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Radio Propaganda Branch
FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION DIVISION
OFFICE OF OPERATIONS

SPECIAL MEMORANDUM

SOVIET PROPAGANDA DISCORDANT WITH COEXISTENCE

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There is little in Moscow's propaganda that can be cited as direct, indisputable evidence of behavior belying the USSR's protestations of a desire for peaceful coexistence. Khrushchev has made it clear that by coexistence the USSR means coexistence between states, with the "ideological struggle" going on unceasingly. Technically, Soviet propagandists could argue that their denunciations of colonialism, attacks on imperialism, and publicity for "progressive" and "national liberation" movements simply lend support to the "ideological struggle." They could argue that their praise of Soviet and denigration of Western aid simply foster the "peaceful competition" that is also to go on together with state-to-state coexistence.

KOMMUNIST, No. 16, 1959, states that coexistence "means a refraining from intervention in the internal affairs of other countries with the aim of changing their governmental structure or way of life or for any other reason." Yet here again, it would be difficult to make out a clearcut case against Soviet propaganda. Unlike Peking, and unlike the bloc clandestine radios with which the USSR would disclaim any connection, Soviet media are careful to stop short of explicit appeals to the people of any country to oppose their government's policies, let alone subvert or overthrow their government. The appeal is always indirect--for example, publicity for antiregime sentiment in a nonbloc country (technically reportage), descriptions of poor economic conditions in the country (again, technically, reportage), or warnings that military alignment with the United States is dangerous because it could involve the country in a nuclear war (purportedly not threats, but reminders of the facts of life, motivated by friendly concern). None of these approaches, it could be argued, is "intervention" because none calls directly for action.

It is, however, possible to point to a number of instances in which Soviet propaganda has violated the spirit (though not the letter) of its avowals of a policy of peaceful coexistence. Part I of this report lists under five categories the Soviet propaganda efforts, lines, or themes that seem most susceptible to interpretation as being discordant with a policy of coexistence; examples are cited roughly in descending order of usefulness (the best examples first) within each category. Part II cites some of the USSR's own statements about what coexistence means and does not mean.

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PART I

A. INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS

1. IRAN

Radio Moscow's sustained denunciations of the Iranian Shah add up to the clearest instance of a propaganda effort to stir up popular rebellion against an existing regime.

The effort has been carried on at several levels--in official notes and statements, in commentaries in Persian from Radio Moscow, and in openly incendiary propaganda from the clandestine "National Voice of Iran," which broadcasts in Persian and Azerbaijani from within Soviet borders.

Moscow has left the most inflammatory material to the "National Voice," over which it would technically disclaim any control. The "National Voice" was particularly vituperative against the Shah personally during November and December--the period of his engagement and marriage--when it called him small-brained, stupid, miserable, useless, sinister, bestial, cowardly, idiotic, lascivious, and debauched.

The "National Voice" has openly incited to rebellion: "Death to the Shah's/ coup d'etat regime, quisling of colonialism! Death to the foreign-propped-up Shah!" (19 January 1960, in Persian).

The closest Radio Moscow itself has come to inciting to revolt has been in comment forecasting (as distinct from urging) an end to the Shah's regime at the hands of an outraged people:

The fury and indignation of the Iranian people against the rotten and hated monarch will, like a sweeping fire, reduce to ashes all abominations, egotism, and immorality which now prevent the Iranian people from prospering. (Moscow in Persian, 19 February 1960)

Major elements of Radio Moscow's comment on Iran (essentially the same elements that predominate in "National Voice" comment, but more carefully worded) are (1) descriptions of dire results of the Shah's rule--poverty, unemployment, absence of civil rights, and absence of adequate health and educational

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facilities; (2) publicity for an allegedly rising popular opposition, as well as military and political scheming, against the Shah's regime; and (3) warnings that the United States sees Iran as a base for "atomic attack" against the USSR and hence that the Shah's policy of cooperation with the United States endangers his people.

The Iranian audience hears 90 to 100 percent of Moscow's comment on Iran--a much larger percentage than most countries hear about their own affairs, and clear evidence of a propaganda effort aimed directly at the Iranian people.

Although the USSR professes concern over a threat to its security from Iranian-U.S. military cooperation, its propaganda behavior makes clear that this is not a serious immediate concern: The alleged threat to the USSR's interests is scarcely mentioned in Moscow's negligible home service comment on Iran.

The most authoritative full-length commentary assailing the Shah's policies to be broadcast by Radio Moscow was a PRAVDA Observer article, carried seven times in Persian on 14 February 1960. PRAVDA said:

The conclusion of the Iranian-American military agreement is an act of teachery by the Shah and the Eqbal government. The Shah's assurance that Iran had never assumed, now would ever assume, any commitments against the USSR--that is, his 'word of a soldier and a man' in 1956--has burst like a soap bubble.

A strong anti-Shah commentary was broadcast by Moscow in Persian on 20 February:

Day in and day out, the Iranians are told that an indissoluble tie exists between the Iranian people and the Shah. But what is this tie? This is the tie between the jailkeeper and the prisoner. Had it been otherwise, would the Shah have needed to build prisons all over the country with such speed, to trample underfoot freedom of speech, suppress decent newspapers and open fire on demonstrators?

Reports that the Shah is in imminent danger of being overthrown by a rightwing cabal figure in the most recent broadcasts of both Moscow and the "National Voice of Iran." Quoting the

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Italian PAESE SERA, Moscow reported in Persian on 4 March that "several influential leaders" had formed an underground group to prepare a coup d'etat against the Shah. The "National Voice" charged more specifically, on 1 March, that the "royal court's scorpions"--Bakhtiar and Nasiri--were in a "final struggle" for power, each seeking the principal role in the "intrigues and troubles brewing around the Shah."

2. GREECE

Radio Moscow has spoken out openly in behalf of Manolia Glezos, a leftist Greek resistance hero who was convicted on espionage charges in July 1959. A recently as 15 March 1960, Moscow broadcast in several European languages (including Greek) a commentary which claimed that the prosecution failed to establish any proof of Glezos' espionage activities and asserted that the trial was staged to undermine the reputation of "the Greek peoples' movement."

At the time of the trial, during the week ending 12 July 1959, Radio Moscow's comment on the Glezos case rose to 17 percent of total comment on all subjects, featuring an appeal by Marshal Voroshilov to the Greek King in Glezos' behalf. Although Voroshilov stopped short of drawing a direct connection between the trial and Greece's acceptance of U.S. missile bases, several Moscow commentators charged that the real reason for the trial was that Glezos had led the "popular opposition" to the bases.

3. IRAQ

Moscow is just beginning to propagandize in behalf of the orthodox faction of the Iraqi CP and against the faction led by Daud as-Sayigh. Inasmuch as the propaganda consists of reprints and rebroadcasts of articles from the orthodox faction's paper, ITTIHAD ASH-SHAB, it cannot be called direct interference in internal Iraqi affairs; rather it amounts to veiled hints of the Soviet Union's displeasure over Premier Qasim's actions.

On 13 February, after the orthodox faction's application for a license was rejected, PRAVDA, IZVESTIA, and TRUD all carried the explanation of the faction's position that appeared in its application, and Radio Moscow broadcast the explanation exclusively in Arabic. The papers failed to point out that the application had already been turned down.

A PRAVDA article on 18 February reported that a group led by Zaki Kharyi had reapplied for a license for the orthodox faction. PRAVDA quoted from an ITTIHAD ASH-SHAB article by Kharyi

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criticizing the as-Sayigh faction as opportunistic and anti-progressive. Excerpts from the Khayri article were broadcast in Arabic on 20 February, including Khayri's warning that Iraqi communists, while preferring legal status, would allow "nothing" to prevent them from exercising their political rights.

B. TAKING SIDES IN DISPUTES BETWEEN COUNTRIES

1. PUSHTUNISTAN

Soviet support for Afghanistan against Pakistan on the Pushtunistan issue, first publicly asserted in 1955, was restated in the joint Soviet-Afghan communique of 5 March 1960 (following Khrushchev's Kabul visit) and was developed at some length by Khrushchev the same day in his Luzhniki stadium speech.

The communique stated:

The sides exchanged opinions concerning the fate of the Pushtu people; and expressed their agreement that for solution of this question the application of the principle of self-determination as based on the United Nations charter is the reasonable way of easing tension and ensuring peace in the Middle East.

When he returned to Moscow, Khrushchev declared:

Historically, Pushtunistan has always been part of Afghanistan...It demands that Pushtunistan be granted the right to self-determination in conditions of freedom and noninterference...We consider Afghanistan's demands that the Pathan people be granted an opportunity to express their will by means of a plebiscite in free conditions and decide whether they wish to remain within the Pakistani national boundaries, form a new independent state, or unite with Afghanistan, to be correct.

Such explicit Soviet statements on Pushtunistan have been rare. Bulganin supported Afghanistan during his 1955 Asian tour with Khrushchev, as well as in his subsequent report to the Supreme Soviet on 29 December 1955. In the intervening four years, there have been no references to Pushtunistan in

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elite pronouncements, even during the visits to the USSR of the King of Afghanistan in 1957 and Premier Daud in 1956 and 1959. Thus support for the Afghan position has been expressed by Soviet leaders only during and just after visits to Kabul.

A rare monitored routine propaganda item referring to an aspect of the Pushtu issue was a 6 July 1959 TASS dispatch from Kabul reporting that the Afghan press had criticized Pakistan's suppression of the Pushtu "and other" tribes.*

2. SHATT AL-ARAB DISPUTE

Moscow has been exploiting the Shatt al-Arab dispute between Iran and Iraq as a means of criticizing the Iranian Government in broadcasts to Iran. Commentators accuse Iran of "provocative actions" and "war hysteria" against Iraq. Iran is said to be encouraged in this venture by U.S. "cold war circles." Such comment has been broadcast in Persian alone. Only news reports have been broadcast in Arabic, conveying Soviet sympathy with Iraq by publicizing Iraqi versions of the dispute.

3. ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTES

Contrary to Western newspaper reports, Moscow has not switched to a more neutral position on the Arab-Israeli quarrels. It still attributes to Israel the general blame for the troubles and takes at face value statements from Arab sources. Although the issue has been dormant in recent propaganda, IZVESTIA said on 6 March 1960 that "the air in Israel is poisoned by a war psychosis." It added that with the full blessing of Western leaders, Israel showed "unwarranted zeal" in border clashes with the UAR and Jordan.

4. KASHMIR AND GOA

The Soviet Union is on record as supporting Indian claims to Kashmir and Goa, although neither question was mentioned by Khrushchev during the February 1960 visit to India and both issues are dormant in routine propaganda.

* Moscow broadcasts in Pushtu are not monitored by FBIS at present.

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Speaking in Srinagar in December 1955, Khrushchev said that the people of Kashmir had already decided that they wanted to be part of India:

The Soviet Union has always held that the decision on the political status of Kashmir must be a matter for the Kashmir people themselves, in conformity with the principles of democracy and the interests of strengthening friendly relations between the peoples of this area...The facts show that the population of Kashmir does not want Kashmir to become a pawn in the hands of the imperialist forces...The question of Kashmir as one of the states of the Republic of India has been settled by the Kashmir people themselves. This is the business of the people themselves.

When Mukhitdinov and Andreyev visited Kashmir in January 1959, Mukhitdinov blamed the United States for dissension over Kashmir and Goa, charging that the United States was backing Portugal on the Goa question with the dual aim of exerting pressure on India and establishing a base for the U.S. Fifth Fleet on the island. Mukhitdinov also said the United States was considering setting up an atomic dumping ground in Goa.

C. WAR OF NERVES AGAINST U.S. MILITARY ALLIES

The Soviet Union has made obvious propaganda efforts to intimidate members of NATO, CENTO and SEATO and other countries allied militarily to the United States. On occasions when such countries have been reported contemplating actions which the Soviet Union considered detrimental to its welfare, Moscow has issued carefully phrased warnings about nuclear retaliation in the event of war, cautioning of the devastation nuclear bombs can cause. In his Supreme Soviet speech of 14 January 1960, Khrushchev said: "Any sober-minded person understands full well that atomic and hydrogen weapons constitute the greatest threat to those countries which have a great density of population."

In the context of attacks on German remilitarization, Moscow has bitterly denounced Chancellor Adenauer. These denunciations have not been part of a campaign to incite rebellion against his government, as in the case of the Persian-language attacks on the Shah of Iran, but have been couched in abusive language hardly in harmony with an atmosphere of detente.

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The attack on Adenauer has been led by Khrushchev himself. Speaking at the 21st CPSU Congress, Khrushchev pictured Adenauer as holding the Christian cross in one hand and an atomic bomb in the other, and said that "according to the gospels" he was certain to go to hell; on 19 June 1959 he described the Chancellor as a "megalo-maniac"; and on 5 August he referred to Adenauer's "senile prejudice." In his speech to the Supreme Soviet on 14 January 1960, Khrushchev compared Adenauer directly with Hitler and said he had "failed to draw a conclusion from the lesson given the German fascists and is embarking on their road."

Although there have been moratoriums on Adenauer for long periods in routine comment, Moscow broadcasters have picked up and amplified Khrushchev's statements. A commentary in several European languages on 22 March 1960 said that the Chancellor's speeches in the United States were "malicious hisses richly spiced with dirty inventions and impertinent cursing."

Moscow propaganda, both elite and routine, has directed its most graphic and detailed retaliatory threats at Germany. Khrushchev told a group of SPD editors on 8 May 1959 that it would take only eight hydrogen bombs to put Germany out of action if it started a war against the Soviet Union.

Warnings to other countries, while less graphic and not entailing such personal abuse of their leaders, have left no doubt that in the event of an "imperialist" attack they would be the targets of a devastating blow. Such warnings have sometimes been coupled with a brief statement of the particular vulnerability of the country concerned.

As indicated in the two examples below, there has been little change in the nature of even elite threats of this kind since Khrushchev visited the United States.

An official note to Greece on 13 May 1959 said that if U.S. bases were installed there "Greece would be subjected to grave danger from retaliatory atomic blows, since its entire population as well as its material and cultural wealth are concentrated in a comparatively small area."

In its protest against the establishment of a U.S. missile base in Turkey in the fall of 1959, the Soviet Union warned that it would take steps to protect its own territory. PRAVDA said on

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13 November that "rockets can fly in either direction," and IZVESTIA warned on 18 November that in the event of war, Turkey's military base would inevitably draw upon itself the "most catastrophic consequences of modern warfare."*

The Soviet Union has also used the nuclear retaliation warning in its effort to obstruct revision of the U.S.-Japanese security pact. A note dated 2 December 1958, urging Japan not to proceed with the revision, said that with the existence of nuclear-rocket weapons, war posed a "veritably mortal danger to states with a dense population and a great concentration of material and other resources on a relatively small territory." A later note--dated 27 January 1960, while ratification of the revised pact was pending--asked:

Is it not clear to everyone today that in the conditions of a modern nuclear-rocket war all Japan, with her small and thickly populated territory--dotted, moreover, with foreign war bases--risks sharing the tragic fate of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the very first minutes of hostilities?

(Yet Moscow's current last-ditch propaganda effort to obstruct ratification of the U.S.-Japanese security pact is kept carefully within semantic limits. Moscow has explicitly denied to the Japanese that it "threatens to use nuclear weapons against anybody." Despite its criticisms of Premier Kishi's policies, its nuclear-retaliation warnings, and its threat to renege on its promise to return Habomai and Shikotan to Japan, the Soviet Union holds out the prospect of better relations with Japan. It explicitly disavows any intent to interfere in Japan's affairs and is careful not to associate itself directly with the domestic Japanese opposition to the pact.)

* An earlier good example of Moscow's war of nerves against countries that might harbor U.S. atomic units was a succession of single radio commentaries in April 1957, each tailored specifically for individual audiences, warning each country in unusually graphic terms of the devastation that could be wrought by Soviet retaliatory blows. The Dutch, for example, heard that an atomic bomb dropped on the U.S. base at Soesterberg would "obliterate Amsterdam, The Hague, Utrecht, Amersfoort, and the entire area between those cities." The Arabs were told that a single nuclear bomb dropped on the Habbaniya base in Iraq would wipe out Baghdad.

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D. EFFORTS TO UNDERCUT U.S. RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES

1. LATIN AMERICA

Soviet propaganda has made a sustained effort to aggravate U.S.-Cuban tension ever since Fidel Castro came to power on 1 January 1959. Beginning in the very first days of the new regime, Moscow broadcasts beamed preponderantly to Latin American audiences have charged U.S. "imperialist circles" with efforts to counter Castro's revolutionary program and make Cuban policy more tractable to U.S. monopoly interests.

This propaganda effort has gone beyond what could be considered an expression of sympathetic interest in the new Cuban regime. Cuban critics of the Castro regime have been branded traitors plotting revolution, and foreign critics have been labeled imperialists plotting intervention. Each new development in U.S.-Cuban relations has been publicized exclusively from the Cuban viewpoint; Castro's attacks on the United States have been magnified and elaborated in Moscow commentaries, while U.S. statements have been assailed as intervention and as an indication that "another Guatemala" is being planned.

Moscow has become more circumspect since Khrushchev's U.S. visit, but the essence of its anti-U.S. charges has remained the same. The main difference is that active hostility to Castro is now imputed implicitly rather than directly to the U.S. Government.

2. U.S. AID

Soviet propaganda on economic aid to underdeveloped areas draws a wholly favorable picture of Soviet and other bloc aid alongside an almost completely black picture of the purposes, value, and extent of Western--primarily U.S.--aid. This type of comment, beamed most heavily to the underdeveloped areas, constitutes as much as three to four percent of total comment broadcast. (The theme is played down in the Soviet home service, which broadcasts little more than accounts of official Soviet aid agreements and attacks on the military aspects of U.S. aid.)

On his tour of Southeast Asia in February 1960, Khrushchev repeatedly expressed bitterness toward Western economic aid. Addressing the Indian parliament on 11 February, he argued that

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the West's economic prosperity resulted from its "looting" of underdeveloped countries, and that repayment of "at least a portion" would be only proper. Expanding on this theme at Bilhai on 14 February, he declared:

Many Western economists maintain that countries such as India would do better to renounce industrial development and concentrate on the production of agricultural goods and minerals, selling them cheaply abroad and importing manufactured goods and equipment at exorbitant prices. These "theories" reflect and seek to substantiate the striving of monopoly capital to perpetuate the warped international division of labor which is produced by colonialism and which dooms hundreds of millions of people to poverty...

Not just any assistance to countries that have taken the road of fighting for economic independence can be regarded as genuine assistance. The experience of past years clearly shows that there are two different approaches in the world to the problem of aid. In the West, some people use their "aid" as a tool of new colonial domination, as a means of insuring the interests of monopoly capital and widening the political division of the world into hostile groupings... We prefer to render genuine aid, so that every country which has freed itself of the rule of colonialists may in a short period develop its economy and produce the goods it needs.

In another speech at Bilhai the same day, which Moscow did not broadcast, Khrushchev said at a dinner that capitalists would give aid only to gain profits or out of fear that underdeveloped countries would turn communist. In a speech in Calcutta on 15 February--also unpublicized by Moscow--Khrushchev chided the Indians for not sharing his bitterness:

I do not think all of you understand when we show bitterness toward the colonialists. For some ages you have been oppressed by colonialists, but still you do not feel as strongly as we do, though we have never been, in the strictest sense, a colony.

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E. ATROCITY STORIES ABOUT U.S. TROOPS

Soviet media have occasionally twisted incidents involving U.S. soldiers into atrocity stories, although such stories have been extremely rare exceptions to a general abstinence from anything approaching "hate" propaganda.

1. Most recently, in reporting the incident in which two Okinawans were injured while scavenging on a strafing range, Radio Moscow led off its Hindi news broadcast on 11 March with this item:

Naha, Okinawa--The newspaper ASAHI reports that two Okinawans, Shimabukuro and Oshiro, were severely injured by machinegun fire from a U.S. fighter plane yesterday on Ie Shima, about ten miles from Okinawa. This is not the first time the American militarists have played a hunting game to humor themselves with the people in Japan and Okinawa.

2. During the 1958 Lebanese crisis, Moscow propaganda briefly exploited Damascus newspaper reports of incidents involving U.S. soldiers in Lebanon. These reports--all on 29 July 1958--apparently were not broadcast in Arabic. One appeared in a Soviet home service news broadcast, and a few were cited in commentaries to European and non-Arab Middle Eastern audiences:

Damascus--Two drunken soldiers of the U.S. invading forces in Beirut ran a tank over two children who were playing near the doors of their homes, AL-JUMHUR reported today. The soldiers then took snapshots of the corpses of the two children and opened fire on the surrounding people, killing a man and a woman and wounding another woman.

* * * *

Damascus--According to AL-JUMHUR, American soldiers and officers have organized in Beirut a large-scale black market in drugs as well as in several goods which are barred from the country.

* * * *

According to AL-MANAR, published in Damascus, the U.S. soldiers are violating Lebanese girls and committing other excesses. A few days ago, a little

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band of soldiers, who had drunk more than was wise, dashed off in a tank in chase of an automobile belonging to a Lebanese. The vehicle and its owner were crushed.

Such incidents, one Moscow commentator (to Spain) said sarcastically, showed how U.S. soldiers were defending the lives and property of the Lebanese. The commentator concluded:

Do the Lebanese behave in this way only toward the Lebanese people? No, the stay of U.S. troops in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and other places has been marked by many crimes. The murders and rapes committed by the U.S. soldiers in South Korea could not be hushed up by the newspapers and press agencies in that country. According to the Korean press, from 27 June 1953--the date of the Korean armistice--to April 1958, inclusive, American occupation troops committed 200 savage crimes.

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PART IINo Lessening of "Ideological Struggle"

The increased emphasis on peaceful coexistence in recent Soviet propaganda has been, as might be expected, accompanied by increased insistence that the issues of peaceful coexistence and "ideological struggle" must never be confused. The Soviet population--and communists in general--are told that peaceful coexistence in no way signifies any lessening of the "struggle" against "bourgeois ideology." There have been frequent repetitions of Khrushchev's 31 October 1959 warning that any weakening of ideological discipline will not be tolerated:

Mutual concessions in the interest of peaceful coexistence of nations must not be confused with concessions on matters of principle, on what is connected with the very nature of our social structure, our ideology. Here there cannot be any question of any concessions or of any sort of accommodation. If there are to be concessions on questions of principle and ideology, it will mean simply skidding onto the positions of our opponents. That would mean a qualitative change of policy and would be a betrayal of the cause of the working class. Whoever starts out on that track is starting out on the road to a betrayal of socialism, and the fire of merciless criticism should be directed against him.

The CPSU's 9 January 1960 resolution on the propaganda, the most comprehensive and widely ranging directive on the subject in the post-Stalin period, enjoins party propagandists to step up the attack against the infection of "alien" ideologies:

The peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems does not make the ideological struggle less acute...

The leaders of some party organizations are not waging a persistent struggle against alien ideology, are not giving a fitting rebuff to manifestations of nationalism, cosmopolitanism, and an apolitical attitude...

An active militant struggle must be waged against bourgeois ideology which is hostile to Marxism-Leninism and against the rightwing socialist and revisionist preachers of that ideology; and the political vigilance of the Soviet people must be unflinchingly heightened...

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The directive's demands for attacks on "cosmopolitanism"--a term which began to drop out of Soviet propaganda after Stalin's death and virtually disappeared from major propaganda media after the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956--is indicative of the regime's concern lest coexistence propaganda encourage "improper" sentiments. Anxiety that the Soviet population has not been adequately inoculated against "alien" influences is suggested in the directive's complaint that failure to imbue the populace with "Soviet patriotism and national pride" has been a "serious omission" in propaganda work.

The demand for unabated "ideological struggle" permeates the propaganda, sometimes appearing in unexpected places. For example, a book review in the January issue of PARTY LIFE (No. 2) criticizes a recent booklet for Soviet youth on the virtue of modesty for failure to stress sufficiently the need for ideological struggle:

Concerning the shortcomings of the booklet, it is necessary to note that little is said in it about the ideological struggle occurring between the camp of socialism and the camp of imperialism. As is known, problems of morals occupy not the last place in the struggle. Bourgeois propagandists cast aspersions on Soviet man; they try in every way to denigrate his spiritual riches. American imperialists lavish a chorus of praise on the ethics of the so-called free individual.

"No Third Way" Can Merge Capitalism and Communism

Any notion that coexistence could lead to an ideological accommodation between "socialism" and "capitalism" is vigorously condemned. A 17 February Soviet home service talk--citing the party propaganda directive's call for continued ideological struggle--denounced George Kennan and "hundreds of revisionist preachers" who sought "ideological disarmament" of the communists. Such people, the commentator said, argued that

as relations of peaceful coexistence develop, the differences between socialist and capitalist states will melt away; capitalism and socialism must merge into some sort of third system uniting the traits of these social orders, and, because of this, ideological reconciliation is essential.

The Moscow commentator attacked this kind of reasoning as groundless. He countered that "there is no third way." "One must choose" either capitalism or socialism. The talk thus underscored Soviet propagandists' awareness of the vulnerability of the peaceful coexistence line to pressures for relaxation of ideological as well as diplomatic tensions.

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