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OSS Form No. 4006

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3.							
4.		William J. Donovan per [illegible]					
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[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]: Director, [illegible]

[illegible]: [illegible] for prevention [illegible]
[illegible] and [illegible]

1. The [illegible] and after being reviewed by our [illegible] it is forwarded to you for your [illegible].

2. [illegible]

3. [illegible] what is in [illegible] informed British citizens. [illegible] our [illegible] of [illegible].

Edward M. Lawrence
[illegible]
Colonel, Infantry

Incl.

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OSS
Form 68 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE May 9, 1944 **REC'D** 5/9/44 5:24 p.m.

TO GUSTAV, CAIRO

X PRIORITY
ROUTINE
DEFERRED

FROM OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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(CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR) DIRECTOR

(FOR INFORMATION) SECRETARIAT, MARKHAM, X-2, SCRIBNER, MEDCO

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#32824. 109 for West or Toulmin alone.

On the 17th of last month, the Office of the Minister Resident MEF, Military Division, GHQ, MEF, announced to USAFINE in communication MIL/40/13 that the following organizations have been formulated, under authority of SACMED: (1) a committee on Balkan Affairs, (2) a Sub-Committee on Balkan Operations, and (3) a Sub-Committee on Balkan Relief, which will take the place, respectively, of (1) the Committee on Middle East Defense, to the extent to which it is acted upon in the Balkans, (2) the Special Operations and Special Operations and Special Operations Working Committee, and (3) the Committee on Administration of Territories in the Balkans. On the 25th of last month, was sent to the Dept. of State by MacVeagh, a cable containing the text of this letter. Two days later he sent a cable containing the text of HQ USAFIME's reply, dated the 25th of last month, which designated the Service to sit on the committees as observers and proposed that representation also be given to the Office of War Information.

Kindly read these communications over carefully. You are not to initiate any action toward obtaining representation of the OSS. I intend to notify you further after having consulted the State Dept. Under no circumstances are you to commit the Office of Strategic Services in any way whatsoever.

SECRET

D: 5/9/44 7:08 p.m.

WD

INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

AIRGRAM

Dispatched: April 28, 1944

From: American Embassy near Government of Greece, Cairo.

Date: April 27, 1944

Received: [illegible]

SECRET

Secretary of State,
Washington

A-37, April 27, 1944, 4 pm.

My A-34, April 25, 2 pm.

The following is the text of the reply dated April 25, 1944 transmitted by USAFIME to the communication from the British Resident Minister concerning the establishment of a Balkan Affairs Committee and two sub-committees, quoted in my airgram under reference.

"HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN
THE MIDDLE EAST

Cairo, Egypt
25 April 1944

Subject: Balkan Affairs Committee

To : Secretary, Middle East Defence Committee,
Office of the Minister Resident (ME)
Military Division, GHQ MEF.

1. Receipt is acknowledged of letter, subject as above, file MIL/40/13, dated April 17, 1944.

2. On the Balkan Affairs Committee, U.S. Service representatives will [illegible] the status of observers only. Representatives [illegible] of the Commanding General, USAFIME and [illegible] Intelligence Division, Headquarters, USAFIME, will [illegible] meetings.

3. [illegible] the Balkan Operations Sub-committee will [illegible] the former Special Operations Committee and [illegible] Working Committee.

4. U.S.

A-37, April 27, 1944

From: American Embassy near Government of Greece, Cairo.

SECRET

4. U. S. Service representatives on the Balkan Relief Sub-Committee will attend in the status of observers only. Representatives of the International Division, Headquarters, USAFIME, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 Headquarters, USAFIME, will attend.

5. Notice of meetings, minutes, etc., of the Balkan Affairs Committee and Balkan Relief Sub-committee should be sent to the International Division of this headquarters. Those of the Balkans operations Sub-committee should be sent to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Headquarters, USAFIME.

6. It is suggested that the Office of War Information be represented on the various committees that are being formed.

7. This is to advise that there are no senior U. S. Army Air Force or U.S. Navy representatives in the positions as implied by the terms of reference of the various committees. The only U.S. service representation will be by USAFIME.

8. If the terms of reference of the various committees are changed or further directives are received by this headquarters, the U.S. services' position on this matter will be reviewed.

For the Commanding General:

CLYDE D. KEITH
Colonel, G.S.C.
Chief of Staff

MacVeagh

AIRGRAM

Dispatched: April 26, 1944

From: American Embassy, Greece, Cairo, Egypt

Date: April 25, 1944

Received:

SECRET

3-B-876

Secretary of State,
Washington.

A-34, April 25, 1944, 2 pm.

With reference to my telegram no.124, April 21, 6 pm., I quote below the text of the communication no. MIL/40/13 of April 17, 1944, together with its enclosures, from the office of the British Minister Resident to the Commanding General, USAFME, concerning the establishment of a Balkan Affairs Committee, and two sub-committees for Operations and Relief. The text of the reply of USAFME thereto has not yet been made available to the Embassy but will be transmitted as soon as received. My latest information, given me by the Chief of Staff personally today, is to the effect that USAFME will reply that it is authorized to attend meetings of the Balkan Affairs Committee and the Balkan Relief Committee in an observational capacity only. As it has been represented on the previously existing Special Operations Committee, it will continue to be represented on the sub-committee now set up to replace that body.

"Subject: BALKAN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

Office of the Minister
Resident (ME) Military
Division, GHQ MEF
Tel no. ME 702

Ref: MIL/40/13

17th April, 1944

Commanding General,
USAFME.

"Under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre, there have been set up in the Middle East the following Committees:-

(a) Balkan Affairs Committee
(b) Balkan Operations Sub-Committee
(c) Balkan Relief Sub-Committee

2. The Composition and Terms of Reference of these Committees are set out in Appendices A, B and C to this letter.

3. Balkan

..-34, .pril 25, 1944

From: merican Embassy to Greece

3. Balkan Affairs Committee

It should be noted that for the conduct of affairs in the Balkans this Committee will replace the Middle East Defence Committee, though the latter will continue to function as regards matters which affect only the Middle East.

4. Balkan Operations Sub-committee

This committee replaces the existing Special Operations Committee and the Special Operations Working Committee.

5. Balkan Relief Sub-committee

This Committee replaces the existing Administration of Territories in the Balkans Committee.

6. It is very much hoped that it will eventually be possible to have full American representation on these Committees. At present it is understood that Service representation only has been agreed to by the American authorities, and the composition of the Committees has been adjusted on this basis. It is proposed that American Political and Economic representatives should be invited to attend meetings as observers.

7. The original intention was that the Secretariat for the Committees should be provided by and form part of the Middle East Defence Committee Secretariat, but that an American representative should attend the meetings and assist in the drafting and agreeing of the minutes. If you decide that you would like to appoint such a representative now, we shall be very glad of his help.

8. I would be grateful if you could let me know in due course to whom I should send notices of meetings, minutes, etc., and who will be the normal representatives for the Services on these Committees.

/s/ H. G. Curran
/t/ (H. G. CURRAN)
Colonel
Secretary, Middle East Defence Committee.

-34, April 5, 1944 From:

APPENDIX 'A'

"BALKAN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

1. COMPOSITION

Minister Resident in the Middle East - Chairman

Flag Officer Levant and Eastern Mediterranean (or his nominee

Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Forces (or his nominee)

Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Middle East (or his nominee

H.M. Ambassador to Greece

H.M. Ambassador to Yugoslavia (or his nominee)

Mr. C. E. Steel

Senior Officer of the United States Navy in the Middle East

Commanding General, USAFME

Senior Office of the United States Army Air Forces in the Middle East

Head of F.E.M.E

Director of Balkan Supply Centre

Secretary to the Minister Resident in the Middle East.

2. OTHER REPRESENTATION.

The Committee is empowered to invite the attendance of such other individuals as it may from time to time consider desirable for examination of specific problems.

3. TERMS OF REFERENCE.

The Committee will transmit information and where appropriate forward recommendations on Balkan matters to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre. Within the terms of policy

directives

..-34, April 25, 1944 From: American Embassy to Greece

directives received from time to time from Higher Authority, the Committee will coordinate and direct the day to day action to be taken in pursuance of the aims of the United Nations in Greece, (including Crete and the Greek Islands in the Aegean), the Dodecanese Islands, Bulgaria, Roumania, Hungary, and, for relief matters only, in Yugoslavia and Albania. In carrying out these functions the Committee will have particular regard to:

a) The activities of Force 133, OSS and FME in relation to the political situation prevailing in these territories.

b) The necessity for affording the maximum practicable measure of efficient relief to the populations of Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece, (including Crete and the Greek Islands in the Aegean) when German military occupation of these territories ceases.

4. SECRETARIAT

The Secretariat will for the present be provided by and from part of the Secretariat of the Middle East Defence Committee

APPENDIX 'B'

BALKAN OPERATIONS SUB-COMMITTEE

1. COMPOSITION

Brigadier General Staff (Operations), GHQ MEF -CHAIRMAN

Office of Flag Officer, Levant and Eastern Mediterranean

Headquarters, Royal Air Force, Middle East

H.M. Embassy to Greece

H.M. Embassy to Yugoslavia

Mr. C. E. Steel (or his representative)

U. S. Navy in the Middle East

USAFME

U.S.A.A.F. in the Middle East

Force 133

From: American [illegible] to Greece

-34, April 8, 1944

Force 133

Office of Strategic Services, Middle East

Political Warfare Executive, Middle East

Office of the Minister Resident in the Middle East

Joint Intelligence Committee, Middle East

Ministry of Economic Warfare, Middle East

2. OTHER REPRESENTATION

The sub-committee is empowered to invite the attendance of such other individuals as it may from time to time consider desirable for examination of specific problems.

3. TERMS OF REFERENCE

(a) The Sub-committee will be responsible to the Balkan Affairs committee for:-

(i) Ensuring that the conduct of Special Operations in, and based on, Greece, Crete, the Greek Islands in the Aegean, the Dodecanese Islands, Bulgaria, Roumania, Hungary, and Turkey is consistent with the policy of His Majesty's Government, and the United States Government, conforms to the Directives issued from time to time by the appropriate authorities in the Central Mediterranean, London and Washington, and is properly coordinated.

(ii) Coordinating these activities with other military and paramilitary operations, and with political warfare activities, in these territories.

(b) The Sub-committee will make recommendations to the Balkan Affairs Committee as necessary for the modification of existing Special Operations policy, and for the formulation of new Special Operations policy affecting the territories enumerated in para (a)(i) above, in the light of changes in the internal situation in these territories.

(c) The

A-34, April 25, 1944 From: American Embassy to Greece

(c) The Sub-committee will dispose of such other questions affecting the Middle East Command as may result from Allied operational activities in the territories (other than Turkey) enumerated in para (a)(i) above, except such questions as fall within the scope of the Balkan Relief Sub-committee. In performing this function the Sub-committee will be guided by the relevant policy directives issued by Higher Authority and will refer questions when necessary to the Balkan Affairs Committee for decision.

4. SECRETARIAT

The Secretariat will for the present be provided by and form part of the Secretariat of the Middle East Defence Committee.

APPENDIX 'C'

BALKAN RELIEF SUB-COMMITTEE

1. COMPOSITION

Commander, Allied Military Headquarters (Balkans)-Chairman

Office of the Flag Officer Levant and Eastern Mediterranean

General Headquarters, Middle East Forces

Headquarters, Royal Air Force, Middle East

H.M. Embassy to Greece

H.M. Embassy to Yugoslavia

Mr. C.E. Steel (or his representative)

U. S. Navy in the Middle East

USAFME

USA F in the Middle East

Balkan Supply Centre

Middle East Supply Centre

Office of the Minister Resident in the Middle East

2. Other

A-54, pril 25, 1944 From: merican mbassy to Greece

2. OTHER REPRESENTATION

The Sub-committee is empowered to invite the attendance of such other individuals as it may from time to time consider desirable for examination of specific problems.

3. TERMS OF REFERENCE

The Sub-committee will be responsible to the Balkans Affairs Committee for coordinating relief measures (including disposal of refugees) for the benefit of the populations of Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece (including Crete and the Greek Islands in the Aegean). In carrying out this function the Sub-Committee:-

(a) Will be guided by such policy directives as are issued from time to time by Higher Authority, by the instructions issued by Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Forces, and by the conclusions of the Balkan Affairs Committee.

(b) Will have particular regard to:-

(i) The procurement and the availability in the Middle East area of adequate relief supplies.

(ii) Facilities for transporting relief supplies to the above territories and for discharge and storage on arrival.

(iii) Facilities, especially sea and land transportation facilities, for internal distribution of relief supplies on arrival in the above territories.

(c) Will, as appropriate, consult the interests and the wishes of the emigre Greek and Yugoslav Governments through the normal channels.

(d) Will bear in mind the necessity of ensuring that responsibility for the execution of relief measures in the above territories passes from the Allied military authorities to the civil authorities (Allied and/or indigenous) smoothly and as soon as possible.

4. SECRETARIAT

The Secretariat will for the present be provided by and form part of the Secretariat of the Middle East Defence Committee.

MacVeagh

P/ad

29 October 1943

Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Grace:

I am attaching a memorandum on the [illegible] situation which I think you should [illegible] to the President. Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

SECRET

29 October 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Referring to my previous letters of [illegible] and October 28, here is additional information on the [illegible] situation. The following [illegible] Albanian [illegible] situation:

"1. Among both Republicans and Royalists, [illegible] unbound confidence in the statements made in [illegible] by Premier Molotov and Secretary of State Hull. [illegible] Foreign Secretary Eden's reservations about [illegible] caused disquiet.

"2. Concerning boundary problems, it is [illegible] that the British, because of their interest in the Balkans, have secretly recognized the persistent claim of Greek representatives in London and Cairo. Albanian claim on Kossova in the North are still made, since the Patriots do not recognize Italian seizure of this region.

"3. Distrust is created by the fact that Italy has not been allowed to join the United Nations. They argue that their acceptance among the United Nations is justified by their guerilla operations which preceded actual Italian occupation. They are irritated by the granting of cobelligerency status to Italy.

"4. Every party agrees that it is extremely essential for a government to be established. The Republicans desire a National Committee, similar to that of France, under the leadership of Fannoli, in the United States; Mirach Ivanaj at Istanbul; Mitrad Ferscheri or Mehdi Frasheri, Albania. The Royalists desire only King Zog. Some Republicans feel that as a final expedient a government which included King Zog would be better than no government at all, but this only with misgivings and as an utter emergency. The popular feeling is certainly not monarchist but democratic.

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"5. Concerning the creation of an Albanian Legion, as in the first World War, failure of Otto of Austria regarded irrelevant as Albania is not a satellite of the Axis but rather a victim."

William J. Donovan
Director

SECRET

27 October 1943

Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Grace:

Attached is a memorandum for the President on the Nelson situation. Would you please see that he receives it? Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

SECRET

28 October 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

With reference to my memorandum of October 25th, here is additional information on the Balkan situation:

"1. All political leaders, with the exception of the fighting forces, are regarded apathetically by the people. The fighting forces are composed of two parts - the Cetniks, led by Mihailovich, and the Partisans, led by Tito. Nearly all the Cetnik units are east of the Tara and Drina Rivers in old Serbia. Their strength is customarily exaggerated. Their greatest strength is given as 15,000 by the Deputy Commander for Mihailovich in South Dalmatia, Colonel Lujovich, who came here a short time ago. These men are nearly all Serbians. Disturbances among the population are created by Mihailovich's title as Jugoslav commander-in-chief and Minister of War, which is obviously opposed to fact.

2. The Partisans are led by Tito, whose true name is Josip Broz. Their official designation is the National Army of Liberation. They are made up of men from every region of the country and they are engaged in hostilities in every part of the country, even including old Serbia. This is in favorable contrast to Mihailovich's relative lack of activity and narrow field. Each day, Tito's forces are growing. Two Italian divisions, the Garibaldi and the Venezian, joined his forces following the fall of Italy, and added considerably to Tito's supplies. The chief fields of Partisan activities against the Nazi are West Crotia, Bosnia, Dalmatia and Slovenia.

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"3. Included in the political aims of the Partisans is the establishment of a federated Jugoslavia with a government selected by democratic elections. This aim is extremely popular. There is no factual foundation for the allegation of communist made against the Partisans. Such inclinations are found only among a small part of the rank and file or the leaders.

"4. The Government-in-Exile anticipates that Mihailovitch, with assistance from the Allies, will reestablish the monarchy with the present cabinet and with Pan-Serbian inclinations. This is stated in confidence by General Givkovith, Deputy of the King as Commander in Chief, and by Prime Minister Purich. The Government is not representative of the population, and causes controversy between factions which frequently terminate in grave clashes. The people are irritated that the United States and Britain protect the Government-in-Exile. With most of the Slovenes, Croatians and Serbians the prestige of Britain has seriously suffered. These people are also firmly against General Givkovith, who, under King Alexander, was Dictator.

"5. Nedich's puppet government in Serbia is extremely disliked and Pavelich in Croatia is spiritedly scorned and hated. Pavelich is backed by his Ustashi militia, a small number of the people and by Nazi military forces.

"6. The United States is considered as reactionary by the Serbians. We are more amicably regarded than are the British, by other Jugoslavs. They expect us to give material support, both during and subsequent to the war, particularly medicines and food, which they vitally require. Tito made a recent complaint

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about the shortage of supplies and has stated that supplies receive priority over the sending of more Allied personnel.

"7. Outside of old Serbia and with the exception of some of the Slovene clericals, who are a tiny part of the Slovenes, the monarchy is quite unpopular today. King Peter is popularly believed to be a youth under the control of political and officer cliques possessing Pan-Serbian inclinations. The population is irritated by the sizeable allowance made to Peter and particularly by his becoming engaged, during the war, to a Serbian.

"8. There is no genuine understanding between the Government-in-exile and the Soviet Union. The primary barrier to such an understanding is anti-Soviet. Although it is frequently stated in rumors, there is no definite evidence which can be obtained of an accord between the Partisans and the Soviet Union.

"9. Generally stated, most of the Jugoslavs desire a democratic Government and a Federated Jugoslavia, covering Slovene areas taken by Germany and Italy after the first world war. They are not adamant on the means of accomplishing the former aim."

William J. Donovan
Director

SECRET

25 October 1943

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

Attached is a memorandum for the President which contains information we have had to obtain. Would you please see that he receives it? Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

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25 October 1943

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In accordance with your wish, I have had made an evaluation of the causes for the deterioration of the Greek situation. I am advised by my advisers that the British in that area continue this evaluation:

"1. Food: [illegible] of the preparation of the crop of 1941-42 which [illegible] not [illegible] prior to the appeal of [illegible].

"2. Leap: There is no doubt that an overwhelming democratic sentiment exists in the Greeks. It is felt that the King return prior to the holding of elections will only provoke incident and consolidate the opposition.

"3. Dodecanese: [illegible] that the Greeks will get the Dodecanese Islands. The current British policy of keeping the Greeks out of participation in military [illegible] and in future civil administration of the Dodecanese alienating both Dodecanese and Greek sentiment.

"4. The choice of Greece in [illegible] a break against the British due to the refusal by the Middle East Command to equip Greek troops in the Greek Islands.

"5. The Greeks are afraid that their national interests are placed in jeopardy by the establishment of Italy as a co-belligerent.

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All Greeks hate and deplore this arrangement. Based on several episodes that have taken place in the islands and in Greece itself, the Greeks keenly differ at the Italians [illegible].

"6. The communist-led [illegible] the largest organization in Greece. Fighting [illegible] taking place between the Nationalist [illegible] and the EAM during the current partial evacuation to [illegible] by the Nazis. It is claimed that the communist leaders of EAM with a view to taking over [illegible] Greece is freed and attempting to consolidate resistance organizations."

William J. Donovan
Director

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[illegible] 18 [illegible] of the Central [illegible]
apparently [illegible] was actually [illegible]
power [illegible] adjacent war [illegible]
political [illegible] around the [illegible]
through [illegible] the [illegible] such [illegible]
the [illegible]

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To: Gen. W. J. Donovan
From: S. E. Gleason

The following notes prepared in the Current Intelligence Staff may be of use to you. No classified material was used in this preparation.

ITALY

[illegible]

3rd - [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
opposition [illegible]

[illegible] - Italy [illegible]
Italian fleet comes into allied [illegible]
days.

9th - Allied forces of 5th Army [illegible] of Salerno; immediately [illegible] strong opposition.
British troops supported by [illegible] Taranto. Move rapidly [illegible] the heel [illegible].
General Montgomery's [illegible] south against [illegible] and demolition [illegible], [illegible] Germans quickly reinforce their [illegible] begin vigorous counter [illegible] allied at splitting allied forces [illegible] wedge straight through to sea [illegible] the allied beachhead [illegible] point [illegible] Agropoli.

13-14th - Allied position at Salerno [illegible] Salerno under heavy [illegible] fire, [illegible].
Heavy German pressure in center [illegible] into allied position, advancing to [illegible] at the sea, this advance finally checked [illegible] fire of guns from allied warships off-shore, arrival of [illegible] allied reinforcements and [illegible] concentration of an intense aerial barrage in the battle area involving up to [illegible],000 sorties and 1,[illegible]00 tons bombs dropped in [illegible] hour period.

16th - By 16th Allies were in a position to repulse successfully German counterattacks from all directions and to assume offensive which in general they have held ever since.

16th - General Montgomery's advance patrols achieve junction with British forces in Taranto Sector and General [illegible]'s right flank at Salerno on the 17th.
Axis of the main allied battle line which at Salerno had been running roughly north-south now gradually swings around to east-west direction, with Nocera, north of Salerno as pivot point.

by this time German air activity [illegible] very great and heavy [illegible], will [illegible] operations [illegible] in scope and effective [illegible] at [illegible].

1st [illegible] rates this [illegible] of major opposition [illegible] strong [illegible].

7th [illegible] not critical [illegible].

[illegible] 5th [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] currently being [illegible] of the [illegible] peninsula. They will [illegible] be hampered by Allied air [illegible] communications [illegible], and [illegible] Allies in the [illegible] (e.g. Naples) will have better [illegible] to the battlefront than they, who must depend on [illegible] in the [illegible] plain. Weather will be a major [illegible] problem in air operations.

<u>Interesting point</u>: Why [illegible] its available strength (available [illegible]) to try to liquidate completely the Allied beachhead at Salerno? Answers, probably, (1) serious [illegible] (2) [illegible] just a feint (3) decision to avoid a decisive struggle until Allies themselves had increased their own commitments.

[illegible]

1. [illegible] reaction with [illegible] Italian [illegible] operation, [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] of [illegible] points.

[illegible]

Italy Political

[illegible] confusion, [illegible] difficult [illegible] Italy [illegible] strongly anti- [illegible] Germany.

Allied and Italian [illegible] across the Italian [illegible] seem to be [illegible] with [illegible] view of [illegible] will be grounded and [illegible] the Allies and Italy will [illegible] new form of democratic [illegible] is restored.

The Italian participation of [illegible] seems destined to [illegible] both either in Italy [illegible] Italian resistance to the Germans in the occupied zones as well as elsewhere.

Because he is the perfect picture of a deposed dictator it seems very doubtful that Mussolini can prove to be a valuable weapon in German hands.

The Balkans:

The Italian surrender compelled [illegible] to affect major redistribution of [illegible] forces in order to replace the Italian occupation forces, the bulk of which [illegible] without opposition.

Faced with the alternative of [illegible] available forces mainly over [illegible] such as the Dalmatian coast, [illegible] or concentrating [illegible] ports [illegible] communication lines, [illegible] the latter alternative, [illegible] groups [illegible] control. [illegible] Ljubljana and Gorizia.

Anzio Beachhead:

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Far East:

Successful [illegible] to support protecting Japan on the eastern flank, such as the attack on [illegible] Islands, 14-19 September; and [illegible], 1 October. [illegible] also to enemy installations in the [illegible] Gilbert and Nauru Island, 12-19 September.

No opposition from Japanese surface craft during September. Light engagement with forces [illegible] Solomon Islands.

In New Guinea, the capture of Lae, [illegible] Finschhafen, a strong new Allied offensive. Heavy air attacks on Rabaul.

In the Solomon Area, last Japanese resistance ends at Vella Lavella and Japanese evacuate Kolombangara Island. Up plans at Treasury Island [illegible].

Very heavy and successful raid on [illegible].

In China the 14th Airforce has been carrying out successful attacks against Haifong.

A reconnaissance area in Japanese homeland bombed on 1 September.

Lord Mountbatten has arrived in India to take over the Southeast Asia command. Conferences between Mountbatten, Stilwell, Somervell, etc.

A crisis in relations between the Chinese government and the Chinese Communists was successfully passed and the threat of civil war was averted.

Russia:

The continuing Russian offensive [illegible] in ousting the Germans from the Caucasus and driving them back to the line of the Dnieper throughout the Middle reaches. The Germans show [illegible] to hold the Crimea and the mainland [illegible] to the north. The German withdrawal [illegible] and orderly, potentially dangerous [illegible] been avoided, and relatively [illegible] been taken by the Russians.

A Russian winter drive [illegible] the Allies as seem as likely.

Of different political development [illegible] the formation of the Free German Committee [illegible] and the German Officers Union, [illegible] important German Junker officers of [illegible] return to the Fatherland [illegible] diplomatic corps government [illegible] Tehran tripartite conference [illegible]

Air Offensive:

[illegible] Germany [illegible] Germany and [illegible] countries. [illegible] to [illegible] Allied [illegible] to realize by [illegible] German industrial [illegible] been [illegible] heavily, they [illegible] Allied [illegible] more important plants, especially [illegible] aircraft plants, to be vulnerable [illegible] the [illegible] by the Allies [illegible] the opportunity to successful attack [illegible] German industrial targets as well [illegible] with sources of German [illegible] oil fields.

The installation of air [illegible] Allied [illegible] forces may [illegible] economic [illegible] represents [illegible] of control on the [illegible] front to try to meet effectively the increasing stresses and strains [illegible] being placed upon the German resilient [illegible] by Allied actions.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: General W. J. Donovan DATE: October 25, 1943

FROM: Whitney H. Shepardson

SUBJECT: Col. Amoss' memo (undated) received October 21, 1943, subject "Special Intelligence Project".

1. I have read the above memorandum with considerable interest.

2. I recommend (at your request) that Macfarland be instructed by Col. Amoss how to build on the "fragment of the old Greek Irregular Project" with which he is in touch.

3. There seems to me no reason why the project should be "special", or handled in any way different from the way London handles its foreign sources, or different from the way in which our Mission in Spain deals with elements there.

4. I am most anxious that the project cease to be irregular, or special, and that the sources (probably of real value) be treated like other sources of value.

Whitney H. Shepardson

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SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE PROJECT

Contention is made that Balkan intelligence presently flows from controlled sources; that original intelligence is scant.

It is further contended that no independent source of Balkan information exists. (Exception: [illegible], through a fragment of the old Greek Irregular Project [illegible] sources, does receive some valuable intelligence [illegible] channels through Cairo.)

It is submitted that a completely secret system under the direct orders of the Director or his Deputy is required for these purposes:

1. Check on authenticity of intelligence currently received from friendly foreign sources.

2. Maintain an independent reporting system.

3. Have a highly mobile organization ready at once to secure intelligence which, in emergency, may be required by the President, the Chiefs of Staff, or by ranking cabinet officers.

Such a system exists. It has performed and has been proven. A part of the system has been "blown". A major part is completely unknown either to our allies or even to OSS

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officers except the Director and his immediate [illegible].

This system provided OSS with its first original intelligence from behind enemy lines and at a time when absence of a directive apparently "froze" operations. This system had contacts in Greece, Germany, Austria, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Spain and Portugal and these agents reported from time to time and these reports were disseminated through regular OSS sources without disclosure of their irregular source.

Types of intelligence reported were: [illegible] information; Morale of civilians and troops in Central Europe and in occupied countries; Political moves in Germany, Greece, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.

This system suffered the first OSS casualties when four of its agents were executed in Athens.

Though it is unknown to our British allies, it was by activities of agents of this system that the British air ferry service between Greece and Turkey was established, manned and operated -- and, until March 1943, controlled. (Capt in Zangas, R.H.N. and his staff.) This air ferry service, operated at virtually no cost to the United States was then taken over by combined British agencies.

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Russian intelligence was reported by this system through regular OSS channels.

Through this system, the Chief of the German intelligence system was contacted and (inadvertently) the British P.W.E. was enabled to frame him before Hitler.

Through this system Greek morale has been [illegible] despite famine and pestilence by the uninterrupted [illegible] of its agents that the might of America was gathering and soon would be felt.

Through this system, the Commanding General of U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East received information that led him to bomb airfields in Saloniki and Athens for the sole purpose of inflicting military damage and raising Greek morale.

Through this system the Greek Brigades were penetrated at the request of the American Commanding General who received resulting intelligence as an emergency service of OSS. (These reports were also filed with OSS, Washington.)

Through agents of this system, OSS was able to stop a revolution, prevent further bloodshed between our allies (Greek and British) and to stop the damaging German propaganda line in Greece.

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Through this system, the United States Anti-Submarine command received valuable intelligence.

The volume of intelligence was great. Dissemination was through regular OSS sources -- without exception.

It is submitted that this system should be preserved; its confidences protected; its operations executed in utmost secrecy.

This system taps -- and can control -- five very vital and completely independent chains of agents. This system has its own trained agents in the Balkan States working into Italy.

There is only one OSS official presently in the Middle East even remotely capable of directing these activities and only one equipped by experience to assist him. And the writer is the only person able to turn over these activities.

Recommendation is made that the writer turn over to Mr. Lanning Macfarland as much of these operations as can be given him with the consent of the key aides.

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[illegible]

[illegible] OF THE [illegible] IN THE BALKANS [illegible]

OF ITALY

Statement of the problem

1. To state the present situation in the Balkans [illegible] the probable consequences of the collapse of Italy.

Discussion

2. Definition of "the Balkans". For the purpose of this [illegible] the Balkans include Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania, Greece, Turkey and the islands in the Aegean Sea.

3. Existing political control. All of the Balkan governments except Turkey are at present under Axis control, [illegible]. In Yugoslavia (Serbia and Croatia), Greece and [illegible] governments are controlled under the orders of German [illegible] authorities. In Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria the government [illegible] office are composed of Nazi collaborators, [illegible] or diplomatic representatives. In Turkey the government [illegible] of course [illegible] a common but is in addition [illegible] cooperating fairly well with the United States. In Yugoslavia and Greece the effective power is controlled by existing governments [illegible] much restricted by anti-Axis national guerrilla forces operating in [illegible] many localities.

4. Existing military control. In Yugoslavia, Greece and Albania the effective military forces are German or Italian, with a small Axis force officered by Germans. In Hungary and Rumania the national armies are to a large extent mobilized but have suffered very heavy losses in Russia, where small contingents are still operating. The Bulgarian army is intact and concentrated in Bulgarian territory or contiguous areas.

In Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria airfields, transportation [illegible] and important industrial establishments are guarded by special German forces. The Turkish army is mobilized and concentrated in Eastern Thrace and along the Syrian frontier. [illegible] are believed to lack adequate modern equipment [illegible], aircraft artillery, and tanks in very [illegible] equipment of a complicated nature.

5. Axis forces in the Balkans. German forces in [illegible] variously estimated at the equivalent [illegible] majority of these forces are still [illegible] (the Greek), the Salonika area and Serbia, [illegible] tachments in Bulgaria, [illegible] special military importance. Italian forces are [illegible] stationed in the Greek Islands, Greece, Albania and [illegible] coast and immediate hinterland. The number of Italian [illegible] to be very low.

6. Strength of Balkan armies. The Hungarian army consists of [illegible] divisions, the Rumanian of 27, the Bulgarian [illegible] and the Croatian of approximately 10. As noted above, these armies are all deficient in [illegible] mechanical equipment and consequently are totally [illegible] for offensive operations against a well trained and well equipped enemy. Only in Croatia is there a Balkan force officered by Germans.

7. Basis of collaboration with Axis. In Hungary and Bulgaria the governments are collaborating because this policy originally seemed to offer the prospect of territorial gains in line with long-standing revisionist aims. Fear of German attack and belief in the inevitability of German dominance at least economic, perhaps also political, were

decisive factors. Fear of aggressive communism [illegible] part at first and has steadily become more im[illegible] military strength of Russia has been an error[illegible] was undertaken without none of [illegible] inescapable and offered the only hope of [illegible] nation. In Croatia collaboration was the outlet of [illegible] against certain aspirations of the Nazi government. [illegible] collaboration the result of [illegible] in a [illegible] and in all cases by [illegible] German intentions [illegible].

7. Importance of [illegible] social mobility in the [illegible]. In all of the countries [illegible] two classes which monopolize [illegible] and military life — [illegible] officials, the latter [illegible] military officers. [illegible] land-owning, commercial and [illegible] professional, the former closely identified with the officials or belonging to related [illegible] nobility into political and military [illegible]. Industrial [illegible] are few in number and in general closely tied by family [illegible] in addition to the peasant class, whence they have very recently come. The official class in each country operate the machinery of government for their own benefit in terms of position, wealth, power and social prestige. Their official incomes are very often supplemented unofficially. They manipulate for their own advantage whatever popular or democratic forms of government may exist. In short, the system is really the disguised dictatorship of a class, which is not numerous in proportion to the total population and is closely tied in with whatever large landholding and industrial enterprise there

may be. In several of these countries the new significant [illegible] developments are in the nature of state-financed [illegible] part of the government monopoly. The fundamental [illegible] ruling classes is to maintain and if possible extend the [illegible] exploitation of their countries and people. In time of [illegible] they confine their attention to manoeuvres, but [illegible] for expansion whenever this seems feasible and looking [illegible].

8. Balkan sympathy with Russia. In the Slavic countries [illegible] and sympathy for Russia are widespread and traditional, [illegible] during the period of Tsarist Pan-Slav propaganda. Even in [illegible] there much communist sentiment among the peasantry. The ruling classes of course differentiate much more clearly [illegible] is Russian and what is communist. In Yugoslavia the Partisan [illegible] are strongly under Soviet influence. Small but well organized Communist parties are in existence. In Hungary and Rumania there is no vital tradition of sympathy with Russia, but communist organizations are believed to be widespread. In Turkey there is no significant communist group and to all classes Russia, whether Tsarist or [illegible], is the age-old traditional enemy. Opinion regarding Russia in Greece is less sympathetic than in the Slavic countries but not as fearful as in Turkey, while communist influence is very strong among guerillas and underground organizations.

9. Balkan reactions to Russian victories. Reactions to the earlier victories were highly favorable except in "collaborationist" circles, for they offered the prospect of relief from Axis pressure. The hope then arose of a battle to exhaustion between the Germanic Soviet and Nazi

armies, with consequent increase in freedom of action to [illegible] now the more intelligent and far sighted individuals, if not [illegible] ments, realize that in all probability [illegible] and now, at least in Eastern Europe, by the Russians. Members of the ruling classes of all the Balkan countries [illegible] be their fate in the event of a Russian victory. [illegible] white-collar classes have been dispossessed and [illegible] occupied by Soviet forces, they are [illegible] imperialistic thinking about Southeastern Europe [illegible] means that the pressures of their own countries [illegible] hostilistic toward existing regimes and their [illegible]. They are becoming convinced that the Axis powers can no longer [illegible] to protect them against Russian [illegible]. They are [illegible] and are now thinking primarily in terms of existence rather than [illegible] extension. They are already half broken and soon will be in [illegible] subject terror that they may [illegible] to practically any or [illegible] Russians may make. Before their terror becomes obvious to us, [illegible] to obtain from us thinking and acquiescence in numbers of [illegible] against Russia.

D. [illegible] relations to Italian defeats and the fall of Mussolini. [illegible] have intensified tremendously the pressure to [illegible] and have made it imperative that immediate measures be taken to adjust plans and policies. Especially since the Italian [illegible] against Greece, Fascist military prestige has been at a low ebb. Italy is now regarded as a negligible factor in political and military calculations, which are based solely on estimates of military power.

for it is believed that the large Italian [illegible] in the [illegible] will disintegrate quickly and lose [illegible] within [illegible].

11. Effect of Italian collapse [illegible] Italian collapse is resulting in great [illegible] an increase in military responsibility without increase [illegible] the Wehrmacht is fully realized. However, [illegible] for the force, skill and thoroughness of the German military [illegible] may for some time continue. If signs of weakening in [illegible] fear and respect can be expected to [illegible] very close watch are maintained closely for some period of time [illegible] are capable of demonstrating measures of [illegible].

Conclusions

12. Fear. The thinking of the ruling classes in [illegible] countries [illegible] to have not been dominated by fear of Germany, [illegible] clinging rapidly in the face of a power [illegible] over and invasions. In hope of securing support against possible Russian [illegible] these ruling classes are looking to Britain and the United States. The situation is believed to be ripe for negotiation with political forces who would probably accept almost any terms of surrender [illegible] proposed. The Turks may also be induced to move against the [illegible], or at least to allow use of their territory, if promised a [illegible] in the post-war settlement.

13. Military. The concentrated fairly well armed forces of Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary are capable of being used against the Germans in the Balkan area, and could be available if political

arrangements for these countries to secede from the [illegible]
Heritiks in Greece and Yugoslavia would also be a [illegible]
the previous agreement of the U.N.S.C. [illegible]
is also available but it is believed that the [illegible]
would be nil in terms of [illegible] commitments, [illegible]
deal been [illegible] of Turkish airfields, [illegible]
is regarded as more [illegible] of [illegible]
states from [illegible]
are believed to be [illegible]
area.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Research and Analysis Branch

PRELIMINARY VIEW OF BALKAN OPERATIONS

March 29, 1943

SECRET
March 29, 1943

PRELIMINARY VIEW OF BALKAN OPERATIONS

Until the Axis position in Tunisia is liquidated Balkan operations must of necessity be limited to guerrilla activities supported only by such supplies and personnel as can be ferried by air from North Africa. Even after Tunisia has been taken the use of the Mediterranean will require the neutralization of Sicily. In the following discussion it is assumed that both these tasks have been accomplished.

I. POSSIBLE OPERATIONS

After Tunisia has been conquered, two sets of operations in the Balkans deserve consideration:

(a) An operation on the eastern shore of the Adriatic. Such an operation would be limited to the supplying of guerrilla troops through the eastern Adriatic ports. Limitation of port facilities and the inadequacy of routes inland from the sea throughout the whole area south of Fiume makes it impractical to attempt large scale landing operations. On the other hand, the provisioning of guerrilla forces in the Balkans can best be undertaken through the Adriatic ports. The tonnages required are small and would not exceed the capacities of the ports which might be made available. The supply of a force of 300,000 guerrillas with ammunition of smaller calibre than 105 mm. together with small arms would require the continuous services of only 4 or 5 ships. Certain of the routes inland from the ports lead to territory which is or can be temporarily controlled by guerrilla forces. The character of the operations envisaged would necessitate, at a minimum, the seizure and control of any one of a number of small ports for such period of time as would permit the unloading

supply ships. What is involved is a series of commando raids striking at one port and then another, coordinated with guerrilla attacks on the ports in question from the interior. Air cover for ships en route to and from destination and in port would require the conquest of air bases on either or both sides of the Strait of Otranto. If such air cover could be provided, it is possible that the strength of guerrilla forces might be sufficient to permit the holding and continuous use of one or more of the Adriatic ports.

The principal advantage of such an operation would be the facilitating of guerrilla attacks on Axis supply lines to the south Balkans. Such attacks, if persistent and effective, might force Axis withdrawal from southern Greece.

(b) An operation involving the establishment of a sizeable United Nations bridgehead in the Balkans with a well protected supply line. An examination of existing and potential port facilities in the area forces the conclusion that Salonica offers the most feasible, if not the only base of operations. Although the terrain of Bulgaria and Rumania affords easier land transport, port facilities of the principal Black Sea ports are small. Burgas and Varna have a daily capacity of 2,200 and 3,000 metric tons respectively, compared with a daily capacity of 7,000 metric tons at Salonica. Port facilities at Constanta are larger (7,200 tons), but the establishment of a major bridgehead at this point would involve, in addition to passing through the Dardanelles and Bosporus, a considerable sea route through the Black Sea vulnerable to land based aircraft. The creation of a bridgehead at Salonica obviously would involve air, sea and ground attack. As noted above, the

securing of a protected line of communication through the Mediterranean requires the neutralization of Axis air power based on Sicily. A protected supply line through the Aegean would require either continuous air cover or the elimination of Axis air power based on Crete, southern Greece and the Aegean Islands.

As long as it stands Crete offers an apparently insurmountable obstacle to an entrance to the Aegean from Africa. While the conquest of Crete from North Africa is not altogether out of the question the provision of continous and extensive fighter cover over landing operations from bases 230-250 miles away would be a very difficult task. The use of Turkish territory, if not outright participation of Turkey on our side, would not only facilitate the elimination of Axis forces from Crete and the Aegean Islands -- essentially an air operation -- but is almost a prerequisite for success. In the following discussion of operation (b) it is, therefore, assumed that, at a minimum, Turkey will participate to the extent of permitting United Nations air bases on her territory. Since Turkey possesses only three large developed bases confronting the Aegean --together with numerous small ones -- the first task facing a United Nations expedition in the Balkans must be the protection of existing and the development of a large number of new Turkish bases.

II. DETAILED CONSIDERATION OF OPERATION B

(a) Objectives. The principal objectives of operation (b) are: (1) diversion of maximum Axis forces -- in particular, air forces -- away from other theatres; (2) encouragement of increased guerrilla warfare against [illegible] lines, personnel and equipment; (3) [illegible]

the Axis of copper, chrome, oil and other resources, and (4) establishment of a base of operations on the continent.

The extent of the diversion of Axis forces will depend upon commitments in other theatres, the capacity of supply routes to the Balkans, and the strength of the United Nations invasion.

Assuming that guerrilla forces can be supplied through the Adriatic ports, the size and effectiveness of these forces and the importance of their objectives will be much increased by an Allied landing in the Balkans.

The importance of the Balkans as a source of raw materials is shown by the fact that about one-third of the Axis oil supply comes from Rumania, one-third of Axis copper from Yugoslavia, and about 75% of Axis chromium from Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece. This chromium, together with Turkish supplies constitutes more than 99% of the Axis supply. Yugoslavia provides 24% of Axis lead, 20% of antimony, 10% of bauxite, and 6% of zinc consumption. Disruption of communication or capture of these areas would thus deprive the Axis of an important source of essential minerals. The loss of Rumanian oil would have a critical effect on Axis industrial and military activity.

(b) Axis strength in the Balkans. At present, the ground forces in the area are largely Italian. Germany has 8 divisions in Yugoslavia (of which two are reserve training divisions) and 2 divisions in Greece. Italy has 17 infantry divisions, 2 mountain divisions, and 1 mobile division in Yugoslavia, 4 divisions in Albania, 8 in Greece, 1 in Crete, and 2 in Rhodes and the Dodecanese Islands. In the Aegean islands, there is one infantry division and one mobile equivalent. Rumania has 8 divisions (including one

frontier and one guard), and Bulgaria has 11 (including 1 mobile and 1 armored unit). In addition, there are 3 Bulgarian divisions in Greece.

In the event of a United Nations operation in the Balkans, it is possible and perhaps probable, in view of the vulnerability of Italy to attack, that Italian ground forces would not be augmented and might possibly be decreased. The extent of German reinforcement would depend primarily on the magnitude of commitments in other theatres. The conditions under which satellite troops, including Bulgarian, would oppose the United Nations forces are discussed below.

Axis and satellite air dispositions in the Mediterranean are estimated as follows:

GERMAN

	Crete-Greece	Sicily-Sardinia	Tunisia	Total
Fighters	0	264	180	444
Bombers	24	696	84	804
Others	12	12	12	36
Total	36	972	276	1284

ITALIAN

	Dodecanese	Yugo-Greece	Sicily & Pantellaria	Sardinia	Italy	Tunis	Total
Fighters	40	40	135	60	275	70	620
Bombers	40	25	80	100	100	0	345
Others	15	95	60	60	75	0	305
Total	95	160	275	220	450	70	1270

SATELLITE

	Bulgaria	Rumania	Hungary	Total
Fighters	146	110	100	356
Bombers	98	92	66	256
Others	106	152	140	402
Total	350	354	306	1014

In the event of United Nations attack it must be assumed Axis aircraft would be concentrated in Greece, Crete and the Aegean Islands to the limit of existing air fields and supply routes.

The strength and disposition of Axis naval forces in the Mediterranean is as follows: In the Mediterranean, Italy has 6 (perhaps 8) battleships, 10 cruisers, 71 destroyers, and 59 submarines, while Germany has 25 submarines. In addition, there are 6 German submarines in the Black Sea.

It is problematical whether United Nations operations would be exposed to naval attack other than submarine. The vulnerability of Italy plus the unwillingness of the Italian navy to give battle might lead to the withholding of other naval forces.

(c) Air aspects. The establishment of a United Nations base in the Balkans is essentially an air operation. What is required is the conquest of Crete and a number of the Aegean Islands with a subsequent development and use of air bases on those islands for the protection of Allied shipping and for attack on Axis positions on the mainland. At every stage in the process United Nations forces would be moving within range of land-based enemy fighters. Since the Axis would undoubtedly defend its position at every step the Balkan operation would yield an excellent opportunity to whittle down Axis fighter strength, providing United Nations planes were not forced to fight under too unfavorable conditions. A reduction of Axis air strength must be considered to be one of the most

important objectives of the operation. It can be seen that what is involved is, at a minimum, an air operation of great proportions.

There are 5 Axis airfields on Crete, of which 3 are important, 5 in the Dodecanese, 2 on the Aegean islands north of Crete and 18-20 on the eastern side of the Greek mainland, of which at least a dozen are large capacity fields. No ship movement through the Aegean could be attempted without control of the island air fields and at least a partial neutralization of those in eastern Greece.

(d) Attitude of the Soviet Union. During the course of the war, it has become increasingly clear that the Soviet Union regards the Balkans as its legitimate sphere of influence. Pan-Slavic sentiment is still strong in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, and Russia has enhanced her prestige through the successful resistance to Germany. So strong is Russian prestige and influence among Yugoslavs and Bulgarians that, if Russia should not express in advance her satisfaction with an Anglo-American Balkan operation, an invasion by our Armed Forces would receive less support and meet more resistance. Conversely, Russian sanction of an Anglo-America operation would place at our disposal all anti-German forces in these two countries.

It follows that an agreement with the Soviet Union would be desirable in advance of the undertaking. Whatever her ultimate intention with respect to southeastern Europe, Russia's immediate objective is clearly the defeat of Germany. If the United States and Great Britain insist

that their commitments on the European continent can best be made in the Balkans, it seems likely that the Soviet Union would lend to the undertaking the moral support necessary to win the participation of the important local pro-Russian groups.

(e) Local forces. In the event of a successful United Nations landing, the available local forces, as noted above, are estimated at 300,000 to 400,000. It is improbable that a large number could slip through the line to join United Nations forces. Consequently, most of their effort would take the form of behind-the-lines guerrilla activities. The magnitude of this effort would depend on (a) how adequately guerrilla forces could be equipped, and (b), particularly in the case of Bulgarians and Yugoslavs, the attitude of Russia toward United Nations operations in the Balkans.

(1) Bulgaria. Bulgaria has made and will continue to make, every effort to keep out of the war. However, if Bulgarian territory is invaded, her forces may oppose United Nations operations. Such opposition may possibly be avoided if:

(a) Adequate diplomatic measures are taken to guarantee Bulgaria's position after the war, and,

(b) Leaders become convinced that the tide must turn.

The active participation of Bulgarian guerrillas on the side of the United Nations will depend primarily on the attitude of Russia toward these operations.

(2) Yugoslavia. The guerrilla forces under Mihailovich will be available in any case, their effectiveness depending on the adequacy with which they are equipped. These forces, however, have been declining in numbers. The availability of other guerrilla forces will depend largely on the attitude of Russia toward the operation. Probably 100,000 troops, poorly equipped, could be relied upon for assistance at the time of invasion. If operations are successful, and the support of the "opposition" group in the Partisan army is obtainable, this number may be augmented to 200,000 or 300,000. Virtually all equipment must be supplied, however.

(3) Greece and Albania. At the time of the German invasion, Greece had about 250,000 men under arms. Of this number, it is estimated that about 150,000 would be available in the event of a United Nations campaign. Together with reserves of military age, the total might be as high as [illegible]

These troops have virtually no equipment, except, perhaps, for some rifles concealed by the evacuating armies in 1941.

In Albania, the maximum number of fighting men is estimated at 200,000. Again, very little equipment is available, since the Albanians were disarmed by the Italians.

(f) The position of Turkey. It has already been indicated that any attempt to establish a permanent bridgehead in the Balkans is excessively difficult without some measure of Turkish cooperation. Turkey would certainly not consent to the use of her territory for United Nations air operations unless and until she is convinced that the Axis is losing the war and until it has been convincingly demonstrated that the United Nations are capable of defending Turkish territory against any retaliation which the use of her air bases might provoke. Such a demonstration would presumably have to take the form of completely adequate preparations for major operations.

However, if Turkey is convinced (a) that the Axis is well along toward losing the war and (b) that United Nations preparations for a Balkan campaign give promise of success, it is possible that her desire for a favorable position at the Peace Conference and for British and American support against potential Russian claims may be sufficient to induce a limited measure of participation.

(g) The shipping situation. Movement of 100,000 men with supplies, from the U.S. into the Balkans would require about 50 transports of 13,000 gross registered tons each, about 50 cargo ships of 6,700 g.r.t. each, and 2 tankers of 10,000 g.r.t. each.

To keep this number of men continuously supplied, the services of 30 cargo ships of 6,700 g.r.t. and 5 tankers of 10,000 g.r.t. would be needed. These figures assume complete control of the Mediterranean. With incomplete control, about 20% additional shipping would be required.

The supply of 300,000 guerrillas with ammunition would require the continuous service of only 3 or 4 ships. If the same force were to be supplied with all materials, except solid fuels, engineering and construction materials, and air corps supplies, at 50% of the American rate of consumption, 16 cargo ships would be required.

(h) Terrain. The mountainous character of most of the Balkan region makes military operations difficult. The obstacles to troop movements are less forbidding in the northern and eastern sections (Rumania, Bulgaria, and Thrace) than in the south and west (Greece, Yugoslavia, Albania). The easiest routes -- those leading inland from the Black Sea -- would require Turkish cooperation if not active collaboration.

A more direct route lies through the Vardar and Morava Valley of Greece, from Salonica to Belgrade. An alternative route to Belgrade from Salonica is provided by the Struma Valley.

Supply of an army of 100,000 would require about 1,100 long tons per day. Since the port facilities at Salonica are capable of handling 7,000 metric tons per day, no shortage of port facilities should develop on the Salonica-Belgrade routes.

The Vardar-Morava rail line, although single-tracked, should provide a good means of [illegible] supply. [illegible] sufficient to prevent [illegible]



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



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MARCH 1943







PRINCIPAL MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE BALKANS

(MINERAL RESOURCES TOTALLING FIVE OR MORE PERCENT OF CURRENT AXIS SUPPLY)

EACH UNIT REPRESENTS FIVE PERCENT OF THE ESTIMATED 1943 AXIS SUPPLY.

■ COPPER
▲ NICKEL
▲ LEAD
● MANGANESE
● ZINC
■ ANTIMONY
■ CHROMIUM
▲ BAUXITE
● PETROLEUM
— SELECTED RAILROADS

PERCENT OF CRUDE AND SYNTHETIC OIL SUPPLY, EXCLUDING SUBSTITUTES



YUGOSLAVIA

Flaming Slav passions make the Yugoslav scene almost incredible. General "Tito" and General Mihailovitch are irreconcilable. The Serb considers the Croat and Slovene past traitors and future dangers to a South Slav State. The Croat and the Slovene, discontents for a thousand years, bitter critics of the Government for the last twenty, are no nearer reconciliation now.

Into the dispute is introduced the Communist [illegible] terms the Serb a Fascist; the claim that Mihailovitch [illegible] a totalitarian state of old Serbia and Bulgaria [illegible] first as authoritarian president of council; [illegible].

The Government-in-Exile, [illegible] of Communist [illegible], is composed of mediocracies; is ruled by Dowager Queen Marie (Rumanian Marie's daughter by a Rumanian cavalry captain). Marie, stoutish, plain and ordinarily affable is still run by the Knejevitch brothers, the opportunist young men who, at one time, introduced the boy king to rather unattractive older prostitutes and to dope.

Older military men have been scuttled by the ambitious Knejevitch clan, leaving only unimportant officers and bewildered younger men and a scattering of others such as Lieutenant-Colonel Radoychich, now aide to the King and Colonel Savitch who, the Queen told me, is "loyal, but wacky; victim of numerous crack-ups in the air and on the ground and of numerous bumps on the head."

Fotitch, Ambassador to the United States, is the clearest of all Yugoslav statesmen, but his character is under grave assault and his blood relationship to Yugoslav quislings also fuel to the flames of criticism.

The most brilliant; perhaps the most serious [illegible] in exile is Colonel Popovitch, the trusted confidant of [illegible] Bonner Fellers; a man I have found honest, able and [illegible] -- perhaps the best of all intelligence operators [illegible] Europe. But, the Knejevitch brothers consider him [illegible] Lord Glenconner lost no opportunity to insult [illegible].

More serious - from one point of view - [illegible] the attitude and activity of British S.O.E. toward the Yugoslav mess. It is the opinion of many skilled observers that S.O.E.'s meddling and their misinforming of other british departments is largely responsible for the present chaotic condition of affairs in Yugoslavia. Up to my departure from the Middle East it is highly doubtful if S.O.E.'s Colonel Bailey had seen or contacted Mihailovitch for more than half a year; it is suspected that Mihailovitch's radio messages were forgeries.

Adding suspicion to doubt was the severe attempt on the part of S.O.E. to prevent O.S.S. direct and independent intelligence contact with Mihailovitch; their determination to block any American direct reporting of conditions in the Mihailovitch "area."

While I was on duty in the Middle East, I attempted to send two reporters who believed they could use their own means in making contact with the Mihailovitch Headquarters. One man

is presumed lost; the other, after a rugged [illegible] dangerous trip from Turkey, through Thrace and Macedonia, was turned back at the Montenegran frontier and eventually made his way through Greece proper across the Aegean to Turkey, finally arriving in Cairo. This agent met Mihailovitch's men who reported that their forces were on the run, seeking shelter; never able to stay long enough at one spot to establish headquarters. They claimed that Partisan sympathizers were reporting their movements to occupation troops. Asked if any British officers were attached to Mihailovitch's staff, they said there were none. The agent said the trip was dangerous; he would not return to it because of his fears of being turned in by Partisan sympathizers or even by Chetniks.

It is doubted if we have the present means of giving original, factual and correct intelligence concerning conditions inside of Yugoslavia even though we now have men there.

To: Mr. Shepardson

Colonel Donovan wished you to see this. Will you please return the file to me.

M. O'Donnell

Director's Office

(3306)

January 27, 1943

The Hon. John J. McCloy
Assistant Secretary of War
3E961 Pentagon Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Jack:

I have your note attaching memorandum concerning Moses Fainberg. We would be interested in talking with him and I will see that this is done.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY.

January 24, 1943

MEMO FOR COLONEL DONOVAN:

Would you be interested in the attached?

J. J. McC.

3967

Balkans 10.121
Russia,
Bulgaria
McCoy, J.T.

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

January 21, 1945

MEMORANDUM To the Intelligence Group

The attached memorandum was sent to me by an American citizen of Russian birth who is unusually well-informed about [illegible] affairs. It raises questions for accompanying [illegible]. If the suggestions have merit act on would be appreciated by O.W.I., O.S.S. and possibly Governor Harriman's staff as well as the State Department.

Edward S. Greenbaum
Colonel, Inf. U.S.A.
Executive Officer

Encl.

Balkans 10,131
[illegible]

Since [illegible]

the [illegible]

volution [illegible]

One can [illegible]

big [illegible] :

[illegible] Soviet [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible], based [illegible]
Also [illegible]
[illegible] of militia.

[illegible] : [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]; [illegible]
inability to [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible];
[illegible] of the communication [illegible]
[illegible] of [illegible]
[illegible]
on the basis of similar geographic [illegible].

Russia has long [illegible]
of cooperating with Russia and to [illegible] Rus-
sian-Turkish War of Liberation of [illegible]
themselves:

( ) [illegible] Latvia [illegible] Constitutions
(after their joining the USSR in [illegible]) guarantee small
peasant land ownership (up to [illegible] in this part of
Europe) against nationalization or collectivization; allotment
of land in perpetual use to landless peasants; recognition
of private ownership of small [illegible] fishing boats
etc. up to 15 H.P.; small inns - to 10 rooms; private houses
(up to [illegible]-[illegible] sq. meters) etc.

One can be sure that Stalin took good care to make
this new "Bill of Rights" known among all neighboring countries
with a similar peasant-small house-and-ownership economic
structure.

(a) Stalin first declaration of War. [illegible]
intention of conferring [illegible]
strengthened by Franco-British [illegible]
Russia's recognition of [illegible]

(b) [illegible]
[illegible]

5. The very [illegible]
[illegible]
Czechoslovak [illegible]
[illegible] the Balkans [illegible]
behind the reduced [illegible]
Blitz- that of a [illegible]
countries with [illegible]
to be permanently "neutralized", or else [illegible]
[illegible]
Communist [illegible]. (MYSSEN is reported back in Hitler's place, in a prominent position)

There were rumors that [illegible]
[illegible] around for a peace [illegible]
Stalin's recent conversations [illegible]
crediting an automatic form of [illegible]
benevolent-neutrality) [illegible]
and Hitler, who would [illegible]
Giving the peace [illegible]
a million miles of [illegible]
information behind [illegible].

Pres. of Portugal

I tried the [illegible] Red-[illegible] [illegible] that it [illegible] [illegible] so; [illegible] [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible] Blitz-[illegible] [illegible] with Roosevelt and Churchill is still to [illegible] serious harm to Russia's slow maturing confidence in [illegible] with democracies as accelerated after the [illegible] in the war. The danger is that Germans themselves may seriously believe in this; I heard from people who spoke to Germans in occupied France, that they were seriously astonished by the (Germans) animosity they met; they were assured by the Fuehrer that they should be welcome as heroes liberators, who had come to save Europe from-

[illegible] -Communist menace.

It is [illegible] to overestimate the importance of continued relief [illegible] and the need to keep the [illegible] possible, [illegible]

[illegible] Now?

[illegible] United States Council [illegible] I [illegible]:

[illegible]

[illegible] about 15. [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] (a) [illegible] in addition to [illegible] from [illegible] ies; in [illegible] to and [illegible] all. Process of [illegible] failure [illegible] be [illegible] proved.

A special United Nations Relief Office should be opened in [illegible] as new [illegible] as possible, e.g. Greece, Palestine, [illegible]. Effort must be made to establish [illegible] kind of a church [illegible], e.g. purchasing some Turkish supplies for relief of Bulgaria and the Balkans.

* [illegible], to [illegible] of Bulgaria [illegible] conditions of [illegible] published.

[illegible] to [illegible] of [illegible] themselves to it, [illegible] seeds [illegible]

[illegible] joint [illegible]

7. Revival of [illegible] Federation [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] both [illegible]tion. [illegible]: WE MUST COUNT [illegible] [illegible] OF [illegible] HITLER. [illegible] AND MILLIONS OF [illegible].