support.

10. From these institutions we were able at first only to get one employee to help us, Miss McKillop, an instructor at the girls college, who had had some stenographic training years before, and who made but a fair half-time stenographer. With the arrival of Major Watson of X-2, and the commencing of his operations he made a "raid" on the colleges and got a number of people who by virtue of residence in Turkey and familiarity with its people were able to be of great help to him. With the end of the college academic year these people were able to devote more time to the office than formerly.

11. Accusations have been made that the Middle East Office, OSS, was not co-operative in the matter of sending personnel to Istanbul. Be it said to their credit, they were experiencing the same kind of "growing pains" as Istanbul, and for a long time were not without personnel problems of their own.

12. In conclusion, in addition to the suggestions that have been made, and that may also be inferred in the relation of certain circumstances, one last word should be offered before closing my report on my Istanbul activities and going on

to the subject of my duty in Cairo.

b. It is true that in a neutral country all members of the staff wear civilian clothing, whether they be civilians or members of the armed forces. Of necessity and for security reasons certain outward manifestations of military courtesy are dispensed with. However, this should not be taken as justification for relaxing discipline. If anything, discipline might be more strenuous, for in a place where your next door neighbor or the man at the next table can be, and frequently is, an enemy, it is desirable that all members of the organization be kept conscious of the importance of their mission. With the experience of over a year's operation here in Cairo, I believe that the Istanbul organization is today following a firm policy, and will when it is concluded, have further contributed much to the cause of the war.

PART II - Service with OSS Turkey as Representative in OSS-ME.

1. It had been foreseen that for a number of reasons it would be necessary for Istanbul to have a representative in OSS-ME. These reasons arose primarily from the single circumstance that as the Istanbul mission was new, there was no one in Cairo who could reasonably be expected to understand the problems of supply and personnel that were faced in Turkey. Accordingly, on his trip to Washington in October, 1943, Lansing MacFarland set forth the nature of the problems faced by the Turkish mission, which trip resulted, among other things, in the designation of the Turkish mission as an operation independent of Cairo, and my appointment as representative of the Turkish mission in Cairo. Upon his return to the Middle East, Lansing MacFarland therefore ordered my immediate return to Cairo to establish a Turkish Desk there, and I arrived in Cairo for that purpose on 11 December 1943.

2. Functions of the Turkish Desk in Cairo were to be:

a. Facilitating travel to Turkey for personnel coming out from Washington recommended for service in Turkey.

b. Facilitating the shipment to Turkey of items of supply or operational equipment which were not available in Turkey or whose cost was so prohibitive that its purchase in Turkey was inadvisable.

c. The recruiting of personnel in the Middle East for service in Turkey.

d. Liaison with OSS-ME to the end that operations of the two missions should be co-ordinated, and that Istanbul should be fully informed at all times on matters of importance to it.

3. Because of the neutral status of Turkey, the problem of getting services personnel into the country was not to be considered lightly. A syllabus for the guidance of people going to Turkey was prepared by me and given to them for reading. It dealt with all the problems of getting civilian clothing, of personal and classified papers and documents, medical immunizations, personal effects and security. Its result was intended to be that of cutting down the time that was lost in Cairo

by personal bond for Turkey because of a lack of knowledge of what to expect there, and also to safeguard the security of the organization and as far as possible, keep secure the nature of the individual's mission in Turkey.

b. At first the procurement of entry visas for Turkey was a very simple matter, but on about 1 February 1944 the Turkish Government stopped the practice of issuing such visas at its Legations throughout the world merely upon application being made. As of that date it imposed the requirement that its Foreign Office in Ankara had first to approve all visas. This meant that before I could forward my "bodies" to Turkey, cover had to be definitely arranged, and vague statements to authorities enroute no longer sufficed to support the purpose of one's trip to that country.

4. The forwarding of supplies and equipment was very difficult. At first no trouble was encountered, but as the needs of the mission and requests from Istanbul increased, the burden upon the Diplomatic pouch became too great and the American Ambassador to Turkey, Mr. Steinhart made strenuous protests against what he considered excessive use of pouch facilities by this organization. As liaison with Mr. Steinhart was a matter to be handled by Istanbul, I continued to govern my use of the pouch by instructions received from Istanbul. This, however, did not have the logical result I expected of wish an understanding, and objections continued to be heard from Mr. Steinhart on the subject. I encouraged the purchase in Istanbul of all things that could possibly be obtained there, rather than depending upon the middle East for these items and thereby further aggravating shipping problems to Turkey.

b. Eventually such an impasse was reached that pouch shipments of other than documents and classified papers virtually stopped. The argument for our case which I gave Mr. Steinhart, namely that many items sent via pouch which would not under normal circumstances have been considered classified gained no ground, and finally we were driven to using the British pouch for classified equipment. The British Ambassador had always been more generous in the nature of things he had allowed to be shipped by pouch, but with the increase of tension in Turco-Anglo-American relations and the failure of the Allied Military Mission to Ankara to gain its points, even the British Ambassador was driven to impose more strict observance of the rules relating to use of the privilege of diplomatic exemption from examination of diplomatic bags. Fortunately I had by that time been able to ship by British pouch an amount of (a) equipment and supplies that was sufficient for considerable operations.

a. With the inauguration of ATC plane service to Adana on Saturdays, a faster means of transport of freight was available. It had always been possible to make heavy shipments of unclassified equipment via a Laked goods van that travelled by rail from Cairo via Beirut and Aleppo to Turkey, but the formalities and time in transit ran into weeks and this service was never used. I enjoyed complete cooperation from the ATC in getting plane space for our shipments and made some shipments by that method, conforming to the letter and the spirit of the instructions of Mr. Steinhart for making such shipments. Subsequently, because of the convenience of the ATC service and because of the very heavy shipment the ATC made to Ankara for its own use, Mr. Steinhart complained that the duty free privilege for his own personal needs was in danger of being rescinded by the Turkish Government because all

Shipments were going into the country consigned to him as Ambassador. Accordingly, our shipments fell off even farther.

d. In the meantime our unique service via Cyprus and the Aegean was being used and I shipped a considerable amount of heavy and classified equipment by that method. I had the satisfaction of knowing that this subsequently was put to good use in operations.

e. In final arbitration of the question of our use of the pouch, Mr. Steinbart made some concessions which enabled us to ship certain equipment which could be reduced to parcels of not too great size. At all times I had the sincere cooperation of the State Department in Cairo. Mr. Jacobs, the Councillor of the Legation; Mr. Scott, Vice Consul; Mr. Thomas and Major Loupe, The Courier Communications Officers for the Middle East, and Mr. Malliday of the pouch room at the Legation. Mr. Bliss, the Registry Officer, for OSS-ME at that time, likewise was very helpful.

5. Recruiting of personnel in the Middle East Theater for service in Turkey was done on a very limited scale. It was confined primarily to the recruiting of enlisted men from the Provost Marshall's office for duty as security guards. These men were required for guard duty at the office in Istanbul and at a house which was rented for storage of material over on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus.

b. Stenographic and clerical help was very badly needed, and a few men in this category were released from OSS-ME, or from other offices of USAPIME for duty in Turkey. At first this was very difficult of accomplishment, but with the replacements from Washington the situation improved.

c. Requests for personnel were made through the Adjutant's section of OSS-ME, who in turn applied to USAPIME for the personnel and judged their qualifications for the duty in question.

6. Because of the lack of understanding which had previously existed in OSS-ME, as to what the needs of the Turkish Mission were there was a definite need for closer liaison between the two missions when the Turkish Mission was subordinate to Middle East as well as when the Turkish Mission was independent, as it was for a short time.

b. Because of the geographical location of Istanbul it was logically dependent upon the Middle East for much of its services. There was uncertainty in Cairo as to just what the policy toward Istanbul should be. For a while Istanbul was an independent mission, yet by virtue of its location Istanbul continued to have to depend upon Middle East for many services. It was a difficult position for both missions to be in, and it was difficult for Middle East, even with the best of intentions to fulfill its own mission without appearing to slight Istanbul. It was found that even when the Istanbul Mission was to all intents an independent mission it saved much confusion to utilize the channels which were already in use between OSS-ME, and USAPIME. It likewise saved as much work and time which I could not spare. I asked for assistance at a time when the work of the Turkish Mission was getting started, but it was some months before help could be found. In the meantime I continued to rely upon miscellaneous personnel assigned to the Turkish Mission and awaiting transportation when I most needed help in the requisitioning and packing of material for Istanbul.

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6. Istanbul had never been on a distribution list for all General Orders from Washington, and there apparently continued to be in Washington some uncertainty as to just what the position of Istanbul was with relation to the Middle East. It was also for this reason that closer relations between Istanbul and Middle East were advisable.

7. In conclusion, my services with OAS-ME as representative of the Turkish Mission were concluded when I turned over all the functions of the Turkish Post to Subhi H. Sadi, Captain, AS, AMS, who had been recruited by Colonel MacFarland as my successor. This then left me free to return to Istanbul to complete the work which I had been compelled to leave unfinished when I was ordered to Middle East in December, 1943.

8. I departed for Istanbul on 3 June 1944 and arrived there on 6 June 1944, to complete and bring up to date the records of my work at that post. These were completed and turned over to John G. Young, Captain, FD, Special Funds Officer shortly after his arrival from Washington late in August, 1944, and I departed Istanbul for Middle East on 28 August 1944, for transportation to Washington and reporting there.

*Leslie H. Boyd*  
 LESLIE H. BOYD,  
 Captain, AS, AMS,  
 Asst to Lansing MacFarland.

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APPENDIX "A"

1. Collection of Original Intelligence.
2. Counter-Intelligence
3. Liaison with other Intelligence Agencies.
  - a. Polish Consulate
  - b. British ISLD
  - c. Conflicts with other Agencies.
  - d. Discrimination of sources between British and American intelligence agencies.
  - e. United States Military Attache.
  - f. United States State Department and Foreign Service.

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15,405  
Field Report  
X Boyd, Capt Leslie H.  
X Turkey

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Director, OSS  
FROM: Acting Chief, SI  
SUBJECT: Report of Conditions in the Field - by  
Captain Leslie H. Boyd, AC. AUS

DATE: 5 October 1944

There is transmitted herewith a field report  
by Captain Leslie H. Boyd.

  
John E. O'Gara

Attachment

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

25 September 1944

TO: Executive Office, SI  
for submission to the Chief SI, and Director, OSS.

SUBJECT: Report in Accordance with General Order No. 63

1. Submitted herewith is a report covering my activities with this organization since joining it in June 1943. Of necessity it cannot be as concise as such a report should be, for my work has been under many branches, and I have felt it necessary to comment upon all of them. The degree of authority with which I can speak and the thoroughness of that comment is dependent directly upon the extent to which I was taken into the confidence of Lanning MacFarland, or had time to pursue the activity in question. Therefore, there are some phases of the work, notably, those of SI, on which only Lanning MacFarland is capable of making a lucid and comprehensive statement.

2. The interoffice memo, subject, "Report on Field Conditions", was not made available to me in Middle East when I prepared the report, and it therefore does not conform closely in organization to that suggested by the foregoing memo. However, I believe that it covers substantially the salient points of interest to this office, with the exception of those discussed in the attached Appendix, "A".

3. Herewith follows an enumeration of the subjects of the report as prepared by me in Middle East which it is hoped will serve the purpose of the index suggested by the interoffice memo of Chief, SI.

PART ONE: Service with OSS in Turkey.

1. My introduction to OSS.
2. Duties contemplated with OSS.
3. The Istanbul Mission as it was at the beginning.
4. Office and administration problems.
5. Expansion of office facilities.
6. Personnel at Istanbul at start of operations.
7. Financial matters.
8. Personnel shortage and consequent problems.
9. Cooperation of OSS, ME with OSS, Istanbul.
10. Conclusion.

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086 Form 2102

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FROM:

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

15403  
F. J. ...

Accession No. ....

Reale 5 October

Date Rec'd. BA.....

To	Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Rec'd.	Fwd'd.		
1. Mr. O'Gara		OCT 5 1952	OCT 9 1952	[Signature]	<del>This has been read</del> By [Signature] 1/9
2. <del>[Signature]</del>					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.  
 A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.  
 Officer Designations should be used in To column.  
 Each Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.  
 Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.  
 Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.  
 For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

(0640)

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1-10 let report  
Schmidt  
Africa Sect.  
S.I.

14 September 1944.

MEMORANDUM

TO Charles S. Chesten

FROM John E. O'Carra

The attached excellent report from Major A.W. Schmidt, Acting Divisional Director, Africa Section SI, raises again the basic question discussed with you this week.

Informally for what it is worth, a number of us in SI feel increasingly strongly that come the completion of the occupation period - phase 2, OSS-SI should die, with the exception noted below. We feel that postwar secret intelligence on the part of the United States can not be accomplished with proper security by this organization or any member of it and that any activities, even the most innocuous, should not be attempted by us.

Hence Major Schmidt's problem as we see it, boils down to the problem of occupational-period intelligence - phase 2, concerning which problem we are sitting about on our own to provide the answer.

John E. O'Carra

**N.B. "exception":** We believe that a remnant of OSS might be transferred into an overt U. S. economic research unit, for instance, to hold the invaluable intelligence experiences gained during this war and as an inside secret nucleus, plan and direct the continuation of a newly constituted and secured SI in a removed location.

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7 September 1944

To: W. T. M. Esale, Lieut.  
Executive Officer, SI

From: A. W. Schmidt, Major  
Acting Divisional Deputy  
Africa Division, SI

Subject: Report on Field Conditions

## I. ITINERARY

1. Major Schmidt left Washington on 9 August 1943 and via the southern ATC route arrived at Accra, Gold Coast, British West Africa on 13 December 1943. After four days consultation at this main field base he continued on to Cairo accompanied by Major D. G. Bonner, at that time Chief of the OSS Mission to West Africa. They arrived at Cairo on 18 December 1943. After a week's discussion in Cairo, Major Bonner returned to Accra and eventually to Washington, arriving early in January 1944. Major Schmidt remained at Cairo until late February 1944 when, upon changed orders from Washington, he was directed to proceed to Accra, Gold Coast, to take over the post of Chief of the OSS Mission to West Africa. During his tenure at Accra Major Schmidt made one extensive trip to Leopoldville, Belgian Congo on a special mission from 3 April to 11 April 1944. Following the arrival of his relief at Accra during the last week of June, Major Schmidt left Accra on 12 July 1944, and after making stops at Roberts Field and Fisherman's Lake, Liberia, Bolama, Portuguese Guinea, and Dakar, Senegal, he left Casablanca on 29 July and flying via the northern ATC route arrived in Washington on 30 July 1944, reporting back for duty to his Division on 1 August 1944. Since his original mission was contemplated to be of several months duration only, Major Schmidt was retained on the Continental T.O. of OSS.

## II. OBJECTIVES

1. In the original division of territory between USAFIME and NATO the entire continent of Africa, with the exception of Tunisia, Algeria, French Morocco, Spanish Morocco, Ifni, Rio de Oro and French West Africa, was assigned to USAFIME. The military objectives of the USAFIME Theater were primarily to the north in the Balkans and the Middle East. Because of the size of the territory to be covered and the difficulty of communications between the various colonies of Africa, operations throughout this area had been and continue to be based on Washington rather than on OSS field bases. The objective of Major Schmidt's mission was to discuss with the Strategic Service's Officer, Cairo and the Chief of Staff, USAFIME the manner in which intelligence from the continent of Africa, for which USAFIME was responsible, could be made more effective and useful. To this end Major Schmidt set up and organized the Africa Section, SI, Cairo, and established its liaison both within and without OSS Headquarters, Cairo. It had been originally contemplated that Major Bonner

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would return to Cairo to take charge of the activities of the Africa Section, SI, Cairo after indoctrination in Washington but these plans did not materialize.

2. During January 1944 British SOE requested the assistance of OSS in a joint and cooperative program to stop the smuggling of industrial diamonds from Central Africa to Germany. MEW studies had indicated that the German stockpile of industrial diamonds would be exhausted by April 1944. It was believed if this clandestine flow of industrial diamonds to the enemy could be minimized during the first six months of 1944 that it might have an appreciable effect on shortening the war because of the absolutely essential nature of this product to many operations of the German war machine. Major Schmidt was directed by cable to represent OSS at the joint meetings in Accra and thereafter to remain as Chief of the OSS Mission to West Africa in order to carry out in the field the Accra recommendations. This was done over a period of the next five months.

3. A third objective was to improve the quality and quantity of intelligence from the various colonies of West Africa in which we were interested: these being primarily Portuguese Guinea, Liberia and French West Africa.

### III. PROGRESS

1. As a result of the work in Cairo, the Africa Section, SI, Cairo, has now been given the responsibility and the authority for the direction of operations in Ethiopia, Eritrea and the Somalilands. Lt. Edwin E. Meader has been made Chief of the Africa Section, SI, Cairo and is working with the OSS officers, Cairo, and representatives of the Ethiopian Desk, Washington to put into effect a comprehensive plan for the penetration of this area.

2. At the request of the Chief, SI, Major Schmidt made inquiries while in Cairo as to what plans were being considered for the establishment of an intelligence organization in Cairo and Egypt after the departure of the military installations and the official OSS Headquarters. As a result of numerous conferences held on this subject between the SI Officers, Middle East Section, Africa Section and A-2, Cairo, plans are now under way for the establishment of an undercover organization within Cairo itself to carry on after the military and official organization depart. It has been decided that Egypt will be administered by the Middle East Division, rather than the African Division, because of the close political and economic ties of Egypt to other areas in the Middle East rather than to the continent of Africa.

3. The joint British-American collaboration on the IDB problem was carried out in a spirit of mutual cooperation and confidence in a manner in which both SOE and OSS can take pride. A letter from the British SOE-SIS Chief at Accra has been received in which he records his appreciation for the fact that in spite of the criticism in many quarters regarding British-American relationships that in this instance effective collaboration of the closest

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and most intimate sort was able to be successfully accomplished with worthwhile results. The full record of this joint investigation is contained in our "Summary of Industrial Diamond Intelligence" which has been prepared for certain officials in the Foreign Economic Administration and the Department of State, and for the sake of brevity its conclusions will not be included here. It can be stated here, however, that we have now come to the conclusion; (a) that our assistance was requested in this program primarily so that the Diamond Trading Corporation could discover how much we actually knew of the ramifications of both diamond smuggling from Central Africa and also the ramifications of the DeBeers world monopoly, and (b) that the Acra recommendations were sabotaged, not by the British Government, but by the representatives of Diamond Trading Corporation, Ltd. in London through their domination of the Diamond Committee of MEN, because of the desire of Discorp to permit no British or American investigators to examine the Belgian mines in the Congo. This was done without the knowledge and to the great discomf of SOE-BIS, in whose representatives we continue to have the highest confidence; (c) as a result of this joint investigation, however, OSS has learned facts of the nature and ramifications of the British monopoly so that the appropriate United States Government agencies will be able to deal with it effectively after the war at their option.

4. In spite of the fact that no American Consulate exists in Portuguese Guinea, effective communications were established for our representative in that area to the end that a good flow of positive and C.E. intelligence has been received in Washington from that area during the past six months. Major Schmidt was able to visit this representative on his return trip to Washington, provide him with additional requisitions and vitalise plans for the future.

5. Mr. Lester A. Walton, the Negro American Minister to Liberia, has made it impossible for OSS to operate in this area through the Department of State channels. In spite of this difficulty effective communications were established between Acra and our Liberian representative to the end that a significant body of intelligence has been received from this area which is considered of vital future importance to United States interests. This intelligence is at variance with official reports to the Department of State, and if properly acted upon should be of essential value in formulating accurate future policy toward this large independent colony on the west coast of Africa in which the United States has both a moral and strategic responsibility.

6. The Africa Division has endeavored for the past two years to secure proper OSS representation at Dakar. It believed that it had achieved this constructively when Admiral Glassford requested the assistance of OSS personnel prior to the departure of the Glassford Mission to Dakar. Two capable officers were provided, but it was necessary to recall them after two months because of the impossibility of maintaining secret communications and also because of the antagonism of the Consul-General to the functions of OSS. Because of the latter difficulty Major Schmidt called upon the Consul-General

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in Dakar in order to discuss this problem as frankly as possible. The Consul-General expressed his opinion in a straight-forward and sincere manner. He stated that OMB should never send a representative to Dakar unless OMB could convince the officials of French West Africa that they had a clear purpose to perform and that otherwise the suspicions of the French would be aroused and would only add to the already delicate American-French relations in that area. When asked if such a clear purpose could be established what he would have any objections to an OMB representative becoming a member of the Consulate, the Consul-General replied that this would be a policy decision which only the Department in Washington could make. Following its session with Department officials in Washington it has been decided that an effort will be made to introduce an OMB chief of Mission into Dakar as soon as the incumbent Consul-General departs that post.

#### IV. PROBLEMS

1. Because actual hostilities ceased in Africa earlier than on other fighting fronts, the Africa Division has faced reconversion problems from one year to six months earlier than other geographical divisions of SI. During this period OMB has necessarily been organized along military lines to perform a basically military job. The military organization has worked and is working, no doubt efficiently, in cases where mass operations are required. The Africa Division has learned, however, that this present organization is not only inefficient, but actually dangerous, in the complicated process of sending one single agent into a territory completely under cover. As a result of the many overlapping directives of the Service departments imposed on SI as an operating department, it is the opinion of the officers of this Division that SI as presently constituted cannot be regarded as a secret intelligence organization. So many people in so many different departments insist on knowing the details of any mission that the principles of the cell system are constantly violated. Prospective agents in most cases are uncovered in their own home communities or in Washington before their missions actually begin. This has not been too serious while we have been working closely with our Allies in most foreign areas and with the trend of the war strongly in our favor in respect to the neutral countries. This type of organization is inadequate, however, for the conduct of true secret intelligence activities both during the transition period and for the longer-range objectives ahead. The best thought of the officers of SI must be devoted to the building of an entirely different type of organization to meet these new problems.

The Africa Division has been particularly conscious of these problems because it is one of the few remaining operating divisions conducting operations based on Washington. The other geographic Divisions have carried out their actual secret and undercover operations from advanced field bases at London, Algiers, Cairo, Beirut and Chungking with relative freedom from the restrictions and handicaps imposed by Washington. In its efforts to operate during the transition period and under conditions which approximate the long term situation, the Africa Division has gained experience and developed principles which may be of assistance to the other geographical Divisions when

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They must face similar problems in Europe and the Far East.

Our major problem at the moment is to obtain adequate requisitions from State and CIA, not necessarily of a positive intelligence type which may duplicate on occasion, but of a secret intelligence type (what others do not want this government to know). This involves a much more precise knowledge of special situations than we have previously been permitted to know and will involve a completely different type of liaison with these and other peace-time departments than CI at present enjoys.

2. The most important field problem of the Africa Division, at the present time is Purpose. The chief question asked by every field representative contacted was "what is the future policy of the United States in regard to the continent of Africa?" This was followed by "since the war objectives have to a very great degree disappeared, what is the objective of OAS on the continent of Africa from this point forward?" Fortunately sufficient requisitions were still available to retain the interest and morale of these individuals over the near term. In practically every instance they are men who are not working for salary alone and are content to remain as long as they have an objective and can be made to feel that they are being of use to their government. It is obvious, however, that unless some statement of policy regarding the United States' interest in Africa can be announced, or unless OAS can furnish these representatives with clear requisitions for their worthwhile secret intelligence concerning important areas of Africa that their interest will wane and eventually they will request transfers or releases. Upon inquiry at the Department of State, the Africa Division, CI has been informed that the Department has no overall policy toward the continent of Africa. Certain elements in the Department have tried valiantly to obtain such a clear out statement of policy since January 1, 1944 but without success to date. The officers of the Africa Division feel that it is the responsibility not only of OAS but of all other interested government agencies to urge upon the Department of State a continuing study of the problems of Africa affecting the national interest of the United States until a clear statement of United States policy in regard to Africa can be officially announced. It is not necessary that this announcement be made separately. It could be announced in connection with a clear statement of the United States foreign policy in regard to all major areas of the world.

3. The problem resolves itself into an isolationist or an internationalist point of view. A strong case can be made for the isolationist point of view. Africa south of the Sahara is primarily an agricultural country. It produces agricultural products which are primarily competitive with those produced in the United States, with the possible exception of cocoa from the Gold Coast and other parts of Africa. Imports from Africa to the United States in the past have always been small and have only amounted to a fraction of the total of our foreign trade. Vegetable oils constituted one of the major exports of Africa, but the United States has always obtained such products as palm oil and palm kernels much cheaper and much more efficiently from the Far East and the Dutch East Indies. Although rubber has been able to be produced in Liberia and in other parts of Africa, the only States

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and the Dutch East Indies will always be able to produce all the natural rubber which the United States can use, particularly with the large synthetic production which is now available in the United States as a result of the asymmetric rubber plants built in this country during the war.

As a result of explorations made to date the mineral resources of Africa are believed to be extensive. The British West African Colonies have been one of the large sources of Manganese for United States needs during the war period. In like manner large quantities of copper and tin have been imported from the Belgian Congo as well as rare metals such as Uranium. Ninety percent of the world's out-put of industrial diamonds come from such African colonies as the Belgian Congo, the Gold Coast, Angola and the Union of South Africa. The United States consumes about eighty-five percent of the world production of industrial diamonds as a result of the new industrial techniques developed during the war. With the exception of the latter commodity, however, most other minerals produced in Africa are available to the United States more cheaply from other world sources.

The total population of Africa south of the Sahara is estimated to be 115,000,000 Africans and 2,400,000 white. Of these numbers the Union of South Africa has a population of 9,000,000 Africans and 2,000,000 whites. This leaves a population for the entire area south of the Sahara to the hundreds of the Union of South Africa of 106,000,000 Africans and 400,000 whites. The only two industrial centers now important in Africa are the Katanga region in the southern Belgian Congo and in the area surrounding Johannesburg in the Union of South Africa. The further expansion of these industrial areas is limited surprisingly by the lack of labor. There is a dearth of skilled and trained labor and this will continue to exist for many years in the future because of the backwardness of the African native, his inability to understand machinery, and because of the color bar which is a corner stone of African legislation in the Union of South Africa. The obvious answer to this deficiency is a broad extension of educational facilities. Because of the social attitudes of the European powers, however, this will be a slow process, not the work of years alone but of generations. One of the greatest deterrents to basic progress of the African native is the inability of the members of one tribe to talk or write to members of another tribe. For example, there are 150 recorded dialects in the Bantu language spoken by the natives in Central and Southern Africa. Most of these have now been reduced to phonetic writing by European phonologists, but there is no common written native language by which one tribe can correspond with another or by which a past body of experience can be recorded for the benefit of future generations. The African native was acquainted with fire before the coming of the white man, but not with the wheel. The black native is so unfamiliar with the function of the wheel that there are many recorded examples of his lifting a loaded wheel barrel and carrying it on his head.

It must be remembered that most parts of Africa are alienically intolerable to the healthful existence of white men. Up to the present time the general rule is that colonial officials and business men remain in Africa for eighteen months and then return to temperate climates for a three to four months rehabilitation. When duration of stay is longer physical difficulties

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become apparent in later years. This is the reason that very few Europeans or Americans ever go to Africa to make it their permanent home. Their desire is always to return eventually to their home land after their period of work is completed. As a result, permanent organization and continuance of managerial abilities has always been most difficult to date. It is possible that this situation will be greatly improved in future years as a result of the progress in medical science, malaria control and cheapened air-conditioning and refrigeration facilities.

Coal deposits, primarily those located in Southern Rhodesia, are apparently adequate for the small industrialization which has taken place to date, but extensive coal deposits are not as yet in evidence to support industrialization on a large scale. Water power, however, is available in abundance particularly in the Congo area. It has been estimated that one third of the world's potential hydroelectric power exists in the 1,000 mile drop of the Congo River from Leopoldville to Matadi, none of which has as yet been tapped. On the other hand, it is estimated that the major gold mines of the Union of South Africa, upon which the entire economy of that commonwealth is based, will be exhausted in another ten years. The officials of the Union are already concerned over the economic problems which this situation will produce. The 9,800,000 whites on the continent of Africa and a large number of the African population will unquestionably provide a good market for American products after the war. The United States, however, cannot hope to export its manufactured goods to the continent of Africa for any considerable length of time unless it is also willing to purchase raw materials from Africa to provide the required purchasing power and dollar exchange to finance these exports. With the exception of Liberia on the West Coast and Ethiopia on the East Coast all other colonies in Africa are under the control of European powers. Of these the dominant one is Great Britain, both through its ties with the Union of South Africa, its direct control over its various crown colonies and its administration of its protectorates and its mandates. The isolationist point of view can be summed up thus: "The United States has no political or economic interest in the continent of Africa. It is a British sphere of influence, therefore turn it over to the British and let us have nothing more to do with it."

5. The internationalist point of view is simply that the United States, having finally emerged as a major world power perhaps against its own will and without its own seeking, must of necessity be interested and continue to be interested in important developments in every nook and cranny of the world. The official members at future international conferences must have more than a superficial knowledge of important areas of the world in order to deal effectively with the representatives of other world powers. Who would have thought, for instance, in the year 1936 that the harbor depths of the port of Majunga on the Island of Madagascar would be important in January 1945? Who would have thought in the year 1936 that the gauge of the track of the Benguela railroad or the condition of its rolling stock would be important to United States interest in case Rommel had been successful at El Alamein in November 1942? In the same year who would have thought that the defenses at Dakar were of particular importance to people of the United States? At the time of

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President Roosevelt's visit to President Barclay of Liberia, Roosevelt stated that never again would the United States permit a threat to its shores by a foreign power from West Africa. This is perhaps the chief reason for the construction of a major air base by the United States at Roberts Field in Liberia and the survey mission currently in Liberia for the selection of a site for the construction of a port and naval base. It is difficult to conceive of any future war in which the continent of Africa will not play a vital part. Since the Mediterranean Sea will always remain a vital supply route to operations in Europe or in Asia, a continuing knowledge of and interest in the developments in North Africa and the southern shores of the Mediterranean will be of vital importance. Although Africa is a newly discovered continent for millions of Americans as a result of the present war, it has nevertheless been very much a going concern for a hundred years. Most Americans are greatly surprised that the coasts of Africa are dotted by substantial cities with many modern facilities, that trade and commerce with the hinterland have been organized for many years by well established companies and that life under European direction is organized on a high scale. Unquestionably the great impetus received by aviation in the present war will bring tremendous strides in the development of the continent in the years ahead. In spite of the climatic difficulties more colonists will turn to Africa from the destitute regions of Europe than ever before. No spectacular growth is visualized, but a steady gradual development is assured.

If the United States is to take part in this development and become thoroughly familiar with important trends, it must place representatives of its foreign service in all strategic locations and substantially enlarge many of these locations as listening post alone. If it enters upon such a program, it should be willing to do it in the proper manner or not at all. The various Legations, Consulates and Consular Agents must be linked together by a secure system of communications through a courier service, similar to the British method of the King's messenger. Where adequate commercial facilities are not available, radio equipment must be installed in the Consulates. Since the British consider Africa as their economic sphere, United States' representatives will not be particularly welcome, but this is perhaps all the more reason why American representation should be adequately and properly equipped to perform primarily an intelligence function. If the United States is to service the tremendous debt incurred during the present war, maintain a greatly enlarged military and naval force and avoid unemployment after the war, it is self evident that it must emphasize and increase its foreign trade, both export and import, to a greater degree than it has ever done before. This need not necessarily be at the expense of any other foreign power. To develop the purchasing power of backward people and provide them with labor saving devices and modern manufactured goods is to the economic interest of all nations. The largest foreign trade of the United States before the war was always with the most highly industrialized and wealthiest nations. In this respect and to this end, it is believed that Africa will become a fertile field in the years ahead. For these reasons it is urged that the internationalist point of view be supported by this organization as opposed to the isolationist point of view.

#### V. CONCLUSIONS

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the maintenance of the morale of our field representa-  
formulation of a clear strategy must urge upon State the  
this government toward the future policy of  
and objectives of the future of the world this means, the purpose  
determined. of the Division can be

2. The basic organization of SI must be changed from its present military structure to the needs of a peace-time organization in order to permit it to function as a true secret intelligence organization based on Washington.

J. Now arrangements must be worked out between SI and the geographic divisions of State, FMA, Commerce, Treasury, Justice, etc. for obtaining adequate requisitions for secret intelligence on the transition and peace-time problems with which they will be faced.

*A. W. Schmidt*

A. W. Schmidt  
Major, AUS  
Acting Divisional Deputy

**SECRET**



15.428  
Field report  
X. Cousins, (USA S.)  
London

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Director, OSS  
FROM: Acting Chief, BI  
SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions - William B. Cousins


DATE: 12 October 1944

There is submitted herewith the report of William B. Cousins, on conditions in the field.

W. H. Beale for  
John E. O'Garra

Attachment

I would like to see Cousins  
10/12/44



OMB Form 2702

SECRET

FROM:

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Lt. Charles P. Bruce

15,446

~~FILED~~

Accession No. ....

Date Rec'd. BA.....

To	Room No.	Date		Officer's initials	Comments
		Rec'd.	Fwd'd.		
1. <del>to relia</del> Lt. Col. Hoffmann	2111	9/76			
2. <del>Capt</del> <del>Kantank</del>					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.  
 A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.  
 Officer designations should be used in To column.  
 Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.  
 Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.  
 Routing sheet should always be returned to Regist y.  
 For officer designations see separate sheet.

(20690)

SECRET





GSA FORM 4001A

Date 12 October 1944

General Donovan

The attached report from Capt. J. S. Kaylor is of a routine nature. The subjects covered here have been reported regularly and adequately in our previous reports from Cairo.

*W. B. Kantaak*  
W. B. Kantaak  
Capt., A.C.  
Reports Officer

Attachment



Office of the Secretary

**SECRET**

(9139)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Captain Kantaack  
FROM : Lt. Greenfield  
SUBJECT:

Filed 15,448  
x Kaylor Capt. J.S.  
x Case  
DATE: September 5, 1944  
x Message center

Attached is the report of Captain J. S. Kaylor  
surrendered in accordance with General Order #63. Captain  
Kaylor is returning to the theater immediately.

Attachment

*Henry L. Greenfield*

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Field No. 15,448

~~SECRET~~

**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : THE DIRECTOR, OSS  
(THRU: CHIEF, COMMUNICATIONS BRANCH)

FROM : CAPTAIN J. S. KAYLOR

DATE: 4 September 1944

SUBJECT: Report in accordance with General Order 63.

I am acting in the capacity as Chief of the Cairo Message Center and am here on temporary duty working with Major Delafield on new cryptographic systems and security and allied operations. Our Message Center in Cairo works similarly to that of the Washington one. We operate twenty-four hours daily and run three eight hour shifts.

For the past fifteen months, in addition to the routine Message Center work we have been training agents to go into the field. We have received a great amount of traffic from these agents which is not always sent on to Washington, since action on some of these messages is taken by the Cairo office. At the present time we are at the peak of agent traffic since we do not anticipate sending any more agents out to the field from the Cairo base.

Due to the Cairo climate a great portion of our personnel spends at least a part of the year in the hospital. This brings about a frequent shortage of personnel. We hope that this difficulty will be alleviated somewhat by the additional personnel allotted to us by the Washington Office. At the present time a number of girls are being processed for Cairo who will replace some of the enlisted personnel being sent to forward bases.

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OSR Form 2202

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FROM:

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. ....

Date Rec'd: SA.....

Boale

To	Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Rec'd.	Adv'd.		
1. Mr. C. Uarn				J.C.C.	
2. Lieut. <i>Chick</i>				W.M.B.	Check copy for in. copy
3. General <i>Lawman</i> <i>Ch. Buxton</i>				W.P.C. G.C.C.	
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.  
 A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.  
 Officer Designations should be used in To column.  
 Each Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.  
 Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.  
 Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.  
 For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

(20649)

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

15.460 -  
1-Field Report  
x Hogue  
1 Belgium Congo

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Director, OSS  
FROM: Acting Chief, SI  
SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions - submitted by 253

DATE: 12 October 1944

There is submitted herewith field report by 253, Africa Division, SI, together with a copy of memorandum to Mr. Fletcher Warren, Department of State, and covering memorandum to Chief, SI from A. W. Schmidt, Lt. Col. AUS, Acting Divisional Deputy.

*W. H. Beale*  
for  
John E. O'Garra

Attachments

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • **SECRET** UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

15460

TO : Chief, SI (thru Executive Officer SI)

DATE: 6 October 1944

FROM : Africa Division, SI

SUBJECT: Report of 253 on Field Conditions in the Belgian Congo

1. There is transmitted herewith the field report of 253, prepared after his return to Washington on 26 September 1944.
2. The manner of his departure from the Congo has been a subject of regret to this Division, and our position is set forth in the attached informal memorandum to Mr. Fletcher Warren of the State Department dated 26 August 1944. The officials of the Department who are concerned with this area have raised no further question regarding the case, and have privately stated that they consider Mr. Beuton's action to have been hasty. The timing was particularly unfortunate in that 253 was in the last stages of resolving many apparently unrelated IDB items into a cohesive pattern.
3. The paragraphs relating to relations with Foreign Service personnel in the field are important in that they point to fundamental problems which must be overcome before representatives of the two organizations can cooperate effectively to a common end, not only in Africa at present, but in the Middle East, Europe and Asia, when military facilities are withdrawn in the future.

*A. W. Schmidt*  
 A. W. Schmidt  
 Lt. Colonel, AUS  
 Acting Divisional Deputy

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15460

20 August 1944

Mr. Fletcher Warren  
 Department of State  
 Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Warren:

At the request of Mr. Perry Jester, there is attached a memorandum commenting on the cable of Mr. Benton from Leopoldville, dated 7 August 1944, regarding Mr. Wilbur G. Hogue.

It would be greatly appreciated if the original of this memorandum could be brought to the attention of Mr. Berle on an informal basis since we believe it contains items of experience which will be of future value to both organizations. It would also be appreciated if the attached copy could be made available to Mr. Jester.

As a result of information recently received from Mr. Hogue and other sources, we are in the process of completing our "Summary of Industrial Diamond Intelligence", a copy of which has been prepared for the Department and which will be forwarded to you within the next few days.

Sincerely yours,

A. W. Schmidt  
 Major, AVB

Enclosures

1. Memorandum
2. Copy of Benton cable 7 August 1944
3. Copy of correspondence on appointment of Mr. Hogue
4. Copy of letter of commendation from British Chief, Acorn.
5. Copy of most recent intelligence item received from Mr. Hogue.

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28 August 1944

Memorandum to Mr. Fisher Warren

1. Reference is made to the cable of Consul-General Newton from Leopoldville, dated 7 August 1944, regarding Mr. Wilbur G. Hague. The purpose of this memorandum is to explain the background of Mr. Hague's mission to the Congo, correct certain inaccuracies in statements which have been made, and endeavor to point out ways in which both OSS and the Department might benefit from this experience. It is not the desire to excuse mistakes or shift blame. We do wish to state, however, that in our opinion Mr. Hague has rendered valuable services to his government in this matter, and after a thorough review of the facts known to date our confidence in him remains unimpaired.
2. Mr. Hague arrived at Leopoldville on 7 November 1943. As indicated by the attached copies of letters to the Belgian Ambassador and the memorandum of conversations with the Department, it was our original desire to send Mr. Hague to the Congo as an open OSS liaison officer. At the insistence of the Department, however, and with our approval, he was eventually sent as Special Assistant to the Consul-General. Mr. Hague's true status was at all times known to the Belgian Congo officials and in no sense was he a secret agent.
3. During the first three months of his stay in the Congo, Mr. Hague established effective and cooperative liaison with Mr. Wittich, French and South African opposites and during his tour of duty to date has supplied us with a steady flow of valuable information on subversive activities in the Congo and other material not available through official channels. This material has been promptly disseminated to the appropriate government agencies. His coverage of the Lubumbashi mutiny, for example, has received the commendation of his associates in the Consulate and MID.
4. As a result of the joint British-American conferences on IDB held at Accra in February 1944, Mr. Hague was assigned the most difficult part of the investigative problem on the smuggling of industrial diamonds to Germany, since it was generally agreed that the major leaks occurred from the Ferminiere mines at Bulungwa and Bocoza. The secret intelligence he developed concerning smuggling methods, both in regard to the safe, sure tunnel and the secondary speculative variety from the collection center at Bulungwa to the outlets at Matadi, Lebits and Kaira are a matter of record and have been of major importance in focusing preventative procedure. Unfortunately, in the course of his investigations, Mr. Hague discovered that Kouandinet, Chief de Bureau at Leopoldville and his Belgian Congo opposite, was plainly mined up in this racket. In like manner, the British SIS Chief in Angola had discovered that many Portuguese officials were involved in that colony.
5. By April it was learned in Accra that NWG in London was not satisfied with intelligence alone but demanded evidence before it would act on official levels. It was pointed out in vain that actual purchases

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would prove little or nothing, even if they could be concentrated, and also that it would be highly dangerous. After repeated exchange of cables, MHW, however, insisted and orders were reluctantly issued to Hogue in the Congo and to the British SIS Chief in Angola to purchase industrial diamonds from known illicit channels. This is an offense of some magnitude in these diamond producing centers.

6. The center of the Congo illicit traffic is at Elisabethville. After ten days study and deliberation, and after his first two choices were found to be unavailable, Hogue finally selected as his contact at Elisabethville M. Jean Decoster, the retired editor of L'Echo du Katanga, pro-American and pro-Allied, undependable from the standpoint of honesty, and with a good knowledge of the diamond racket. His "worthiness" mentioned in Mr. Benton's cable consisted, from the official Congo viewpoint, of his liberal editorial policies, his criticism of Societe Generale methods in the Congo and his efforts to improve the lot of the natives. Decoster owned property at Dilole, on the Congo-Angola border (one of the diamond transfer points) and at Lulumbourg (on the edge of the diamond fields). This gave him the opportunity to travel. On his second trip to Lulumbourg, Decoster must have struck a hot trail for five days after his arrival, the Surets picked him up on an IRS charge and reportedly forced him to talk.

7. As evidence against Hogue, the Governor-General told a raid on Decoster's home in Elisabethville in which there was found a post list written on Hogue's typewriter and 100,000 francs clearly earmarked by Hogue for a secret matter which Decoster was to carry out. This is obviously a frame-up by the Surets for Decoster possesses nothing from Hogue's typewriter or in writing and a portion of the 100,000 francs had long before been spent, so this must have been found. Decoster was not unaware of Hogue's investigations into IRS and we believe became justly alarmed concerning the extent of Hogue's knowledge of his own connection with the racket. (This is the same incident which is attempting to place the blame for the Lulumbourg matter of the Force Publique upon the American missionaries in that area. This is absurd, for the native troops had no contact with the missionaries, and is an attempt to cover the inefficiency of the Belgian officers and support the Catholic Bishop de Rembigne in his endeavor to oust all Protestant missions from the Congo.)

8. As a result of this experience, the SI Branch of the G-2 has learned the following which it is immediately adding to its training courses:

a. No representative should ever attempt to perform an operation as delicate as selecting a cut-out and setting up an organization without months of residence in the immediate area. (Because of the pressure of his duties at Leopoldville, Hogue had ten days. It should also be pointed out that there was not a single American resident in the area and no consular representation to lend advice and assistance.)

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b. The cut-out selected in this case was unimpeachable from the standpoint of being with us. He ran into difficulty because he was too prominent. Everybody knew him - particularly the Surets.

c. To pound home what has been already emphasized and re-emphasized: Every OSS representative connected in any official capacity with an American Consulate, if called upon to carry out an undercover operation, must use a sufficient number of cut-outs so that in no instance can the operation be traced back to the Consulate if the operation fails.

OSS is fully cognizant of its responsibilities in this matter, and in the present instance is not concerned over the person of its own representative, but primarily with the eventual effect on American prestige in this area.

9. At the same time, and on the assumption that officers of the Foreign Service desire to work in utmost cooperation with the functions of OSS, we respectfully submit that the Foreign Service can also learn something from this experience. In the present instance, the purpose and reason for Hogue's investigations were sufficiently clear that a strong case could have been made by the Consul-General regarding the Governor-General's representations. In our opinion, the Foreign Service Officer should have pointed out that Hogue's activities were not directed against loyal Belgians and Allies but against subversive elements who were trading with the common enemy. In this respect an American might accomplish what a resident Belgian officer could not accomplish. The evidence submitted could have been readily denied because it was in effect manufactured and was not accurate. The name of Declere had come from the British suspect list but since nothing had been proved against him, the Governor could have been informed that Hogue in effect had cleared him of suspicion.

The British handling of a simultaneous situation in Angola is interesting in contrast. In this instance, the British SIS representative was listed as a full fledged member of the British Foreign Office and carried the rank of Vice-Consul. Police Chief Rome caught one of his operatives, reportedly with the diamonds on his person, traced it back to the SIS representative, and because of Rome's intense hatred of the British, representations soon followed from the Governor-General. In this instance, however, the British Consul-General accompanied the SIS representative to the Governor and thrashed out all the issues for several hours. Immediately thereafter, navicerts began to be held up, payment for raw materials were delayed and all the familiar signs of pressure began to appear. The result is that the British SIS representative is still at Luanda. He will, no doubt, be removed in due course by his home office, but it will be at British option and in a manner not to reflect on British prestige.

10. The rapidity of Consul-General Benton's apology and his ready acceptance of the Governor's assertions disturbs us. The manner in which the case was handled made it impossible for Hogue to deny or contest the charges or for him to withdraw without harm to American prestige. The Governor-General offered to permit Hogue to remain until the end of his tour

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on 18 Oct. but only on the condition that Huges submit to him a report on the results of his investigation in the Congo. This we have refused to let him do, and that it would strike hard at Belgian Surate and individuals in addition capacity which would muddy the waters more. The only alternative, in our opinion, was for him to leave. We cabled him to return at his earliest convenience, and to do everything possible to preserve American goodwill.

11. Because of the risks which must be assumed in order to learn what others do not want this government to know, it is inevitable that an occasional incident will arise. British SIS, in spite of their long experience, have learned that no matter how careful and circumspect they try to be, difficulties of this nature do arise. The British have also learned that the secret intelligence obtained is usually worth the risks involved, and that these risks can be minimized by proper support of their Foreign Office officials - at critical moments. In the present instance, it is, therefore, to be regretted that Mr. Linton has not appreciated the splendid work which Mr. Huges has performed for this government and has not seen fit to accord him adequate support under the circumstances.

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Leopoldville  
August 7  
878

I am informed by the Governor General that the Congo police while searching rooms in Elisabethville which De Coster, a Belgian national, had been occupying, found a list of "suspected people". Wilbur Hegue, representing OSS, was mentioned on the list as the source. Some 100,000 francs were also found among De Coster's effects with definite indication that the money had come from Hegue for expenses in a secret matter which De Coster was supposed to carry out.

The Governor General was especially disturbed because De Clerck, a magistrate at Elisabethville was on the list. The Governor feels that if U.S. agents working in Congo are suspect that he should be given this information. It is most regrettable that the name of De Clerck, who is respected everywhere in Elisabethville, was mentioned on this list. Hegue made a poor choice of confidential agent also when he picked De Coster when the local police consider very untrustworthy and have been observing for some time.

I made an apology for what has happened and assured the Governor General that we thought he should be informed of any suspicions against local officials.

The Governor General then expressed the view that the presence of Hegue in the Congo is no longer desirable. He does not want to seem insistent, however. I added that Hegue's duty tour would be finished on September 17 and I inquired whether there was any objection to Hegue's remaining until then. The Governor said that this would be satisfactory.

I have told Hegue what the Governor General charges against him. Hegue admits that the charges are, in general, correct. However, he has taken such care in making his investigations, that he thinks the Governor General would not find it easy to make formal charges.

Hegue agrees with me that his usefulness in this region is now impaired and that he should leave as soon as he can. He will settle all his affairs and be ready to depart on September 17th, unless he is instructed to the contrary.

I know that Stehli is not mixed up in this and, as far as I know, he is not suspected.

I will report by air in full.

BINTON

SECRET

August 8, 1944

OUTLINE OF INDUSTRIAL DIAMOND SMUGGLING AS CARRIED ON BY EMPLOYEES OF THE C. F. L. IN THE BELGIAN CONGO

1. In making the following report, I wish to state that there is not in it for which I have no actual proof as yet. The information was obtained from a number of sources and put together rather laboriously by myself. It falls into a reasonable pattern and I am presenting it for what it may be worth. I know it will have your careful attention. Here it is:

2. In 1941, Celestin Gamus, director general of C.F.L. DES MINES DU PAYS DU CONGO SUPPLEMENTAIRE AUX GRANDES LAGS AFRICAINS, an Italian organization, supplied Italy and Germany with 7,500,000 francs worth of industrial diamonds. These were flown into Ethiopia by a Belgian citizen of Italian origin named Sambaldi. This man is at present the head of TRANSEKAT, a supply service organization which is a subsidiary of C. F. L. His headquarters are at Albertville, Belgian Congo. During 1943, Sambaldi acquired a new airplane and appears to have unlimited petrol. It is assumed that C. F. L. obtained the plane for him.

3. I have no way of knowing at the moment whether this IDB activity on the part of Gamus was voluntary or whether he was ordered to take part in it by the Italian powers in Belgium. I must assume, however, that the smuggling was carried out at least with the knowledge of high officials of the Italian group since M. Tricot, African director of C. F. L., knows of Gamus's activity, but while they are bitter enemies, he still does not dare to expose Gamus if any confidence can be placed in statements made by Tricot's mistress, Madame De Ryckere, a Belgian.

4. The collapse of the Italians in Ethiopia ended this method of delivery. The British have reported, however, that diamonds passed into Cairo by air from South and Central Africa. Since Gamus continued to furnish diamonds to the enemy into 1943, it is likely he used this route. Early in 1943, Allied successes apparently caused him to decide that it might be well to free himself of IDB activity. It is natural that he had to buy certain people off. This is when the leaks began to occur.

5. Gamus was assisted in his IDB activity by a South African of German origin. This man's name is Steen. He appeared in the Congo in early 1943, but had been carried on the C. F. L. books for a long period at a salary of 5,000 francs a month. Shortly after Steen's arrival in the Congo, he and Gamus had a bitter quarrel. Steen was treated in a high handed manner by Gamus, used to dealing with underling Belgians. The former talked a little about Gamus and IDB --- not much, however, because Gamus got to him quickly. Steen now has a comfortable job with C. F. L. at Kinshasa with a fat salary. The few remarks made by Steen to one of my informers proved enough to get our attention focused on Gamus.

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6. In considering the 7,500,000 francs worth of diamonds supplied by Camus to the enemy in 1941, it is difficult to estimate the number of carats this represents. Using the declared export value of industrial stones shipped from the Congo in 1945, approximately \$0.40 a carat, as a measuring device, the total would fall between 400,000 and 500,000 carats.
7. This may be the reason that German consular officials in Angola and Portuguese East Africa had no interest in small purchases of diamonds, and supports the theory that Germany, with her estimated annual consumption of industrial diamonds of 500,000 carats, had a big, regular source of supply on which she could depend.
8. Camus is a fairly smooth operator. Until something shows me to be wrong, I am convinced that Captain J. M. Ed Elst was planted in Leopoldville by Camus to discover just how much was known there about his activity or about IDB in general.
9. Elst, posing as a former C. F. L. employee looking for a berth on an Allied ship, sat idle in Leopoldville from early December of last year until July 3, 1944. During this time he spent considerable money and never appeared to be short of funds. He knew a lot about IDB. Two weeks after he found out that I was hot on IDB, he slipped out of Leo to return to his old job as a C. F. L. lake steamer captain.
10. My feeling about Elst is additionally supported by the fact that very early in July, Camus received a telegram from some one in Leopoldville which caused him to become extremely excited. He was at the C. F. L. offices in Albertville at the time. He immediately telegraphed SARRINA for a special plane to take him to Leo, and left for Kindu in his private railroad car. A plane brought him into Leo from Kindu on July 15th. This was about the date I cabled Asora and Washington that it was rumored that the Congo administration was going to take some action on IDB, possibly because of my exposure.
11. Camus's IDB activity is known to a number of high ranking people in the Belgian Congo including Triset, Brassier, head of the Bank du Congo Belge, and Mariassius, chief attorney for C. F. L. The British do not seem to have clicked on it yet.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

15.463  
F. C. C. L. H. P. A. B.  
**SECRET**

8 October 1944

To: Executive Officer, BI, (For submission to Chief, BI,  
and Director, OSB)

From: No. 253

Subject: Report on Field Conditions in the Belgian Congo

FIELD ASSIGNMENT

After having completed a counter-espionage assignment in 1942-43 which covered Liberia and a section of French Ivory Coast, 253 was assigned to the Belgian Congo. Permission was obtained from the Belgian Government-in-Exile for him to go there as an accredited representative of the Office of Strategic Services. When the Department of State was informed of this appointment, Mr. G. Howland Shaw, Assistant Secretary of State, requested that 253 be assigned to the Belgian Congo as Special Assistant to the American Consul at Leopoldville. He arrived there 7 November 1943.

In his final letter of instructions, 253 was ordered:

a. To investigate the presence and activities of enemy agents in the Belgian Congo.

b. To devise ways and means of expanding our intelligence operations to meet possible future developments on the African continent.

c. To obtain military and economic information from the Belgian Congo and neighboring territories which was not available through existing channels, etc.

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In February 1944, 253 was called from the Congo to the IDB conference in Accra, held jointly by OSS and British Intelligence under the guise of MINW. As the result of this conference, 253 was instructed by the Chief of OSS Mission in West Africa to concentrate on the investigation of the ways and means by which the enemy was obtaining industrial diamonds from the Belgian Congo.

The specific assignment was:

- a. To obtain a list of all employees of FOUMINIERS, the big diamond mining organization of the Belgian Congo.
- b. Check the possible use of Red Cross parcels as a means of moving industrial diamonds to Europe.
- c. Determine if industrial diamonds were being forwarded to Europe through diplomatic pouches.
- d. Contact smugglers and buy from them industrial diamonds to have as proof that such stones were available in the Congo.

PROGRAMS OF THE WORK

En route to the Congo in September 1943, 253 was instructed to stop in the Republic of Liberia for the purpose of reporting to Washington current conditions in that country, and to determine if his old undercover organization in French Ivory Coast could function under the direction of the OSS representative just assigned there under cover. This task was completed, 253 arriving in the Belgian Congo early in November 1943.

Over three hundred information items and reports on sociological, military, economic and political subjects were forwarded to Washington and approved by the home office.

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The assignment to the IDB investigation was accepted by 253 with some misgivings as he realized that this was a delicate task which could lead to criticism by the Belgian Congo administration and in turn might embarrass the Department of State, which obviously would not support any OSS representative engaged in an investigation about which it was uninformed and perhaps not in sympathy. He was aware that it was repeated MEW pressure from London which was forcing his superiors to authorize activity about which they were personally dubious.

Despite his personal feelings, 253 conducted the investigation. The list of FORMINIERE employees was obtained, the shipping of Red Cross parcels investigated and evidence discovered that a full year's supply of industrial diamonds had reached the enemy through this medium in 1942, and facilities for the movement of industrial diamonds via diplomatic pouches were checked and reported. A diamond smuggling ring including a high Belgian cartel official was discovered. In an effort to buy sample diamonds from small-time smugglers, only gem stones came into the net up to the time of the arrest of one of 253's cutouts by the Belgian Congo Surete.

The arrest of this cutout revealed to the Surete that 253 was in possession of considerable information regarding the smuggling of industrial stones...smuggling in which at least one member of the Surete was involved. A framed-up charge against 253 was presented by the Surete to the Governor General of the Belgian Congo who immediately summoned the American Consul General. This American official was aware of some of 253's activity since he received para-phrases of all cables sent to OSS through the Consulate General.

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As the result of the bit of information known to the Consul General, he agreed with the Governor General that 263 had been engaged in "questionable" activity and insisted that he leave the Congo.

263 returned to the United States at the end of September 1944.

CONDITIONS IN THE FIELD WHICH MIGHT BE IMPROVED

In an area such as the Congo due to its non-military character the most critical problem an agent must face is his relationship with representatives of the Department of State on whom he is wholly dependent for communications. The ranking officials of this organization are jealous of their authority and (for the most part) quite uncomfortable at the presence of OSS agents in their territory. The unanswered question arises: Is an OSS agent working under the Joint Chiefs of Staff entirely subordinate to State Department representatives in such non-military areas? The representatives of State insist that he is subordinate; the OSS agent is in the position of having to "serve two masters" - an impossible situation for anyone. To add to the difficulty, many State officials resent the higher cable, entertainment allowances and salaries of OSS representatives, and lean toward obstructionist activities to express their feeling.

Conditions in the field changed during 263's period of activity in the Belgian Congo. From November until May the American Consul was Mr. Patrick Mallon. He placed no particular obstacles in the path of his Special Assistant, but did insist on his prerogative of examining material sent out, as well as being submitted paraphrases of all cables. He did not insist on reading incoming material.

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From Mr. Mallon's departure until the arrival of J. Webb Benton, as Consul General, Mr. Leonard J. Cromie was Acting Consul. Mr. Cromie was extremely inquisitive about the work which 253 was doing, wrote a letter to the Governor of Leopoldville Province, referring indiscreetly to 253 as "OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE," and issued several memorandums addressed to 253 under this title. He tried, among other things, to extend his authority to the reading of incoming pouches.

The arrival of J. Webb Benton placed 253 in a difficult position. 253 had been warned in advance of Mr. Benton's arrival that he was strongly inclined to view the whole activity of OSS as only a useless "duplication of State Department activities." Mr. Benton has expressed this attitude to several members of the Africa Division and to Mr. Shepardson who explained in great detail why this is not true. 253 was informed in advance that Mr. Benton did not seem impressed or interested in the explanation. Almost from the day of his arrival he began to act in a veiled but unfriendly manner. This increased until the question of "serving two masters" came into the open.

The attitude of Mr. Benton toward OSS can be shown clearly by a conversation in which he asked 253 the following question, "If so ordered by your superiors, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to take part in an investigation or activity that might reflect upon the Consulate General of the United States, would you carry out your orders?" When 253 answered that he would carry out his orders, although he did not anticipate that such orders would ever be given, the Consul General was most indignant and said that such a situation was "impossible and could not be tolerated." Thereupon, he reported this attitude of 253 to the Department of State in such a way as to reflect on OSS and its Congo representative.

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253, as well as other OSS men who have been in the field, know that secret information is information which a government or organization does not wish known...that to obtain such, certain risks are assumed and certain activity undertaken which would not be condoned by the Department of State.

It is not fair to expect an OSS representative attached to the Department of State to attempt to gather secret information when he must necessarily expose himself to the Consul or Consul General with whom he works through the medium of the paraphrases of his cables.

An OSS representative, under State cover, therefore, can safely collect only positive information, which is information which the local government or organizations wish to have. In so doing he is accused by the Department of State and our agencies of "duplicating their efforts."

It is evident from the above that some clarification of authority and responsibility is necessary to improve conditions in the field. Some understanding must be reached between top-ranking officials of State and OSS here in Washington so that field representatives of both will be instructed by them exactly how to function together without engaging in discussions about authority. An OSS representative cannot survive any antagonism of a Foreign Service officer without having his OSS work nullified. Each must be instructed definitely how he must be helpful to the other and each must understand his own rights.

The following are some of the problems that confront an agent placed in this unfavorable situation;

1. no group of individuals could be more status conscious than the members of the rigid hierarchy of the Foreign Service. In their

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minds, one either is "in" or "out" and there are no shades-of-gray about the matter. Most of the concern centers around the grade of the individual involved and the greatest fear manifest in the environment is that some one may presume "above his station". Since a Special Assistant is not a real member of the hierarchy, he is constantly reminded of his "worthless condition" and made conspicuous by not being allowed to fit into the pattern. He is a continual source of curiosity to local officials who are not able to understand why he is not treated as a Department of State representative by representatives of the Department of State. For this reason, the designation of Special Assistant not only provides no cover but achieves the opposite result by drawing attention to the OSS representative.

2. The Consulate was so crowded at the time of the arrival of 263 that he could not share the offices of the staff. No help was given him except personally by a friendly, young vice consul, and he was treated as an "outsider" - a fact which the Belgians were quick to recognize.

3. The Consul General was privileged to read outgoing pouches and paraphrases of cables. This put him in possession of "dangerous knowledge"; there was no way to hide secret information from him. The evil of this became apparent at once when the Governor General of the Congo demanded an explanation from the Consul General regarding the IDB investigations of 263. The Foreign Service representative showed at no time any real desire to support the OSS representative but rather demonstrated an eagerness to agree with the Governor General's wishes. The Consul General gave 263 no chance to deny anything but at once admitted his activities in IDB. Had he not done this, nothing could have been proved against 263.

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As the matter was handled, however, the Consul General admitted that 253 was engaged in "questionable activities" and went so far as to ask the Governor General whether he considered 253 persona non grata. The Governor General had only to nod in affirmative thus saving him the trouble of formulating the charge. This made it easy for the Consul General to remove from his area the OSS representative whom he considered insubordinate because of loyalty to his organization. In effect, then, 253 was obliged to leave his post not because of the discovery by the Consul General of his IDB activities but rather because the Consul General found this a convenient weapon against 253 whom he believed to be a threat to his absolute control of the area.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

With two years of field experience behind him 253 wishes to make the following recommendations.

1. Heads of OSS must be made to realize that the gathering of secret information is frequently a delicate and hazardous occupation involving many risks. This cannot be done within the present framework of the Department of State, hence to saddle a field agent with so-called State Department cover is, until changes are made, to limit him to the obtaining of positive information which only duplicates or adds to information being obtained through the normal channels of the Foreign Service.
2. Heads of OSS must be made to realize that there exists in the field a feeling of envy and suspicion toward OSS agents on the part of Foreign Service officials which sometimes causes them to unconsciously sabotage the work which the OSS agent is trying to do.
3. Heads of OSS must be made to realize that under the existing set-up there is no such thing as State Department Cover. In the field, every-

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one down to the last native clerk in a Consulate knows that a "Special Assistant" is an intelligence officer. Hence cover just does not exist.

4. Heads of OSS must be made to realize that Department of State wishes OSS agents assigned under its "cover" not to facilitate their activity but to enable a degree of State Department control to be exercised over these Americans who might possibly do as what the State Department considers a reflection on its position.

b. OSS agents in the field must be allowed State Department facilities for cables and communications without having to expose the contents of those communications if engaged in the gathering of secret information...or other arrangements should be made to handle communications. The October, 1942, directive of the State Department to all its Foreign Service officers places OSS in the same category as NSA, ONI, and other created war agencies, in that the cables and pouches of their representatives, being transmitted by State Department facilities, are subject to examination and review by the senior Foreign Service officer. In other words, there is no true secrecy of communications for OSS representatives through State. It must be realized here that such secrecy is a basic requirement for true secret intelligence activities and is so recognized by all foreign intelligence organizations.

c. If OSS is going to be an organization for the gathering of secret information, experienced field agents must be given the opportunity to serve in responsible executive positions in OSS so that their knowledge and experience can be utilized to the fullest extent. It is not a solution to merely place an experienced field man on a desk. Capable field agents must be placed where they are permitted to plan and direct. After all, the chief purpose of OSS should be to obtain information through the medium of its agent

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
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abroad. Surely some of these men are capable of directing the recruiting, training, assignment, and planning for future agents.

*Two Fifty Three*

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FIELD REPORTS

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Name:	Branch:	Theater:	Tab:
RUENSTEIN, LT. COL. SIDNEY S. 15,287	X-2	CBI	A
PAMPIN, JACK C. 15,300	SO	CBI	B
PEEL, ROY V. 15,345	SI	SWEDEN	C
PODD, FRED D. L. JR. 15,389	OSSTO	MEDTO	D
ROBERTS, E. DENNIS J. 15,401	MU	MEDTO	E
BOYD, CAPT. LESLIE H. 15,405	SI	TURKEY	F
SCHMIDT, MAJOR A.W. 15,417	SI	AFRICA	G
COBBINS, WILLIAM B. 15,428	SI	FTO	H
BRUCE, CHARLES F. 15,446	SO	CBI	I
KAYLOR, CAPT. J. S. 15,448	COMMUNICATIONS	METO	J
HOGUE, G. J. JR. 15,470	SI	AFRICA	K

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Area Commander, for instance, where he has to devote a good share of his time to the administration, supply, and maintenance of an area.

*Harold P. Larson*  
CAROLD P. LARSON  
Major, Infantry  
Operational Group Command

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Area Commander, for instance, where he has to devote a good share of his time to the administration, supply, and functioning of an area.

*Harold P. Larson*  
HAROLD P. LARSON  
Major, Infantry  
Operational Group Command

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the briefings for these operations were very scanty and I might say incomplete. It looked as though not enough effort was put forth to obtain all the information regarding a certain area for a certain operation. Then too, in a couple of instances, the men were briefed about a half hour before the operation took off, and as a result had no time to study the situation or digest the information. In another instance a party about to embark on an operation was given maps of France of a very small scale, and as a result they were of little, if any, value to the party. We tried to get special containers packed for the O's to carry their own equipment, but higher headquarters could not see it our way. We had to use standard packed containers that were primarily intended for use in equipping the French resistance movement. We did manage, however, to get one container packed with M-1 rifles for our use, and were allowed to clean and zero in the weapons of certain other standard containers that we took along on operations. Major Stroud at the packing station was very cooperative in packing our rucksacks and other items of equipment in packages for our operations, and did a splendid job for us. The administration section of SO Branch also did very well in the handling of our records, leaves, furloughs, pay, etc.

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As a result of our experiences in the European Theater of Operations, I should like to make the following recommendations:

- OK ✓
- 1.) That O's have their own separate branch or command in each theater, and not come under another branch for administration and operations.
  - 2.) That O's be run as a strictly military organization.
  - 3.) That O's have direct liaison with air operations section, packing station, and planning staff. By this recommendation I mean that O's should have an officer in each one of these sections to handle O's affairs.
  - 4.) That the briefing officers be O's officers or officers thoroughly familiar with O's work so they will know just what is to be included in the briefing of the men who are to go on an operation.
  - 5.) That an O's group leader or Unit Commander be allowed to give full time to the training and operation of his organization and not have additional jobs as an

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to supplement the overall plans with regard to Norway. I also drew up an appreciation of a target area for attacks against road and rail communications from north to south in keeping with the policy of SHAEP, at that time that they could no longer accept with equanimity the flow of German reinforcements from Norway to the continent and wanted them stopped. This appreciation was submitted to Scandinavian Section, SO Branch, OSS, and in a covering letter it was pointed out that although OGs could do the type of work called for in this appreciation, it was felt that the job was more of an SO nature. In addition to this planning work, we were required to keep a situation and operations map of all clandestine operations, so the Commanding General could see at a glance what was happening in Norway at any given time. I remained at SCORCO until 18 January 1945, at which time I moved back to London for the purpose of getting the records etc. of the OGs in order, in preparation for their return to the United States.

While in the European Theater of Operations, the OGs were under the administrative and operational control of SO Branch. Upon arriving in the theater, I was told to report to the Chief, SO Branch. Although they had heard of OGs, it seemed as though they knew little about them; that is, just what they were, their capabilities, limitations, etc. During the entire time we spent in Scotland, from 14 December 1943 to 21 May 1944, we only had four visitors from Headquarters in London, with the exception of an officer from Services Branch who came up periodically to see how we were getting on with ration supplies, living facilities, gas, oil, etc. An officer from the Scandinavian Section visited the area for two hours one day; the Chief of Training Branch spent part of an afternoon, evening, and the following morning with us; and during the time we were planning and training for the "Barter" operation an officer from SO Branch spent approximately three days with us. This gave us the feeling of being left out and not wanted, and it took a great deal of effort on the part of the officers to keep the morale of the unit at a high level. Services Branch did do a good job in helping us get the areas set up, arranging for rations, gas, oil, fuel, etc. As to ammunition, demolitions, and training supplies in general, headquarters appeared to do its best and we fared quite well from that standpoint. After moving to Brock Hall the training branch did much for OGs in obtaining slots for them in the various British and American Special Training Schools. In addition they obtained for us various training needs that heretofore we could not get. As for the actual operations the OGs participated in,

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Training at Area "P" consisted of a general review of previous training, weapons training and firing, ski training (when snow was available), and mountain and cold weather training. Recreation was nil at the area and liberty runs to Blairgowrie were made three times a week.

While at Area "P", Captain Elsmo arrived in the Theater for the purpose of straightening out certain matters pertaining to the command of OGs in the Theater. After a thorough study of the situation and a series of conferences, it was decided that the possibility of operations of an OG nature in Norway was very remote, and the OGs should be re-grouped to the United States for regrouping in preparation for the Far East. It was further decided, however, that since a promise had once been made to the men that they would get operations in Norway, those of the OGs who still wanted to operate in Norway would be allowed to transfer to the SO Branch for any operations they might have in that country. This was done on a voluntary basis; the men were interviewed and a list of those wanting to transfer to SO was drawn up. Orders were then issued transferring these men to SO. The remainder of the men, those still remaining with OGs, were then moved to Area "H" at Holme, England on 18 January 1945, to await transportation to the United States.

Area "H" - (Holme) - 19 January 1945 to 1 February 1945. The set up at Area "H" was again the same as described in the previous section on Area "H". Training consisted of some physical training, and working in the parachute and packing sheds. While working here, the men and officers learned something on how to pack parachutes and containers. The men and officers were moved to London on 1 February 1945, and on 2 February 1945 moved to Southampton, England, where they embarked for the United States. After a continuously rough crossing, the group arrived in New York on 18 February 1945, and came directly to Area "P" from the boat.

During my tour of duty in the European Theater of Operations, I also worked on the special planning staff at SCOTCO. SCOTCO is the headquarters designated by SHAEP to be responsible for the planning and carrying out of operations in Norway. On 10 November 1944, I was transferred from Area "H", where the OGs were located at that time, to London. After spending about two weeks in London, getting oriented on the Norwegian situation, I was sent to SCOTCO at Edinburgh, Scotland. Here a special planning committee or staff was set up, composed entirely of British officers. I was the representative of OSS on this special planning staff. While I was there we drew up plans for a special operation

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that the proper containers and packages were aboard. On 10 October 1944, Lt Col Obolensky left the United States and I again assumed Command of the CGs.

I received instructions to send the two groups under Captain Cook and Captain Earle back to the United States, which was done, and on 25 October 1944 the remaining CGs were moved to Area "H" near Peterboro, England, because of better quarters and facilities with winter coming on. Area "E" was then dissolved and the personnel of Station Complement returned to Services Branch in London.

Area "H" - (Holme) - 25 October 1944 to 20 December 1944.  
Area "H" was quite a large installation, being the packing station of OCS. The men were quartered in winterized tents and the officers lived in the large house which was part of the area. Administration was much easier in that I only had command of the unit and had nothing to do with rations, and the area administration. In other words, we were quartered and boarded at the area and I was responsible to the Area Commander to see that the unit obeyed the area regulations and maintained a standard of discipline in keeping with the customs and regulations of the service. Training consisted of physical conditioning, which was constantly stressed, firing of weapons, booby trap and demolition instructions, and critiques of actual combat operations the unit had participated in. The latter proved quite interesting because the critiques were of actual combat and not just problems, and I think a good deal was learned from them. Recreation at Area "H" consisted of movies for the men twice a week at the area, and liberty runs to Peterboro every night.

Area "P" - (Dalnaglar Castle) - 21 December 1944 to 18 January 1945. On 20 December 1944 the unit moved to Dalnaglar Castle near Blairgowrie, Scotland, with the idea of getting ski training for anticipated operations in Norway. Dalnaglar Castle was designated as Area "P". Living quarters at Area "P" consisted of the Castle which served as quarters for the men and officers, and several out-buildings were used for supply room, motor pool, and ski shop. A Nissen hut equipped with showers and honey bucket latrine facilities served the men and officers, as these facilities in the Castle were not adequate. The administration at Area "P" was handled in much the same manner as at Area "E" (Stronlairie Lodge). Rations were drawn from the American depot at Glasgow with the exception of bread and fresh vegetables which were drawn from a British depot at Perth, Scotland.

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men and officers were sent to a number of British Special Training Schools. These included the British advanced course in parachuting arranged for by Lt Col Obolensky. Other schools included radio communications school, reception committee and Eureka school, the picking of air fields school, foreign weapons school, and code and cipher school. A number of practice experimental parachute jumps were made with equipment, to determine exactly what should be carried into combat and the best means of carrying it. Practice jumps were also made in conjunction with problems. Recreation did not offer too much of a problem, as there were a number of towns in close proximity to Brock Hall and transportation facilities were fairly good. During our stay at Brock Hall a total of nine operations were carried out in France varying in size from one man to an overstrengthened group. All operations were dispatched from Harrington Airport (the OSS Airport) except one, which left from Tempsford, a British airport. Standard containers which were packed by the OSS packing station at Area "H" were dropped with each operation. One special container, containing M-1 rifles and ammunition and as many special packages as were required for the operation, was packed for us. We worked out a system for dispatching which is as follows: The standard containers to be taken on the operation were selected. The equipment and supplies to be packaged were obtained and sent with an officer to Area "H" for packaging. The rucksacks of the men were packed two to a package and each package given a serial number. By having an officer present at the time of the packing we knew what equipment and supplies were in each package and also whose rucksack was in each package. When all was completed, the officer accompanied the containers and packages to the airport where they were loaded on the planes according to a loading list which had in the meantime been prepared. This loading list was made up as follows: After getting the serial numbers of all packages and containers, the serial numbers of the planes to be used for the operation were obtained. Then we would take the plane number 1 and list the personnel to go in it, then list the containers and packages by serial number to go on that plane. A close check had to be kept on containers and packages to see they got on the right plane, because one had to be sure that the packages containing rucksacks got on the same plane as the men to whom the rucksacks belonged. The package containing a radio must be loaded on one plane, the container containing a mortar was loaded on one plane, the containers containing the ammunition must be loaded on the same plane. If this were not done, one plane may get lost or not drop for some reason while another plane does drop, then you may have a mortar with no ammunition or vice versa. Therefore, an officer checked the loading of each plane to see

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aids used in training were constructed. A Signal Corps radio instruction set-up, which was used to instruct in sending and receiving Morse code, was requisitioned from communications Branch. Classes were held for two hours each evening, one hour being for the radio operators assigned to the unit, and the other hour a voluntary class for anyone else in the unit who wished to learn. Also, while at this location, everyone was sent to the OSS parachute school at Kinross, Maryland where they completed their parachute training. Reception for the men proved a difficult problem in that we were some distance from town, the roads were bad, and only a limited number of vehicles were available. It was solved, however, by letting 50 per cent of the men go on pass from Saturday morning to Sunday afternoon while the balance cleaned up the area and stood inspection. This arrangement gave the men one long week-end away from the area every other week. No operations were mounted from this area, although one was planned-- the "Harper" operation. The men were clocked, and a special course of training in preparation for the operation carried out. The operation fell through, however, because of the non-availability of the necessary lift to the target area.

Due to the SHAAM decision to release Norwegian OOs for operations in France, Area "H" in its entirety was moved by rail to Brook Hall near Northampton, Maryland, on 31 May 1944. On arriving at Brook Hall, we were met by Lt Col Obolensky who had just arrived from the Mediterranean Theater to assume command of the OOs in the European Theater. I was designated as Lt Col Obolensky's Executive and Operations Officer and continued the job of Area Commander. On 4 June 1944, two operational groups under the command of Captain Cook and then Lt Lt Warle, a total of eight officers and 68 enlisted men arrived at Brook Hall from the Mediterranean Theater and were assigned to OOs European Theater of Operations.

Area "H" - (Brook Hall) - 31 May 1944 to 30 October 1944.  
This location consisted of a large house and a number of sub-buildings. The officers of the unit and the enlisted men of station complement were quartered in the house. Night-men pyramidal tents were erected to house the men of the operational groups. The out-buildings were used for supplies, storage, and a motor pool. Additional latrines and shower facilities were built to take care of the needs of the men. The administration of the area was handled in the same manner as at the other locations. Rations and supplies were drawn from an American depot at Wellington, 34 miles from Brook Hall. Training continued along the lines of physical conditioning, problems, firing, demolitions etc., and in addition

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Beginning on 10 January 1944 all of Area "B", including personnel, supplies, beds, mattresses, chairs, dishes, cooking utensils, etc., was moved to Stronlaith Lodge near Whitebridge, Scotland, by truck, a distance of approximately 70 miles. The move was completed on 15 January 1944, using the vehicles assigned to the area.

Area "C" - (Stronlaith Lodge) - 10 January 1944 to 21 May 1944. This location consisted of a large building (Lodge, Stronlaith Lodge), a small lodge known as Killin Lodge, a large bothy, a garage, and a number of small out-buildings. The large building lodge housed the men of the unit, Killin Lodge was the officers' quarters, the large bothy housed the enlisted men of the unit complement and was also the kitchen and mess hall, the garage was the motor pool, and the out-buildings were used for supplies and storage. This location was in the highlands, nine miles from the main road and Whitebridge. (Whitebridge consisted of a hotel and gas pump; the nearest town and rail head was Inverness, 35 miles from our location). The road from Whitebridge to the Lodge was very bad and many times impassable; therefore constant repair was necessary to keep it open so supplies could be brought in. At times, after a severe rain or snow storm, the entire unit had to suspend training from two days to a week and repair the road by filling in spots, constructing crude culverts, drainage ditches, etc. A bridge on this stretch of road was also repaired by the unit by putting in additional concrete piers which we managed to obtain through the Ministry of Works. The administration of the area was handled the same as at Forest Lodge. Rations and supplies were drawn from the American depot at Glasgow and from the British depot at Inverness. Training at this area was intensive and very good. It included physical conditioning, one week of ski-training (we only had sufficient snow for one week's training), weapons training and firing, demolitions (complete instruction was given in all British demolitions and auxiliaries), cross-country hikes, bivouacs, problems (mostly night problems), field firing problems, demolition problems, compass work, map reading, aerial navigation exercises, etc. Squad and section work was stressed to teach the men to work as teams. There were no training aids at the area and all had to be constructed. A recreation shelter was constructed; the area was made from cardboard boxes nailed on a frame, painted white with a black bullseye; a mock village was constructed to teach village and street fighting; crude bridges and dams were built and blown up on problems; an obstacle course was made, and various other

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HPL/CH

10 April 1948

SUBJECT: Report by Personnel Returning From Overseas  
 TO : The Director, OSS  
 FROM : (a) Branch Chief, Operational Group Command  
 (b) The Secretariat  
 Major Harold P. Larson, Colonel, Inf.

Unit "A", and Company, Operational Group, sailed from New York on 2 December 1945 and landed at Swansea, Wales on 13 December 1945 after an uneventful voyage. The Unit then moved by rail to Forest Lodge near Aviemore, Scotland, arriving on 14 December 1945.

Area "A" - (Forest Lodge) - 14 December 1945 to 15 January 1946. Forest Lodge was designated as Area "A" and was to be our temporary location until our permanent quarters at Stonebridge Lodge near Whitebridge, Scotland was completed. The area consisted of a large hunting lodge with a number of sub-buildings. The men and officers were quartered in the Lodge, and the out-building were used as mess hall, supply room, garage and motor pool, and a class room. I was designated as Area Commander in addition to my job as Unit commander, which meant I had to supervise and direct the drawing of rations, gas, oil, supplies, etc., establish good relations with the populace, and the dozens of other little things an Area Commander falls heir to in addition to running a training schedule for the unit. We had a station complement of 27 enlisted men from Services Branch, consisting of cooks, drivers, mess sergeant, and men to do the general housekeeping tasks, assigned to the area. Rations were drawn from an American depot at Glasgow, except for bread and fresh vegetables which were drawn from a British depot near Grantown-on-Spey. A post exchange was also established at the area. Training at Forest Lodge consisted of physical conditioning and a review of the training we had in the States, such as map reading, compass work, weapons training and firing, demolitions, problems, etc. I contacted a British Special Training School about 16 miles from Forest Lodge and they were most helpful in loaning us training aids, and giving us any assistance we desired. Recreation for the men was in the form of dances, usually put on by the local people, movies, etc. In the several villages within a radius of ten miles of the Lodge. A liberty run was made three times a week to these various villages.

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- 1 -

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*Field Report*  
*Larson*  
*09.*  
*SCK/fb EYO*

201-LARSON, Harold P. (O) 1st Ind

HEADQUARTERS OPERATIONAL GROUP COMMAND, OSS, Washington D.C.,  
21 April 1945

TO: The Director  
THROUGH: The Secretariat

1. Forwarded.
2. Major Larson was in command of the Norwegian OGs in ETO.


*Samuel King Jr*  
 SAMUEL C. KING JR.  
 Major, Infantry  
 Acting in Command

*Hold for WJL*  
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## RESTRICTED

same. Eventually the ration situation was cleared up by OGB in part but for a considerable period, a munition, spare parts for weapons and radios were available only through the "buddy" and "barter" system of our excellent supply non Commissioned officers. Morale suffered both in officer and enlisted men ranks because we were unable to promote up to even our table of organization strength. Our personnel performed brilliantly in the field and even today, only a fraction of the men have received the awards for which they were recommended and which they so well earned. There was a real lack of motor transportation. At one time our motor transportation consisted of one ton 4 x 4 and one motorcycle both provided by the British. Eventually this situation was cleared up but not until we had almost wound up our operations on VIs. We were also in great need of power boats. All of our operations were amphibious and we had to depend solely on the Royal Navy and on the Partisans for sea transportation. A request to OGB for a naval officer to act in the capacity of a liaison with both the Royal Navy and the Partisans in our behalf was initiated by our headquarters but never fulfilled.

5. Upon the formation of the battalion organization, supply channels were opened, administration became regularized and most of the difficulties were straightened out or were being studied.

6. The undersigned had the opportunity to learn of the operations of other branches of OGB during a two month's temporary duty assignment with 2677th Regt OGB and once to appreciate the fact that they as well as the OGB are doing a good job.

*William G. Bliden*  
 WILLIAM G. BLIDEN  
 Captain, Cavalry  
 Operational Group Command

- 3 -

RESTRICTED

## RESTRICTED

- V. Reported for duty to 8th Army Detachment at point north of Forli, Italy, 15 Dec 44.
- W. Recalled to Co A 2071 Sp Gen Bn, 17 Feb 45.
- X. Returned to sq 2071 Sp Gen Bn 19 Feb 45.
- Y. Departed Naples for United States 27 Feb 45.
- Z. Arrived in Washington D C, 12 Mar 45.

3. Many of the difficulties which arose in the field have been corrected since the formation of the 2071 Special Reconnaissance Battalion. Those conditions which were in need of improvement were:

- a. Poor Administration.
- b. Inability to obtain supplies from U.S.
- c. Lack of communications.
- d. Poor liaison with other branches of CCB for both intelligence and operations.
- e. No plans for CCB or other CCB units to draw on Army GOC for supplies.
- f. Inability to promote officers and enlisted men.
- g. Inability to get awards and decorations.
- h. Lack of transportation facilities both motor transport and water transport.

4. Specifically in the original OD set up we were unable to enforce discipline for lack of Courts Martial Power. Morning reports were not called for by any higher headquarters. On our arrival on the island of Vis and for approximately one month thereafter we did not have enough ammunition to last in a five day fight for more than one half hour and all that time we were in imminent danger of attack. The CCB in Bari either would not or could not aid us in obtaining this ammunition. For lack of authority we were unable to obtain American rations and were forced to draw on British rations which the men did not like and morale at this point dropped alarmingly. Our communications with the mainland (Italy) were through an CCB weather station which was some distance from us and out of telephone communication. Messages both incoming and outgoing were delayed greatly. Our own intra unit communications were affected through a small number of Walkie-talkie sets without an adequate reserve of batteries or replacements. SO and SI personnel were using the island as a jumping off place without the OD commander knowing their mission. This at one time caused considerable embarrassment and might have caused a disaster, in that one of these SO or SI groups contacted civilians who were not loyal and the Germans learned of a proposed attack on the islands of Pagan and Ulan. Partisan headquarters were alerted of the activities of some of these groups and this strained what were formerly amicable relations between the CCB and the Partisans. Weapons, ammunition and even rations were difficult to obtain at first because depots and dumps in the area often claimed we had no funds for drawing.

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WHL/sj

19 April 1945

**SUBJECT:** Report by Personnel Returning from Overseas  
**TO :** The Director, OSS  
**THROUGH:** (a) Branch Chief, Operational Group Command  
 (b) The Secretariat  
**FROM :** Captain William G. Hilden, O 444 202, Cav

1. The undersigned submits this memorandum in the spirit of constructive criticism and in the hope that future OD operations may benefit by the criticisms set forth herein.

2. The following is a log of the places that the undersigned visited and the dates upon which he arrived and departed from them:

- a. Arrived Oran, Algiers, 12 Nov 43.
- b. Departed Oran, 22 Nov 43.
- c. Arrived Camp Hookstep, Cairo, Egypt, 19 Dec 43.
- d. Departed Camp Hookstep, 20 Dec 43.
- e. Arrived OSS Desert Camp 20 Dec 43.
- f. Departed OSS Desert Camp 1 Jan 44.
- g. Arrived Italy 5 Jan 44.
- h. Arrived Commando Training Camp at San Michele, Italy, 9 Jan 44.
- i. Departed Commando Training Camp 19 Jan 44.
- j. Left Italy 20 Jan 44.
- k. Arrived Island of Vis, Yugoslavia, 21 Jan 44.
- l. Raid on Island of Hvar 27-28 Jan 44.
- m. Reconnaissance of Island of Solta 18-19 Feb 44.
- n. Raid on Island of Solta 18-19 Mar 44.
- o. Reconnaissance of Islands north of Vis: Kornat Group and Dugi Otok, 15-25 May 44.
- p. Attack on Island of Dugi 1-4 June 44.
- q. Departed Island of Vis and arrived in Bari, Italy, 12 June 44.
- r. Attended Parachute School at Brindisi, Italy, 20-25 June 44.
- s. Assigned Camp Commander of OD Camp at Torre A Mare, Italy, 1 Jul to 5 Dec 44.
- t. Assigned to Co A 2571 Sp Recon Bn, 6 Dec 44.
- u. Placed on temporary duty with Co D, 2677th Regt OD on 12 Dec 44 and assigned to duty with 8th Army Detachment, 15 Dec 44.

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*etc. Rep. C*  
*12/10/48*  
*OG*  
*Boyle*

201-111111, William G. (G) 1st Inf  
HEADQUARTERS OPERATIONAL GROUP COMBAT D, 1st, Washington, D.C.,  
20 April 1948

TO: The Director, O&A  
FROM: The Secretariat

- 1. Forwarded in accordance with current regulation.

*James A. King*


Major, Infantry  
Acting in command

*11066 for*  
*US 3/1*  
*OG*

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## CHRONOLOGICAL OUTLINE OF EXPERIENCE

DATE	RANK	PLACE	COMMANDING OFFICER	DETAILS
<b>A. SERVICE PRIOR TO O.S.S.</b>				
1. May 14, 1942	Pvt.	Ft. Benning, Ga.	Colonel Ryder	Parachute training
2. Mar. 16, 1942	Sgt.	Ft. Benning, Ga.	Colonel W. Williams	Par. & Dem. instructor
<b>B. SERVICE IN O.S.S. IN U.S.A.</b>				
3. Jan. 8, 1943	Sgt.	Washington, D.C.	Major Jerry Sage	Prepared for overseas
<b>C. SERVICE IN O.S.S. OVERSEAS</b>				
4. Jan. 26, 1943	Sgt.	Military Operations Sp. Planning, Number 1	Major Jerry Sage	Instructor dem. small arms of agents for sabotage & espionage
5. Mar. 1, 1943	Sgt.	Military Operations Sp. Planning, Number 1	Lt. Elmer Harris	hounded at Sebasteia, Tunisia
6. July 20, 1943	Sgt.	Experimental Det. G-2	Colonel Eony	Acting 1st Sgt. Supply & transportation sgt.
7. Aug. 10, 1943	Sgt.	2677th Co. Exp. Sta. #6	Major E. Crosby	Administration Clerk
8. Sept. 2, 1943	2nd Lt.	2677th Co. Exp. Sta. #6	Major E. Crosby	Administration Officer
9. Aug. 3, 1944	2nd Lt.	2677th Regt. French SI	Mr. Henry Rye	Administration Officer
10. Aug. 6, 1944	2nd Lt.	Hq. 7th Army G-2 SCS	Colonel E.H. Gamble	Train & Officer
11. Sept. 11, 1944	1st Lt.	Hq. 7th Army G-2 SCS	Colonel E.H. Gamble	Operational supply & transportation officer

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1. Cooperation

a. Major James F. Lawrence and Mr. Jerome J. Wieniewski did cooperate and send me all the essential operational matters, i.e., those used by the unit. Their spirit and cooperation, which is above reproach, should be copied by all headquarters operational supply officers.

b. For their fine cooperation, they both received a fine letter of commendation submitted by Colonel E. W. Gamble. In my opinion, both Major James F. Lawrence and Mr. Jerome J. Wieniewski should be awarded the Legion of Merit. For exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services prior to and after the invasion of Southern France, these two men are deserving of such an award.

*Stephen Byrnes*  
Lieut. Col. Stephen Byrnes

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-3-

**SECRET**

the field, clear all travel orders, conduct agents to the air field prior to their departure for occupied France. Just before the Invasion of Southern France, my job was to procure the essential operational supplies to be used D plus in Southern France. The entire staff of the French SI desk contributed their share in the Procurement Program.

August 6, 1944 -- worked under Colonel E. W. Gamble as Finance and Training Officer for the French SI desk. Was accountable and responsible for all the money used by the French SI desk prior to the invasion of Southern France. As Training Officer, conducted classes in physical training. Along with my other duties, I procured the essential operational supplies for the French SI desk and the entire unit going into Southern France.

7. September 11, 1944 -- was appointed Operational Supply Officer under Colonel E. W. Gamble for the 7th Army detachment. Also was appointed Transportation Officer for the 7th Army detachment which, at that time, had one hundred and twenty-five vehicles with only eighty-seven enlisted men to drive these vehicles. Along with my other duties, was appointed Special Services and Post Office Officer.

A. Procurement of local supplies in the field

1. Very difficult because no allocations were authorized by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 of the 7th Army. Everytime I tried to draw supplies, I had to give a long story on the type of work the unit was engaged in. This had to be explained because of the priority given to the combat units. Later, I had established an A Priorat with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 giving the 7th Army unit the same procurement privilege allocated the combat divisions of the 7th Army.

B. Procurement of O.S.S, special operational supplies from base head-

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- on reconnaissance patrols to determine the best possible areas to put agents through the lines. At this particular time, we were working in Med Jaz Al Hab Mountain area. I prepared demolition charges, conducted agents to the lines and helped put them through for sabotage and espionage activities. My job also was to procure essential operational supplies, repair and maintain the transportation.
2. March 1, 1943 -- was ordered to lead a patrol into Sebektia, Tunisia to determine the possibilities of putting agents through the lines. While scouting for the town of Sebektia, Tunisia, a Captain of G-2 2nd Corps stepped on a German anti-personnel mine. The blast of the mine wounded five of the patrol, and I was seriously wounded and was hospitalized for three and one half months.
3. July 10, 1943 -- after being released from the hospital, I worked with Colonel Eddy as the Acting First Sgt. Supply and Transportation Sgt. until I was relieved to take up a new job as Administration Clerk for Station #6.
4. August 10, 1943 -- worked as the Administration Clerk for Station #6 which was the SI School for the Experimental Detachment G-3 under Colonel Eddy. Major Richard Crosby was the Commanding Officer of the SI School.
5. September 2, 1943 -- was appointed a 2nd Lt. as the Administration and Conducting Officer of Station #6 under Major Richard Crosby. My job was to maintain the records of the SI School, procure essential supplies, teach isolated students unarmed self-defense, small arms fire, and conduct pro learn in the city of Algiers in connection with the SI course.
6. May 8, 1944 -- was appointed Administration Officer for the SI desk under Mr. Henry Hyde. My job was to clear agents going into

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21 April 1945  
**SECRET**

CHRONOLOGICAL OUTLINE OF EXPERIENCE

A. SERVICE PRIOR TO O.S.S.

1. March 12, 1942 -- went through parachute training course at Ft. Benning, Ga. Upon graduation was asked to join the instructors staff of the Parachute School which I accepted.

2. April 16, 1942 -- I started as an instructor at the Parachute School, Ft. Benning, Ga. My duties consisted of training students in ground training and unarmed self-defense. After teaching with the old manuals and methods of unarmed self-defense, I had asked permission to substitute my own manuals and methods which I had learned in the Hawaiian Islands. Permission was granted to me by the Commanding General of the Parachute School. I had increased the training program, substituted my own manuals and methods in hand-to-hand combat fighting. In the evening, I instituted a training schedule for the instructors of the school to train the students in my methods. The entire program was a success. While at the Parachute School, I went through the demolitions course and trained students until I was relieved and transferred into O. S. S.

B. SERVICE WITH O.S.S. IN THE U.S.A.

1. January 8, 1943 -- I was transferred into O.S.S. as an instructor of parachute ground training, demolitions, small arms and unarmed self-defense. While in Washington, D.C., I prepared for overseas duty. I was immediately shipped overseas on secret operations.

C. SERVICE WITH O.S.S. OVERSEAS.

1. January 26, 1943 -- arrived in Algiers, North Africa and immediately proceeded to Tunisia to touch agents in demolitions, small arms and unarmed self-defense. Upon arriving in Tunisia, USMC Major Jerry Sage, I instructed agents in the above. After the instructions were over, I was ordered to go to the front with the agents. I was

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*file*  
**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

*16-702*  
*Field Report*  
*x Ryssek*  
*x MacRO*  
*x St.*

**TO :** Director, OSS  
**FROM :** Chief, SI  
**SUBJECT:** Field Report - 1st Lt. Stephen Ryssek

**DATE:** 23 April 1945


There is submitted herewith the field report of  
Lt. Stephen Ryssek.

*E. B. L. Penrose*  
E. B. L. Penrose  
Acting Chief

Attachment

*file*

*Lt. Stephen Ryssek*  
*should be*  
*sent to*  
*022*  
*SECRET*



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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, CIA  
SUBJECT: [Illegible]

HEADQUARTERS OPERATIONAL GROUP COMMAND, OCS, Washington, D. C. 24 April 1945  
TO: The Director, CIA  
FROM: [Illegible]

SGK/jvt

1. Provided in accordance with current regulation.

SAMUEL C. KIMO, JR.  
Major, Infantry  
Acting in Command

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**RESTRICTED**

When first arriving in England, all supplies were placed under an Infantry officer who had all earmarked for combat, so that it was necessary for us to draw on what was available at the nearest American hospitals, who, though cooperative, were not always able to furnish or spare necessary drugs, equipment, etc. Even after medical services were set up, their scope was limited to "garrison troops". While in France, specific medical supplies which were required were ordered, and although delivered at a later date, were in the form of a routine kit, two of which had already been dropped to us and contained very little of the specific requirements and much of excess or non-necessary supplies. I think it should be possible to pack to fit specific requirements (all of which were readily available in England).

b. Planes landing behind lines were equipped with litters for transporting of wounded, but blankets were not, and should be, provided.

c. There was apparently a discrepancy in the rules for dropping of gasoline behind lines, which usually ended with no gasoline reaching the troops, and activity was limited to a marked extent by gasoline shortage.

d. Although I was not missing any equipment in my operation, three packages containing personal equipment belonging to an operation in another part of France were dropped with me.

e. Briefing was done with instructions and data that had in several points changed some time previously, and probable exigencies were not always anticipated e.g. maps were not considered to be essential for my drop because there were already maps in the area to which I was going. In one of the operations, numerous last-minute details were saved by the London office so that they could be done in the last half hour, and although everyone in camp pitched in and helped, it took about one hour of rushed work to accomplish these things, and as a consequence the men were about a half hour late in starting, and had become unnecessarily upset and excited, and some were probably haunted for some time by the feeling that they had forgotten something.

f. Unnecessary delay occurred in some cases in the forwarding of the radio messages from the field.

cc: Colonel Missal

*Frederic B. Acers, Jr.*  
 FREDERIC B. ACERS, JR.  
 Captain, MG

**RESTRICTED**

**RESTRICTED**

24 April 1945

**SUBJECT:** Report by Personnel Returning from Overseas

**TO :** The Director, OSS

**THROUGH:** (a) Branch Chief, Operational Group Command  
(b) The Secretariat

**FROM :** Captain Fred B. Agas, Jr., O-447103, MO

1. Overseas duty began 2 December 1943 and terminated 18 February 1945. During this entire period I was with the Norwegian COs and my stations were the same as covered in the report made by my Commanding Officer, Major Harold P. Larson (with the exception of his SCOTCO assignment). During this period my duties were maintenance of the medical services, including sanitation, medical supply, and instruction for this group. On 13 August 1944 I was parachuted into the Department of the Vienne, France. The mission:

- a. To provide medical service to the Maquis.
- b. To assist in organizing such other medical services available.
- c. To cooperate with village doctors serving the Maquis.
- d. To provide medical service for allied troops in the vicinity.

These were performed until 27 August 1944 when I received a gunshot wound of the leg and was hospitalized until 3 September 1944 when I returned to England. During this period in France a message was sent, as requested, to Intelligence Branch, SOO, giving information on the medical situation in this Department.

2. During the period 8 October 1944 till 27 November 1944 I was hospitalized for fractured clavicle. In connection with this, special praise should be given to the medics, S/Lgt Peck, Tec 3 Anderson, Johnson, Nelson, and Osthus for the manner in which they maintained the medical services. During the entire time in the field they did a superior grade of work.

3. Condition in the field that might be improved:

- a. Supply was the condition which caused the most difficulty.

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201-AGEE, Fred B. Jr. (O) 1st Ind  
HEADQUARTERS OPERATIONAL GROUP COMMAND, OSS, Washington, D. C. 24 April 1945  
TO: The Director, OSS  
THROUGH: The Secretariat

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- 1. Forwarded in accordance with current regulation.


*Samuel G. King, Jr.*  
SAMUEL G. KING, JR.  
Major, Infantry  
Acting in Command



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DIRECTOR'S OFFICE

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China/SOL

INTERVIEWER'S DATA SHEET  
OSS/CHINA - PERSONNEL

NAME \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_ 45

UNIT ADDRESS: \_\_\_\_\_ RANK \_\_\_\_\_ ASN \_\_\_\_\_

AGE: \_\_\_\_\_

TIME IN GRADE: \_\_\_\_\_

MILITARY EXPERIENCE: \_\_\_\_\_ TIME OVERSEAS \_\_\_\_\_

CIVILIAN EXPERIENCE: (education, jobs, etc.)

REMARKS: (personal appearance - volunteers for special duties - etc.)

Interviewer \_\_\_\_\_

Primary Skill \_\_\_\_\_ PHS \_\_\_\_\_

Secondary Skill \_\_\_\_\_ Security OK \_\_\_\_\_

Branch Slot \_\_\_\_\_ Req# \_\_\_\_\_ Requested for transfer \_\_\_\_\_

Branch concurrence \_\_\_\_\_ Reported in \_\_\_\_\_

Washington notified \_\_\_\_\_

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APPROVED BY (1) \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_

APPROVED BY (2) \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_

Control Number: \_\_\_\_\_

Reference Number: \_\_\_\_\_

Approved Category: \_\_\_\_\_

Existed: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Spec: \_\_\_\_\_

(Quality degree of proficiency)

(Be specific and also indicate whether the training will be by OSD or others.)

(Education: professional, etc.)

(must be very complete for Washington requests)

*(Review done of after  
sent in)  
Should use actual number  
Inclusion should  
Station report of info*

*2 Wash  
50/R  
1 Peng*

Field Photo and Reproductions: Lt. Cunningham, Lt. Brady and Lt. Hoffman took me to their new compound. It is an excellent setup. Brady explained the problem was complicated by fantastic ideas as to MO's reproduction requirements (Washington). MO needs no Alpha or Beta units here because of the ability to get printing done locally. Four mobile units will be adequate.

Lt. Cunningham is acting as Special Services Officer - a full-time officer is needed here.

April 19

AAA: Lt. Meeker told me of the activities of Navy and SACO and returns they get. He also outlined his job of political reporting.

MO: Mr. Halling has been with MO at SACO. He was enthusiastic about the possibilities of distributing MO material through SACO.

Mr. Dulin and I had a long discussion of the importance of high echelon MO work and the wastefulness of unimportant activities. He needs personnel who can work with various forces in China. Among them George Delbert. O's production in Washington is of very little value out here.

OPRO: Col. Davis outline the XRM project to me. This is the type of thing which I think is of greatest importance. At present it is exploratory. Colonel Doering and I had a long discussion and agreed on the following points:

1. Great things are expected of OBS in this theater.
2. To accomplish them we need personnel and equipment.
3. The status here is like the diver at the end of the airline.
4. We must eliminate all unimportant operations as our procedures are too costly for that type of work.
5. Both of us are worried about MO postwar plans.

Colonel Heppner asked me to check up on his Legion of Merit with Major Little. Mr. Dulin asked me to report on McElroy to Ken Mann.

**SUBJECT:** Kunming Notes, #2  
**TO :** Mr. Kenneth Hinks, Planning Board, OSS, Washington, D. C.

April 9

**Communications:** Visited the Commo Compounds. Major Swenson and Captain Luck told me of their supply and personnel problems.

**Officer Billets:** Colonel Doering and I visited the Officers' billets.

April 10

**HQ Commandant:** Major Callahan took me through the Officers' and enlisted men's billets. They are extremely crowded.

**Services:** Major Driver is terribly understaffed. He needs particularly a couple of good statistical clerks. All arrangements for property must be made through SOS which causes delay. This procedure was setup after the Staff House and Girls' House were procured. Furniture and equipment are procured by the Services Officer direct. His greatest problem is knowing when buildings will be required and when they will be ready.

**Evacuation Committee:** This committee has worked out complete plans for evacuating Kunming. This complicates the problem of supply and personnel, particularly civilian and female personnel.

**SI-Chungking:** Mr. Christian told me of his work, particularly his contacts with Chinese in the Shangtung Peninsula. He also commented on conditions under McCarthy and Hall and the need for Chinese business experience. He wanted to be remembered to General Magruder.


**Adjutant's Office:** Capt. Weiss said that the Adjutant General's Office wants a letter from the Director to establish priorities for personnel returning from this theater.

**SSO:** Had a long talk with Colonel Hoppner about his discussions with General Wedemeyer. These were very encouraging for OSS but place on us an obligation to perform effectively. This obligation can only be carried out with complete support from Washington. One of Colonel Hoppner's greatest needs is for a comptroller.

April 11

**PIRSO:** Attached is the requisition form and the interview form used by PIRSO here. Major Little told me that the requisition forms are sent to Washington with a control number established by him. I want to talk to Comdr. Antell about these requisition forms as the Theater never knows whether the requisitions have been received. It seems to me that the Theater should receive a monthly report, acknowledging the requisitions, reporting whether or not the branch is in agreement, what personnel has been recruited against each requisition and a schedule of dates for training and arrival. Major Little also told me of the Strademyer Project and its personnel problem.

ORGANIZATION OF SI BRANCH OSS CHINA THEATRE



ANNEX # 1

21/1/45

For the 7 1/3 kv., he hopes to have a Japanese program when the station can be located near enough Japan to use medium wave. Again, it will be primarily True News but directed under Japanese cover.

Auchincloss is doing some interesting work in monitoring. I was very impressed with his realistic view of radio in this theater. He has a very simple setup, with only one American Sgt. and the others are Chinese recruited from Southwestern University where some have been professors and instructors.

April 01

27. Y-2: Lt. Thurston told me of his plan for DDT bug and monitoring. This seems to be very important work and he also cited a number of cases of Government property which has been stolen and recovered through our work.

Sunday Afternoon: A group of us went up the mountains to see the temples.

Sunday evening: Col. Doering and I discussed a number of problems concerning personnel and morale.

Attachment

2 MI charts

10. Executive Officer and Secretariat: I outlined the purpose of our programs and what we desire in the way of reports. They requested more copies of programs and field manuals.

11. SO: Col. Willis writes the SO plans. He reviewed with me the operations under IOWA and YAK. SO is doing much more than I had realized.

12. AGFETS: According to Col. Smith, the AGFETS activities south of the Yangtze will be in his command and those north under Major Krause.

The AGFETS intelligence network is much more complete than I had known from reports I had read in Washington, as it extends from Hongkong to Peking. Col. Smith showed me his communications set-up, a copy of which Mr. Knollenberg is taking back to Washington. (I want to see this again back there).

AGFETS has 30 weather reporting stations. He helps the Air Force by reporting weather information, troop information, rail information, shipping information and stationary targets.

13. I was interested to see how the intelligence program is lining up with:

- a) The use of the Chinese Army contacts.
- b) Christian's business contacts.
- c) The FRODOX contacts.
- d) The EAGLE contacts.

April 7:

14. SSO: Col. Heppner, Col. Doering and I discussed the importance of screening personnel, male and female, for CT. We also discussed the responsibility of assessment.

15. X-2: Lt. Thurston outlined the X-2 work. He has 7 functioning field stations directed by Americans who operate agents. They seem to be doing excellent work both in their field and in special studies. When I get home I would like to contact X-2 regarding these studies.  
We operate independently of the British and Chinese under cover of CIC.

15. SAT: I visited the Country House with Major Handy and Capt. Nehring. They are to move from there to another location about 150 miles south of Kuming.

Their training is primarily for Americans sent over from the States. (This raises a question of coordination of Catalina training and China orientation). They also train some Chinese, primarily for Communications. Most of the agents' training will be done at forward bases.

There will be no assessment school but the psychologists are going to do an "observation job" while the Commando Units are in training. They will also go forward to assist in the selection of agents.

16. MO: Gordon Auchincloss told me of his plan for the 500-watt station. The program is due to start next week. It is primarily True News purported to come from the Chinese. It is directed against one city. The program lasts 7 minutes and is broadcast 3 times a day.



Each Branch Chief reported on the status of his work. Col. Heppner read a directive setting-up the forward field commands. For the present there will be two - Hsian for North of the Yangtze and Chihkiang for South of the river. The QUAIL project is handled out of Szemao.

In the evening I attended a dinner party given for the Army and Navy Medical Officers in Kunming.

April 5:

8. Operations Officer: Col. Davis acts as chairman of the OFSCOM and as Operations Officer. He outlined the following SO operations:

IOWA Project - for the area south of the Yangtze  
YAK Project - for the area North of the Yangtze  
Theater request for help at HSIAN  
Northeast China Reconnaissance

IOWA will have 9 teams reporting to Mansfield. These teams are made up of 4 American officers who arm 100 - 150 guerillas. Their primary task is to cut communications. Under IOWA there will also be teams working with the Chinese general Army.

The OG's are to organize 20 Command Units of 200 men (T/O 170) The First Chinese Parachute Regiment of 1300 has been supplied for the nucleus of this operation.

The FIC situation is very unclear as to policy.

Field Photographic is doing an excellent job closely connected with operations. (AKRON Project and photographing other areas that are about to be overrun).

9. MO: Mr. Dulin has 32 people of whom 6 are in Kunming. He needs administrative and Services personnel very badly.

There are 4 field MO outposts south of the Yangtze. A new project is up for an operation of 8 people at HSIAN (CENTUS).

Lt. Auchincloss has a 500 watt station operating now and will shortly have a 7 1/2 kw.


Printing can all be arranged for locally. There is no need for printing equipment and printers from home. Washington creative work tends to be directed too much toward the home front.

Mr. Dulin discussed the Rodney Gilbert River Plan.

Mr. Dulin has the most realistic attitude on MO activities. I am particularly enthusiastic about his High Echelon work, using Kaji, POW's and Misci. I feel that there is areal opportunity for MO along these lines here.

Mr. Dulin said he could make a 500 watt station available to SACO as soon as he gets a program director. He feels that we are committed to this.

HEADQUARTERS  
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
CHINA DIVISION



AFO

SUBJECT: Notes on Visit to Kunning  
TO : Mr. Kenneth Hinks, Manning Board, OCS, Washington, D. C.

April 3:

- 1. Left Calcutta arriving Kunning 1630.
- 2. The Strategic Services Officer, Colonel Hopper, outlined his organization. My initial impression was that it is the best organized unit I had visited. It is much more active than I had realized.

April 4:

3. Intelligence Officer: Col. Whitaker is to be stationed in Chungking, his job will be intelligence liaison. He will be responsible for supervising and setting-up intelligence targets.

He takes it as his first responsibility to carry out the program for the penetration of Japan's inner zone.

He emphasized the need for services personnel, Communications personnel and good, young, strong men without too much rank.

4. SI: Col. Helliwell outlined his organization and procedures. It is an excellent set-up and I was very much impressed.

He needs 675 people of whom only 30 or 40 will be in HQ at Kunning.

All reporting is centered in Kunning.

We discussed the following projects: MAOLM, PHOENIX, QUAIL, NORTH CHINA.

5. Reporting Board: Mr. Smith went over the work of the Reporting Board with me. The Intelligence Officers get out the daily REPORT. The Reporting Board gets out the regular intelligence reports.

6. SI-CHI: Capt. Brown told me of his CHI work.

7. OPBOOM Meeting: Col. Davis presided. 10 key men were present. They discussed a rough plan and agreed that they would be worked up for submission to the Committee in final form.

The SI plans are a model of field planning. I want to get hold of copies of MAOLM, etc. when I get back to Washington.

4. SI

Major Chartrand does not ~~authorize~~ <sup>supervise</sup> SI work.

5. REPORTS

Pvt. Howell will follow our programs for future reporting.

6. X-2

Major Helfrich told me of his X-2 work, particularly with the AFL and the CIO.

7. AIR OBJECTIVES

Lt. Reardon has 17 planes, his own strip, his own mechanics, and no losses.

8. CONA

Lt. Niemczyk keeps the records for native personnel.

9. R&A

Captain Owen outlined the dissemination procedure. (a) Relay of cables. (b) Daily evaluation. (c) Relay to Kandy. (d) Weekly reports. Captain Owen had worked with Ted Ryan and is particularly interested in air targets.

10. AFL

I talked with Maung Shee, 28 years old, graduate of Baptist high school, local politician, who described the work of the league.

Spent the day at the Chinese and American consulates and visited with Col. Coffee.

SECRET

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## 3. OGD

Mr. Reuchine described the OGD setup and the cooperation with the corresponding British organization.

SO Marsh

## 1. MO

Major Hamm covered the following points with me: (a) Most MO is tactical. (b) They are short of personnel. (c) They have no use for theorists. NOTE: I took the plane to Bhamo on the 30th. Major Hamm was on the plane and visited with him.

2. *Pla* - 101

Captain Cox outlined: (a) The method of processing intelligence. (b) Interrogation work. (c) Map work. (d) Study of Jap equipment. (e) Target designation. Ten out of 18 air force targets were OGS designation.

## 3. COMMUNICATIONS

I went through the Communications setup and learned particularly about the valuable use of pigeons.

Black Marsh

Commanding Officer - Col. Peers reviewed his organization setup, the work of SI, work of OGS, and evaluation of MO, his shortage of air plane parts, and his shortage of supply personnel.

## 1. MO - Bhamo

Major Boldt covered the following points: (a) The informer campaign. (b) The Jap surrender order distributed by briefcase and courier. (c) Front line soldier campaign. (d) Black news. Staff meeting NOAC - Col. Briedster conducted the meeting on March 31st and on April 1st.

## 2. PLANS STAFF

Major Cummings told me how they wrote up their plans and initiated their operations. He would like to see our overall program.

## 3. OPERO

Major Ornes told me of their operation activities. They brought in three Jap prisoners that day.

SECRET

Page 3

Col. Van der Hoff is to go to Delhi on "classical reporting".  
There is real opportunity for this provided it is done with prejudice.

27 March

Left Colombo at 6.00 o'clock. Reached Calcutta at 8.00 o'clock.  
Met with Col. Doering who is on his way to Kandy.

28 March

## 1. SUPPLY OFFICER

Captain Hook showed me the following: (a) His excellent control  
of catalog supplies. (b) the six MO trucks (GAMA)

## 2. AIR LIAISON

Lt. Volck explained his liaison work.

## 3. SI - Kandy

Major Reeda outlined the SI setup, covered specifically the  
following: (a) the work of the area desk. (b) the contacting  
officers. (c) The reports board, (I am attaching the weekly  
intelligence summary) (d) there is no definite intelligence  
~~procedure~~ procedure but the planning board is doing some work on  
it. (e) relationships with the British (in Malaya, original ideas,  
important missions). *Target*

## 4. REPRODUCTION

Lt. Caldwell showed me the Reproduction and R&A units. A  
very large part of the reproduction work is for MO.

## 5. MO

Dr. Tolberg told me of the many plans set up for MO in this  
Theater.

29 March

## 1. X-2

Major White reviewed the security work X-2 has done and the  
future liaison work. He covered particularly the activation with  
the Chinese.

## 2. COMMUNICATIONS

Major Miller took me through the Communications building.

## 3. C&amp;D

**SECRET**

HEADQUARTERS  
 OSS-SU DETACHMENT 605  
 FORMERLY  
 BRANCH HEADQUARTERS  
 OSS-SU DETACHMENT 101  
 APO 465

9 April 1945

TO: Mr. Kenneth Hinks  
 FROM: OSS SU Detachment 605, APO 465  
 SUBJECT: 8th Memorandum of Notes on Trip

26 March

1. R&A

Dr. DuBois reviewed with me her expanding program of political reporting. We discussed the dangers of being involved in crusades. We drove to Galle. *Trial*

2. MU - Galle

Major Clark, Commandant, Captain Camp, Commanding Officer London Group of swimmers, and Capt. Lamberton met with us. Capt. Lamberton covered the following points:

- a. There should be a greater use of the swimmers for the things they are trained to do. This means that someone should be planning operations for the swimmers.
- b. There should be a single command of the swimmers not two groups.

3. AIR OPERATIONS

Major Karcher told me that no one here had ever been able to explain what the Stratmeyer Project was. He is using all of his officers for liaison and for escorting.

Lord Louis was keenly interested in the blind bombing film worked out by the Planning Staff. This project is still alive.

4. FIELD PHOTOGRAPHIC

Lt. Norton discussed the IPDP Project with me. This is held up since it seems inadvisable to jeopardize other operations by undertaking this without full authority.

5. ASSISTANT INTELLIGENCE OFFICER - Delhi

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but of sufficient interest to warrant its inclusion in the report. Such materials may be presented in appendices. For example:

- a. Intelligence -- Escorting Officers often will have procured items of information during their participation in the air or S/M sortie -- shipping and enemy defenses sighted, information given by prisoners taken aboard S/M, etc.
- b. Medical information -- matters of special interest to the Medical Branch, such as nature and degree of insect life encountered, food deficiencies, etc.
- c. Maps and photographs.

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- 3 -

**5. Narrative****CONFIDENTIAL**

The Reporting Officer should tell the story of the actual operation at whatever length and in whatever way he finds natural. (Most Reporting Officers have chosen to write this narrative in the form of a log, giving dates and times of events during the course of the operation.)

**6. Results**

The Reporting Officer should provide a concise statement of objectives achieved by the operation, and make note of any failures.

**7. Comments and Recommendations**

From the point of view of future operational success this is the most important part of the report, and thought should be given to its preparation. Comments and recommendations should be written from the point of view of insuring better planning, better equipment and supplies, better personnel for future missions. Excellencies as well as deficiencies should be indicated.

Comments and recommendations might be organized as follows:

a. The plan -- indicate any parts of the Operational Plan, particularly the Signal Plan, which proved impractical or inept; indicate any features of the plan which proved particularly valuable.

b. Personnel -- indicate deficiencies in training and aspects of training which may have proved especially effective. Include special recommendations for individual members of the party.

c. Equipment -- State deficiencies and excellencies and make recommendations for future missions.

**8. Appendices**

The Reporting Officer may not wish to obscure his narrative by the inclusion of detail which is irrelevant to the actual execution of the operation.

**CONFIDENTIAL**



- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

The objectives of the operation should be listed briefly. (Refer to Dispatch Order and/or Operational Plan to insure completeness of statements.) The Escorting Officer will state only the objectives of his particular phase of the operation.

## 2. Personnel

a. Personnel should be listed in two groups:

- (1) Escorting personnel, who proceeded to the point of infiltration and then returned to base;
- (2) Operational personnel, who were infiltrated.

b. Rank and corps of military personnel should be shown; nationality and operational function of native agents should be indicated.

## 3. Equipment

Only a summary statement is necessary, listing the principal items of equipment taken along; (for example: ICR, electric motors, miscellaneous small boat gear, etc.) A complete list of supplies and equipment is not desired. In addition, state the approximate total weight of the supplies and equipment transported.

## 4. Transportation and Departure

a. State the type of the transporting craft and the names of its commanding personnel.

- (1) In the case of S/M transport, state the name of the S/M and its Commanding Officer;
- (2) In the case of air transport, state the Air Force and Squadron involved, the Squadron Commander, and the number of sorties assigned to the operation.

## b. Departure

State date, time, and place.

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OPERATIONAL REPORT

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A. Purpose and Procedure

1. The Operational Report is designed (1) to provide OSS, Washington, and the Chief and Operations Committee, OSS/SEAC, with a clear and complete account of how an operation is executed; and (2) to provide the Operational Planning Officer with a critical evaluation of the operation for purposes of future planning.
2. The full Operational Report will comprise separate reports by the Escorting Officer, the Conducting Officer, the Commanding Officer of the operation (if he does not serve either of the first two functions), and any other appropriate members of the escorting or operational parties.
3. The Operational Report is a Top Secret document. Each of its component parts will be prepared in five copies, four to be forwarded to the Operational Planning Office by the Reporting Officer's Branch Chief, one to be retained in the Branch's files. (Since a copy of the full Operational Report will always be available in the Registry and the Operational Planning Office, this fifth copy should be omitted if the Branch has no need therefore.) The Operational Planning Officer will compile the reports under one cover, adding any supplementary comments he may deem appropriate and forward the four copies of the full Operational Report to the Chief of Mission, and distribution will be as follows:  
 Original: OSS, Washington  
 Copies: Chief of Mission and then Registry  
 Operational Planning Office  
 Branch responsible for operation

B. Content

1. Statement of Objectives

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(c) Distribution of materials through agents from Rome.

(d) Distribution of materials through Force 136.

Plans and Operations Officer-SI. Captain Koke explained his work controlling conducting officers in SI. (Col. Coughlin is considering transferring Koke from SI to Scofield. The Conducting Officers, however, will remain in SI.)

OSD. Scofield reviewed with me the forms for various plans in this Theater. It is an excellent setup and I want to review it with the Planning Staff when I get back.

Communications. Major Compton outlined the Communications setup.

"P" Division. I talked with Colonel Berno, the American representative on "P" Division. The discussion covered particularly:

(a) The relationships with the British for various areas in SEAC.

(b) How far we should go with operations versus intelligence in various areas.

I am convinced that our programs must help clarify these situations. Colonel Berno, although he had been SSO, had never heard of the Over-all and Special Programs nor the field manuals.

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3. On the other hand, in this area simple projects must be developed for effective use of agents who are rejected because they are not up to the projects for which they are recruited.

Assessment School. I was very interested in the work Dr. Ballachy and Dr. Hudson are doing and Dr. Ballachy's attitude toward it. Under Dr. Lyman there was a three weeks training and observation period. Dr. Ballachy felt that this was a waste of time so has shortened the observation period to four days. If the man can be sized up by test in four days, then the assessment program has possibilities. If not, it is no better than observation under training. Dr. Ballachy recognizes the whole project as experimental.

Col. Coughlin is considering transferring this observation program to Calcutta where the men will be observed immediately after recruitment. This makes sense to me.

We returned to Kandy, arriving about 5:00.

~~Under~~  
~~File March~~

Strategic Services Officer. Colonel Coughlin and I reviewed an administrative problem concerning the control of funds. We also discussed a number of matters for which the Over-all Program should provide the answers.

Insights Officer. Mr. Warner had not seen the Over-all and Special Programs. He has agreed to report by Special Programs in the future. I assured him that a new Over-all and Special Program would be here shortly.

He asked me about the history. It seems that in this Theater, as elsewhere, one is clear as to what is to go into the history or who is to do it. For example: he will probably be the historian but he has never seen the memorandum sent out by Dr. Reed last September.

I am attaching an outline for an Operational Report which is being used in this Theater. It is very similar to the one I recommended to the Reports Committee in Washington.

22. Lt. Withrow covered the following points with me:

(a) The new 5 Kilowatt station provided by the British in Calcutta to carry news programs in Thai and Malay. The station is merely to out in before and after Japanese news programs. I was very pleased to see how simple and specific the operation is.

(b) Distribution of materials through the line in the Arakan.

**SECRET**

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- (e) Forced withdrawal of X-2 activities from Ceylon.
- (f) Redefinition of X-2 work and new understanding with the British. No longer emphasis on security.
- (g) Special survey for future activities.

23rd March

R.A.A. Dr. DuBois outlined the work on targets and her attitude toward IPDP. The problem on IPDP is that it has not been thoroughly explained. Samples should be sent from Paris if this job is to be done effectively.

NYC. At 10:00 we drove to the "NY" Camp at Trincomalee, arriving there about 4:00. On the way we stopped at the SAC Headquarters. Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Wheeler was most complimentary about our work here and told how the British appreciated it.

NYC Camp. Captain Karr of Schools and Training showed us the Schools and Training Camp. I was impressed by the excellent setup and its administration.

British Base in Trincomalee. Captain Slaughter, head of the submarine flotilla, expressed great enthusiasm for OSS, offered any assistance he could. Col. Wilkinson confirmed there was an excellent relationship.

Captain Slaughter's main worry was that the submarine activities were not coordinated for rescue work with the 20th Bomber Command. He asked if OSS could help in this.

24th March

Training Officer, NYC Camp. Captain Gulp outlined the training situation to me, covering the following points:

- (a) The difficulties of training Agents--the importance of training aids in coaching.
- (b) The problem of training when Schools and Training does not know what the projects are.
- (c) The difficulties of handling poor agents. I drew these conclusions from my discussion:
  1. Agents must be charged to some individual with a check to make certain they are used within a reasonable time.
  2. Agents should be recruited and trained for specific projects.

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

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**22nd March**

**Ops.** Operations and Planning Staff. Dr. Scofield described the work of his staff. It goes far beyond planning and gets into the organizing and controlling. Graves and Barnette are with him but he needs more help. Helm is to transfer to China to work with Special Projects. (John Gardner would be an excellent man for Scof's staff--and the job would be worth while for him.)

**III.** Commander Pier outlined three activities:

- (a) the work of his 40 swimmers in the Arakan,
- (b) the work of his boats in the Arakan,
- (c) the agent training work at Trincomalee.

**Intelligence Officer.** Commander Taylor outlined the Intelligence setup. There is here, as in Company D, Florence, a problem of relationship with SI, Operations to a combined operation and planning control. (I am convinced that the form of organization is less important than the personnel and that sufficient leeway should be permitted to fit the form to the personnel on hand.) Taylor told me of the work we are doing for the Air Forces,

- (a) designating safe areas,
- (b) indicating targets,
- (c) reporting results.

**Planning Board.** Col. Coughlin, Col. Wilkinson, Commander Taylor, Dr. Daniels and Dr. Scofield met on a new Joint Planners Directive for "P" Division and for discussion of participation in the ROGER project. The discussion showed the need for clarification of our position with reference to various countries in the South East Asia Command. This should be clarified in the Over-all and Special Program.

**IV.** John McDonough covered a number of points with me:

- (a) Indian operations
- (b) X-2 surveys in strategic areas: Karachi, Bombay, Madras, Delhi, Calcutta, Assam.
- (c) Our semi "police" activities in Calcutta. (Work in Chinese areas and work in High Echelon areas.)
- (d) The new combined Intelligence setup in Kandy in which X-2 is the American representative.

**SECRET**

**SECRET****MEMORANDUM****SUBJECT:** 7th Memorandum of Notes on Trip.**TO :** Mr. Kenneth W. Minks  
Room 106 Central Building  
29th & E Streets, N.W.  
Washington, D.C.**20th March**

Started from New Delhi at 6:00, arrived at Calcutta at 2:00.

**MO.** Visited the MO setup with Lt. Withrow. Later discussed MO results with Col. Coughlin.

**MO House.** Visited with Col. Coughlin, Col. Harry Little, Major Farr, particularly on the Akyab project.

**21st March**

Up at 2:45 for 5:00 plane to Kandy with Col. Coughlin. Discussed a number of problems with him on the way, e.g., reclassification of an officer, women secretaries, assessment school.

**Headquarters, Colombo.** Inspected the well set up and well kept supply rooms with Col. Coughlin and Major MacDonald.

Lt. Ivacs took me through his reproduction setup.

**Recruiting.** Col. Coffey, a British Officer who helps us with recruiting of native personnel, reported a study he had made for Col. Coughlin covering problems of recruiting, handling and assessing of Asiatic agent personnel. It was one of the most helpful and revealing discussions I have experienced.

Arrived at the Bungalow at Kandy about 9:00; met General Timberman.


**22nd March**

**Staff Meeting.** Attended staff meeting at which Col. Coughlin gave an excellent summary of his field trip, covering

- (a) What he had learned about the future of American Force and OSS in SEAC,
- (b) The policies involved in the possible participation of OSS in the project I had heard planned in Delhi,
- (c) A summary of OSS activities in the Arakan.

**SECRET**

# POSITION OF OSS IN THEATER ORGANIZATION SIMPLIFIED





**SECRET**

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1st - Mr. McCarthy outlined our activities in India:

- (a) Getting experience
- (b) Contacts British couldn't make
- (c) Positive protective intelligence
- (d) Relations with British concerning agents

British Intelligence Services, India - Mr. McCarthy took me to meet Sir Denys Pilditch, Director of the Intelligence Bureau Home Department, Government of India. He also introduced me to Wm. McK. Wright, Head of the Combined Section; the Combined Section being a coordinating group composed of members of the Intelligence Bureau and people from the Office of the Director of Military Intelligence. Mr. Wright outlined briefly the measures and methods employed in their defense of India.

British Force Planners - Lt. Martin took me to dinner with the British Force Planners.

**SECRET**

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17 March - Surge Barracks, Delhi - Visited with Major Ryan, Captain Fogg and Lt. Fisher. They outlined the functions of OSS, Delhi:

- (a) Importance of liaison with Army Headquarters
- (b) Services, (Captain Fogg)
- (c) Importance of planning in the supply picture (Lt. Fisher)

The last MO personnel left Delhi today.

Note: When I return I want to talk to Ed Wilson about the possibility of his making available John Wilson's monthly News Letter to such Detachments as New Delhi.

18 March - Headquarters, IPT. Met with Major Ryan, Capt. Fogg and Lt. Martin at the Headquarters Office. Attended meeting with the three of them and Lt. Fisher on the plans and supplies for a special project about to be undertaken. Lt. Martin (Liaison with the Force Planners) covered the following points with me:

- (a) How he works with British Force Planners
- (b) His relationship to the Planning Section in Kandy
- (c) How he planned in the Arakan project
- (d) Our contribution in the Arakan project
- (e) What we can contribute which the British cannot contribute in the now proposed project (Intelligence branches, SI, H&A, X-2; CG's; MU; MO)

IDC - Major Nordbeck took me through the House at 38 Feroz Shah Road and told me of his IDC work. He asked me why our programs did not include IDC. When I return I want to inform myself more clearly as to the relationship of IDC and H&A.

Note: I am attaching a chart showing OSS's place in the Theater which was prepared by Lt. Martin. Since this Headquarters must explain OSS to the Theater Commander and his staff, on my return I should like to consider the possibility of supplying this Headquarters with copies of the Strategic Services Field Manual.

19 March - U.S. Liaison Office, China. Met with Colonel Patterson and Colonel Dickey. Colonel Dickey outlined to me the situation in China.

H&A - Captain Goelidge told me of the work H&A is doing. It is primarily concerned with collecting material for operations, particularly in the Arakan. We also discussed the situation on political reporting.

**SECRET**

**SECRET**HEADQUARTERS  
OSSEU DETACHMENT 503  
APO 885Z/Sent - 319  
MAR 31 1945

19 March 1945

MEMORANDUM TO KENNETH W. HINES:

Subject: Staff Memorandum of Notes for Reference on my return.

14 March - Enlisted Men's Billet, Cairo

Colonel Aldrich and I inspected the billet. It is well equipped and well kept. The Colonel takes a great interest in the enlisted men.

15 March - Was called to the airport at 1:20 a.m., the plane took off at 5:00 a.m. for Karachi.

16 March - Arrived Karachi 1:14 a.m., to bed at 3:30 a.m., up at 8:30.

X-2 Karachi - Mr. Lawson and Mr. Healey told me of their X-2 work covering:

- (a) Our work with the British (our contribution)
- (b) Our work on the Chinese
- (c) Our agent work (15) and results to date
- (d) Our methods of pay
- (e) Our positive intelligence protective work for U. S. Forces

Liaison with OSS Personnel - Mr. Healey met me at the airport and saw that I was well taken care of. My experience at the airport indicated certain needs:

- (a) Identification of OSS personnel and their positions (Krollenburg and Tollberg)
- (b) Security and destination (Major Moe)
- (c) Importance of assimilated rank
- (d) Briefing personnel as to what to expect

APW Hospital Karachi - Called on Miss Billie Aiken and Miss Joy Hamer. Both from MO Delhi. They explained their MO work.APW G. ATO, Karachi - Col. Gleason of SO China helpfully briefed me on certain aspects of the China operation.

17 March - I met Jaeger of Field Photographs and discussed a number of problems with him. Left Karachi at 8:20 for Delhi. Arrived Delhi 9:30 p.m.

**SECRET**

**CAIRO DISSEMINATION**

*Copy for Under-Thinker  
(by request)*

Office of Origin	Area Covered	Country	Number of Copies	Type of Intelligence and Remarks
CAIRO	Egypt	Cairo	2	Press, public opinion, etc. NO CONTROL copies. Egypt & Arab Union, NE DEVAL movements and Q.H. SI, RO, CIP, X-2
	Iran	Washington	1	
	Iraq	London	2	
	Lebanon	G-2	2	
	Palestine	Jicams	2	
	Saudi Arabia	CHI	1	
	Syria	W/Eg	1	
	Tyran Jordan	M/Eg	1	
	Turkey	BLD	6	
	Greece	Files	4	
ATHENS	Greece	G-2	2	Press, public opinion, etc. NO CONTROL copies. CIP, NO.
		Jicams	2	
		ORI	1	
CASEREA	Balkans and Central Europe	Files	2	OS - Not interested in YUGOSLAVIA, ALBANIA, ITALY, GERMANY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA.
		G-2	2	
		Jicams	1	
ISTANBUL	Balkans	Washington	2	S copies if control. 10 copies if on Greece. CIP, NO, ISTANBUL (return copy).
		London	2	
		Caserta	12	
		Athens	2	
		File	3	

\* Turkish and other Near East reports from Istanbul should be disseminated like Cairo reports - see above.

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14 March:

Reports Office: Miss Wendell outlined the reports procedure in Cairo. The duties vary slightly from some of the other offices:

- (a) Much of the editing is done by the Near East SI Desk.
- (b) Evaluation is primarily a desk responsibility.
- (c) Some materials are referred to R&A for comment.
- (d) Dissemination follows an agreed list which is attached.

Lastly, Reports, Cairo, does some processing and dissemination for Athens.

I discussed with Javelin at some length his activities.

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3.

12 March:

Africa/SI: Lt. Meader, the Africa/SI Liaison Officer, clarified for me the relationship of Africa/SI to Cairo:

(a) Lt. Meader gets intelligence direct from northeast Africa and makes it available to SI/Cairo for local dissemination.

(b) Intelligence from North Africa is made available in Casablanca to the military there. Copies are sent to Meader in Cairo.

(c) Intelligence from the remainder of Africa goes direct to Washington.

Director's Office: Lt. Beyer went over the over-all and special programs and the method of reporting.

13 March:

R&A: Lt. Seeley has two R&A "professionals" with him. At this time most of the work of R&A is the collection of materials for R&A/Washington. He commented on the excellent relationship existing between his organization and the corresponding men in the British organization.

Security: Capt. Kennedy and I went over a number of Security problems.

Staff Meeting: Col. Aldrich asked me to explain to his staff certain aspects of our programs and our relationship to the Semi-monthly Reports. The staff also questioned me about what should go into the history.

Port Said: Col. Aldrich and I drove to Port Said to interview one Gerry Sage, POW, whose capture was reported by AMET.

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2.

2) Paris seems to have been quite unaffected by the occupation. The people are gay, well clothed and well shod. The food shortages are not noticeable either in Paris or in the areas east.

3) The destruction in certain Belgian cities is terrible, but again the people look well fed and there is ~~no~~ evidence of food shortages for children and babies during the German occupation. I was interested that R&A's ~~intelligence~~ (Kaplan's) confirmed this point.

4) The destruction in southern Italy, the poverty and the apparent hunger are beyond belief. Rome seems unaffected by the war. The Italians in southern Italy are doing little to rebuild, but in the northeast part, behind the Eighth Army, they are energetically rebuilding roads, bridges and towns.

10 March:

Arrived in Cairo.

Director's Office: Met with Col. Aldrich and Capt. Houston, who outlined the reduced organization and its work. They have a streamlined set-up which is functioning ~~quite~~ <sup>very</sup> well.

11 March:

Director's Office: Col. Aldrich and Capt. Houston introduced me to General Ritter, Chief of Staff, AMET. We had a nice visit. Capt. Houston took me through the Hq organization.

12 March:

SI/Isak: Mr. Leary covered with me the following points:

- (1) His relationships to SI/Greece and SI/Istanbul.
- (2) His relationship to Africa/SI.
- (3) His handling of agents in the Near East.
- (4) His Reports system.
- (5) His determination of intelligence objectives.

SI/Iran and Iraq: Lt. Daren discussed with me our activities in Iran and Iraq, particularly explaining why we collect the type of intelligence we do.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
U. S. ARMY FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

12 March 1945

MEMORANDUMTO : Commander Kenneth W. Hinks  
SUBJECT: Notes on MTO and AMET6, 7 and 8 March:

Maj. Carpenter sent me to Capri for two days to get over a cold. It is a beautiful place and we have a well managed set-up. The trip gave me an opportunity to visit with Capt. Fortunata, SI/Italy, Lt. Merde, MO, Sgt. Hobson, from Jugoslavia, and Miss Malbin and Mr. Mully of Reports.

9 March:

Returned to Caserta.

Staff Meeting: Attended the staff meeting on the Sunrise Project. Col. Glavin outlined the problem and the lines of action were set down.

Director's Office: Col. Glavin explained the new AFHQ order which makes OSS responsible directly to General McNarney and his staff and no longer under G-3, METOUSA. We were unable to find a copy of the Basic Field Manual. When I return, I should like to consider arranging for MTO to get an additional copy.

Col. Glavin outlined three proposed MO activities in northern Italy, two of which have now been killed, and the third is pending subject to authorization from the Fifteenth Army group.

Other Meetings: I had supplementary meetings with Maj. Newhouse, Col. ~~Wahl~~ and Mr. Ryan.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON MTO AND MTO

1) London and England have been greatly affected by the war. There is a noticeable shortage of man power in England -- no young men, either in uniform or out. The food and clothing situation is very bad.

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MO

I visited with Major Dewart in Rome..

Medical Services

I visited with Miss Seymour and Major Hill of Medical Services. Major Hill is making a study of the Italian medical Corps as part of our medical intelligence work.

March 4 -

Sunday I spent in bed with a slight temperature.

March 5 -

I returned to Caserta and spend the rest of the day in bed with a slight temperature. Major Carpenter of the Medical Department had just returned from Belgrade, where he is in contact with the Yugoslav Medical Corp and with the Russian Medical Corps.

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danger was that the partisan leaders wanted to establish themselves as leaders because they were friends with the Americans and wanted to keep this position post-war.

OSS Detachment - 8th Army

Captain Teale took me to the OSS detachments at Torley and at Rimini.

He has his own planes, which have been given him by the 8th Army. One is Italian with Italian pilots; two are German and they expect two more captured German planes.

Headquarters British 8th Army

Captain Randall of the Civil Liaison Staff of the British 3-2 has supervision over OSS and related activities. Here is an outline of our conversation: (1) OSS is responsible for contact with the partisans across the lines. Captain Randall feels that OSS has been most effective. He referred to a top secret report on the Bulow operation, which I want to study when I return to Washington. He has one 90 man there but does not want to work with SOE; (2) the Civil Liaison officers of the British Army are directly responsible for the partisans on this side of the lines. They do not use OSS for this as the 8th Army does. They have arranged to have the partisans incorporated in the Italian Army under their own leadership. Captain Randall feels that wherever we build up the partisans we must make some provision for maintaining discipline over them when they are over-run, or when peace comes. The partisans like the arrangement made by the British, according to Captain Teale; (3) Captain Randall said that the 8th Army is very "unorthodox", as all of the Staff officers, including the Chief of Staff, are reserves who have had their only military experience in Africa. He cited as an example their organizing of a commando group called "Popsies Private Army". 270 men, fully armed, are dropped behind enemy lines.

Captain Teale pointed out how the policy of the 8th Army had resulted in the Italians getting back to work very quickly.

March 3 -

We drove to Rome over Route 3. This part of Italy has suffered little from the war and extensive repairs have been undertaken.

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**SECRET**OSS 5th Army

I met with Major Abrignani (aged 24) - very capable - running an excellent show - primarily intelligence with the 5th Army.

March 2 -

MU Detachment with 8th Army

Lt. Kelly told me that the work the San Marco boys are doing for the 8th Army is primarily providing transportation.

I am attaching a newspaper account of one of the MU-OSS operations.

MO - Lt. Taquey

I had a visit with Lt. Taquey. Except for him, all others I talked to in Company D felt that the distribution of MO material through the lines by Bauerkraut had not been an effective operation.

R&A

Mr. Rockline: Mr. Rockline interviews prisoners of war. He says that only about 5% are belligerent Nazis now.

Reports Board

Lt. Barnes reviewed his reports system. It is best illustrated by the daily chart attached. The material for this must be in by 2 o'clock each day and is distributed by 4 o'clock. This is in addition to their regular intelligence reports forms.

G-3 - 15th A.G.

Colonel Lazar told me of the very good work done by Company D and the 5th Army Detachment. He emphasized that Sukling should have a promotion.

I was interested in his comment about the partisans... that the partisans were 5% zealots and 95% men who wanted to get out of working for the Germans. Lazar said the great

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work primarily on intelligence, but do some operations. Many of the teams work on strategic intelligence. There is no infiltration through the lines and back. All are dropped. Teams are put in by (a) XI, Company D. (b), 30, Company D, (c) 5th Army Detachment, (d) Fourth Corps Detachment, (e) Second Corps Detachment, and (f) Eighth Army Detachment.

A.G. All operations are cleared through Special Ops G-3, 16th

Holding Area, Cecina

Lt. Hartmeister has a house in Cecina for agents. He arranges for the flights. We drove to Cecina this afternoon and visited the house. Lt. Wolf also has a house in this area for the men recruited by Lt. Goff.

We visited the air field and saw the many planes available for dropping.

Packing Station - Rosignano

Captain Mathews has a well-stocked and well organized packing station.

March 1-

Fourth Corps Detachment

We visited the Fourth Corps Detachment at Ponte Mariana, north of Luca about 10 miles from enemy lines. Major Rosetti was up with some 270 partisans, putting them back in the line to hold a sector given up by the Brazilians.

Partisan Hospital, Pescio

Dr. Verzeano took me to the partisan hospital which OSS has supplied with medicines. AMO provided the building and the Italian army the doctors, and the Italian Red Cross the nurses.

We also visited the partisan rest area.

I met the Italian Minister for Occupied Areas and the partisan commander, Armando. Interestingly, they told me they wanted to be Allies - not co-belligerents.

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areas through Italian sources. They have several men who are not id entified with OSS.

X-2

I spent a most profitable two hours with Lt. Angleton. He outlined the work he is doing (a) in northern Italy, (b) the SOI Unit at the front and in Rome (c) the Japanese work (d) the "Dagger" project. When I get home, I want to study one of his 270 "Keys".

Lt. Angleton wants to go to China when the job is finished here.

Communications

I visited the Communications setup, since Rome is to be the main communications center for MEDTO.

February 27

Drove to Florence, arriving there early afternoon.

Company D

Major Suhling explained his organization. His rough charts are attached. He is doing a job I would be proud of. I was interested in his problems of organization. Some time I hope we can develop a manual for field detachments, helping to clarify the relationships between branches. Major Suhling, Major Borden, Commander McGovern and I spend the evening together.

February 28

Staff Meeting - Company D

Major Suhling had all his branch chiefs together to discuss plans for activities, should Germany collapse. Roughly, the plans were: (1) Suhling would go into Austria with the 15th A.G. or its successor. The detachments with the 5th and 8th would follow the Army Headquarters. A base would remain at Florence to clean up Italy.

I was particularly impressed with the work being done by Lt. Goff who is working with resistance groups.

Operations

Major Smith, Operations Officer, described the teams in northern Italy. There are many more than I realized. They

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25 February:

En route to Rome. Drove to Rome by way of Casino, where the destruction is beyond belief. The Italians are doing little to rebuild. Lt. Kaplan of R&A, Food Economist for the Balkans, drove with me and told me of the studies he was making of the food situation in the eastern Balkans for G-5 (particularly as a supply for Vienna).

We arrived in Rome at 1:30.

MO

Gene Warner explained the MO activities. They are very impressive. I was particularly interested in his comment to the effect that they have distributed some 16 million pieces since they moved to Rome six months ago and have distributed 1 million this past month. He rated the importance of his distribution in the following order: (1) supplying newspapers, leaflets and stickers for distribution by partisans in northern Italy; (2) distribution in Germany by the "Mail Bag" project. I had not heard of this in Washington; it is one of the most interesting MO developments; (3) distribution by the Sauerkraut agents (he rated this less important than the other two). Warner is anxious to continue MO into post-hostilities and peace.

MU

I visited the RAD reproduction plant which seems to be doing very good work.

26 February:

R&A

Lt. Conley outlined the R & A activities for me. These are very much as covered by Major Hughes in his report in Washington.

MO

Gene Warner took me through his very efficient printing plant.

SI

Lt. Bisceglia and Capt. Caputa reviewed the SI activities covering the operational activities in northern Italy, political activities, political reporting on northern Italy and on liberated Italy and, lastly, reporting on other

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Yugoslavia. I talked to Major Lindsay, who has just returned from Yugoslavia. I should like to read his report when I get back to Washington.

X-1: Major Erdwurm has excellent relations with the other branches in this Theater, certainly the X-2 One Harmony has been well established.

Feb. 24 -

Assistant Intelligence Officer. I visited with Colonel Rosen, who is giving up the intelligence work to go up to the forward bases.

R&A. I visited with Captain Hite. He has the following R&A personnel here: (1) several men making maps with the Reports Board; (2) four men who work with Field Photographic, with the IPDP; (3) he himself disseminates R&A reports in Caserta.

He has no personnel making studies in this area.

SI: Colonel Maddox took me through SI and introduced me to Mr. Cox and Major Flues. I studied a very excellent document prepared for the Budapest team, called "Program of Intelligence Requirements, BDPTOU", dated 2 November 1944. This gives in great detail instructions as to the type of intelligence wanted in Budapest. We went over the SI picture in this Theater. He gave me a copy of his report on SI Branch MEDTO at Beginning of 1945". This is an extremely helpful document.

R&D: Major Keller described the work of R&D in this Theater. I had not realized that R&D was doing so thorough a job on selling its secret weapons in the Theater.

OO: Colonel Bislaski told me that they have some 200 Italian OO's at Siena. Only a few are on operational work in enemy country.

PWN: I spend the evening with Don Menfie and with Jim Lihen of OWI. PWN is giving up all activities in liberated Italy and will concentrate against the enemy. OWI and MOI will work independently in liberated Italy. OWI takes over five OSS people, leaving Menfie and four others with PWN.

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I was particularly interested in his criticism of our over-all and special programs in that they were not sufficiently specific in preventing our duplication of the work of other government agencies. I believe this same opinion was shared by Glavin and Newhouse.

6. Operations. - Lt. Klowan told me that the Operations Office heads up SO, Schools and Training, Field Photographic, MU, and Ops Supply. The points I am particularly interested in are:

(1) SO teams in north Italy do a lot of intelligence work for which they are briefed by SI. SI teams in turn are briefed by SO for special operations.

(2) The Field Photographic project on strategic areas is a big one and apparently R&A is not yet equipped to work with Field Photographic on it. (omit?)

(3) MU is being discontinued. One craft had an accident and the other is being shipped to SEAC.

7. SICE. Colonel Chapin outlined the work they are doing on the penetration of Austria. They got a complete go-ahead on this yesterday. They seem to have a very practical set-up.

(a) Penetration by Germans headed up to Colonel McCullough.

(b) Penetration by French officers headed up to DePiolenc (Q Section).

(c) Penetration by Communist groups out of Company D.

They are also working on penetration by Italian officers.

Colonel Chapin was most complimentary about the work of C&D in Bari.

All of this heads up at present in Bari, which is being transferred to Rosignano.

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Feb. 21 - En route to Caserta - spent the night at  
Marseille.

- Feb. 22 - Arrived at Caserta at 12:30.
  1. Executive Officer: Major Newhouse reviewed the activities in this Theater and lined up my program.
  2. We discussed the history problem and reporting. I admired very much the business-like way in which I have been taken care of since my arrival.
  3. SI. Commander Kats: We discussed his future work in ETO and his ideas for a permanent SI. He is keenly interested in the permanent organization.

February 23.

- 1. Directors Office. Glavin briefly reviewed his meetings in Washington on personnel and the comment he picked up on the Far East.
- 2. Personnel. - I talked with Lt. Gardner about his work. He is undoubtedly doing a very important job. Major Newhouse would hate to lose him.
- 3. PLOPS. - Captain Carleton outlined the operation of PLOPS. I was interested in the contrast between this operation and that in ETO. In this Theater there is no full-time planning staff but to a great degree the branches do their own planning under the guidance of PLOPS.
- 4. Executive Office and Secretariat. - I talked to Major Newhouse and Lt. Guy about reporting by special programs. Although there are difficulties and probably this cannot be undertaken fully until a new Secretariat or Reporting personnel comes out from Washington, Major Newhouse has given instructions that a summary report, by program, will be prepared once a month.
- 5. I also talked to Major Newhouse about the history project. As in ETO, this also needs clarification here.
- 6. Communications: Colonel Hero has planned communications far ahead for the situation in Germany after collapse.

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FEB 20 - PARIS.  
Liaison with DGR

Colonel Carter outlined the responsibilities as liaison with DGR.

He also told me of the work of the SMO French officers with the 3rd Army Divisions.

They infiltrate personnel for tactical information.

The HEBE project which the French are pushing would provide similar officers to interview returning French civilians. It is not certain that this project will go through.

SHAFT, PWD - Versailles

I tried unsuccessfully to reach Magary, McGranahan and Miller, formerly of the Planning Staff.

Miss.

I spent most of the day cleaning up matters before taking off to MCDTO tomorrow morning.

*Handwritten signature*

18 February 1945 - G-2 12th Army Group

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I met with Major Kirkpatrick, formerly of OSS, now Chief of SO Intelligence Section, G-2 12th Army Group. He is a most able man and has undoubtedly done much to make General Sibert appreciate OSS.

Lt Colonel Colby in command of OSS, 12th Army Group, outlined his program for dropping bodies into Germany.

Since the 12th Army Group is to play an increasingly important part in the groups of Germany, it seems to me that this headquarters should be one of our strongest. At present, it consists only of 3 officers. Lt Colonel Colby, Major Runkle and a Lieutenant.

Colonel Weaver, G-2 Air 12th Army Group, introduced me to his staff and told me of their work. He has 3 officers who were formerly with OSS on target work.

Major Kindlberger, formerly of R & A, now heads up the tactical target work, assisted by two R & A men, Lt Rose and Lt Bernstein. They determine supply and transport targets. Some of the excellent work to which OSS contributes is illustrated by the attached weekly intelligence summary.

Lt Colonel Challoross came up to Nurem from the 3rd Army. I was very much impressed with his intelligence and ability. He is putting numbers of agents through the line for tactical information and plans to drop more agents 30 to 40 miles behind the lines from planes.

Since I had heard very little of the work being done by the 3rd Army, I was also surprised to learn of the amount being done.

19 February - G-2, 12th Army Group - Nurem

I had a nice visit with General Sibert who is very much interested in our work.

Following this visit, I returned to Paris.

**SECRET**15 February 1945 - En Route to 7th Army

Lt Isaac of the Secretariat and I were driven to Reutenburg, Command Post for OSS 7th Army. We met the personnel at dinner in their headquarters which is a convent taken over for officer's quarters and officers. It is run by the nuns and is a modest and well-managed establishment.

16 February - CP/OSS/7th Army

Major Wentworth outlined the work of this detachment. We inspected Henry Hyde's operational headquarters and also the holding area. Hyde is doing the same outstanding job he did in North Africa. He is recruiting, training and dispatching agents into Germany. Some are sent through the lines, others are dropped from Lyon. The primary emphasis in the 7th Army is on agent penetration for strategic information.

I also visited with Major Crosby and the other members of the Staff. There are some 35 officers and 65 enlisted men.

17 February - G-2 7th Army

At CP/7th Army, Luneville, Colonel Quinn outlined the needs of the 7th Army. gave helpful information for penetration and followed Major Wentworth's report with great interest.

He told me of the excellent fighting of the US Japs with the 7th Army and urged us to consider them for SI and X-2 in the Far East. This was repeated by Colonel Bruskin (CIC) who said that now was the time for OSS to recruit Japs and Chinese who are now with the 7th Army. I do not know what higher policy is involved but I want to talk to Lt Antell about this.

Lt Carre, OSS Asst Intelligence officer, is an excellent liaison with Colonel Quinn and Colonel Peters (Deputy to Quinn). They seem to rely heavily on him. I am attaching a couple of reports he prepared for G-2 as a result of the work of our agents. The specific information had been requested by Colonel Quinn.

XVI. R&A

22. Mr. Deutsch and I continued our discussion of R&A. I am attaching a copy of the R&A memorandum on the Penetration of Germany. I want to go over this on my return.

XVII. PRESENTATIONS:

23. Colonel Gamble and M. Jor Black presented American decorations to the French members of the GUNEX team. It was a very impressive ceremony, greatly appreciated by the French, as they had not yet received similar honor from their own Government.

XVIII.

15 February 1945

24. I start today at 7:00 AM for a visit to 7th Army and 12th AG. Planning to return to Paris on Tuesday next.

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thualastic about the outline he showed me.

Field Photo will headquarter in Paris with only a liaison man in London.

13 February 1945

X. ST. GERMAINE HOLDING AREAS FOR I & SO.

16. I visited these areas, talked to Lt. Harris, in charge, and interviewed some of the men.

XI. R & A (HAROLD DEUTSCH)

17. Mr. Deutsch outlined R & A activities and went over a very interesting document he has prepared on R&A activities in Germany. I should like to get hold of this document from R&A on my return to Washington.

XII. FIELD PHOTOGRAPHIC

18. Lt. Kellogg, Lt. Amstutz, and Lt. Huguet took me to the headquarters of Field Photography and explained in detail the "FDP" project.

This is one of the best run shows I have witnessed -- beautifully planned and well carried out. I am sure that the techniques being worked out in Paris can be used effectively in other theatres.

They have made real progress on photographing ports and are out working on inland areas. They expect to be able to complete France within eleven (11) weeks and then be ready to go into Germany.

XIII. FIELD DETACHMENT SECTION

19. Major DAVID showed me the controls they have over the Field Detachments and how his office services the Field Detachments.

14 February 1945

XIV. X-2 Branch

20. I spent the morning with Jimmy Murphy at the X-2 Headquarters.

XV. SO BRANCH (MAJOR PERRY)

21. Major Perry has two officers with him -- Lt. Laucate, who is recruiting a few SO CALPO agents for sabotage and coup-de-main operations in Germany, and Lt. Hastings, who is cleaning up the SO activities in France.

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thru Doctor CARROLL, a member of the Board who is going forward with SHAEF. He helps determine SHAEF's needs and sees that they get the material.

I am attaching for my information, two memorandums on the Intelligence Objectives prepared by SHIA.

One of the greater advantages of the SHIA Reports Board is that it disseminates for both ST and NSA. The NSA dissemination covers only current reports. It does not include the regular NSA studies.

(A most valuable summary of OGI intelligence is included in the quarterly Report of the SHIA Reports Board, Paris, dated 12 January 1945. It is a TOP SECRET document which I want to study on my return)

VI. ST LABOR DESK (LT. JONES AND MR. WILSON)

12. The Forward Mission of the Labor Desk has been merged with the MO consultation of 12 AG to form the overall recruiting unit. The remaining functions of the Labor Desk are:

- a. Getting intelligence for HARRI (penetration data).
- b. Contacting emigrant groups for political reporting.
- c. Recruiting of personnel thru labor contacts in Paris.

VII. ST FRENCH DESK (MR. OJHSMEYER, MR. HAVILAND)

13. This desk handles the French agent personnel which is being sent to London for German penetration purposes. The personnel is obtained from the French Intelligence Services which are contacted by Lt. Colonel Carter.

VIII. ST GERMAN DESK (MR. ADAMS AND MR. BRING)

14. Their work likewise is that of taking care of personnel recruited for penetration of Germany. Doc. Adams made the suggestion that in interviewing returning OGS personnel, psychiatrists might effectively be used in the field as well as in Washington. This is something I would like to consider when I get back in connection with the reports of clear interviews, now being considered by the Reports Committee.

IX. FIELD PASTO (LT. KELLOGG, LT. SCHALBERG)

15. KELLOGG is most enthusiastic about the work being done by the Arrested Advance Survey Unit. I agree with him that every effort should be made to build this up for other theatres.

The second function of Field Pasto, WFO, will be to make a permanent record of outstanding OGS jobs.

Lt. Schalberg is working on the file (TOP SECRET) I was very en-

**SECRET**

become fluid again.

- (3) In evolving references and other civilians P/W later viewing it left to the reader.
- (4) Making available intelligence from all three sources to Q-2.

IV. MORALE OPERATIONS

- 7. MAJ's 12 AG work in penetrating the lines for propaganda purposes will be discontinued and the personnel used for recruiting agent personnel for all AG purposes.
- 8. Colonel Gamble was studying the planning group papers.

12 February 1945

V. S.I. (CMDR. GAMBLY)

- 9. The Commander outlined the work of SI in Paris. It is primarily:
  - a. Recruiting for London.
  - b. Liaison with the French services.
  - c. Working with the Field Detachments.

S.I. (MAJ. DODDGE AND CAPTAIN THOMSON)

10. MAJ. DODDGE and CAPT. THOMSON had a number of questions regarding the overall and special programs, post hostilities. They were particularly interested in the list of typical subjects for if as they felt such a list would help clarify their relationship to X-2. Doddge emphasized repeatedly the importance of such a document in planning ahead.

VI. STIA REPORTS BOARD (MAJ. HUTTON, MAJ. SHILKINER, CAPT. ROBERTSON)

11. I found this one of the most interesting things I have come into in this theatre. I believe there is much to be learned from the STIA experience. HUTTON is Chief, SHILKINER, of NSA, Deputy. SHILKINER heads up the Political Economic Section which has one NSA full-time man and has the use of other NSA personnel part time. This is extremely important when there is a shortage of expert personnel as for Germany.

The other section is the Military Section which comes under Captain ROBERTSON. The STIA Reports Board is doing an excellent job in liaison with SHILKINER.

**SECRET**



NOTES ON O.S.M. PARTS

**SECRET**

Memorandum: Kenneth W. Hinkle

11 Feb. 1945**I. SECRETARIAT**

1. I reviewed the activities of the Secretariat and the general set-up of OCS with Mr. Gady. We discussed:

- a. Reporting
- b. Programs

**II. BELGIAN MISSION:**

2. Lt. Colonel Oester told me of the activities of the Belgian Mission. I was interested to see that he was studying the overall and special programs, post hostilities, and the special program for German penetration.

3. In connection with the first paper, he pointed out that administrative decisions were necessary to implement it.

4. His only criticism of the German Penetration Program was that it came late. I emphasized that it had been in every program prepared in the last eighteen months.

**III. DIRECTION'S OFFICE:**

5. Colonel Gamble and I discussed the whole Paris set-up. He wants me to visit the Seventh Army and Twelfth Army Group.

6. We covered the following points in our discussion:

a. The Seventh Army set-up is more or less of a pattern operation. The men are responsible to Army Headquarters but are attached in some cases to divisional headquarters. He is opposed to making OCS responsible to divisional headquarters.

b. The Seventh Army OCS personnel perform the following functions:

- (1) Strategic Penetration: Heavy Hyde reports and plans the men behind the lines by plan. Colonel Gamble regards this as the most important work.
- (2) Tactical Penetration thru the Lines: This is of decreasing importance. May become more important if the lines

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3. Neither Colonel Roller nor Mr. Baldwin believe in short range penetration for NO purposes. The NO facilities on the continent will largely be devoted to recruiting personnel for deep penetration by all branches. NO has one team in Germany now and plans to put in another.

4. NO is making personnel available to ST for penetration in Germany.

5. Colonel Roller cabled General McClure that now was the time for MATCIBOX if it is to be used.

6. NO has found the P.C. suggested plans very helpful though none has been used as it was drawn up.

7. NO would find the Mittraux reports very useful.

16. NO Scandinavian Countries - I visited the combined SO/SOW Norwegian and Danish Headquarters in Oxford Square. I was convinced that this was a very worthwhile and well-managed operation, particularly the intelligence end of it from Denmark. I talked with Lt-Colonel Wilson of the British, Captain Brogger, Cdr. Vetlesen, Lt-Colonel Skabo and Major Winklehorn.

February 10

19. OPVAP - Colonel Forgan had talked to Colonel Jackson about using the objectives in planning group papers as an outline for operational planning and for reporting in this theater. OPVAP is taking on this problem. I talked to Colonel Jackson about controlling activities by preparing a control board which would state the objectives and summarize regularly all projects or other activities in implementation of each program. I believe this will be done and I am certain that the reports from this theater will give a complete picture of programs on each program.

20. OPVAP - Lt. Shaughnessy and I reviewed the work done by the various detachment in France.

21. Miscellaneous - I had short meetings with Lt-Colonel Pfeiffer and Mr. Brewer on their work on the continent.

22. Leave tomorrow for Paris.

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12. SO - Mr. Miller told me of the situation regarding the contact and supply of American prisoners of war, etc. in Germany. It seems that SHAEF may ask us to do something on this but that we probably will not have the personnel since much of our personnel has been transferred away.

13. MTO - Colonel Weil outlined to me the situation in MTO and suggested an itinerary for me.

14. Colonel Gable - Colonel Gable reviewed for me his trip to the Far East on which he was to determine the need for our plane squadrons in this theater. He felt that one might be used in Burma/India and one or two in China but the Air Forces refused to permit the transfer from ETO. I was interested in his explanation of the situation in China and the possibility of there being a base in north China reporting to Heppner in Chungking as well as a base in Kunming.

15. Director's Office - I met with Colonel Forgan and covered a number of points. Specifically:

1. I told the Colonel of the background for our overall and special program post hostilities and how this paper contemplated the main ETO Hq in Germany responsible to the Commanding Officer of American forces there. German activities might probably be under a Chief for Germany. London would become a sub-office and other countries might have missions reporting to the Strategic Services Officer/Germany.

2. We discussed the receiving and employment of personnel from the States in London.

3. Colonel Forgan has found the special German penetration program extremely helpful and is putting all his energy behind it.

16. General Meade and Colonel Howard - General Meade is head of Interior Affairs, USCCC; Colonel Howard head of Economics for USCCC. Colonel Howard, an old friend of mine in Germany, reviewed his plans for the Economic Division.

February 9

17. MO - I met with Colonel Roller and Mr. Baldwin. They outlined the present MO activities:

1. MATCHBOX will probably be broken up for a series of German programs over the radio time they have in England.

2. There will probably be an ETO addition of Neues Deutschland and this may be supported for a radio program.

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7. IRA - Mr. Allan Evans took me through the whole IRA organization. The outstanding points were:

1. The European Political Report which is gotten out each week is the main publication. There are practically no other studies being made in the form of reports. I feel that the Planning Group will be interested in seeing this summary.

2. Second work of the Political Economic Division is collecting of materials primarily for Washington. This involves, among other things, participation in the forces.

3. The third function is planning for the German operation. Further, IRA has gotten away from the position of being an "information service" for military governments. The Map Division is doing a lot of work preparing maps for US Group CC. The Map Division also collects and supplies maps for OSS in Washington.

4. The Economic Target work is gradually being cut down and Mr. Evans expects them to do very little on bomb damage.

8. GO - Gerry Miller reviewed with me the present GO activities against the Scandinavian countries and the proposed activities against Germany, including the proposed prisoner of war work.

February 7

9. I spent the day at Station Victor. It is certainly a well functioning unit and the enlisted personnel have an excellent set up.

February 8

10. Director's Office - I visited with Colonel Forgan about a number of matters. Pertaining to personnel, he feels that it is very important for the morale of our military personnel that they receive some recognition of their services. This comes back to the committee report I had prepared for Colonel Buxton in which I recommended that a letter of appreciation be written each man leaving OSS. I shall take it up again on my return. Colonel Forgan suggested that there might be a unit citation. For example, a station citation for the men at Victor all of whom want to get to France but who must stay here in order to support our agent work in Germany.

11. OP HU - I met with Captain Gossard and with Colonel Ram who took me through the Baker Street set up.

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Hq & Hq Detachment  
Office of Strategic Services  
European Theater of Operations  
UNITED STATES ARMY  
(Main)

AFPO 413  
9 February 1945

MEMORANDUM :

TO : Mr. Kenneth W. Hinks.

February 5

1. C&D and R&D - Lt-Col. Reddick, Omdr. Turnbull and Omdr. Jones explained the procedures of C&D and R&D. This is a well functioning composite unit. Omdr. Turnbull has prepared a paper dated January 1 outlining the procedures. This paper has been sent to Omdr. Morgan. It should be invaluable in preparing an operating manual for use in the Far East. Both Omdr. Turnbull and Colonel Reddick hope that they may set up their complete unit in the Far East, probably China, when Germany collapses as there is no possibility of their continuing such activities in this theater.

2. SI - I reviewed with Mr. Casey the SI organization and the SI plans for Germany.

3. Schools & Training - Captain Shine told me of the work of Areas 'O', Milwaukee and 'P'. I was interested that they have no assessment program in this theater but that Captain Shine has found the assessment work in Washington very helpful to him here.

4. Plans & Operations Staff - Among other subjects discussed, was the overall and special program for Germany post hostilities. The Staff asked why the U.S. Military Commander was emphasized so much. I pointed out that this document contemplated our serving not only military government but also the U.S. Military Commander. Again it raised a discussion as to our primary responsibility. Was it to the U.S. Military Commander as such or was it to US Group CC in Berlin?

February 6

5. Branch Chiefs Meeting - Mr. Norman Pearson discussed the plans for X-2, M15, M16 War Room.

6. X-2 - Mr. Norman Pearson outlined to me the X-2 activities from this theater. I am always impressed with the very professional job X-2 is doing.

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**SECRET**February 3

18. I went over some other matters with Colonel Forgan, particularly those concerned with the personnel for the penetration of Germany. I am sure he is going to make every effort to use German personnel from other Branches for SI intelligence purposes. We also reviewed the overall personnel problem as discussed in Washington. Colonel Forgan emphasized the same viewpoint expressed by Colonel Bruce, namely, that further major reduction in personnel could be effected by eliminating certain branches.

19. As Mr. Cheston requested I told Colonel Forgan of Captain Armour's promotion.

20. Lt. Winton of MO reviewed MO's activities. They are as follows:

a. The Steady-Lloyd team whose work has "bogged down" now that the lines are no longer fluid.

b. The MATCHBOX project growing out of a suggestion of the British but which has been held up.

c. The MO contribution to the British published German newspaper.

d. MO contribution to the British PANCAKE operation.

21. Lt. Winton tells me that MO has personnel which SI wants for the penetration of Germany but MO may not be able to part with them because of post hostilities plans developed by MO/Washington for Germany.

22. Lt-Colonel Lincoln and I have reviewed the history project and the preparation of War Diaries. The relationship of the War Diaries to the history project is confused so I am writing Colonel Deering about the history project.

United States

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and is going to work out some reporting method to conform to our ideas as requested in General Donovan's memorandum of 2 November 1944 which he had never seen.

10. Colonel Jackson has not seen the overall and special programs now covering ETO activities. Since he cannot find these programs it is very important to get the revised programs over as soon as possible.

11. Lt. Bastedo reviewed with me the plans for a mission to Germany. We discussed the place of OSS in US Group GQ versus its place on the theater staff when SHAEF is no longer in the picture. One of the main problems is going to be the relationship of the head of OSS/Germany to the head of OSS/ETO when, and if, the OSS HQ/ETO moves to Germany.

12. Lt. Dickinson and I went over the counter-sabotage work which is being done by the SOI Units with the various armies and with SHAEF.

February 1

13. Mr. Pratt had not seen the special program for the penetration of Germany. He is faced with a very serious problem of getting enough German speaking administrative personnel to carry out this program. He needs very badly the help of the SI/Germany Operations Officer in Washington who should take the initiative in getting such personnel.

14. Mr. Tepper and Mr. Sutton described in great detail to me the Bach Unit. It is a most interesting and impressive job. I feel that the Planning Staff should urge SI to work with it preparing an operating manual covering this function. The Bach Unit has forms and procedures developed in memoranda which will be very helpful and which I believe can be secured through Lt. Helms.

15. I met with Colonel Forgan and reported several messages which Mr. Cheston had given me.

February 2

16. I spent the day at Helms inspecting the Packing Station. This is an operation which I was very proud of. I was particularly interested in the care of the enlisted personnel. I do hope that both the packing station work and the Bach project referred to above will be covered in the history.

17. Dr. Callisen and I reviewed the intelligence objectives for the penetration of Germany and the nature of our intelligence work after the collapse of Germany. It is very important that we think as specifically as possible so that our men can be recruited and placed where they can get the type of information we need.

Hq & Hq Detachment  
Office of Strategic Services  
European Theater of Operations  
UNITED STATES ARMY  
(Main)

United States

**SECRET**

AFD 413  
2 February 1945.

MEMORANDUM :

TO : Mr. Kenneth W. Hinkle.

January 29 *LONDON*

1. Spent most of the day straightening out papers and living quarters.

January 30

2. Attended regular branch Chiefs meeting held once a week. Main topics of discussion were liaison with foreign governments and dissemination. A very helpful discussion.

3. Met with Hugh Wilson who explained what he is doing on two problems; (a) penetration of Germany and (b) intelligence objectives.

4. Reviewed organization with Lt-Colonel Brass.

5. Reviewed reporting Board with Mr. Gold. This Board has primary contact with "customers" on intelligence objectives.

6. Met with Dr. McLeod who explained what he is doing on intelligence objectives.

7. Attended Plans & Operations Staff meeting where main topics discussed were; (a) OSS Field Detachments, (b) Recruiting for German penetration and (c) Priorities for work of OSS Detachments (first priority strategic intelligence). Was very much impressed with the work of this staff in operational planning. The special German penetration plan and the post-hostilities plan arrived today and are being studied by the staff.

8. Reviewed personnel setup with Colonel Palmer, new Personnel officer, ETO.

JANUARY 31

9. Reviewed with Colonel Jackson the purpose of the overall and special programs and told him of our hope that we could follow progress on these programs through the regular reports. ~~United States~~ the idea

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Approved For Release 2013/09/25 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410005-4



- 5 -

**SECRET**

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"At Chungking there is a detachment where Colonel Heppner spends one week out of four in liaison with the Army. His Intelligence Officer, Colonel Whitaker, is located there for liaison with the Army intelligence agencies. Major Quentin Roosevelt is there as SI liaison primarily with the Chinese.

"At Kunning SI, R&A, X-2, SO, OG, and MO are represented, each with a strong branch chief and a good skeleton organization.

"I have sketched the organization in some detail to indicate that it is an important set-up and to emphasize the need for numbers of personnel and carefully selected personnel. The first problem is more people, but of equal importance is the necessity of getting the right people. Every person that goes into China is in a degree a burden on the organization there since he must be supported in large measure by transportation over the Hump. Practically nothing is available in China except that which comes over the Hump. This was brought home to me quite vividly by the arrival of 30 OGs who had driven over the Stilwell Road. They arrived after 12 days of driving with some 10 jeeps and 6 or 8 trucks. They looked tired, worn out. On the way over they had abandoned 5 new trucks which could not take the strain of the Stilwell Road. Colonel Heppner and Colonel Doering asked me to emphasize to this meeting the following points: (a) We must provide facilities for all the personnel that goes into China. Therefore, it is extremely important that we build up our services as quickly as possible, including medical services. (b) The operating personnel sent out there must be designed to do important work. There is no place in the China Theater for trivial operations. The effort of getting people there and for maintaining them is too great for this. (c) Every man that goes out should be scheduled to do important work. At the same time he should be equipped to do other jobs in case the specific job for which he is sent does not materialize."

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- 4 -

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## INDIA-BURMA --

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## CHINA --

(7) I summarized the situation in China at a staff meeting. Although I departed from my notes when talking at the meeting, the notes which I prepared for that talk present the situation as follows:

"Two weeks ago yesterday Colonel Doering and I climbed to a shrine well up on a mountain behind Kunming. We were discussing the OSS problem in China. Col. Doering said that the problem reminded him of a diver at the end of an air line, the diver being completely dependent upon what went through that line. That is a very good description of the situation as it is for OSS in China. I am convinced that we have a wonderful opportunity for effective work in that theater.

"The Army is looking to us for help. To a surprising degree the Army is depending upon us.

"I found in China an excellent organization, headed at Kunming by Colonel Heppner. He spends three weeks out of every four in Kunming.

"He has a two-area field headquarters, one at Haian and the other at Chihkiang. Haian, under Major Krause, is responsible for all OSS operations north of the Yangtze. Chihkiang, under Colonel Smith, is responsible for OSS activities south of the Yangtze. Each of these area field headquarters has sub-bases well behind enemy lines.

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General Observations

ETO --

(1) I was very much impressed by the results of our operations. This impression was confirmed by the very complimentary comments from General Sibert, General Meade, Colonel Quinn, and other Army officers.

(2) There is in ETO experienced personnel which should insure success for our operations in China. Such personnel should be made available at the earliest possible time.

(3) In ETO many excellent procedures have been standardized; for example, the development of cover and providing of documents for agents, packing station operations, Reporting Board procedures. The experience represented in these established procedures can be very beneficial to the Far East.

ETO --

(4) The same comments which apply to ETO also apply to MTO. Especially I should like to comment on the effectiveness of the work done by Major Suhling's Company D, Major Abrignani's detachment with the 5th Army, and Captain Thiele's detachment with the 8th Army. Both Abrignani and Thiele can contribute to the operations in the Far East when they can be spared.

AMET --

(5) OSS/Cairo is doing an outstanding job in the difficult transition period from war conditions to peacetime conditions.

**SECRET**

- 2 -

**SECRET**

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- February 22-24: Caserta. OSS Headquarters.
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- March 15: (enroute Karachi)
- March 16, 17: Karachi. X-2 Office.
- March 18, 19: Delhi. OSS Headquarters; G-2; IN; G-2, China.
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- March 21-26: Kandy, Trincomalee, Colombo, and Galle, OSS Activities.
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- March 30-April 1: Niamey. OSS Headquarters; NOAC Headquarters.
- April 2: Calcutta. OSS Headquarters.
- April 3-12: Kuming. OSS Headquarters; including outside areas.
- April 12-19: Returning to Washington.

**SECRET**

40-

**SECRET**

16 709

*Field copy  
x Hinks*

30 April 1945

**TO:** General William J. Donovan  
**FROM:** Kenneth W. Hinks  
**SUBJECT:** Overseas Trip

Summary of trip

I dictated a report each day which was addressed to me in Washington, so there is on file a complete record of my itinerary and observations. The following memorandum is a short summary of highlights.

Itinerary

I departed from Washington January 27, arrived London January 29. My itinerary from then on was:

January 29-February 10: London. OSS Headquarters; SOE Headquarters; Communications at Henley; Packing Station at Holme.

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February 19: Namur. G-2, 12th Army Group.

February 20: Versailles. PWB, SHAEF.

**SECRET**

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES PLANNING

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: General William J. Donovan  
FROM: Kennett W. Hinkle  
SUBJECT: *EWJH*

DATE: 14 May 1946

*16709*  
*Hotel Report*  
*Hinkle, K.W.*  
*5/17/46*  
*16709*

I am attaching the memoranda I dictated to myself each day while I was away. These are in exactly the form in which they left the theater and were received here. I did not re-edit the notes as I felt in their original form they are somewhat more revealing than in an edited form.

*Notes H Reports on WJD*  
*Return to*  
*✓*

APR 18 1946  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

- 5 -

**SECRET**

"There is a sub-base at Szemao reporting direct to Kunming. That sub-base services Indo-China.

"At Chungking there is a detachment where Colonel Heppner spends one week out of four in liaison with the Army. His Intelligence Officer, Colonel Whitaker, is located there for liaison with the Army intelligence agencies. Major Quentin Roosevelt is there as SI liaison primarily with the Chinese.

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**SECRET**



- 3 -

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**SECRET**

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

30 April 1948

16709  
Hotel Report  
**SECRET**

X Hinks  
X Planning Staff

TO: General William J. Donovan  
FROM: Kennett W. Hinks  
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
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February 19: Namur. G-2, 12th Army Group.

February 20: Versailles. PWB, SRAEP.

**SECRET**



CONFIDENTIAL

-- 2 --

Under the circumstances no specific difficulties were encountered.

H. L. Shepard  
Major, G.E.

CONFIDENTIAL

25 April 1945

**MEMORANDUM**

**TO:** The Director, OSS

**THRU:** Chief, SO Branch, and  
The Secretariat, in turn.

**SUBJECT:** Report of Returning Personnel

The following report is submitted in compliance with General Order No. 63, dated 14 March 1945.

On 25 December 1944, I left the United States, by air transport, for the ETO under orders to report to the London office for permanent duty.

It was originally intended that while in the ETO I should act as technical advisor in a counter-sabotage organization then being developed to counter an anticipated large scale enemy sabotage program. Due to various circumstances, including the fact that the enemy did not launch the expected program, I had no duties while in the Theatre, with the exception of a very small amount of time spent in assisting in the collection of a few sabotage devices for a museum to be installed in the Paris office.

Due to the above described situation, I had no opportunity to observe the operations of OSS in the field and, therefore, am not in a position to offer constructive criticism or suggestions relative to such operations.

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

25 APRIL 1945

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**SUBJECT:** Report of Returning Personnel

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On 25 December 1944, I left the United States, by air transport, for the ETO under orders to report to the London office for permanent duty.

It was originally intended that while in the ETO I should act as technical advisor in a counter-sabotage organization then being developed to counter an anticipated large scale enemy sabotage program. Due to various circumstances, including the fact that the enemy did not launch the expected program, I had no duties while in the Theatre, with the exception of a very small amount of time spent in assisting in the collection of a few sabotage devices for a museum to be installed in the Paris office.

Due to the above described situation, I had no opportunity to observe the operations of OSS in the field and, therefore, am not in a position to offer constructive criticism or suggestions relative to such operations.

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-- 2 --

Under the circumstances no specific difficulties were encountered.

  
H. L. Shepard  
Major, U.E.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL 16,716

25 April 1945

*Field Report*  
*x Sheppard, Mr of H.L.*  
*x SO*  
*x ETO*

MEMORANDUM

TO: The Director, OSS  
THRU: Chief, SO Branch, and  
The Secretariat, in turn.  
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Form 1002a

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
**ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET**

10,714  
F. [unclear]

FROM:

Maj. Shepard


Accession No. ....

Date Rec'd SA .....

To	Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Rec'd.	Fwd'd.		
1. The Director				CSE	file
2. Lt. Duggan				[initials]	
3. <del>Kentels</del>		27 Apr		NCK	I find this can be handled just with [unclear] also.
4. DTP					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.  
 A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.  
 Officer Designations should be used in To column.  
 Each Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.  
 Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.  
 Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.  
 For officer Designations see separate sheet.

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Procurement and Supply  
Motor Transportation  
Administrative Services  
Reproduction  
Finance (Vouchered Funds)

4. Our present problem is one of liquidation of supplies and installations in the UK. Steps have been taken to amend AG 400 to permit OSS in ETO to turn in to the Army all property whether acquired from the Army or purchased from appropriated funds. Such an amendment is expected to become operative within a week and will be of great assistance to us in our liquidation proceedings. I have with me inventories of all OSS supplies in the ETO and am going over these lists with a FAR EAST representative to determine what supplies can be shipped to China. The balance will be returned to the Army prior to 1 July 1945, if possible.

5. Our relations with the Army in the ETO have been good and we do not anticipate any particular difficulties in connection with our operations on the Continent. Our present personnel is ample to handle the work expected of us and we intend to make a portion of our reproduction staff available for reassignment within a few weeks.

*Arthur B. Griffin, Jr.*  
Arthur B. Griffin, Jr.  
Major, QMC