

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
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Remarks:

JSC
Executive Secretary
4/22/82
Date

2637 (10-81)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

82-432/9

April 20, 1982

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MEMORANDUM

TO: Members of the Interagency Group on Coordination of Substantive Preparations for the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament

SUBJECT: IG Meeting on April 22

The first meeting of the SSOD Interagency Group will take place on Thursday, April 22, at 10:15, in the PM Conference Room (7422). The purpose of this meeting is to consider basic U.S. objectives for SSOD II and to begin consideration of possible initiatives which the U.S. might put forward at the SSOD.

To guide our discussion is a scope paper drafted by ACDA. It is a revision of a paper circulated earlier and takes into account comments made since then. We are also circulating a memo from Ambassador Kirkpatrick, which discusses possible U.S. initiatives for the SSOD.

Please inform Alexander Liebowitz (632-4761) of the name of the representative from your agency.

Robert D. Blackwill
Robert D. Blackwill
Principal Deputy Director
PM

James George
for James George
Assistant Director
ACDA/MA

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April 19, 1982

UNGA SECOND SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT

Draft Scope Paper

I. Setting

The non-aligned conceived the idea of the First SSOD and continue to regard it as their "child". In one sense the concept of the Special Session is an element of the North-South dialogue in which the neutral and non-aligned nations (NNA) press the developed countries to make concessions to their point of view. In this case they are interested not only in reducing the perceived threat of nuclear weapons but also in achieving their objectives in other areas that they relate to the general complex of arms control issues such as assistance in nuclear technology.

If the NNA perspective makes up the warp of the fabric of the Special Session, the East-West issues comprise its woof. In fact the majority of substantive issues with which the session will be seized are US-Soviet issues. The strains in East-West relations, which are unlikely to have abated by June, will have a profound effect on the course of the Special Session.

These strains will also affect public attitudes toward the session. "Peace" groups, both domestic and foreign, will want to seize it as an occasion for applying heat to both sides, although in the nature of things that heat will be directed more to the US and its friends than to the Soviets and their minions. For those

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public groups that are skeptical about the value of UN debates, the SSOD will be regarded as just another opportunity for adversaries to weaken the US defense modernization effort. Thus, to the extent that it attracts public attention, the session will be conducted in an atmosphere which is a mixture of impatience and cynicism.

The General Assembly forum of the SSOD has obvious drawbacks: the general debate of the initial two weeks will be repetitive at best as each nation strives to insure that its favored ideas receive recognition. But the SSOD also gives us an opportunity to gain better understanding and acceptance here and abroad for our policies and for more realistic ways of dealing with the problems of arms limitation in both the nuclear and conventional fields. While the documents produced by the session will be mainly horatory, they will be with us for some time and will serve as the basis for the international community's future approach to arms control issues.

Regardless of the internal workings of the session itself, SSOD II should take on particular significance for the US and its Allies because of the decision by President Reagan and other major Western leaders such as Chancellor Schmidt and Prime Minister Trudeau to address it. The conjunction of SSOD II with the freeze and anti-nuclear movements makes it essential that the US approach to SSOD II be coherent, positive, and coordinated with the arms control components of other activities

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in the same time frame -- the President's first visit to Europe and the NATO Summit; his speeches on national security issues in connection with that trip; possible arms control initiatives undertaken in that period; and the resumption of the INF talks.

II. US Objectives

The US approach to SSOD II will have two basic themes:

-- We will seek to promote understanding and support for arms control of the sort described in the President's speech of November 18, 1981: "substantial militarily significant reductions in forces; equal ceilings for similar types of forces; and adequate provisions for verification."

-- We will press for wider recognition of the need for improvements in the verification and compliance mechanisms for current arms control agreements and inclusion of adequate mechanisms in future agreements.

In line with the first theme, we will work for the following objectives:

-- endorsement in any concluding document of basic arms control objectives compatible with our own;

-- exposing the hollow, propagandistic nature of Soviet arms control proposals;

-- establishing in any Comprehensive Program for Disarmament to be adopted by SSOD II, a realistic set of guidelines for future international arms control activities that will neither create artificial deadlines nor be juridically binding;

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-- preserving the integrity of the CD as the single multi-lateral negotiating forum, while resisting proposals for its enlargement or procedural changes that may command wide support but might threaten the consensus principle or pave the way for unbridled expansion of the Committee.

In support of the second theme, we could engage in various activities:

-- Support initiatives such as the Swedish proposal to convene the states parties to the Biological Weapons Convention to improve its verification and compliance provisions and the Belgian proposal for a compliance mechanism to improve the 1925 Geneva Protocol on chemical weapons;

-- Make positive proposals of our own on verification and compliance, to possibly include:

- a. SSOD endorsement of the principle of adequate mechanisms in arms control agreements for verification and compliance;
- b. SSOD support for the reexamination of existing multilateral agreements towards improvements of their verification and compliance mechanisms;
- c. SSOD establishment of new bodies or procedures to deal with verification and compliance questions.
(A permanent UN body on verification and compliance; an Ad Hoc working group within the Committee on Disarmament for the negotiation of verification and compliance mechanisms; an independent international institute for the study and development

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of verification and compliance mechanisms; a
mandate to the World Health Organization to create
the capability for investigation in the CW and BW
areas?)

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III. Objectives of Others

A. Non-aligned

-- to publicize the lack of movement since SSOD I and to pressure the US and USSR as well as other nuclear powers to make more and faster progress on nuclear disarmament negotiations;

-- to press for a Comprehensive Program of Disarmament;

-- to get maximum exposure for their views on arms control and get the leadership of both the Western and Communist camps to listen to them.

-- to gain a greater say in disarmament negotiations by strengthening the role of the UN in multilateral disarmament machinery and persuading the major powers to do more of their negotiating in bodies such as the CD;

-- to obtain an explicit recognition of a linkage between disarmament and development, if possible including commitment to make resources freed by disarmament available for development assistance;

-- to win increased recognition of their right to share the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology and combat "discrimination" against them by nuclear suppliers in the name of non-proliferation.

B. Soviet and East European

-- to use this major political event to try to seize some of the high ground on disarmament issues, by pumping up old Soviet initiatives on subjects such as a non-use-of-force treaty,

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and non-stationing of nuclear weapons, as well as to launch new cynical initiatives.

-- to possibly promote a Balkan nuclear weapons-free zone, with implications for a possible Nordic NWFC.

-- to castigate the West and the US in particular for propagandistic purposes on the "neutron" bomb and binary chemical weapons, among other issues.

-- to urge a superfluous World Disarmament Conference as the follow-on to the SSOD.

C. Allies

The Allies will in general work closely with the US to maintain a united front; they share many of the objectives listed in Section II. Some Allies, however, have special concerns which lead them to take positions that may vary somewhat from the US approach, or, on occasion, to break completely with the rest of the West.

-- the EC-10 has become institutionalized as a group working within the arms control community and its tendency to seek the lowest common denominator within the group dilutes the support we might otherwise receive from some of its members. For a long time Ireland has tended to lean heavily toward NNA positions and now Greece is taking a similar tack;

-- On the test ban issue many allies are at odds with us. Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Norway and Denmark

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in particular are under great public pressure and may openly oppose us. The French and British have views similar to ours about the substantive aspects of a CTB, but may be flexible on language giving CTB a high priority among nuclear arms control measures. Other differences between US and Allied positions have shown up in the past, e.g., nuclear supplies to South Africa and a South Asian nuclear weapons free zone, but these have not been serious enough to break general allied unit;

-- the European Allies will be keeping one eye on their dissenters at home and will probably wish to make a splash with initiatives that are "headline-grabbing" even if their chances for success are small, such as the French call (originally made at SSOD I) for the creation of an international satellite verification agency, or the FRG's global approach to CBM's;

-- some Allies, particularly the French and Germans, attach importance to a comprehensive program for disarmament (CPD) believing fundamental Western interests can be protected while incorporating enough of the NNA desiderata to give it political appeal. It is too early to judge whether this will produce serious divergences between the Allies.

IV. US strategy

-- We should make use of the Barton Group in New York to coordinate strategy with our friends to the maximum extent possible and arrange bilateral meetings with others for the same purpose;

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-- We will prepare a wide-ranging public information plan, utilizing resources in State, ACDA, and USICA to insure that US positions are adequately communicated to foreign governments and both US and foreign public interest groups, both before and during the Special Session.

-- On compliance issues such as CW/BW use we should be building a record on which we can draw at SSOD II, including the sharing of the maximum possible amount of information with interested parties;

-- After two weeks of general debate, the President's address will conclude statements by world leaders. He should build on and follow up his November 18, 1981 speech on arms control, exploiting the fact that negotiations on INF are underway and that START negotiations are imminent.

V. Discussions with the Soviet Union

Unlike the situation at the time of SSOD I we do not have a large number of ongoing negotiations with the Soviets, nor do we share many common objectives. Nevertheless to the extent possible we will want to keep track of what the Soviets are thinking and planning about the session. We can accomplish this in part through third parties, including certain of our allies and leading non-aligned who may be willing to share with us the results of their consultations with the Soviets.

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THE REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TO THE
UNITED NATIONS

April 19, 1982

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MEMO TO: Secretary Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Mr. William C. Clark
National Security Adviser
Mr. Eugene Rostow
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Mr. Charles Wick
Director, International Communication Agency

FROM: Jeane J. Kirkpatrick *Jeane J. Kirkpatrick*

SUBJECT: PREPARATIONS FOR THE SECOND SPECIAL SESSION ON
DISARMAMENT (SSOD II), NEW YORK, JUNE 7 - JULY 9, 1982

President Reagan's intention to address the SSOD II came as welcome news. It reinforces the importance of our efforts underway for some time at USUN to use the SSOD II as an occasion for effective public diplomacy.

We know our record and intentions are better than the Soviets. The problem is that too many others do not know it. Such a good opportunity to tell them will not soon come again. This opportunity is unique because the SSOD II, at which many world leaders will appear, is sure to attract world attention, and the presence at the United Nations of an elite international press corps assures world-wide coverage.

USUN personnel have been actively involved in conversations with State, ACDA, NSC, ICA and Defense to explore how we should take advantage of this opportunity. An overview of our plan follows:

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I. US Goal

The US should use the SSOD II to wage its assault in the battle of ideas on defense, nuclear policy and arms control. The expected attendance of nearly all major world leaders makes this a prime opportunity. Each nation will send a high-level delegation accompanied by press and non-governmental organizations. The Japanese, for example, expect thirty to forty Diet members and at least 1,500 private citizens here for the events.

With our goal one of public diplomacy, our targets are (in rough order of priority):

- A. Foreign press
- B. Foreign delegations (Ambassadors and appointees)
- C. Foreign parliamentarians and opinion-leaders
- D. American press
- E. Foreign non-governmental organizations, and lastly
- F. American non-governmental organizations.

To help balance the American NGO participation (surely the largest group), I have written more conservative (national security) organizations on how they might receive credentials for the SSOD II. We must, however, still expect most NGO's to be in ferocious opposition to Administration plans and programs.

II. US Themes

The target groups should receive themes that are both simple and consistent (themes most effective in public diplomacy). These themes should be reflected and reinforced in President Reagan's speech, the main display (now being designed by ICA), pamphlets and briefing teams.

A. The history of US initiatives on arms control is a proud one, from the time of the Baruch Plan to the Zero Option and plans for real reductions in strategic nuclear arms. We should discuss US proposals to place nuclear weapons under international control in the 1940's; such ideas as the "open skies" proposal of the 1950's; the test ban and non-proliferation treaties of the 1960's; the biological and chemical treaties, SALT I, ABM accord and real reductions sought in the March 1977 SALT II proposals of the 1970's; and the Zero Option and START ideas of the 1980's. The US has been and is today the main force for realistic, verifiable arms control and peace initiatives in the world.

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In a similar vein, the US has been the main financial contributor to United Nations disarmament efforts: to the United Nations Disarmament Committee, the US Disarmament Scholarships and the United Nations Disarmament Studies.

B. The history of USSR actions in arms procurement across the board (particularly in strategic nuclear arms) has been relentless and destabilizing. In essence, there has been no "arms race" over the past fifteen years; one side (the USSR) has been building steadily while the other (the US) has been holding steady, even declining.

The military trends have been adverse over the past fifteen years to the point where the Soviet Union now allocates 150 percent of our defense budget, now spends two and a half times the US level on strategic nuclear forces, and now has deployed 300 SS-20's aimed at Europe, etc. The Reagan Administration came to office with the USSR having an open production line in all three legs of the strategic triad -- land, air and sea-based strategic nuclear forces -- while the US had an open production line in only one (sea-based).

C. In terms of use of arms (as well as possession of arms), the USSR has been the main destabilizing force. The situations in Afghanistan and Kampuchea speak for themselves. The Soviets' involvement with yellow rain casts new fears of inhumane and outrageous behavior reinforcing the need for verifiable arms control agreements. The massive Soviet arms shipments to Ethiopia -- twice as much in an eighteen month period as the US delivered there over a quarter of a century -- and use of Cuban troops in Africa shows their readiness to use, as well as to stockpile, weaponry.

D. The values of the United Nations Charter and of the US are higher than military might. We, like people across the world, long for freedom and prosperity. However, neither for the First World nor the Third World can there be either economic development nor political development (toward stability and freedom) without security. Security can come in terms of arms stabilization, arms control, or a buildup to maintain deterrence. The tasks of building security are not pleasant; they are, nonetheless, necessary given the Soviets' clear record on both amassing and deploying military might.

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III. US Techniques of Presentation

A. The main presentation of our themes will, of course, be the President's address.

B. We plan an impressive display with charts, graphs, simple language, film, video and guides in the lobby of the US Mission. All the sundry groups briefed by US personnel will first be shown the display to set terms of reference for the ensuing discussion.

C. We will distribute brochures and pamphlets (currently in preparation) on:

1. US Peace Initiatives from the Truman to the Reagan Administrations
2. US/Soviet Trends over the past fifteen years; current US/Soviet expenditures and arsenals in such categories as strategic nuclear, theater nuclear, conventional and chemical weapons; in research and development; and investment
3. Nuclear Freeze proposals
4. The uses of weapons, as well as possession thereof (i.e., Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Africa, Central America), and
5. The relation of security to economic development and liberty.

D. We will have a full-blown "speakers bureau" headquartered at USUN for foreign delegations and foreign and American press. The primary briefers will be:

1. Members of the US Delegation (Presidential appointees)
2. US Ambassadors at the State Department awaiting on-going assignment (we have begun to set this in motion), and
3. Staff members of USUN, PM, IO, ACDA and the Pentagon.

E. Daily press briefings on different arms control and disarmament topics, with material and experts on hand.

We also plan to establish a small (two to three people) think-tank at USUN as a resource base during the SSOD II, to handle technical questions that arise. Finally, we will explore the possibility of a Hughes-type briefing of declassified, aerial photography for a very select group of high-level foreign delegates (Heads of Delegation and their immediate staff).

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F. To back up our speakers, we will have material on hand on such topics as:

1. Nuclear freeze plans
2. INF negotiations in Europe
3. CW use (yellow rain)
4. US chemical weapons plans
5. CTB (comprehensive test ban proposals)
6. SALT/START
7. US/Soviet conventional arms transfers

IV. Possible US Initiatives

Presumably, the final determination of initiatives will emerge from the NSC process, after planning is done in State, Defense, ACDA and the NSC. Whether an initiative ready by June should be unveiled at SSOD II or in Europe during the President's trip (or on its own) is again a decision for NSC principals. Nonetheless, we submit the following ideas as first-cuts -- to be explored and considered by experts and then (if merited) by the NSC.

A. Calling a multilateral conference on major military expenditures at present and over the past two decades. LOGIC: To move toward real disarmament, we must be more precise and knowledgeable about armaments, particularly each major country's level of effort on defense. ADVANTAGE: This emphasizes the Soviets' two main "public diplomacy" vulnerabilities: (1) secrecy and (2) relentless military buildup; and obversely our two main "public diplomacy" advantages: (1) openness and (2) steady or even declining military expenditures over twenty years.

B. Calling the Security Council to meet on the Soviet/Vietnamese use of chemical weapons, pursuant to the terms of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. LOGIC: The evidence has become overwhelming. The US cannot indefinitely assert that there have been and are now gross violations of solemn international obligations without our invoking the agreed-upon mechanism in case of violations. ADVANTAGE: Obviously, to take our case one step beyond its present level. Also, such action points up that the Administration takes arms control agreements very seriously, demands adherence to those already in force while seeking to proceed on to other accords, and places verification at the forefront of our concerns.

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C. Calling for a consideration of a pledge of no first-use of nuclear weapons in Europe after the establishment (through MBFR, Warsaw Pact reductions or substantial NATO augmentations) of a conventional force balance in Europe. LOGIC: Arguments on "no first-use" have begun and are sure to spread by June. The Administration should meet the challenge head on, in a positive manner. ADVANTAGE: Such an initiative would point up Warsaw Pact conventional superiority on the Central Front (as well as INF advantages). It would also reinforce the Administration's message that the Europeans must do more in defense to lower the nuclear threshold. There cannot be a budding nuclear allergy and conventional acquiescence.

D. Calling for a multinational conference on conventional arms in the non-aligned world and on arms transfers to such countries. LOGIC: Arms control and disarmament cannot be confined to nuclear weapons (as the Third World desires) but must be comprehensive. ADVANTAGE: This initiative would emphasize how (1) the rate of growth of military expenditures has been higher in the Third World than the First or even Second Worlds and (2) the Soviet Union has become the world's foremost arms supplier-around the globe.

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