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No. 1834

TURKISH EDITORIAL COMMENT ON
AEGEAN TERRITORIAL WATERS ISSUE

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TURKISH AEGEAN DIPLOMACY SCORED

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 23 Sep 81 p 3

[Editorial by Ali Sirmen: "It Was Known"]

[Text] The European Parliament's support and endorsement through the Fourcade Report of Greece's decision to extend its territorial waters to 12 miles has sparked justifiable reaction in Ankara.

Ankara has declared that the European Parliament resolution is not binding and that we do not recognize it. But this stand does not alter a very serious situation that is out in the open... Greece has always viewed the Aegean as its own internal sea and seems determined to imprison the enormous Turkish landmass within a narrow strip along the Aegean coast.

This is precisely Athens' goal...

This goal has been known for a long time...

The strategy the Hellenes have used to attain their goal has also been known for a long time: Put off problems to bring them up in international forums under favorable conditions when they believe things will go their way; then rally support for their cause against Turkey.

There is no need to be a keen observer or even an expert who follows events closely to see that the reasons for Athens' entrance into the EEC were more political than economic. Konstandinos Karamanlis in numerous speeches has also expressed in a rather direct fashion that his reasons for entering the EEC were chiefly political.

What political benefits could Greece have expected from full EEC membership?

Almost all of us recall what has happened in recent years to our neighbor's parliamentary system which has been devoid of any sound foundation. By securing limitations on the parliamentary system and ensuring the president's being granted powers, stretched at whim, Karamanlis has controlled center-left--or ostensibly so--party governments and protected this self-serving parliamentarianism against the left while at the same time he has integrated with the EEC in a bid to protect this parliamentary system from the Generals' boots...

This was the domestic policy thrust in Athens' entry into the EEC.

In foreign policy, there was one entity that could exacerbate Greece's problems by entering into the EEC: Turkey. Albeit Athens could not hope to settle a problem with Sofia or disputes with its other neighbors through EEC pressure because of the political and economic configurations involved. But Turkey was Greece's neighbor most susceptible to EEC reaction and pressure. It was a pre-determined fact then that Athens would without a moment's hesitation use its membership advantages against Turkey in the foreign policy sphere.

The truth is that the Greeks deftly used the trump in their hands, and yet, what they had handed over to Turkey shortly before was of almost equal value, or, if examined from certain perspectives, the neutralization of a far more valuable trump...

Had it been played right, Greece's hasty decision to quit the military wing of NATO--which smelled of blackmail, and that Greece later regretted--would have been an invaluable trump for Turkey in dealing with the Aegean problem.

Although Athens, under the pressure of domestic events and the United States, wanted to return immediately to NATO's military wing, Turkey's approval was required under the North Atlantic Treaty Agreement of 4 April 1949. At that time, many people--not just we--emphasized the importance of this trump and stressed that this situation was the best international weapon for settling Turkey's problems with Greece over the Aegean. They stated that Ankara must assert as a condition that problems between the two countries over the Aegean be resolved prior to Athens' return to the military wing of NATO.

However, owing to pressing NATO interests, the government of that day suddenly and without reciprocity relinquished this trump with a decision made on high. And Athens, as soon as the paper hit the table, issued a slew of decisions that stated exactly what sort of stand it would adopt.

In short, it had been known for a long time that the Aegean issue would come to this.

This recent development is not just a victory for Greek diplomacy but the product of monumental recklessness in Turkish diplomacy.

At this juncture, Greece is on the way to imprisoning Turkey on the Aegean coast. Even if this is not legally binding, it is an important step in itself. Turkey must henceforth adopt a warrier, more determined and tougher stand toward Greece over the Aegean.

A point not to be forgotten when implementing this policy is that even though Greece's 12-mile decision pins Turkey to the Aegean shore, it violates the interests of certain small and large states that transit the Straits and the Aegean, sail the major oceans, and whose special rights are set down in the Montreaux Convention. Moreover, the decision abrogates the rights granted by the Montreaux Convention to Black Sea countries by turning the Aegean south of the Straits into an internal sea.

At any rate, Western countries must remember when supporting Greece's 12-mile decision in the Aegean that Turkey can find support elsewhere for its views on the matter.

But even when there is awareness of certain policy points, one may deliberately feign ignorance. To thoroughly clarify those points and prevent feigned ignorance requires successful diplomacy.

If Ankara henceforth wants to check irresponsible support for Greek faits accomplis in the Aegean, it is obligated to mount on this point a more successful diplomatic effort than in the past.

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CARTOONIST VIEWS TERRITORIAL SEA ISSUE

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 21 Sep 81 p 9

[Cartoon by staff cartoonist Nehar Tublek titled: "Through Nehar Tublek's Eyes"]

[Text]



Cartoon Caption: "Strange! Whenever I get together with these friends my back always itches [Translator's note: Backscratcher used by figure on right shaped to form the words 12 MILES]

CSO: 4654/14

'MILLIYET'S' TOKER WARNS GREECE ON AEGEAN

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 20 Sep 81 p 8

[Metin Toker editorial: "Who's on Whose Agenda"]

[Text] A while back, I was talking with a Greek friend of mine. He said "We had no idea you were going to do this to us." I answered: "But we gave you a clear and serious warning." He insisted "Still, we didn't expect it. We thought that there would never be a Turkish-Greek war in our region." I said: "This wasn't a Turkish-Greek war though...Turkey exercised its right to intervene in Cyprus in its capacity as a guarantor state in response to the Greek intervention. Beforehand, it had warned a thousand times that it would do so." My Greek friend continued his explanation, saying: "With the support of your air and sea forces you landed a great big army on the island. There you fought against us, against Greeks. This is the truth and the essence of the matter. We had thought that such a thing could not be. This is what lies underneath Greece's suspicions and anxieties concerning Turkey, underneath the anger stemming from disappointment."

As you may be able to guess, we were discussing the "Cyprus Incident." I had not a particle of doubt that my counterpart was sincere and that he favored improving Turkish-Greek relations. He also knew that I was of like mind. Consequently, we listened with good intentions to each other's well-intentioned words.

To recognize the seriousness of warnings is a matter which requires skill. Those not demonstrating this skill must seek the party responsible for their ills among their own ranks; and they are doing so. However...Should the Greeks extend their territorial waters from 6 miles to 12 on their own or with moral support, Turkey will not recognize this. It will protect its freedom to move now as before in open areas, its own territorial waters, or international waters. Should the Greeks attempt to oppose this militarily this would mean war. Everyone has his own thoughts on how such a war would end.

Turkey does not covet a single inch of Greek soil, sea or airspace. It has put up with the unbelievable status of some Greek islands which penetrate into our homeland. Had we harbored other thoughts or desires, we would have "seized" some of them during the Cyprus action. There would not have been much risk with Athens in such a state of confusion. It could have been considered that Israel-type faits accomplis are not easily undone. Turkey did not undertake

such an action, not because of risk assessments, but because it was not considering such a thing. This still applies today. However, you must not even dream that Turkey will stand by inactive while on your own or with moral support, you try to change the status of the Aegean and throttle Turkey. Was America able to remain inactive, even in the Gulf of Sidra?

The warning has been given: Turkey will not recognize this. Only by defeating it in a war will it be possible to cause it to recognize this. Should a war break out, no Greek friend should subsequently say: "We never expected this from you."

The European Community, which Greece wishes to get behind her, must also not say this, should it side with Greece.

We wish to be friends with the Greeks, to remain within West Europe. West Europe is not a monolith. There are governments, there is public opinion, there are parliaments and parliamentarians. The parliamentarians have voting considerations, personal considerations. There are the weaknesses of conceit, arrogance and "political tourism," which is particular to parliamentarians. All of the above play a role in the positions taken. It is necessary to react to this with understanding. That is what we are doing.

However, there are serious states in West Europe. A time will come in relations between states when all the other elements will lose their importance. A state's seriousness and responsibility will come above all else. As a matter of fact, West Europe's civilized nature and superiority derive from this fact.

Turkey experienced a regime crisis. How and why it came to this pass is apparent to everyone. The determination exists to establish a healthy democracy and to make it operate. Efforts are being made to realize this in the "shortest possible time." The Turks are pleased with these efforts. Everyone coming to Turkey sees this. All West European ambassadors communicated this observation to their countries from Ankara. From 12 September up to the present, not one single step backwards has been taken. Every promise has been acted upon. The continuing national consensus surrounding 12 September is a result of this. This is our own internal matter.

As for the state of the economy, America, all of West Europe, all directly or indirectly involved international organizations agree that it is making an extraordinary recovery.

In such a climate, the refrain "Turkey is on Europe's agenda" does not please us. In fact, it is a cause of anxiety for those who believe that our place on the world scene should remain the same. Because an exaggeration of this could develop into the refrain "Europe is on Turkey's agenda."

It is not a question of asking Turkey to change its status within the European Council, nor to suspend its membership or for it to ask that its contribution be frozen. We will establish our democracy easier and faster in our present status. Our overlooking of certain unfortunate "slips of the tongue" stems from

this. Had our goal not been democracy, would we have submitted our candidacy for the European Community? Don't you know that an operating democracy is a condition for this. Are we careless or stupid?

However, in Europe, the "other elements" prevail over the serious state. Europe takes this or that decision concerning us. We don't care. Now, at this point, "Europe is on Turkey's agenda" occurs.

This must not be considered simple bravado. It is not possible to humble the Turks, even in difficult times. We are aware of the morale problems faced by the German government. When German aid did not come as expected in July, perhaps as a result of this and perhaps as a show of "solidarity with the Socialist International," not a single official demarche was made to Germany, not a single reproach was voiced nor a single request made. In the same way that the manner in which Turkey established democracy is an internal matter, whether or not Germany gives us aid is something which is up to them. Austria has indicated that this year it will not give the \$10 million which it gave last year within the framework of the OECD. We undertook not a single initiative in that regard. Later they indicated their regret over the matter. German aid has also come pattering in this month. Because, for one thing, West Europe strengthens itself from the defense standpoint when it gives us aid. And then, are American weapons purchased with German military aid? Or French goods with Austrian financial aid? No. Of course, we meet our requirements, but the money still returns to the economic machinery of those who give it.

The criticism that "the Turkish administration is not overly open to suggestions from outside," if it refers to this behavior, is correct. The policy at present is that laid down by the "highest authorities." The economy is experiencing difficulties, but exploiting the ability to tell lies abroad concerning the interventions during this difficult period for us, some as a result of political necessity, some out of capriciousness and some as a result of provocations, is a matter which we cannot accept. Our West European friends must understand that they are obliged to refrain from damaging the domestic as well as foreign image of a one-of-a-kind, sui generis administration such as ours. They themselves must explain this to those who do not understand it.

Because, the extent to which this administration preserves its freedom of movement will determine how rapidly it leads the nation to salvation.

Those European parliamentarians who ally themselves behind our Greek neighbor on issues which do not concern them at all and once again cause it [Greece] to long for adventures, as well as those who set up committees and undertake junkets across Turkey must ponder responsibly what could be on whose agenda.


The warnings of serious Turks are always serious.

CSO: 4654/14

'MILLIYET' CARTOON ON TERRITORIAL SEA ISSUE

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 20 Sep 81 p 1

[Text]



CSO: 4654/14

MUMTAZ SOYSAL URGES RESTATING OF POSITION ON 12-MILE ISSUE

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 18 Sep 81 p 2

[Mumtaz Soysal Editorial: "Casus Belli"]

[Text] No, the "Casus" which is "Belli" is not the one with which you are familiar. You are to read the first letter of the first word as a "k" and do not draw out the "a." The other word is a form of the word "bellum" which in Latin means "war." "Casus Belli," the shortened version of which is "casus," in Latin, in international law, means "war conditions" or "a situation which, when arising, can be considered by a state to be a reason for war."

Well before now, Turkey had informed both friend and foe that, should Greece extend its territorial waters in the Aegean from 6 nautical miles to 12 miles, she [Turkey] would consider this a "casus belli." This term had even found its way into official documents.

Why?

Because the extension of Greek territorial waters to 12 miles is a very serious situation for Turkey. It is a "vital" problem relating to whether or not a "nation" and "state" will survive.

Why?

Greece has approximately 3,000 islands in the Aegean. Why and how a portion of these were generously relinquished is another story. But, for this reason, even when the territorial waters are maintained at 6 miles, 35 percent of the Aegean is Greek territorial water. Turkey's territorial waters come to 11 percent. Thus, under the present conditions, 56 percent of the Aegean is open sea, over which no one can claim control.

However, if Greece were to extend its territorial waters to 12 miles, 63 percent of the Aegean would fall under Greek authority and an area representing only 26 percent would remain international open sea.

Even worse, at present, if nothing else, Turkey can reach open sea without entering Greek territorial waters via three large areas--those being the area between Meric [unlocated] and Mitilini, and Bababurnu, which is across from

them; and the Candarli and Sigacik bays. Now, if the territorial waters are extended to 12 miles, Turkey will find itself in the position of being unable to travel down to the Mediterranean except through two narrow passages, one in the waters off Bozcaada and the other between Sakiz [Chios] and Nikarya [Ikaria], in the waters off of Koraka Burnu [Koraka Point].

Okay, let us say that this is of no real importance because of the "right of free passage" during conditions of peace. What about fishing? And the exploitation of natural resources?

Not to mention the continental shelf.

Knowing all this, Greece is staging a new game against Turkey.

Now, the Common Market, or "European Community" according to its new name, has been brought into the picture. The matter involves the determination of the Community's "boundaries." A report prepared by French parliamentarian Marie Madeleine Fourcade with this aim in mind does not stop at considering quite normal the extension of Aegean territorial waters to 12 miles, it attributes to Greece the nature of an "Island State." Accordingly, the boundary between the "European Community" and Turkey is just beyond the Aegean's Anatolian shore. And, where the distance between the islands and the mainland narrows to less than 12 miles, it runs along the "median line" between the two. That to the east of this line belongs to us and that to the west belongs to Europe.

More correctly, to Greece, which is once again up to its tricks under the protective wings of Europe.

What this means in terms of air space, the 200-mile "economic zone" adjoining the territorial waters and even the continental shelf, is clear, very clear.

Is Turkey going to yield before pillage? And should it not yield, will it be satisfied with the diplomatic notes which it has given to Common Market jurists, the warnings which it has given, and its diplomatic initiatives?

In short, is there still a "casus belli" or not?

It appears that the flexibility shown in the matter of the FIR line, the accommodations arrived at in return for the return to NATO and the conciliatory initiatives made on Cyprus have given the other side the impression that things have changed in Turkey; this to the extent that the 12 mile issue, clearly stated to be a cause for war, can once again be aired.


Greece took the decision to extend its territorial waters in the Aegean from 3 to 6 miles back in 1936. Turkey waited until 1964 to do the same thing. Perhaps they are calculating that the "casus belli" reaction will once again come in a delayed manner or not at all.

This is the perfect time to notify friend and foe once again--in Latin or in Turkish--that in regard to the equitable sharing of the Aegean with our neighbor on the opposite shore and in regard to living like human beings on this half of the Aegean, nothing has changed in Turkey, nor will it change, nor can the Turkish people accept any change whatsoever.

MAPS SHOW EFFECT OF 12-MILE GREEK TERRITORIAL SEA

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 19 Sep 81 p 1


[Text] The situation in the Aegean given 6 and 12-mile Greek territorial waters.



Key: (1) Current situation (6 miles)

[Darker area] Turkish territorial waters

[Lighter area] Greek territorial waters



Key: (1) The situation given 12 mile Greek territorial waters

[Darker area] Turkish territorial waters

[Lighter area] Greek territorial waters.

CSO: 4654/14

GREEK ILL WILL OVER AEGEAN BLASTED

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 21 Sep 81 p 8

[Editorial by Zafer Atay]

[Text] Good faith is essential to foreign policy. But it is certainly not a wise move to make this a one-sided deal.

We think Turkish-Greek relations have come to just such a point. Turkey has shown its good will by lifting NOTAM 714, which hindered flights over the Aegean. Turkey has shown its good faith...without preconditions. It allowed Greece's return to the military wing of NATO. Turkey has shown its good faith. It has ensured that contacts on the secretary general and ministerial levels have not been cut off.

What has Greece done in return?

So as not to give the leftist opposition grist for its propaganda mill, Greece up to now has failed to disclose the easement it has obtained with respect to Aegean airspace. Nor has Greece been inclined to fix areas of command responsibility in the Aegean promised via a negotiated settlement after reintegration. Finally, Greece has shown its bad faith by saying, "Let the 1974 situation continue."

Well, let us accept as a political strategem Greece's avoiding disclosure for now on account of the elections. But how is one to interpret renegeing on a promise? Turkey had long insisted, "Let the Aegean dispute be resolved and then we will grant Athens the necessary permission," as a prerequisite to Athens' return to the military wing. But owing to the alliance's weakened southeast wing and Soviet expansionism in the region, NATO members removed this precondition by asking Turkey "to make a further demonstration of its good faith." NATO on this issue has been unable to reap a single result up to now. Turkey wants to share command responsibilities in the Aegean. Greece refuses to accept this.

Ultimately, Athens successfully mounted a new strategem during the European Parliament meeting in Strasbourg last week.

A report prepared in step with the Greek position on the Aegean was passed as a fait accompli through the European Parliament, which is composed of representatives elected from the 10-member countries of the European Economic Community.

Greece became a full EEC member at the start of this year. It thus became necessary to redefine the association's customs boundaries. For this purpose, the duty of preparing a report was given to the French deputy Mrs. Fourcade, who appears to be completely uninformed on the Aegean issue. Fourcade prepared a report on this highly complex and technical issue that was in conformity with Greek views. Meanwhile, Greece did not overlook getting the esteemed members of the European Parliament to spend their summer vacations free on the Aegean islands. The parliamentarians, who thoroughly loosened up on sun, sea, fish and wine, in the end approved the report with a raise of their hands.

Doubtless the Parliament's decision is in the nature of a recommendation. It will be further discussed in the Council to be attended by EEC foreign ministers. But the EEC, unknowingly, has abetted a very dangerous ploy. According to the report, the 3,000 islands--most of whom are chunks of rock--that Greece holds in the Aegean are to have distinct continental shelves. Given this, Greece can extend its territorial waters to 12 miles and can demand a 200-mile economic zone....

The rough meaning of this complex statement is: "Greece can with EEC permission close the Aegean to Turkey...."

The Aegean is a semi-closed sea. The islands that we let Greece snatch away as the result of certain historical errors are accruing major advantages for Athens. Even today Turkey's sovereign borders comprise only 11 percent of the Aegean. Greece controls 35 percent of the Aegean. The remainder constitutes international waters to which the entire world has free access.

For Greece to extend its territorial waters from 6 to 12 miles and for every island to have its own continental shelf would mean that Turks could travel in this sea only by means of a passport. It means that Turkey would be unable to venture into this sea without Greek permission. This is unacceptable. In fact, Turkey openly stated years ago that a 12-mile limit would be a casus belli. The EEC is obligated to rectify this error perpetrated by the Parliament....

The fact that Athens, in the wake of Head of State General Kenan Evren's call that "the Aegean become a sea of friendship" made during his Izmir address on 9 September, has mounted such a strategem indicates perfectly how devoid Greece is of good faith.


We believe its high time--even past time--to speak in a language Greece will understand....

CSO: 4654/7

'CUMHURIYET' CARTOON ON TERRITORIAL SEA ISSUE

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 22 Sep 81 p 1

[Text]



Cartoon Caption: Greek: Up to here is 12 miles...You may not go into the water without my permission.

CSO: 4654/14

AEGEAN ISSUE SPARKS CALL TO REVIEW RELATIONS WITH WEST

Istanbul MILLI GAZETE in Turkish 22 Sep 81 p 5

[Editorial by Mehmet Fahri]

[Text] The European Parliament in its resolution approved the extension of Greek territorial waters to 12 miles. In short, owing to this resolution, the zones extending up to 12 miles off Greece as well as the islands have been incorporated into the Common Market's customs boundaries.

One newspaper characterized the European Parliament's resolution as "nonsense." Even Foreign Minister Turkmen passed it off by declaring, "This resolution is not binding upon us." It is also impossible for us to take it seriously in light of European Parliament Commission members' statements regarding the altering of the resolution at our behest.

But approaching such an issue superficially can lead us into error. It can serve to deceive us and the Turkish community...as it has done up to now.

Rather than dwelling on whether this resolution is invalid or nonapplicable to us, the issue that must be most emphasized in the wake of this European Parliament resolution is the fact that this body has once again expressed an attitude often displayed in the past.

It is whitewash not to focus on this mentality and hope to pass it off by saying, "My dear sir, the European Parliament did make such a resolution but it is not binding upon us. What's more, it will be altered at our behest." This would be to no avail and would only result in harm. Furthermore, we characterize these words as an attempt to defend or vindicate the European Parliament before Turkish public opinion, despite the resolution having been made against us.

Some papers are charging the resolution is invalid by taking another tack: it was adopted with the votes of only 110 to 403 deputies. Yet, it is not a very convincing logic to hope for results based on the grounds that a resolution adopted with only some one-quarter of deputy votes is invalid. If the absent deputies had not wanted Parliament to pass such a resolution, they would have been present during

the session and cast "no" votes. The resolution would thus have failed. By not doing so and not attending the session, they helped the resolution's passage through Parliament. It is this fact that in our view puts a different face on the picture.

In short, the European Parliament representatives of Common Market countries have once more demonstrated that they favor Greece, not Turkey. It is precisely this attitude that must be focused on and assessed. The reasons for this attitude lie in the facts that Turkey has not been accepted into the Common Market despite years of efforts and that various obstacles have been thrown before Turkey. Turkey is not taken very seriously when it says, "I am Western not Eastern." Although Turkey is an associate Common Market member, it does not even receive the same outlets for its export produce that Israel does.

Whether or not we want to understand, the West is telling Turkey, "Find someone like yourself to marry." Is it not shameless to continually insist, "We are Western; we are no different than you," when the West's attitude is so abundantly clear? But for heaven's sake isn't this what we are saying?

Actually, we ought not be surprised that the West prefers Greece over us since the West has a cultural and religious affinity with the Greeks. What has the West in common with us? Beyond our saying that we are Western, in what areas does Turkey have something in common with the West?

On the contrary, the West harbors an unforgettable attitude manifest in the partition of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of its own colonial administration over these lands. But the West was not satisfied there. Was it not Westerners who divided Anatolia among themselves, landed the Greeks at Izmir, and let them loose upon the Turks? One ought not be surprised that those who dispatched the Greeks to Anatolia years ago should side with them today.

We are obliged to assess our relations with the West in light of these attitudes. Efforts to clear the West by inventing some excuses will bring us only disillusionment...just as they have done up to now.

CSO: 4654/8

END