

Date **18 June**

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
EXECUTIVE REGISTRY
FILE # 6-116-
10-37

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THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
Washington, D.C. 20230

JUN 16 1980




Dear Mr. McIntyre:

It is my pleasure to submit to you the Transition Plan for Civil Operational Land Remote Sensing from Space called for by Presidential Directive/NSC-54 of November 16, 1979. This Plan was prepared by the Department of Commerce in close coordination with an interagency Policy Group consisting of policy level representatives from the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Energy, the Interior and State, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Agency for International Development. Representatives of the Office of Science and Technology Policy and the Office of Management and Budget participated.

The recommended actions are presented on pages 14-16 of the Executive Summary of the Transition Plan. These recommendations have been subjected to careful review and comment by the agencies represented on the Interim Policy Group. They concur in the recommendations, except to the extent that reservations are expressed in the letters of concurrence and comment which appear in Enclosure B. The 1982 budget proposals are tentative, and the estimates will be refined as we prepare our September 15 submission.

I look forward to a prompt response from the Office of Management and Budget with respect to the specific recommendations contained in the Transition Plan so that we may move forward expeditiously to meet the President's objectives.

Sincerely,



Secretary of Commerce

Enclosures

Honorable James T. McIntyre, Jr.
Director, Office of Management and Budget
Washington, D.C. 20503

cc:

Honorable Frank Press, Director, Office of Science & Technology Policy
Honorable Bob S. Bergland, Secretary of Agriculture
Honorable Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense
Honorable Charles W. Duncan, Jr., Secretary of Energy
Honorable Cecil D. Andrus, Secretary of the Interior
Honorable Edmund S. Muskie, Secretary of State
Honorable Robert A. Frosch, Administrator, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Honorable Douglas M. Costle, Administrator, Environmental Protection
Agency
Honorable Stansfield Turner, Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Honorable Douglas J. Bennet, Jr., Administrator, Agency for International
Development



PRIVILEGED

TRANSITION PLAN

**FOR CIVIL OPERATIONAL
LAND REMOTE SENSING
FROM SPACE**

JUNE 1980

**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL OCEANIC AND
ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION**



The information contained herein must not be disclosed outside the agencies represented on the Interim Policy Group until made public by the President or by the Congress

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

Executive Registry
80-1499/1

11 June 1980

Honorable Philip M. Klutznick
Secretary of Commerce
Washington, DC 20230

Dear Phil,

The following comments address the interests of the Intelligence Community with reference to the Transition Plan for Civil Land Remote Sensing.

As you are aware, the Intelligence Community exploits all possible sources of data that could contribute to its knowledge of foreign areas. Consequently some intelligence organizations have been using Landsat-derived data, and we anticipate that they will continue to use data derived from the follow-on Civil Land Remote Sensing Program. Estimates of the nature and extent of these requirements have been provided to the NOAA personnel who developed the Transition Plan. These requirements would be met by spectral capabilities such as provided by the current Landsat multi-spectral system -- upgraded to improve reliability and timeliness of product delivery.

In common with other current users of Landsat data, we have concerns about the program maintaining continuity of data -- both over time and with reference to full geographic coverage. It is regrettable that there is a strong probability of having a gap in data continuity in the near term. We believe that the current efforts to minimize the extent and duration of any such gap should continue to be pursued vigorously. A gap will have adverse effects on certain ongoing intelligence analyses. Therefore the measures that the Transition Plan outlines to maintain continuity subsequent to the transfer of operational responsibility seem highly desirable -- not only from the Intelligence Community viewpoint, but from the aspect of satisfying broader aspects of national policy. Maintaining continuity of data should be viewed as basic to the national policy of ensuring a successful operational remote sensing program. Extensive disruptions of data continuity will tend to drive current domestic and foreign users to alternative methods of satisfying their data needs and facilitate foreign competition.

With reference to the system funding options, from the viewpoint of developing the efficient centralized management and review system that is essential to any major operational system our preference is for having NOAA budget for all system funds -- with other agencies sharing the costs of the system products. Next in our order of preference is

EXECUTIVE REGISTRY
FILE # 2-116

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the Transition Plan recommendation of having NOAA budget for core system costs, but having the increments of special system capabilities funded by user agencies. We can support this option as being equitable and cost-effective, and it would help minimize the inefficiencies and complexities of fragmented management and budget review responsibilities. We object to Option 3 of having the user agencies fund all system costs on the ground that such multi-agency funding creates an impossible management situation and budgetary obstacles that would clearly undermine the objective of establishing an operational civil land remote sensing system. Furthermore, consideration must be given to the point that as capital investments make the civil follow-on systems more effective, the number of eventual US and foreign users in government, academic and research organizations, and in the commercial sector, will become correspondingly greater and the U.S. federal agencies' share of the imagery products proportionally less. These factors emphasize the inequity of apportioning all capital investment costs among a small number of federal agencies.

An inadequate or poorly implemented system of capital investments poses the risk of developing an inefficient or unreliable remote sensing system. This will serve only to further stimulate foreign competition and lead to erosion of the current US leadership in civil applications of remote sensing technology from space, maintenance of which is a basic objective spelled out in the Presidential Directives. Since the Europeans and the Japanese are already making major remote sensing advances, satisfying this objective is a major consideration. Furthermore, a marginal or substandard US system not able to compete with foreign competition also decreases the likelihood of achieving private sector involvement in the future operation of civil remote sensing activities--still another Presidential objective.

We have no comments on the choice of the institutional framework for the operation of the system--provided that whatever system is devised is efficient and responsive to user requirements and can handle classified materials. We do, however, have a comment concerning the recommended concept of developing a rigid propriety concept for the data derived from the system. This approach is one way of attempting to implement the Presidential policy of encouraging involvement by the private sector. However, in phrasing the recommendation it seems desirable to ensure that this propriety approach would be implemented if experience and subsequently developed information indicate it to be a desirable course of action--rather than to mandate this approach at the beginning.



STANSFIELD TURNER

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10 June 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

[Redacted]

Deputy to the DCI for Collection Tasking

SUBJECT: Transition Plan for Civil Operational Land Remote Sensing

Executive Registry
80-1499/3

STAT

1. Action Requested: Your signature on the attached letter to Secretary of Commerce Klutznick that comments on the just developed Transition Plan for Civil Operational Land Remote Sensing--the follow-on to the current LANDSAT system program. Comments on the Plan must be transmitted to the Secretary by Friday, 13 June 1980, so that they can be forwarded to OMB as attachments to the Plan on Monday, 16 June 1980.

2. Background: As you are aware, the three recent Presidential Directives relating to national space policy (PD/NSC-37, 42 and 54) include provisions for the development of an operational satellite remote sensing program for civil applications. PD/NSC-54 levied upon Commerce the responsibility for preparing a Transition Plan to such an operational system. Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) chaired the development of the Plan. I participated in the deliberations of the Interim Policy Group as your representative for the Intelligence Community.

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3. In the course of these interactions, a number of problems that have affected or could affect intelligence activities were identified and most were resolved in a satisfactory manner. We see the probable data gap in the near-term (through about 1982) as one remaining major problem. This, however, is a problem about which little can be done because of past budgetary decisions, but our continued pressure on this point has stimulated NASA, which will remain responsible for operating the present LANDSAT system, to advance the near-term launch schedule.

4. During evolution of this Plan, OMB has exerted the strongest pressures for having the user agencies share more of the costs of the system and has directed these pressures toward sharing capital investments rather than only toward paying more for the products derived from the system. This is obviously a tactic to ensure that the user agencies do not let their requirements carry them away on a program whose costs over a ten-year period are estimated to range from \$2.0 billion for continuing the LANDSAT system to \$10 billion for a far more extensive two-meter resolution system. The attached letter explicitly states for the record that intelligence needs would be satisfied by the spectral bands of the current LANDSAT multi-spectral system, upgraded to ensure reliability and timeliness of product delivery. This position should improve our defenses against OMB pressures to have the Intelligence Community share in front-end costs to greatly improve system capabilities.

5. Partly for the same reason, the letter endorses the funding option of having NOAA budget for core system costs and having the individual user agencies budget for special system capabilities (such as the high-cost, high-resolution capability in which we are basically not interested, or special collection and processing services for which we will probably have ad hoc needs). Of the options presented, this funding option is a feasible compromise that should have minimum impact on the intelligence organizations and yet basically permits a centralized management which significantly improves the likelihood of developing a successful operational system.

6. White House Staff (OMB and OSTP) representatives want individual agency comments on the cost-sharing aspect, on their agency's requirements for a fully operational system, and on the institutional alternatives for eventual operation of the system (government corporation, private corporation). Apparently, OMB will analyze these comments to narrow the range of options and probably proceed with another assessment cycle.

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7. Staff Position: The attached letter provides the vehicle for protecting the operational needs of the Intelligence Community while simultaneously minimizing the budgetary impact of the OMB pressures for user sharing of additional costs. [redacted] also agrees with this assessment.

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8. Recommendation: I recommend that you sign the attached letter to the Secretary of Commerce.

[redacted signature box]

25X1

Attachment:
Proposed Letter for DCI Signature

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