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29 March 1946.

MEMORANDUM

**DESENSITIZED**

To: Lt. Col. John J. McDonough

per CSN 43-26

From: Joseph P. McCarthy

*CIT-USA OCL-DIPLOMAT*

Subject:

*50X1-HUM  
AFGHAN, WWII*

On 27 March 1945,  paid a visit to the Delhi office and said that it is his plan to leave Delhi for Kabul on Friday, 30 March 1945. Mr.  said that he had stopped by in order to learn whether there were any specific requests for information that he might receive from us and which he might begin working on on his arrival at Kabul.

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*Burt's  
Owl  
&  
Liaison*

I took this excellent opportunity to go more fully into our proposed Kabul project and also to discuss in greater detail our interest in, and our present knowledge of, Kabul and Afghanistan.

In discussing the Kabul project, I felt that it was perfectly safe to permit  to read our memorandum to Colonel Berno dated 13 December 1944, in which this project is proposed. He stated, in reading this memorandum, that he agrees with the expressions contained therein as to the likelihood of enemy activity in that area, both before the war and at this time, but he repeated that he believes it would be impossible and possibly prejudicial to the other American interests should we attempt to initiate this project.

The six tasks contemplated for our undercover agent in Kabul, which are outlined in that memorandum, namely, 1) Determine the identity of all Japanese at Kabul and those commuting to and from there; 2) Learn what persons other than Japanese who are in touch with the Japanese Consulate and other Japanese residing in Kabul; 3) Check the movements of those persons in and out of Kabul referred to in 2) above; 4) Establish the means of communication used by the Japanese; for instance, radio, courier mail, etc.; 5) Learn the extent of the use of Kabul as a disseminating station of information in the Middle East and Far East; 6) Work with our military attaché and obtain from him the information he already

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[redacted] that insofar as No. 1 is concerned, he can furnish us, and will furnish us, through [redacted] the name of all of the Japanese connected with the Legation at Kabul and also the names of all of the Germans connected with the German Legation, which is still functioning there. He said that these people do not travel from Kabul.

Item No. 6 can most easily be covered by [redacted].

[redacted] Insofar as Items 2, 3, 4 and 5 are concerned, [redacted] believes it would be impossible for anyone we might send in there to accomplish these tasks.

He went on again to relate that he is very close to Colonel Lankester of the British Legation; says that Lankester has an excellent informant system set up, this system having been established years ago and probably originally brought into being in order that the British may be advised of tribal movements along the border.

[redacted] was positive in his statements to the effect that if we did attempt the organization of sources of information in Afghanistan, the British would learn of it almost immediately, and it would be a great hazard in that we would probably attempt to recruit informants who are already in the employ of the British.

During the course of the conversation, Mr. [redacted] said that he has been shown by Lankester copies of telegrams indicating that there is a Japanese intelligence system working between Kabul and India. He pointed this out in describing his close relationship with Lankester.

He also said that Ingersoll Rand, to his knowledge, has sold a considerable amount of equipment to the Afghanistan government and that they are withholding 10% of cost price of this equipment, claiming that the company had failed to send a qualified representative into Kabul to properly set up the equipment, much of which is still in its cases. This would, of

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course, indicate that it would be a comparatively simple matter to, if the project had been feasible, cause Lawson to enter into Afghanistan.

[redacted] went on to say that he had been under the impression that Afghanistan came within the jurisdiction of our Cairo office. This impression was gained for the reason that two American schoolteachers, one, [redacted] had been given some indoctrination in espionage at Cairo, probably by our office, before they went into Afghanistan. He said that this indoctrination apparently was insufficient as both these people, who are no longer in Afghanistan incidentally, came to him and explained their position to him. It seems that they were unable to gather any really important military information and were capable only of obtaining political and economic information, which, according to [redacted], was more easily obtainable by him, which was at the time being obtained by him and reported to the State Department. He considers that the project in the use of these school teachers was an absolute failure.

Until about six months ago, one Flannery, road engineer for General Motors, was in Kabul and had an excellent opportunity to travel a great deal. Flannery is now in Bombay. [redacted] believes that while Flannery had an excellent opportunity to observe, the chances are that he would have proven to be a poor observer. It may be well, however, for Robertson to interview Flannery.

As you recall, during July of 1944, Washington requested that we make an effort to obtain copies of the weekly summaries prepared by Col. Lankester. This matter was taken up with George Jenkin and his suggestion had been that we apply for this information through our own military attaché, explaining that reports from Lankester would be of little interest to us.

I discussed this situation with [redacted] and he said that he would be inclined to agree with the expression of Mr. Jenkin. [redacted] is furnished a copy of each of the reports prepared weekly by Lankester. These reports are given to him for

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reading and return. In the preparation of the reports, Lankester makes no effort to include in them any material of a military intelligence nature. They are almost solely concerned with movements and activities of the various tribes, with the movements and activities of other foreign representatives in Afghanistan. The reports are in the form of a "news sheet" or running memorandum.

[redacted] will study these reports and 50X1-HUM will probably be in a better position to evaluate the information contained therein, passing along to us those bits that may be, inadvertently, included which will be of interest to us.

While I was very much impressed with Mr. [redacted] during the original interview, at the close 50X1-HUM of this interview, I had a much greater appreciation of his ability. I believe that he will provide for us all the coverage we possibly will need in Afghanistan.

jpm/rhl

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