

SECRET

Grant Mission 13,5-93-

X Parante, ...

X Report

OSS SEEC. DET. G-2
HEADQUARTERS
FIFTH ARMY

7 January 1944

SUBJECT : SALE Island Project

TO : Commanding Officer

1. Submitted herewith is report of Project on SALE ISLAND AIR BASE (Cape Verde Group) by Colonel MOSCATELLI of the Italian Regia Aeronautica. Translation by this Section also attached.

2. Colonel MOSCATELLI was taken on by this Section in September 1943. While he was doing special work, it was important that the intelligence he could offer to Allied Air Forces be obtained by competent interrogators. This Section finally got in touch with CSDIC, who after several days of interrogation in Naples took the Colonel to Algiers and thence to London.

3. During his two week interrogation in London Colonel MOSCATELLI first discussed this Project with Mr. MAZZARINI of OSS. The project is to obtain for American use the Italian-leased Portuguese air base in the Cape Verde Islands, SALE. On his return trip to Italy, the Colonel also discussed this project with Colonel GLAVIN and Mr. SCAMPORINO. Prior to reporting back to his mission the Colonel was advised by Colonel GLAVIN to go to Brindisi to regularize his military position. While there he was able to secure the enthusiastic, but necessarily unofficial, endorsement of the Air Chief of Cabinet and the Commanding General of the Royal Italian Air Force.

4. Colonel MOSCATELLI is in an exceptional position in regard to this project form:

a. He is known and admired in all Italy and most of Europe.

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- b. He has great influence with Italian Air authorities.
- c. He has diplomatic connections in Portugal, where he is well known and respected.
- d. He has had broad experience and possesses extensive technical knowledge.
- e. He is absolutely trustworthy and is most anxious to cooperate with the Americans.

Malcolm W. Callanan
MALCOLM W. CALLANAN
2nd Lt. NMB
Intelligence Officer



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Project for SALE ISLAND

From official sources it is known that Portugal has granted, in response to requests, the English certain rights on the Atlantic Islands of AZORES, but has reserved all rights on the CAPE VERDE ISLANDS where there is an important ITALIAN air base on the ISLAND of SALE.

In 1938 ITALY organized regular air service between ITALY and SOUTH AMERICA. This service was operated by Soc. L.A.T.I. (Linee Aeree Transcontinentali Italiane) with the following itinerary: ROME - SEVILLE - LISBON - VILLA CISNEROS - SALE ISLAND - PERNAMBUCO - RIO DE JANEIRO - BUENOS AIRES. The weekly service that was initiated continued into 1941 until exactly two months before the declaration of war against the U.S.A.

It should be stated that although the directors of the L.A.T.I. in Brazil developed no respect in the minds of the Brazilian authorities, the members of the plane crews were universally admired by all air organizations not only for their excellent service but for their exceptional courage, ability, and security as well. The only interruptions of service on this line occurred during the war when the supplies of aviation gasoline for the base on the island of SALE had to be transported secretly by small boats.

ITALY had treaties with SPAIN and PORTUGAL which permitted, up until 8 June 1943, all civilian planes of the L.A.T.I. to maintain weekly air service, ROME - SEVILLE - LISBON.-

These treaties included:

- a. Permission to fly over Portuguese territory and to use the airfield of LISBON as a refueling station with all necessary radio-telegraphic assistance.
- b. Permission of PORTUGAL to build the airfield on SALE ISLAND and to utilize all installations, but agreement not to develop any permanent installations and agreement to obligatory landings at LISBON on the Atlantic Line.

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- c. Permission to fly over Spanish territory with landings and appropriate services at the airfields of SEVILLE and VILLA CISNEROS.

Copies of these treaties are deposited near the office of the attached Air-Force Officer in LISBON, Lieut. Col. Luigi BIANCHI.

Actually, the administration of the Society is entrusted to the Ministry of Air (Direction of Civilian Air-Traffic), and General SANDALLI delegated me, (already surveyor of flight for this society) to represent the society. (In any discussions of SALE ISLAND - Ed). The Director of Traffic Commendatore Carlo TONINI is in BARI.

"The air base of SALE ISLAND is of particular importance in the following aspects:

"a. ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS:

Contrary to much that is reported in official Pilots, atmospheric conditions over this island are excellent, and, are exceptional for an Atlantic Base.

1. The prevailing winds are the Northeast Trades which blow from NE to SW with a surface velocity of 20/25 km. per hour (12/15 mph).
2. There are absolutely no heavy fogs. Occasional light fogs develop at flying levels when the HARMATTAN, warm winds from Africa, blow.
3. Rain is so rare that the island is completely devoid of vegetation. There are no sudden rains, and in the past three years only two storms, both at the time of the autumnal equinox, have been recorded.
4. The sky is generally 5/10 covered with cumulus clouds.
5. The climate has characteristics similar to those of the CANARY ISLANDS, but is preferable because of the continual presence of the Northeast Trades which brings more moderate temperatures.

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6. Records of synoptic observations for three years indicate that conditions are far superior to those of the African air base of BAKAR.

b. LOGISTICAL CONSIDERATIONS:

1. The indigenous population of the island comprising some 800 persons, is by nature anxious to serve. Some of the young men under proper instruction become excellent motor mechanics and plane assembly workers.
2. Every ten days the island is supplied with water and food by a small Portuguese ship, 28 de Maio, which sails through all the CAPE VERDE ISLANDS.
3. Every month a ship arrives from LISBON bringing additional supplies which are unloaded in the two small harbors of PEDRALUME and SANTA MARIA.
4. This ship is loaded with the entire production of salt from two salt-pits and large amounts of canned fish prepared by the Portuguese firm of "NASCIMENTO".

c. TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS:

1. The distance from SALE ISLAND to PERNAMBUCO is approximately 3100 km.
2. About 200 km. from SALE ISLAND is the Portuguese island of PRAIA which is just southwest of the line of flight. There is an emergency landing field on the island with a landing strip 1400 meters long but very narrow, in some points only 200 meters wide.
3. The Brazilian island of FERNANDO DE NORONHA is about 450 km. from the American coast and has a runway of reinforced concrete of 800 meters in length.
4. The length of flight without the possibility of landing can be considered as only 2450 km.
5. The airfield on the central part of the SALE ISLAND has dimensions of 2000/1600 meters with possibilities of enlargement. It is oriented NNE to SSW in the direction of the prevailing winds which facilitates the take off of heavily loaded planes. The nature of the ground exceptionally firm and very level, is such that it is not

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necessary to build runways. There is nothing to interfere with landing or taking off.

6. The following installations have been constructed on the island:

- a. One modern mansion capable of lodging 100 persons very comfortably.
- b. Two small villas
- c. One small hospital
- d. Numerous houses for native employees
- e. One temporary tin building housing all officers, completely furnished with modern fixtures
- f. One repair shop
- g. Two hangars
- h. One complete radio-station with cars A.T. 800 and R.A. 310
- i. One medium-wave radio-"goniometrica" station
- j. One meteorological station
- k. Three large depots for all materiel
- l. One auxiliary installation for water supplies with a reserve of great capacity, and one installation for the distillation of sea water
- m. One complete electrical development with two half diesel generators, and some generators operated by the wind
- n. Three roads which unite all of the island
- o. A complete system of illumination for night flying.

Since SPAIN and PORTUGAL have acknowledged the BADOGLIO Government, service on this Atlantic airline might be resumed with the approval of the Allied Authorities.

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The Italian Air Force, wishing to cooperate with the Americans and having the right to use the base of SALE ISLAND through valid international agreements, could provide:

- a. All the necessary personnel, including specialists, to operate the complete ground installations.
- b. Ten planes, S. 82, each capable of transporting 2000 kilograms of freight from ITALY to SOUTH AMERICA.
- c. The necessary personnel for the plane crews, men who have been employed by this line in the past and who could establish for the first time service twice a week.

The line, in my opinion, should follow the itinerary: NATAL - SALE ISLAND - MARRAKECH - LISBON - NAPOLI or BRINDISI, thus cooperating in transports over South America and the Atlantic Ocean.

It will not be difficult to establish the means of resuming the above mentioned service which would provide a considerable increase in air transport across the Atlantic through the utilization of a new, perfectly organized base, the characteristics of which have received the unconditional approbation of technicians.

Colonel MUSETTI

NAPLES, 27 November 1943



*Melan...
20/11/43*

Report from Pacatte
to Scamporino, 9-26-43,
Covering report activities
Sept. 9-26.

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SEPTEMBER 26, 1943
 ISOLA DI CAPRI
 OSS ADVANCE OPERATIONS
 COL MILERY HUNTINGTON, AUS, C.O.

FROM: 1st Lt Andre Pacatte, AUS

TO: Vincent Scamperino

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SUBJECT: Covering report activities Sept 9-26.

Landed at Paestum Sept 9th on D-Day at 1000 hours. Cooperated with 6th Corps C.I.C. on checking the local peoples. We supplied C.I.C. with Italian speaking personnel as they did not have any. Our forces took over Paestum and Cappaccio. On Sept 11, Lt Hoagland, Lt Judson, Capt Crowles and myself entered Agropoli being the first Americans to do so. We immediately asserted our authority by interrogation of Podesta, Carabinieri etc. Capt Cowles of C.I.C. did not choose to remain with us in Agropoli having some understandable trepidation re the possible return of his enemies. We will work with C.I.C. when possible but our first experience did not prove very constructive. We employed the technique of giving explicit instructions to the Italian officials for future conduct but not otherwise disturbing their positions despite their past affiliations or actions. After two days of orientation in Paestum I began the infiltration of agents for the gathering of military information. Lt Hoagland cooperated with me splendidly in several very dangerous missions behind enemy lines. We gathered much valuable military intelligence including definite descriptive locations of targets for our air force. All information regarding enemy air fields, munitions dumps, troop movements etc., was forwarded to Col. Galloway, 6th Corps G-2 and Lt. Col. Crowder 36th Division G-2. With a very limited personnel, only three Italian agents which I had recruited in Tunis, we proved ourselves the most important source of military information for the 6th Corps and 36th Division. We next moved to Salerno in order to be able to infiltrate agents either North or South, however, I was not there long as Donald Downes ordered me to the Island of Ischia to organize surrounding Island territory. In two days from my HQ at Forio on the Island of Ischia we sent five teams into Naples, transporting them by fisher boats. Three teams were successful and we received much highly valuable information from same. Two teams failed to get onto the mainland due to fear of the fisherman transporting them to risk the machine gun fire from the German shore patrols which are daily becoming more numerous. Due to this difficulty in finding transportation I decided on the 25th to move my operations from Ischia to Capri where the Tee Tee Boats are based. Also I was advised by Lt. North that Capri was becoming a center of much political and intelligence activity as well as a refuge for increasing numbers of evacuees from the mainland, the latter of course splendid subjects for interrogation. From here I am dispatching agents in the immediate future to Benevento, Castel Volturno, Pozzuoli, the Gaeta region and Castellamare. Before leaving Ischia I advised the U.S. Military authorities of the presence on the Island of four Germans in hiding on the Mountain. I have also furnished Lt. Col Henaley, Allied

litary Commander of this Island group, with a complete outline of the Italian Military Command on the Island of Ischia, listing sympathetic anti-fascists, fascists, and pro-axis officers and specifically suggesting the removal of Lt. Col. Insabatte. Lt. Hoagland is still at Salerno as far as I know. I wish to recommend him for promotion for excellent work under constantly dangerous conditions. We have contacted several important Italian Politicos and found them very eager to cooperate. For example General Pavone and others could be trusted to lead armed forces or guerilla units behind enemy lines and it is suggested that consideration be given such a project. Today, Sept. 26th, I met here in Capri with Major Stacey Lloyd, now S.I. officer for this area under Col Huntington. Major Lloyd informed me that it was Col. Huntington's desire that I for the moment remain here in Capri as operational officer responsible to Lt. North acting as OSS coordinating officer in this Island Area. As time will permit I will forward you report on present political forces in and out of Italy.

Andre Facatte.

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Print Memorandum 13572
Memo to Maj. E.J. Smith
in Dept. Pacetto 3 Jan. 1944

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OSS SPEC. DET. G-2
HQ FIFTH ARMY

3 January 1944

SUBJECT : Transportation
TO : Major B.J. Smith
FROM : Captain Andre Pacatte

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On October 15th it was decided by Colonel Ellery G. Huntington Jr. that I should proceed to the Adriatic side of Italy to obtain or to find means of getting agents into the portion of Italy covered by the Fifth Army. First, I spent several days making a survey of available fishing crafts or small schooners which could be used by us. I started in Bari by talking to Commander Best N.O.I.C. I was advised that no craft of any kind or size could operate without the permission of the British Navy in command of the water. I approached several boat owners from Termoli, Margherita di Barcova, Barletta, Molfetta, Bari, Mola, Monopoli, Brindisi, Osturni, Fazano and found that all the best crafts had been requisitioned by the British and were operated under their control. However I was assured that no objection would be raised if we could obtain a boat, and if we operated it, provided of course that it be under proper Naval Authorities. I also determined the possibilities of entry via 8th Army front and found it possible upon which I sent cables to that effect. I was advised by Colonel Huntington to try and get a submarine, preferably an Italian one. I investigated the situation in Brindisi, Bari and particularly in Taranto. I found several M.A.S. boats, submarines and other crafts which were available. Admiral de Courten assured me of his complete cooperation but said that it was up to the British to permit the Italians to work for us. In Brindisi I went to a Captain Stone, U.S.N.R. who received me very coldly and offered no cooperation except by turning me over to Captain Zirilli U.S.N. who cooperated with us very well. Thru him I met

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Admiral Powers and Admiral Peters who informed me that they had no objections in helping us to obtain clandestine transportation but that they needed an O.K. from the 15th Army Group in Bari. I went to the 15th Army Group in Bari and spent a few days being interviewed by SIS, SOE and other echelons of the 15th Army Group. Finally, on November 6th, I received from Lt. Col. D.N.S. Hunt of the B.O.S. (I) a paper authorizing me to request clandestine transportation from the British Fleet at Taranto. I was instructed by Lt. Col. Hunt to go to the N.O.I.C. in Bari to see a Commander Campbell. This officer looked at my written request and told me he was powerless and that I should see the Admiral in Taranto. I proceeded to Taranto and saw Admiral Peters who turned me over to Captain Bonant R.N. who is the chief of Operation. I was then turned over to Commander Clark who is the coordinator of all clandestine operations on the Adriatic. Commander Clark S.O.S.O. (A) (in Taranto) advised me to go to Molfetta and see Commander Michel A.C.F.A. (African Coastal Flotilla Adriatic). Upon arriving I found out that Commander Michel was not there but a Lt. Levy who was his assistant. I talked over my problems and found that he was extremely cooperative. He was very enthusiastic about the mission and we made out our plans. We were to use a surface craft - a special schooner, refitted with powerful engines and equipped with radar and other radio devices to facilitate clandestine landings. We arranged a tentative date - November 30th and set a period of training (a night at sea and also a landing on our coast so as to practice with the rubber boats). However, his boss, Commander Michel was to be consulted and his final O.K. given. There was no doubt in my mind that the operation wouldn't proceed. After waiting 3 days and receiving no answer from him I decided to return to Molfetta and see him. Upon arriving there I met Commander Michel who acted very strangely, very rudely, and told me that he had only a few minutes to spare. I explained my mission (which I thought was settled) very curtly. After

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hearing about the operation he informed me that he could not deny-
 thing for us as his schedule was very heavy, but maybe that he could
 help us in the next moon period, but that he could not promise. I
 then asked him to write a letter to my superior, Colonel Huntington
 stating the reasons governing his inability to help us in carrying
 out this mission. To that he refused and I left. A British Naval
 Officer who had been present at the meeting followed me outside and
 told me that he was very indignant. Also, that he had been looking
 forward to our mission and that Commander Michel was very unfair to
 us and did not tell the truth. He also stated that they had the time
 to fulfill this mission. I went to look at the boat and found it to
 be an ideal one for our operation. Its crew were all British who were
 very enthusiastic and had superior equipment. From there I went back
 to Brindisi and decided to see Admiral McGregor and tell him about
 Commander Michel's attitude. But before that I decided to see our U.S.
 Naval Liaison who had cooperated with us very well. Captain Zirolli
 was not there but I talked to his assistant Lt. White U.S.N.R. telling
 him the whole story and also asked him to go to the Admiral. Lt.
 White then asked me to let Captain Zirolli to handle this situation.
 I then received a cable from Colonel Huntington ordering me back to
 Headquarters. Upon returning I found that he had been recalled to
 Washington and was being replaced by Colonel Haskell. After a confer-
 ence it was decided that I go back to Brindisi and try again to obtain
 clandestine transportation. Then a cable came from Major Nicos indic-
 ating that Captain Zirolli U.S.N. had brought the whole matter to the
 Admiral who called a meeting at which Lt. Commander H. Scott, SOE,
 promised to get us a submarine. I then saw Lt. Commander H. Scott who
 told me that it would be an Italian submarine but that I should not
 under any circumstances contact the Italian Navy and leave everything
 under the control of him (Lt. Comd. H. Scott) and also give a report
 containing the names of our agents, the plan of operations, where they

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would eventually go, etc. He told me about the landing point and also that it could not be changed. The point was between PESARO and FANO, where the land is very low and 50 yards from the beach is a railroad line and 100 yards from the railroad is a main highway well traveled and patrolled. ~~Obviously the location was unsuitable and had a 90 per cent chance of being a failure. Nevertheless I agreed to anything Lt. Comm. Scott wanted and then thru my contacts got in touch with the Commanding Officer of the Submarine Flotilla who in turn told the Submarine Commander to consult me on the landing and to take my orders only.~~ I told Lt. Comm. Scott that I wanted to accompany the group composed of 15 agents. My request was turned down because there were too many people on the boat already but I told him that I would take out an agent and still go. There was no argument and he consented to my leaving with the party. ~~Also without his knowledge I got my Italian assistant in the submarine. I did that so as to protect the security of my agents, preventing them to talk too much to the crew of the submarine and to be certain that our former enemies would not pull a fast one.~~ While we were on our way I discussed landing points with Commander Sorrentino who was in charge. ~~We finally decided to land at Castel di Mezzo, North of Pescara. The beach was very narrow and the land rose up suddenly and then go over a tunnel, the land was wooded and gave a very good cover. We were informed by the British that North of 44° parallel were mines, so we followed the route up to about North of Catholica and went a few miles north of it (saw no signs of mines although we were travelling on the surface) to check the coast.~~ The landing was made according to plans and was a successful one. Before leaving I did as was requested and gave to Lt. Richard R.N.R. (assistant to Lt. Comm. Scott) a report giving the names of agents, plan of operation, final destination etc.. The report was a very complete one, ~~except that the names, plan of operations, and final destination were picked at random and did not correspond to~~

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~~reality~~ While in the submarine I talked of clandestine transportation to the submarine's officers and found out that the Italian Navy had baby submarines built especially for clandestine operations. I found out that there were six of them, one in Malta and the other five in Taranto, none of which were in use. After returning to Headquarters I proposed that a request be made by Fifth Army to obtain the sole use of a submarine of the "AXUL" type, three baby submarines and 10 Italian planes. A previous investigation showed that the Italians had 45 planes of all types which were not being used at the time. Colonel Howard approved the project and gave me a letter outlining it and requesting General Taylor to get the transportation wanted. I went to 15th Army Group and saw General Airy, BGS (I). He heartily approved and endorsed the letter. I then went to Brindisi and had a talk with General Taylor. General Taylor gave me a letter after our conversation to Admiral McGregor for the submarines and also one for Air Commodore Foster for the planes. The Allied Control Commission (General Taylor) decided on all Italian equipment and personnel, Commodore Foster heads the Air Control Commission which controls the use of the Italian planes and Admiral McGregor who controls the use of any craft on the Adriatic. Before seeing Admiral McGregor I saw Captain Zirolli, U.S.N. who knew the ground and advised on what position to take with the Admiral. He then took me to the Admiral. The Admiral regretted very much that he was unable to accede to the 5th Army request but the Submarines were being used or were going to be used and couldn't possibly be turned over to us for any length of time. I remained for over one hour trying to reach an agreement but got nowhere except a vague promise, however he advised me to go to AFHQ who in turn would direct him to act. I went to Commodore Foster who assured me that all Italian planes were being used in the Balkans Operations. That was 15 planes out of 45. I asked for the

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the others but was told that they were of a type not suitable for our work (although an Italian aviation expert had told me that the Comt 506 (Seaplane) could be used in certain locations and offered to pilot the plane). I returned to Headquarters and proposed to go to Algiers and ask Colonel Glavin to intercede through AFHQ and get us transportation. Colonel Reutershan gave me a letter to Colonel Glavin and directed me to go to Algiers. I presented myself to Col. Glavin upon arrival and he assured me that a solution would be found after the conference with General Donovan. While in Algiers I tried to find out who was in charge of clandestine transportation and found that Captain De Poilens was. I talked with him, and asked whether or not we could use U.S. planes which were supposedly under OSS controls and found that we have five, but being based near Brindisi and taking supplies and men to Algiers to fly them in Italy or France, they were never where they were wanted. I also saw Colonel Mann, G-3 AFHQ in Special Operations. He advised me to try again thru channels and if we couldn't get anything there to send a message to him and he in turn would put pressure on the Admirals. I finally returned to Caserta and reported to Colonel Reutershan. A conference which took place in Naples with Admiral Morse and some members of his staff in which transportation was discussed. Major Bradish Smith made a separate report on it. (Exhibit X) Later a conference took place with Colonel Howard G-2. He decided to take the matter up to General Clark. Lt. Col. Morse of G-2, Fifth Army went to 15th Army Group and with an indorsement of General Airey went to General Taylor who in turn endorsed the project and forwarded it to the Naval people. This was on January 6th 1944. So far - January 10th - nothing has been heard. Meanwhile a sub is needed within the next few days from the 14th on.

Grant mission 12, 818 -
operation Report 3 & 4

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Mr. Samuel

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Grant Action
x Fifth Army
x Hunterton, Col.
x Operation Report

**HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY
HQ. OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
SPECIAL DETACHMENT G-2**

25 October 1943

- AREA-A-----ALBANO LAKE
- AREA-B-----SERRI
- AREA-C-----ROME DISTRICT
- AREA-D-----COLLE FERRO-ARTENA
- AREA-E-----ISERNIA-VENAFRO
- AREA-F-----ISERNIA-VENAFRO to ROCCASBOGA-ATINA
- AREA-G-----ARCE-SORA VALLEY

- CHRYSLER-ROMBINI FACTORIES
- BORDER-PARADI "
- BUTLINTON-DELFINO "
- HARVESTON-STACCHINI "

- ALBANY-----ROME
- BANBORD-----FRISINGONE
- BOY-----ISERNIA
- DAYTON-----VENAFRO
- DETROIT-----ROCCASBOGA
- CHICAGO-----ATINA
- ST. AGNES-----MONTE MATESE
- STANFORD-----ARTENA
- FOURKESPEIS-----COLLE FERRO
- WENTON-----ALBANO LAKE
- PHILADELPHIA-----VALLERBY

- JONES-----LT. GEN. CARLO MATTEINI
- SMITH-----COMMANDER MAX POMBO
- GREEN-----ENGINEER MAURIZIO BONES
- BROWN-----BARON MARIETTI

- GROUP 1-----PARTITO D' ABBIGLI
- GROUP 2-----COMMUNIST-SOCIALIST GROUPS
- GROUP 3-----GARIBOLDI AND POLIGN

SECRET

27 October 1943

Subject: OSS Operational Plan Nos. 3 & 4.
To : E.B. Howard, AC of S, G-2, Fifth Army.

1. Submitted herewith are copies of OPs Nos. 3 & 4, dated 25 October 1943.

2. Key to Plans is being separately submitted.

3. OP No. 3 is designed:

a. To prepare the groundwork for information services for Fifth Army and its components in Areas from which, is expected, tactical intelligence will be required at a later date and from which, now, valuable long range intelligence should be obtainable; and

b. To provide for the organization and exploitation of numerous groups of patriots whose services, in carrying out acts of Sabotage and similar quasi-military actions, may be an aid to planned military operations.

4. OP NO. 4 is intended to present, in aid of military action, a Plan for the utilization of an organized but irregular Detachment of Italian officers and men and a group of civilians as a screen of guides, (reasonably familiar with the mountainous country indicated in the Plan) in carrying out, on the flank and in the rear of certain of the enemy's forces, programs of action and sabotage directed, by the Army Command, to conform to the requirements of planned operations.

5. In aid of OP NO. 3:

a. The facilities of a plane or planes will be required for a limited number of dropping operations--first of all to enable communications to be established and, subsequently, to deliver arms and like equipment to groups so located as to warrant the expectation that their assistance may be of service to the work of Combat Units; and

b. Assistance will be needed in obtaining, from the 82 Airborne Division, the return of certain radio equipment given by OSS to this Division. The equipment concerned consisted, originally, of some seven Agents' Sets which are irreplaceable and are badly needed by OSS as aids in the establishment of a communications network calculated to give to Fifth Army constant and current information on enemy activities.

6. OP NO. 4 is essentially an irregular Combat Mission which will succeed only if made a part of the military program. The Italian speaking personnel will be furnished and compensated by OSS and must be equipped by Fifth Army. It is assumed that such personnel would be delivered to Fifth Army components for direction and handling. It is believed by OSS that the required personnel may be obtained from among civilians, officers and soldiers with respect to whom preliminary recruiting and screening have already been undertaken. The officers and soldiers would be largely selected from Italian Parachute, Demolition and Commando units as well as from the "Alpini". The qualified number available on short notice will probably not exceed 250 to 300.

7. The program suggested under OP NO. 4 has already been discussed with the Chief of Staff and G-2 of Sixth Corps and a desire indicated to employ a Detachment of the character suggested.

8. Request is hereby made for such authority as may be necessary to activate the Plans submitted, or such portion thereof as may be deemed advisable, and for such supplies and equipment as may be required in compliance with such authority.

ELLERY C. HUNTINGTON JR.
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

Distribution:
Colonel Howard
Files (4)

Ref:
OSS OPs NOS. 3 & 4 and G-2 reports 68 & 69.

HEADQUARTERS
HQ OFFICE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS
SPECIAL DETACHMENT G-2

17716-001
v. H. H. H. H.
v. Operational tapes

23 October 1943

SUBJECT: Operational Plan No. 3 -- Resistance Force - Organization and Employment.

TO : Colonel EDWARD, Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, Headquarters, Fifth Army.

1. Directives:

- a. Intelligence - From G-2, Fifth Army
- b. Operations - From G-3, Fifth Army

2. Objectives:

a. Preliminary Objectives

1. Intelligence

a. Organization of Radio Stations and courier net works within Area A and B; with assistance of Resistance Forces there located.

2. Operations

a. Organization and equipping of Resistance Forces within Areas mentioned for purposes of Sabotage and Combat Missions as may later be directed.

b. Furnishing of funds for the purchase of food, clothing and other necessities to sustain members of Resistance Forces in Area A and B, above mentioned, and in Area "G".

b. Ultimate Objectives

1. Intelligence

a. The furnishing of continuous secret military information of a general nature and special information in aid of

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... military program in event OP No. 4 is not activated or fails to become effective.

B. Combat Missions - For like purposes under the direction of G-3, Fifth Army.

3. Plans

a. Essential Data - OSS conferred on 23 October 1943, with the following gentlemen who arrived recently from Area "g" having made the journey by automobile from ALBANY to TROY in sixty hours, thence on foot across MT. AGNES. MR. JONES, MR. SMITH, and MR. GREEN, the latter being or having been the General Manager of the CHRYSLER, BORDEN and HITTLETON factories for all of Italy. One of such factories is located at POUGHKEEPSIE.

The gentlemen in question have been working for some time in the organization of and are in touch with large members of Resistance Forces in Areas "A", "B", and "C", above-mentioned, and in Area "D". They also knew the whereabouts of the other irregular elements which, however, are not so numerous as those to be found in the Areas specifically indicated. The Resistance Forces in Areas "A", "B", "C" and "D" are about as follows:

AREA "A" - This group is located between TRINTON and PHILADELPHIA. It is a well organized command of 1000 men and operates under the direction of MR. BROOK leader of Group 1, Area "G". The group has access to explosives at the HARVESTER PLANT of MR. GREEN located at POUGHKEEPSIE.

AREA "B" - There is, in this Area, a group of eight (8) officers and two hundred and fifty (250) men. Near its hiding place (2400 feet altitude) is an excellent field (3000 feet long), for landing. This field is not visible from the post of any neighboring German Unit, the nearest of which is a hospital unit 3 kilometers distant. This group is connected, by courier service, with the group in Area "A" and, through such group, with Group "1" of Area "G".

AREA "G" - There are several organized groups here of which the most important are Groups "1", "2" and "3". Group

- 3 -

"1" has about 3,000 men all armed, some with sub-machine guns. They are living on food purchased on the Black Market and must have funds in order to survive. This group is commanded by MR. BROWN. Group "2" comprises both civilians and military personnel. Their numbers approximate 10,000. Most of them are armed with rifles, pistols, and grenades. Group "3" is composed of two semi-military group - well armed - numbering altogether about 4,000.

AREA "D" - The hiding place of this group is between POUGHKEEPSIE and STAMFORD. There are 500 men at STAMFORD and at POUGHKEEPSIE, hidden near the HARVESTER plant, some with rifles (with 400,000 rounds), 8 seventy-five m/m field guns (with 3000 rounds of shrapnel) and 10 twenty m/m machine guns with 200,000 rounds including armor-piercing bullets. The arms and ammunition can be obtained and used by the members of this group. Additional officers are needed; however.

b. PROXIM

1. Preliminary Action

a. The establishment by OSS of a radio station at ALBANY and near PHILADELPHIA and STAMFORD. Other stations will be established at or near TROY and HARTFORD. These last named stations will be used primarily for short range intelligence, but will be available, also, in aid of the work of the Resistance Groups and in support of OP No. 4. Radio Operators with sets, have already been sent overland to ALBANY and HARTFORD and one is soon to be sent, with a set, to TROY. Operators, without sets, will be sent to STAMFORD and POUGHKEEPSIE in the expectation that sets may be dropped at STAMFORD pursuant to arrangements made through the radio station at HARTFORD or TROY.

b. The building of intelligence networks and courier services from the communications centers thus established for the purpose of furnishing continuous military intelligence to Fifth Army and its components through OSS channels.

c. The expedition, overland, of selected Italian Officers to assist in organizing and commanding the groups in Areas "A", "B" and "D" for sabotage and combat work.

d. The sending, by courier, of funds reasonably necessary to provide for the existence of the Groups in question especially those located in Area "G".

- 4 -

2. The dropping, by parachute, of the following supplies at the following points:

<u>AREA "A"</u>	<u>POINTS</u>	<u>SUPPLIES</u>
	STAMFORD	1 Radio Set 100 Sten Guns or Marlins 500 Lbs. Plastic 250 Time Pencils 50,000 Rds 9 m/m Ammunition Woolen underwear and overcoats for 275 mm. 275 Italian Combat Arm bands

<u>AREA "A"</u>	<u>POINTS</u>	<u>SUPPLIES</u>
	STAMFORD or PHILADELPHIA	1 Radio Set 500 Sten Guns or Marlins 500 Time Pencils 250,000 Rds 9 m/m Ammunition 1,000 Lbs. Plastic Clothing; especially shoes and overcoats - as possible 1,000 Italian Combat Arm bands

3. Final Actions:

a. Intelligence - Continued information through all net works particularly in direction and aid of Operations.

b. Operations - Sabotage in aid of general military operations or sabotage and combat to assist CP No. 4 - as may be directed by G-3, Fifth Army.

4. Information - See OSS reports 68, and 69 to G-2, Fifth Army, dated 25 October 1943.

5. Requirements and Means: Transportation and Material

a. Transportation - Two planes especially equipped for dropping operations - Italian Government; one plane and crew immediately - OSS; one plane and crew, November moon period. Number of operations required - estimated as follows:

STAMFORD - 2	PHILADELPHIA - 2
--------------	------------------

b. Arms and Ammunition

500 Sten guns, Marlins or substitutes - Fifth

- 5 -

300,000 Rds Ammunition for same; Fifth Army
 500 lbs Plastic; Fifth Army
 750 Time Pencils; Fifth Army and OSS

4. Clothing:

750 Overcoats; Fifth Army
 750 Shoes; Fifth Army
 1000 Pr Wool Underwear; Fifth Army
 1275 Arm Bands; OSS

5. Radio Equipment:

4 Agents' Sets; OSS
 2 Type 177 or 193 Set - Fifth Army

6. Funds:

Five thousand dollars to be supplied by
 OSS.

7. Personnel:

a. Intelligence - Two Officers, organizers and leaders, required at each of the following points: HARTFORD, TROY, FOUCH-KENTON, BENTON and ALBANY. Members of local groups will be recruited for intelligence teams.

b. Operations - Six Officers will be required in ALBANY; five at FOUCH-KENTON; two with the group in AREA "B"; and five at AREA "A". These Officers will act as instructors and will form a part of the Officer Staff. Local resistance force members will be organized into Sabotage groups and combat teams as required.

8. Communications:

- a. Networks as indicated
- b. Base Stations

- 1. Courier Service - Forward Echelon
- 2. Radio - OSS Base Headquarters

9. Instructions:

- a. Briefing - Of Officers, Organizers, Leaders,

SECRET

Instructors and Radio Operators will cover only preliminary action provided for under plan. Briefing will be by OSS; Commanding Officer, Forward Echelon, Chief Intelligence Officer and Dispatching Officer assisted by the OSS Communicator Officer.

b. Documents - Organizers, Leaders, Instructor and Radio Operators will take no maps or other documents other than usual Italian Civil and Military papers. All will use Italian Army dress and pack as "cover". Native food, supplemented by "K" ration, components if necessary, will be carried in sufficient quantities for a 3-day journey.

c. Identification - For plane operations and courier and Radio Service will be as arranged at time of briefing subject to changes required at or near D-Day.

d. Timing - D-Day will be fixed by agreement before Organizers (if any) leave; and Operations, including stand-by arrangements, with reception committee, will be on dates plus or minus D-Day, and at hours, to be indicated by radio at the direction of G-3.

e. Intelligence Information Activities - will be continuous as prescribed in the plan.

f. Tasks - Sabotage and supplemented action will be as indicated in OP No. 4.

STACY B. LLOYD
Major, A/ UK S.
CO, Forward Echelon

APPROVED:

E. C. Huntington Jr.
MELHRY C. HUNTINGTON JR.
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION

- 1 - G-2 Fifth Army
- 1 - OSS, Algiers
- 1 - OSS, Washington
- 2 - Files

REFERENCES: Map - Italy


1:500,000 Sheets 17 and 18


As per supplement of even date.

OP No. 4 - OSS OPERATIONAL PLAN No. 4, 25 October 1943.

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ITALY ROAD MAP 1:200,000






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


20 Long E of Rome


40

8 00 Km Lanciano

2










40'



LEGEND

TARGETS

-  2 Bombing
-  5 Sabotage
-  14 Parachutists
-  3 AIRFIELD
-  6 MOTOR POOL
-  DIRECTION OF MOVEMENTS
-  LOCATION OF RESISTANCE GROUP

40' Long. W. of Rome

12° Long. E. of Green

A.M.S. M592
 First Edition 1943
 Prepared under the direction of the Chief of Engineers,
 U. S. Army, 1943.
 The Italian Touring Club map No. 17 at scale 1:200,000
 was used as the base for this map.

SECRET

GLOSSARY

Acquedotto, Acquad. Aqueduct	Montagna, M ^{te} Mountain
Alveo River-bed	Monte, M. Mountain, mount
Baia, B. Bay	Ospedale Hospital
Bosco, B. Woods	Padule, Pad. Swamp, marsh
Bocca, Bca. Mouth of River	Piana, P ^{na} Plain
Borgo, B ^o , B ^o Borough, suburb	Piazza Public square
Cala Bay, cove, inlet	Poggio, P ^o Mound, hill
Campo Field	Porta, P ^o Bridge
Canale, C., Can. Canal, channel	Porto, P ^o Port
Capo, C. Cape	Posta Post Office
Capo, C. Cape	Pozzo, P ^o Well
Casale, C. Hamlet	Punta, P ^o Point, peak
Casa, C ^o House	Rio, R. River
Caserna Barracks	Rocca, R ^o Rock
Cima, C ^o Summit, peak	Ruini Ruins
Cima, C ^o Hill	Saline Salt marsh
Corno, C ^o Hill, peak	Scoglio (i), Sc ^o , Sc. Rock (s)
Costa, C ^o River mouth	Selve Woods
Fontana, Font. Fountain	Serra, S ^o Glen, Ravine
Fossato Trench	Sorgente Spring
Fossa, F ^o , F. Ditch	Stagno Shore, beach
Guila, G. Gulch	Stagno, St. Marsh, pond, lagoon
Grotto Grotto	Stazione, St. St. Station
Isola, (a), I., (I) Island (s)	Strada Street, road
Lago, L. Lake	Strada, Str. Street
Laguna Lagoon	Terrazza Terrace
Lama Flooded district	Torre, T ^o Tower
Macchia Thicket, shrub	Via Avenue, way, road
Mare Sea	Viale Avenue
Mare Sea-coast	Vigna Vineyard
Mare Drainwater, phi	

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY
HQ OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
SPECIAL DETACHMENT G-2

*OSS
Washington*

25 October 1943

SUBJECT: Operational Plan No. 4 - Irregular Action in aid of Military Program.

TO : Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, Headquarters Fifth Army.

1. Directives

a. Intelligence: As desired by G-2, Fifth Army.

b. Operational: In accordance with directives of G-3, Fifth Army.

2. Objectives

a. Preliminary Objectives

1. Intelligence: Continuous general military information to G-2 covering Areas "A" to "G", inclusive, and North and Northwest of Area "G". Special information to G-3 and OSS in aid of operations described in this OP No 4 and in OP No 3 of even date.

2. Operational: Attack by Irregular Detachment, in aid of military action, over mountainous country: First, toward line BRUX-BAYTON; Second, toward line CHICAGO-DENVER. Operations to be aided by sabotage activities Areas "B" and "D" in accordance with program OP No 3 of even date.

b. Ultimate Objectives

1. Intelligence: As indicated in Section 2-a-
above; supplemented by special information from Areas "A", "B",
and "G" covering changes in enemy dispositions these regions
as result of OP No. 4 as supplemented by activities under OP No 3.

2. Operational

a. Final Goal: An irregular mission in

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Area "E" in aid of Military action. Direction toward line TROY-DAYTON. Sabotage diversions, in aid of above, in Areas "B" and "D".

2. PROGRAM Two: Continuation of Irregular Mission toward Area "A". Supplemental sabotage in Area "A", "B" and "D".

3. PROGRAM Three: Juncture of elements forming Irregular Mission with Resistance Forces located Area "A", "B" and "D" for operations in aid of Military Action (including landings North and/or South of Albany) assisted by Resistance Forces located in Area "G". Such operations predicated on Military Action based on HARTFORD and on situation existing on occupation of HARTFORD.

NOTE: PROGRAM Three to be covered by separate Operational Plan.

3. PLAN

a. Essential Data: - The mountainous country in Area "E" Northwest across TROY-DAYTON and CHICAGO-DETROIT lines to Area "G" is practically devoid of enemy troops. It is believed that an Irregular Detachment numbering from 500 to 750 Officers and men could make their way, with the aid of pack-animals, along the lines indicated. Speed would be essential and light, but effective, equipment. If timed to conform to pressure from the main allied forces and to assistance from Resistance Forces in the enemy rear (particularly Area "B" and "D"), rapid withdrawal and consequent losses of men and material could result. Accurate timing and good communications would be essential and the chances of success would be materially enhanced if the program outlined in ONS OP No 3 could be completed (through the Preliminary Action Stages) at an early date.

b. PROGRAM: - To send an Irregular Detachment of 500 Italians and 250 American Officers and men through the mountains with the first objective the cutting of the TROY-DAYTON line. Thence immediately toward Area "G" across the line DETROIT-CHICAGO to strike the enemy rear and flank and assist in compelling further withdrawal.

Arms and Equipment with which to equip Resistance Forces encountered along the line of advance would be carried by the Irregular Detachment. The Detachment would hope, ultimately, to contact the large and organized Resistance Elements now located in Area "B" and "D".

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All personnel included in the Detachment should have mountain experience. As many as possible among the Italian members of the Detachment should know the country to be traversed. At least 25 guides should be provided and these must be continuously assisted by natives of the respective localities traversed. Included in the personnel of the Detachment should be a platoon of Engineers for mine clearance and not less than 30 demilitarists for mine laying and other sabotage calculated to impede enemy withdrawal.

Communications should be sufficiently constant to permit of control by G-3, Fifth Army, of all action taken by the Detachment. Communications provided under OSS OP No 3, if carried out, should be ample. OSS Base Station, for the purposes of OP No 4 can be located as directed by G-3, Fifth Army.

4. Information: - See OSS Reports 65 and 49 to G-2, Fifth Army, 25 October 1943.

5. Requirements of Transportation and Material and Personnel

a. Transportation

100 Pack Animals - FIFTH ARMY

b. Arms and Ammunition

As prescribed by G-3, FIFTH ARMY

c. Clothing

Winter clothing and equipment - including equipment for an additional 16 Officers and 270 enlisted men; members Italian Operational Groups (OGI) authorized by endorsement of Commanding General, Fifth Army, 4 October 1943, to Handle Letter OSS of 26 September 1943 - Fifth Army.

d. Food

For estimated 2 weeks operation.

e. Radio Equipment

- 1 - Type 693 Transmitter and Receiver, R'
- 3 - OSS Agent Sets - Head Airborne Div

SECRET

2. Prudal

None required.

6. Communications

- a. Carrier Service: OSS Forward Echelon to Detachment and Detachment to OSS Forward Echelon - twice daily - OSS.
- b. Carrier Pigeon Service - As arranged - Fifth Army.
- c. Radios - OSS network as per OSS, OP No 3 - OSS.

7. Personnel

a. To be furnished by recruiting balance of 9 Italian Operational Groups (out of 13 authorized) which will require an estimated two weeks time from the date of necessary authority.

b. U. S. Army As prescribed by Commanding General, Fifth Army.

8. Instructions

As indicated by G-3, Fifth Army.

STACY B. LLOYD
Major, A. U. S.
OO, Forward Echelon

APPROVED:

KERRY C. MONTGOMERY JR
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION

As per OSS OP No 3

REFERENCES: See OSS OP No 3

SECRET

ADDRESS REPLY TO
COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

Grant Mission - 12, 290 B
X Fifth Army
X Reports
X Italy

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

8 September 1943

Brig. General William J. Donovan, Director
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

*Documents
received
Admission
7 Sept. 1943*

Dear General Donovan:

In accordance with your request of 3 September,
there is attached a set of the reports of the subcommittees
of the Committee of Operations Analysts on Italy.

Sincerely yours

B. N. Gates
BYRON N. GATES
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Chief, Management Control



SECRET

Grant Mission - 12, 290B

X Fifth Army

X Reports

X Italy

3 September 1949

Brig. Gen. Byron E. Gates
Chief, Management Control
Army Air Forces
Room 4C 945 Pentagon Building
Arlington, Virginia

Dear General Gates:

The Office of Strategic Services is sending, in the near future, a unit to work with the 5th Army.

✓ In that connection it would be very desirable if they can take with them, in addition to their other material, a set of the Bombardment Advisory Committee reports on Italy.

I shall, therefore, be very grateful if you will authorize Colonel Ferrara to release a set for the use of this mission.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Director

EMMasca/eh

*For General
Buxton
on his arrival
of Buxton*

D. Buxton

*General Morrison 102904
Fifth Army
X Clark, Lt Gen Mark*

14 December 1945

F

Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark
Commanding General, Fifth Army
APO 464, c/o Postmaster
New York City, N.Y.

Dear General Clark:

I want you to know, first of all, how very much I appreciated your letter of commendation. I know, better than anyone else, the many things I did not do, and it was, therefore, particularly gratifying to learn that my Commanding General believed something had been accomplished.

Every moment of my stay with Fifth Army was a delight, and I will never be able to tell you how greatly I value the privilege of having served in your command. Fifth Army always seemed to me more like a well coached, inspired football team, directed by an All-American leader, than it did a cold-blooded war machine. I was conscious, everywhere, of a warmth of relationship and cohesion of effort which is not generally evident in so impersonal an organization as an Army. It is a great tribute to you, and your dynamic leadership, that this is so. It is reflected in the very noticeable feeling of pride which your officers and men all have at being "one of General Clark's boys". A feeling I share, I might add. I only hope I may be allowed to continue to consider myself one of the family -- in absentia though I am -- and trust that if Bill Donovan assigns me, again, to foreign fields, it may be with a show of yours.

I tried to reach Mrs. Clark on my arrival in Washington as I wanted to let her know that you are thriving on bad weather and hard campaigning. She was out of town for a few days, but I had a nice talk with her mother and left your letter.

Each day I read, avidly, all Fifth Army news which consistently occupies headline space. May the days to come be filled with success!

Many thanks, again, for your great kindness, best regards and a Merry Christmas and Happy New Year.

Faithfully yours,

Hilery C. Huntington Jr.
Colonel, Infantry

Paul Mission 12, 2409
X Fifth Army
X Chief of Staff
X Washington, Cal 8

14 December 1945

Major General Alfred M. Gruenther
Chief of Staff, Fifth Army
APO 464, c/o Postmaster
New York City, N.Y.

My dear General:

It is almost impossible to find any adequate way of telling you how grateful I am, not only for all your helpful and considerate interest while I was with Fifth Army, but, what is more important, for the opportunity of serving under your direction. I knew before I left Washington last summer that mine would be an interesting assignment, but I did not visualize Fifth Army, its Commanding General and its Chief of Staff as they really are. I need not say that I am proud, beyond words, to have been a part -- even such a small part -- of your organization. That which pleases me most of all, however, is that, while having the privilege of watching you manage so skillfully and quietly that very substantial enterprise known as Fifth Army, I was given an opportunity of getting to know you as a man and a friend as well as a soldier.

Your patient willingness, at all times, to discuss the trivial problems of our fledgling detachment, did more to enable us to rationalize possible OSS associations with combat units than we were able to accomplish in eighteen months of hard work here in Washington. As a result of what you and Ed Howard made possible for us, I think I can demonstrate to Bill Donovan (when, if ever, he returns) that, with adequate preparation, OSS can really make itself useful to Armies in the field. My boss and I have always believed this to be true, but we needed some sort of "proving ground". This, General Clark, by his willingness to "bake us on", and you and Ed, by reason of kindly and patient interest, furnished us. While our demonstration was insignificant in scope, it served a real purpose, and if we manage some day to do a little more for other combat forces, it will be because of the opportunity to learn which came through Fifth Army.

- 2 -

I saw Mrs. Grunther for a moment on the first day of my return, and delivered your envelope to her at that time. She is perfectly delightful, and promised to give me a real Martini on my next visit, which will be soon. I also saw Mrs. Howard. They were together as you predicted they would be.

Needless to say, my thoughts are constantly of all of you. I must continue to consider myself a part of Fifth Army until someone orders otherwise, and that photograph of you -- my prized possession -- makes the association a very real and personal one.

I hope things are going well, and that I may see all of you again soon. Meantime, my kindest regards, Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year, and the best of luck.

Faithfully,

Ellery G. Huntington Jr.
Colonel, Infantry

Col. Hunter
Grant Memorial 12-21-45
X Fifth Army
X Clark C. G. Mather
X Huntington Col Galloway
15 December 1945

Colonel D. H. Galloway
Sixth Corps Hqs., Fifth Army
APO 484, c/o Postmaster, N.Y.

Dear Don:

Just a word to let you know that I talked with Mrs. Galloway, and told her how disgustingly well you are, and of what a fine job you are doing. She was delighted to have the news, and I was equally pleased to be the bearer of such ~~good~~ tidings.

You will never know, Don, how much your interest and help in our OSS activities meant to me. We had a job of pioneering to do, as you know, and without the assistance given and helpful interest shown by you, Dutch Keiser, Colonel Langevin and a few others, we would have been unable to make any kind of a demonstration.

Will you please tell Dutch Keiser that I called Colonel and Mrs. Brooks, and also Mrs. Keiser at Fort McPherson. I also talked with Mrs. Langevin. She will get in touch with Mrs. Lucas and tell her about the General.

My recollection of Sixth Corps Staff is a very vivid one. I never saw a finer crew, nor one which works together more smoothly than yours. The assignment has been a hard one from the moment the first whistle blew, and I don't see how it could have been better handled.

Will you please say hello to the General, the Chief of Staff, Langevin and Weber, and any others who may remember me.

Merry Christmas, the best of New Years and my warm regards.

Faithfully,

Ellery G. Huntington Jr.
Colonel, Infantry

C
O
P
Y

14 December 1943

Colonel Edwin D. Howard
Army Chief of Staff, G-2
Fifth Army, APC 404
c/o Postmaster, N.Y.

Dear Ed:

I am not going to be too formal with you even if you are (or were) my boss.

There are three things which stand out in my mind as I look back on my stay with Fifth Army. First, the fine and able crowd which the Commanding General has gathered about him; second, the real "esprit" which is most noticeable everywhere; and last, but not least, a picture of your tireless patience in listening to my tales of wee no matter how trivial. I never remember coming to the G-2 tent when you or Tom Wells were too busy to see me, or listen to me, and almost invariably my visit meant just one more problem for one of you to solve.

As one knows better than I, that, what little OSS has been able to do to make a place for itself in combat circles, is the result, entirely, of your willingness to "give us a hand", no matter how pre-occupied with other things.

While, as I have indicated, I brought back definite impressions of Fifth Army as an organization, the memories I really cherish are those of the friends I made -- or hope I made -- there. If ever I serve anywhere again before being relegated to a less exciting life, I hope it may be with the same crowd. And if Ed Howard is my boss it will be alright with me.

I located your charming wife on my first day in Washington -- the 8th to be exact. She was with Mrs. Gruenther as the General said she probably would be. She was delighted to hear about you, and to find that you were really as well and as unhappy at being separated from her as you have evidently been representing in your letters.

Please tell Tom Wells that I called his sister and brother-in-law, and had nice chats with both of them. They were pleased to have up-to-date news, and when next I am in New York, I am to have a cocktail with them. Incidentally, I have the same promise from Mrs. Howard, and Mrs. Gruenther.

Thanks again for all your wonderful and patient help. Best luck to all of you, the seasons greetings and my warm regards.

Faithfully,

/s/ Ellery D. Huntington Jr.
Colonel, Infantry

P.S. This is also for Tom.

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY
A. P. O. #121, V. S. ARMY

Handwritten:
Frank [unclear]
Fifth Army
Clark

23 November 1943.

SUBJECT: Commendation.

TO : Colonel Wilsey Huntington, O.S.S.

1. I wish to commend you, on the occasion of your transfer from Army with Fifth Army, for the splendid manner in which you have organized and directed our OSS activities during the past two months.

2. In view of the fact that OSS activities had not been permitted in Italy prior to the landing of the Fifth Army on September 9, 1943, it was necessary for you to build your organization and develop your procedures from the ground up. In spite of this fact you overcame the many obstacles and difficulties incident to the task in such a manner as to permit early benefits to the Fifth Army from your organization. The accomplishments of the OSS under your direction are a tribute to your untiring efforts and superior organizing ability.

3. My staff joins me in wishing you the best of luck and every success in your new assignment.

MARK F. CLARK,
Lieutenant General, USA,
Commanding.



CONFIDENTIAL

Grant Mission 12, 29 A
x 5th Army
x Clark, Lt Gen Mark
x Huntington, Col Ellery

25 August 1943

My dear General Clark:

This will introduce Colonel Ellery C. Huntington, Jr., concerning whom I have already talked with you.

Colonel Huntington is peculiarly well qualified to be of service to you in our work, as he is head of our Operations unit, which includes various specialities for work behind the enemy lines. As you will find, he is not only attractive and agreeable, but is a lawyer of ability and a very practical fellow in getting things done. He can tell you about the staff he will have with him.

I hope you heard from Ismay as I went into the whole situation with him, and he said he would write you.

I hope to get away next week, and look forward to being with you. If you can give me a jeep and a gun I won't bother you further.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark,
Commanding General, Fifth Army

Grant Mission 12,290

SECRET

(35)

6 September 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Joint Chiefs of Staff
 Public Health Building
 Washington, D. C.

Attn: General John R. Deane, Secretary

SUBJECT: Attachment of OSS Personnel to Fifth Army

1. Authority is requested to permit Colonel D. K. H. Bruce and Colonel G. S. Vanderblue to be attached to General Mark W. Clark's Headquarters, Fifth Army, for a period of approximately 30 days. It is planned to have the attachment made about 25 September 1943.

2. Colonel D. K. H. Bruce, O-500883, Air Corps, is the Strategic Services Officer, STO. Colonel G. S. Vanderblue, O-500884, Signal Corps, is the Chief of SO Branch, London.

3. The purpose of the attachment is to enable these officers to take part in the OSS operations planned for the Fifth Army. From this participation, these officers will gain valuable experience for the planning of similar OSS operations in support of military effort in the STO.

G. Edward Huxton
 Acting Director

SECRET

Grant Mission
x Fifth Army
SECRET
x Personnel
x Office North
x [unclear]

28 August 1948

Subject: 8th Army Mission (Grant Mission) - Personnel - MD Representation

To: Lt. Delan

1. I understand that Mr. Warner will be the MO nominee for the Grant Mission.
2. Will you be good enough to cable the necessary instructions to Mr. Warner to report to me upon my arrival?

Elery C. Munzington, Jr.
Colonel, AUS
Deputy Director - Operations

cc: General Donovan ✓

ech:lm

Grant Mission 12, 290

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

*5th Army
Personnel
Africa, etc.
Assignments*

26 August 1943

Subject: 5th Army Mission (Grant Mission) - Personnel
To: General Donovan

1. The following personnel has been notified to be prepared to leave on the above Mission, to wit: Mr. Donald McKay, Captain Stuart Hughes, Lt. Commander Breed, Lt. Colonel Serge Obolensky, Captain Bradish Smith, and a Communications Officer, 2nd Lt. James W. Russell who has been in training at Area "F" with Operational Groups and who is a combat officer as well.

2. In addition to the above personnel, Mr. Brennan has cabled requesting the assignment of a Lt. Cagiati, and Colonel Vanderblue has again asked London for the temporary assignment of Major Canfield. Lt. Dolan has suggested Mr. Warner (already in North Africa) as the MO representative and will, I understand, cable necessary instructions. R and A will attach to the Mission, as an economic analyst, Mr. Sidney Alexander, who is now in the Theater and to whom, presumably, word will be sent by Dr. Langer. Mr. Barnes, cartographer, will be ordered by Dr. Langer to Algiers from London.

3. In accordance with my memorandum of even date, I will consult with Colonel Eddy before asking for further personnel. R and A suggests that this personnel should include an economist (Mr. Dorr), another cartographer (Ensign Kline) and Ensigns Roberts and Sawyer

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on Topographic Intelligence.


4. Colonel Eddy has already cabled asking for additional training and communications personnel and this cable has been answered today. There should be included two or three training and operations officers from the Maritime Unit as there are no representatives of this Unit now in the Theater.

5. Clerical assistance in the Theater is terribly short and I am sure some help of this sort will be required by our Mission. One excellent clerk-stenographer now with Operational Groups is available, to wit: T/Sgt. Carlo Di Torneo.

6. I am attempting to contact Mr. Gerli in New York, but so far have not been able to reach him. When I talk to him I will tell him that you hope to be able to arrange for transportation for him soon, and that I am looking forward to seeing him.

7. Colonel Eddy has cabled about additional OG personnel (cable 641), and I have answered that in two weeks time we could send 2 more Italian Groups, 2 French Groups (totaling 16 officers and 120 enlisted men), 1 Section of German speaking personnel (2 officers and 15 enlisted men), and 2 Norwegian Groups (8 officers and 60 men) who would later have to be dispatched to London. This would give additional combat teams for the Island operations which may eventuate.

8. I have made all the necessary transportation requests through Mr. Mygatt in Mr. Kimbel's office.


Ellery C. Huntington, Jr.
Colonel, AUS
Deputy Director - Operations

CC: Dr. Langer
Colonel Kenerick
Commander Woolley
Mr. Scribner
Lt. Dolan
Mr. Mygatt

Grant Mission 12, 270

SECRET

x Fifth Army

x Personnel

x Operations

x Requirements

28 August 1948

Subject: 5th Army Mission - Grant - Personnel

To: Mr. Kenneth Mygatt

1. In addition to orders and transportation for myself on which you are now working, orders and transportation should be arranged (as soon as adequate Theater authority is obtained) for the following personnel to wit: Mr. Donald McKay and Captain Stuart Hughes of R and A; Captain Bradish Smith, room 2175 Qas Building; Lt. Commander Edward Breed, room 2188 Qas Building; Lt. Colonel Serge Obolesky, Area F and 2nd Lt. James W. Russell who is located at Area G.

2. The additional officers above mentioned total six in number, but Commander Breed has his own Navy orders with number 1 air priority and can, I assume, be dispatched on these orders to Algiers from which point I will arrange to have him sent by Colonel Eddy to the 5th Army. The other five individuals should be included in the Theater authority on which you are now working. If by any chance Commander Breed must be included as one of the five (because his Navy orders are insufficient) then 2nd Lt. James W. Russell should be dropped from the list.

3. At General Donovan's suggestion I am going to attempt to arrange with Colonel Eddy and the Theater Commander for the dispatching of a second flight of civilians and officers for 5th Army duty. There would be included in this flight one or two additional members from R and A and such other personnel as seems necessary after discussion with Colonel Eddy. I realize that nothing can be done on the second flight until after my arrival in Algiers.

4. In connection with orders issued to officers, these orders should specifically provide for the issuance of all necessary equipment including an automatic pistol.

5. The officers mentioned in paragraph 1 can be reached through my office.

cc: General Donovan
Mr. Eddy
Mr. [unclear]
Mr. [unclear]
Mr. [unclear]
Mr. [unclear]

Walter G. Huntington, Jr.
Colonel, USA
Deputy Director - Operations

Grant Mission 12,290

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D C

SECRET

24 August 1943

v
with [unclear]
x [unclear]
x [unclear]
x [unclear]

Subject: 5th Army Mission (Grant Mission) - Personnel Requirements

To: General Donovan

1. War Department cable #OM-IN-14829 (20 August 1943) authorized travel for the undersigned and five additional officers. The officers included will be 2 representatives from R and A, 2 representative from MO, 1 representative from SI and 1 representative from SO.

2. It is probable that additional members to the staff will be furnished in the person of Mr. Barnes (R and A cartographer) from London and Major Canfield from SO, London.

3. Certain personnel is, of course, available in the Theater, but it would seem advisable for OSS to consider supplementing immediately Theater staffs in order to care for the requirements of handling operations called for by the Grant Mission and also operations called for in the proposal made by General Donovan respecting the Islands of S and C. My suggestion is that consideration be given to the following personnel:

a. At least 1 additional Italian expert and one additional cartographer from R and A.

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SECRET

b. Additional training personnel capable of carrying for SI, SO and Operational Group training. It is my suggestion in this connection that Colonel Obolensky and a staff of 6 officers who have been selected by him be dispatched to supplement existing training facilities. Colonel Obolensky and the officers mentioned can later be used with French speaking Operational Groups as all of them have been selected not only for their instructional ability but because of language qualifications.

c. That Major Cheever and his Marine Parachute crew be dispatched at once. This crew will be able to assist in parachute training in Algeria and can later be sent to London which is their ultimate destination. Commander Halliwell has agreed to this arrangement.

d. That at least 4 of the Communications Officers selected from the 22 officers now with Operational Groups also be expedited to the Theater. These officers are trained in combat as well as in communications, and

e. That additional communications personnel and equipment be dispatched at the earliest possible moment.

4. In addition to the foregoing there are now in training approximately 3 French speaking Operational Groups (90 men and 12 officers), some or all of whom should be most useful in the Theater especially in connection with operations in Island C. It would seem that consideration should also be given to arranging shipment of this personnel even if the training period here is reduced.

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SECRET

5. Do you wish me to discuss the foregoing matters with Colonel Eddy with a view to obtaining Theater authority?



Ellery C. Huntington, Jr.
Colonel, AUS
Deputy Director - Operations

cc: Colonel Gamble
Colonel Kenerick

Note: I have just seen cable #744 from Bill Eddy which says that the membership of my own party cannot be increased. It does state, however, that the group may include civilians as well as officers so that Don McKay and Ed Taylor may be included. This cable would seem to make necessary, however, some additional authority.

E.C.H. Jr.

SECRET

24 August 1945

Subject: 5th Army Mission - MC Representative

To: Lt. Dolan

1. I understand that Mr. Ed Taylor is no longer available for the above mission.

2. Will you make a new nomination at once, being sure that it is satisfactory with General Donovan, and would you also be good enough to discuss this nomination with me?

3. Be sure that the person nominated has all inoculations and is otherwise processed. I would like to have the name of your nominee at once.

**Ellery C. Huntington, Jr.
Colonel, AMM
Deputy Director - Operations**

cc: General Donovan ✓

ech/lms

SECRET

24 August 1948

Subject: Operational Groups - North Africa - Italian Speaking Personnel

To: Colonel Kenerick

1. Since Operational Groups have on hand some additional Italian speaking personnel, I would suggest:

a. That steps be taken to process as much of this personnel as is now present (after such personnel has been carefully screened) for immediate shipment to the Theater irrespective of the extent of training, and

b. That the Security Office be requested to make a special investigation.

2. Italian speaking personnel could, it seems to me, be dispatched under the general authority from the Theater pursuant to which other Italian speaking personnel has been shipped.

3. I have already written a memorandum to General Donovan covering French speaking personnel and potential operations on the Island of C.

4. In case I fail to have an opportunity to discuss this matter with General Donovan, will you be good enough to call this memorandum to his attention at some time soon?

Henry C. Huntington, Jr.
Colonel, USA
Deputy Director - Operations

cc: General Donovan ✓

cc: [unclear]

24 August 1948

**Subject: SO Operations - Mid East - Greek Operations -
Cable #824**

To: Lt. Smolianinoff

1. In connection with cable #824 from Cairo, SO Cairo is requesting some SO officers for liaison work, approximately 25 non-commissioned officers as interpreters with American liaison officers (the figure 25 is selected as presumably some of the SO officers would be language speaking), approximately 70 NCO interpreters for use with the British, 25 NCO's for use as instructors and approximately 18 W/T operators.

2. The filling of the above requirements will be impossible from the SO allotment, and such requirements should, therefore, be cared for by Operational Groups.

3. The above request totals 50 officers and 187 enlisted men including W/T operators. My suggestion is that the requirements be met from 4 groups and 1 Field Service Headquarters which would furnish roughly 21 officers and 148 men.

4. The difference between 50 officers and the 21 officers available from Operational Groups in accordance with above suggestion will have to be supplied by the assignment of communications officers and additional combat and engineer officers taken from the instructional staff of Operational Groups. Colonel Kenerisk will have to designate the number of officers so available, but I should hope they might include a total of at least 9 officers in the categories mentioned. The remaining 50 officer positions (making a total of 50) would have to be filled by using non-commissioned officers taken from the 4 Groups and 1 Field Service Headquarters above mentioned.

5. It should be borne in mind by our own people in the Theater and by the British that we cannot commission officers out of hand with the same facility as the British.

A great many of our non-commissioned officers are as fully qualified to be officers as are many of the provisional appointees in the British Army. The British provisional appointments can be made and withdrawn out of hand. We have no such system in the American Army and are, therefore, being obliged in many cases to use our outstanding non-commissioned officers where the British are able to use officers.

6. I would suggest that a cable be sent Cairo stating that we are filling their requirements in the manner above suggested and that an airgram letter of explanation be forwarded outlining the point made in paragraph 6 above and detailing the makeup of the Groups and Field Service Headquarters from which can be selected the personnel described in cable #824.

7. The personnel requested should in all respect be specially selected from the Greek Battalion concerning which cable #827 deals. In this connection Colonel Gamble and Colonel Kennerick should see Colonel Bigelow at once with a view to having an increase in the GO allotment assured so that the numbers of the Greek Battalion may be obtained.

8. In the answering cable to Cairo the point should be stressed that this amount of personnel can be quickly obtained only if Theater request for members of the Greek Battalion is immediately received.

9. So far as the immediate dispatch of the personnel requested is concerned, I would suggest

a. That as soon as Theater request or authority is received steps be taken through Colonel Hoag to obtain at least 200 or 300 selected members from the Greek Battalion out of which will be specially selected personnel requested in cable #824.

b. That this selection be made by a special recruiting team and with the help of the Commanding Officer of the battalion.

c. That as selections are made personal history statements be immediately obtained and forwarded to the Security Office and processing immediately commenced, and

d. That training be devised in such a way that it can be interrupted as soon as travel orders are received.

10. I would suggest that Colonel Kenerick, Colonel
Gamble and Lt. Smelianisoff consult on this situation at once.

Elery G. Huntington, Jr.
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Director - Operations

cc: General Donovan
Colonel Gamble
Colonel Kenerick

ech:mas