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FULL TEXT

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PHYLLIS HAINES: The Central Intelligence Agency, which for obvious reasons tries to maintain a low profile, is the subject of two new controversies, because of recent events I should say. One, the overthrow of the Allende government in Chile; the other, the Watergate breakin and subsequent coverup.

This morning we'll ask two experts how much the CIA was involved in those events. And we'll also try to find out how the CIA operates, how often those so-called dirty tricks are used, and the extent to which even the President knows what the CIA is doing.

MARY HELEN McPHILLIPS: And those two experts are, first of all, Miles Copeland, who began his career with the OSS, which was the forerunner of the CIA. He's served as a consultant to the CIA, and he has also helped to organize intelligence and counter-intelligence systems for other governments. And he is the author of a book about the CIA, called "Without Cloak or Dagger, the Truth About the New Espionage."

And Tad Szulc, who's a well-known journalist, a former political, diplomatic, and foreign correspondent for the New York Times. He's well versed in the workings of the intelligence community. And he wrote "Compulsive Spy, the Strange Career of E. Howard Hunt." And his latest book is called "Innocents at Home."

And let's get right to the major controversy at the moment about the CIA. To what extent does that agency employ dirty tricks to topple governments unfriendly, or seen as unfriendly to the U.S.A.? Miles, I'll give it to you first.

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MILES COPELAND: That's two questions. First of all, dirty tricks, I don't think nearly enough under the present circumstances, given the kind of world that we didn't create, we just happen to be living in.

You know, Chile, let us start, let us jump right in with Chile. You know, the CIA has no magic, it has no gooffa-dust it can throw in the eyes of labor union leaders and truckers, and say you boys go out on strike. The only way the CIA can organize the overthrow of a government is to use forces which already are existing in the country.

I mean, you can't mobilize forces that aren't there. If Allende really was a popular leader, the CIA wouldn't have had a chance.

HAINES: Don't you think eight million dollars would go fairly...

COPELAND: You couldn't win an election in Boston for eight million dollars. Besides, they didn't spend the eight million dollars in Chile. But what the eight million dollars went for, after all, was to help people in the country do what they wanted to do anyhow.

You see, the Allende did freeze the funds of the unions, so the unions could not operate the way unions operate in a free country, let us say Britain or here, where they go on strike and they have union funds. He even closed the commissaries so they couldn't buy food.

So the CIA made it possible for the unions to do what they wanted to do anyhow. As for the newspapers, of course there Allende had refrained from closing down the press, as the Soviets had told him he should do. He thought he knew best, and he thought he could just do it subtly by freezing newsprint. And, of course, the CIA made it possible for them to buy newsprint.

But the CIA, you know, is limping along on sort of second rate talent these days, and the best the propagandists could do for the newspapers was just enable them to keep open. I'm told that they wrote some articles for the press, and they just weren't any good. The press could write their own articles. They were against Allende.

According to the British Embassy - of course, we usually leak to the British because they're more left-wing than we are, and we usually can believe what they say, they had more credibility than our own government had at the time - but the British say

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that, after all, when Allende won only thirty-six percent of the vote when he was elected, but that he had at most ten percent of popular support at the time when the CIA mobilized the ninety percent to throw him out.

But the CIA did it, I think, very awkwardly. I think IT (sic) got in and messed things up. I mean, ITT sort of bungled around. They had every right. I mean, I think we do that in this country when a private company is about to be taken over unfairly, and seized by some government power, of course the private company goes roaring to the American embassy. And of course ITT went right into the American embassy, and didn't roar loud enough, and the embassy was sort of weak and scared, the CIA had come into a lot of criticism in Vietnam, so they were very timid.

So my theory is, to put it bluntly - I think Tad will undoubtedly disagree - but I think they came in a little too late. I think they should have prevented the Allende election in the first place, which they could have done.

You know, Allende came for help, too. As our ambassador has testified, he personally was approached by Allende, who said look, you're handing out money to the other parties, hand it to us.

But I've neglected the last part of your question. We do not support moves of this sort to put in a pro-American government. That is never, never the policy. It's to prevent communist dictatorships. In fact, in the unlikely, in the impossible event that there was such a thing as a popular communist government, which just couldn't be in the world today, even is Russia, well then I think we would, we would even tolerate that.

McPHILLIPS: Tad, it's your chance.

TAD SZULC: Well, I guess it's my chance to say two things. I agree with you in the first instance that it was a bad job from an intelligence viewpoint, it was badly done, but for other reasons than you'd say. The second point, which should be really the first point, is that I have reservations about the United States Government getting involved in destabilizing, overthrowing other governments, on the theory that they may become more or less dangerous.

Because if you follow this, then where do we go from here? We have Portugal now, which probably merits some attention.

COPELAND: It'll get it.

SZULC: Why not Greece? Italy, which since 1948 is the

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genesis of this whole business. Sooner or later we'll be in the business either for the CIA or the Department of Agriculture, or what have you, in changing, overthrowing governments around the world.

It seems to me the world is changing to the point where this simply doesn't work. I think it may create a backlash in the long run which can be more damaging to the United States than the existence of Marxists, whatever that means, socialists, even pro-communist government in a place, say, like Chile, which is 'x' thousand miles removed from here.

So I'm a little uneasy with this whole conceptual approach to how intelligence should be used in these kinds of cases. Okay?

COPELAND: No, not okay at all! What happens if we don't, Tad? I mean, you're perfectly happy for communist dictatorships to take over in these countries? Because they will. You see, the CIA, we know about the CIA failures, but there are many, many countries in the world where they have perfectly well-running democratic systems, thanks to the fact that the CIA helped the democratic forces keep out communist dictatorships. And those we never know about. We know about the CIA's failures.

SZULC: I know, we know about those, we know about Greece.

COPELAND: What about Greece? Tell us about it.

SZULC: After the 1967 coup of the colonels, which was another communist, shall we say, non-democracy.

COPELAND: Well wait a minute, let's stick on Greece a minute. You're not saying that the CIA put in the colonels, are you? They supposedly, after the colonels got in -- but are you saying that the CIA put the colonels in?

SZULC: I cannot document it either way.

COPELAND: Well, it is documented now. You know the chief of the station there, whom I believe is a friend of yours, will say that they did everything in the world to help the Greek government all the time stand up, stand up and have real democratic government in Greece, and stand up to these tremendous pressures, which are coming from a communist minority; and that in desperation they threw in their hands. And then what happened in Greece, what happened in Chile later on happened in Greece, the colonels came in and took over. But you can't say the CIA wanted those colonels to come in. I mean, that's the last...

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SZULC: Not necessarily, but once the colonels were in, for the next seven years they developed the situation of government, which if democracy's what we're talking about, which is relevant to me, and it's your context, this is not what obtained. I think that we made several blunders in 1974, in handling the junta's dying days in the Cyprus context.

Let's go to Brazil, where allegedly the CIA, or someone, played a certain role in pushing the military coup d'etat. And by the way, I do agree with you that I know of no situation in which any intelligence agency worked in a vacuum, (WORDS UNCLEAR) ...to a government. Obviously you have to have a situation which is conducive to the last final push of encouragement, either by the CIA or the State Department with economic aid. Obviously this is true.

But I think that we seem to be in situations in which, whether we installed them, as we did in Guatemala with Col. Cassiarnas, or we begin to support them once they're in, in the cause of anti-communism we create the other monstrosity.

I was just as unhappy in Prague in 1968 seeing Soviet tanks in the streets as I was in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, seeing kids going to jail for saying, you know, long live freedom.

COPELAND: You know, I'll bet you if we had long enough to discuss this we'd wind up agreeing. Because I don't find very much difference in this from my own views. But I think what it really comes down to is a question of the lesser of evils. I don't think Tad and I like it either way. I mean, the CIA certainly doesn't like military dictatorships.

Let me go back a little history here. I started this thing out, I was probably the first political actionist the United States Government had. In Syria in 1948, wasn't it, Tad, you remember we put in Sayim (?) down there, my great buddy. And our idea then was to say we want somebody who can make peace with Israel. And back in State Department they couldn't care less what kind of government it was, as long as they'd do something about Israel.

And, as you know, in those days there were no Arabs in the Syrian army, they were all Serbs and Caucasians, and Jews, and so on. But we thought if we could get this Kerd (?) in, military dictatorship or whatever, then he'd make peace with Israel.

And I remember when we first reported this, by George McGee, who was Assistant Secretary at the time, we let him know that

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we were in contact with this colonel who would take the government over. And I think we even told him in a letter that I'd been around town and told him how to grab the radio station, and how to grab the power, and all this sort of thing.

The message back was: don't tell us about it; if there are truly democratic forces that want to take over, say, we mustn't stand in their way. Democratic forces! We'd said that it was going to be a military dictatorship. Okay, so Sayim (?) took over, and didn't make peace with Israel, so we got rid of him and put in Shishakly, who was another military dictator, another friend of mine.

But when Kermit Roosevelt got into this thing, he was brought in by Frank Rizener - all of these people were friends of mine, you run into the same friends down in Washington - Kerm said no military dictatorships. He just would not deal with them, because once you get them in they're hard to get out.

The reason you get them in is because they're easy to deal with. You get the colonel, and the majors do what the colonels say, and the captains do what the majors say - you can deal with a few people and take over the whole country. But Kermit said once you get them in you can't get them out.

So when the Ajax operation, the Iran king (?) thing, he said nuts to the colonels, we'll not do anything with them at all, we'll get popular forces. So the whole...

SZULC: They had a perfectly good Shah to bring back.

COPELAND: Well they did, and they had the Shah to bring back, of course.

SZULC: He did exist, he had a certain amount of support. So that you know, the elements in Iran were much more in favor of a rational operation than very often elsewhere.

COPELAND: Well, let me continue what I was saying, Tad, and this is where you may disagree just as a matter of fact, but I can tell you that I don't know anybody at the agency that wouldn't do without a military dictatorship, unless there was just nothing else to do. You deal with certain countries in the world, and they're not democratic, the people are not -

Egypt, I mean, the Egyptian people, can you imagine a Democratic and Republican Party? In a situation like happened in Chile, can you imagine anything other than a kind of dictatorship in Egypt, or Syria, or Iraq? If you have anything, you're going to have a kind of military dictatorship, that's all you can have.

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SZULC: But Chile's not comparable.

COPELAND: No, no, I know it's not. In Chile the CIA should have backed one or both of the parties. As you know, they didn't back one of the opponents, they didn't back both of them. And it didn't settle all the fights they were having between them.

HAINES: Mr. Szulc, do you go along with the idea that the United States Government should intervene in the domestic affairs of other governments? I mean, are you accepting that?

SZULC: Certainly not.

COPELAND: Certainly not, I don't think the United States should do that either. But you asked the question wrong. Of course they shouldn't. But they have to every now and then. It isn't a question of whether they should or shouldn't. Because the dangers of not doing it are so terrible.

Phyllis, look, you know we're not a self-sufficient country at all. We have deliberately become internationalist. Instead of developing alternatives to what they call in Washington omninium(?) - am I getting the phrase right - these funny little metals that you need to harden steel, to make it resistant to high temperatures - there's a whole range of them, the names of which I don't even know, probably Tad doesn't either but funny little things, very, very essential to us, and we have to have them. And if we don't get them our industry can be brought to a halt just much more quickly than stopping the petroleum supply. We have to have those things, we have to have them.

And if there is a communist dictatorship emerging in some country which is going to say you can't have them, well then we have the alternative of really absolute chaos, or doing what is necessary to have a government which at least has the power, freely, to accept our American dollars.

SZULC: Well, Miles, you're equating any government which is communist with any government which is...

COPELAND: Communist dictatorship.

SZULC: Or dictatorship...

(OVERTALK)

COPELAND: Can you imagine a democratically elected communist party, can you imagine that?

SZULC: Well, it almost happened in Chile.

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COPELAND: What percentage...

SZULC: Wait a minute. I think the point that should be made at this stage is that, what do you do if you have a government, dictatorship or not, which is not communist, which sympathizes with the United States, which is nationalist on another model, which either has developed or will develop in the Third World, and which refuses to provide you with oil or other raw materials, do you also apply the same pressure, quite aside from the ideology? There's no end to this road, once you start on it.

And this is the situation with the north and south, those who are poor are now rich, those who are rich, you and I, are becoming poor. If we will have the reaction of invading people, you know, from Abugadi (?), to Chile, to Portugal, then my god, you know...

COPELAND: You know, the only way you can get a government in this world which has anything like an intelligent electorate, which won't do business with the United States, they must be all on LSD tablets. You know, it's profitable to do business with the United States. Just to say arbitrarily, we won't deal with the United States, it's kind of suicidal, the world economy being what it is now.

Now if you're talking about the Arabs, I think they'd love to get off the hook that we got them on. I don't think the Saudis want to hold us up. I think maybe the Arabians are having a little burst of being obdurate. But I think even they realize that they are making terrible targets out of themselves, not for us, but for the other side.

Look, in China, all of these three year plans, five year plans, in the so-called Third World, none of them are going to reach it, because there's just not enough goodies to go around. But the Chinese have committed themselves now to an industrialization program which requires two hundred million tons of oil a year. And they can't go back. I mean, they're building their factories, they're getting away from coal. It's making tremendous -- they've even moving populations.

Now they only have in sight, with the Yellow Sea, and with all of their finds, thirty-five million tons a year. And they're even selling some to Japan, even though they can't spare it even now. But before very long they're going to be short one hundred and sixty-five million tons. And they've got to get that from...

SZULC: From somewhere.

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COPELAND: Yeah, and the Arabian Peninsula is a tremendous target of the Chinese, as the Saudis well know. Now my second point is that even if I were exaggerating, and I'm not, the Saudis are terrified of the Marxist-Leninist little groups...

SZULC: The king is petrified of a radical colonel, of a Saudi, Arabian Quadaffi.

COPELAND: And the Palestinians. He's worried about his princes being kidnapped when they go abroad, they are subject to Black September, and everything else. Now all the king is saying to us, in effect, and as I believe you're directly aware he told Mr. Kissinger this, look, get the pressures off me and I'll do what you say, I'll be reasonable. But consider my problem, consider the pressures on me which you helped create.

SZULC: Well, we did help create, because we overarmed the Persian Gulf, we overarmed, either by supply or by direct sale, for "balance of payment" reasons, quote-unquote, a strong arsenal of arms in the Persian Gulf.

COPELAND: So it's not a CIA problem, then.

SZULC: No, it's not, for once it's not.

COPELAND: Okay, I agree with you.

SZULC: But you create a situation which then becomes a problem. If you have an overthrow of Faisal, which I suppose is in the cards, it did happen in Libya and elsewhere, then how do you put this whole thing together again, so that your SaudiArabian government will be pro-U.S., whatever pro-U.S. means in the context?

COPELAND: We don't care about that, they're already pro-U.S. May I make a suggestion? Look, this little book that I wrote here answers most of the questions about how the CIA does things. And it's the first book that's really told as much as anybody's told.

Can we talk about Tad's book, because that's really...?

SZULC: That's an old one, it's been out for a year now.

HAINES: I would like to talk about something that Mr. Szulc has written at length about in New York magazine, and I am very curious to find out how much control Mr. Kissinger has in all of the things we have discussed. Apparently most

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Americans are aware that he is involved in leading us in his open policies as a negotiator, as a diplomat. But what happens in the Forty Committee, and how much control does he actually have over the CIA?

SZULC: Well, I think it's an unusual situation where the Secretary of State, which Mr. Kissinger now is, as of last year, is also the head of the National Security Council operation, which in turn has this thing called the Forty Committee - which, by the way, has only five members. It's named after the sequential number of the document which created it. So is that sense he directs, in a certain dimension, the work of the larger intelligence community, which is the CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, the State Department, Intelligence Research, what else, I've forgotten.

McPHILLIPS: He's in charge of them all.

HAINES: Did he decide on Chile, was it his decision, or was it the President's decision?

COPELAND: Well, it wasn't the CIA's, I assure you. If you knew the CIA you'd know they never decide on anything. They're so afraid they're going to do something wrong, they haven't got time to worry about doing something right.

SZULC: No, I think the point I want to make - excuse me - the point I want to make is that you have to understand that the intelligence community, of which the CIA's a part, is not an animal that works by itself. It is part, it's tied into the larger foreign policy making function of the government at its highest level, of which the President is obviously the number one man.

In the situation which now exists Dr. Kissinger indeed has in hand the intelligence community through the Forty Committee and other groups. Now as Miles knows, there are a great many people in the CIA who are very unhappy with the arrangement

which has developed in the five or six years under Kissinger. Some of my acquaintances and friends feel, for example, that Kissinger has destroyed or very badly damaged the function of national estimates of the CIA by, in effect, becoming the traffic cop of the community himself.

I think, from the little I know, from the outside, I tend to agree that evaluators should be professional evaluators. I think the CIA has some of the best ones. We're talking now about the analysis side of the agency. Kissinger cannot be

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the producer and the consumer of intelligence at the same time. And I think this is where he is weakening the Intelligence Agency in the area which I think is very important and useful, which is analysis, evaluation, and so on.

Because, you know, we all talk about the CIA in terms of dirty tricks, covert operations. But there's a huge world of, you know, academics and experts on every subject under the sun, who are part of the analysis section. And you cannot have a foreign policy unless you understand events in the world. You do not understand them unless you analyze the material which comes from many sources.

And this is where I think the CIA is being damaged the most by the kind of pressure it has today. Do you agree with me, Miles?

COPELAND: I agree entirely, yeah.

HAINES: And before you agree any more, perhaps we can take a break, and we'll come back, and we hope to find out what people are talking about when they say covert and overt operations. We'll be back in just a moment.

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HAINES: We're talking with Miles Copeland. The book is "Without Cloak or Dagger, the Truth About the New Espionage." We also have Tad Szulc, whose latest book is called "The Innocents at Home."

And, Mary Helen, during the break you said you'd like to start back at the beginning.

McPHILLIPS: Well, I think maybe we ought to clarify just what the CIA was authorized by law to do.

COPELAND: Well, they're set up to provide the executive branch of the United States Government with such information as it needed in order to make intelligent decisions: I think later they narrowed it to say affecting national security, because there are other intelligence agencies.

SZULC: The National Security Act of 1947, which has one interesting section, that is Section Five, which describes the normal intelligence gathering operations with which the agency's charged. And then it says: and the agency may perform from time to time other tasks that it may be charged with by the National Security Council.

And I guess this was the key which made it possible for the agency to get into a great many other things.

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COPELAND: But it didn't do many other things. Finally Frank Rizener was brought in to think of things to do. The Russians were doing it. And we are not saying the Russians are doing it so it's all right for us to do, that's just the wrong way to say it. I mean to say that is like saying Hitler was arming and taking over half of Europe, so we were imitating Hitler. It's not a question of that, it's a question of defense.

So President Truman decided that we should look into the possibility of getting into this act, where required. Well, we formed a very small OPC, it was called, Office of Policy Coordination, one of these funny titles.

SZULC: That was before the Central Intelligence group.

COPELAND: No, it was after. The Central Intelligence group, then the CIA. And the CIA was divided into various departments, China, Russia, and so forth. And then a secret operations section was set up, and it was spying, espionage. And then an outgrowth of that was political action, covert action, that was doing things clandestinely. And that was headed by a man named Frank Rizener. And I came back from Syria to devise means of systematically interfering in the affairs of sovereign nations. And we did this only -- you have to go right to the White House before you can do these sorts of things.

HAINES: But is it legal then?

COPELAND: Oh yeah, oh sure.

SZULC: I guess it depends how you care to define statutes. The law does use the construction: and any other such actions as the National Security Council might direct.

COPELAND: So when the National Security Council directs it, it's legal.

SZULC: It is legal, and this is what's called the secret charter, I believe.

COPELAND: That's right.

SZULC: Because once you have this loophole, or this statement in the law, any other function could mean anything, including invading the moon with frogmen, doing anything. And there's no limit to it.

COPELAND: It could be anything.

HAINES: May I ask you a question?

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SZULC: So there's a flaw, maybe.

HAINES: Mr. Szulc, can we at all be morally indignant about communism and communist subversion if we as a nation take part in upsetting other governments? I mean, how can we go around talking about...

COPELAND: Phyllis, come off it, look, could we...

HAINES: I'm sorry, I don't mean to be rude, but I did address the question to Mr. Szulc, I would like to hear his answer.

SZULC: Well, I can, I am indignant about a great many things. This is one of them. This is going backwards to what I said before. I don't share Miles' view that it is necessary or an advantage for the United States to get involved in changing, altering, upsetting, overthrowing governments which--whose ideology we don't like. Because I don't think we can acquire missionary zeal of overthrowing people we don't like.

And there's a built-in contradiction. If we are going to be consistent with what Miles was saying, and we don't like communist dictatorships - I was in Prague in 1968 when the Soviet tanks rolled in to stop precisely an attempt at liberalizing that which was Marxism, or whatever you want to call it, I sat in the American embassy and looked at the American flag and said, my god, you know, if we're ever going to be free anywhere in the world in the name of democracy against communist dictatorship, this is the time.

But of course now, because of the Yalta agreement spirit, or what have you, was still there, so we were looking the other way, and we were organizing a coup d'etat in the Chad (?) or in Paraguay, while the Soviet tanks were rolling down the street.

So one should say this, of course I'm morally indignant, because I think it's silly to create intervention only when it suits you, and sometimes for irrelevant reasons. You know, we can discuss the pros and the cons of Chile. I think the concept is wrong.

And I think a changing world - you know, we were talking about trade, and we're so proud of the wheat we sold to the Soviet Union, we could have been buying copper from Chile, which we were:

So to answer your question, I think it's wrong. Certainly we should have major intelligence operations to know what happens in the world, because otherwise we cannot cope with the world

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or live with it. I suppose a situation may arise which anyone can visualize; and which it might be a matter of national interest to intervene in a situation which may have a real, deep danger to the stability of the western world, or the United States. And maybe a new economic force in the oil things, one of these cases may arise somewhere.

COPELAND: I agree with all that. I think that the question of moral indignation - I always object to it as sort of a heavy question...

HAINES: You keep saying that!

COPELAND: When Hitler rose in Europe we didn't have time to horse around with being morally indignant, we had to do, let's face it, the same thing. We had to arm ourselves, we had to fight, we had to kill people, which is morally wrong.

Now what I do agree with Tad on is that we should do this only when there's no other way out, when the only answer to stave off some catastrophe is to step in and do this clandestine kind of thing, which is infinitely better than sending in battleships.

Now what Tad is worried about is that we'll get carried away and we'll do this every time we don't like something. And we shouldn't do that, I agree with you.

SZULC: There are many times where we shouldn't. The Bay of Pigs was a silly thing.

COPELAND: And that was not the CIA, you know. Your information is that the CIA believed that the Bay of Pigs was a good thing?

SZULC: Dave Bissell (?), who was the authority at the time, told me at the time that he believed it could be carried out, and that's why...

COPELAND: With air cover.

SZULC: With air cover.

COPELAND: They didn't get it.

SZULC: But he also said something else, which is what they believed at the time, which is popular support on the island, once the brigade landed on the shores. I'm not at all convinced that air support short of, you know, running B-52's over Cuba, would have made all that much difference to that small, disorganized brigade which landed in that place. And so on, and so on. I think it was a professionally bad job of predicting intelligence, and so on.

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COPELAND: We haven't disagreed. The CIA did something it shouldn't have done, as Tad tells it. Now I don't agree that the CIA believed it was a good thing. Because, you know, they went on record all along the line, first saying that there was not this much resistance in Chile, that was the intelligence side of the show. Dick Bissell said nonetheless we should do it. General Eisenhower very much wanted this operation. And then when President Kennedy came in he cut out that white elephant, which the CIA said was the sine qua non, that is the air cover, and he cut that out at the last minute. This is all documented.

HAINES: Can we go back to something - oh, I'm sorry, you wished to say something?

SZULC: No, that's all right.

COPELAND: I was hoping we were going to talk about Watergate here.

McPHILLIPS: We'll get to Watergate, too. But can we go back to something you said, in relationship to Chile? You said that the CIA should have guaranteed that someone other than Allende was elected in the first place. And I want to know if Tad would agree with that.

SZULC: No, I would not.

COPELAND: I didn't put it exactly that way...

SZULC: But the spirit of the thing -- No, because I think that the terrible things which Kissinger predicted on the 16th of September - which is a day I happen to remember, because it was the background briefing for editors - in which he said if Allende was elected - and he was elected - but if he was confirmed by congress, the Chilean congress, then we will have communism in Argentina, and Brazil, and Peru, and down the line.

COPELAND: They were on the way to it, there were scores of Argentinian, Brazilian, Uruguayan communists pouring into the country, setting up little headquarters.

McPHILLIPS: I thought we were in a detente, that it was arranged by Dr. Kissinger.

SZULC: It depends with whom. But I don't think that -- again, you know, this is the reverse of what you were saying about documents in which the CIA cannot organize revolution, which I agree. But by the same token I don't think that Chilean

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communists can, if you want to call it that, move the contagion of communism to Peru, or...

COPELAND: Well, they were being hospitable, they were providing headquarters for communists from other countries.

SZULC: This is not a very valid reason for overthrowing Allende, because the Brazilian government is not happy about, you know, their exiles.

COPELAND: There are other reasons we haven't been told, you must agree with that.

McPHILLIPS: How about Portugal, people are very concerned there that the communists will win over in the next election?

SZULC: I think there's a very interesting lesson there, it's an irrelevant lesson, particularly for the south of Europe, because we have Italy and Greece. What happens when the forty years of dictatorship the Portuguese had under Salazar and Gae-tano, do you create a situation in which you destroy normal, healthy democratic forces to the extent that only clandestine movements, such as the Portuguese Communist Party in this context, will survive?

I believe, as in Spain, if Franco ever dies, which is questionable at this point, I wouldn't be surprised if we had almost a rerun of the Portuguese situation, he knows all the difference that you allow. So the question is, if we support, the United States did support over the years those dictatorships, the Salazars, the Francos, with the military bases, credits, and so on, don't you really create in the long run that which we profess to fear most, which is communism?

And I think that Portugal is one of those incredible cases where non-fulfillment of false prophecies - you know, something like this. And I think one should ponder, when you deal with strong-arm governments, whether you are not really creating that which you profess to fear. And I think that Portugal is a case in point.

HAINES: It seems very strange to me also, and I would like you to answer this question: how on the one hand the United States can have an open detente, as Mary Helen brought up before, with the Soviet Union, we've been visiting China; and yet you wave around this word communism. You know, granted it's a horrible thing to have a country that's not free. But you have a President going back and forth freely to visit communist countries, so how can you legitimize having -- why overthrow a government of communists that is so small, infinitesimal, as compared to the gigantic Chinese government, or the Soviet Union?

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SZULC: Because you have a super-power situation here. You deal elegantly with super-powers who have nuclear weapons, such as the Soviet Union and China. Albania has no nuclear weapons, neither does Chile, therefore you are not bound by the detente rules of the game.

The warmth that comes into the Brezhnev-Nixon or Ford relations is not required with Chile, because Chile is not the threat that the Soviet Union could be to us in a nuclear situation.

COPELAND: Absolutely, the same way the other way around. You know, the Soviets...

SZULC: But it's kind of dishonest, you know.

COPELAND: Read Tass, you know, the Soviets are very, very warm about detente, and they believe in it when they're talking to us, but read the Soviet press about how they feel about Chile. Read the advice that they're saying, the way they should have had Chile to do all over again.

HAINES: So are we saying if you're a small country and we don't like the kind of government you have, you're in real trouble - is that what you're saying?

COPELAND: I'm saying, Phyllis - you see, you put it in a moral light, in this moral-immoral -- we don't make the rules of this world. Really, we are the most democratic people, and we're the most benevolent. Doing business with the United States is a good thing for anybody to do.

But there are people working against us who use dirty tricks, who are friendly to us to the extent that they have to be, and at the same time work against all these little governments in the Third World.

But remember this, we are always on the defensive. There's no case that you can name where the American government would say we're going to take over such and such a government and put a pro-American government in and have them do it our way. We don't have to. If we leave things alone they'll be pro-American.

What we do is to prevent the other side from putting a government in there which would deny friendship to us.

SZULC: Before you define the other side putting in, can we document or claim that Guatemala, poor Mr. Arbens, was an agent of the Soviet Union? But first a very important point,

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because we live in a world of mirror images. We profess to be for democracy, however we interfere in a novel democratic process which happens to produce a Marxist government in Chile. At the same time the Soviet Union, which has this new detente relationship with the United States, thinks nothing of sending tanks rolling into one of their clients, if you like the word, or satellites, and destroying a liberal government within that orbit. So the super-powers do work in mirror images.

COPELAND: But there's one thing you keep leaving out here. There are many, many countries in the world we don't hear about. We hear about Guatemala, we know about Chile, we know about Cuba. But think of those many, many places we don't know about where there are more or less democratic governments, as democratic as the people in the country will allow, and they have the CIA to thank for keeping out the other side.

McPHILLIPS: But if we don't know about them, how do we know they exist?

COPELAND: We can't, that's what the CIA's all about. And that's the great trouble the CIA has, is that the things that it does every, every, every day, which I wrote about in my book and my book is the only one that's written about that side of the CIA, by the way. Here we have Marchetti raising the roofs because he's given away ten times as many secrets as I have, and you don't get in trouble with the CIA.

My book doesn't praise the CIA, as I think Tad will agree. But it does show that the CIA is doing things every day that keeps some of these Chile situations from arising in the first place.

SZULC: You know, Miles, Bill Colby, who's the director of the CIA, attended a very interesting conference in Washington about three weeks ago on the subject of covert operations, and he made a point which kind of symbolizes this whole attitude. Bill said there must be some in between a diplomatic process and the landing of the Marines. And this something is covert operations.

Now I think this is taking an enormously broad concept, because I cannot believe that the United States does not have intellectual and dramatic human resources to do that only with two choices, sending a diplomatic note, or sending the Second Airborne Division. If we have been reduced to that, then I am quite concerned about this country.

COPELAND: Well, I'm quite concerned for this reason: all this talk about is the CIA going to do this in Portugal, and all these situations that are arising which are much more dangerous than Chile. And my answer, having just come from Washington,

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is probably not. Probably the CIA is going to sit up there scared to death, with its best personnel quitting, and the CIA is going to do precious nothing about some of these situations arising. Neither is our government, and the situation is just going to deteriorate - in Italy, and Portugal, and some of these other places. The CIA is off the air, forget the CIA.

McPHILLIPS: Something I'd like to ask, and we will - we have to take a break for a moment - but how much do the big international companies, that are really American companies, have to do with how our government views other governments? But first of all a short break, and we'll be back.

* * *

McPHILLIPS: Back again now with Miles Copeland, affiliated at one time with the CIA, who's written a book, "Without Cloak or Dagger," and Tad Szulc, the well-known journalist, whose latest book is "Innocents at Home."

I'd like to know just how much influence big companies - ITT comes to mind, but there are many others - big food companies, and so forth, whose money and management is American, have to do with what the United States Government does about other countries' governments.

COPELAND: I'm going to make this answer as short as I can, because I'm more interested in hearing Tad's response to it, reaction to it, than I am in what I've got to say myself. But I am a capitalist, I'm a nasty old money grabbing capitalist. And I am that because I believe, I really believe that what's good for General Motors is good for America. I have to believe that.

I believe we have no apology to make for our capitalist way of life. I think that people who've dealt with us throughout the world have gained from our capitalistic relationship with them.

Now if the CIA gets off the air, as I suspect it is, the companies that I've been working with, which I do not intend to name, do not intend to take this lying down. We intend to do what we have to do throughout the world to look after our capitalistic interests - capitalistic interests, underlined, quotation marks, any way you want it, italicize it, whatever you want to do - and we will regard ourselves as acting in the best interests of the United States, as we're doing it.

We don't intend to be secret about it except where we have to. We don't intend to be secret in the sense that the CIA

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is concerned. We intend to let our government know what we're going to do, and if our government is in a position to stop us, it can.

But that's the way I feel about it, and I think the way most multi-national corporations based in America, and elsewhere, feel about it.

McPHILLIPS: Do you have any response to that, Tad?

SZULC: Oh, I'm sure that Miles is right, that this is the way the companies do. But, again, it seems to me that in a world of multi-national corporations, or trans-nationals, you have a new danger developing, that you get parallel foreign policies.

Miles said that the U.S. Government can't stop company X, Y, or Z from perpetrating the act of purchasing government below the Sahara. But I think that the companies, because of their resources, which are political and economic, may engage, as they have engaged, in political situations which not necessarily have to match the U.S. foreign policy.

Quite aside from whether we stand for capitalism or not, because I'm not even sure this is relevant. You know, there's a whole separate, which you know better than I, but which I think has to be discussed some time in great seriousness: to what extent with a totally free hand the oil corporations have, for the last twenty-five years, since World War II, in their dealings with the oil producers, have led to the situation of crisis, and the creation of OPEC, the fear of OPEC. And this was the Standard Oils, and the CalTechs of this world, who are free to do what they please, both in their dealings overseas, both in their dealings at home, resenting any kind of control by the United States Government.

And the results are deplorable - the crisis of '73, the new crisis in oil. I remember a passage - may I just say one thing? it was outlined by FDR back in the end of the war, he said, you know, "Oil companies are a problem, you cannot govern with them, but you cannot govern without them." And I think this was at the time he was trying to establish that government oil corporation. He hasn't, for reasons which are history.

What is the situation today? That the oil companies themselves have lost their leverage in the OPEC countries. The U.S. Government has no leverage. Therefore my question is, is it really all that wise, in the name of capitalism or any other name, to allow multi-nationals to have their own foreign policy?

I think that the American national interest - which to me is somewhat distinct from pure capitalism - can suffer in

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the end if, you know, a major company has its own foreign minister, or war minister.

COPELAND: My turn. Well, I would say that if there is a clearcut American policy, rather than just some goody-goody statement of it, I think that everybody would fall in line. But, my god, imagine going to a doctor, you've got cancer, "Doctor, I've got a terrible pain in my left chest," and so forth, "and I think I've got cancer," and so forth, and he says, "Just a minute, I'll go away and consult." And he comes back and says, "Well, I have a statement to make. I am unalterably opposed to disease in any form." And there you are standing there with cancer.

Well, this is the kind of thing we've been hearing from the State Department. So I say: conflict of policy - conflict with what policy? Lord knows, it had clear enough policy in restricting the oil companies with the many things it's tried to do. There's plenty of policy there. I mean, if you've ever worked for an oil company...

SZULC: No, I haven't.

COPELAND: Well, you know, you can't wiggle your little finger without the Federal Government...

McPHILLIPS: A lot of people have said that we don't have a clearcut foreign policy.

SZULC: Well, I think to the extent that it matters, the Senate hearings this spring and late last year on the whole tiresome history of the oil companies in the Middle East, long before the creation of OPEC, all the conflicts which were arising at the time - you mentioned George Magee, who was very much involved in all of this at the time he was Secretary of State for the Middle East.

I am not convinced to this day that the national interests of the United States - which means, I suppose, a supply of fuel, or what have you, to the nation, to the country, to its industry - necessarily has to be equated, or has been equated with the stock market, or dividend interest of corporation X, Y, or Z.

In an old-fashioned sort of way I'm interested in the national interests of the two hundred million Americans.

COPELAND: So am I, Tad. I think they're identical in this case, thanks to this way of operating, which I see no apologies for.

McPHILLIPS: Can we go on to Watergate, since it's still, much as people would like to forget it, it's still clear

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in many people's minds? What is your understanding of the actual involvement of the CIA in the whole Plumbers operation? Either one of you.

COPELAND: I don't know, I haven't heard...

SZULC: To the extent that millions and millions of pages of testimony have been brought out by now, I suppose it was probably marginal. I think that the agency made a mistake, violated the statutes, by allowing Mr. Hunt and his friends to acquire two big pieces of equipment, you know...

COPELAND: Wait a minute, it was a false beard, or something.

SZULC: Look, the whole thing was absurd to begin with. Nevertheless, Mr. Howard Hunt, basically a nonentity, arrives in the office of the Acting Director of the CIA at the time, General Cushman...

COPELAND: Coming from the President of the United States.

SZULC: Coming from John Ehrlichman, who was not quite the President of the United States, we know that much.

COPELAND: Same thing, same thing.

SZULC: Probably in the same conversation asking for disguises, voice altering devices, and what not, for what turned out to be the absolutely insane, insane purpose of interviewing some chap up in New England on Senator Kennedy's personal problems, as we now find out.

Now you, Miles, as a senior, former official of the company, of the agency, would you have, looking at this man with this kind of request, not wondered whether this was a proper role for the agency to get involved in?

COPELAND: Well, if it came from the White House, it would never occur to me to say, well now, wait a minute here, does the President of the United States know what he's doing? The President of the United States is the boss. If an idiot like Hunt came bumbling into my office, and really had come from the White House, and said I want to borrow all these things, I'd say wait, please don't tell me what you want it for. Because I would not want to associate myself with the lunacy that he conceivably could have up his sleeve.

I don't know whether you know the story of how he did come in, and what happened as he talked to the Deputy Director of the CIA.

SZULC: It so happened the Deputy Director had, would you

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believe, a tape on which the whole transcript of the interview between General Cushman and Howard Hunt is recorded. And it's the most absurd conversation, which has to do with said houses, back when in Washington, the fact that he, Hunt, uses the gymnasium at Langley. And then comes this peculiar request, you know, to make available essentially that which you can buy in at least one place I know on New York Avenue in Washington for twenty-five dollars. I'm appalled that the agency allowed itself to be sucked into something as absurd as this.

COPELAND: It was so absurd that nobody took Hunt very seriously. But do you know how long it takes a CIA technician to get inside a room?

McPHILLIPS: You do, but tell everybody else.

COPELAND: All right, okay, I'm sure Tad knows this already. To have just a man minimally trained to bug your office, to get in - and he has to do it in a classroom, he has to do it blindfolded in simulated darkness - it takes him one minute to get in, and put the bugs in, and get out. And it takes a lookout.

Now here these guys go in with Abbott and Costello, or the Four Marx Brothers, Keystone Kops, and they bumble around for twenty-two minutes.

HAINES: You know what's amazing to me? Now maybe I sound like a cynic, and maybe I'm naive, I'll admit it. But I went to school to learn about arrest with a warrant, no entry without permission, no search and seizure. And here you say with pride that this is how we're training men to break into homes.

COPELAND: No, no, no, I didn't say that, Phyllis, please, now...

HAINES: Any place, break into any place.

COPELAND: No, no, break into some place in Soviet Russia. And you don't think that it's right for the CIA to break into the Kremlin, if they can?

HAINES: I'm just saying how amazing it is how we're training people to break in.

COPELAND: Well, I must confess - but horrified if you like but I think this program is to be informative, as well as everything else, and I will now impart to our many listeners, as I'm sure we have, that the CIA does train people to go right inside Moscow, indeed, and to bug premises right in the Kremlin, and it can do that.

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Of course, as Marchetti has pointed out in his book, they bugged our American Embassy, too. But we have succeeded in bugging, putting bugs in premises right in...

HAINES: Here is the question: How do you stop this organization?

COPELAND: How do you stop what organization?

HAINES: This organization, the CIA, from going too far?

SZULC: Phyllis, let me for a second do a thing which is unnatural for me, which is to defend the CIA. Because I think we should not lose sight of the fact that this is a complicated, predatory world, in which others have intelligence services, where it is required or necessary for us to obtain information.

Let's separate espionage, or spying, which has been with us for five million years, and will be, from covert operations, such as overthrowing governments. Look, we have spy in the sky satellites to look over Soviet missile developments; they have, to look over our Minute Men, and so on. This we all accept, and we don't think it's wrong, because national defense, however you define it, requires it.

And I think that my quarrel, if I dare to put it so bluntly, with this sort of operations is that, in this whole enormous shouting against covert operation, with which I concur, what is lost from sight - I think what Miles was getting at, really - the fact that so long as the Soviets have a KGB, and right-wing dictators elsewhere have their secret operations, we need an intelligence function. When I say intelligence I mean gathering, collection of intelligence, interpretation and understanding of it.

Because you cannot run a government in a complex world without it. Sometimes - and I'm sorry that the world is so - we do have to break in, into somebody's safe to borrow briefly a piece of paper. But let's be very clear between collection of intelligence, which I suppose is dirty business in some way, from you know, the Bay of Pigs, and the Chiles, and so on.

HAINES: But is there a difference now - although I admit it was not the CIA, but the point was brought up, because I thought for a moment of the breaking in of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office.

SZULC: Well, it's criminal to begin with.

HAINES: Yes, and this is not the CIA doing this, but at the same time, you know, how can you control it, and how

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do you know that at some other time there won't be another person who would have the CIA go too far?

SZULC: No, Phyllis, your answer is someplace else. If I may put it this way, your answer is the kind of President this country has, the kind of moral climate that you have in the White House. Under former President Nixon, a clamor has developed in which buggings, breakins, corruption, which went enormously beyond the CIA - the CIA was a minor, insignificant partner in sort of a national disease which was spawned by the immorality of the Nixon government.

It's not the CIA, it's not the New York Police Force, it's the kind of government you have in Washington which sets the example, creates a permissiveness in which a government -- Look, don't forget that one of the Articles of Impeachment against Mr. Nixon was his misuse of the CIA. So I think we should put the blame where it belongs, which is in this case on the...

HAINES: I just wanted you to say it, not me.

McPHILLIPS: There's one last thing, if we can get it in, and it'll have to be quick, Miles - you say in your book that there is some evidence in court -- Oh, it's too late.

HAINES: Yeah, we have to take a break. I'm sorry, we're at the end - a break, it's all over. Thank you very much, Miles Copeland, for yourself and your book, "Without Cloak and Dagger," and Tad Szulc, for being with us. And your new book is "Innocents at Home." Thank you very much.

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HAINES: You know, it's fantastic to see that our guests were very enthusiastic about the subject, and that perhaps Watergate has made us all more conscious of what the CIA is doing, and what other organizations in the country are doing.

McPHILLIPS: Well, I think that's good, if nothing else good came out of it.

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