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2 June 1965

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER 22-65

(This estimate supplements NIE 22-63 and NIE 22-64)

French Foreign Policy

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Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

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FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the main lines of French foreign policy under de Gaulle and how these might change after his departure from office.

CONCLUSIONS

A. De Gaulle views France and the US as competitors for the leadership of Europe. Most of his recent policy initiatives, intended to enhance the position of France, have widened the areas of difference between France and the US and weakened the fabric of unity in the Western Alliance, but they have not as yet brought him nearer his goal of European leadership. (*Paras. 4-8, 24, 25*)

B. De Gaulle considers it essential to join France and Germany in a common policy in order to achieve his objective of a French-led West European political grouping of sufficient strength to negotiate European issues on equal terms with the US and the USSR. If, as appears likely, there is no significant early German movement toward French foreign and defense policies, the downward course in Franco-German relations is almost certain to continue. (*Paras. 4-12*)

C. Recently de Gaulle has moved away from his earlier view that Soviet policy was too rigid to permit any kind of meaningful discussion with Moscow with respect to Europe, and he will probably continue to probe the possibilities of political understanding with the USSR. He almost certainly considers that he must be circumspect in his dealings with Moscow, particularly because too rapid movement would reduce his chances of establishing French leadership over Western Europe. (*Paras. 27-30*)

D. De Gaulle's assault on NATO and his step by step disengagement from it are almost certainly intended to gain leverage on the US and the other NATO members. We believe that he will, at the very least, insist upon major structural reforms in NATO, but his

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antipathy to NATO as it is now constituted may be so strong that even such changes would not satisfy him. He almost certainly prefers a series of bilateral alliances among the US, UK, France, and West Germany, which would involve relatively loose arrangements for coordinating military operations in wartime combined with a small amount of coordinated planning in peacetime. He probably seeks eventually to reduce the US role to that of a nuclear backup to Europe's own defense arrangements under French preeminence. While his terms for staying in the Alliance are probably not yet clear in his own mind, they will be high. If he is not satisfied he will probably withdraw from NATO and ultimately from the Alliance. He almost certainly will not leave NATO before the French presidential elections in late 1965; but he has stated that he will not permit troops or installations on French soil after 1969 that are not under French command and control. (*Paras. 19-20*)

E. De Gaulle advocates the establishment of a regime in Vietnam which would be neutralized with respect to all outside powers. That such a regime would probably be Communist would in de Gaulle's view be of incidental importance, on the grounds that the strong nationalist feeling of the Vietnamese and their historic desire to resist domination by China would prevent the Communists from ruling Vietnam as instruments of Chinese policy. In any event, France will certainly be unwilling to participate in any way in the defense of the area against Communist takeover; moreover, France will not invest military or economic resources to bring about or defend a settlement. (*Para. 33*)

F. The longer de Gaulle is in power, the more likely his policies are to shape the political conditions, institutions, and relationships in Western Europe. If de Gaulle leaves the scene during the next two or three years, his successor initially will probably make little change in the fundamentals of present French foreign policy. However, no other leader will have the degree of freedom from internal restraints that de Gaulle has had in shaping French policy. Lacking his stature and his authority, de Gaulle's successors will be less effective and less decisive in conducting France's foreign affairs. It is possible that successor governments will come to be less fixed in their attitudes on European and Atlantic matters than de Gaulle has been, and, as time goes by in the post-de Gaulle period, the sharp nationalist edges of French policy may be blunted. (*Paras. 40-44*)

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DISCUSSION

I. INTRODUCTION

1. President de Gaulle has now dominated French affairs for seven years. During that period the French economy has prospered, the nation has experienced important political and social changes, and France has become a nuclear power.¹ Recent French achievements are not due entirely to the General, but he has made his own the cause of national rejuvenation and the achievement of economic and nuclear strength. His dominance has provided France with the governmental stability conducive to progress and growth.

2. French foreign policy is the personal creation of General de Gaulle. His closest advisers often appear uncertain of his specific positions until he makes them public. No internal political pressures restrain or impel him to any significant degree. His authority soars above opposition groups. The General is eloquent and relentless in his pursuit of *grandeur* for France, majestic in his disdain for detail, and aloof from the humdrum problems of day-to-day implementation of policy. Over the years, his style and his broad foreign policy objectives have remained unchanged.

3. Above all, General de Gaulle strives to establish France as a major world power and the leader of Western Europe. Ultimately, he hopes that France will be the spokesman for Western Europe in negotiations with the Soviet Union for a grand settlement of European problems. But in de Gaulle's view, a number of intermediate goals must be achieved first: France must develop a credible nuclear power of its own, France must strengthen its position among the powers of the Western Alliance, and the role and influence of the US in Europe's affairs must be reduced.

4. Since the settlement of the Algerian War in 1962, the pace of French policy initiatives has accelerated, and some aspects of French foreign policy have undergone significant change, particularly with respect to the Communist powers. Most French initiatives, beginning with the exclusion of the UK from the EEC in January 1963, have widened the area of difference between France and the US.

II. MAJOR COMPONENTS OF DE GAULLE'S FOREIGN POLICY

The Mainsprings

5. There are two prerequisites to the achievement of de Gaulle's broad foreign policy objectives. One is to induce West Germany to adopt common policies

¹ For a broader discussion of internal trends see NIE 22-63, "France Under de Gaulle," dated 26 June 1963.

The French nuclear program is analyzed in NIE 22-64, "The French Advanced Weapons Program," dated 18 November 1964.

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with France. De Gaulle is convinced that France cannot become the leader of Europe until France and West Germany are working together toward shared—i.e., essentially French—goals. Together, in de Gaulle's view, the two would form the nucleus of a larger European grouping, initially the Six, which would have the economic and political resources and the military potential necessary to rank with the US and the USSR. The second prerequisite is to prevent any possibility of a European settlement between the US and the USSR without his concurrence. De Gaulle has long feared that the two superpowers ultimately would compose their differences, including those concerning the future of Europe. He has seen significant movement in this direction in the recent period of detente and in the nuclear test ban treaty. He seems to feel that a US-Soviet agreement would perpetuate the division of Europe along present lines of Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe and of US ascendancy over Western Europe.

6. To fulfill either of these prerequisites, de Gaulle feels there must be, first and foremost, a drastic reduction in the role and the influence of the US in Western Europe. The close US-West German relationship is the principal obstacle to achieving the kind of relationship with Germany that de Gaulle desires. The only sure way, in his view, to prevent the US and the USSR from deciding the future of Europe is for France to become Western Europe's leader and spokesman. In de Gaulle's mind the proper role for the US is to stand aside holding its protective nuclear umbrella over Europe.

Europe

7. De Gaulle's objective is to organize Western Europe into a loose association of powers led by France—a "Europe of Fatherlands"—which would have sufficient strength and coherence of policy to negotiate European questions on a more or less equal basis with the US and the USSR. His concept of the Europe which would emerge from these negotiations—"Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals"—is quite vague in both content and timing. It does seem to include a mutual and reciprocal withdrawal of the US from Europe and of the USSR into its own boundaries. The Eastern European nations would recover their independence from the Soviet Union, though Communist regimes friendly to Moscow might remain in power; and the nations of Western Europe would become less subject to US influence, although some type of defensive arrangements might continue.

8. *Germany*: The achievement of de Gaulle's aspirations for Europe depends upon what he can accomplish with West Germany. He retains a considerable measure of traditional French distrust of Germany. He therefore considers it important to anchor West Germany to France or to some broader grouping under French leadership in order to head off any possibility that the Germans might embark on a unilateral course adverse to French interests. He also realizes that his objective of a French-led West European bloc strong enough to stand up to the US and the USSR would be impossible to achieve without the added increment of German strength.

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9. De Gaulle is almost certainly disappointed by the downward drift in Franco-German relations since the high point reached with the de Gaulle-Adenauer agreement of January 1963, even though much of the deterioration is attributable to his own actions. To be sure, the drift has not been altogether downward; the Germans have met French desires in a number of matters, both political and economic. But de Gaulle has not been able to shake the West German Government's confidence in and desire for US support for the defense of Europe, and he has not been able to frighten or cajole the Germans into moving toward his idea of French political ascendancy on the continent.

10. De Gaulle is fully aware of the importance that the West Germans attach to German reunification, and, although he has diverged from them by his early public recognition of the Oder-Neisse line, he has been careful to give them reason to believe that he favors eventual reunification. De Gaulle probably would view the emergence of a united and powerful Germany as a challenge to French ascendancy in Western Europe, but he almost certainly sees very little possibility that reunification will come to pass in the foreseeable future. He probably regards the issue as a vehicle for international politics, rather than as a goal to be sought.

11. The Germans, on the other hand, have become increasingly suspicious of French intentions toward the USSR, and they fear that a Paris-Moscow agreement at German expense may be in the making. They are apprehensive of de Gaulle's intention to minimize the US role in any settlement of European problems, including the reunification of Germany. Many Germans also suspect that de Gaulle intends the French nuclear force more as an instrument for French political domination of Western Europe than as an instrument for its military defense.

12. If, as appears likely, there is no significant early German movement toward French foreign and defense policies, the downward course in Franco-German relations is almost certain to continue. Over the long run, if de Gaulle cannot persuade the Germans to go along with his basic European policies, he will have to reappraise his objectives and strategies.

13. *The UK:* De Gaulle considers the UK an impediment to realizing his own ambitions for France. In his view, the UK is a handmaiden of US policy in Europe, and seeks to cling to its special relationship with the US and to its Commonwealth interests rather than to cast its lot with Europe. Consequently he excludes the UK, for the present, from the European political grouping that he hopes to build and lead. His policy has been, and probably will continue to be, to exclude the UK from the European Economic Community and to prevent the UK from increasing in any way its position or influence on the continent. At the same time, de Gaulle is willing to undertake certain projects with the UK, such as joint production of aircraft, and there are signs that he has not entirely given up the hope of converting the UK to a European continentalist approach. Indeed, in the long run, a French tie to a converted UK

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could provide an alternative policy in case of a failure of Franco-German relations.

14. *The European Communities and Integration:* De Gaulle was not in favor of the treaties which established the existing European communities when they were first adopted. Since returning to power in 1958, he has accepted the European institutions which have been created and has followed policies that allowed them to grow, while seeking to make them serve French economic interests. The beneficent French policy toward the European economic communities, in spite of their integrative effects, seems to some extent to be at odds with the hostile French policy toward political integration. It appears that de Gaulle has become increasingly apprehensive of late about the possible loss of sovereignty in the economic field that could result from further progress toward integrated economic institutions. Hence, he is likely to resist continued evolution of the communities toward more integrated forms. In the political sphere, de Gaulle has excluded any approach going beyond the creation of a loose political grouping of European nations with extensive consultative arrangements but with no supranational institutions.

15. De Gaulle desires an agreement among the Six for the coordination of their foreign and defense policies along French lines. He has emphasized his insistence on including defense problems among the subjects the union would deal with to the exclusion of the US. If negotiations are resumed on European unity the French will probably make some kind of proposal for coordinating European defense programs independently of the US and NATO. But the smaller countries are reluctant to enter into a consultative arrangement of this sort lest it tie them to French policy and lose them the balancing support of the US and the UK.

The Alliance and NATO

16. In de Gaulle's view, alliances are created for specific purposes; they should have the same life span as the conditions which called them into being, no more. General de Gaulle applies this simple but rigid concept to the Atlantic Alliance. He sees it as a transient relationship limited not only in time but also in area, structure, and competence. It is useful and proper only so long as the threat continues which brought it into being—the possibility of a Soviet attack on Western Europe.

17. It is not likely that General de Gaulle will change his basic convictions concerning the nature of alliances in general or the Atlantic Alliance in particular, but in practice his approach may involve temporizing. Although he almost certainly believes that a Soviet military attack has become highly unlikely, he does not claim that the Soviet menace has permanently disappeared, and this, together with the political consequences of a French decision to withdraw, probably continues to justify French participation in the Alliance for the time being. In de Gaulle's view this participation binds France only to those specific obligations France agrees to and does not require France to support the policies of

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other participants on nonmilitary matters or to assist them with their problems in other parts of the world.

18. In the past, General de Gaulle has drawn a distinction between the Atlantic Alliance and the organizational structure which has grown up around it—NATO. While he continues to accept the Alliance for the present as a necessary defensive undertaking among independent nations, he is opposed to NATO. He believes that it provides an institutionalized framework for the perpetuation of US (and British) influence in Europe. He is determinedly opposed to the concept of integrated NATO forces and command structure. As he views it, such integration removes French forces from French control and places in foreign hands the decision as to when and how to defend France. This is, in de Gaulle's view, a clear and inadmissible infringement of French sovereignty. The General is also opposed to the US views on a proper strategy for NATO.

19. We believe that de Gaulle will, at the very least, insist upon major structural reforms in NATO, but his antipathy to NATO as it is now constituted may be so strong that even such changes would not suffice. Clearly de Gaulle's assaults on NATO and his step by step disengagement from it are intended to gain leverage on the US and the other NATO members so that, from a position of maximum strength, he can press his views on such questions as reorganization of the Alliance, French "status" in the West, and perhaps US-French nuclear cooperation in some form. As far as West European defense is concerned, de Gaulle almost certainly prefers a series of bilateral alliances among the US, UK, France, and West Germany, which would involve relatively loose arrangements for coordinating military operations in wartime combined with a small amount of coordinated planning in peacetime. He probably seeks eventually to reduce the US role to that of a nuclear backup to Europe's own defense arrangements under French preeminence.

20. De Gaulle's terms for staying in the Alliance are probably not yet clear in his own mind. Although his current statements almost certainly contain an element of bargaining, his terms in negotiating NATO matters will be extremely high, and if he is not satisfied, he will probably withdraw from NATO and ultimately from the Atlantic Alliance. If he does withdraw, his timing will depend upon the state of French relations with the USSR, the US, and West Germany, and on de Gaulle's estimate of how best to advance his views concerning the future of Europe. He almost certainly will not leave NATO before the French presidential election in late 1965; but he has stated that he will not permit troops or installations on French soil after 1969 that are not under French command and control.

Nuclear Weapons

21. General de Gaulle regards the possession of nationally controlled nuclear weapons as an indispensable political asset, both for the achievement of great-power status and for his campaign to replace US leadership in Europe with that of France. A nuclear weapons capability confirms French confidence in

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the destiny of France. In political and psychological terms, a nuclear capability gives France a decided advantage over West Germany and provides France equal status, at least, with the UK.

22. General de Gaulle also considers that France's nuclear force will have military importance. French military strategy is based on deterring a Soviet invasion of Western Europe rather than on actually having to resort to military action to combat it. The General is opposed to the US strategy of "flexible response" for the defense of Europe because he sees it as permitting a Soviet advance deep into Western Europe with a resultant destruction of much of the area. His plan is to maintain firmly the threat of the immediate use of strategic nuclear weapons against the population centers of the USSR in response to any but the smallest border incursions by Soviet forces. The French assert that this posture will be so convincing that the nuclear force never will be used in actual hostilities. The General will almost certainly continue to support the doctrine of instant nuclear response since this gives the small French nuclear force² its overt rationale. He probably is not particularly worried about having to implement it and face the consequences, since he regards a Soviet invasion of Western Europe as highly unlikely. In any case, the French believe its potential as a trigger for the US strategic nuclear force would probably maximize the political impact of the force in both Washington and Moscow. Consequently, de Gaulle opposes efforts within NATO to reach agreement on force levels and plans for the implementation of the strategy of flexible response which is favored by the US.

23. Gaullist spokesmen have suggested that the French force should be regarded as the first step toward a European nuclear deterrent. Such suggestions probably should be interpreted in the light of de Gaulle's belief that the French force should be accepted as European simply because France is in Europe. We do not believe that de Gaulle would ever give up control over the French nuclear force or that he would agree to associate the French force with a European nuclear force in a manner that would dilute French control.

The US

24. De Gaulle now views France and the US as political competitors pursuing divergent goals in the reorganization of Europe. The expressed purposes of US policy in postwar Europe, as de Gaulle sees it, have been achieved—the continent has recovered economically and politically from the effects of World War II, and the European nations have reached the point where they are again capable of conducting their own affairs. He concludes that neither US nor European interests are served best by continuation of a major US role in Europe.

25. In addition to these general considerations, de Gaulle regards many specific past and present US policies as contrary to French interests. Past instances include the US refusal to assist the French nuclear weapons program,

² By the early 1970s, France will probably have a submarine-missile force of three submarines and an IRBM force dispersed in hardened sites.

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the negative US response to de Gaulle's 1958 proposal that the US, France, and the UK establish a tripartite directorate to concert policy in all areas of the world, US opposition to France in the Suez affair, and lack of support in the Algerian War. General de Gaulle has little confidence that in a future crisis the US would give full attention to the views or interests of its allies. He supported the US on the Cuban missile issue, but he has since cited it as illustrating US readiness to make unilateral decisions affecting the interests of the nations of Western Europe.

26. Until recently France solicited US investment; it has cooperated with the US in various arrangements to alleviate difficulties with the US balance of payments. But de Gaulle now regards many types of US direct private investment in France as a threat to French economic independence. Since late 1964 he has taken measures to curtail US investment and has sought (so far unsuccessfully) to rally the other EEC nations behind a similar program. The recent French decision to convert into gold those dollar earnings in excess of franc-area payment needs was related to the investment issue in that it will increase the financial pressure on the US to curtail the flow of dollars to France. Although the decision on gold was partly motivated by economic and financial considerations, the manner in which it was handled by the French Government revealed substantial political purposes. The investment issue has quieted down as a result of voluntary restraints by US investors, but the principle of French—and European—economic independence remains a sensitive matter.

The USSR and East Europe

27. De Gaulle is confident that Russian national interests and Russian nationalism have become more important than Communist ideology in determining the course of Soviet foreign policy. This does not necessarily mean, in his view, that Russia will cease to be a disruptive or dangerous force in European affairs. It does mean, however, that the Soviet leaders will see in a more realistic light the advantages of political and economic association with Western Europe, and that they may become more amenable to negotiation along traditional national lines. De Gaulle regards such changes in Soviet thinking and orientation as an evolutionary process, probably already under way, and he will be alert to any opportunities to advance this process.

28. During the past two years de Gaulle has moved away from his earlier view that Soviet policy was still too rigid to permit any kind of meaningful discussion with Moscow with respect to Europe. He has taken a number of initiatives calculated to probe the possibilities of Franco-Soviet rapprochement. De Gaulle's view of the Vietnamese situation coincides in certain respects with that of Moscow and the French have made some attempts to concert the Vietnam policies of the two countries, but without success. More recently, the departure of Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov from Paris provided the opportunity for a number of extraordinary expressions of warmth and understanding between the two governments. De Gaulle took part in and stimulated this unique treatment of the departing Soviet ambassador. Soviet adoption of the French color TV

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system as the basis for joint research and production has also been treated in France as a major step toward closer relations with the USSR. These developments, and Gromyko's visit to Paris in April, probably foreshadow further political contacts, for it is certainly de Gaulle's intent to expand the areas of political understanding between France and the Soviet Union.

29. Yet de Gaulle almost certainly considers that he must be circumspect in his dealings with Moscow. He is restrained by concern that too rapid movement would reduce his chances of establishing a common policy with West Germany and French leadership of Europe. He also believes that the quickened pace of military developments in Vietnam has injected a new and unfortunate element into the situation. In his view recent events in Vietnam have put pressures on the Soviets for increased militancy in order to minimize Moscow's political losses to Peiping, have clouded relations between the US and the USSR, and have slowed down recent tendencies to reduce the role of ideology in Soviet policy.

30. As de Gaulle views the likely unfolding of events in Eastern Europe, the Communist regimes will eventually become more nationalist than Communist and Moscow's hold over them will continue to decrease. Until the summer of 1964, he avoided any initiatives in Eastern Europe, although it is an area of considerable interest to him. Apparently he now believes that he can intensify French contacts with these countries without offending Moscow. At least for the near future, de Gaulle's policies in Eastern Europe are likely to be more economic and cultural in content though political in purpose.

Communist China and Southeast Asia

31. One of de Gaulle's most conspicuous diplomatic actions in disregard of US susceptibilities and policies was the recognition of Communist China in January 1964. The French maintain that recognition of Peiping was logical and inevitable once the wars in Indochina and Algeria, in which Peiping opposed France, were past. De Gaulle probably believed that recognition of Peiping would provide France some additional leverage in dealing with Moscow and widen French opportunities to exploit the Sino-Soviet conflict. Moreover, he was certainly not averse to demonstrating his independence of US wishes. However, he probably was guided primarily by his conviction that Communist China is destined, by virtue of its size, location, and potential power, to play the dominant role in the Far East, and by his hope that he could influence Peiping's attitudes and policies. Thus far recognition of Peiping does not appear to have paid France any substantial political or economic dividends. But de Gaulle will almost certainly continue efforts to cultivate good relations with Peiping as one means for increasing French presence and influence in the Far East.

32. French policy toward Southeast Asia, and particularly toward Vietnam, diverges markedly from that of the US. De Gaulle considers Indochina within the natural sphere of influence of China. Although he acknowledges that US

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air and sea power will continue to exercise strong influence over the Western Pacific, including Japan and the Philippines, he regards US efforts to sustain pro-Western regimes on the mainland as bound to fail over the longer run. De Gaulle also genuinely fears that a Sino-US war may develop in Vietnam with negative effects on his hopes for Europe. Hence, he has sought to be the peacemaker, calling for negotiations and for neutralization of Vietnam. France retains economic and cultural interests in Indochina and is the only Western power which has regular political contact with both Hanoi and Peiping. De Gaulle probably still hopes to be able to use these links to bring about a resolution of the Vietnamese war, though rebuffs from both the Communist powers and the US have lately reduced French activity. His decision to reduce the role of the French SEATO representative at the May 1965 ministerial meeting was probably intended to increase his flexibility in seeking a solution in Vietnam, partly by dramatizing his dissociation from US policies in the area and partly by avoiding unprofitable disputes with the US.

33. De Gaulle advocates the establishment of a regime in Vietnam which would be neutralized with respect to all outside powers. That such a regime would probably be Communist would in de Gaulle's view be of incidental importance, on the grounds that the strong nationalist feeling of the Vietnamese and their historic desire to resist domination by China would prevent the Communists from ruling Vietnam as instruments of Chinese policy. In any event, France will certainly be unwilling to participate in any way in the defense of the area against Communist takeover; moreover, France will not invest military or economic resources to bring about or defend a settlement.

The Third World

34. France continues to have close political and economic ties with its former African colonies. Relations with Algeria are especially important to France because of French interest in the Saharan oil deposits and at least for some time to come in the nuclear test site. However, France also considers its relations with Algeria as important in demonstrating that, unlike other Western powers, France can work closely with a regime of radical social and economic orientation. Paris hopes that advocacy of independence from both power blocs will attract many uncommitted and underdeveloped countries into a loosely organized third world under French leadership. De Gaulle's relatively good relations with Israel and many Arab states reflect a clever balance of French responses among highly complex conflicts of Middle Eastern interests. De Gaulle will continue to seek to expand French influence and prestige among the third-world countries, and appeal to those who dare assert independence from the "two hegemonies" of the US and the USSR.

III. IMPLICATIONS OF DE GAULLE'S FOREIGN POLICY

35. De Gaulle's foreign policy, particularly during the past two years, has had a profoundly unsettling effect on relations with the US and on Western Europe. De Gaulle is firmly convinced that with the recovery of Western Europe, the

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fading of the Soviet threat, the Sino-Soviet split, and the advent of nuclear proliferation, the world has entered a new era. More than most national leaders, he has sought to accelerate the process of change and to guide the new trends toward his own objectives. In many instances the pace and the directions he seeks to set are incompatible with the ideas and desires of the US and of Western Europe.

36. In particular, de Gaulle has challenged the entire organizational concept on which European defense has been based since the establishment of NATO. He has brought this issue to a head much faster and in a much more acute manner than any other West European nation would have done; he has moved the problem to a point where the consideration of basic alterations in existing organizational arrangements for the defense of Western Europe is becoming unavoidable.

37. To an increasing extent, de Gaulle's policies are beginning to force the Western European nations, particularly the NATO powers, to choose between France and the US on political and military issues. West Germany is especially vulnerable to this pressure because its national interests require close ties with both the US and France. At times, de Gaulle has been brutal in his treatment of Bonn on sensitive issues, such as French-Soviet relations, European integration, and his own relations with Chancellor Erhard, in spite of Erhard's exposed position owing to the German elections scheduled for next September. The harshness of de Gaulle's moves vis-a-vis Bonn does not, in our view, indicate that he is losing hope of bringing West Germany into line with his own policies. Rather, they are probably a reflection of his own view that he knows the best way to handle the Germans and that this involves an alternation of carrot and stick. Clearly, however, his methods as well as his purposes tend to antagonize the Germans, even though so far he has often gotten his way.

38. De Gaulle has invoked French nationalism not only because of his own convictions, but also with the intent of bolstering the French sense of destiny and self-confidence. His moves to assert French national interest have already contributed to the loss of momentum toward European political association, and there appears to be substantial concern among Europeans that de Gaulle may frustrate the various steps toward economic integration planned for the near future. Indeed, among Western Europeans in general, his policies are causing a great deal of irritation with France because French policy so often appears to them to be high-handed in the pursuit of *grandeur* at the expense of their concepts of European unity, cooperation, and security. At the same time many Europeans do appear to share de Gaulle's belief that the time has come to depend less on US leadership. Thus, overall, de Gaulle's policies have not only widened the areas of difference between France and the US but also stimulated divergent thought among Europeans. For the present, however, the dominant European reaction is to hold to the idea of solidarity with North America, and to postpone hopes of European unity.

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39. Another consequence of de Gaulle's policies is that they give the USSR opportunity to try to widen the fissures now evident between France and the other North Atlantic countries. This in itself is sufficient basis for Moscow to give the appearance of interest in any negotiations with Paris for a political understanding. The USSR has no more reason than the US to expect that de Gaulle can be manipulated or worked with very easily. However, for its purpose of weakening NATO and Allied unity, Moscow does not need to manipulate de Gaulle; it need only go along with him.

IV. AFTER DE GAULLE

40. For seven years it has been General de Gaulle's intention to set France a course which, in its grand design and basic purposes, will not be altered after he leaves the scene. Although his policies are unpopular with many, his impact on French attitudes toward foreign policy has been substantial and in many respects probably long lasting. The longer he remains in power, the greater this impact will be. This is so not only because of his effects upon French attitudes and the momentum his policies will achieve with respect to future French policies. It is also true because the longer he is in power, the more likely his policies are to shape the political conditions, institutions, and relationships in Western Europe.

41. The foreign policies of the initial successor government will depend to a great extent on the time and circumstances in which de Gaulle leaves power, as well as on the situation then prevailing elsewhere in the world. If de Gaulle leaves the scene during the next two or three years, his successor initially will probably make little change in the fundamentals of present French foreign policy. For example, the desire for first class power status and for the leadership of Europe will almost certainly continue; and the idea will persist of a French-led Europe seeking its own destiny between the two super powers and attracting to its side nations of the third world. The attitude of the successor government toward the organization of European defense will remain under the influence of the actions de Gaulle will have taken on NATO.

42. The French advanced weapons program has probably already achieved such momentum that any likely successor government almost certainly will continue it. In view of other requirements upon the nation's resources after de Gaulle, a successor government might reduce annual expenditures for the advanced weapons program and spread the plan out over a somewhat longer period in order to step up social welfare programs to win political support. The difference between the US and France arising from US anti-proliferation policies and French determination to build a nuclear force will continue.

43. De Gaulle's departure from power will give new impetus to the conflict in France between those who believe in his vision of French nationalism and French preeminence in Europe and those who are attracted to the ideal of European political integration. This will be only one of the large issues that will come to fore on the reawakened domestic political scene. It is possible,

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however, that successor governments will come to be less fixed in their attitudes on European and Atlantic matters than de Gaulle has been, and, as time goes by in the post-de Gaulle period, the sharp nationalist edges of French policy may be blunted.

44. Yet, even if governments after de Gaulle share his general attitudes and policy, no other leader will enjoy the degree of freedom from internal political and economic restraints that de Gaulle has had in shaping French policy and implementing it. His successors will be subjected to the pressures of special interest groups to a much greater degree than de Gaulle, and they will probably be forced to give greater heed to public opinion. Lacking his stature his successors will almost certainly be less effective and less decisive in conducting France's foreign affairs. Moreover, and perhaps above all, his successors will lack his particular mystique, authority, and imperious self-confidence when they appear on the international stage. They will be neither so credible nor so formidable as de Gaulle. When de Gaulle speaks, all nations listen and some tremble; this will not be likely with a M. Pompidou.

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