

GERMANY
CONT'D

GERMANY
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Bombing
Darius
SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

CONFIDENTIAL

May 22, 1943

MEMORANDUM

To: General William J. Donovan
From: S. E. Gleason, Jr. *WJG*
Subject: Presentations in the War Room

Referring to your memorandum of May 20th,
I have already asked Mr. Coombs to write up his
extremely valuable report on the German Air Force.
I will send it to you as soon as it arrives. Mean-
while, I am attaching Private Kecker's report on the
RAF attack on the German dams.

Attachment

Copy to Sheppardson 5/30

SECRET

BLASTING OF WEST GERMAN DAMS

On the night of May 17 the RAF attacked three dams in western Germany: the Moehne, Sorpe, and Eder. The first of these is located on the Moehne River above its junction with the Ruhr River, which flows into the Rhine at Duisburg (58 miles west of the Moehne dam). The Sorpe dam is about eight miles south of the Moehne. These two dams are thus at the head, approximately, of the Ruhr Valley, in which important German heavy industries are situated; the cities of Dortmund, Duisburg, Essen, and Dusseldorf are in the area, below the Moehne and Sorpe dams. The Eder dam is located on the Eder River about 25 miles above its junction with the Fulda; the combined stream runs north to Kassel and eventually to Bremen as the Weser River. Flowing from Duisburg north and east to a point on the Weser River near Kassel is a portion of the Mittelland canal, which connects the Rhine with eastern German rivers which also run from south to north in general direction.

The three dams, Moehne, Sorpe, and Eder, built shortly before the War of 1914-1918, controlled about two thirds of the water-storage capacity of the area between Duisburg and Kassel; the supply of pure water which they regulated was important industrially and furnished household water for about 4,500,000 people. The Moehne dam was built largely for water supply purposes; the capacity of its reservoir has been estimated at 184,000,000 tons of water. A hydroelectric station was operated in connection with the dam; its capacity was 4,000 kilowatts, and it produced about 9,200,000 kilowatt hours annually. The Sorpe dam reservoir had a capacity of 200,000,000 tons of water. This water supply served to maintain the level of the Weser River and facilitate operation of portions of the Mittelland canal in this area. The Eder dam also regulated the flow of water to a series of power stations below the dam. The principal plant, at Waldeck, was capable of an output of 118,000 kilowatts and annually produced about 50,000,000 kilowatt hours; together with two other hydro plants on the river below it produced about 72,000,000 kilowatt hours a year. This production was consumed largely in Kassel and Hannover.

For the mission of destroying the Moehne, Sorpe, and Eder dams, the RAF dispatched 18 Lancaster bombers. The technique of the operation was to drop parachute mines from low altitude into the reservoirs just behind the dams; explosions taking place against the dam wall (behind the water resistance behind, greatly to increase the force exerted on the wall) were calculated to blow out the wall and release the contents of the reservoir. At the Sorpe dam this technique apparently was not successfully carried out; there explosions damaged a

SECRET

length of 250 feet on the crown of the dam. Some water poured out as a result, carrying some earth from the dam, but the flow ended after ten hours. The slope was the shallowest of the three dams, having a capacity only 1/20 that of the Hohen. However, a large measure of success was achieved in the attacks on the Eder and Hohen dams. At the former, the reservoir wall was breached for a distance of 180 feet and to a depth of 250 feet, the break releasing large quantities of water which in rushing out still further injured the dam. Similar damage occurred at the Hohen, where the breach was 200 feet wide. In both cases the larger part of the reservoir contents was released, the Hohen being nearly emptied.

The resulting floods had most destructive effect in the Ruhr Valley from the Hohen breach. Three many villages on the river below the dam were completely inundated; the Hohen power station was wiped out; Dortmund, 20 miles to the west was flooded; a number of bridges, including the railway bridge on the Dortmund-Duesseldorf line over the Ruhr, were washed out. It is estimated that the Ruhr flood in its effect was the equivalent of one month's Allied bombing in the area, at the current rate of attacks, in terms of housing, factories, and other buildings destroyed. The breaking of the Eder dam caused less serious flood damage of war significance; the quays at Kassel were flooded, but the activities of the city in normal times was not crippled. The area between the Eder dam and Kassel is largely rural, in contrast to the urban development of the Ruhr district, so that the areas most heavily flooded were not of particular importance.

With respect to loss of electric power, through damage to hydro stations and loss of reservoir contents, the Eder break was the more significant. Dortmund and Kassel depended to a substantial extent on plants at and below the Eder dam, and the loss of this electricity is a serious consequence to these centers. On the other hand, the loss of electric power through destruction of the Hohen station and depletion of the reservoir is of negligible importance. The Hohen station was not a large producer, and the industries of the Ruhr have drawn their electric power from thermal plants to the extent of 80-90% of their requirements; such loss of power as has resulted in the Ruhr can probably be supplied through the grid system of electric power distribution from other parts of Germany.

The disruption of the Hohen water supply, however, will be severely felt along the Ruhr Valley; water rationing will be necessary as a result, and even this measure will have to be supplemented by resort to available wells in order to satisfy the minimum requirements of the general public and war industries. The Hohen supply of pure water had been particularly important industrially, for coke plants and chemical power stations. Not nearly so acute a shortage is likely to result from depletion of the Eder reservoir, because of the smaller industrial and public demands for water in this less developed area. The shortage, any, however, to some extent the opera-

SECRET

tion of the Mittelland canal between Duisburg and the Weser since much of the usual supply of water will not be available for maintaining levels along the route.

In point of morale disturbance, the breaking of the Mochina dam with the consequent flooding caused considerable alarm among the Ruhr population; in the Rhen area there was less impact on morale.

To: _____

SUMMARY OF STRATEGIC INFORMATION
MENTIONED HERE IS THE BIG LOOSE-
LEAF BOOK FROM R & A IN WJD OFFICE.

Director's Office

10.004
V. Blodman
172
1247

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Col. Donovan
FROM: Sidney S. Alexander
SUBJECT:

DATE: March 12, 1948

The attached table contains the figures which you requested from me concerning a comparison between German production of strategic raw materials in 1938 and her consumption in a war year, 1948.

These figures are taken from among those presented in the Summary of Strategic Information, copies of which are in your possession, or are in process of reproduction. The Summary of Strategic Information also includes general appraisals of the enemy position in these commodities. It was from these summaries that the points mentioned in my talk were drawn.

Attach.

Material
x Treasury Dept.
x Chicago
MARCH 22 1943

MR. LADD
WILLIAM A. KINGS

I have your memorandum of March 22d concerning the possibility of securing control of the material formerly belonging to the German Consul General in Chicago. My I correct one statement in this memorandum. This material is not under the supervision or control of the Office of Foreign Funds. It is presumably being stored in Chicago by the Swiss Legation as custodians for German Affairs in this country. As such, it is probably immune to seizure.

In similar cases in the past, however, we have occasionally found means to circumvent this obstacle. I believe Mr. Bera has some knowledge of the type of material involved. If he could let me have a report giving me as much information as possible as to character and quantity of material, I shall endeavor to take steps to get control for the OSS. I emphasize, however, that this may in this case be impossible, due to jurisdiction of the Swiss Government.

Please instruct me.

W. A. K.



Approved
Special Agent

X R. R. R. & Information
 X Material
 X Treasury

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

SECRET


INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Col. William J. Donovan
 FROM: William L. Langer
 SUBJECT: Material on German Transport Procured from the
 Foreign Funds Control

DATE: March 17, 1948

Dr. Ludwig Homberger of the Topographic Intelligence Subdivision of the Europe-Africa Division went to Chicago on March 7, and the next day met Mr. Joseph Arrowsmith, Supervising Agent, Foreign Funds Control. As a result of their conversation Dr. Homberger was able to procure for O.S.S. use very valuable material on German transport. Dr. Homberger carried out the commission with dispatch and efficiency. I append hereto his memorandum describing the materials in some detail and a copy of the receipt which Mr. Arrowsmith issued to Werner Brothers Kennelly Company, the company formerly in charge of the documents.

All documents which have up to this time arrived in Washington have been deposited with the C.I.D. I have requested that they be duly accessioned. The films which Mr. Homberger speaks of in the attached memorandum have not yet arrived. When we have a chance to examine them their disposition may be determined.


 William L. Langer
 Director, Branch of
 Research and Analysis

Attachments

-2-

Messrs. R. H. Tracy and William D. Dreyer of the Foreign Funds Control Office to Mr. Webb's office. It will be mailed by him to you. I, myself, took the "Reichsgüterkursbuch" and one copy of the Reichsbankbuch which will be handed over to C.I.D. The films will be shipped by express by Werner Bros. Kennelly Co. to you.

I should like to emphasize that I found in this matter full cooperation from Mr. Arrowsmith and his associates as well as from Mr. Webb.

/s/ L. M. HEMBERGER

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P
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Werner Hres. Kennally Co.
2615 North Broadway
Chicago, Illinois

March 9, 1948

Pursuant to our letter of request, dated February 25, 1948, receipt is acknowledged of the following printed matter and other property taken from certain filing cabinets formerly owned by the GERMAN RAILROADS INFORMATION OFFICE in Chicago, and now stored in your warehouse at 2615 North Broadway, Chicago, Illinois:

General Descriptive Books	7
Time Table Books	33
Tariff Rules Books	5
Folders of Travel Literature, Maps, Pictures, etc.	26
Packages of Film Lectures	3
Film (2 boxes)	2

Total pieces - 76

/s/ JOSEPH ARONSMITH
Joseph AronSmith
Supervising Agent
Foreign Funds Control

Chicago, Illinois, March 9, 1948

I have this day taken custody of all items listed above, which are being shipped this date to the OFFICE of STRATEGIC SERVICES, Washington D.C. by order of Sherman Kent, Chief European Africa Division.

Office of Strategic Services

By /s/ LUDWIG M. HOMBERGER
Representative

Case 62-8-1022

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

March 6, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL DONOVAN

FROM: William A. Kimbel

Person to see concerning the material seized by Treasury from the German Bureau of Railroad Information.

Joseph Arrowsmith
Foreign Funds Control Office
Federal Reserve Bank Building
Chicago

The Treasury is sending a teletype message to Chicago to receive George Bowden as soon as he reports and to give him every assistance.

*Germany 10760
Railroad Info. office
Material
Treasury*

*Control Bowden
will take care*

*✓ Arrowsmith
- A R A file
- Transit -*

*German
x Railroad of info. office
x material
By [unclear]*

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

DATE: MARCH 5 1943

TO: COLONEL DONOVAN
FROM: WILLIAM A. KERR
SUBJECT:

I am advised by one of our friends in the Treasury Department that after considerable search, they have just located in Chicago most of the material which belonged to the German Railroad Information Office. This material is comprehensive. There are eleven large file cabinets containing apparently films, literature and other material on all phases of German travel and communications.

The Treasury Department has indicated that other government agencies are after this material, and they have brought it to my attention first so that our interests can be met before others put in an official claim.

The material is too extensive to be shipped to ^{WASHINGTON} ~~New York~~. It could be inspected in Chicago. It is now being stored under the control of the Swiss Government as representing German affairs in this country.

Please instruct me as to our interests and wishes, and I shall make the necessary arrangements with the Treasury Department to make this material available to us. The Treasury Department would like an immediate response so that they may release it to others if it is not our intention to pursue it.

WAK
W. A. Kerr

cc: Mr. [unclear]

X Stuttgart

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: COLONEL DONOVAN
FROM: WILLIAM A. KIMBEL
SUBJECT:

DATE: MARCH 3 1943

The Department of State has handed to me the attached paraphrase of telegram No. 1065, dated February 16 1943, from Bern, with the thought that it may be of interest to you.

W.A.K.

Attachment

- cc: Colonel Burton
- General Magruder
- Mr. Shepardon
- Colonel Loman
- Commander Halliwell
- Major Loman
- Major Deering

SECRET

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM: American Legation, Bern.
 TO: Secretary of State, Washington
 DATE: February 16 1943, noon.
 NO.: 1065.

Stuttgart was visited toward the end of January by a leader of a German underground opposition organization. This organization has cells in the greater part of Germany but it is non-communistic. Assembled to listen to a speech by this leader were about one hundred and twenty-five oppositionists. Mostly they consisted of persons who have lived underground for the past ten years, but besides some bourgeoisie there were one or two clergymen.

The assembly was polled by this leader on the question of continued assistance to the democratic countries. Secret ballots were used, and the first produced the following results: 7 to 8% disapproved, 29% abstained from voting, but more than sixty per cent were in favor of such aid. Pursuant to a demand that the abstainers cast positive or negative votes, the result of the second ballot was as follows: fifteen per cent against, and the balance, eighty-five per cent, approved. Explanation by the dissenters was that it was their belief that because they could not expect to receive any help from the democracies, continued aid to them was futile.

In a smaller Bavarian city where more than a dozen persons were left with a short notice to listen to him, the leader experienced similar results.

Note from the Legation: Since the foregoing came from a source of highest credibility, what has been set forth in the foregoing is considered a fact.

SECRET

German 10,642
~~*Troops*~~
x Spain
x State Dept.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: COLONEL DOROVAN
FROM: WILLIAM A. KIDDEI.
SUBJECT:

DATE: FEBRUARY 25 1943

I am advised by the Department of State that they have received a cable from Ambassador Hayes stating that a careful investigation has been made of the Nester report indicating that German troops are approaching Spain. They can find no facts to confirm this rumor. Close observation is being maintained, and the State Department will be kept advised.

The State Department will keep me posted.

WAK
W. A. K.

cc: Colonel Sutton
Commander Halliwell
Mr. Sheperden

SECRET
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Germany 10,639
x Cable
x JCS

February 24, 1943

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN R. DEANE

I thought you might like to have the following information contained in a cable we have just received from one of our representatives:

It is reported that the Germans have increased the manufacture of shells air torpedos for gas and have also increased preparations for gas warfare. It is also reported that, as was done last spring, there is likely to be in the coming months a reduction in food rations in Germany. (It is believed that for psychological reasons every effort will be made by Germany to avoid a reduction of that kind for the time being.)

According to other reports, the Germans are actively engaged in fortifying the Bug line as a position of second defense in the event of failure to hold the Dnieper.

Cable # 1132 - Bern -
Bureau to Viala

William J. Donovan
Director

SECRET

copy to [unclear] 2/24

German 10,626

x Casualties

x m. 3 8

x British War Office

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE: Feb. 24, 1943

To: Colonel William J. Donovan

From: Edward S. Mason

Subject:

I am attaching two memoranda; one commenting on MIS estimates of German casualties, and the other on British War Office estimates.

ESM

Attachments 2

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

SECRET

TO: Dr. E. S. Mason

DATE: February 16, 1943
LS-113

FROM: D. N. Wheeler

SUBJECT: Comment on the M.I.S. Estimates of German Losses.

✓ The M.I.S. estimate of German battle losses is based on the use of standard daily hospital admission rates. These are multiplied against average strength to get average daily admissions, and the result is multiplied against total days to get total admissions. The number of men killed in action and missing is derived by the use of standard ratios of killed, etc., to hospital admissions from battle causes.

Daily admission Rates

It is evident that much depends upon the admission rate selected. As M.I.S. remarks, these are difficult to determine, as they "must be based on comparisons (which are dangerous) and modified in the light of known changed battle conditions."

M.I.S. has made use of World War experience in estimating the current rate. World War losses have been tabulated by day, month, or year during 1914-1918. It is not stated which national armies were studied, nor is there any indication of how the figure of one

- 2 -

SECRET

per thousand per day was derived from the data used. Inasmuch as M.I.S. specifically mentions the necessity of modifying World War rates in the light of known changed battle conditions, it would be interesting to know what modifications have been introduced in arriving at the one per thousand per day figure.

One difficulty in the use of these standard rates is illustrated by the experience of the German army in the World War. In the 12 months August 1914 - July 1915, the daily wounded rate¹ was about 1.33 per thousand. But in the following year (1915-1916) the rate fell to .76 per thousand, and the year after to .62 per thousand. Thus the rate for the second year of war was nearly 43 per cent below the rate for the first year of war, and the rate for 1916-1917 was more than 53 per cent below the 1914-1915 rate. Any casualty estimates based on the unmodified 1914-15 experience would thus have been subject to considerable error.

It appears therefore that the central problem in selecting a standard loss rate based on World War experience is the problem of appraising the modifications of World War rates made necessary by changed

¹The number reported wounded was about 10 or 12 per cent higher than the number hospitalized for battle causes. Daily hospital admission rates are not available for separate years.

- 3 -

SECRET

conditions. Unfortunately, no objective method is available for revising the World War rates to make them applicable to the present war.

Average Battle Strength

The computation of the strength figure against which the standard rate is to be applied may also cause some difficulty. The daily admission rate for battle causes of the German army in the World War - .69 per thousand - was figured against the entire field army (Feldhaer) regardless of whether all troops were in an active theater of war or not.¹ The A.E.F. admission rates for battle causes were calculated against the mean strength of the entire A.E.F., including all supply services - stevedores, construction forces, Motor Transport Corps, etc.²

If A.E.F. and other World War experience is to be used to estimate German losses in the present war, the World War rates should be applied to comparable categories of the present German army. Actually, however, it appears that a more restricted definition of strength has been used in the M.I.S. paper in

¹"Militaerbericht Ueber das Deutsche Heer im Weltkrieg 1914/18" Berlin, 1934, Vol. III, pp. 9, 10, 62.

²The Medical Department of the U.S. Army in the World War Vol. XV, p. 82.

- 4 -

SECRET

computing mean German strength on the Russian front. The term "battle strength" is used and a figure of 20,000 men per division is applied to arrive at "battle strength." This figure of 20,000 men per division evidently excludes a considerable part of the forces on which the World War rates are based. The World War rates are not based on "battle strength," but (in the case of the U.S. Army) on the entire A.L.F. with all its administrative and supply services. In the case of the German army, the rates are based on the entire Field Army (Feldheer). The "average battle strength" figure of 3.1 millions is therefore not the relevant figure for the application of World War daily hospital admission rates.

It appears that in arriving at "average battle strength" the hospital population has been excluded in the M.I.S. estimates. But as the World War rates are based (both in the case of the American and of the German armies) upon strength including hospital population, the exclusion of the hospital population from the present strength base is unwarranted. The M.I.S. paper itself makes this point explicitly in stating that "temporary" losses are counted in the strength of the army.... Each division carries "basis" allowances for such populations

- 5 -

SECRET

and can function without these patients until they return.^{al}

The M.I.S. estimates of the German order of battle in Russia have stood at about 180 divisions during most of 1942. Applying the M.I.S. multiplier of 27,000 men to 180 divisions gives a figure of about 4,900,000 men. This figure represents a strength base comparable to the strength base from which the World War admission rates are derived. The figure of 3,100,000 represents a strength base which is not relevant to World War admission rates.

Duration

In general the duration of operations does not present any special problems. However, under this point it should be noted that for any but the Russian campaign, the short duration of the period of operations is likely to lead to odd results. For instance, in the case of the Crete campaign, the application of the M.I.S. method gives 185 permanent losses, compared with the German High Command's admission of 4,358.

General Comment

There are marked differences between the rates assumed by M.I.S. and those used in our estimate for several basic factors. The per cent of wounded ultimately discharged as unfit is 20 per cent in the M.I.S.

I.I.C. 12/1, p. 2.

- 6 -

SECRET

estimate, compared with 7.2 per cent in our own. M.I.S. estimates captured and missing at a figure 70 per cent as large as the number killed; we estimate missing at a figure 35 per cent as large as the figure of killed.

Our former method of estimating non-battle dead and unfit for further service has been drastically revised. The details of the new method are explained in the section giving our own estimates. The new method gives a figure in this category considerably below the M.I.S. figure.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

SECRET

TO: Mr. Edward S. Mason

DATE: February 16, 1943
LS-114FROM: D. N. Wheeler *DNW*

SUBJECT: Comment on British War Office Estimates of German Losses

(a) Non-battle casualties

The British War Office estimate of German non-battle permanent losses is 1,659,000 to October 25, 1942. This assumes a daily hospital admission rate of 2.5 per thousand per day up to the beginning of the Russian campaign, and 5 per thousand thereafter. Of the hospitalized, the War Office calculates that 7% will die or become unfit for further service; a further 9% will be fit for limited service only.

The War Office fails to distinguish between dead and unfit for further service in these estimates. This is unfortunate, as it makes comparison with other estimates or with earlier experience difficult or impossible. It is possible, however, to compute the combined death and disability rate from non-battle causes in the World War, and compare this combined rate with the British War Office combined rate.

The War Office rate for the Russian campaign (3 per thousand per day) multiplied against 7% dead and unfit, multiplied by 365 days, gives an annual dead and unfit rate from non-battle causes of ~~1.00~~^{1.25} per thousand.

The realized German army rates in the World War were ~~200~~²⁰ per thousand ~~per year~~. The War Office rate is thus over 6 times as high as German

“*Statistik*", pp. 76, 174, and Table 151.

SECRET

- 2 -

World War experience, a departure so great as to suggest a computational error in the British figures.

It may be argued that the exceptionally severe conditions of life on the Russian front have resulted in non-battle death and disability rates far above those that would be expected on the basis of overall World War experience. In order to test the probability of this development, we have examined the medical records of the German VIIIth Army in the World War. This army was operating in Courland (Lithuania) during the winter of 1916-1917 and it was exposed to severe winter conditions. The records fail to bear out the assumption that winter conditions in Russia are likely to cause a great rise in non-battle (casualty) rates. It is true that for January and February the admission rates for the VIIIth Army were somewhat above the average for the Western Front armies during the same two months. But taking the year as a whole, the average admission rates for the VIIIth Army were well below the average rates for the armies on the Western Front. On the average, the Eastern Front, in spite of the severe winter, was a more healthful environment than the Western Front.

The point can be made with even more force. For the German field armies as a whole, during the four years of war up to July 1918, the death rate from non-battle causes was 5.6 per thousand per year. The death rate of German males aged 20-45 in 1913 was 5.6 per thousand per year, exactly the same rate. Evidently, the exclusion of the unfit plus more systematic medical care cancelled out the worsened general living conditions.

SECRET

- 3 -

(b) Battle Casualties

The British War Office has based its estimates of German battle casualties on the experience of the British Army in the World War. Using monthly battle losses in 1917, the War Office has arrived at a basic loss rate of 11.6 per month; this figure is then adjusted in terms of forces engaged and intensity of fighting on the Eastern Front.

The War Office amendments to World War experience in terms of German order of battle and intensity of fighting are probably based on fragmentary intelligence data. There is unfortunately no objective method of dealing with such data. It is believed, therefore, that the gross battle casualty estimates of the British War Office rest on an un sound method.

German, 10,527 A
x 908000
x 5/12/43 2/16/43

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel William J. Donovan

DATE: 2/19/43

FROM: Walter C. Langer *W.C.L.*

SUBJECT: Memorandum on Goebbels Speech of February 18, 1943

It is obviously impossible to furnish a thorough analysis of the Goebbels speech without the complete text in German. Nevertheless it may be of interest to compare the gist of the speech as reported in excerpts in the New York Times of February 19th with statements made in my memorandum of February 17, 1943 on the State of Morale in Germany. In that Memorandum I pointed out that the German Propaganda on the Home Front had adopted a new strategy in its attempts to raise the morale of the Germans.

This new strategy was built on two main themes: (1) To exaggerate the danger in the East with threats of German destruction at the hands of the Bolsheviks; and (2) To explode any secret hopes in the minds of the German people that the democracies might come to their rescue at the eleventh hour, by exaggerating our weakness and stupidity.

The first theme is clearly presented by Goebbels in such statements as these:

-2-

"Only now do we see it in its whole wild greatness. Here we have a threat to the Reich and to the European Continent which by far surpasses all dangers to which the western world has been exposed hitherto."

"In the East there rages a war which knows no Mercy. The Fuehrer described it correctly when he said that from this war there will not emerge victors and vanquished; there will be left only those who survive and those who have been destroyed. In the East, the German nation is waging a war where everything is at stake."

"Behind Soviet divisions stand Jewish murder squadrons, and behind them rises the terror ghost of famine and complete anarchy."

"The onrush of the steppes against our venerable continent has broken out this Winter with a violence overshadowing all human imagination."

"We must wage this war, which is a war for the survival of our nation, with the whole life of the nation."

The second theme is presented even more clearly:

"Against this, the German armed forces and their Allies represent the only imaginable bulwark."

"The German armed forces and the German nation with their allies alone have the strength to achieve final salvation of Europe from this danger."

"European countries, Great Britain included, claim to be strong enough to oppose bolshevization of the European continent in good time and with good effect. Such a claim is childish. Should the strongest military power in the world not be able to break the Bolshevik danger, who else would have the strength to do it?"

"I am fully convinced that the lamenting Lords and Archbishops in London have no intention of opposing in any practical form the Bolshevik danger which arises with a further advance of

-3-

the Soviet armies. The Anglo-Saxon states are spiritually and politically so deeply infected with the Jewry that they cannot longer estimate this danger."

"Signs of the paralysis which has befallen the Western European democracies in the face of deadly danger are heart-rendings****"

In addition he employs the time-worn technique of directing aggressive impulses against the Russians by accusing them of all the crimes of which the Nazis are guilty:

"Their policy is aggression and aggressive war."

"We know that in the East we have to deal with international devilry which does not recognize normal relations between men and states," etc.

I am of the opinion that these supplementary appeals, terror on the one side and no help on the other, are meeting with considerable success in stiffening German morale. One could almost imagine that the German offensive in Tunisia in the last days was partly designed to demonstrate to the German people how weak and ineffectual our armies are. One should not forget, however, that the type of morale produced by this kind of appeal is unstable. It makes for unity of purpose (defense of the homeland) and determination which is willing to make incredible personal sacrifices but it tends to fall to pieces as soon as the danger is past. England during the days of the Blitz is an excellent example of morale of this type. It will, therefore, be in the interest of the Nazi leaders to continue to exaggerate their dangers as long as possible

-4-

in order to keep this newly aroused morale operative.

The validity of my assumption that a large number of Germans secretly or unconsciously hoped that the democracies would save them might be questioned. From a psychological point of view the answer is relatively simple. The German propagandists have always shown an amazing insight concerning the secret hopes and fears of their people. If they were not reasonably sure that this expectation existed at the present time they would not take such pains to point up our inability to cope with this danger. From a pure "Strength through fear" point of view it would be to their advantage to play up the danger of invasion from the South as well as from the East.

It might also be pointed out that, like many of Goebbels speeches, it is a masterpiece of psychological strategy insofar as it serves the double purpose of building up their own morale while attempting to destroy ours. The fear of what will happen in Europe in the event of a Russian victory is scarcely hidden in the minds of a great many Americans. There is also great concern about our ability to get the Russians out of Germany if they ever succeed in getting in. The result is that many people in this country view the Russian advance with mixed feelings.

-5-

The same concern is probably present in the minds of the English.

The Goebbels speech nourishes these doubts. The ultimate goal is probably to reduce our aid to the Russians and stir up dissension by demanding a more concise statement of our respective views on the future of Europe in general and Germany in particular. In other words the speech aims to force our hand on the one side while it feeds doubts concerning our present course on the other side. This is really psychological strategy at its best.

-2-

would be to overlook many deeper psychological factors. Some of these are probably poorly formulated in the minds of the German people but nevertheless it seems logical to suppose that they are at work.

From a psychoanalytical point of view the situation, very briefly stated, looks something like this: As late as last Fall the German people were assured by their leaders that the Russian campaign was progressing according to plan. That they must not be misled by the German failure to advance further into Russia into believing that Germany was unequal to the task it had assumed. It was explained to them that advances were only justified after the territory taken had been consolidated, rehabilitated and turned to productive ends. Germany, they claimed, was devoting her energies to these ends and guaranteeing her future in this territory. Not only were they assured that all was well at the front at the present time, but also that they need not fear a repetition of the experiences of the previous winter. All precautions had been taken, the army was equipped for the worst eventualities and Stalingrad would fall into their hands within a few days. At this point we may assume German morale was still relatively high.

Very shortly, however, the infallibility of Hitler was put to a severe test. Stalingrad did not fall and the Russians began turning the German armies back. In addition, Rommel was in full retreat in North Africa. Undoubtedly, there was an underlying fear in the minds of a great many Germans that something of this sort might happen.

-4-

It is safe to assume that during this period German morale definitely slumped.

In the midst of this we invaded North Africa, won the cooperation of the French and drove the Germans into Tunisia. The psychological significance of this event can scarcely be overestimated. To the average German this must have meant that the thing he had dreaded was now becoming reality--the active participation of the United States in the war. To the majority of the German people the conclusion that they could no longer hope to win the war was inescapable. At this point we would guess German morale hits its lowest mark.

Psychologically, however, it would be an error to assume that this slump in morale was based solely on their disillusionment of Hitler's invincibility or on the defeats sustained. There are defeats and defeats. In America, for example, we would not feel nearly as badly if we were defeated at the hands of the Germans as we would if we were defeated by the Japs. And so it probably was in Germany. If they could not hope to win the war and were destined to ultimate defeat, then they would much prefer to have it at the hands of the Americans and English than at the hands of the Russians. These are powerful nations with tremendous prestige and defeat by them would not constitute utter disgrace.

War was the situation without its redeeming features from the point of view of the German people. If an invasion of the Continent by the English and Americans was imminent, it would hasten the

-4-

termination of a hopeless and costly war. Furthermore, these are civilized nations famous for their spirit of "fair play" and "sportsmanship" and the outspoken opponents of Communism, their dreaded enemy. We may suppose that consciously or unconsciously many Germans felt "that defeat under any circumstances was bad enough but that if they must be defeated, as they undoubtedly will be, then it is better to be defeated at the hands of the English and Americans for not only will they be more generous in their peace terms but they will also protect Germany from being turned over to Russia and a Communistic regime."

We must remember that Communism means something different to the Germans than it does to us. For many years they have been taught that Communism is their greatest menace and their experience with Communism in the pre-Hitler days was not pleasant. It also seems safe to assume that the experiences of millions of German soldiers in Russia during the war have ^{not} made them feel more kindly to this type of regime. The Russian standard of living as they found it in reality must have appalled many of the German soldiers who had believed themselves to be suffering from deprivations at home. Their experiences at the front probably heightened their fears of Communism in Germany rather than alleviating them. Under these circumstances we can easily imagine that the approach of the English and the American armies might be secretly viewed as an act of Providence destined to save the German nation from the Communist menace. This factor too worked in the direction of lowering the morale of the German people.

-5-

In the midst of this, however, our activities in North Africa suddenly come to a stop. We do not succeed in promptly driving the Germans and Italians out of Tunisia but, on the contrary, as time goes on the Axis forces seem to get the upper hand and take the initiative. To the German people, at least many of them, this was a secret disappointment. To them it could only mean that we were fundamentally weak and that one could not take much stock in our big talk and threats. They had hoped that we would come and save Germany from the Communists and now it turned out that we could not even defeat a fragment of the German army fighting far from home. What, then, could they hope to get from us in fighting off the Russian hordes?

At this point the German attitude toward the war must have made an about-face. What they had believed to be a war of conquest for world domination now turned out to be a defensive war involving their own homes and their future well-being. It was coming out just as Hitler had said from the beginning, that Germany would have to destroy Communism or Communism would destroy Germany. Now the battle was really here and Germany stood alone with her back against the wall. She could expect no help in fighting off this menace because the democracies were too weak and stupid to see the danger. German propaganda has not been lax in furthering this point of view. By a clever psychological stratagem they have turned their mistakes and defeats into morale-building techniques. Their main propaganda themes now are (1) the horrible Russians and (2) the weakness of

-6-

England and America and their inability to save Europe. In keeping with this new strategy it is noticeable that the Germans now announce their defeats on the Russian front almost immediately instead of holding them up for a few days in order to prepare their people for a shock. One gets the impression that they almost go out of their way in order to shock their home front into greater activity.

In addition to the fear of the Communist danger, another factor must be taken into account. The Germans have always frowned upon the Russians as a people and despised the Russian force of arms. A defeat at the hands of the Russians alone would, in the present circumstances, be an unendurable disgrace. No self-respecting German could hold his head up again if he permitted Russia to defeat Germany and her allies on the field of battle singlehanded. On the other hand, if Germany succumbed to the combined onslaughts of Russia, England and America he could snatch some consolation even from the defeat. It may also be noted that our own domestic squabbles about the allocation of materials and some of the testimony before congressional investigating committees has played right into the hands of this new German strategy. They have not been slow in picking it up and this together with the factors previously mentioned has served to strengthen the morale of the German people considerably.

My guess would be that the Germans will throw their weight against England and America even at the cost of defeats in Russia in order to keep up this delusion. The appeal is no longer to fight

-7-

ffer the glory of Germany and the Fuhrer but to fight for their own
kins, their children and their homes. In all psychological warfare
there is no more powerful incentive than this and we can expect the
Germans to exploit it to the fullest. We can undermine this strategy
only by proving that we are not as weak as the Germans try to make
us out to be.

It is hardly necessary to mention that in exploiting their
dilemma the Germans also hope to lower our morale in the expectation
that we are nearing the finish.

ferman 376
K. Morale Rpt's
x Ho new
state Dept.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel Donovan
FROM: Mr. Oechsner
SUBJECT:

DATE: February 13, 1945

At your request I am returning to you the attached copy of paraphrase of telegram 7 565 from Bern, sent through the State Department.

SO
Frederick Oechsner

SECRET

Date Feb. 8, 1943

To Frank

Remarks:

Will you read this -- note it, and
return.

W.J.D.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PARAPHRASE

Telegram no. 565

Dated: 1/25/43, noon

From: Bern

Rec'd: 1/25/43, 10:24 pm

Following message for War Department from Military Attache
from Bern.

Pursuant to the request of the Office of War Information it
is suggested that since Colonel Solbert is no longer with that
organization his name be omitted from the forwarding instructions
in telegram no. 203, January 11 from Legation, and that material
be designated simply for OWI and OSS.

I am submitting in first morale reports a substantial amount
of material, for two reasons, as a foundation for "feel" of
situation and as of potential usefulness to United States propaganda.

Is contemplated plan of sending reports of this nature once a
week, unless sudden developments, acceptable, and if so, is it
desired that reports arrive any specific day? As more sources of
information are developed, the basis will gradually expand.

(1)-(4). Businessman, Swiss, pro-United Nations, holding politi-
cal post, who contacted many friends in Berlin during a recent
visit there.

- (U) Excellent source.
- (O) Plausible support for information.

The morale of the upper and upper middle (?) classes, particularly

leading businessmen and intellectual leaders better than 3.

(3) Fair.

(64-A) Open small reign of terror being conducted, particularly against grumblers, almost brazenly by SS and Gestapo.

(64-A) Medium low incidence.

(63) Only one-fifth of population favor Hitler and his Government but are powerless to do anything but go along

(63) Greater number sceptical concerning regime. Support it because of mere acquiescence mixed with fear.

(13 (7)--102) Cannot evaluate situation because of continuous talk victory and biased news. The food experts are even at present in ignorance of the dangerous situation of the German forces at Stalingrad and the reverses of the Caucasus Armies.

(83) Rare and of no particular consequence.

(102) Doubts felt by small minority. Majority feeling confident of victory.

(120) Demonstrated fear when informed that both the Allies and neutral countries were starting to identify the people with the regime and to feel that both were to be blamed.

(120) Attitude and fears of the majority concerning the consequences of defeat.

(112) Inferment departed prior to raids which occurred recently.

(112) Very infrequent.

(161) After a bomb lands on an area it is fenced off, and a demarcation company sign put up.

(161) Very light property damage.

613. Not hated nor feared to such an extent as thought, although believed tough. Instead, the civilians (as distinguished from military element) ridicule it.

(613) Russia.

612. Main hate.

(612) Great Britain.

611. Because large number of Germans have connections there and hate of country was not developed before the war, hate inhibited. Disappointment and displeasure at finding United States an enemy.

(611) United States

389. Two small pieces meat furnished workers in Siemens plant weekly, together with vegetables, and potatoes cooked in water. In even the middle class eating places the quality of the food is generally bad and frequently inedible for Swiss. Blutworst composed of soy bean flour soaked in blood is an example.

(389) Sufficient to maintain worker efficiency at subsistence level.

430. Greatly inadequate. Vacations eliminated. Long lines at theaters. Prostitutes have disappeared from the streets, but soldiers being taken care of by other girls. Party girls being furnished with the names of three or four soldiers at front and when these men are on leave, expected to do duty by them.

(43) Extent and kinds of recreation.

420. Money plentiful but nothing to purchase. Articles shown in windows are not for sale. There is such a scarcity of cigars that they make excellent bribes for even relatively high officials of the government. Drug shortage. Germans admiring the overcoat of our informant were surprised that such things could still be purchased in Switzerland.

(420) Creature comforts other than those mentioned above available and within financial reach majority or their real income or ability to spend cash income.

413. Berlin.

(413) Unpleasant overcrowding.

615. In intimate group known as Der Versrecher (possibly "Der Verbrecher" - the criminal.

(615) Hitler

940. Low tension, even in feeling against regime. Unfriendliness on part of all. Laughter lacking, loud talking as formerly.

Because of gasoline shortage, thousand aviators being used in infantry. In Berlin 17-year-old girls mobilized. Anti-aircraft guns being manned by boys and girls of fifteen. Anti-aircraft sent Italy from Copenhagen.

(940) State of irritability and nervous tension.

850. Until very recently thought the current fighting in Russia was nipping up action; that Soviet main power long ago crippled.

(850) Opinions concerning general trend of military events.

871. Live like kings.

(871) Members of party

V. German, anti-Nazi, white collar middle class, coming into constant contact with wide circles of people through his profession.

(V) Good source.

4. Morale of lower and middle classes in states of Baden and Wurttemberg.

(4) Poor.

23. Informant has several young relatives employed in war factories who are very happy they are not at front. Since they would do anything to keep from being sent to Russia, they carry on their work well so that they may remain at home; food situation results in lower production than formerly; aversion to occupational participation existent, but inhibited; strict supervision avoids slow down by sabotage.

(23) Participation based largely on mere acquiescence fortified by fear of consequences of defeat.

24. Even among the young people, who were once very susceptible to the Nazi ideology, antagonism is beginning to be evident. There have been several incidents illustrating this, including one at a Christmas gathering of Hitler youth when after an older party leader stated that he was well aware that

Christian Christmas songs were unsuitable for the National Socialists, a boy instantly started to sing one, putting particular emphasis on the final clause "and Christ will be our Redeemer". An incident similar to the above occurred at Sigmaringen. Another illustration occurred when an older high school (gymnasium) student told teacher that pupils did not want any more history which had been altered to suit the Nazis. When the teacher stated that the speech was treason, the pupils replied as a group, "Then we're all traitors." Because editors require that an expression of patriotic sentiment be included in death notices of soldiers, people often refrain from furnishing the press with notices of the deaths of their soldiers' relatives. Church attendance is increasing and is another evidence of discontent; inner rage at Nazis finds outlet in churches. In order to show opposition, women especially substitute greeting "Grussgott" (Greet God, old German greeting) for "Heil Hitler". The so-called "Grussgott" movement which was never entirely stamped out in Baden and Wurttemberg is again gaining in strength. It is suggested by Free that a propaganda directive be issued urging that the "Grussgott" greeting be used.

(64) Not mentioned in Cable No. 203, which gives key to these numbers.

124. As a drug which is too frequently used loses effect so has the fear propaganda; it no longer motivates the people

to intense efforts or inspires loyalty to the party. The fear first in the minds of the people is the loss of their relatives, and secondary is the fear of punishments which will be inflicted after defeat. The people believe that the more long-drawn out the war, the less likely it is that their relatives will return and the greater final defeat.

(124) Intense fear starting to become dissipated, and propagandist campaign is losing its motivating force toward taking part in war effort.

103. People who think are most uncertain of victory, but even the majority, too weary to think, are losing faith in victory; official propaganda no longer believed; say they know things are going badly although they have no foundation for vague doubts.

(103) Majority starting to feel victory uncertain; defeat beginning to be expected by good sized minority.

144. People in state of dull despair, simply fed up.

(145) Strong.

164. Such a great degree of indifference that no circulation of positive plans.

(160) Talk and discussion concerning peace.

460. Great many in Wurttemberg and Baden of Italians, Hungarians, French, Poles, Dutch, Norwegians. The party recognizes them as a danger.

(460) Foreign civilian labor in Germany.

44. This exists, but the penalties are so severe that the people do not show outward resistance; no complaint regarding loans since people have money to pay them.

(44) Apathetic public inertia against acceptance.

63. Smaller number agents provocateurs since they are now afraid that after Germany is defeated they will be shot.

(63) Greater number sceptical regarding regime; they support it because of mere acquiescence mingled with fear.

600. Greater number feel end of war will come soon since Germany is unable to resist much longer; state Germany was able to have stood war lasting two years, but not a long war. Workers in Berlin sing "es geht alles voruber, es geht alles vorbei, auch Adolf Hitler und seine partei" (all passes, all passes, also Adolf Hitler and his party).

(600) Opinion concerning number of years war will last.

670. So far the Church is the only alternative leadership to appear, it is only there that opposition can take form. Clergymen, particularly in Catholic areas, are the leaders of the opposition.

(670) Leaders or groups, the leaders of which are potential competitors of Hitler, who seem to command increasing confidence of people.

651. Where once people thought Hitler was never wrong, they now admit that it is possible for him to make mistakes.

(651) Hitler

655. Talk against Goebbels, who is termed "loudmouthed".

(655) Goebbels

652. Usual quips.

(652) Goering.

940. Strong, particularly at official bureaus where it is necessary to wait. Irritability has increased lately. Disputes resulting from insults are now submitted to special Friedensrichter instead of the regular courts.

(940) State of irritability and nervous tension.

770. Not much thought about war objectives; feel Herrenvolk theories empty speech; they desire only that their soldier relatives return home. One soldier said that Germany was already large enough for him and a peasant said that they could have managed without the war.

(770) Beliefs as to Germany's war objectives and attitudes with regard to those objectives.

871. Contention by Party that best party members are at front, but people complain that "very best" - strutters and party bosses - remain at home.

(871) Members of party.

890. In some villages local party tyrants.

(890) Complaints and criticisms concerning government.

850. People have recently been becoming more worried about the Russian front and are discussing it more, they have misgivings concerning the trend of events, but no definite information.

General "feel" of situation as derived from both above informants; apathy, energy lacking, widespread physical fatigue, nothing is of consequence - "Wir wollen von dem schwindel nichts hören" (we don't want to hear any more about the swindle), "es ist alles Wurst" ("it is all bologna") - unexpected fatalism. However, there is still much staying power, and there is no evidence of any nature pointing to a civilian collapse or of even incipient positive resistance against the regime, which has the situation well under control. Majority of people have but little interest and no enthusiasm and believe there is no alternative to carrying on. Few take trouble to listen to the radio or read the newspapers since the press so dull and obviously fixed; certain amount of skepticism, especially among best educated class. It is thought that the submarine successes are exaggerated.

The morale in Baden and Württemberg is lower than that in Berlin for the following reasons (among others): the two states have had greatest casualty rate for the armed services of any parts of Germany; they are solidly Catholic; people in Berlin are more exposed to and influenced by official view point and propaganda, and they by nature are more apt to be easily led to optimism. Another factor is that the report on Berlin is based on observation before the seriousness of the Russian front situation was

beginning to be admitted by the German press within the last week, while the report for Baden and Wurttemberg was very recent and so indicates the anxiety and suspicion which it is likely have increased in all parts of the country in most recent past.

Both the reports given above are in line with recent information in possession of the Legation.

Rumanian public opinion as stated by a representative of large Swiss financial interests in Rumania who recently spent two months in Rumania and who has intimate contacts in official circles is as follows: Leaders of the country are prepared to enter war on the side of the United Nations and feel that this policy will meet with the support of the public.

(850) Opinions concerning general trend of military events.

HARRISON

Germany 10, 1943
Denmark
x Finland
SECRET
Food

January 26, 1943

MEMORANDUM

FROM: William J. Donovan

TO: Mr. Walter A. O'Meara

The following may be worth looking into as a propaganda item:

In addition to the food deals which the Finns have negotiated with the Danes with the collaboration of the Swedes, the Germans are purchasing some Danish food supplies for Finnish account. According to Danish informant the Germans have charged the Finns double the price which they (the Germans) paid to the Danes for these food supplies.

SECRET

German Air Force - 10,327
X Developments

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

SECRET

TO: Brig. Gen. Wm. J. Donovan

DATE: 18 October 1943

FROM: Edward S. Mason *E.S.M.*SUBJECT: Data on German Air Forces.

At the Combined Intelligence meeting this afternoon Group Captain Du Boulay presented the following figures on the German air force: IE strength in the Mediterranean area is now estimated at 950. Actual strength is 825 planes, of which 90% are serviceable. In Italy, south of Spuzia, German air strength is at present 170, of which 100 are fighters. The scale of effort in Italy has recently increased slightly. The number of sorties by fighters and fighter bombers now average 120 per day. In the Eastern Mediterranean 60 to 70 sorties were flown by Ju.88 and 87's against Lerros. Planes were escorted by 30 single-engine fighters.

On the Russian Front there has been little change for the past week. Long-range bombers have been reduced by 30. Lateral transfers of planes along the Front are frequent. The Germans are now using the revised version of the Ju.88, known as the Ju.188, on the Russian Front. It is capable of flying above Russian anti-aircraft fire, and above the range of Russian fighters. From Kiev south the scale of German action averages 700 sorties per day.

In the raid against Schweinfurt, 295 Fortresses attacked, of which 60 were lost. The crews, however, of 5 of the lost planes were saved over England. 573 tons of bombs were dropped. Photographs indicate destruction of all 3 plants. (A report from Stockholm purporting to come from a Swedish ball-bearing company official travelling through Germany, would seem to indicate that the raid was less successful than indicated.) The German effort thrown against the Schweinfurt raid was 700 sorties by 300 fighters. The twin-engine fighters were able to operate without refueling.

Half of the German twin-engine fighters are equipped with 21 carburetor (about 9 inches) rocket motors. These rocket motors appear to be rather successful against tight formations. They have not been used against RAF night raids, presumably because the night raiders do not fly in formation.

December 24, 1942

Mr. Frank J. Wilson
Chief, U. S. Secret Service
Treasury Department
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Wilson:

I have received the box containing travel booklets on Germany, picture post cards and various maps which were sent to your Newark Office by Mr. Paul W. Goeltz of Verona, New Jersey, together with a copy of an interoffice communication dated December 15th, relative to the matter.

We are very glad to receive these, as such material is always useful in our work. Thank you very much for sending them on and for writing me about it.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

REFER TO FILE NO. 2-14.2



OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
U. S. SECRET SERVICE

TREASURY DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON, D. C.

December 21, 1942

Colonel William J. Donovan
Director
Office of Strategic Services
Twenty-fifth and E Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

We are attaching, for such use as may be deemed proper, a box containing travel booklets on Germany, picture post cards and various maps of Germany which were sent to our Newark, New Jersey, Office by Mr. Paul W. Goelts, 8 Valhalla Way, Verona, New Jersey.

We are also enclosing a copy of an inter-office communication dated December 15, 1942, from our Newark, New Jersey, Office, which is relative to this matter. The sender has been advised of this reference.

Very truly yours,

Frank J. Wilson
Chief, U. S. Secret Service

Enclosures
Registered Mail



Reports to [unclear]

*Germany 9563
x Hitler, 4 associates
x Field, Henry*

December 12, 1942

MEMORANDUM

From: Colonel Donovan

To: Mr. Oechner

Will you look at the attached and let us have your opinions.

W.J.D.

100

*Germany 9563
Hitler, Four Associates
Field, Henry*

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel Donovan

DATE: December 11, 1942

FROM: Major Bruce

SUBJECT:

There is attached a report on "Four Close Associates of Hitler" prepared by Dr. Henry Field, about which he wants to talk to you.

D.B.
David Bruce

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

copy in Dr. Field's

Colonel Donovan
Major Bruce

December 11, 1942

There is attached a report on "Four Close
Associates of Hitler" prepared by Dr. Henry Field,
about which he wants to talk to you.

David Bruce

RECORDED-21

INDEXED-21

SECRET
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Classified by [unclear]
Declassify on: [unclear]

014.0

✓ Spanish Fishing Craft
x French Submarines

September 29, 1942

MEMORANDUM

FROM: William J. Donovan

TO: Major David Bruce

Can we find out whether or not it is true that Spanish fishing craft are supplying a German submarine base at Labrador.

Is it true that five French submarines are granted permission by the German Armistice Commission to go to Dakar at the end of September?

German: 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000

SECRET

September 23, 1942

MEMORANDUM

There is a Mrs. Ann C. Stewart (Mrs. W. Mc. Stewart), born in Nurnberg, Bavaria, of German origin, who is working in a very confidential capacity with the British in New York. She mentions the following as being actively interested in a Particularist German Movement:

Max Barth;

Annette Kolb, the German essayist and writer;

Robert Humber, now teaching at Yale University;

Will Schaber, a Swabian newspaper editor and formerly correspondent of the *Volksrecht* Telegram Bureau, and later editor of the *Volksrecht* in Czechoslovakia;

Werner Richter, former correspondent of the *Volksrecht* (not to be confused with Prof. Werner Richter, formerly with the Ministry of Education in Prussia).

Werner Thumann, who, according to Mrs. Stewart, has swung to Particularism.

She also mentioned as a possible adherent to the program the Prince Leopold of Wittelsbach, now living in Washington, who, she says, is a friend of General Donovan's brother.

Mrs. Stewart said she believed Crown Prince Ruprecht and his son, Albrecht, were both now in Italy.

She also reported that recent news from Bavaria indicated that there was a good deal of passive resistance to the regime. According to her opinion, there is every reason to believe that a successful campaign of German Particularism, if not

- 2 -

Separatism, could be launched from Switzerland, and that there would be no dearth of people who would be glad to engage in such work.

John C. Wiley

German - 8268
captured material
* by ...
* JCS -

August 25, 1942

Colonel Norman Fiske,
The Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Public Health Building,
Washington, E. C.

Dear Norman:

We are informed that the Russians are in possession of captured German material. I suggest the advisability of ascertaining whether or not the Russians have given this both technical and scientific examination.

Don't you think it would be advisable to make an effort to obtain the results of an examination if such has been made, and if not, try to get permission for us

to do so?

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
ORGANIZATION OF INFORMATION

WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

TO: General George C. Marshall
Chief of Staff
War Department

See 322

FROM: William J. Donovan

As you may know, I have brought before the Joint Intelligence Committee the advisability of unifying our effort in the analysis and scientific examination - as opposed to technical examination - of captured war material.

In this connection, the vast field of battle in Russia unquestionably has brought it about that the Russians are in possession of a mass of captured German material - airplanes, tanks, ordnance, etc. It is incredible to believe that the Russians are not giving this both technical and scientific examination. Thus, a great field of knowledge might be opened to us, not only for our benefit, but for the benefit of the Russians themselves, since the knowledge thereby gained would help us to improve the weapons which we are sending to Russia.

As you know, various attempts have been made by our armed forces to win collaboration from the Russians in fields of intelligence, etc. An equally earnest endeavor has been made by the British armed forces in this sense. Both have remained fruitless.

There are, however, some indications of a changing attitude. We know, for instance, that Molotov returned to Moscow deeply impressed with the friendliness and lack of suspicion with which he was received - both in England and here. Since his arrival, we have been requested to undertake certain subversive operational activities from behind the Russian front. These are indications only, but it does look as if they might be slightly more ready to collaborate.

Since the requests of the armed forces in this connection have not been met by the Russians, I suggest that

SECRET

-2-

only political pressure, and that from the highest sources, could hope to succeed. You might feel that it would be well to discuss with the President whether he would not urge upon Mr. Litvinov, and ask Mr. Churchill to urge upon Maliski, the deep and mutual advantage of permitting us and the British to send a small group of experts to operate behind the fighting lines in the examination and analysis of captured material.

William J. Donovan

to: Bruce

This is a result of an instruction of W. J. D after a conversation this morning with Com. Steele - R. A. F. and me.

Please send on if you approve.

OK WJ

~~for~~ sent
7/1 From the file of
MARK R. WILSON

SECRET

-2-

only political pressure, and that from the highest sources, could hope to succeed. You might feel that it would be well to discuss with the President whether he would not urge upon Mr. Litvinov, and ask Mr. Churchill to urge upon Dalaki, the deep and mutual advantage of permitting us and the British to send a small group of experts to operate behind the fighting lines in the examination and analysis of captured material.

William J. Donovan

*German success
* Dieppe Raid
* success*

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

August 25, 1942

MEMORANDUM

TO Colonel William J. Donovan
FROM Edward S. Mason
SUBJECT Dieppe Raid

In line with our conversation yesterday evening regarding the success of the Dieppe raid I am attaching a memorandum analyzing the results, with which I agree. I am also attaching an evaluation paper by the Economics Division for publication in "The War This Week". It seems to me that the salient facts are these:

In previous extensive fighter raids over France the British have not succeeded in getting the Germans off the ground to any very considerable extent. This the Commando operation did most successfully.

In view of the admittedly large monthly German plane losses in Russia, losses which do not fall very far short of their monthly rates of production, considerable additional losses forced on them in the west are likely to produce important results.

I am inclined to believe that if two or three raids a month were staged which were as successful as the Dieppe raid they would involve, in the course of three or four months, a substantial diversion of German air strength from the Russian front. In fact I believe that the diversion of German air strength is about the only practicable way of assisting Russia by military action in the near future.

ESM

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

August 21, 1942

MEMORANDUM

To : E. S. Mason
From : W. W. Rostow

Subject : Commando Raids and the Diversion of German Air Strength

1. British daylight fighter sweeps over France, in recent months, have not imposed serious losses on the German Air Force. No major objectives were threatened, and the Germans could afford not to engage the attackers, on a large scale.
2. The raid on Dieppe, however, forced the Germans to bring into action their full air strength in the region. Very appreciable German aircraft losses were suffered. Total destroyed and damaged probably amount to about 270 aircraft, of which perhaps 100 are repairable in the course of several months. Fully one-fifth of German combat plane production for one month (1250) must be diverted to meet these losses.
3. The response of the German Air Force to the Dieppe raid suggests possible immediate Allied action, capable of diverting German strength from Russia by ground and air operations of limited liability in the West.
4. In general, air losses in support of or in defense against ground operations have proved very high. A conservative estimate, for example, covering German losses on the Eastern Front for the first ten months of the Russian-German War, places the monthly loss rate at 900 combat planes.
5. German air losses, in support of offensive operations in Russia, may thus not require the diversion of perhaps three-fourths of current production. If the bulk of current production was required to support defensive air operations in Western Europe, it is extremely unlikely that the Germans could undertake major offensives against Leningrad and the Russian armies of the center in the course of the next few weeks.
6. This might be done by a series of Commando raids in force, supported by Allied air strength.
7. Even should the Germans be convinced that these operations were not designed to establish permanent beach-heads, it would be necessary for them to use large scale air defenses; since unopposed Allied air power might, in conjunction with the Commando ground operations, result in the destruction of important defense points or naval bases, and serious, if temporary, break-throughs. In general, any land operation in Western Europe must take precedence, in German aircraft allocations, over probable offensive operations in the East.

German 206-
rain 11
Dieppe 2nd
x 11

-2-

4. Any evaluation of this plan must, of course, take into account the probable losses to be suffered in a series of large-scale Commando raids. No report of Dieppe losses is at present available. It should be noted, however, that in no other theater can Allied action be sure of evoking a full and immediate commitment by the Germans of their air strength.

German 306

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

and [unclear]

August 25, 1942

MS 43

1 [unclear]
2 Dieppe [unclear]

THE DIEPPE RAID AND GERMAN AIR STRENGTH

The United Nations' Commando raid of August 19 against German forces in Dieppe resulted in the heaviest engagement of Allied and Axis air forces since the peak of the battle of Britain in September, 1940. Prior to the raid, the German Air Force had apparently been avoiding full-scale combat with R.A.F. fighters and bombers in their sorties over France. The Dieppe raid, with its accompaniment of attack and high-altitude bombers and screens of fighter planes, forced the German Air Force to give battle as a consequence. The G.A.F. suffered casualties on a scale which has weakened German strength in air combat units, immediate reserves, or stored reserves.

The Air Ministry report for the Dieppe raid claims 28 German planes shot down, 25 "probably destroyed" and 140 damaged. Following the usual rule-of-thumb, half of the probably destroyed and 30 per cent of the damaged planes may be taken as actually destroyed, or a total of 150 German planes shot out of the air. 115 planes are treated as damaged and may be expected to be out of action for an average of two months while they undergo repairs.

Air Ministry reports do not as a rule include estimates of planes destroyed or damaged on the ground or the operational accidents which inevitably occur in an engagement of the character of Dieppe. Flying Force-planes of the U.S. Army Air Force attacked a German fighter airbase at Abbeville, and while no claim was made of destruction or damage to planes on the field, planes undergoing repair were doubtless destroyed or damaged as a result of hits on hangars, and flying accidents incurred as a result of damage to runways. With the inclusion of a conservative allowance for losses on the ground and in accidents behind the lines, it may be estimated that the Dieppe raid resulted in the total loss of 170 German planes and damage to 140 more.

G.A.F. losses in the one-day Dieppe action on August 19 were undoubtedly, at the average monthly rate of loss in the western Europe theater for the three

SECRET

- 2 -

previous months. Air Ministry reports of enemy losses in the Metropolitan Area, which include German bombers shot down over England as well as enemy planes destroyed by the R.A.F. over the Channel, France and the Low Countries present the following figures:

	Destroyed	Probably Destroyed	Damaged	Estimated Total Destroyed/
May	10	23	69	134
June	130	37	126	304
July	67	18	33	70
Average	10	26	78	136

The apparent hesitance of the G.A.F. to engage the R.A.F. in western Europe on a full scale, until forced to do so by the Stoppo raid, may be explained by the fact that the German position in air reserves has been somewhat strained. That this is the case is attested by the operational intelligence of the R.A.F. and by the fact that G.A.F. losses of combat planes in all theaters, estimated on a minimum basis, were little short of production in May and in excess of output in June and July.

German airplane production, according to accepted estimates, is currently about 3000 planes a month. Of this amount some 600 are training types and another 100 transports. Combat plane production is estimated at 1000 monthly. Three hundred of these craft are probably required each month for operational training. On the basis of these estimates, roughly 260 combat airplanes are available each month for allocation to theaters of war or to build up reserves.

The R.A.F. engages the Luftwaffe in western Europe, in the Mediterranean, including Malta, Sicily, Libya, Egypt, etc., and in Northern Norway. Air Ministry reports of losses in these three areas for the months of May, June and July were as follows:

✓ Includes customary proportions of total losses in "Probably Destroyed" and "Damaged", together with losses for operational non-combat losses.

SECRET

- 3 -

	Destroyed	Probably Destroyed	Damaged	Estimated Total Destroyed
May	283	88	228	370
June	288	74	216	360
July	352	110	312	559
Average	308	91	266	450

German air losses on the Eastern Front are quantitatively more important than casualties inflicted by the R.A.F. Unfortunately, the only information coming from that theater consists of German and Russian admissions of their own losses and claims of casualties inflicted on the enemy:

	German Losses		Russian Losses	
	German Admissions	Russian Claims	Russian Admissions	German Claims
May	182	1,418	500	1,551
June	165	1,640	612	1,538
July	211	1,548	803	2,305
Average	186	1,536	640	1,877

Russian claims of German losses may be taken to be an exaggeration of the truth because of the absence of evidence that German air strength is declining at a rate indicated by these figures. German admissions of their own losses, on the other hand, are too low in relation to the known intensity of air fighting on the Eastern Front. Somewhat between the two figures are Russian admissions of their own losses. This series may be taken as a rough minimum measure of German casualties for two reasons: 1) the Russians are naturally unwilling to render comfort to the enemy and may therefore be expected to admit as losses no higher than those known to be suffered by the Germans; 2) if Russian losses have been as high as admitted, German losses must be

✓ Available summary proportions of total losses in "probably destroyed" and "damaged", together with allowance for operational non-contact losses.

SECRET

- 4 -

equally large since Germany has not won clear superiority of the air along the Eastern Front.

If the conservative assumption is made that the Russian admissions of their own losses may be taken as a measure of total German casualties on the Eastern Front, including losses on the ground and suffered in non-combat accidents, a minimum estimate for total German losses of combat-type planes in theaters of war may be compared with estimated production available for combat as follows:

	Destroyed by R.A.F. and in Non- Combat Operations	Destroyed on Eastern Front	Total Losses	Production
May	576	500	670	950
June	588	618	678	950
July	588	603	1,568	950
Average	583	640	1,070	950

This calculation, it may be observed, makes no allowance for the fact that a growing number of damaged aircraft are being lost to the G.A.F. for an average period of two months while the scale of operations is rising. Later, when the intensity of air battle has remained stable for a time or begins to decline, the recovery of damaged planes from repair depots will equal or exceed the loss of planes as sustained because of new damage.

On the basis of the foregoing estimates, which moderate rather than exaggerate recent German losses, G.A.F. strength declined 180 planes on the average each month during May, June and July. The Dieppe raid with its further loss of 170 planes, will bring the net depletion of German strength to 350 planes, if the August level of wastage on other counts equals that for the three previous months. Whatever the proper estimate of German front-line plane strength - and this question still engenders differences of opinion, its diminution by 300 planes a month even for a short period will appreciably reduce it.

Dieppe Raid and German Air Strength

Dieppe Raid on August 19 marked heaviest engagement of Allied and Axis air forces since peak of Battle of Britain in September, 1940.

155 German planes shot out of the air; 117 planes damaged and will be out of action for average of two months. German plane casualties thus weakened strength in air combat units, immediate reserves and stored reserves.

German plane losses in one-day Dieppe action were considerably above average monthly rate of loss in Western Europe theater for the three previous months.

Average for three previous months was 88 destroyed, 23 probably destroyed, 75 damaged, or a total destroyed of 136.

German plane production in accepted estimates is currently about 2000 planes a month. Of these 650 are training types and 100 transports - combat plane production therefore is estimated at 1250 monthly. Three hundred of these are probably required each month for operational training. Therefore, 950 combat airplanes are estimated to be available each month for various theaters or to build up reserves.

In Western Europe, Mediterranean and Northern Norway theaters German plane losses averaged for May, June and July: 266 destroyed, 91 probably destroyed, 252 damaged - estimated total destroyed 430.

It is estimated that for May, June and July German plane losses averaged 430 by R.A.F. and non-combat operations, 640 on Eastern Front.

Therefore, Germans averaged 1,070 planes destroyed in each of these three months, against a production of 950 per month.

German air strength decreased 130 planes on average in May, June and July. This, added to 170 planes lost at Dieppe, brings depletion to 300. Regardless of first-line plane strength, diminution by 300 planes a month even for a short period will appreciably weaken it.