

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Routing Slip

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	D/ICS		X		
4	DD/NFA				
5	DD/A				
6	DD/O		X		
7	DD/S&T		X		
8	Chm/NIC		X		
9	GC				
10	IG				
11	Compt				
12	D/EEO				
13	D/Pers				
14	D/OPP				
15	C/EAS/OPP				
16	C/IAS/OPP				
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/ACIS/DDI	X			
19	EXDIR		X		
20	DDI		X		
21					
22					
		SUSPENSE	Date _____		

Remarks:

Executive Secretary
 6 Jan 82
 Date

STAT

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE

MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DDCI

Douglas

The DDI would like you to mention this to the DDCI, please. Thanks.



DDI Action Officer

DDCI

DE

Date January 25, 1982

STAT

DDI - 070-171

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDI

[redacted] tells me that the DCI queried the DDCI on the status of the CW verification paper directed on page 3 of NSDD 18 (attached).

STAT

- That paper is being prepared by ACDA -- with substantial input from CIA and coordination with the IC.
- Work has been under way for several weeks; a first draft exists; and the Working Group expects to meet the 30 January deadline.
- CIA's participation is being spearheaded by [redacted] of our staff. She has, of course, coordinated the draft with OSWR and SOVA. A CW treaty monitoring paper prepared earlier by the IC for the IG has been an important input.

STAT

We will keep you informed.

[redacted]

STAT

*Informal
DDCI
VMS
LJG*

ACIS

Date 20 January 1982

~~SECRET~~

DDI 096-82

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II
90070

January 4, 1982

RECLASSIFIED
82-4028


SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
UNITED NATIONS
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
AGENCY

SUBJECT: Chemical and Biological Weapons Arms Control

The President has formally approved the implementation of the attached National Security Decision Directive on the United States' chemical and biological weapons arms control policy.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:


James W. Nance
Acting Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Attachment

SECRET
Review December 10, 1987

~~SECRET~~

L117-NSDD 15

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

January 4, 1982

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 18

UNITED STATES CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
ARMS CONTROL POLICY

The President has reviewed the interagency recommendations on United States chemical and biological weapons arms control policy and approves the policies set forth below.

To encourage compliance with the 1975 Biological Weapons Convention and the Geneva Protocol of 1925, the United States will:

(1) Intensify its public information campaign and use the 36th United Nations General Assembly debate, particularly the UN Group of Experts investigating CW use, and debate in the First (Political) Committee on the issue of reports of chemical and toxin weapons use in Afghanistan, Laos, and Kampuchea, as well as discussions in the Committee on Disarmament and other international fora, to continue to expose the chemical and biological warfare activities of the Soviet Union and its associated states to international scrutiny and pressure;

(2) Seek to convene* a meeting of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention with the aim of strengthening its verification and compliance mechanisms in light of probable Soviet non-compliance, and to provide an additional forum for maintaining international pressure on the Soviet Union concerning its chemical and biological warfare activities; and

* The phrase "Seek to convene" represents the policy decision which is required, and is used without prejudice to tactical judgments (i.e., whether the US would propose the meeting or support the Swedish proposal for a meeting of States Parties) to be made once policy approval is obtained.

SECRET

Review on December 10, 2001

Extended by J.W. Nance

Reason: NSC 1.13 (d) (e)

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

2

(3) After assessing the results of the steps above, and after evaluating interagency analyses, consider invoking the other two remedies provided by the Biological Weapons Convention:

- (a) Taking the issue to the United Nations Security Council, and
- (b) As an ultimate step, withdrawing from the Biological Weapons Convention.

To provide the basis for proceeding with the above, the Government is directed to study and submit recommendations on:

- Specific measures to strengthen the verification and compliance provisions of the Biological Weapons Convention;
- The relationship of the United States' position on biological warfare to other arms control, East-West and United Nations strategies;
- Consultations with United States Allies on a strategy in the United Nations and elsewhere; and
- The legal issues associated with formally charging the Soviet Union with violation of the Biological Weapons Convention.

With respect to chemical weapons arms control, the United States will:

(1) Support the eventual objective of concluding a complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons production, development, and stockpiling, recognizing that for the foreseeable future such a prohibition would be unverifiable by national technical means alone;

(2) Ensure that modernization of short- and long-range chemical weapons systems proceeds so that the United States has a credible and effective deterrent retaliatory capability, and so that the United States can gain negotiating leverage in the area of chemical weapons arms control;

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

3

(3) Allow the United States-Soviet negotiations to lapse informally; and

(4) Support chemical weapons arms control discussions in the Committee on Disarmament leading to multilateral negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament on a chemical weapons prohibition, if further interagency study should support such a step.

In support of United States chemical weapons arms control objectives, the Government is directed to study and, by January 30, 1982, submit recommendations on United States Government positions with respect to:

- verification;
- declarations of chemical warfare agent and munitions stocks and production facilities;
- entry into force;
- an appropriate public posture with respect to CW arms control;
- relationship of the United States' position on chemical weapons to other arms control, East-West and United Nations strategies; and
- consultations with the United States Allies on a strategy in the United Nations and elsewhere.

Ronald Reagan

SECRET

SECRET