



*Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries  
of the Free World, 1975*

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## Foreword

In this report the term *Communist countries* refers to the USSR, the People's Republic of China, and the following countries of Eastern Europe -- Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania.

The term *less developed countries of the Free World* includes the following:

- (1) all countries of Africa except the Republic of South Africa;
- (2) all countries of East Asia except Hong Kong and Japan;
- (3) Malta, Greece, Portugal, and Spain in Europe;
- (4) all countries in Latin America except Cuba; and
- (5) all countries in the Near East and South Asia.

The term *extension* refers to a commitment to provide goods and services either on deferred payment terms (five or more years with maximum 8% interest) or as grants. Assistance is considered to have been extended when accords are initialed and constitute a formal declaration of intent. The term *drawings* refers to the delivery of goods or the use of services. Estimates of the value of Communist military agreements and deliveries are in Soviet trade prices.

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**Communist Aid to Less  
Developed Countries  
of the Free World  
1975**

**OVERVIEW**

Soviet military assistance dominated Communist relations with the LDCs in 1975. Arms aid was especially important in supporting Moscow's political objectives in the Middle East and the African countries of Angola and Somalia. Communist economic programs meanwhile continued as a low-key effort. Highlights of the Communist military and economic programs were:

- A cutoff of major Soviet military deliveries to Egypt at midyear.
- A heavy infusion of Soviet military support for the Marxist faction in the Angolan struggle.
- A signing of large new Soviet economic and military accords with Somalia.
- A large increase in Soviet economic aid commitments to the border countries of Afghanistan and Turkey (see Appendix A). These two received more than 85% of 1975 Soviet commitments. Moscow also signed its largest military agreement ever with Afghanistan.
- A sharp rise in the number of Communist technicians in LDCs. About a 20% larger contingent of military advisors followed new equipment into areas where Soviet interest was high, especially Syria, Libya, Mozambique, and Uganda. The number of economic technicians increased more than 15%, mostly in North Africa and the Near East.

## THE MILITARY PROGRAM

1. Communist countries signed arms accords totaling \$925 million with the Third World in 1975 and delivered \$1.5 billion worth of equipment (see Table 1).

Table 1

Communist Military Agreements with and Deliveries to Less Developed Countries<sup>1</sup>

	Million US \$							
	Total		USSR		Eastern Europe		China	
	Agree- ments	Deliv- eries	Agree- ments	Deliv- eries	Agree- ments	Deliv- eries	Agree- ments	Deliv- eries
<b>Total</b>	<b>16,600</b>	<b>14,375</b>	<b>14,350</b>	<b>12,475</b>	<b>1,675</b>	<b>1,375</b>	<b>575</b>	<b>525</b>
1955-65	4,750	3,675	4,025	3,075	625	575	100	25
1966-75	11,850	10,700	10,325	9,400	1,050	800	475	500
1966	525	625	450	500	25	50	50	75
1967	675	550	525	500	100	25	50	25
1968	575	600	500	500	50	75	25	25
1969	450	525	350	450	100	50	Negl.	25
1970	1,150	1,100	1,025	1,000	50	75	75	25
1971	1,625	1,000	1,450	850	100	75	75	75
1972	1,150	925	925	800	150	50	75	75
1973	2,025	2,225	1,900	2,075	100	75	25	75
1974	2,750	1,600	2,475	1,450	200	125	75	25
1975	925	1,550	725	1,275	175	200	25	75

1. Including cash payments.


Deliveries were less than the emergency assistance of 1973 and 1974 in the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli war but still were a peacetime record. Soviet arms agreements again accounted for about 80% of Communist arms supplied LDCs, with Eastern Europe providing small amounts of support equipment to Soviet clients and China's military aid continuing as a marginal program.

2. Although 1975 Communist agreements were less than 10% of global military sales to the Third World, Communist arms deliveries accounted for 22% of the total delivered. The small Communist share in military sales reflects the continuing large orders the West has received from Persian Gulf countries as well as the drop in Communist orders from the record 1973-74 levels. On the other hand, Communist deliveries were a larger share of total deliveries to LDCs because the Soviets were able to fill orders mainly from inventories while new Western orders are taking years to produce and deliver.

3. Moscow still concentrates its military program in the strategic Middle Eastern area. In 1975 Moscow also used its military program to promote political and military objectives elsewhere. It provided arms to Angola, Mozambique, and Somalia in Africa and continued to strengthen the armies of the LDC border states, such as India and Afghanistan. Moscow's efforts were not always successful, however. Its attempt to force Egypt to resolve outstanding difference by denying spare parts and other essential military items backfired.

#### **Arab States Still Moscow's Prime Customers**

4. Most Soviet military sales to the LDCs were in the Near East, where about two-thirds of Soviet military technicians continued to be stationed. Deliveries to the area also remained high, reaching a peacetime peak despite reduced deliveries to Iraq and Syria, which dropped from record 1973-74 levels. They reflected a winding down of the Near East crisis and the need to assimilate the advanced hardware already received. Large deliveries to Libya are resulting in a buildup of modern equipment that is giving Tripoli arsenal status among Arab belligerents.




**TU-22 Bomber**

5. Moscow's withholding of arms supplies as a weapon in its debt negotiations with Cairo contributed to the deterioration of Soviet-Egyptian relations. Moscow lost its largest arms customer in the Third World as Cairo shopped for alternative supply sources and early in 1976 abrogated its Friendship Treaty with the USSR.



**MIG-23**



### **USSR Upgrades Inventories of Border States**

6. Moscow reaffirmed its support for its Asian neighbors in 1975, with agreements to modernize Afghanistan's armed services and to provide India with a continuing stream of sophisticated equipment. The USSR continues as Afghanistan's major supplier of military goods and India continues to be almost entirely dependent on the USSR for military equipment.

### **Stepped-Up Arms Supplies to Southern Africa**

7. Turmoil in sub-Saharan Africa provided opportunities for Soviet arms support. The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola received Soviet military supplies and military advisers; accompanied by Cuban equipment and personnel.

8. Elsewhere in Africa, Moscow focused on clients that have offered facilities for Soviet military forces, especially Somalia and Guinea. Somalia's willingness to provide military facilities to the USSR led to heavy Soviet support, and Moscow has developed the port at Berbera for Soviet and Somali use. Guinea, which has provided air and naval facilities for Soviet reconnaissance units and a stopover point for the Angolan airlift, received additional military equipment.

### **Military Technicians in LDCs**

9. The number of Communist military advisors and technicians in LDCs increased about 20% to 9,300 in 1975 (see Table 2). Advisors followed new equipment into Communist-supplied areas and were concentrated in the countries

Table 2

**Communist Military Technicians<sup>1</sup>  
in the Less Developed Countries, 1975**

	Total	USSR and Eastern Europe	China
<b>Total</b>	<b>9,300</b>	<b>8,090</b>	<b>1,210</b>
Africa	3,745	2,605	1,140
Latin America	35	35	....
Near East and South Asia	5,520	5,450	70

1. Rounded to the nearest five persons. Data are minimum estimates of the number of persons present for a period of one month or more. Persons engaged solely in commercial activities are excluded.

where Soviet military activity was high. Syria received the largest share of the increase. Iraq, Somalia, Algeria, and Afghanistan (in that order) employed almost a third. Somalia had 1,000 technicians in residence, the same number as in 1974. Most of China's 1,200 technicians abroad were in Tanzania, the second largest recipient of Chinese military aid.

### Military Training

10. LDC personnel receiving military training in Communist countries rose almost 30% in 1975. Most of the 4,400 trainees were in the USSR (see Table 3\*).

Table 3

**Military Personnel from the Less Developed Countries  
Being Trained in Communist Countries, as of December 1975**

	Total <sup>1</sup>	USSR <sup>1</sup>	Eastern Europe <sup>1</sup>	China <sup>1</sup>
<b>Total</b>	<b>4,400</b>	<b>3,575</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>625</b>
Africa	3,025	2,325	100	600
Latin America	50	50	....	....
Near East and South Asia	1,325	1,200	100	25

1. Rounded to the nearest five persons. Data refer to the number of persons departing for or in training but not necessarily completing training.

\* For further details on military training, see Appendix B, Table 7.

Libya, Somalia, Tanzania, and a number of African countries that have received small amounts of Soviet aid were responsible for most of the increase.

#### ECONOMIC RELATIONS

11. Communist economic aid to LDCs has remained approximately constant since 1971. Commitments in 1975 amounted to almost \$1.9 billion with Moscow's share unusually high because of sizable credits to Afghanistan and Turkey (see Table 4\*). China's contribution was well below that of the early 1970s, and East European commitments reached a new low. Aid deliveries of about \$680 million in 1975 dropped below the yearly shipments since 1971, mainly because of the sharp decline in China's outlays as its major project – the Tan-Zam Railroad – was virtually completed in 1975.

Table 4

#### Communist Economic Aid to Less Developed Countries, Extensions and Drawings

	Million US \$							
	Total		USSR		Eastern Europe		China	
	Ex-tended	Drawn	Ex-tended	Drawn	Ex-tended	Drawn	Ex-tended	Drawn
<b>Total</b>	<b>20,529</b>	<b>9,282</b>	<b>10,859</b>	<b>5,900</b>	<b>5,830</b>	<b>1,722</b>	<b>3,840</b>	<b>1,660</b>
1954-65	6,295	2,657	3,833	1,915	1,719	487	743	255
1966-75	14,234	6,625	7,026	3,985	4,111	1,235	3,097	1,405
1966	1,699	500	1,241	335	294	75	164	90
1967	473	520	291	305	132	115	50	100
1968	638	495	379	305	205	120	54	70
1969	933	520	494	350	426	100	13	70
1970	1,101	570	198	375	175	125	728	70
1971	2,171	770	1,125	430	484	150	562	190
1972	2,188	735	802	370	828	110	558	255
1973	1,569	805	657	435	484	140	428	230
1974	1,610	1,030	575	665	764	145	271	220
1975	1,852	680	1,264	415	319	155	269	110

12. Communist economic aid, which has never bulked large in the global aid picture, contributed less than 10% of all official aid agreements with LDCs in 1975 and only 2%-3% of global aid deliveries. Communist aid shipments lag commitments by a much longer time than do those of the West, in part because

\* For further details on individual economic agreements, see Appendix B, Table 8.

the Communists provide a higher share of project aid in contrast to greater Western emphasis on balance-of-payments assistance.

13. When aid repayments by LDCs are included, the Communist share of net global aid is less than 2%. For some recipients, there was actually a net outflow of goods in 1975 as repayments topped new aid receipts.

14. Iran offered Moscow its first credits from the Third World to finance a paper plant in the USSR. East European nations, which had received commercial loans from OPEC countries before, also accepted project credits from the LDCs for the first time as Bulgaria and Poland received commitments from Iran.

15. In 1975, Mexico and Iraq signed general agreements with CEMA, its first with countries of the Third World.

#### **Soviet Aid – Broader Agreements with Old Clients**

16. Some Soviet economic aid patterns that have emerged in recent years became clearer in 1975. The USSR provided larger individual credits, and broad agreements were signed with Turkey and Cyprus that are similar to the "framework" agreements concluded with Argentina and Indonesia in 1974.

17. These give Moscow greater flexibility in implementing project proposals. Follow-on negotiations will be required to set credit terms for each project or elements thereof under these open-ended credits. The result will likely be a mix of terms, including commercial-like trade credits as well as aid loans with repayment periods exceeding 10 years and interest rates of 2-1/2%-3%. These more flexible agreements appear to be a compromise between the concessional umbrella credits common during the 1950s and early 1960s and the well-defined allocations with harder terms often used since then.

18. More than 80% of the \$1.3 billion in 1975 Soviet pledges went to two already large clients – \$437 million to Afghanistan and \$650 million to Turkey. These credits were the largest Moscow had ever extended to LDCs.

19. Continuing its emphasis on expensive, eye-catching heavy industrial public sector projects, Moscow's new assistance to Turkey included expansion of Soviet-built steel and aluminum plants. In Afghanistan, where Soviet development aid is pervasive, the new assistance includes 20 major projects in agriculture, irrigation, electric power, natural gas and petroleum development, mineral and metal processing, and transportation.

20. Somalia, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh also received Soviet aid in 1975. Sri Lanka's \$57 million credit will assist hydropower development, and Bangladesh's \$46 million credit will be used for additional commodity assistance and several new industrial projects. Somalia, a continuing major Soviet target, received its largest commitment (\$62 million) from Moscow, of which \$60 million went toward port and fisheries development.

#### **East European Aid: Limited in Scope**

21. East European donors reduced their aid commitments in 1975. The \$319 million of East European aid was less than half the 1974 level because of large reductions in the amounts provided Latin America and the Near East. Almost a third of the aid went to Africa for expanding commercial ties with Algeria and Tunisia. Romania remained the largest donor despite a 50% cut in aid, accounting for 54% of the East European total. Bucharest's aid included a \$150 million credit to the steel industry in Brazil and the first Communist credit to the Philippines (\$30 million for a powerplant).

#### **China: An African Program**

22. Chinese commitments of \$270 million dropped below the unprecedentedly high levels of the early seventies, when China mounted its new aid offensive, but it demonstrated China's continuing effort to project itself as a stable source of cheap development financing for poor countries.

23. The Chinese program again emphasized Africa, where Peking has become a source of well-organized aid projects for poorer countries. About 55% of China's 1975 commitments went to Africa. Nepal, a longstanding client, received most of Peking's non-African aid to extend a road system.

## Implementation

24. Aid deliveries dropped almost a third in 1975 because (a) the huge 1974 Soviet emergency wheat shipments to India were not repeated and (b) China's major project – the Tan-Zam Railroad – was completed. Soviet deliveries were highly concentrated, with more than half for major industrial plants under way in Egypt, Iran, and Turkey and for oilfield and pipeline construction in Iraq. These projects employed almost 40% of the nearly 18,000 Soviet technicians in LDCs. Egypt received the largest deliveries despite political strains from their military supply relationship. East European deliveries remained at about the level of the past two years and again were concentrated in the Near East and South Asia, with Egypt, India, and Syria receiving the largest amounts.

## The Communist Technical Presence Rose

25. Communist economic technicians in the Third World rose by a fourth, bringing the total number to 55,290 (see Table 5). The East European contingent,

Table 5

Communist Economic Technicians in Less Developed Countries<sup>1</sup>

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
<b>Total</b>	<b>24,010</b>	<b>35,050</b>	<b>39,295</b>	<b>43,960</b>	<b>47,355</b>	<b>55,290</b>
China total <sup>2</sup>	8,110	18,600	22,165	23,540	22,945	23,590
Africa	6,960	17,200	20,275	22,010	20,675	21,325
East Asia	150	....	30	40	75	35
Europe	....	....	....	....	120 <sup>3</sup>	70 <sup>3</sup>
Latin America	....	....	30	50	75	70
Near East and South Asia <sup>4</sup>	1,000	1,400	1,830	1,440	2,000	2,090
USSR total	10,600	11,025	11,200	13,095	14,685	17,785
Africa	4,010	4,200	3,760	4,590	6,000	5,930
East Asia	100	150	25	25	10	25
Latin America	35	75	190	185	300	330
Near East and South Asia	6,455	6,600	7,225	8,295	8,375	11,500
Eastern Europe total	5,300	5,425	5,930	7,325	9,725	13,915
Africa	3,150	3,300	3,805	5,075	7,450	10,290
East Asia	60	75	20	10	25	30
Latin America	140	150	130	165	175	225
Near East and South Asia	1,950	1,900	1,975	2,075	2,075	3,370

1. Minimum estimates of persons present for a period of one month or more.

2. Including laborers in some countries, especially Tanzania, Zambia, and Somalia.

3. Malta.

4. Excluding the large number of Chinese personnel reported working on the Karakoram Highway in Pakistan.

up by 4,190 in 1975, saw the largest increase. Soviet and East European technicians were concentrated in Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. The largest East European group was in Libya, working under commercial contracts.

26. Moscow expanded its program in 1975 by 3,100 technicians, mostly in Iran and Iraq. Tehran now hosts the largest number of Soviet technicians.

27. China increased its already huge technical force to 23,590. They surpassed both the Soviet and the East European teams, which together totaled 31,700. Some 90% of the Chinese were working in Africa on major projects such as the Tan-Zam Railroad and road construction in Somalia and Sudan.

28. The Chinese provide technical services without charge, equivalent to more than a \$100 million grant in 1975. The USSR usually allows LDCs to defer payment of project technicians' salaries, although LDCs must pay cash for administrative services.

#### **Academic Training: Investment in the Future**

29. LDC students resident in Communist educational establishments rose to 27,275 in 1975 (see Table 6). The USSR still hosted about two-thirds of the LDC students. Academic training has provided entree to some countries that have refused other forms of cooperation with the Communist world. Spanning two decades, the program has reached more than 72,000 Third World students and has cost Communist countries only \$70 million a year. Graduates of Communist universities are beginning to move into influential positions in their home countries, especially in Africa.

Table 6

**Academic Students from Selected Less Developed Countries  
Being Trained in Communist Countries, as of December 1975**

			Persons
<b>Total</b>	<b>27,275</b>	Zambia	295
<b>Africa</b>	<b>14,895</b>	Other	615
Algeria	1,750	East Asia	335
Angola	300	Indonesia	50
Botswana	25	Laos	190
Burundi	145	Other	95
Cameroon	180	Latin America	2,940
Central African Republic	305	Bolivia	240
Chad	190	Brazil	140
Congo	885	Chile	245
Dahomey	115	Colombia	460
Equatorial Guinea	85	Costa Rica	320
Ethiopia	920	Ecuador	385
Gambia	55	El Salvador	165
Ghana	315	Guatemala	25
Guinea	365	Mexico	35
Ivory Coast	30	Nicaragua	60
Kenya	300	Peru	190
Malagasy Republic	425	Venezuela	60
Mali	585	Other	675
Mauritania	185	Near East and South Asia	9,105
Mauritius	180	Afghanistan	895
Morocco	270	Bangladesh	1,105
Nigeria	1,140	Cyprus	990
Rwanda	245	Egypt	815
Senegal	215	India	545
Sierra Leone	415	Iraq	650
Somalia	600	Jordan	650
Sudan	1,575	Lebanon	465
Tanzania	655	Nepal	100
Togo	150	North Yemen	410
Tunisia	350	Pakistan	180
Uganda	290	South Yemen	470
Upper Volta	215	Sri Lanka	175
Zaire	525	Syria	1,125
		Other	530



## APPENDIX A

### COUNTRY SECTIONS

#### Africa

##### *Algeria*

While no new movement was perceptible in Algeria's longstanding economic ties with the USSR, Algeria has been expanding its relations with Eastern Europe. In 1975 East European countries committed nearly \$70 million in new aid, and for the first time their technicians outnumbered the Soviet contingent (3,100 compared with 2,500).

Hungary's \$70 million November credit for industrial equipment underlined Algeria's continuing success in attracting East European development financing. The new aid brings Eastern Europe's total commitment to \$414 million.

East European nations had responded quickly to Algeria's requests for aid for its first four-year plan (1970-73), and after 1970 Algeria became the second largest East European aid client. Credit use is expected to accelerate under recent contracts. Most important is a contract signed in June 1975 for Czech and East German collaboration on a \$57 million pump manufacturing plant at Medea.

Rapidly rising trade with Eastern Europe provides Algeria with needed industrial equipment and services at moderate prices. For Eastern Europe, Algeria is an important market and a source of oil and phosphates. By 1974, trade had risen more than six times the 1970 level, to an estimated \$215 million, and it continued upward in 1975.

##### *The Soviet Contribution*

Moscow's most important contribution to Algerian development is \$300 million in credits for a 2-million-ton steel mill at Annaba, which on completion will be the largest in Africa. The plant now is operating near its initial capacity of 400,000 tons annually. Plagued by continuing construction delays, its expansion is running several years behind the 1977 scheduled completion date. Soviet personnel still are conducting extensive minerals and metals prospecting that began in 1969 and have drawn up long-term plans for petroleum development.

Algerian-Soviet trade increased about 75% between 1970 and 1974 to \$225 million. Imports have outrun exports because of the sharp rise in Soviet commodity prices while Algerian wine prices rose marginally. Machinery and equipment have accounted for one-fourth of Algerian imports while cement, building materials, edible oils, steel, coal, and other raw materials also were important. Wine accounted for 90% of Algeria's exports to the USSR.

### *Guinea*

The Kindia bauxite mine - Moscow's major aid undertaking in Guinea - approached its annual capacity production rate of 2.5 to 3 million metric tons by the end of 1975. The project was initiated in 1970 with \$92 million in Soviet aid. About 90% of the output is shipped to the USSR, 55% for repayment of Guinea's debt and 35% on barter account. Guinea has demanded renegotiation of the 20-year 1970 agreement, hoping Moscow will raise the price it pays for bauxite, which has been about \$10 a ton below the market price.

### *Libya*

#### *USSR - Focus on Military Sales*

Libya views its large modern arsenal of Soviet equipment as a prestige symbol and as a possible warehouse for equipment needed by other Arab nations. Moscow has delivered T-62 tanks, SA-2 missiles, and TU-22 bombers. Soviet Premier Kosygin's May visit to Tripoli underscores the importance Moscow attaches to this relationship.

Outside the military program, the most important development was a June agreement for a Soviet 2-megawatt (MW) nuclear reactor and a nuclear research center in Tripoli.

*East European Countries Still Major Contractors*

East European countries are more deeply involved than Moscow in Libyan development projects, on a commercial basis. Under the auspices of recently formed joint economic commissions for planning and development, East European countries concluded large new contracts in 1975. Hungary and Romania agreed to study the feasibility of three major rail lines, to assist in oil exploration, and to aid in the construction of refineries and petrochemical and fertilizer plants. Poland will assist with several new roads and water resources development.

An estimated 5,000 East Europeans were employed in virtually all sectors of the Libyan economy, under commercial contracts. Poland was most active with 3,000 technicians working on road and bridge construction, urban development, port modernization, agriculture, and geological exploration. Romania's largest project, a housing complex, depended on the services of more than a thousand Romanian technicians.

Libya pays for these goods and services in cash or oil. Barter agreements to exchange petroleum for goods and services were signed with Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Romania in 1974.

*Morocco*

Rabat, irritated by Soviet support for Algeria in the western Saharan dispute, stalled decisions in 1975 on new long-term Soviet economic programs in Morocco. Existing economic relationships with the USSR continued, and relations with most East European countries remained cordial.

*Economic Relations: Setbacks for Moscow*

By October, Soviet-Moroccan relations had undergone a severe deterioration as the Moroccans felt the Soviets were supporting Algeria's position on the Sahara question. The agreement on phosphate development at Meskala was not signed.

The draft on Meskala called for Soviet financing and construction of a phosphate mine, processing facilities, and a 20-mile railroad to the port of Essouira. Moscow also was to install phosphate handling equipment at the port. In return, the USSR was to receive 2-5 million tons of phosphate rock a year during 1980-90 and 10 million tons annually over the next 15-20 years. The phosphate deal could reach \$5 billion and is the largest the USSR has ever proposed to a Third World country.

The Meskala project was to be the linchpin of Soviet economic policy in Morocco. Until now Soviet economic activity had focused on implementation of \$100 million in Soviet credits provided during the past ten years. Moscow already has constructed dams, irrigation facilities, cold storage plants, and powerplants.

In spite of political frictions, commercial relations proceeded normally. Moscow agreed in December 1975 to increase its 1976 oil exports to Morocco in exchange for citrus fruit.

### *Eastern Europe*

During 1975, more than 500 East European technical personnel, mostly Bulgarians and Romanians, were working in Morocco. Poland made its first deliveries under an agreement to provide two sulfuric acid plants, while Romania was involved in mineral and metal prospecting, copper mine development, and water resources management. Early in the year, Bulgaria signed an agricultural agreement with Morocco, but its terms were not revealed.

### *Mozambique*

The major Communist aid commitment to Mozambique was a \$55 million Chinese credit for development projects and \$4 million worth of wheat as a gift. East Germany agreed to send technicians to train Mozambicans in agriculture, animal husbandry, industry, education, and health. In December, Bulgaria signed an agreement for cooperation in geology and mining.

### *Nigeria*

Communist China, under a technical assistance program begun in 1974, completed a three-month survey of small-scale industry in Nigeria. By the end of the year a 22-man team was training Nigerians in metal, wood, and leather fabrication. The terms of Chinese involvement in these enterprises have not been disclosed.

### *Somalia*

Somalia's strategic Red Sea location and political orientation have made it a focal point of Soviet affairs in Africa. In 1975, Moscow took further steps to tie Somalia's fortunes even closer to its own. The USSR provided Somalia the largest economic aid package it had given sub-Saharan Africa since the late 1960s, and the two countries signed a new arms accord. In return for port facilities and the pervasive Soviet presence in its military establishment, Somalia has received support to build one of the largest military inventories in Africa.

The number of Soviet advisers remained at about 1,000 and were spread through all levels of the military. The number is expected to grow with additions to Soviet facilities at Berbera.

### *Economic Aid*

The USSR in 1975 provided \$62 million in economic assistance to Somalia, which included \$14 million in grant aid for refugee resettlement. Most of the remaining aid is for developing Somalia's fishing industry.

About 1,000 Soviet personnel worked on ongoing aid projects and refugee resettlement in 1975. Construction continued, though far behind schedule, at the USSR's largest project – the Giuba River Dam and associated hydropower and agricultural facilities.

China has implemented its somewhat smaller program in Somalia far more rapidly than the USSR. Chinese technicians completed a hospital and began construction of a sports complex in Mogadiscio and continued to work on the Belet Uen-Burao road.

### *Sudan*


China and Romania have the most active Communist aid programs in Sudan. In 1975, work neared completion on China's major aid undertakings – the 145-mile Wad Medani-Gedaref road and a textile plant, which together have absorbed almost half of China's \$82 million aid program in Sudan. Romania pushed ahead with construction of an assembly hall under a 1971 line of credit. The USSR concluded two small agreements with Sudan in 1975 as relations slowly recovered from the events of June 1971, when Moscow was suspected of complicity in the attempted

Communist takeover. A small military agreement negotiated in 1975 still awaited Sudanese ratification at the end of the year. Moscow also agreed to build a military hospital and to extend the activities of a 25-man Soviet team conducting geological surveys in the Red Sea hills.

China and Romania are Sudan's major Communist trading partners. This trade accounts for about 10% of Sudan's global trade. Khartoum signed agreements with East Germany, Poland, and Romania in 1975 calling for hard currency settlements instead of previous barter arrangements.

### *Tanzania*

The first shipment of Zambian copper transited Tanzania in September over the Chinese-built Tan-Zam Railroad. Although the line is not scheduled for full commercial operations until late 1976, the event marked the successful completion



of China's largest construction project in the Third World. China is now turning to developing an iron ore mine and coal deposits, which will be made accessible by a new rail link with the Tan-Zam Railroad. Under a \$75 million 1974 credit, Peking will pursue these activities and also expand a clothing mill built originally with Chinese aid.

## Other Africa

Despite the military takeover that brought a leftist government to power late in 1974, Communist relations with *Ethiopia* did not change appreciably during 1975. An Ethiopian delegation that visited East European countries to seek development assistance received only assurances of political support. Soviet initiatives were confined largely to donations of \$600,000 for drought relief and \$100,000 worth of equipment for the Soviet-built polytechnic institute at Bahr Dar.

*Gambia* received its first economic aid from a Communist country in 1975, a \$17 million credit from China. The credit, following establishment of diplomatic relations in late 1974, probably will finance agricultural development.

The Soviets made their first major effort to reestablish economic cooperation with *Ghana* since the overthrow of the Nkrumah regime in 1966. Soviet specialists resumed work on several Soviet-aided plants whose construction was suspended in 1966, including a concrete panel factory.

China pledged \$17 million to *Guinea-Bissau* for agricultural equipment and rice cultivation. Peking also donated 2,000 tons of rice to the new government. The USSR provided a \$500,000 refrigerated fishing trawler as a gift in June and reportedly will deliver four additional trawlers.

China stepped up aid to *Malagasy* in 1975 with \$55 million in new credits, which bring China's total aid to \$66 million. They will go for roads, agricultural development, and light industrial plants.

The USSR promised technical assistance for a merchant marine academy, mining surveys, and a cement plant study.

Moscow continued its assistance to *Mali* for exploitation of gold at Kalana under \$12 million in credits previously extended. Peking continued work on rice projects and an \$8 million expansion of a textile complex at Segou.

China reinforced its position as the most active aid donor in *Mauritania* outside the Arab world. Work on a health center, a sports stadium, a powerplant in Nouakchott, and preliminary studies on a deepwater port project were part of

the Chinese \$85 million aid initiative. The USSR continued a small fisheries program under a 1973 agreement and was preparing to build a fisheries research center. No substantive commitments emerged from aid discussions with Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland during the year.

*Togo* received a \$500,000 gift of agricultural equipment from Peking. China also sent survey teams to study a sugar plantation and refinery and political party center to be financed under a \$45 million 1972 credit. In November, Romania announced that it will provide assistance for mining, agriculture, and industry, but terms were not revealed.

*Tunisia* received its first aid from Hungary in November 1975 – \$10 million for agricultural development and food processing facilities. Negotiations with China continued for implementing the largely unused \$40 million credit extended in 1972. Soviet Premier Kosygin's good-will visit to Tunisia in May produced a Soviet agreement to study Tunisian requests for aid for its new five-year plan. Some new Soviet projects may be financed under the \$34 million in aid already extended to Tunisia.

China began work on several agricultural projects and a conference hall in *Zaire* under a \$100 million 1973 credit agreement.

Plans for road construction and agricultural projects went ahead under Peking's \$51 million 1974 credit to *Zambia*. Some Chinese personnel working on the Tan-Zam Railroad probably were transferred to the road construction effort.

#### **East Asia**

China, anxious to restore closer relations with *Burma*, tried to expedite use of economic credits reextended in 1971. During the visit of Burma's president to Peking – his first since 1971 – China may have reallocated some outstanding industrial credits for commodity assistance.

*Indonesia* still has not normalized relations with Peking, but it continued its two-year-old policy of improving economic relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe. Project negotiations continued under a 1974 agreement with the USSR. Moscow and Indonesia have agreed in principle to proceed with two power projects and the Soviets are studying Indonesian requests for aid to the aluminum industry. Jakarta signed economic agreements with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Romania early in the year.



*Malaysia's* economic relations with China cooled somewhat in 1975 as the rapid growth expected for its exports to China failed to materialize. Exports instead fell, and Malaysia's trade deficit probably exceeded the \$200 million annual level of recent years.

The *Philippines'* relations with Communist countries expanded markedly in 1975. Diplomatic relations were established with China and restored with Cuba, and trade contacts were expanded with East European countries. Romania became the first Communist country to extend economic development credits to Manila – \$31 million for a thermal powerplant.

*Thailand* established trade and diplomatic relations with China in 1975. In August, the two countries signed a \$100 million agreement to barter 200,000 tons of Thai rice for Chinese crude oil and petroleum products.

#### Latin America

##### *Argentina*

Communist countries continued to deliver modest amounts of economic aid to Argentina under agreements valued at more than \$535 million. Moscow signed new contracts in 1975 to provide generators for the Lujan de Cuya and San Nicolas thermal powerplants now under construction. Although several contracts were signed, activity under Eastern Europe's \$283 million in 1974 credits was limited.

##### *Brazil*

Almost all Communist aid to Brazil is incorporated in trade agreements encouraging larger equipment sales. The \$150 million trade credit extended by Romania in 1975 was the largest Communist credit to Brazil. The credit will finance Brazil's steel plant purchases from Romania, including rolling mills, sinter plants, plate heating furnaces, and steel structures. Bucharest also agreed to \$30 million in additional commercial financing for a petrochemical plant.

Communist countries have continued to run large trade deficits with Brazil that must be settled in hard currency. To help correct this imbalance, Poland signed a \$1 billion contract to exchange coal for Brazilian iron ore over a 10-year period. Soviet oil sales to Brazil are helping to reduce the USSR's deficit.

### *Colombia*

Late in 1975, Colombia announced plans to promote new economic and commercial ties with Communist countries. The Soviets offered Colombia 10-year credits at 5% interest to buy Soviet equipment. Previously, Moscow had extended credits for trolley bus purchases. At year's end, Moscow was still studying Bogota's request for Soviet participation in electrification, oil and gas exploration, and transportation projects.

Hungary will sell Colombia \$9 million worth of buses under a 1975 commercial agreement, and Czechoslovakia signed contracts for two powerplants. At the end of the year, Romanian technicians were studying joint ventures involving a gas pipeline, coking coal, petroleum, and agriculture.

### *Peru*

Peru is still drawing on \$229 million in economic aid extended by Communist countries in the early 1970s. The aid is heavily concentrated in hydropower development. Moscow signed contracts for studies on a power project in northeastern Peru and for the installation of oil storage tanks for Peru's Andean pipeline project. At the end of the year Lima was considering a Soviet offer of further equipment credits. There were unconfirmed rumors at midyear that East Germany had agreed to provide \$200 million in industrial equipment credits.

### **Other Latin America**

The People's Republic of China agreed to renew the line of credit pledged to the Allende regime, under which some \$50 million is still available. China wants to ensure continued supplies of copper and nitrates from *Chile*, the value of which fell in 1975 to \$12.5 million compared with \$117 million in 1974.

In March China provided *Guyana* with \$10 million in economic credits, in addition to the \$26 million it extended in 1972. Romania signed its first economic agreement with Guyana to participate in mineral exploration, hydropower development, agriculture, and wood processing. The terms of the agreement are not known.

China – the only Communist country to offer development assistance to *Jamaica* – sent a team to Kingston in mid-July to study several textile projects discussed in March 1974 when diplomatic relations were established.

*Mexico* signed a general agreement with CEMA in August, establishing a joint commission to promote cooperation. The terms of the agreement were not announced. The USSR also signed scientific cooperation agreements on joint research in energy, geology, and oceanography.

In a continuing effort to expand relations with Communist countries, *Trinidad and Tobago's* prime minister led a delegation to the USSR and Romania during July. Moscow agreed to study proposals for project assistance, and the Bucharest visit yielded agreements for Romanian assistance for geological studies, onshore petroleum drilling and production equipment, refineries, and a petrochemical complex.

#### Near East and South Asia

##### *Afghanistan*

Moscow reaffirmed its deep aid commitment to Afghanistan in 1975 by providing the largest amount of economic assistance it has yet extended in a single year to this border state.

##### *Economic Relations*

New Soviet economic credits to Afghanistan totaled \$437 million in 1975. The aid was allocated to 20 major projects in agriculture, irrigation, electric power, mineral and metal processing, and transportation. The credits will assure Moscow a major role in the Afghani Fifth Plan.

About half of Moscow's \$1.3 billion in aid to Kabul has been disbursed. Soviet aid is responsible for construction of about two-thirds of the roads completed since

1956, half of the electric power capacity, and the addition of at least 100,000 acres of cultivated land. The USSR developed Afghanistan's natural gas production facilities and constructed pipelines to transport gas to the USSR. In 1975, natural gas accounted for a third of Kabul's total exports to the USSR, covering the debt service due the USSR under revised payment schedules.

Peking's irrigation project in the Parwan Valley is the largest Chinese project under way. The gift hospital being built in Kandahar is more than half completed, and work proceeds on the expansion of the Chinese-built textile mill at Bagram.

Moscow continues as Afghanistan's most important trading partner, accounting for about one-third of its total trade. Although data for 1975 are not available, the value of trade probably increased over 1974 because of higher prices for Afghanistan's natural gas and raw cotton. As in 1974, the balance was likely in Afghanistan's favor.

### *Egypt*


The deterioration of Soviet-Egyptian relations in 1975 was reflected in Moscow's cessation of arms deliveries and refusal to ease debt repayment terms. East European countries apparently were not affected by the chill in Egypt's Soviet relations, and they concluded a number of new economic accords.

Debt talks reached a stalemate over conditions for rescheduling Egypt's \$5 billion military and economic debt. Although they were put off until August 1976, an interim arrangement is in effect through the annual trade protocol that provides for \$180 million of repayments through an Egyptian export surplus in 1976.

### *Economic Aid Business as Usual*

Strains in Soviet-Egyptian political and military relations have not directly affected ongoing Soviet development assistance to Egypt but may have influenced future prospects. Although cautious in supporting new aid efforts, Moscow wants to maintain a role in Egypt. Accordingly, in 1975 the USSR continued all projects under way and agreed to go ahead with two new projects, a cement plant at Asyut and an addition to capacity at the Naja Hamadi aluminum plant, both to be financed under existing credits. Until the 1973 war Moscow was Cairo's major aid source. Since 1973 Arab aid has accounted for more than two-thirds of all external financing available to Egypt, dwarfing the Soviet assistance program.

Oil Refinery, Alexandria



In 1975 the largest Soviet project still under way was the expansion of the steel mill at Hulwan, Egypt's only integrated steel plant. Scheduled for completion in 1976, annual capacity will climb to 1.5 million tons, about three times the current domestic requirement for steel in Egypt. Production began in 1975 at the 100,000-ton Naja Hamadi aluminum plant. Other ongoing projects include Soviet assistance to Egypt's fishing industry and irrigation and rural electrification programs. Undertaken in the late 1960s and early 1970s, these projects have proceeded slowly and have been overshadowed in recent years by Western sponsored efforts in the same area.

The only new Communist economic aid to Egypt was a \$25 million Hungarian credit for machinery and equipment. Other East European countries continued work on projects under old credits. A new protocol with Romania called for further implementation of sulfuric acid plants, the Hamrawein phosphate complex, and a petrochemical plant under credits still outstanding.

In contrast with Egyptian-Soviet long-term debt problems, Cairo settled its outstanding commercial debt questions with Hungary and Poland. Although Hungary and Poland insisted on future settlements in convertible currency, both agreed to accept Egyptian goods to settle past trade imbalances.


### *India*

The static pattern of Communist aid to India, which has characterized the relationship since 1966, continued throughout 1975. No new assistance was

provided, work was initiated only on a couple of Czech projects, and drawings on project aid remain at the low level reached several years ago.

Work continued on the Bokharo steel plant, the largest Soviet project under construction in India, and on the expansion of Bhilai, scheduled eventually to reach a 4-million-ton capacity from the present 2.5 million tons. A 2,000-ton rolling mill at Bhilai is also under construction.

Moscow agreed to undertake studies for new coal mines under a 1966 trade credit, and signed a \$20 million contract for equipment installation at the Mathura refinery, for which designs have been completed.



Soviet-built Oil Refinery, Barauni

East European projects also moved slowly. Czechoslovakia initiated work on a foundry forge and a fertilizer plant under its \$105 million 1973 credits. It also provided components for plants built under earlier Czech credits. Poland continued its decade-long effort in coal mine development work.

Soviet-Indian trade continued its upward trend. Helped by higher prices and volume, Indian exports rose sharply, while imports rose even faster because of increased receipts of fertilizer and petroleum.

### *Iran*

A February Soviet-Iranian accord calls for Iran and the USSR to undertake projects in both countries whose eventual cost could reach \$3 billion. Moscow will continue work under its current program and will expand the Soviet-built machine tool plant at Arak and build new powerplants and grain silos. Iran offered credits to the USSR to finance a paper plant. Repayment will be made from the plant's output.

Soviet aid to Iran continued to focus on the Isfahan steel mill. The plant's current annual capacity is planned to reach 1.9 million tons by 1978. About \$500 million in Soviet credits has been provided for the plant thus far. Plans to expand Isfahan to 8 million tons over the next decade probably will be executed under commercial contracts.

To accommodate growing Soviet-Iranian trade, Iran is improving its rail links with Soviet assistance. Under a series of 1975 protocols Moscow will electrify a 90-mile line from Tabriz in Iran to Julfa on the Soviet border and has begun studies on a 100-mile railroad from Mashad in Iran to Tadjhen in the USSR.

In a mutually profitable arrangement, the two sides entered a trilateral agreement for the sale of Iranian natural gas to Western Europe. Delivery will be made through a second pipeline to Iran's border with the USSR. For 20 years beginning in 1981, Iran will deliver 36.8 million cubic meters of gas per day to the Soviet border, to be consumed in the USSR. In turn, the USSR will deliver 31.1 million cubic meters of gas per day to Western Europe, the difference representing a transit fee paid to the USSR. West European consumers will pay Iran for the gas in hard currency.

All East European countries signed accords with Iran calling for large increases in trade and faster implementation of aid programs. Romania and Iran signed protocols under the \$1.5 billion of reciprocal accords concluded in December 1974. New projects include engineering work on the Saveh dam, construction of powerplants and food processing plants, expansion of a chemical plant at Shiraz, and studies for petrochemical and other plants.

### *Iraq*

Despite its vastly increased ability to buy Western goods and services, Baghdad continued to depend on the USSR and East European countries for most of its

development assistance. At the end of the year Iraq signed economic protocols with the USSR for new project studies. In July, Iraq became the first Third World country to sign a cooperation agreement with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA).

### *Economic Activity Expands*

Although petroleum development remains the USSR's largest and most important program in Iraq, Moscow signed contracts in 1975 to expand its support to other major sectors.

### *The Petroleum Development Program*

Soviet technicians during 1975 completed the third-stage development at the North Rumaila oilfield and the beginning of oil production at the Nahr Umar field. North Rumaila's capacity was raised to more than 800,000 b/d, but Soviet technicians still are grappling with pressurization problems that have limited output.



**Oil Refinery, Rumaila**

The USSR and Iraq also signed a contract in 1975 for exploitation of the Luhais oilfield in southern Iraq, expected to produce 50,000 b/d. Although financing for the estimated \$50 million program was not announced, Moscow probably sought repayment in oil, which it has received for other assistance to the oil sector.



### *Large New Contracts in Other Sectors*

Under Moscow's \$220 million 1971 line of credit, assistance is being provided for two thermal powerplants, which, when completed, will double Iraq's electric power capacity. Moscow contracted to install four 120,000-kw turbines for the plant, continued to build the powerplant at Nasiriyah in 1975, and conducted surveys for the Mosul plant. In addition, under a Soviet contract whose terms are not known, work accelerated on the ath-Tharthar irrigation and flood control project.


Protocols were signed with virtually all East European countries and China to speed work under outstanding credits. Baghdad signed a \$17 million agreement with an East German firm to install signal equipment on the Baghdad-Umm Qasr railroad. China began construction of a bridge over the Mosul River, its first aid project in Iraq under a \$45 million 1971 credit.

### *Pakistan*

Late in 1975 Moscow began construction of Pakistan's largest industrial undertaking, a 1.1-million-ton steel mill at Karachi; Moscow has extended \$435 million of credits for the project. The steel complex, on the books since 1970, is scheduled for completion in 1980-81. The USSR also agreed in 1975 to increase petroleum exploration activity at several locations. Moscow continued work on a thermal powerplant at Guddu and transmission lines and sent a team to discuss mineral development assistance in November.

China mounted no new aid initiatives in Pakistan, its largest aid recipient. Work continued at a

Pakistan: Soviet Oil and Gas Prospecting



cotton-spinning mill at Tarbela, a textile mill at Kotri, and the expansion of the heavy machinery plant at Taxila. China also plans to construct a small iron and steel plant at Chilgazi to complement the heavy machinery plant and the foundry forge at Taxila.

### *Sri Lanka*

A \$57 million Soviet economic credit to Sri Lanka, Moscow's first major aid commitment to Colombo since 1958, highlighted Communist relations with Sri Lanka in 1975. The February agreement, which more than doubles Moscow's previous aid to Sri Lanka, will be used to construct the Samanawala 120-MW hydropowerplant and to build an irrigation network.

China completed the Pugoda textile mill, under construction with Chinese aid since 1970. Meanwhile, survey work began on flood control and irrigation projects, a sheet glass plant, and fisheries development under a \$44 million 1972 line of credit. Late in the year, China and Sri Lanka also signed their annual rice-rubber barter agreement for 1976.

### *Syria*

#### *Economic*

No new aid agreements were signed between Moscow and Damascus in 1975. The USSR and Syria signed a protocol under an old credit agreement for large-scale oil prospecting under Moscow's comprehensive 1976-80 oil development program for Syria.

Syria is Eastern Europe's largest Third World credit recipient with commitments of \$778 million. Romania, the largest East European donor, agreed to allocate part of its outstanding credits to heavy industry and for oil development—areas where Bucharest already is active. Romania also agreed to go ahead with a superphosphate plant at Homs, and construction was begun on the 120,000 b/d refinery at Baniyas, which will be Syria's largest refinery when completed in the late 1970s.

### *Turkey*

In July the USSR and Turkey signed a "framework" agreement that may eventually provide \$650 million in new Soviet credits for Turkey's industry.

Separate agreements will be signed to allocate the proceeds and to specify terms for individual projects. Expansion of the Iskenderun steel complex to 4 million tons, additional facilities at the Seydesehir aluminum complex, and two 400-MW thermal powerplants will be financed under the new agreement.

Turkey, with half a billion dollars of earlier Soviet pledges, has become a major Soviet aid recipient. In December, Soviet Premier Kosygin participated in the opening of the 1-million-ton Iskenderun steel plant, one of Moscow's largest aid projects in the Third World. Other Soviet projects include a refinery at Aliaga, a sulfuric acid plant, a plywood factory, and an aluminum plant.

### *Other*

A \$46 million Soviet credit and \$10 million from Hungary, extended before the August coup, highlighted Communist economic aid to *Bangladesh* in 1975. Moscow also allowed Dacca to defer the first of five annual installments on its 1973 \$35 million loan of 200,000 tons of wheat, although repayments continued on other credits. Negotiations with Moscow were begun in July for more military aircraft, but were not resumed after the coup. The Soviets did provide new economic credits (repayable at 2% interest over 15 years, after a three-year grace period) for a cotton-spinning mill, a gas liquefaction unit, and an experimental cotton farm. The new agreement also provided \$7.5 million for commodities to help finance local project costs.

Hungary signed an agreement in June to furnish railway passenger cars; payments would be made over a 12-year period in jute products and other agricultural goods.

President Ceausescu's April visit to *Jordan* produced new economic accords under which Bucharest will explore for oil and build an oil refinery on a joint venture basis. Romania also agreed to expand the Az-Zarqa oil refinery and to participate in agricultural projects. Financial details are not known.

China gave *Nepal* \$80 million in grant aid for a major addition to its road construction program. Peking will build a 250-mile road from Pokharo to Surkhet. Chinese aid to Nepal now stands at \$179 million, mostly for roads and light industrial plants.

## APPENDIX B

## STATISTICAL TABLES

Table 7

Military Personnel from the Less Developed Countries  
Trained in Communist Countries,<sup>1</sup> 1955-75

	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	China
<b>Total</b>	<b>44,200</b>	<b>37,225</b>	<b>3,975</b>	<b>3,000</b>
Africa	12,925	9,575	650	2,700
Algeria	2,200	1,975	200	25
Burundi	75	75	....	....
Cameroon	75	....	....	75
Congo	800	325	50	425
Equatorial Guinea	200	....	....	200
Ghana	175	175	....	....
Guinea	1,250	850	50	350
Guinea-Bissau	100	100	....	....
Libya	925	900	25	....
Mali	250	200	Negl.	50
Morocco	150	75	75	....
Mozambique	250	200	....	50
Nigeria	500	475	25	....
Sierra Leone	150	....	....	150
Somalia	2,475	2,375	75	25
Sudan	525	300	25	200
Tanzania	1,900	875	Negl.	1,025
Togo	25	....	....	25
Uganda	775	650	125	....
Zaire	75	....	....	75
Zambia	50	25	....	25
East Asia	9,275	7,575	1,700	....
Cambodia	25	25	....	....
Indonesia	9,250	7,550	1,700	....
Latin America	250	250	....	....
Peru	250	250	....	....
Near East and South Asia	21,750	19,825	1,625	300
Afghanistan	3,550	3,300	250	....
Bangladesh	400	400	....	....
Egypt	6,225	5,675	550	....

Table 7

**Military Personnel from the Less Developed Countries  
Trained in Communist Countries,<sup>1</sup> 1955-75  
(Continued)**

	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	China
India	2,125	2,075	50	....
Iran	275	275	....	....
Iraq	3,200	2,950	250	....
North Yemen	1,050	1,050	....	....
Pakistan	350	50	....	300
South Yemen	750	725	25	....
Sri Lanka	Negl.	Negl.	....	Negl.
Syria	3,825	3,325	500	....

1. Rounded to the nearest five persons. Data refer to the number of persons departing for or in training but not necessarily completing training.

Table 8

**Communist Economic Credits and Grants Extended to Less  
Developed Countries, 1954-75 and Years 1974 and 1975**

	Million US \$											
	1954-75				1974				1975			
	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	China	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	China	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	China
<b>Total</b>	<b>20,529</b>	<b>10,859</b>	<b>5,830</b>	<b>3,840</b>	<b>1,610</b>	<b>575</b>	<b>764</b>	<b>271</b>	<b>1,852</b>	<b>1,264</b>	<b>319</b>	<b>269</b>
<b>Africa</b>	<b>4,609</b>	<b>1,435</b>	<b>1,063</b>	<b>2,111</b>	<b>334</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>237</b>	<b>313</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>150</b>
Algeria	931	425	414	92	....	....	....	....	70	....	70	....
Burundi	20	....	....	20	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Cameroon	79	8	....	71	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Central African Republic	6	2	....	4	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Chad	60	10	....	50	....	....	....	....	9	9	....	....
Congo	49	14	10	25	....	....	....	....	10	....	10	....
Dahomey	44	....	....	44	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Equatorial Guinea	1	1	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Ethiopia	205	104	17	84	1	1	....	....	1	1	....	....
Gambia	17	....	....	17	....	....	....	....	17	....	....	17
Ghana	237	93	102	42	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Guinea	382	200	105	77	83	2	80	1	....	....	....	....
Guinea-Bissau	18	1	....	17	....	....	....	....	18	1	....	17
Kenya	66	48	....	18	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Malagasy Republic	66	....	....	66	....	....	....	....	55	....	....	55
Mali	177	86	23	68	12	12	....	....	2	....	....	2
Mauritania	89	4	....	85	57	....	....	57	....	....	....	....
Mauritius	35	....	....	35	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Morocco	148	98	50	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Mozambique	59	....	....	59	....	....	....	....	59	....	....	59
Niger	53	2	....	51	51	1	....	50	....	....	....	....
Nigeria	45	7	38	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Rwanda	23	1	....	22	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Senegal	58	9	....	49	1	1	....	....	....	....	....	....
Sierra Leone	58	28	....	30	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Somalia	291	153	5	133	1	....	....	1	62	62	....	....
Sudan	299	64	153	82	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Tanzania	364	20	13	331	75	....	....	75	....	....	....	....

Table 8

Communist Economic Credits and Grants Extended to Less  
Developed Countries, 1954-75 and Years 1974 and 1975  
(Continued)

Million US \$

	1954-75				1974				1975			
	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	China	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	China	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	China
Togo	45	....	....	45	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Tunisia	157	34	83	40	....	....	....	....	10	....	10	....
Uganda	31	16	....	15	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Upper Volta	61	1	....	60	2	....	....	2	....	....	....	....
Zaire	100	....	....	100	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Zambia	335	6	50	279	51	....	....	51	....	....	....	....
Europe	45	....	....	45	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Malta	45	....	....	45	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
East Asia	841	156	341	344	34	....	....	34	65	1	35	29
Burma	126	16	26	84	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Cambodia	134	25	17	92	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Indonesia	482	114	263	105	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Laos	31	1	4	26	25	....	....	25	6	1	4	1
Philippines	68	....	31	37	9	....	....	9	59	....	31	28
Latin America	1,787	602	1,042	143	494	209	285	....	166	....	156	10
Argentina	537	245	292	....	483	200	283	....	....	....	....	....
Bolivia	64	31	33	....	1	1	....	....	2	....	2	....
Brazil	407	30	377	....	....	....	....	....	150	....	150	....
Chile	423	238	120	65	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Colombia	15	10	5	....	8	8	....	....	....	....	....	....
Costa Rica	2	....	2	....	2	....	2	....	....	....	....	....
Ecuador	19	....	19	....	....	....	....	....	4	....	4	....
Guyana	36	....	....	36	....	....	....	....	10	....	....	10
Peru	229	28	159	42	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Uruguay	45	20	25	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Venezuela	10	....	10	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Near East and South												
Asia	13,247	8,666	3,384	1,197	748	349	399	....	1,308	1,190	38	80
Afghanistan	1,376	1,263	40	73	....	....	....	....	437	437	....	....
Bangladesh	413	300	102	11	54	28	26	....	56	46	10	....
Egypt	2,230	1,300	796	134	....	....	....	....	25	....	25	....
Greece	84	84	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
India	2,430	1,943	487	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Iran	1,288	750	538	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Iraq	1,013	549	419	45	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Lebanon	9	....	9	....	9	....	9	....	....	....	....	....
Nepal	199	20	....	179	....	....	....	....	80	....	....	80
Pakistan	1,131	652	74	405	216	216	....	....	....	....	....	....
Sri Lanka	323	95	73	155	11	....	11	....	57	57	....	....
Syria	1,256	417	778	61	453	100	353	....	....	....	....	....
Turkey	1,210	1,180	30	....	....	....	....	....	653	650	3	....
Yemen (Aden)	91	15	21	55	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Yemen (San'a)	194	98	17	79	5	5	....	....	....	....	....	....