

THE
Polish Regained
63
Poland Provinces

by
J. A. WILDER

With a Foreword by Professor W. J. ROSE

A monograph on the achievements of Poland's first year of administration of its regained provinces, describing the state in which they were taken over and estimating the loss to Germany's economy and their importance to the economy of the new Poland.

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A Survey of a Year's Achievement

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J. A. WILDER

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FOREWORD

My acceptance of an invitation to commend this little book to the British public does not mean that I am in agreement with everything said in its pages; but it does mean that, in my view, the factual material set out here, as well as the views represented, deserve more attention than they have received hitherto. The author has every right to be considered an authority, since, long before the war, the field of Polish-German relations had been his major concern as an economic historian. To some it may seem that he has been at too great pains in the assembling of data, and they may regard certain pages as rather dull reading, but every picture is made up of many details, and those who follow the argument with care will have to admit that he has made out a strong case.

The pity is that, under conditions as they exist in the publishing world, when it reaches the public a study of this kind (made in the autumn of 1946) is already a year out of date. If the results of the second year of Polish achievement in the "Regained Territories," bringing the story down to midsummer 1947, could have been included, the record would have been much more impressive, the evidence of progress far more convincing. Even the grimness of a very severe winter could not hold the march of events or dim the enthusiasm of those engaged in a great pioneering enterprise.

The whole visage of the new Poland is markedly different from that of 1919-1939. From being a chiefly agricultural country, Poland has taken on the features of a much more urbanised and industrial nation, possessing in coal an instrument for international exchange that makes her the envy of her neighbours. This natural wealth, coupled with the will to work for which Poles are proverbial and a reasonably sensible economic policy can in time bring out of the calamities of war and occupation a level of well-being known only to few in pre-war years. No nation deserves this more; and none has a better claim on the co-operation and goodwill of the whole continent.

W. J. ROSE

University of London,
October 1, 1947.

This book was written in autumn, 1946. A short supplement describing the economic developments in the Polish Regained Provinces during the second post-war year till Midsummer, 1947, is, for technical reasons, being published separately.

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Part I

The Economic and Political Aspects

1. THE PART PLAYED BY THE FORMER PRUSSIAN EASTERN PROVINCES IN FEEDING GERMANY

One often comes across the statement that there is a danger of Germany starving as the result of depriving her of the provinces lying east of the Oder and the Western Neisse. There is no doubt that if the pre-war level of consumption were to be restored in Germany the loss of the eastern provinces would make it necessary to increase somewhat the amount of food imported from abroad. The loss will make it much more difficult for the Germans to realise their dream of self-sufficiency in food consumption—that dream of everyone who is preparing for war, but did these provinces really feed the Reich, and will their loss really cause starvation? To answer this question one has to discover what quantities of basic articles of food were supplied by the lands situated east of the Oder and Western Neisse, what percentage of the production and consumption of the rest of Germany these quantities represented. For these figures we must turn to German pre-war statistics, and, here, the investigation has been greatly facilitated by the work of a German scientist who studied this problem and published the results of his research in 1930.¹

All the figures given below are taken from this source, except where otherwise stated. Adjustments have been made wherever necessary, as Volz uses the term "German East" to cover an area larger than that of the Polish Regained Provinces.

WHEAT AND RYE. It appears that in the year 1927-28, for instance, the Reich consumption of wheat amounted to 4,895,500

¹ Volz, Wilhelm: *Die Ostdeutsche Wirtschaft*, Berlin-Leipzig, 1930.

tons,¹ whereas the production was 3,567,000 tons. Of this latter amount, 845,000 tons were grown in the eastern areas, including also 32,297 square kilometres situated west of the Oder and Western Neisse (part of Lower Silesia, part of Brandenburg, and part of Pomerania). The eastern districts supplied 50,260 tons of wheat to other parts of Germany, including Berlin. They also sent 104,320 tons abroad. So that altogether the export from these areas amounted to 154,580 tons. But during the same year 114,000 tons of wheat grain were imported into these areas from the central and western provinces of Germany; in other words, some 63,740 tons more wheat grain were imported from other parts of Germany than were exported to them; while a further 6,000 tons were imported from abroad. Thus the total imports of wheat amounted to 120,000 tons and the surplus of export over import to 34,580 tons.

In the same year, Germany as a whole, had a rye consumption amounting to 6,155,600 tons, while production amounted to 7,680,000 tons,² of which 3,200,000 tons were grown in the "East." The export from the "East" to other parts of Germany including Berlin, amounted to 178,840 tons of rye grain, while 254,000 tons were exported abroad, making a total of 432,840 tons. During the same year, 46,000 tons of rye were imported into this area from other parts of Germany (so that it had an export surplus of 132,840 tons, within Germany) while a further 8,800 tons were imported from abroad. Altogether 54,800 tons were imported into the area, the export surplus of these provinces thus amounting to 378,040 tons.

Obviously, in order to get a complete and undistorted picture of the situation, these figures need to be corrected, by taking the turnover of flour into account. For it appears that in the year under discussion, 293,600 tons of flour were exported from this area to other parts of Germany, including Berlin, while 101,700 tons were imported—the net internal export surplus thus amounting to 191,900 tons. 22,500 tons were exported abroad,

¹ *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich*. 1931, p. 319.

² *Ibid.*

but 4,100 tons were imported from abroad, so in this respect the export surplus amounted to 18,400 tons. Thus the total export surplus of flour from the eastern agricultural areas of Germany amounted to 210,300 tons net. As the local mills worked on a basis of 70 per cent. rye and 30 per cent. wheat, one can say with fair accuracy that the surplus of rye flour amounted to 147,210 tons, and of wheat flour 63,090 tons. Since after milling, rye has a 70 per cent. flour yield, while wheat has a 68 per cent. yield, the forgoing figures correspond to 210,300 tons of rye and 92,780 tons of wheat. It appears, therefore, that the total export surplus of the German eastern provinces in grain and flour amounted to 127,360 tons of wheat (or 4.68 per cent. of the production of the rest of Germany) and 588,340 tons of rye (or 13.13 per cent. of the production of the rest of Germany). But of this Berlin and the rest of Germany consumed only about 30,000 tons of wheat (or 1.18 per cent. of its own production), and 333,140 tons of rye (or 7.4 per cent. of its own production). It is then not surprising that the German authority comes to the conclusion that "for the German Reich the east plays no role whatever as a supplier of wheat, and a quite insignificant role as the supplier of rye."¹

Further, as we have pointed out, these calculations were made in respect of an area some 32,297 square kilometres larger than that which Germany is losing in the East. This represents 27 per cent. of the area which was the subject of the German investigations. Therefore, assuming that the supply of grain to the rest of Germany came more or less equally from all parts of the former eastern areas, we can with fair accuracy reduce the figures given above by 27 per cent. In considering the extent to which the Polish Regained Provinces supplied Germany with grain, we have to make a further reduction,² since they con-

¹ Volz op. cit., p. 85.

² The whole territory covered by Volz has an area of 150,313 square kilometres, of which only 100,581 square kilometres fall to the Polish Regained Provinces. Obviously, in reckoning the extent to which these areas supplied Germany with food, we have not taken into account that part of East Prussia which has been incorporated with the U.S.S.R.

stitute rather less than 70 per cent. of the area to which the figure quoted above refers. It, therefore, transpires that the Polish Regained Provinces supplied Germany with some 22,500 tons of wheat and some 233,000 tons of rye. This constitutes 0.77 per cent. of the wheat production and 4.53 per cent. of the rye production of the rest of Germany. Moreover, it constituted 0.46 per cent. of the wheat and 3.78 per cent. of the rye consumed in the whole of Germany in the year 1927/28.

POTATOES. Here the German writer we are quoting drew up his statistics for an area rather smaller than in the case of grain. This amounted to only 8,408 square kilometres more than the area Germany is losing on the East.¹ In the years under discussion the consumption of potatoes in Germany amounted to some 34,000,000 tons,² while production was some 40,000,000 tons. Of this, 12,700,000 tons were harvested in the areas with which we are concerned. However, the export of potatoes from the eastern provinces to Berlin and the rest of Germany amounted to not more than 750,000 tons (or 2.74 per cent. of the production in the rest of Germany, and 2.2 per cent. of the total consumption in Germany). It is not surprising, therefore, that Volz comes to the conclusion that the "Reich has no need whatever of the east (i.e., the eastern provinces) for its supply of potatoes."³ If we make the same adjustment for potatoes as we have made for grain, it appears that the Polish Regained Provinces supplied not more than 622,500 tons of potatoes (or 2.27 per cent. of the production of the rest of Germany, and 1.83 per cent. of the total consumption) to the rest of the country.

PIGS. In respect of pigs, Volz gives figures for a larger area (exceeding the area lost to Germany by 32,297 square kilometres). In 1928, 1,628,000 pigs and young pigs were sent from this area to the rest of Germany, including Berlin, but in return it received 302,500 head, so that in regard to internal

¹ In Brandenburg he does not include the Potsdam district while in Pomerania he leaves out the Stralsund district.

² *Statistisches ahrbuch* 1931, p. 319.

³ Volz, op. cit., p. 75.

turnover the export surplus over import was 1,325,500 head. But it must be remembered that a further 2,500 head were sent abroad, while 10,000 head were imported from abroad, so that the net export surplus of these areas was 1,318,000 head. Making the analagous adjustment to those made for previous items, it appears that the Polish Regained Provinces provided the rest of Germany with 927,500 head of swine in 1928, the net export surplus being 922,600 head. In the areas now remaining to Germany there were some 16,320,000 head, or approximately equal to the local consumption. Thus the Polish Regained Provinces sent some 5.68 per cent. of the local stock and consumption of the rest of Germany, or some 4.63 per cent. of the total German consumption.

CATTLE. From the same area as that dealt with above in respect of swine, 629,000 head were sent in 1928 to the rest of Germany, including Berlin, while 52,500 head were received. Thus the export surplus was 576,500 head. Since 13,000 head of cattle were imported from abroad during the same period, the net export surplus was 563,500 head. Making the usual adjustment, we can see that in 1928 the Polish Regained Provinces supplied the rest of Germany with 383,550 head of cattle, or some 2.75 per cent of its total.¹

Here it must be pointed out that other German scientific works dealing with various aspects of the problem of food supply, reach figures which closely approximate to those cited, and confirm the accuracy of our calculations.²

Therefore, seeing that before the war the Regained Provinces supplied Germany with only 0.77 per cent. of the wheat produced in the areas left to Germany, and only 4.53 per cent. of the rye, 2.27 per cent. of the potato production, 5.68 per cent.

¹ According to the *Statistisches Jahrbuch* for 1931, Germany had in 1928, 18,414,136 head of cattle; according to Polish calculations on the basis of various statistics there were 3,665,700 head of cattle in the Eastern Provinces before the war.

² Cf. *inter alia* Krull, C: *Die Ostprussische Landwirthschaft*, Berlin, 1931; Rudas A: *Die Wirtschaftliche Verflechtung der Provinz Pommern. Zeitschrift des Prussischen St. Landesamtes*, Berlin, 1930; Scheu, E: *Deutschlands Wirtschaft-Geographische Harmonie*, Breslau, 1924, and works by Hurtig, Witt, etc.

or the requirements in swine, and only 2.75 per cent. of the cattle, it is impossible to say that the eastern areas fed the Reich. Even if we admit that all the German writers concerned with this problem took a propaganda attitude to it, and sought for political reasons to demonstrate that the Eastern Prussian provinces were not adequately exploited in the state economy, it is impossible to ignore the testimony of these figures. We have, it is true, to add a certain quantity of frozen and smoked meat sent mainly to Berlin, and a certain quantity of dairy products (especially cheese). But even this does not alter the actual fact that before the war the eastern provinces played a very insignificant part in feeding Germany. It follows that the assertion that, if Germany is deprived of the areas lying east of the Oder-Western Neisse line, this will have a catastrophic effect on food supplies to Germany, is quite unfounded—the more so if the living standards of the Germans are to be reduced by 30 per cent. in accordance with Allied decisions.

2. THE ALLEGED DANGER OF AGRICULTURAL OVER-POPULATION OF GERMANY AND THE REALITY

The provinces lying east of the Oder-Western Neisse line were regarded as agricultural parts of Germany and, in accordance with the Potsdam decisions,¹ the German population has been evicted from these provinces. Certain people are now attempting to suggest that there will be neither employment nor a place for these agriculturists in a diminished Germany. First, it must be stated that a considerable part of the arable land situated east of the Oder-Western Neisse frontier was cultivated by Polish hands, people who were either autochthonous Polish population, who had supported themselves all through the centuries on small parcels of land, or seasonal workers, who travelled

¹ "The Three Governments having considered the question in all aspects, recognize that the transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary will have to be undertaken."

legally and illegally from Poland during the months of field labour, attracted by higher earnings than could be obtained on the land in Poland.¹ The need to bring workers from Poland into these areas was due to two factors. First, the cumulative effects of the flight from the land which was general all over Germany² and, secondly, there was a spontaneous flight of the local population westward—a factor we shall discuss later. For decades past, German writers have expressed anxiety as to the fate of the areas under discussion. Right down to the outbreak of the recent war we find this anxiety expressed in the most varied forms, not only in expert studies but also in popular expositions, whenever the question of the eastern provinces of Prussia came up for consideration. This anxiety was formulated in the following words over half a century ago: “The great area of agricultural regions (the reference is to the areas east of the Oder and Western Neisse) is short of people who could cultivate and harvest it. Thousands of agricultural workers’ dwellings are standing empty. The shortage of good workers has reached such dimensions that it has frequently become impossible to carry on agriculture rationally.”³

For this very reason, despite the agricultural character of the areas under discussion, out of a total population of some 8,300,000 inhabitants, the number actually engaged professionally in agriculture was some 1,654,000.⁴ As the German statistics for these areas did not give details of profession by nationality, we

¹ Details of this in *The Polish-German Frontier*, by J. M. Winiewicz, 2nd ed., pp. 12, 13, 20, 26, 29 and in *Zurück zum Agrarstaat*, by Burgdorfer, 1933, p. 31.

² In absolute figures the numbers of the population maintained by agriculture within the frontiers of post-Versailles Germany were: 1882, 15,944,000 (40 per cent.); 1895, 15,446,000 (32 per cent.); 1907, 14,922,000 (27.1 per cent.); 1925, 14,374,000 (23 per cent.); 1933, 13,661,000 (21 per cent.). *Statistisches Jahrbuch*, 1937, p. 20.

³ Sering, M. *Die innere Kolonization im ostlichen Deutschland*, Leipzig, 1893, p. 78; Cf. Rogmann, H. *Die Bevölkerungsentwicklung im preussischen Osten in den letzten hundert Jahren*, 1937. Many writers describe these areas as a “Raum ohne Volk” (space without people), e.g., Volz, op. cit., Burgdorfer, F. op. cit., etc.

⁴ Occupation census of 1933; it must be pointed out that the figure for persons actively engaged professionally in agriculture does not consist exclusively of persons maintaining themselves solely by agriculture.

do not possess exact particulars of the number of Poles included in this figure. According to Polish calculations made on the basis of the German population census of 1939, there were some 1,200,000 persons in this area who, being Polish by extraction, would not be subject to eviction.¹ At least half of these maintained themselves by agriculture. If we accept this same proportion for the population of these areas generally, it appears that there were at least 363,000 Poles professionally engaged in agriculture in the Polish Regained Provinces. Assuming that the war losses among the agriculturists of the eastern provinces of Prussia were proportionately no higher than those of the German people generally, some 70,000 must be deducted from the figure of 1,291,000 Germans actively engaged in agriculture in these areas.² Practically, then, it is a question of finding work for 1,221,000 agricultural workers from Germany's former eastern areas.

Now let us consider what possibilities there are of increasing employment in the agriculture of the areas left to Germany. The entire area is distinguished by a comparatively high degree of afforestation (27.7 per cent.) which quite considerably exceeds the percentage recognized by experts as necessary for the maintenance of a country's self-sufficiency in timber. As the German expert Ostendorff showed,³ some two-thirds of the forests in Germany are located on land which could be exploited agriculturally. Two-thirds of the area under forest in Germany, as at

¹ The task of verifying these people is now in progress in the Polish Regained Provinces. Any German citizen who was living in the area before the war can apply for recognition as a Polish citizen, if he regards himself as a Pole, and has reached the age of sixteen. Down to Autumn, 1946, Polish citizenship had been granted to some 900,000 persons, including children who automatically take the citizenship of their parents. These figures have been compiled by the States Repatriation Board.

² "The Results of the War of 1939-45 as regards the population of Germany and of the Allied Countries of Europe"—a report of the International Committee for the Study of European Questions, April 13th, 1946—reckons the German losses at 3,600,000 (p. 10), of which the civilian losses did not amount even to ten per cent.

³ Ostendorff, "Die bauerliche Siedlungskapazität des Deutschen Reiches"; *Petermanns Mitteilungen*, Ergänzungsheft No. 228, 1937, p. 31.

present constituted, would amount to 6,778,800 hectares (close on 17,000,000 acres). This would provide land for 338,940 self-sufficient twenty-hectare (close on fifty acres) small-holdings. In addition, a very large area of German arable land is in the hands of large landowners. If ten per cent. of the land were left for the large undertakings necessary for breeding and seed-selection, after carrying through a thorough-going land reform there would still be 2,725,000 hectares (close on 6,812,500 acres) available in Germany for parcellation.¹ This would provide 136,250 self-sufficient twenty-hectare (50 acre) farms. In other words, after bringing under cultivation part of the area now under forest, as German authorities themselves demanded should be done before the war, and carrying through the agrarian reform

¹ In these calculations no account has been taken of the quite large areas in use by the military in the shape of exercise grounds, airfields, etc. Here are the figures of land available for settlement after carrying through a land-reform, by provinces and districts:—

<i>Province</i>	<i>Hectares</i>
Saxony	526,734
Schlesvig-Holstein	222,310
Hanover	199,390
Westphalia	135,846
Hesse-Nassau	48,860
Rhineland	167,540
Hohenzollern	2,250
Total: Prussia ...	1,302,930
Bavaria	257,330
Saxony (Land)	172,782
Wurtemberg	38,250
Baden	13,500
Thuringia	160,254
Hesse	14,740
Mecklenburg	573,534
Oldenburg	63,260
Brunswick	55,494
Anhalt	55,396
Lippe	15,880
Schaumburg-Lippe	1,746
Grand Total ...	2,725,096 hectares.

The German Minority in Poland and the Problem of Transfer of Population; The Polish Ministry of Preparatory Work concerning the Peace Conference. Information Notes, No. 6, p. 39.

which both the Social-democrats and the Communists of Germany are now asking for, 9,503,800 hectares (close on 23,759,500 acres) could be made available for distribution in the areas remaining to Germany, which would provide 475,190 self-sufficient fifty-acre holdings. In the area of the Polish Regained Provinces in the year 1939, the area under agricultural cultivation amounted to 6,123,500 hectares (some 15,483,750 acres) distributed among 462,226 farms (including those belonging to Poles, who of course will not be subject to deportation to Germany). Of these, 84.2 per cent. (389,376 in absolute figures) occupied by holdings of less than twenty hectares and we may add that they occupied only 36.5 per cent. of the total area under cultivation in these districts.¹ Thus it would be possible to form some 13,000 more holdings in the area of Germany than existed in the Polish Regained Provinces, and there will be available a 55 per cent. bigger area.

What are the quantitative possibilities of employment for those professionally engaged in agriculture, on the 9,503,800 hectares, or nearly 23,769,500 acres, we have mentioned? Taking British conditions as the basis for calculation (where only 27 persons are employed to every 250 acres) we get the figure of some 2,566,000, or twice as many as need to be found agricultural work in Germany. However, if we take continental conditions into account, and choose as our basis the average of 40 engaged in agriculture to every hundred hectares (250 acres),² we get a figure of over 3,800,000 persons. One can, therefore, safely say that Germany has possibilities of employing in agriculture not only those deported from the Polish Regained Provinces, without detriment to those who were working in properties destined to parcellation, but that in addition there are possibilities of moving

¹ Bulawski, R: *Problemy osadniczo—przesiedlencze Ziem Odzyskanych*, Cracow, 1945, p. 15.

² This figure is rather lower than that which prevailed in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and much lower than that for Poland (46.8 per cent.), Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland (in these three countries the number of persons professionally engaged in agriculture exceeded 50 to the hundred hectares). All the figures here cited relate to pre-war days.

"back to the land" a part of the urban population. Of course, besides, there is no reason why a part of the people hitherto employed in agriculture should not work, in the future, in some "light" industries.

Similarly, no allowance has been made for calculations as to the development of Germany's population, made by the Reich Statistical Bureau in 1930. According to these estimates which, of course, did not take into account the recent war and its effects, from 1945 onwards the population of Germany should fall considerably.¹ In other words, the problem of German over-population which is such a bugbear to certain experts will grow less and less important with the passing of the years.

3. THE PROBLEM OF POLISH ECONOMIC SETTLEMENT OF THE REGAINED PROVINCES AND ITS DEMOGRAPHIC ASPECT

There is one other aspect of the problem of the Polish Regained Provinces which causes some anxiety even in official pronouncements² and must be discussed.

Fears are expressed that the Poles will not be able to take effective economic possession of and exploit the areas placed under their administration by the Potsdam decision. These fears are not new. After the first world war, German propaganda very suggestively and convincingly put forward the view that the Poles would ruin economically the areas taken from the Germans and that, especially in Silesia, the achievements of the period when this province belonged to Prussia would go to waste. Twenty-five years ago these arguments seemed so convincing that for many years they were to be found repeated in non-German publications.³ At that time the Germans, thanks first

¹ Cf. Burgdorfer, F. op. cit., p. 115.

² Cf. Mr. Bevin's speech, 26th October, 1945 (Hansard, Vol. 414).

³ Vide, e.g., Street, C.J.C., *Upper Silesia, an Economic Tragedy*, London, 1924; Staehler, H., *The Dismemberment of Upper Silesia*, London, 1929, etc.

of all to certain decisions of the Geneva Convention of May 15th, 1922, and later by way of activities in the League of Nations, were able to hinder and render difficult Polish economic life in Upper Silesia. They availed themselves of these possibilities in a very subtle and vindictive manner, and in addition carried on illegal activities aimed at making it impossible for the Poles to run economy rationally in this province.¹ Nevertheless the Poles, whom for centuries propaganda originating in Berlin had declared to be lacking in organizational and economic ability, managed to carry on. Whereas in 1913 the output of coal had amounted to 32,200,000 tons, in 1929, it had risen to 34,400,000 tons. Though it was lower in other years, this was only because production had to be adapted to the requirements of the markets. The man output per diem, which in 1913 had been 1.2 tons in the Polish part of Upper Silesia, increased from year to year, and finally reached two tons. (It must be pointed out that at the same time the daily man output was 1.2 tons in Great Britain, 1.5 tons in Germany, 1.6 tons in Holland, while in France and Belgium it was only 0.8 tons). Many similar examples giving the lie to Prussian propaganda, which attempted to arouse doubts as to the Poles' organizational capacity and ability to handle economic problems, could be adduced from the experience of the twenty years of independence. But one condition is necessary: the Poles must be afforded possibilities of displaying their talents, and the fixing of Poland's western frontier on the Oder and Western Neisse gives them just those possibilities. We shall be dealing later on with what has already been achieved in a single year under most difficult working conditions, in areas devastated by war to an extent unknown in Western Europe. There need be no fear that economic life and production in these areas will stagnate—on the contrary, it will be developed still further in a number of spheres. In the new situation, the Germans will not be able to hinder development, as they were in regard to Upper Silesia after 1918. Above all, they will not have

¹ Interesting information on the subject of all these German activities is to be found in the study of Professor W. J. Rose, *The Drama of Upper Silesia*, London, 1936.

control over a number of enterprises, as they had before. For in the 1920's, some 85 per cent. of Silesian industry in the Polish section of the province was still in German hands. One could give the names of numbers of Germans who directed great enterprises in Polish Upper Silesia from Berlin, deliberately aiming at reducing them to economic ruin. Some of them were in possession of shares which were known to have belonged previously to the Prussian government. They were financed by the great German banks, which suffered considerable losses for the sake of these objectives. An example was Baron von Flick, who was also known for his influence in the Rhenische Stahlverein. The activity which he and his colleagues pursued (and this in the days of the Weimar Republic) was unscrupulous and quite criminal in character. When steps were taken by the Warsaw government to examine the books of enterprises under Flick's control, the directors and members of the administration did not wait to see the results (which were a revelation) but fled. The trials of the directors of various enterprises controlled by German finance proved beyond doubt that there had been a deliberate effort to reduce the production of mines and also of industrial establishments.¹ To-day, the Germans will be unable to exploit international agreements for the purpose of creating political and economic difficulties in the lands transferred to Poland. In other words, it will be incomparably easier to carry through the tasks involved.

But another essential question does arise. Are the areas situated to the east of the Oder and Western Neisse a complement of Polish economy in a manner analogous to that in which they were a complement previously to German economy? Or should the aim be to exploit all their potential possibilities to the full, and to develop their industry to such an extent that they will be able largely to take the place in Europe of that part of German industry now liquidated, in accordance with the Potsdam decisions, by the Berlin Control

¹Rose gives a general summary of these conditions and several typical examples. (Op. cit., pp. 244/247).

COMMISSION: THE RECONSTRUCTION of ruined industry in the Regained Provinces will call for a maximum effort, especially if we take into account the powers of a country so devastated by war as Poland. But the Poles can muster this effort. Judging by development so far, there is no doubt that the annual production of steel, for instance, will reach 2,000,000 tons by the end of 1949, and this will present some 100 per cent. of the pre-war capacity and 140 per cent. of the production of the areas now comprised within the Polish frontiers.² But what of that? In all probability, even after the restoration of war devastation, this production will exceed home requirements at the most by 25 per cent.; and it will be possible to assign not more than some 500,000 tons of steel and steel products to other continental countries. When the restriction of German production is taken into account, this obviously does not go far to meet Europe's needs. However, Silesia affords possibilities of steel production far in excess of 2,000,000 tons per annum, though that country which suffered the greatest war devastation of all, is not as yet in a position to exploit possibilities. Such an effort calls for outside assistance—for credits from the wealthy countries, which did not suffer at all during the war, or suffered only insignificantly. An analogous situation exists in a number of other branches of industry.

The people of Poland are fully aware of all this, and they have been not a little surprised to hear others demanding that there shall be no restriction on the production capacity of German industry, for the sake of European consumers' interests. Everybody in Poland considers that these same people would perform a far greater service to Europe to her living standards and her security, if they did just as intensive propaganda rather for

¹ During the press discussion of the level of production to be left to German industry, Mr. Lincoln Evans, Assistant General Secretary to the Iron and Steel Trades Confederation, put forward the idea that German production should be replaced by that of other countries, and of Poland first and foremost. (*The Times*, 5th November and 9th November, 1945).

² Data from the Polish three-year plan of reconstruction, drawn up by the Central Board for Planning.

Poland to be granted credits enabling her to exploit to the full her present possibilities, and thus replace German by Polish production.

As the result of the changes brought about by the recent war, Poland's area has been considerably reduced. In accordance with the Allied decision, and with the Polish-Soviet agreement concluded in Moscow on August 16th, 1945, an area of 69,535 square miles has been ceded to the republics of Lithuania, Byelorussia and Ukraine, an amount which constituted 46.3 per cent. of Poland's pre-war territory. In accordance with the Potsdam decision of August 2nd, 1945, in the north and west 39,555 square miles of former German and Danzig territory have been placed under Polish administration, 26.3 per cent. of Poland's pre-war area. As a consequence the total area of Poland has been reduced by 20 per cent. It is well to remember these figures when it is said that as the result of the same war the Germans, who caused it, waged it in a barbarous manner, and finally lost it, have lost 22 per cent. of their pre-war territory (including that part of East Prussia taken by the U.S.S.R.).

As a result of these changes the geometrical centre of Poland has been shifted more than 122 miles to the West, whence it was driven out by the German expansion of the Middle Ages.

The entire population of Poland has to be accommodated within this reduced territory, and this incidentally was suggested by the Allies themselves.¹

An agreement was concluded with the U.S.S.R., by which the Poles who before the war inhabited the area east of the so-called Curzon Line are now being transferred westward to Poland. The great majority are being settled in the area of the Regained Provinces, where by the summer of 1946 some 4,000,000 souls were already settled.

According to the latest estimates, after all the population

¹ Vide Mr. Churchill's speech in the House of Commons, December 15th, 1944. (Hansard, Volume 406). In a statement on December 12th, 1944, Mr. Stettinius had even promised the help of the United States Government in carrying through this transfer of population. (Department of State Bulletin, December 24th, 1944, Vol. XI, Nr. 287, p. 836). But this promise was not kept.

movements within Poland are completed—the deportation of the rest of the Germans, the completion of the transfers from beyond the Curzon Line, and the return of those who found themselves outside the country during the war—the population of Poland will be close on 25 million.¹ In other words, the density of population of the country, as the result of the incorporation of the Regained Provinces, will be some 207 inhabitants to the square mile. If the provinces lying east of the Oder and Western Neisse had not been incorporated, the density of population in Poland would have been some 310 inhabitants to the square mile, and so would have corresponded with the density of population of a rich and industrialized country. It would have been impossible to support such a population density in a Poland deprived both of the western Regained Provinces and the territories eastwards of the Curzon Line, and backward in industrial development as the result of nearly a century and a half of subjection—a Poland which, apart from coal, does not possess any outstanding natural wealth. Pre-war Poland was really an agricultural country, and yet because of her climate, the nature of her soil and imperfect cultivation, comparatively little of the agricultural production showed a profit. Consequently, Poland could export agricultural products only because a large part of the population was undernourished. If the density of population in Poland to-day were to be 310 to the square mile—in a country whose material war losses amount to 30 per cent. of its former national wealth, and whose territory would have been reduced by close on fifty per cent.—the country's fate would be unavoidable. Not only would it be impossible to make good the ruin and devastation, but over one-fourth of the population left after the ravages of war, some six million people, would be forced to a lingering death, or to emigrate (no one knows where) in order to preserve proportionately the same number of in-

¹ These estimates have been based on the population census taken on February 14th, 1946. According to the figures of the report issued by the above-mentioned International Committee for the Study of European Questions (p. 9), the Germans murdered 4,620,000 Poles, but in Poland these losses are estimated at some 6,100,000.

habitants as Poland had before the war. Yet, even then, when the country had not been devastated, the population had difficulty in maintaining a very low standard of living. In such conditions Poland would lose all chance of survival as an independent State. For this reason, among others, it has become categorically necessary that Poland's western frontier should be on the line of the Oder and the Western Neisse.

4. THE ECONOMIC CORRELATION OF POLAND AND HER REGAINED PROVINCES

To get a proper understanding of the natural economic bonds linking Poland with the former German provinces situated east of the Oder and Western Neisse we must take a glance back into the past.

The political bonds linking Poland with the various districts forming the Regained Provinces were snapped between the 12th and the 17th centuries. (Some of the frontier counties were annexed by Prussia only in the second half of the 18th century). None the less, the economic bonds linking the two areas survived until the first partition of Poland in 1772. Their close co-operation and interdependence found expression in the special trade agreements which were concluded between Poland and various provinces, agreements which did not cover the other areas of the states of which these provinces were a part. How close this co-operation was, how far the well-being of these areas was based on it and how beneficial it was to Poland, was completely demonstrated when, as the result of the policy pursued by the King of Prussia, Frederick II, these bonds were broken. The ineffective protests which the local people of Wroclaw (Breslau), Szczecin (Stettin), and East Prussia made in memorials sent to Berlin were in many cases warmly supported by the administrative authorities of the eastern districts of Prussia. These memorials were provoked by the impoverishment which was painfully affecting the people, and which found expression in numerous bankruptcies, and a sharp decline in trade

and production.¹ However, all these steps were without effect, since from that time right down to the outbreak of the recent war, political factors had a decisive influence on Berlin's attitude to these provinces, while economic factors were ignored.

The artificial separation of these areas from the Polish lands which retained their independence after the first Partition, and then from those which were under other foreign governments and, finally, in our days, from the Poland that was reconstituted after the first world war—a separation maintained by customs barriers, and later by a tariff policy also—could not conduce to a normal economic development. Similarly, the Germanization of the Polish resident population,² and the economic oppression of those who refused to be Germanized, were bound to react harmfully on the life of those areas. All this conduced to the formation of a situation in which 20th century German authorities, discussing the provinces lying east of the Oder and Western Neisse called them a *Raum ohne Volk* (Space without people).³

¹ This problem is discussed more extensively in relation to all the provinces now forming the Regained Provinces in my work "The Polish-Prussian Commercial Treaty of 1775: Poland's loss of access to the sea—its economic consequences." (La Societé des Sciences et des Lettres de Varsovie, 1937), Polish edition with an English resumé. A summary of the economic co-operation is given on pp. 49/52; the effects of the severing of the economic bonds on these provinces, on pp. 240/260. In the English resumé it is discussed generally on pp. 343/4. This work was based on sources inter alia in the Polish, German, British and French archives. I have dealt especially with the fate of East Prussia in my monograph *The Economic Decline of East Prussia*, published in English by the Baltic Institute in 1937, and based on German sources. The period we are now considering is discussed on pp. 5/16 of this work.

² Polish periodicals were published in Wroclaw (Breslau) down to the end of the 18th century. Public worship in the Polish tongue was forbidden there only after Hitler had come to power. In **Szczecin** (Stettin) and Slubice (Frankfurt-on-Oder), the Polish language was known generally at the end of the 18th century. Larger and smaller groups of people who did not succumb to Germanization survived, scattered all over the recovered areas, right down to contemporary times, and these constitute the group of 1,200,000 Poles already mentioned, who are not subject to deportation. The majority of them were poor, small farmers from whom factory and agricultural workers were recruited, and some lived right on the frontier as it exists to-day. For instance, the eastern suburb of Barsc (Forst) lying on the right bank of the Western Neisse, was mainly populated by a Polish proletariat right down to Hitlerite times.

³ Vide Volz, Burgdorfer, etc.

Anyone closely examining the economic structure of these areas before the war would have found it difficult to avoid comparing it with colonial conditions. Perhaps this was most striking in the provinces richest by nature, and having the greatest potentialities, namely Silesia. The natural wealth was exploited by firms which had their headquarters in the heart of Germany. Silesia supplied raw materials, or semi-manufactures, which were worked up into ready-made goods of high value in the west, beyond the Oder and Western Neisse line. The local officials received a special "eastern" bonus to their salaries, but the local workers received wages lower than those in other parts of Germany.¹

By way of example, we shall take that valuable metal, zinc. Before the war German Upper Silesia supplied about half of the total German production. The local mines belonged to two firms: Georg von Giesche's Heirs and the "Schlesag." Giesche's factories were situated in Magdeburg, while the Schlesag factories were in Cologne. In all Silesia there were only two small factories producing zinc buckets. The most important nickel deposits in Germany were situated in Lower Silesia, near Zabkowice (Frankenstein); and they were under the control of Krupps. Not only was there not a single manufactory of nickel alloys in all Silesia, but not even a single refinery; they were all built in the heart of Germany. When steps were taken in Germany to develop the production of synthetic rubber it was difficult not to pay attention to the fact that the necessary basic raw materials were to be found in Silesia. So one small factory was built there, in Zarow (Sarau), its production capacity being not much more than $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the total German production.

This state of affairs was not due to some fortuitous turn of circumstances, but was characteristic of German policy, or rather of Prussian policy, which for ages has been pursued deliberately in the area of the provinces lying east of the Oder and Western Neisse. As the result, these districts, which have just as great

¹ W. J. Rose, *op. cit.*, the chapter entitled "A Capitalist Culture Pattern"; J. M. Winiewicz, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

possibilities as the rest of Germany, had a very low level of social income; in certain districts it did not amount even to one-third of the average for all Germany. It is characteristic that this applies not only to the area situated east of the Oder and Western Neisse as a whole, but even to the great industrial centres found there. In 1928, a year when economic conditions were unusually good, the average income of the working person in Wroclaw (Breslau), was close on 20 per cent. below the average for the great cities of Germany, while in Zabrze (Hindenburg) it was 30 per cent. lower. Even if we take the former great German ports into account, it transpires that the one which is returning to Poland, namely Szczecin (Stettin), had an average income some 8 per cent. below the general average for German port towns.¹

In these conditions it is not surprising that there was a continual exodus of population from these areas to the west, to those parts of the state where there were normal, and not colonial conditions. This outflow applied especially to Germans. With the aid of German statistics this population movement can be fairly precisely determined, but only for Silesia, Pomerania and East Prussia; although we know that the population fled also from the other areas situated east of the line under consideration.² From the three provinces just mentioned, 2,156,800 people emigrated in the years 1840-1910, a further 402,500 emigrated during the years 1910-1925; and so in 85 years, in the course of three generations, 2,559,300 people left these provinces. We can fairly say that for the whole of the area now recovered by Poland, which before the war had a population of some 8,300,000 and an average density of population of some 215 to the square mile, the exodus over three generations was from

¹ *Statistisches Jahrbuch*, 1933, p. 471.

² Volz, op. cit., p. 42.

³ Ibid., pp. 41/42, 111. Heinz Rogmann, *Die Bevölkerungsentwicklung im preussischen Osten in den letzten hundert Jahren*, Berlin, 1937, took the years 1843/1933 as a basis (p. 234). From his calculations it would follow that in the course of these ninety years 3,008,200 persons emigrated from the areas under discussion. Vide also the cited *German Minority in Poland*, pp. 7/9 and 34/35.

2,800,000 to 3,000,000 people. It is not surprising that the German authorities were filled with anxiety at such figures.³

The first attempts on the part of the Berlin authorities deliberately to counteract this state of affairs came at the beginning of the 19th century.¹ The subventions, which later, between the first and second world wars, were called "Osthilfe" (Help to the East), began to flow into East Prussia in 1808. But the Prussians did not rely exclusively on positive financial assistance. Taxation reliefs were granted, special investment funds and credits were formed; as we have said, the officials were paid special bonuses, all kinds of facilities were granted in order to tempt Germans from other districts to settle to the east of the Oder and Western Neisse, and to tie the local population closely to those areas. When all these artificial means were of no avail, the authorities resorted to no less artificial administrative methods. The most varied obstacles, difficulties and trickeries were placed in the way of Germans wishing to emigrate from those districts. Only two methods were not tried. No attempt was made to change Berlin's treatment of these areas as colonies, an attitude which dated back to the Middle Ages, when, as the Reich advanced its conquests eastward, the so-called marches were formed in the conquered territories. Nor was any attempt made to change the policy which aimed at the utmost separation of these districts from the Polish lands which were not under Prussian domination. These two possible changes of policy which, of all justifiable economic measures, were the only ones that could be really effective, Berlin could not adopt for political reasons. In the Prussian capital it was consequently held that Prussian, and later German, "State necessity" required the areas east of the Oder and Western Neisse to become the "bastion of Germanism," and to constitute the starting-point for further expansion. All policy and life in this area had to be subordinated to this end, and no regard was paid to the fact that there thus arose conditions and an atmosphere not favourable

¹ We are not dealing here with the question of the attempt to colonise these areas, which began earlier and was of a somewhat different nature.

to normal economic development. Popular flight from these districts was resisted, and not very effectively, only with counter-measures consisting even of bribery and administrative pressure.

For Poland, in contradistinction to Prussia, the lands lying east of the Oder and the Western Neisse are of enormous economic importance, quite apart from their demographic significance which has already been discussed. On this point a few explanations seem to be called for.

Although in western Europe the Polish worker has long since won himself a good opinion as being intelligent, conscientious and industrious, although Polish technicians are inventive and ingenious, as is shown, for instance, by the large number of patents taken out by them, and although Polish industrialists abroad have not yielded place to representatives of other nations in their ability to organize labour or in their resourcefulness, even when working under the most difficult conditions, nevertheless, down to the outbreak of the recent war Poland was an agricultural country, or rather, was under-developed industrially. To find the explanation for this state of things, we must take yet another glance into the past.

Factory industry began to develop in Poland, as in the majority of European countries, in the 18th century. At the end of the sixties of that century a revolution broke out. The then King of Prussia, Frederick II, gave his support first to one then to the other side, aiming at prolonging the state of unrest which was destroying the country economically and weakening the State's prestige and its political strength. From Frederick's correspondence we learn that he was concerned, inter alia, with destroying Poland economically, and especially, as he declared, with ensuring that a further industrialization of the country should not be carried out in the immediate future.¹ Soon after the end of the revolution Poland suffered the first Partition, in 1772, which enabled Prussia to cut her off from the sea and thus, in the existing state of communications, to bring

¹ Friedrich der Grosse: *Politische Korrespondenz*, Vol. XXVII, pp. 333, 347 and 366, letters to Benoit dated 18/9/1768, 25/9/1768 and 2/10/1768.

her foreign trade entirely under Berlin's control and obtain a decisive influence on her economic life. During the last twenty odd years of Poland's independent existence (1772-95), the Prussians were therefore able, not only effectively to prevent the normal development of industry in Poland, but also to reduce the existing textile, iron, ceramic and other industries to ruin. This policy provided Prussian industry with enormous possibilities of development, especially as it had an almost exclusive market for its goods in Poland, which was hermetically cut off from the rest of the world.¹ From the time when, at the end of the 18th century, Poland ceased to exist as an independent state, being divided up among Prussia, Austria and Russia, the first two of the partitioning powers pursued a policy of preventing the development of industry, continuing this right down to the outbreak of the first world war. They did no more than exploit the slender local resources, which were passed through the manufacturing processes elsewhere. Only in the area taken by Russia were these tendencies aiming at preventing a normal development of industry not to be found. But in that area there were hardly any natural riches on which industry could be based. To give some idea of the conditions then prevailing and the situation in which Polish industry had to work, I cite the example of German capital buying up coal-bearing districts in parts of Poland under Austrian or Russian control, in order to make it impossible to open up new production, or at least restrict existing production. The object of this activity was clear, nor was it a secret to anyone living at that time. In a period of intensive development of industry throughout Europe steps were taken to ensure the most far-reaching restriction of economic development in Polish areas, irrespective of the state political frontiers within which they were situated.

1914 brought the outbreak of the first world war, which was to bring Poland her independence. But before this deliverance came, the Germans had occupied that part of Poland which had

¹ Vide the fuller analysis of this problem in my work already mentioned, *The Polish-Prussian Commercial Treaty of 1775*.

been under Russia—the only part in which the authorities had not deliberately set obstacles in the way of the development of industry. Because of the lack of natural resources mentioned above, this industry was not very extensive, yet it played a considerable part in the economic and social structure.

It so happened that during the years 1914-18 there were no pitched battles in the neighbourhood of the Polish industrial centres, and the latter might hope to emerge unscathed from the first world convulsion. But the German occupation authorities decided not to let this happen. The moment they were settled-in they set about the destruction of Polish industry on a large scale. Excuses for this were easy to find. For instance, the people were obliged to hand over all the copper found in the country to the authorities for the requirements of the German armaments industry. A single copper screw or a plate with a copper surface was made the pretext for dismantling great and expensive machinery. Even the very assumption that some part of a machine was made of this metal was sufficient to ensure its destruction. In the case of a number of factories some basic piece of equipment, such as generators, was confiscated and carried off. After the war, a number of pieces of equipment of this kind, taken from the Lodz mills, were found near Kovno in Lithuania in sealed warehouses, or in the open, in a condition rendering them suitable only for scrap.

As a result of this deliberate action on the part of the German authorities it was established after their eviction that Polish industry had suffered losses amounting to some £692,400,000, according to prices then current, and although under the Versailles Treaty the Germans were bound to pay reparations for the damage done, the sums actually recovered did not exceed a small fraction of one per cent. of what was due.¹

During the period separating the first from the second world war, while Poland was independent, her economic situation was extremely difficult. The country's population was mainly agricul-

¹ *Almanach Polonais*, Paris, 1926; Rzepecki, B: *La situation general de l'industrie*, p. 187 and 190.

tural and, as agricultural had not the advantage of either a very rich soil or a favourable climate, with the conditions then prevailing on the world market it could not provide either full employment or adequate support. The only way out of this situation was an intensive development of industry. On the other hand, in the competitive conditions reigning in the world, and above all in Europe during these twenty years, countries with a backward economy which had not created the foundations for modern industry on a large scale during the 19th or at the beginning of the 20th century, could think of developing their own industries only if they had exceptionally good natural conditions and substantial capital at their disposal. Poland did not possess any considerable capital of her own, since the economic situation we have described had prevented its accumulation, and the war had largely destroyed such capital as she did possess. Foreign capital came to Poland with great difficulty and only in "homeopathic" doses—a large part of the available international capital was located in Germany.¹ The natural foundations were confined to a certain, actually quite considerable quantity of coal which, however, in general was not suitable for coking. The oil-fields were approaching exhaustion.² This was obviously too little to ensure that in the conditions of the inter-war years an agricultural country could change over to industry by its own efforts. The efforts actually made in this direction were tremendous, the percentage of the population employed in industry rose from 10.3 per cent. to 19.3 per cent.,³ but the number of surplus agricultural workers was still estimated at some five million, or 12 per cent. of the total population. This caused grave over-

¹ In the years 1924/35, the total foreign credit, both long and short-term, granted to Poland amounted to some £100,000,000, while, during the same period, Germany was granted £1,240,000,000.

² At the beginning of the present century the annual output of crude oil in territories which before 1939 belonged to Poland exceeded that in 1939 by 2,000,000 tons; by 1913 the figure was only 1,114,000 tons, and in 1938, only 507,000 tons. *Concise Statistical Year Book of Poland*, 1941.

³ According to the 1921 and 1931 population censuses (1931 was the last population census held before the outbreak of the war). From 1920 to 1939 the proportion of persons living by agriculture fell from 66 per cent. to 59 per cent. (the latter figure is an estimate).

population on the land, an extremely difficult situation, that gravely disturbed the social and economic balance of the country. The foreign investigators of Polish conditions who declared that the country's economic position was at the root of all Poland's troubles were completely justified.

The transference to Poland of the lands lying east of the Oder and Western Neisse gives her the possibility of making good the enforced neglect of the country's economic development during the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, since it provides the requisite natural bases for the expansion of industry.

It is not a matter of increasing Poland's already considerable coal deposits, but the essential one, that she should get adequate deposits of coking coal suitable for foundry work, and that the centres of Poland's heavy industry should have direct water communications via the Oder with the sea port of Szczecin (Stettin) in order to ensure comparatively cheap water transport of iron ore from Sweden.

In these conditions there are completely new prospects for iron and steel, and therefore for all machine-industry. This is the more important since to-day, within the Polish frontiers, are found certain deposits of manganese ore, and some chrome. The same is true of the possibilities that are provided by large deposits of zinc, lead, copper, and the nickel mines. Supplies of special fire-proof clay of the muffle type provide an indispensable auxiliary raw material for the zinc industry. There is no need to mention all the types of mining to be found in the Polish recovered areas. There are deposits of quartzite, of clays suitable for pottery and china, special sands which, since they lie close to the coal-mines, will make it possible to produce all kinds of glass, etc. Even this partial list of the natural riches available reveals the possibilities that these areas provide to Polish industry, and *ipso facto* of solving her economic problems with all their consequences. In addition, there are great prospects for the textile industry in Silesia which, thanks to its specially good conditions for flax cultivation, already constituted a source of wealth for this area even before it was torn from

Poland in the Middle Ages.

It is true that in 1945 the Poles found an enormous part of the industry existing east of the Oder and Western Neisse in ruins; it is true that even before the war this industry, as we have noted, was not developed to the extent that the possibilities of the areas allowed: but the energy with which the Polish people have set about the reconstruction of what did exist and the realization of plans aiming at exploiting local resources, not only provides a guarantee that general living standards will be raised in Poland, but also ensures that Europe as a whole will by no means lose by Germany being deprived of these areas. Everything indicates that the quantity of goods produced there will increase by comparison with the pre-war position, and in any case, will not diminish. A high level of production in those areas is far more to Poland's direct interests than it was to Germany's.

In this summary of the economic significance for Poland of her new western frontier, I have not mentioned one other factor of far-reaching importance, viz., the extension of the Polish seaboard to some 308 miles. Pre-war Poland had the shape of an irregular sack which, on the seaboard, narrowed to a width of only some 45 miles (including the Bay of Puck). Passing over the strategic significance of such a state of affairs, it also had tremendous influence on the country's economic life. Although a large part of her foreign trade was carried by sea, she was a continental country. For the great majority of the people, the sea-coast was only the spot to which they thronged from all over the country in the summer-time, for holidays in crowded seaside resorts which stretched almost unbrokenly one after another for the whole distance. Only to-day have conditions been created for the Poles to become a genuinely continental-maritime nation with all its economic consequences, from fisheries through ship-building to adequately developed overseas trading relations.

5. THE POLITICAL ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM

One of the most fundamental causes of misunderstanding between people of good will is the fact that, seen through

different eyes, the same thing does not always look alike to everybody. The situation is still worse if it is observed from different parts of the world, since not only is the perspective changed, but the same thing or problem is seen from completely different angles. At such a time no little effort is needed in order to see the thing whole. We have to overcome the tendency to see the picture which is shown to us in two dimensions, we have always to remember the third dimension which is a fundamental feature of our world, not to mention the fourth dimension, as time is often regarded.

The author's object here is to present the German problem and the question of the Oder and Western Neisse frontier as it appears when observed from present-day Poland. In the British Isles, in Western Europe, in the U.S.A., this problem is seen from its western side; for centuries the peoples of these countries have been used to seeing Germany's western features, which are completely unlike those she presents to the East. This is why, to a large extent, the very problem of a definitive separation of Germany's eastern provinces from the Reich is regarded with quite different eyes on the East.

To realize the picture of Germany as seen from Poland, one has to bear in mind that through the ages Poland has had contact first and foremost with her immediate neighbours, the Prussians. "Prussian" was a synonym for "German" hundreds of years before Berlin became the capital of the Reich, before the time when, in the words of the British sociologist, A. Farquharson, "complete domination of Germany by Prussianism, Prussian brutality and efficiency (became) a model for the whole nation. Traces remained of romanticism and a lofty idealism, but a realism which went to the verge of cynicism and indifference to all ideals and all morality was widely accepted. The idea of universal humanity fell into contempt."¹

This is the picture of the Prussian mentality imposed on Germans as it is seen from London, and it is similar to the view

¹ Gooch, G.P., Ginsberg, Willoughby, Butler, Stig, Pascal, Farquharson: *The German Mind and Outlook*, London, 1945, p. 199.

OF IT FROM PARIS, BRUSSELS, OR THE HAGUE. Unfortunately, to anyone observing it from Warsaw or Prague, it appears even less attractive.

All the power of Prussia was built up on the foundation of the lands which she wrested from Poland. Some interesting remarks on this question are to be found in the book by Mathews, *European Balance*.¹ When, for instance, to go no further back, the Hohenzollerns broke the political bonds linking East Prussia with the Commonwealth of Poland (until that time East Prussia had been a vassal state of Poland with political and social institutions similar to the Polish), they had to terrorize the population, who resisted, by methods not very dissimilar from Nazi methods. It is understandable that in these conditions the Prussian rulers, in their anxiety to tie to themselves the peoples of considerable areas, among whom the memories of Poland, of Polish political and social institutions were too vivid, had to propagate a fierce anti-Polonism, the only analogy for which is to be found in anti-Semitism. For centuries officials and all who, for one reason or another, wished to find favour in their rulers' sight, were on principle negatively disposed to everything Polish. There was not a defect which they did not ascribe to the Poles. And so, in the course of generations, hatred was artificially generated, the effects of which were felt most painfully in Poland during the recent war. We do not want to burden this work with quotations, so we only cite the words spoken by Bismarck: "Beat down the Poles until they have no spirit left in them . . . All we can do is to exterminate them altogether."²

But Bismarck was speaking of Poles who had been subdued, who had been deprived of their own state rights, and were under Prussian domination. Such words would not have come from the Bismarck known to the West; he uttered them with his face turned eastward.

As the Prussian hegemony took firmer and firmer root in Germany, and as its influence extended, there was a development

¹ London, 1945, pp. 18/19.

² Vide Winiewicz, J. M. op. cit., p. 30.

of anti-Polish propaganda, or hatred for Poland and the Poles without regard to whether the period was the time of Polish subjection before the first world war, or during the existence of an independent Polish state between the two wars, or during the occupation of Poland between 1939 and 1945. Wherever the Prussian influence was stronger, there this hatred was deeper. Wherever the Prussians were less popular, it was less strong, or did not exist at all. A Pole travelling through Germany before the war was definitely conscious of this fact; and those Poles who were carried off to forced labour in Germany during the war, or even those in the various military camps, were conscious of this difference in the attitude of the local population. For instance, one found no feeling of hatred for Poles among the Austrians. Despite the fact that Austria shared in the partitions of Poland, although a large part of Polish lands was under Austrian domination for as long a period as were those lands taken by Prussia, yet it was difficult to think of any Polish-Austrian antagonism after 1919.

No one in Poland indulges in the illusion that sentiments deliberately excited and maintained for so many generations, and teachings driven into the heads of so many generations, can now suddenly disappear without leaving a trace, just because the Germans lost the war.¹ This is not the first war the Germans have lost. Moreover, there is, it appears, good reason for D. W. Brogan's statement: "What irked the rulers of Germany, long before the rise of Hitler, was not the injustices of Versailles, but the loss of the war . . . The fundamental injustice was the loss of the war by the people who, in its own eyes, deserved to win it, as the most efficient nation, militarily and economically, in Europe and the world. It was not because the world had judged them unjustly, because they had been forced to bear the burden of an unjust defeat that they were embittered."²

After all, even those Germans who succeeded in resisting the

¹ Vide German primers and history readers for youths and children, the sections relating to Poland.

² D. W. Brogan: *Is Innocence Enough: Some reflections on Foreign Affairs*. London, 1941; pp. 59/60.

propaganda of hatred admit that "Nazism has successfully infiltrated into Germans suspicion of all foreigners . . . There are still forces in Germany to-day who try to exploit the material difficulties of the occupying powers with propaganda which tries to prove that Western civilization is done for and that Nazism or some other totalitarian regime has taken its place. Such propaganda will lead to new disasters not only in Germany but in the whole of Europe . . . In the present situation the Nazi ideas will become the last aim to which the young people cling."¹

So long as these "forces" function and influence the mentality of the people in Germany, it is difficult for Poles to view the future without fear. The more so, as these "forces" are revealing their activities quite definitely, if only in the form of the expanding illegal organization "Edelweiss," which is strongly reminiscent of the terrorist bands that operated after the previous war,² a fact which, for that matter, is quite openly confirmed, among others, by the Bavarian premier, Dr. W. Hoegner.³

As the trial held before a British military tribunal at Luneburg in April, 1946 showed, this organization in directing its terroristic activity "mainly against displaced persons, particularly Poles,"⁴ those who have suffered most of all during the war, who against their will were carried off to Germany and had to work in hunger and cold, in the worst of conditions, at the demand of the Hitlerites, who punished resistance with death by long-drawn-out torture.

The Poles have grave reasons for fear and anxiety so long as there is no "re-education" of the Germans; of all Germans who regret not so much their provocation as their loss of the war, whose characteristic feature is, to use the words of one who knew them well (Sir Neville Henderson), "inability either to see

¹ Pastor Niemöller, in Berlin, 20/3/46. Reported in Manchester Guardian, 21/3/46.

² After the first world war various anti-Polish and anti-democratic terrorist organizations, such as the Freikorps, the Selbstschütz, and the notorious Black Reichswehr, operated in the eastern provinces of the Reich.

³ *The Observer*, 21/4/46.

⁴ *Evening Standard*, 25/4/46.

any side of a question except his own, or to understand the meaning of moderation,"¹ a "re-education" which is proceeding far more slowly than was expected. And here it must be remembered that the British occupation zone, in which in Field-Marshal Montgomery's view "75 per cent. of the German population had remained Nazi,"² is no exception to the rest of Germany. In view of such conditions, can the Poles expect that the Germans will quickly forget the teachings of Hegel, Treitschke, Nietzsche, not to mention the teaching of Hitler, Rosenberg, or Goebbels?

It has to be remembered that while a subdued, disarmed and demilitarised Germany will not be a threat for some of the powers for decades, or even for fifty years, she is always dangerous to Poland. Hitler, indeed, lost the war militarily, but, as Lord Beveridge confirms, in respect of population he won it.³ To a large extent he realized his plan, the plan which, according to Rauschning, was outlined as follows, as early as 1934: "We are obliged to depopulate as part of our mission of preserving the German population. We shall develop a technique of depopulation. And that is what I intend to carry out—that, roughly, is my task . . . I shall keep their men and women segregated for years . . . The French complained after the war that there were twenty million Germans too many. We accept the criticism. But our friends will have to excuse us if we subtract the twenty millions elsewhere."⁴

It is true that, according to the calculations of the "International Committee for the Study of European Questions," Hitler did not succeed in murdering twenty million people, but the losses of the European allies in killed alone amount to not less than fifteen millions, over four times as many as those of Germany; while by their brutal and ruthless policy the Germans succeeded in reducing the natural increase of population all over

¹ Final Report . . . on the circumstances leading to the termination of his mission to Berlin, Cmd. 6115, p. 4.

² Speech at Hastings, 8/3/46.

³ Sir W. Beveridge, "Peace and Population," *The Observer*, 28/4/46.

⁴ Rauschning, Hermann: *Hitler Speaks*, 3rd Impression, London, 1939, p. 140.

the continent, though increasing it in their own country, despite the war. According to the same committee's calculations, Poland's losses in population (97 per cent. of them being civilians murdered in cold blood) are far higher than Germany's not only in percentage, but in absolute figures, since the difference amounts to over one million more.¹ One must seriously reckon with the fact that certain still influential elements in Germany, and especially in Prussia, will come to the logical conclusion that, even if lost, a war waged with barbarous ruthlessness pays in the case of weaker neighbours. This manner of reasoning can be very easily instilled into the German people. And the industrial potential left to Germany by the resolution of the Allied Control Commission on March 28th, 1946, is incomparably higher than that of Poland. Without going into an analysis of the possibilities in all spheres of production one can state on the basis of the figures concerning steel, after taking over the Regained Provinces, Poland will have only one-fourth of Germany's armaments possibilities. Of course, the peace treaty will stand in the way of German rearmament. But everybody in Poland remembers that, when Germany signed the Versailles Treaty, she bound herself not to rearm; that the Versailles Treaty established a special Allied Control Commission, entrusted with the task of seeing that Germany scrupulously fulfilled her obligations. So surely it is difficult to expect the Poles to base their feelings of security on legal prescriptions restricting German freedom of action, until they pass the test of experience. A quarter of a century ago, Poland put her hopes in the League of Nations, and the clauses of the peace treaty concluded with Germany. She was tragically deceived. There is not one Pole who did not directly feel the painful consequences of this failure, and one-sixth of the entire nation was murdered ruthlessly. Thus, it is not surprising that to-day the instrument constituted by U.N.O., which undoubtedly is a more perfect instrument than the League

¹ The report on the results of the war of 1939-1945 already quoted. According to Polish calculations, the number of killed and murdered is $1\frac{1}{2}$ million higher, so that the difference between the Polish and German losses amounts to 2,500,000.

of Nations, must show convincingly that Poland can feel safe in its protection.¹ Nor is it surprising that Poles want the future peace treaty with Germany, which will undoubtedly provide better security against a new German aggression than did the Treaty of Versailles, to demonstrate its actual effectiveness. Nor is it surprising that everywhere in Poland to-day there is distrust of Germany, and fear, of a revival of Prussian militarism.

For this very reason the incorporation of the so-called Re-gained Provinces is from the political point of view understood in Poland first and foremost as a strengthening of Poland's potential and a weakening of the Prussian potential. Of course, in order to understand the Polish attitude to a frontier along the Oder and Western Neisse other factors have to be taken into consideration. These have already been discussed, with the exception of the emotional aspect of the problem, evoked by the return of ancient Polish lands to their mother country, which has no place here. But one of the most essential factors is, as we have just indicated, the change in power relations as between Poland and Prussia. It is not a matter of reducing the area of the German Reich by 22.2 per cent., but of reducing the area of Prussia by 40.2 per cent.² This fact affords a basis for the expectation that there will be an actual reduction of Prussian influence in Germany, and that it will finally be possible to build up normal good neighbourly relations with Germans who have not been systematically poisoned by the anti-Polish propaganda of Prussian militarism.

Unless the influence of Prussian mentality is rooted out of Germany, not only will it be impossible for normal neighbourly relations to exist along the Polish-German frontier, but the peace of Europe generally, and even of the world (as the last two wars have shown) will be under continual threat. The words

¹ It is difficult to be surprised at the attitude taken by Poles, when doubts as to the effectiveness of U.N.O. activity are expressed by others. Vide *British Security*, a report by a Chatham House Study Group, London, 1946; or D. J. Dallin, *The Big Three*, London, 1946.

² One should remember that the area of Prussia has been reduced not only by the transfer of areas to Poland, but also by the area transferred to the U.S.S.R.

uttered seven years ago by the present Prime Minister of Great Britain have not lost their actuality for the present day: "The problem to-day is not merely the defeat of German aggression, but the establishment of conditions which will make aggression impossible."¹

When all that has been said is taken into consideration, one cannot be surprised that everybody in Poland understands the importance of the new frontier. This is shown by the result of the referendum held on July 30th, 1946, in which 94.2 per cent. voted in favour of this frontier. And it must be remembered that very many of the people understood the approval of the western frontier as meaning the final renunciation of the areas situated east of the Curzon Line, the renunciation of Lwow and Wilno, with which all Poles, not only those coming from those districts, have been very closely bound by ties of sentiment. Even among emigré circles who are irreconcilably hostile to the present government in Poland, there is general realization of the necessity of attaching to Poland the former eastern German provinces.²

¹ Rt. Hon. C. R. Attlee, M.P., *Labour's Peace Aims*, November, 1939, p. 8.

² Vide articles in the emigré press opposed to the Warsaw government, e.g., *Dziennik Polski i Zolnierza Polskiego*, of 2nd May, 1946, *Mysl Polska*, May-June, 1946, etc.

Part II
The First Year

1. THE FIRST YEAR OF POLISH ADMINISTRATION IN THE REGAINED PROVINCES

"I am greatly impressed by the mass of tasks which await the Polish Government in this vast area, which is equal to one-third of the present territory of Poland. But I am also filled with admiration for the determination with which the Poles are setting about this work."

C. M. DRURY.

Head of the Unrra Mission in Poland; in a statement to the Press, on August 6th, 1946, after a journey through the Regained Provinces.

"A great deal is being written abroad about the bad management of the Western Areas. That is not in accordance with the truth; on the contrary, what I have seen in the areas Poland has recovered indicates that a genuine economic reconstruction is going on there."

LA GUARDIA.

Statement to the Press, August 24th, 1946, after a visit to the Regained Provinces.

The following pages constitute a modest attempt to describe life, and above all, economic life in the areas of the Polish Regained Provinces during the first year of Polish administration.

Though the decision concerning these areas was taken on August 2nd, 1945, at Potsdam, in actual fact a spontaneous drive of Poles westwards started even earlier. They commenced work on empty farms, in workshops, and even factories. June is thus regarded as the anniversary of the actual beginning of the Polish activity in almost the whole area. Owing to the difficulty of assembling material it is possible that not all the figures and comparative data will apply exactly to June, 1946; some may relate to a rather earlier date, others to a later date (though these exceptions are always indicated), but they will always be undoubtedly accurate.

Obviously it is impossible in a few dozen pages to present the full results of a year's endeavour by millions of men and women over an area of some 38,824 square miles,¹ so I have been content with a general summary of the conditions which the Poles found on their arrival, the conditions in which they worked, and a number of examples, drawn from the most important spheres, showing the results achieved. The examples are various and the achievements both great and small—I shall always endeavour to provide an explanation of such disparities. Perhaps, when the reader comes to realize the conditions in which these people are working to-day, and especially in which they worked a year ago, when he sees the ruins in which they began living without support from any country, for none could provide them with adequate material help, he will agree that the average of those achievements seems incredibly high. To understand how this could be, one must understand the psychological state of the Polish people when they were liberated from the German occupation. At last they had the opportunity to give vent to their accumulated desire of six years for concrete creative labour, labour for their own State and for themselves. It would be difficult to find anyone in Poland who has not mourned the loss of some near and dear one, not to speak of the material losses everyone has suffered—millions have lost literally everything. Thus, a large section of the community regards the pre-war

¹ Excluding the former Free City of Danzig.

days as a "previous life, before the reincarnation." These people, especially those who have felt the pain and the despair more intensely, seek oblivion and are finding it in hard work. So they work, often beyond their strength, but it is work which yields very positive results, results which are astonishing the more perspicacious of the foreign observers who are now visiting Poland.

A description of these results in the Regained Provinces has been made possible thanks to materials placed at my disposal by several friends. Especially I feel bound to express my gratitude to Dr. R. Fleszarowa and M. Z. Milobedzki in Warsaw, and M. P. Zaremba, the Mayor of Szczecin, who spared no effort to obtain the information for which I asked them. Apart from these sources, a considerable amount of information, especially of a detailed nature, concerning particular localities, industrial works, etc., is derived from the Polish Press. Wherever the material is drawn from other sources, the fact is stated in a footnote.

2. THE SETTLEMENT AND ECONOMIC CONDUCT OF THE POLISH REGAINED PROVINCES

A Bureau of Western Areas was set up under the Polish Prime Minister's office.¹ The purpose of this Bureau was to study all the problems connected with the former Prussian provinces lying east of the Oder and Western Neisse.

The Bureau's labours, especially in regard to the destruction or removal of Warsaw libraries by the Germans, were greatly facilitated by the many exact and detailed studies prepared in Poland during the German occupation by a group of experts and specialists who worked in a special section of the Underground Movement concerned with the problem of taking over control of these very areas. This assistance was of particularly

¹ Later 1945, it was transferred to the Ministry for Public Administration, and in November, 1945, it ceased to exist, on the creation of a special Ministry for the Regained Provinces.

urgent importance because the Bureau had to make up the complements of the administrative authorities who entered these areas shattered by war and almost depopulated to organize the life of the provinces as they were liberated by the armies. Furthermore, it had to supply these authorities with their information and data. Before long particular Ministries, especially those dealing with economic life, had organized so-called "Operational Groups" to take over industry, agriculture, communications, etc.

In the first months this work of staffing the administration in the areas then recovered obviously involved an enormous effort on the part of Poland. I am not referring simply to the fact that these people had to travel in ramshackle lorries which often broke down on the way, or that each of these lorries with its requisite load of petrol reduced the already very inadequate transport supplying the towns of Central Poland with food. Nor do I have in mind the fact that the entire personal baggage with which these people set out, often to an unknown area, to engage in the hard work of the pioneer, often consisted of a single change of underclothes and a stock of food sufficient for a few days, carried sometimes in a rucksack, but usually in a sack slung by a string over the shoulders, as all rucksacks had been confiscated by the Germans. The effort consisted in the fact that these people were just as much needed in the areas from which they were sent. During their occupation of the country, the Germans particularly exterminated the educated members of the community and all who had had experience of administration. At this time only very few of those who had survived in the various German camps had succeeded in returning to Poland, and the repatriation of those abroad had not yet begun. And for these reasons every individual sent to occupy an administrative post in the Regained Provinces left a gap in the administration of the rest of the country. Nevertheless, both the Government and the people fully realized the necessity of sending the best and most energetic to the areas taken over from the Germans.

Although these "Operational Groups" were prepared to find

considerable devastation, what they did find on the whole surpassed anything they had imagined. Only a few of the southern counties in Silesia at the foothills of the Sudeten mountains, which had never been attacked and where Germans had remained until the capitulation, only these had escaped.

The value of the areas put under Polish administration as the result of the Potsdam decision was estimated at some £2,250,000,000.¹ Of course this figure relates to pre-war days. The value of these territories when they were taken over by the Polish authorities consisted above all in their potentialities, for, although the destruction in industry, by comparison with the position in 1938 is reckoned at 50 per cent. for the whole area, this by no means signifies that 50 per cent. of the industrial establishments were ready to start work. It merely means that the total value of the mines after the water had been pumped out and the underground and surface equipment put in order, the value of the factories capable of repair, the value of the undamaged machinery (often dug out of rubble), which can be put into serviceable order, amount to 50 per cent. of the value of the industry which was situated in the Polish Regained Provinces in 1938. The Polish authorities on their arrival found there only 27 per cent. of all pre-war industrial establishments in workable condition. The installations of the coal industry and the fuel and power industry have been salvaged up to 80 per cent., but those of the chemical industry, for instance, only up to 40 per cent. In the metal industry, which before the war employed some 85,000 persons, and had an estimated value of some £28,000,000, 50 per cent. of the buildings have been saved out only 10 per cent. of the machinery and technical installations remains intact. Industrial establishments were at first taken over by engineers and technicians sent by the Ministry of Industry, and in the great majority of cases their main task was to make an inventory and to secure the existing equipment and buildings,

¹ According to the figures published in volume 526 of the *Statistik des Deutschen Reiches* the value of the area of the Polish Regained Provinces on January 1st, 1935 was approximately £1,595,000,000. This figure, however, did not include transport and communication, military establishments, etc.

and any stocks there might be, against destruction and pilfering by the bands wandering over these areas. Special commissions of experts investigated the state of the damaged factories and the possibilities of starting them up again.

At the same time steps were taken to create institutions called "patronates." That is individual industrial enterprises in the old Polish areas took over the care of analogous institutions in the Regained Provinces. Above all they "lent" them professional staffs, of which there is such a shortage in Poland to-day, and which are indispensable in the work of reconstruction, refitting, or even only the restarting of the industrial works taken over. These staffs organized first training courses for workers. Some times the factories undertaking the "patronate" were in a position to supply missing machinery, or parts, so that, thanks to this system, it was possible in a comparatively short time to resume production in a considerable percentage of the industry of these areas. Thus, in May, 1946, the industries of the Regained Provinces were already giving employment to over 184,500 people¹ of whom over 80 per cent. were Poles (the remainder consisted of German prisoners of war and Germans not yet deported from the areas). These 184,500 people were engaged in the following works, that by then had been put into operation:

- 36 works in the chemical industry.
- 6 works in the sugar industry.
- 61 works in the timber industry.
- 13 works in the electrotechnical industry.
- 77 works in the fuel and power industry.
- 24 works in the foundry industry.
- 64 works in the production of building materials.

¹ This figure covers only the workers and employees of the branches of production specified below. Actual figures for the rest of industry, such as the glassworks, foodstuffs, etc., could not be collected. In September, 1946, there were 200,000 Poles in the industries of the Regained Provinces.

77 works in the metal industry.

39 works in the papermaking industry.

44 works in the leather industry.

74 coalmines.

181 works in the textile industry.

To give an idea of the progress made, we may take the example of the metal industry, for which we have equally exact data relating to June, 1946. In May, 11,299 persons were working in this industry in the Regained Provinces, while in June the figure was 16,534; in this latter month, Poles constituted some 94 per cent. of the total.

Destruction was greater in communications, than in industry. With the exception of those in the southern counties of Silesia the railway lines had been destroyed over long distances (70.6 per cent.) and the bridges blown (55.3 per cent.). This latter circumstance was particularly unfortunate on the Oder (all the 52 bridges between Kozle (Cosel), and Szczecin were destroyed), since it not only made it impossible to restart east-to-west railway and road traffic, but also prevented navigation on the river. The bulk of the rolling stock had been taken away by the retreating Germans. The engines and trucks left were in need of very thorough repair—which was the reason why they had been left behind. The buildings of the railway workshops had not suffered serious damage (10 to 20 per cent.) with the exception of the largest of them all, at Wroclaw (Breslau) 30 per cent., and at Starogard (Stargard) 40 per cent.; but their equipment was damaged irreparably to the extent of 85 to 95 per cent.¹

Before the war there were close on 44,600 kilometres (27,875 miles) of hard surface roads in the area of the Regained Provinces. 23 per cent. of their surface, or close on one quarter

¹ The only exception was that of the comparatively small repair shops at Pila (Schneidemuhl), where 10 per cent. of the equipment was lost. Vide U.N.R.R.A. European Regional Office, *Transport Rehabilitation in Poland*. June, 1946, p. 7.

was destroyed.¹

As this destruction was chiefly caused by mines, and to some extent by bombs, during the initial phase in reality a much greater percentage of the roads were unfit for use. Over enormous distances the former railway bridges did not exist at all, and obviously those built by the military as the armies advanced were inadequate.

The problem of getting communications into working order was undoubtedly the most pressing of all. First, the most important railway lines were restored, and the main roads repaired sufficiently to be used. U.N.R.R.A. supplies did much to increase the rolling stock, supplementing home production (a large percentage of which is carried on in the restored and re-equipped factories in the Regained Provinces). In addition steps have been taken to bring the ports on the Oder into service (by the end of 1945 the ports of Gliwice, Kozle and Maluszyn were all in operation) to clear the river channels, to repair and add to rolling stock, etc. In 1946, a total sum of £2,525,000 was assigned for the restoration and development of communications on this river (a body has been specially set up to cope with this task), all the sectors of which, with all the existing installations were transferred to the Polish authorities by the Soviet military authorities on August 6th, 1946. The clearing of the river channel and repair of the locks was also completed about this date.

Perhaps the industry most hard hit in the Polish Regained Provinces was agriculture. Enormous tracts of the country were devastated, and almost everywhere there was danger of mines, so that every time anyone ventured into a field he ran considerable risk (8,782,500 acres had been mined). After the front had moved on the average state of equipment in the farms was bad (it has to be remembered that the great majority of the farms were completely abandoned, and the villages completely or almost completely deserted, so that there was no one to guard property. Worse still, the position in regard to livestock was absolutely tragic. The county of Boleslawiec (Bunzlau) in Lower Silesia,

¹ Ibid., p. 8.

with an area of over 400 square miles and 5,181 agricultural holdings of various sizes, had altogether four pairs of emaciated horses, sixty cows and five pigs, and this state of affairs was by no means exceptional. For the Regained Provinces as a whole the number of horses amounted to 10 per cent. of pre-war days, the number of horned cattle some 8 per cent., pigs some 4 per cent., and sheep some 3 per cent.¹

The total pre-war value of all the agricultural holdings in the Polish Regained Provinces was estimated at some £500,000,000.² Out of a total of some 462,000 holdings, some 240,000 were so devastated that they could not be brought into service (i.e., apart from lack of livestock, their buildings and farm equipment were either completely destroyed, or required thorough repair). Obviously this does not mean that the absolute agricultural value of these areas has been reduced by close on 59 per cent. But it did mean that close on 59 per cent. of the farms were, practically speaking, eliminated from production in the immediate future, while the remaining 41 per cent. were capable of being brought into operation only after a very large quantity of livestock, and above all of settlers, had been brought into the area. However, it was far easier to find agricultural labourers than livestock.³ Immediately on the heels of the Polish administration, and more than often preceding it, crowds of people, mainly farmers, arrived in the areas, desiring to settle and to work there. The majority were Poles from the farther side of the Curzon Line, or were drawn from the above-mentioned group of people "surplus to agriculture" in areas which had remained with Poland, or else landless agricultural workers and small farmers from the same areas, who were unable to obtain even a modest existence from their land. At first this movement was so spontaneous that the authorities, who at that time were only in

¹ J. Kolipinski, *A Study of the Role of the Regained Provinces in Poland's Economic Organism*, *Przegląd Zachodni*, Nr. 6/1946, p. 517.

² Calculated on the basis of *Statistik des Deutschen Reiches*, Vol. 526. Berlin, 1939. "Die Hauptfeststellung der Einheitswerte nach dem Stand von 1 Januar. 1935."

³ In September, 1946, Polish settlers were already running 330,150 individual farms.

an incipient state of organization not only in the Regained Provinces, but throughout Poland, were unable to control it. Only after some months had passed, and brought stabilization, was it possible to begin to put proper detailed plans for settlement into practice. In principle what was done, was to see that the settlers took over areas with soil and climatic conditions similar to those with which they were acquainted, and that socially organized groups of settlers were not broken up, for it was assumed that on the one hand a peasant would feel more comfortable if in his new home he had the same neighbours as before, as far as possible the same priest, the same village teacher, and that on the other, in the atmosphere of post-war demoralization (which, we may say in parentheses, proved less than was feared), it would be easier for him to maintain a moral standard. The transports of settlers "from beyond the river Bug," which began officially to arrive after the conclusion of the agreement with the U.S.S.R. already mentioned, were organized on these principles.

By then the law on agrarian reform,¹ which enacted the principle that agrarian holdings in private hands should be of not more than fifty hectares (about 125 acres), or 100 hectares (about 250 acres), was already in force. It was, however, considered that to set about carrying through agrarian reform in the Regained Provinces before they had been brought under economic control would have a negative effect on production. Nevertheless, apart from a small number of large estates under the administration of the State or of institutions intended for cattle-breeding, etc., it is expected that in principle all the agricultural areas will be divided into small holdings of from seven to fifteen hectares ($17\frac{1}{2}$ to $37\frac{1}{2}$ acres) according to the soil conditions, while in certain cases the holdings may be of twenty hectares (fifty acres).

At first the settlers arriving in the Regained Provinces did not obtain holdings as their own property, but they were guaranteed priority in allocation of the areas which they were managing

¹ Issued September 6th, 1944.

and cultivating. As the various counties are brought under economic control, the local farmers receive the farms as their own property by a special transfer deed. This is usually associated with a special ceremony. Naturally, this procedure does not affect the Polish autochthonous population already possessing farms in the Regained Provinces.

The large estates constituted a separate problem. Some 8,000 farms aggregating some four million hectares (about ten million acres) half of which is cultivable, are destined to be parcelled out. At first they were administered by managements delegated from the Ministry for Agriculture and Agrarian Reforms. In the spring of 1946 steps were taken to form special co-operatives for the purpose of parcelling out the large agricultural properties and forming them into individual small holdings with their own buildings and equipment. This type of co-operative must complete its task within a period of not more than five years, after which it will be automatically dissolved. Anyone can become a member of a co-operative, if he has obtained a transfer deed for an agricultural property from the administrative authorities. In other words, the farmer first becomes the owner of the land, and only thereafter may (but not must) become a member of a co-operative. On joining the co-operative the farmer pays an enrolment fee of about one pound, and is under an obligation to contribute his share in the form of a corresponding number of hours of labour in co-operative work (helping in building his co-operative neighbours' farms, etc.), or by paying in cash a sum of about one pound four shillings per hectare (about $2\frac{1}{2}$ acres), of his own farm. These co-operatives enjoy the benefit of quite considerable government and banking credits, and also aid in another form. For instance, 10 per cent. of the livestock supplied by U.N.R.R.A. has been allocated to members of these co-operatives. It may be of interest to give the total figures for the livestock with which work was begun on these farmsteads, which cover over five million acres of arable land; there were 9,200 horses, not quite 17,800 cows, 6,500 sheep, and less than 3,300 pigs.

Taking into consideration the conditions the Poles found in the Regained Provinces and the difficulties under which work has been and still is carried on there, it is not surprising that in 1945 only some 18 per cent. of the pre-war area was sown and that the harvest amounted to no more than 7.1 per cent. of the pre-war figures.

In 1946, close on 30 per cent. of the whole pre-war area was sown. Sowing of the entire area is to be expected only in 1949, and then only because, *inter alia*, three-quarters of the total credits assigned for rural reconstruction in Poland down to that date are destined for the Regained Provinces.

The situation in these areas in the summer of 1946 was already easier than in 1945. The position in regard to livestock was gradually improving; the number of horses exceeded 20 per cent. of the pre-war figure (four-fifths of these being brought by repatriated people from beyond the Curzon Line), that of cattle was more than 12 per cent. (of which one-third was brought by repatriated people from beyond the Curzon Line). The agricultural population was however, disproportionately high and in quite a number of districts it has been necessary to stop any further influx of settlers. The total figure was already some 2,000,000 persons, which amounts to 80 per cent. of the pre-war population.¹ Taking into account the serious devastation, it is doubtful whether any large number of agriculturists can still be settled in the area of the Regained Provinces before agrarian reconstruction and reform has been carried through.

Yet we must remember that when the organizers arrived these areas, with the exception of the few counties in Southern Silesia which the war had passed by, were wildernesses over which roved remnants of the German army, deserters, and bands of robbers. This state of things was the result not only of the mass flight of the local population before the approaching invasion, but also of the evacuation which the German authorities had early carried out on an enormous scale. From the beginning of

¹ Before the war the total agricultural population of the area was 2,491,000; the figure of 1,654,000 previously given being that of those professionally active in agriculture.

1945 onwards, news and descriptions of this organized exodus from the eastern provinces of Prussia had begun to appear in the German, and even the Swedish Press.¹ In the course of February alone, 651,000 civilians were evacuated from East Prussia and by sea routes alone.² As before the war East Prussia had some 2,500,000 inhabitants, it is obvious that much larger numbers were evacuated overland. For some weeks in the summer of 1945, after the close of hostilities, there was a wave of German refugees from the West returning to the Polish Regained Provinces, but this ceased as soon as the frontier was adequately manned.³ Very often when they arrived at their former places of habitation they found that Polish settlers were already ensconced there, which caused additional difficulties for the local authorities then in process of organization.

When speaking of the additional difficulties, one may not ignore the armed bands of so-called "Freies Deutschland" under the command of German officers, who were even in 1946 still ravaging certain districts, plundering, robbing, blowing up bridges, burning and looting. It is true that such incidents occurred later only sporadically, but at first they were a real plague.

Finally, we must remember that these areas were taken over at a time when chaotic conditions prevailed not only in these areas but nearly on the whole of the European continent. Besides these provinces were generally regarded by the Soviet Army as conquered enemy territory. This did not render the work of the Polish pioneers any easier. The Soviet army understandably, took possession of those buildings which were in better condition, the larger farmsteads, and all kinds of communication and transport resources, as well as certain industrial enterprises, and

¹ E.g., *Morgentidningen*, January 27th, 1945; *Aftentidningen*, February 2nd, 1945.

² *Deutsches Nachrichten Büro*, March 1st, 1945.

³ This has to be regarded as the explanation of the disparity between the figure of 1,500,000 Germans in the Polish areas, given by the Polish Government at the Potsdam Conference and the number of Germans later deported.

exploited them for their own requirements.

Then, too, we must recall the conditions prevailing in the hinterland of these areas. Poland had been stripped of its experts in every branch. Those who had escaped during the war began to return home only in the summer and autumn of 1945 (as is well known, this movement is not yet ended). The country's material destruction surpassed anything that could be witnessed anywhere else in Europe (proportionately the devastation was even greater than that in the U.S.S.R.). Suffice to say that the material losses caused by the war and the activities of the occupation authorities in the former Polish lands have been estimated at some 30 per cent. of the pre-war national capital wealth. Some 32 per cent. of industry was destroyed, and transport was in an even worse situation, half having been destroyed. Some 16 per cent. of the farms had been eliminated from general production. The position in regard to livestock was certainly better than in the Regained Provinces, but the numbers did not amount even to half the pre-war total: horses, 44.9 per cent., cattle, 33.5 per cent., sheep, 46.6 per cent., pigs, 17.3 per cent. Only when all the foregoing factors have been taken into account can one attempt to obtain an objective estimate of what has been achieved during the first year in the territories placed under Polish administration by the Potsdam decision of August 2nd, 1945.

When all the difficulties are taken into account (and we have outlined only the most important of them, those of fundamental significance) then the fact that as we have said, the 1945 harvest in the Polish Regained Provinces did not exceed 7.1 per cent. of the pre-war harvest, and that in 1946 some 37.3 per cent. of the pre-war areas had been sown, and the harvest was expected to be 30 to 40 per cent. of the pre-war level, ceases to cause surprise. Nor is it surprising that the production of the coal mines in the areas taken over by the Polish authorities rather late in 1945 in a very deteriorated condition, did not much exceed 25 per cent. of the annual production in normal pre-war years during the remaining months of 1945, especially if it is borne in

mind that in June, 1946, the worker's daily output was already over 56 per cent. of his pre-war productivity, while employment has reached over 85 per cent. of the pre-war level.

In a word, it is not a matter for surprise that during the first year of Polish administration of the Regained Provinces production in all spheres was much below the pre-war level. Any objective estimation of what has been achieved in these areas must take into account the state of devastation, and the conditions in which they were and still are, working. Those conditions are undoubtedly more difficult than anywhere else in post-war Europe, and certainly far more difficult than in the various German zones, where the occupation authorities are coming up against such considerable difficulties in the organization of normal economic life.

3. THE AREA AND ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION OF THE POLISH REGAINED PROVINCES

The Polish Regained Provinces embrace the former Regierungsbezirk of Oppeln (German Upper Silesia) which under its ancient historical name of Opole Silesia has been incorporated into the province of Silesia. The Silesian Voyevoda, whose administrative seat is in Katowice, has a branch of the administration with its headquarters in Opole (Oppeln). The former Regierungsbezirk of Breslau and part of the Regierungsbezirk of Liegnitz lying east of the Western Neisse, with the exception of the Wschowa county (Kreis Fraustadt), and the Zielonogorski county (Kreis Grunberg) from the former Regierungsbezirk of Frankfurt-on-Oder, the eastern part of the Barse county (Kreis Forst) and the Zoraw county (Kreis Sorau), and, finally, in the south the Zytawski district (Zittau) form Lower Silesia and come within the province of Wroclaw (Breslau). The Wroclaw Voyevoda has a branch in Boleslawiec (Bunzlau). The Wschowa county, lying east of the Oder part of the Regierungsbezirk of Frankfurt A.O.,

with the exception of the above-mentioned counties, and without Chojnice county (Kreis Königsberg) and Mysliborz county (Kreis Soldin), Babimost county (Kreis Bomst), Miedzyrzecki county (Kreis Friedeberg), Trzcianka county (Netzekreis) and Pila county (Schneidemühl), of the former Regierungsbezirk Grenzmark Posen-Westpreussen, have been included, under the historical name of Lubusz Land, in Poznan province. The Poznan Voyevoda has his local department at Gorzow (Landsberg). All that part of the former Stettin Regierungsbezirk lying east of the Oder, together with a small scrap lying on the west, right at the mouth of the river, the small eastern part of the island of Uznam (Usedom), some six miles across at its widest part, and the island of Wolyn (Wollin), the former Regierungsbezirk of Köslin without the county of Leborg (Kreis Lauenburg) together with the rest of the former Grenzmark Regierungsbezirk are called Western Pomorze and form the province of Szczecin. Some 65 per cent. of former East Prussia is also under Polish administration, namely the part lying to the south of a line running from west to east some twenty miles south of Krolewiec (Königsberg, now Kaliningrad). The greater part of this area, known as Mazuria, is part of the Olsztyn province. Outside the bounds of this province are certain counties in the west, the former West Prussian (Westpreussen) Regierungsbezirk, there being the counties of Elblag (Kreis Elbing), Kwidzyn, (Kreis Marienwerder) Malbork (Kreis Marienburg) and Sztum (Kreis Stuhm) which with the above mentioned county of Leborg (Kreis Lauenburg) are attached to the province of Gdansk; but on the east the counties of Elck (Kreis Lyck) from the former Allenstein Regierungsbezirk, and Olecko (Kreis Treuburg) and part of Goldap county (Kreis Goldap) of the former Gumbinnen Regierungsbezirk have been attached to the province of Bialystok.¹

¹ Before, and even during the war the administrative division of these areas suffered quite frequent changes. Consequently we have taken the position that applied in the beginning of the 1930's as the basis of comparison with the present division, as the situation then was, seemingly, most generally known.

4. OPOLE SILESIA

Opole Silesia has an area of some 3,750 square miles and embraces the southern part of the easterly projection of former German Silesia. Before the war its professionally active population was divided up as follows: about 43 per cent. were in agriculture, about 35 per cent. in industry and crafts, about 12 per cent. in trade and communications, and the rest in other professions, the total population being some 1,500,000. From the economic aspect the most important part of this area is the coalfield, situated close to such towns as Bytom (Beuthen), Zabrze (Hindenburg), Gliwice (Gleiwitz). It amounts to rather less than one-tenth (some 220 square miles) of the whole of the Upper Silesian coalfield, the rest of which before the war was within the frontiers of Poland, containing about 15 per cent. of the total coal deposits of this field. There are sixteen mines, rather large, with an annual production which before the war fluctuated between 500,000 and about 2,000,000 tons. The aggregate output of the Opole mines in the year 1937 was some 23,200,000 tons, and they gave employment to some 50,000 workers.

The individual mines, when they were taken over by the Poles, were flooded, fires were raging in almost all the others, the majority were cut off from electric power. Everywhere the "wartime" system of exploitation carried on by the German authorities had caused unforeseen and incalculable rock-movements resulting in the piling up, crushing and crumbling of coal. The number of miners at work did not in general exceed fifty per cent. of the pre-war figure. The lack of trained people for executive positions was particularly felt, for these had consisted almost entirely of Germans, and they had fled westward before the advancing front.

Despite the obvious difficulties arising out of these conditions, sooner than many expected, all the coal mines in Opole Silesia were working on a larger or smaller scale. Obviously the production in that month was not and could not be large. It amounted to only some 8 per cent. of the average monthly output in the year 1937. When it is taken into account that all the under-

ground fires were brought under control or localized only in November, 1945, the production for December, which exceeded 33 per cent. of the monthly average for 1937, cannot be regarded as low. In June, 1946, it already exceeded 45 per cent. of the average level in 1937. And the output per worker per day leapt in the course of the year from some 25 per cent. of the pre-war output to some 60 per cent. In June, 1946, the employment figures were about 80 per cent. of the pre-war employment figures.

Of the four coking plants one was so completely wrecked that it could only be brought into operation after the necessary reconstruction now in progress has been completed. After the necessary repairs the other three were able to start up on a small scale in July, 1945, reaching some 10 per cent. of the production of all four coking plants in 1937. Owing to further repairs, by June, 1946, this production was approximately doubled. Of the two formerly existing briquette plants one was brought into operation comparatively quickly, the other was in such a condition as to be able to begin work only after thorough repairs lasting several months. None the less, in June, 1946, the output of briquettes in Opole Silesia was already close on 90 per cent. of the 1937 level.

In addition to coal, there are deposits of zinc and lead ores with a heterogenous content of these two metals, that constitute a valuable addition to the natural wealth of Opole Silesia. In 1937 the production was 722,000 tons, yielding close on 77,500 tons of zinc and 17,500 tons of lead. The four mines in the area, all situated near Bytom, employed an aggregate of 2,940 workers before the war. When taken over by the Polish authorities the mines were completely unfit for exploitation, owing to the effect of war operations. The small, single-shaft mine "Nowa Wiktorja" (formerly the "Neue Victoria") called for least repair, and even this mine yielded close on 126,700 tons of ore in 1937, but to-day its deposits are almost completely exhausted, and the ore left contains not more than 6 per cent. of metal, which is far below the average for the area. The other mines lacked

pumping machinery, hauling machinery, compressors, boilers, transport, slipwire for underground, and even the former cable railways had disappeared. Of the surface installations, only empty buildings were left. The shops for machinery construction closely associated with the mines had been stripped. Despite the extremely difficult conditions in which the work had to be carried on, and a definite and considerable drop in the metal yield, in June, 1946, the output of the Opole mines then in operation already reached over 39 per cent. of the whole pre-war output in the area.

So far as the entire zinc industry in Opole Silesia is concerned, the damage done by the Germans during their withdrawal is estimated at £4,788,000 at pre-war prices. The Polish authorities took over only 35.8 per cent. of the previously existing establishments in a state fit for operations even after repairs had been completed.

And so if we remember that in relation to pre-war monthly figures the output of ore in June, 1946, as we have said, amounted to 39.3 per cent., the production of zinc concentrates 47.2 per cent., while zinc oxide was 65.9 per cent.,¹ we get some idea of the effort put into the reconstruction of this branch of industry.

Before the war the iron industry in Opole Silesia produced some 275,000 tons of pig iron and some 700,000 tons of raw steel. When it was taken over by the Polish authorities the industry was not in a much better state than the zinc industry. Owing to the enormous needs arising from the reconstruction of the country the work of restoring this branch of production was undertaken with particular intensity. Of the six previously existing foundries two had been completely destroyed, in the others and in the wire-rolling mill at Gliwice whole departments of production did not exist at all, while those remaining called for very thorough repair, without of course taking into account the fact that the furnaces had been extinguished. None the less,

¹ Before the war, zinc ore extracted in Opole Silesia was only partly processed there, so it is possible that some disparity may be found in the figures.

in June, 1946, not only were the four former foundries and the wire-rolling mill at work, their production ranging between 10 and 75 per cent., but the construction of a new foundry at Gliwice has been completed and production started on July 22, 1946, with over a thousand workers employed.

All the other branches of industry are in an analogous state. Certain factories, which were taken over in a state of less devastation, have already surpassed the pre-war level of production, e.g., the great works for the chemical transformation of timber, situated near Strzelce (Gross Strehlitz). In general everything that can be put into operation is being operated. A characteristic example of this policy is the town of Raciborz (Ratibor), 85 per cent. of which was destroyed, so that out of 3,500 buildings only 352 are suitable for use. Yet already in June, 1946, a great factory of carbon electrodes (which is working first and foremost to meet the needs of the artificial fertilizer works), a soap and candle works, the third largest in Poland, a macaroni factory, a sugar refinery, a yeast works, and a chocolate works (with a production based on U.N.R.R.A. supplies) were in operation.

The work of restoring the main communication lines in Opole Silesia can be regarded as completed. The most important achievement of this kind was the opening of six railway bridges over the Oder in Opole on July 21st 1946.

Already in 1946 there were small-holdings vacant in Opole. Of the great estates, the one in the worst state was being farmed up to 80 per cent. of its pre-war amount. As it is proposed to parcel out the great estates covering an aggregate of some 100,000 acres of arable land, one must reckon with the influx of a further small number of farmers in the future.

According to the population census of February 14th, 1946, the density of population in Opole Silesia was some 85 per cent. of the pre-war figure, and it must be pointed out that about half of the population were indigenous Poles. Since then a few more settlers have arrived and to-day, owing to the devastation in the area, further settlement not only in agriculture but in the towns, too, is impossible. The Poles now arriving there

from beyond the Curzon Line must be transported further to the West.

The educational system was considerably extended in Opole Silesia during the school year, 1945/46. There were 772 elementary schools, attended by over 151,000 pupils; there were also 53 general secondary schools, attended by about 9,250 pupils and 23 technical secondary schools with over 1,850 pupils, in addition there was a very considerable number of courses and trade-finishing schools for adults. And finally, there was the newly opened engineering faculty (school of university degree) at Gliwice, with 2,270 students. In the school year 1946/47, plans were made for the opening of more schools, above all of elementary and secondary schools.

5. LOWER SILESIA

Lower Silesia, which administratively forms the Wroclaw province, extends over an area of some 9,516 square miles to the West of Opole Silesia as far as the Western Neisse. In the south it has a natural frontier in the chain of the Sudeten mountains, which towards the north pass into a spacious plain, ending in small moraine hills rising to a couple of hundred feet. Lower Silesia, especially its southern part, contains various natural riches, though only in relatively small quantities, yet they served as the basis for quite a considerable industrialization of the area. It has to be pointed out that the industrial traditions of Lower Silesia reach back to times before there was any considerable exploitation of its natural riches. Owing as it was mentioned above to the suitable soil and climate, flax cultivation, for instance, was quite successful in the area, and the result was a development of the textile industry, which constituted the basic wealth of the province during the Middle Ages when it formed part of the Polish State.

Before the war there were some three million people living in Lower Silesia, and the average density of population was

approximately 517 inhabitants to the square mile. Of the working population some 37 per cent. were employed in agriculture, some 35 per cent. in industry and crafts, some 14 per cent. in trade and communications, and the remainder in other professions.

Although the average devastation of the whole province as the result of war operations is estimated at not more than 20.7 per cent., nevertheless, owing to the comparatively high percentage of destruction of living accommodation the present absorption capacity of the whole area is estimated at not more than 65.8 per cent. of the pre-war state (in figures, 2,000,100 persons). According to the population census taken on February 14th, 1946, Lower Silesia then had some 1,930,000 inhabitants (or 96.5 per cent. of the total that can at present be accommodated in the province). Although since then a large number of Poles have arrived, mainly repatriated people from beyond the Curzon Line, it has to be remembered that large numbers of Germans have also left for the West, so that the population in Lower Silesia cannot have undergone any great change, and it is to be assumed that in the summer of 1946 it had not exceeded its size of February, or at least only to an insignificant extent.

The capital of Lower Silesia is Wroclaw, a large industrial centre, which before the war had close on 630,000 inhabitants. The retreating German authorities transformed the town into a fortress, and it was captured only after a long siege. Despite all the efforts of the Poles on the spot to extinguish the fires that raged all through the town after its capture (in many cases started deliberately by the military garrison and Hitlerite organizations), the destruction exceeds 64 per cent.

Owing to the difficult general economic situation the Government was not in a position in 1946 to grant credits of more than some £480,000 for the rebuilding of Wroclaw.

At first the work of safeguarding the remaining undestroyed part of the town and the equipment of the industrial enterprises was rendered particularly difficult, owing to the fact that large areas were mined. For instance, the municipal gasworks, which

was also partly destroyed, was the scene of a number of tragic accidents, and it became necessary to stop work there until the military had cleared the mines.

Of the many examples indicating how the work of rebuilding economic life in Wroclaw has been and still is proceeding, we quote that of the artificial silk mill (formerly the Vereinigte Glanzstoff-Fabriken A.G.). After thorough examination of the state of the factory, a commission of experts pronounced that it was impossible to put it into operation. As there is a very severe shortage of textiles in Poland, a group of engineers and a staff of workers was found who decided to try to save the factory. They obtained permission to do so and set to work to dig the machinery out of the ruins, to repair it, and put in order the damaged equipment. The factory was already in operation in May, 1946, and was producing 17,600 lbs. of artificial silk per day, with 820 workers employed.

Another extremely important achievement was the repair of the State Railway Truck Works (formerly Linke-Hoffmann). It was found possible to bring this works into operation in January, 1946, and in that month it turned out its first hundred goods trucks. During the first six months of 1946 it turned out 1,234 goods trucks, and in June its monthly production reached 320 trucks, or about 40 per cent. of its pre-war production capacity. In the same months steps were taken to produce railway carriages. When it is taken into account that parallel with production the factory is continually being extended, repaired, and machinery completed, a large part of which was completely destroyed, then one begins to realise the enormous effort put into this form of production, which is so important to-day in view of the lack of transport facilities in Europe.

Among the more well-known Wroclaw industrial works one may mention the hydrometer works (formerly H. Meinecke), which had a large proportion of its buildings, as well as pumps, electric cables, and gas pipes completely destroyed. Only just under 34 per cent. of its machinery was left in a state suitable for repair, the rest being completely destroyed or carried off

None the less, in the middle of 1946, after many months of intensive work, it was possible to put the works into operation on such a scale that by the end of 1946 it will be in a position to turn out 3,000 hydrometers.

Work on the saving and restarting of all the rest of the once extensive industry of Wroclaw has been undertaken on the same scale ever since the arrival of the Polish authorities. For instance, the many factories of the clothing industry that existed there before the war were taken over either in a destroyed or a pillaged state (there was an aggregate of over 15,000 workshops in 1939). Not one factory was in a state ready for immediate operation. Consequently those workshops and machinery suitable for exploitation and which could be re-erected are being assembled in the buildings left undamaged, and new industrial establishments are being formed from the fragments of the past, being brought together so that the aggregate should form a unit capable of production.

In June, 1946, work had already been completed on the restoration of a great soap and glycerine works, a great oil works (to produce eight tons per day), nine manufactories in the provisions industry were already operating, as well as a weights factory, a pump factory (formerly the Albert Knauth), a number of factories producing insulating material, ferro-concrete materials, etc. It is impossible to mention them all.

In May, 1946, the population of Wroclaw exceeded 100,000. The great majority are former inhabitants of Lwow and partly of Vilno. The characteristic dialect of the first city particularly is mainly to be heard in the streets. Here too the representatives of the Lwow scientific world have founded new homes and with enormous effort and hard physical labour succeeded in rescuing a considerable part of those collections and installations of the the Wroclaw educational and scientific institutions which the Germans failed to carry off. And they, too, in the autumn of 1945, made the University and Polytechnic active again. The lecturers, numbering 102, consist almost entirely of professors of the Lwow higher educational institutions, who managed to keep

alive during the German occupation and are now continuing their work, in Wroclaw. In the spring of 1946, the University had 1,300 students, while the engineering faculty had eight hundred. The former Lwow scientific societies hold their meetings in Wroclaw on the same days as they were held before the war. Works of art and scientific collections are also being brought from Lwow. In 1945 a special Commission for Care of Historical Remains was organized in Wroclaw, to watch over the care and repair of historical buildings.

All over Lower Silesia life is developing as it is in Wroclaw. Apart from the few southern counties already mentioned there is quite considerable devastation throughout the province. A glance through the data concerning the former county towns most often reveals a degree of devastation fluctuating between 20 and 40 per cent., though of course in some cases the figures are higher. For instance Zegan (Sagan) shows over 50 per cent., Luban (Lauban), 65 per cent., Trzebnica (Trebnitz) 80 per cent., the historical town of Glogow (Glogau) which before the war had 33,000 inhabitants, is destroyed almost to 100 per cent., and so on.

Taking all Lower Silesia with the exception of Wroclaw, the devastation in the various branches of industry is as follows:

Mining	20 per cent.
Metal-working industry	90 per cent.
Building materials	74 per cent.
Chemical	82 per cent.
Timber	67 per cent.
Paper	70 per cent.
Provisions	80 per cent.
Textiles	60 per cent.
Public Utilities	70 per cent. ¹

Obviously the above figures are subject to the same reservations as were made in discussing the losses suffered as the result

¹ Records of the Industrial Congress of the Regained Provinces, August 27th to 29th, 1945.

of military operations in the Polish Regained Provinces generally.

We begin our summary of the economic situation in 1946 in Lower Silesia with mining, which has suffered least of all the branches of industry. Here we shall give only a general description of the more important spheres of mineral production. We begin with the coal deposits grouped at the foot of the central section of the Sudeten mountains in Walbrzych (Waldenburg), and in Nowa Ruda (Neue Rode) near Kladzko (Glatz). This field is distinguished by its relatively difficult conditions of exploitation, due to the strong dislocation of seams, and also by the large variety of kinds of coal, among them much high quality coking coal. Before the war there were seven mines (four in Walbrzych and three in Nowa Ruda). In 1939, their aggregate output was up to 4,911,000 tons, with some 19,500 workers employed.¹ As all these mines required comparatively little repair when taken over it was possible to have them operating shortly, and despite the shortage of labour, close on 37 per cent. of the average monthly pre-war output was reached. In June, 1946, the total output of these mines with a degree of employment still rather below the pre-war level exceeded 44 per cent. of the pre-war monthly output.² The reasons for this disproportion between the state of employment and the output by comparison with the pre-war position has to be sought in the fact that there is a shortage of the specially highly qualified miners these mines require. The great majority of the miners employed there in June, 1946, consisted of unqualified only in the training stage. One must expect that only with the influx of experienced miners, who worked in France in emigration before the war, will the output be greatly increased. Apart from exploitation of the existing mines, since 1945, geological investigations have been in progress in Lower Silesia. In the coalmining industry they have resulted in the discovery in the largest mine, the Julia, of seams

¹ The state of employment in 1938, as quoted by the U.N.R.R.A. publication, *Industrial Rehabilitation in Poland*, which gives 19,481 workers, p. 7.

² In June, 1946, the output of the coking plants attached to the mines reached 62.3 per cent. of the monthly pre-war output.

9ft. 10in. thick, whereas hitherto the seams have been of 2ft. 7½in. to 3ft. 3½in. thick. In this field a seam of such thickness as over 9ft. is a discovery of considerable importance. Furthermore it has been established that there are considerable, hitherto unknown deposits of nickel in the Kladzko county in addition to those that have long been worked at Zabkowice (Frankenstein). Similar geological investigations and borings have added importance to the exploitation of arsenic ore (which contains a small admixture of gold) with the discovery of a number of new veins three times as rich as those exploited before the war. As a result the mine at Zlotystok (Reichenstein) near Zabkowice, which was taken over in a state of devastation, but which after pretty thorough repair was brought into operation in the middle of November, 1945, reached an output in June, 1946 which was equal to 150 per cent. of the monthly pre-war level.

It is impossible to mention all the other mines in so brief a sketch. They have been put into repair and brought into operation, but great difficulties have been met with. Not only were they flooded, but all the installations were destroyed, the machinery carried off or broken up, and obviously these mines took longer to bring into operation. We may take the opportunity of pointing out that a large part of the production of the Lower Silesian quarries is now allocated for the rebuilding of Warsaw, and the first transports of this material began to arrive in the capital already in the autumn of 1945.

The textile industry, in Lower Silesia, which was highly developed, was in a bad condition when the Polish authorities took over, 60 per cent. of its installations were found to have been destroyed. Its reconstruction and the earliest possible starting up of whatever could be put into operation was from the very beginning regarded as among the very urgent tasks, because of the shortage of textile goods, which is felt even more painfully in Poland than elsewhere. It is difficult to compare the production of those factories which were taken over in a condition suitable for restarting after lesser or greater repairs with the pre-war position, since, as in other areas, the machinery salvaged

... ~~... and reorganized~~ in complete production units in accordance with the state of the buildings, so that really new industrial establishments are being organized; existing enterprises are enlarged, the missing machinery is brought from Central Poland, etc. We may give the case of the cotton goods mill in Bielawa (Langbielau—formerly the Christian Dierig A.C.) as an example. It was taken over on August 10th, 1945, and two weeks later spinning began, while simultaneously further repairs were proceeded with, which made it possible to start the weaving shops on January 1st, 1946. In May, 1946, the works were already employing far more workers than in pre-war days, and were accounting for 10 per cent. of all Polish production. This mill is in course of still further extension.

In April, 1946, taking the whole of Lower Silesia, 50 per cent. of the pre-war total of spindles and 20 per cent. of the looms were working in the cotton industry, while in the woollen industry the figures were 40 per cent. of the spindles and 45 per cent. of the looms. In the flax industry 25 spinning and weaving shops have been brought into operation, giving employment to over 10,000 people, and the monthly production is about 900,000 yards of woven goods.¹ In Rychbach (Reichenbach) alone, twelve spinning shops (with an aggregate of over 100,000 spindles), eighteen weaving shops (with over 2,800 looms) and three independent dyeing works were in operation. There were great difficulties associated with the starting up of the artificial thread mill at Jelenia Gora (Hirschberg) which was producing a kind of nylon, because the secrets of its production were not known. Their discovery called for several months of laborious work on the part of Polish experts, before it was possible to begin production in the spring of 1946.²

The clothing industry, which is closely associated with the textile industry, has similarly been brought into operation. Only seventy (or 35 per cent.) of the previously existing factories

¹ The figures for the flax industry relate to September, 1946.

² In September, 1946, 152 textile works were in operation in Lower Silesia.

taken over had any machinery at all. These works were mainly partially destroyed, and in many instances had been pillaged. Here too it was necessary to bring together machinery, etc., from various works, and it was found possible to complete seventeen works, all of which are in operation, and on July 1st, 1946, they employed an aggregate of some 3,200 workers.

In the timber industry, which was next to the textile industry in the extent of its destruction, only 37 works were suitable for reconstruction. Of these 32 have already been re-equipped and brought into operation,¹ and they employ an aggregate of 2,400 workers. Work is in progress to bring the remaining five into production. Here it may be mentioned, that part of the furniture ordered by Great Britain is being made in these Lower Silesian works.

Turning to the public utilities, we may only say a few words in passing about the production of electric power. Apart from the southern counties already mentioned, the Polish authorities found the power stations more or less destroyed, and the high tension cables had been torn down over long distances. In April, 1946, the total power output of all the Lower Silesian power stations then in operation already exceeded 71 per cent. of the pre-war output, while some 50 per cent. of the total length of high tension cable had been restored.² Here it must be pointed out that the great power station at Walbrzych (Waldenburg) is daily supplying 500,000 kilowatt hours (or over 71 per cent. of its output) to Czechoslovakia.

We have already said a little about the building materials industry, destroyed as to 74 per cent. of its pre-war state, when discussing the mining industry. Here we must also mention the most important of the enterprises operating in 1946, such as the large cement works near Boleslawiec (Bunzlau) which is situated in an area that is one of the most devastated of all—40 per cent. of this county's area was mined when taken over. Then there is the gypsum works near Lwowek (Lowenberg).

¹ Up to September, 1946.

² By September, 1946, 60 per cent.

Then the glassworks at Walbrzych, with a production capacity of 222,000 square metres of molten glass, or those at Peczek (Penzig). We may also mention one of the largest manufacturers of roof shales in Europe, that at Borowsko (Freiwalden), near Zegan (Sagan), and, finally, the porcelain works at Walbrzych, which by 1946 were half restored; it is well-known that despite the suitable conditions and its situation on the spot where the raw materials were available, the German firm of Rosenthal, to which it belonged, would not permit the production of fine quality porcelain in it before the war. In addition, in June, 1946, there were also six works producing fine china; four more were under reconstruction, but all hope of putting the remaining four into operation had to be abandoned, as they were completely destroyed.

We shall not discuss the provisions industry, which has been ruined to a large extent (80 per cent.). It consisted mainly of small establishments, and those that were saved or could be brought into operation were almost all working in 1946. By way of example we may mention that of the 21 sugar refineries in Lower Silesia, only the one at Swidnica (Schweidnitz) was left in such a condition that it could be repaired. It was able to provide service during the 1945/46 sugar refining season. The other refineries were either completely destroyed, or all the machinery had been removed from them by the Germans.

Eighty-two per cent. of the chemical industry in Lower Silesia was destroyed; of those works which have been brought into operation the most well-known are those at Zarow (Saarau), near Swidnica, which reached its pre-war level of production as early as May, 1946.

We have already discussed to some extent the restarting of the 90 per cent. devastated metal-working industry, when speaking of the reconstruction of Wroclaw's economic life. Owing to the very serious devastation of this branch of industry, the aim is first and foremost, independently of plans for the future, to restore the production which is most indispensable in the present phase of reconstruction. In the machine tools works at Wroclaw,

that have really been rebuilt, in the casting works at Nowa Sol on the Oder (Neusalz) which were started in June, 1946, after thorough repair and partial re-equipment, in the works turning out steel cables for the mining industry, started at Walbrzych, and a number of others, everywhere one can see unsparing effort and energy being put into the work of making production possible.

Ending this very hasty survey of Lower Silesian industry, we must once more emphasize that it by no means covers the whole of the industry, nor all the achievements in any one sphere during the first year of Polish administration. We have been simply concerned to provide a general summary, on the basis of examples drawn from the most varied spheres.

Here we must devote a few words to the crafts of Lower Silesia. Before the war there were close on 65,000 handicrafts workshops and establishments in the area. As the result of the consolidation policy of the German authorities during the war, their number was reduced to some 30,000. The Poles arriving in Lower Silesia found some 15,000 workshops and crafts works completely destroyed. Of those which could be put into operation or repaired, some 8,000 were working by the end of March, 1946, giving employment to about 30,000.

When considering the economic life of Lower Silesia it must be borne in mind that the most serious "bottle-neck," especially in the incipient phase, was the absence of communications and transport. It was not possible to set about the planned restoration of communications on a larger scale for months after the close of war operations, owing to the movement of Soviet troops, which for some time absorbed every available means of transport. And for the same reason the date when work on the restoration of communications in Lower Silesia began, must be taken as about August 20th, 1945. Down to April 1st, 1946, 149 bridges, viaducts and railway conduits had been restored out of a total of 249 destroyed; six tunnels had been rebuilt, out of nine destroyed; and 800 railway buildings had been repaired; finally, during these seven months over 1,051 miles

of permanent way had been repaired, raising the length of line in service to 1,450 miles (throughout the entire province only 399 miles of permanent way were taken over in serviceable state). It is true that the rolling stock is still inadequate, but it is now sufficient to meet the most urgent needs.¹

Next we must discuss agriculture in Lower Silesia. Apart from the several southern counties already mentioned more than once, in general, agriculture suffered very severe devastation. There was a very acute shortage of livestock, and the percentage that remained in relation to the pre-war position was lower than the average for the Polish Regained Provinces generally (the county of Boleslawiec has already been mentioned, by way of example, and it is situated in Lower Silesia). Moreover, large tracts of the country were mined (as already mentioned, 40 per cent. of the area of the Boleslawiec county, and not only arable land, was mined, while the figure was 25 per cent. for Strzelin (Strehlen) county, and so on). Finally, a considerable number of the farmsteads were destroyed to such an extent that only traces of the former buildings were found on them. At the end of March, 1946, i.e., before the commencement of that year's field work, some 89 per cent. of the farms on which work was at all possible had been taken over by Polish settlers, while 8 per cent. were reserved for repatriated Poles returning from Yugoslavia and Switzerland and the so-called "soldiers' settlement." For it must be remembered that the farms in five counties have been set aside for soldiers' settlement, in other words, the farms in these counties are handed over to men who have taken part in the struggle for independence during the last war (irrespective of what army or partisan force they were in).² It is intended that from the large estates, which for the time being are being managed by state administrations, or by social institu-

¹ On March 1st, 1946, the state of the rolling stock was as follows: locomotives in service, 283 (506 under repair), carriages, 727 (in service and under repair), goods trucks, 14,391 (in service and under repair). *Statistical News of the Chief Bureau of Statistic of the Republic of Poland*, No. 8, 1946, pp. 111/112.

² In other areas four counties have been set aside for soldiers' settlement in the Lubusz Land, and six counties in Western Pomorze.

tions, a further 875,000 acres will be parcelled out.

Here it is worth mentioning that the Germans left some 10,000 acres of hewn forests in Lower Silesia. Taking advantage of credits of some £30,000 for this purpose, during 1946 one quarter of these "arrears" will be made good, and steps taken to re-forest the rest of this area.

As, owing to the conditions described above, the 1945 harvest could not meet the winter requirements of the population of Lower Silesia, from the beginning of 1946 down to the opening of the harvesting season considerable quantities of food were systematically assigned to the area from central Poland. With this assistance the colonists not only in the towns, but also in certain rural areas, were enabled to get through that first, very difficult winter.

In this province, as in the rest of Poland, trade is partly in private hands, while part of it is carried on by co-operatives, of which there were 334 in the province, with 464 shops, on June 1st, 1946. It must be pointed out that in the undevastated towns all the former shops were open again by April, 1946.

Finally, to complete this cross-section of life in Lower Silesia, we must say a few words on the educational system. We have referred to the higher educational institutions when dealing with Wroclaw. On April 1st, 1946, there were 944 elementary schools, with over 71,700 pupils; there were also 37 general secondary schools with some 6,200 pupils, and fifteen secondary technical schools with close on 600 students (this, of course, does not include the very extensively developed schools system attached to certain industrial works). Obviously this state of affairs is quite inadequate to meet the educational requirements of a population of some two million people, and it was planned to extend education considerably in the 1946/47 school year.

6. THE LUBUSZ LAND

The Lubusz Land, which constitutes the western part of the historical area known as Wielkopolska (Great Poland) is now

administratively part of the province of Poznan. It embraces an area of some 4,287 square miles situated on the middle Oder, the Lower Warta and the Notec rivers. Before the war this province was inhabited by some 661,000 people employed mainly in agriculture, though the soil is in general only average. A considerable part of the area is covered with forest. The only natural riches are brown coal and peat.

Industry was represented by several dozen medium and small-sized works. They were mainly textile and clothing factories, and a few metal works. The provisions industry was rather more developed (it consisted mainly of small works) and so was the timber industry, which however was reduced to half its size by the war.

On arrival in this area the Polish authorities found it considerably devastated, with the exception of the southern zone. The towns, large and small, were devastated up to 40 per cent., though greater devastation was also found in certain cases.

Throughout the whole of the area only one small town, that of Zemsz (Sommerfeld), which had 10,000 inhabitants before the war, remained untouched. The villages situated along the main east-west lines of communication were almost completely burned down, while the remainder were almost completely stripped of their livestock, agricultural machinery, food stocks and almost all movable possessions. There was an average of less than five horses and less than two cows to every 2,500 acres of arable land.

Owing to the very large number of residential buildings destroyed, it was calculated that the whole of the area could have a maximum absorption capacity of some 370,000 people, or about 54 per cent. of the pre-war position. On February 14, 1946, when the population census was taken, there were some 272,000 inhabitants, or over 73 per cent. of the total that could be settled there. But the population had greatly increased by the summer of 1946 because of the influx of Polish settlers, and the very small possibilities of reduction through the departure of Germans, who in February, 1946, constituted only some 6

per cent. of the total population. However, with the reconstruction and repair of the less damaged houses, the possibilities of settlement are continually increasing. It must be pointed out that certain less devastated counties, especially in the east, were 100 per cent. populated already in the winter of 1945/46 (the first was the county of Miedzyrzecz).

The German army was forced to retire from the Lubusz Land relatively early (partly during the February of 1945), and the spontaneous influx of Poles from the neighbouring area of Wielkopolska started to come to the province deserted by former inhabitants. This is the explanation of the fact that repatriated Poles from beyond the Curzon Line constituted not more than about half of the total Polish settlers.

As in other areas of the Polish Regained Provinces one tremendous difficulty in restarting economic life was the very serious devastation of the railways and highways, and the lack of rolling stock and motor transport. This caused enormous difficulties not only in regard to the transport of settlers, but in the necessary supply of food for them from central Poland, the supply of livestock and equipment to the rural areas, and machinery and installations for the industrial works, which—where they were not completely destroyed—consisted mainly of empty buildings.

Despite these difficulties, by the autumn of 1945 three brown coal mines, four textile works, several saw mills, a furniture factory, two larger power stations, and three gasworks, were completely in operation, not to mention the numerous comparatively small works of the provisions industry. Almost all the crafts workshops which could be brought into operation were already in service, manned in the majority of cases by settlers from Wielkopolska.

Since then a number of other brown coal mines have been restarted, and, as new shafts are being sunk, there are cases in which, as in the mine at Zielona Gora (Grunberg), the output in the summer of 1946 had reached 200 per cent. of the pre-war production. It is expected that in the near future, thanks to

this development, not only the Lubusz Land, but also a considerable part of the rest of the Poznan province will be rendered quite independent of supplies of coal from Silesia. Already certain power stations are being run on brown coal.

One of the most important achievements for the State as a whole, was the starting up of the Trans-Oder Works for bridge and truck construction (formerly the firm of Beucheld) at Zielona Gora. It is true the buildings of this works were taken over almost untouched, but they had been completely stripped of machinery and plant, so that it was necessary to put the whole works on a new basis, with new equipment. As each shop was completed it was brought into production, and the works as a whole began production in June, 1946; in that month it turned out 25 goods trucks. As it is being extended, in the course of a year since its restarting one can reckon on its achieving an output of 300 trucks monthly. At the same time it is engaged in the construction of iron bridges.

Similar work, though not always so advanced, owing to the varying degree of difficulties, is going on in all the industry of the Lubusz Land. In March, 1946, the first exhibition of Polish industry in the Lubusz Land was organized at Gorzow, and people were surprised to find that the production possibilities of the area were greater than had been expected. Gorzow is becoming the capital of the whole province. It is the centre of its cultural life, with its own permanent theatre, etc.

Apart from the devastation and lack of livestock and equipment already mentioned, agricultural production was still further impeded by the fact that the soil, which is naturally of poor quality, had been rendered almost barren by the spoliatory policy pursued by the Germans during the war. The soil required large quantities of fertilizers, which did not exist in 1945. The areas in the neighbourhood of the Oder, which were comparatively the most fertile, were mined, and at first it was quite impossible to set foot on them. A considerable part of the agricultural settlers put into this area came from Podolia and Volhynia (beyond the Curzon Line) and were accustomed to very

fertile soil, and now are being taught how to cultivate poorer soils at specially organized courses. But, in general, it can be said that in 1946 the fields were cultivated wherever the villages had been spared or were only partially destroyed so that the settler had somewhere in which to live. But where the buildings were destroyed and it has not yet been possible to rebuild them, large tracts of land were lying fallow.

Education in the Lubusz Land, especially of the elementary kind, was started on a considerable scale relatively early. On April 1st, 1946, there were 394 elementary schools, with some 33,000 pupils, 21 general secondary schools, with over 2,500 pupils, and one secondary technical school.

7. WESTERN POMORZE

With the exception of the county of Leborg (Lauenburg) which was incorporated into the province of Gdansk, all Western Pomorze (embracing part of the former Regierungsbezirk of Grenzmark) as far as the Oder, and a small scrap of land west of the Oder near Szczecin and the eastern cape of the island of Uznam (Usedom) are part of the province of Szczecin, covering an area of some 11,624 square miles.¹ Before the war, this area was inhabited by not quite 1,780,000 people. The average density of population of this part of the Regained Provinces, was some 139 inhabitants to the square mile (if the inhabitants of the one large city in the area, Szczecin, are left out of account, the figure was about 115 to the square mile), whereas at that time the average for the whole province was about 153 to the square mile. The professionally active population was divided as follows: some 50 per cent. in agriculture, some 23 per cent. in industry and crafts, and some 14 per cent. in trade and communications, the remainder being in other professions.

On their arrival in Western Pomorze the Polish authorities found considerably less than half a million people there, a large

¹The county of Leborg, which has been incorporated with Gdansk province, has an area of 497 square miles.

proportion of them consisting of the Polish autochthonous population, prisoners of war and Poles carried off to forced labour. Later, as in other areas of the Polish Regained Provinces, there was a return wave of Germans into the area, but it is difficult to put this into figures.

The devastation over the whole area is estimated at 40 to 50 per cent. of the pre-war position. By comparison with the pre-war position, the devastation in the towns amounted to 64 per cent., which in pre-war prices represented a value of some £48,840,000. In the villages the total estimate of buildings destroyed, is some 32 per cent., or a value of about £3,200,000. Taking into account the destruction of residential buildings the maximum absorption capacity of Western Pomorze was then estimated at some 900,000 to 1,000,000 inhabitants. On February 14th, 1946, the population of the present Szczecin province was over 895,000.¹ The inhabitants were estimated at a similar figure in June, 1946, with the difference that Polish settlers had taken the place of the considerable number of Germans evacuated (estimated at about 20 per cent. of the total local population). Of the Poles by then settled in Western Pomorze some 60 per cent. constitute repatriated persons from beyond the Curzon Line. As this province is outstandingly agricultural in character, to understand the present situation and settlement possibilities we need to consider the "geography of rural devastation." The only really fertile areas of Western Pomorze lie on the West, extending in a southerly direction along the Oder. It was here that the Germans built one of their last lines of defence and here that the most desperate battles were waged. As a result 40 per cent. of the area of the four counties of Kamien (Cammin), Nowogrod (Neugard), Gryfin (Greifenhagen) and Chojnice on the Oder (Königsberg) which are of the greatest agricultural value, was mined, when the Polish authorities took them over. The rural buildings were destroyed to such an extent that there could be no thought at all of agricultural

¹ The population census was taken before the change in the administrative division of the country.

settlement before their reconstruction. Along the sea coast on the north and along the southern boundary of Western Pomorze stretch two parallel zones of greatly inferior soil. In both these areas violent battles took place, but as the Germans had not organized permanent defences there, the destruction was much less. Not only whole farms, but entire villages were completely unscathed, and so there was already a large number of settlers there in the spring of 1946, all the undestroyed farms were occupied, and the adjacent fields under cultivation. Between the two zones we have mentioned, stretches a considerable area of sandy soil, which is of little value to agriculture. It so happened that there was little fighting here, and so very little destruction. As a result, at the beginning of the summer of 1946, all the farms were already taken over by Polish settlers, and were being managed. But it must be noted that in this very area there were large Prussian junkers' estates, so that before the war the average density of population of a number of the local counties fluctuated from 82 to 93 inhabitants per square mile, even if the urban populations and areas are included. Obviously rational agricultural settlement, corresponding to the real absorption capacity of the area, will be possible only after agrarian reform has been carried through; as we have said, special co-operatives are occupied in this task. The state of livestock and equipment was just as catastrophic in Western Pomorze¹ as in the other parts of the Polish Regained Provinces. A considerable improvement has now taken place (though the position is still inadequate) thanks not only to what the Polish settlers brought with them but also to U.N.R.R.A. supplies and to supplies brought in from Denmark and Sweden. It must be pointed out that already £2,122,500 had been invested in the reconstruction of agriculture in Western Pomorze down to September 1st, 1946.

Apart from Szczecin, which will be discussed separately later, the state of the various towns in regard to which the total extent of devastation has already been given, was as follows:

¹ Out of U.N.R.R.A.'s supplies for 1946, 10,326 horses and 7,000 cattle were assigned to Western Pomorze.

Out of the total of 25 towns of significance as economic centres, five were destroyed not more than 10 per cent.,¹ nine were devastated between 10 and 20 per cent.,² two were devastated between 20 and 40 per cent.,³ four were 40 to 60 per cent. devastated,⁴ two were 60 to 80 per cent. devastated⁵ and three over 90 per cent.⁶

We have already dealt with the nature of the industries in this province. The state in which they were found by the Polish authorities when they arrived is indicated by the fact that the value of the industrial buildings destroyed is alone estimated at 83 per cent. of their value in pre-war days (some £7,840,000 according to pre-war prices). In the case of the buildings saved, a large quantity of the machinery was carried off, or destroyed. It has to be emphasized that the larger establishments were most badly hit, and only 43 per cent. of these were in such a state that it was possible to think of their reconstruction at all. Among these, about one-third were already at work in April, 1946. Down to September 1st, 1946, some £467,500 had been invested in the industrial reconstruction of this province.

By way of example we shall describe the fate of certain larger industrial works which played an important part in the economic life of Western Pomorze before the war, dealing at the moment with those situated outside the town of Szczecin. In the provisions industry, the largest enterprises were the numerous sugar refineries, which handled some million tons of sugar-beet each year. They were all destroyed. Only one at Gumience (Gumenz), near Szczecin, was in a condition to be restarted after thorough repair and replacement of the missing machinery. As a result,

¹ Bialogrod (Belgard), Drawsko (Dramsburg), Szczecinek (Neustettin), Walcz (Deutsche Krone) and also Lebork (Lauenburg), incorporated with Gdansk province.

² Bytow (Butow), Derlowo (Rugenfelde) Koszalin (Koslin), Lawiczka (Regenswalde), Leba (Leba), Miastko (Rummelsburg), Mysliborz (Soldin), Postumino (Stolpmunde) and Slawno (Schlawe).

³ Gryfin (Greifenhagen), and Swinoujscie (Swinemunde).

⁴ Kamien (Cammin), Nowogrod (Neugard), Starogrod (Stargard) and Wolyn (Wollin).

⁵ Chojnice on the Oder (Königsberg) and Choszczno (Arnswalde).

⁶ Kistrzyn (Kustrin), Kolobrzeg (Kolberg), and Pырzyce (Pyritz).

the beetroot harvested in 1945 had to be transported to such refineries in central Poland as had not been destroyed. In view of the state of communications at that time, this involved enormous difficulties. As two other refineries, at Zagorze (Greifenburg), and Kluczow (Klutzow), which have been rebuilt in the meanwhile, were in operation in addition to the refinery at Gumience for the 1946/7 sugar refining season, and as there has been a considerable improvement in the state of communications, this situation was much easier that season.

In the metal industry, the first works calling for mention is the foundry at Stolczyn (Kratzwieck) near Szczecin which before the war had a production capacity of 150,000 tons of pig iron per annum. It was 30 per cent. destroyed. After taking it over in the middle of March, 1946, the Polish authorities immediately set to work to reconstruct it, and it will be in a position to restart production soon. We must also mention the railway waggon works at Chojnice on the Oder (the former firm Waggon-Fabrik L. Steinfurt A.G.), which had a production capacity of 2,000 trucks per annum; it was so completely destroyed that it is not capable of restoration.

In the building materials industry, four large cement works played the most important part in the province's economic life. With the exception of the one situated on the island of Wolyn (Wollin) which for Pomorze conditions was little destroyed, they were all in ruins. After this one had been brought into a state rendering production possible, a second is now being rebuilt. The situation in this branch of industry is difficult because before the war it was provided with raw materials from the island of Rugen, now cut off by the frontier.

Of the larger power stations, only one has really been spared, that at Police (Politz) near Szczecin, with a 300 MW capacity, which has worked normally from the moment it was taken over. The other, smaller stations which it has been possible to start up so far (August, 1946), have an aggregate capacity of over 28 MW.

In the textile industry the most important concern was the

artificial silk works at Zydowin (Sidowsane), its buildings were only 30 per cent. destroyed, but when it was taken over it was completely without machinery. None the less it was decided to start it up, and the work of reconstruction is under way, machinery being brought from central Poland. Although it was expected that normal work would begin only in the early spring of 1947, the works already had orders not only for the home market, but also from Sweden.

The synthetic petrol works at Police (Hydrierwerke Politz AG), with a production capacity of 600,000 tons per annum, was completely destroyed during air raids.

In Western Pomorze the timber industry consisted mainly of small works, which were 40 per cent. destroyed during war operations. In June, 1946, 90 per cent. of the works lending themselves to repair and renewal of production were already in operation. On the other hand, the paper industry will to all intents and purposes have to be rebuilt from the foundations.

Sea fisheries played quite an important part in the economic life of Western Pomorze. As it is extremely important for Poland that this sphere should be exploited—far more important for Poland than it was for Germany—considerable activity was at once devoted to restarting the fishing centres. The fishing ports on the coast were transferred to the Polish authorities in general between the autumn of 1945 and the spring of 1946. With the exception of Nowe Warpno (Neuwarp), a little port in the Gulf of Szczecin, which was preserved, the extent of destruction of the ports varied between 20 and 60 per cent. In the summer of 1946, not only was reconstruction in progress in them all, but they were all functioning as fishing centres. Very energetic steps were taken to reconstruct and repair the yards engaged in the building of fishing boats all of which are by now in operation.

Finally, we must mention that the railways, which were taken over in the same state as those in other parts of the Regained Provinces, have been put into a condition rendering it possible to maintain communications all over the province. The repair

of the permanent way and the necessary railway installations alone absorbed a credit amounting to some £917,500 (down to September 1st, 1946). On March 1st, 1946, the area of the then province of Szczecin¹ had operable rolling stock consisting of 129 locomotives, 7,390 trucks and 430 carriages.² Since then, thanks to intensive repairs and U.N.R.R.A. supplies there has been a notable increase in the quantity of the rolling stock.

Apart from the private traders, of which there are many all over Western Pomorze, especially in Szczecin, the distribution of commodities is in the hands of co-operatives, as it is in the remainder of Poland. On June 1st, 1946, there were over two hundred co-operatives, with over 270 shops scattered all over the province.

Owing to the fact that settlement operations in general met with very great difficulties during the first phase, much greater than, e.g., Opole Silesia, the state of education in Western Pomorze during the school year 1945/46 was inadequate, and it was to be extensively developed for the school year 1946/47. On April 1st, 1946, the province of Szczecin as it was then constituted had 427 elementary schools with over 31,000 pupils, 22 general secondary schools with some 2,200 pupils, and five secondary technical schools with 400 students.

Now we must devote some attention to the capital of Western Pomorze—Szczecin. Szczecin is a seaport with a comparatively poorly developed industry. Its main hinterland was Silesia and, at certain periods in its history when there were no artificial barriers caused through customs frontiers—Wielkopolska. Though canals link the Oder with the Spree, Berlin, which lies comparatively close, mainly used its communications with Hamburg, and made only limited use of the port of Szczecin.

Before the war the town of Szczecin had 273,000 inhabitants.³ When the first Polish authorities arrived there, after searching,

¹ On May 29, 1946, the province had been increased by six counties with an aggregate area of some 3,222 square miles.

² *Statistical News*, No. 8, 1946; pp. 111/112.

³ During the war, in October, 1939, the area of the town was enlarged almost six-fold by the inclusion of adjacent communities, and the population of "Great Szczecin" increased to 381,000.

they found only 6,000 people,¹ among the ruins of a town 42 per cent devastated. Because of the serious destruction of living accommodation in the town it was not possible to accommodate more than some 80,000 persons, while after thorough repair of the houses which had not been completely destroyed the figure could be increased to 140,000. In June, 1946, Szczecin had some 80,000 inhabitants, but according to the figures for October 1st, 1946, it had then about 110,000, of which 5.4 per cent. were Germans. This last figure was made up of the families of German workers who were temporarily employed by the Soviet authorities in that part of the port which had not been transferred to the Polish authorities. The work of taking over the port by the Poles began comparatively late (March 5th, 1946), since it was still used by the Soviet authorities as a transshipment port for the export of reparations from the Soviet occupation zone in Germany. The first ship arrived at the coastal zone, some three miles in length, along the Lower Oder, originally assigned to the Poles, on March 15th, 1946. In June, 1946, the Polish authorities had 10 per cent. of the port at their disposition, and by October 1st, 1946, 25 per cent.

Extensive investments will be required to bring the port to a normal serviceable state, since the quays have been destroyed from 10 to 20 per cent., the warehouses, etc., from 20 to 30 per cent., while the interior equipment of the warehouses and loading installations have been destroyed to over 80 per cent. A bureau for ports reconstruction, specially set up for this type of work, is carrying out the restoration of the port installations as they are taken over.

According to plans already in operation the port of Szczecin will be used for the export of coal (the first coal transport carried down the Oder, now cleared of obstacles to navigation, arrived in the port at the beginning of August, 1946), and the import of iron ore destined for Silesia and possibly for Czechoslovakia. In addition it will be used for the transshipment of

¹ Later there was a considerable influx of German people returning from the West, as was the case everywhere in the Polish Regained Provinces.

cement and other building materials from Silesia. It is also expected to service the Oder basin (and part of Wielkopolska) with small commodities and in the export of provisions from those areas.

Turning to the most important of the Szczecin industrial works, we begin with the docks. The most important group, comprising the former Stettiner Oderwerke and the Baltic Werke, was stripped of all the most essential machinery and installations by the Germans, and it will be necessary to bring in and instal entirely new equipment. Here a dock is now being built which will be the second largest in Poland. Before the war Szczecin had another dock (the former Stettiner Vulkan) which has its buildings almost undamaged, but the Germans completely stripped it of all machinery and technical plant. In addition there was a motor-car works (the firm of Stoewer Werke AG), which was 30 per cent. destroyed, and the majority of the machinery also. The buildings have already been restored. Machine-tools have been brought from central Poland, and it will be possible to fit up new machinery from parts of the broken machinery. This works began to produce car trailers in August, 1946, and at the end of the year a car repair workshop was also in operation.

The clothing industry was extensively developed in Szczecin, and there were four large factories turning out medium quality men's clothing. Out of the salvaged parts three factories have been fitted up (the first began to operate in the winter of 1946, and the others were started during the summer) and these are at present specializing in workmen's clothing made from Lodz materials. They give employment to some 750 workers.

The large shoe factory which existed before the war (the firm of Wolff und Co AG), which employed 1,200 workers, was completely destroyed and cannot be rebuilt.

Of the four paper mills operating in Szczecin and its immediate neighbourhood, two were completely destroyed as the result of military operations, and in the other two the buildings were 60 to 70 per cent. undamaged, but on the other hand all

the machinery was carried off. Among the more important Polish successes must be reckoned the starting up of a factory for yeast vitamin extract (the former firm of "Crepin") which called not only for repair and partial reconstruction, but also the discovery of methods of production previously unknown in Poland.

In addition to its quickly developing economic life, Szczecin is becoming an important centre of cultural and scientific life. Two new higher educational institutions (the Academy for Maritime Commerce and the Engineering Faculty) were in 1946 in course of organization, and a number of scientific institutions had opened branches there. In the summer of 1946, the Lwow theatre, famous in Poland took up permanent residence in the town, with not only all the actors and actresses, but the scenery, costumes, and all appurtenances.

Despite its eccentric situation on the very frontier, the communications with the town, which have largely been restored, will enable it to be transferred into an important centre both economically and culturally; eighteen trains daily linked it in 1946 with the interior of the country.

The reconstruction of the town is going on according to the plan which was available for examination at the International Housing and City Planning Exhibition held at Hastings from October 7th to 13th, 1946. 4.4 per cent. of the total credits assigned for urban building in Poland down to the year 1949 has been allocated to Szczecin.

8. MAZURIA (FORMERLY EAST PRUSSIA)

About 65 per cent. of former East Prussia was handed over to Poland by the Potsdam conference. This is equal to an area of some 9,150 square miles. Before the war (1939), some 1,290,000 people inhabited the area, the density of population being some 147 to the square mile. About 82 per cent. of this territory is now administratively part of the province of Olsztyn. Of the remainder, as was said above, the four western counties

have been incorporated with the province of Gdansk, while the three eastern have been incorporated with the province of Bialystok. In the former East Prussia, as a whole, the professionally active individuals were 55 per cent. engaged in agriculture, not quite 20 per cent. in industry and crafts, while some 12 per cent. were in trade and communications, the remainder being in other professions. We have no exact data concerning the nature of employment for that part of East Prussia which fell to Poland, but one can safely state that in this part the percentage of employment in agriculture was still higher than in East Prussia as a whole, while the percentage in industry and crafts was lower.

Although the country was of an outstandingly agricultural character, yet by its very nature it is not destined for agriculture. Really fertile soil is to be found almost exclusively only in the west, in the valley of the Vistula, and along the Vistula bay. The rest of the country consists almost entirely of light sandy soil, or so-called clayey sands, which cover about 75 per cent. of the total area. But not only the soil is the agriculturist's enemy in this territory, but also the climate. One need only state that the average period of vegetation lasts 188 days in a year. Although the German government was never niggardly with help for the local agriculture, putting very considerable capital, more than elsewhere, into its modernisation and into raising the fertility of the soil by every possible means, the average harvests were much lower not only than the average for Germany, but even the average for the Polish Regained Provinces.¹ Moreover, the field crops were regarded in general as of poor quality. Cattle-breeding yielded greater possibilities than crop cultivation, but it had to depend to a large extent on fodder brought in from outside, since the locally grown fodder was insufficient.

¹ The average harvest per acre in the province of Olsztyn was lower than the average for the Polish Regained Provinces by 2 per cent. in the case of rye, nearly 12 per cent. in the case of wheat, nearly 11 per cent. in the case of barley, 9 per cent. in the case of oats, over 16 per cent. for sugar beet, 13 per cent. for potatoes. Plans for the afforestation of the poorest soils are now under consideration.

Mazuria was taken over by the Polish authorities in perhaps a worse state than any other of the areas we have so far described. Undoubtedly this was partly due to the fact that in this area fighting went on for a very long time. Such towns as Malborg (Marienburg) were defended by the Germans right up to the capitulation of Germany, while for some weeks after smaller and larger German forces commanded by officers made it difficult for the area to return to normal life, by attacking, burning and destroying towns and villages. The railway network was very badly damaged, considerable lengths of roads and areas of field were mined, and all this made it difficult to reach certain districts at first. A large part of the fertile county of Elblag (Elbing), which is situated in a land depression (some $13\frac{1}{2}$ feet below the surface of the sea) was flooded by the Germans, and the pumping stations rendered useless.

In the towns 50 per cent. of the buildings were destroyed completely, in the villages 20 per cent. The position in regard to livestock did not come up even to the level of the provinces already described. In the case of horses, so indispensable to field work, there were barely 3 per cent. of the pre-war total, while pigs amounted only to the minute fraction of 1 per cent. As a result of this, settlement, especially at first, was proceeded with more slowly than elsewhere, and as, owing to the energetic compulsory evacuation before the approaching front which the German authorities had carried out, only very few people were left behind¹ and they almost entirely old people, women and children. That is why in the spring of 1946 large areas were lying fallow. During the first phase, a strong movement was to be observed in the southern counties, as a great wave of agriculturists from the neighbouring over-populated areas of central Poland shifted into them. But the planned settlement of the areas situated more in the interior of the province began only later, and went on mainly parallel with the restoration of communications. To this area Poles from the Vilno district were pri-

¹ The Polish authorities found some 30 per cent. of the pre-war population, one-third of these being autochthonous Poles.

marily directed, as they are accustomed to quite similar, though in general better climatic and soil conditions. A large number of former inhabitants of the destroyed city of Warsaw have settled in the towns, especially in Olsztyn. By June, 1946, over 78 per cent. of the farms smaller than 250 acres were taken over by settlers and were most of them under cultivation. The larger estates, managed by administrators on behalf of the State, were most of them transferred to the co-operatives of the type already mentioned, for settlement and parcellation. Although there has been a considerable improvement in the number of livestock, it was still very inadequate; horses amounted to 8 per cent. of the pre-war number; cattle to 3 per cent., pigs to 1 per cent. and sheep to 5 per cent.

Apart from agriculture, which was the basis of the local economy, the area has large potentialities in fresh water fisheries. It includes 1,060 lakes with an aggregate area of close on 233,600 acres. To be objective it must be said that this type of activity was unnecessary to German economy and so the lakes were not intensively exploited, being confined to satisfying the comparatively small local requirements. So the lakes were not stocked with fish, nor was attention paid to quality, with the result that some 50 per cent. of the catches consisted of low quality fish.¹ When the Polish authorities took over the area, apart from a serious exhaustion of the stock, 41 per cent. of the surface of the lakes generally was not suitable for fishing as large numbers of barriers and obstacles against aeroplane landings were sunk in them. Owing to the systematic cleaning of the lakes, in August, 1946, it was possible to exploit 83.5 per cent. of the total surface. In addition steps were taken to restock the lakes. Apart from the large fish-rearing establishment at Szwaderki, it is planned to bring three others into operation. The fish manufactory works have not only been rebuilt, but extended. The shipbuilding yard engaged in building fishing boats at Gizyce (Lotzen) is already in operation, and a further yard is on the point of being put into service at Frombork

¹ Roach, tench, bream and perch.

(Frauenburg). In the first season the fishing of the Mazurian lakes resulted in a total catch of not more than 350 tons, but in the 1946/47 season it was reckoned, on the basis of results so far, that the catch would be at least 2,000 tons.

The only natural riches in the area consist of a certain quantity of peat; after the repair of machinery, exploitation of the peat bogs was begun in the summer of 1946. The timber wealth of the country is only a myth.

When one talks of the industry of this particular area, one thinks really of only one important enterprise, namely the large dock and shipbuilding yard at Elblag (F. Schichau GmbH), which gave employment to some 5,000 workers. In addition to ships, turbines and pumps were also manufactured there. Of this establishment all that is left is a reminiscence of the past in the form of the remains of its ruined buildings. In addition there was also a large factory of gumboots in Malbork (Standard Marienburg Gummiwerke AG), now completely destroyed, which before the war employed some 500 workers. All other industry was on a small scale, often bordering on larger crafts workshops. For instance, there were a certain number of small factories turning out agricultural machinery and implements, building and cabinet-making fixtures, and numerous repair workshops. Less than 22 per cent. of these establishments were taken over in a condition justifying consideration of their restoration and operation, and only 10 per cent. of the machine-tools in the area before the war were found on the Polish authorities arrival; and all of these were of old-fashioned types and required capital repair. All the basic more expensive machinery was missing, and there was a complete lack of any tools and instruments. The small-scale provisions industry, which was extensively developed, played a greater role in the area's economic life. But here, too, the destruction was pretty considerable. The dairies that were suitable for repair and operation had a manufacturing capacity equal to some 37.5 per cent. of the pre-war figure. The fact that, owing to the lack of cattle, they could not be exploited at once in any case, is another

question. Quantitatively the flour-mills saved, or capable of being operated after repair, amounted to 63 per cent. of the pre-war figure, but as they were only the smaller mills, their milling capacity was only some 45 per cent. of the pre-war total capacity for the area. Forty-four per cent. of the distilleries were saved, and were suitable for repair or for reconstruction; and so on.

In addition the timber industry played a certain part in the economic life, but when taken over, 60 per cent. of the works were destroyed. But as the forests had been greatly over-exploited, and considerable areas burnt down, at first, steps were only taken to secure the majority of the undamaged saw-mills from destruction, and only six were at work in the spring of 1946. The question of electrification of the province was at first quite a difficult problem. For the former East Prussia constituted an independent centre supplied with power primarily by five larger power stations, of which only the one at Elblag was situated within the new Polish frontiers, and that one was badly damaged. The destruction of the Elblag power station made it also impossible to set to work to pump away the water from the depression of the Elblag (one-third of the county) and the Malborg county. In June, 1946, the Elblag power station (15 MW) had been working for some months, and fourteen pumping stations had been repaired and put into operation, so that the work of draining the area was already in progress. A number of small power stations scattered all over the province have been put into operation, in many cases equipping one station with the remnants of several others (for instance, in Biskupiec-Bischofsburg). The crafts workshops that could be put into operation in the towns are already working (in April, 1946, over 900 workshops were already functioning). Here it must be pointed out that in certain of the larger towns especially there is definite over-population. For instance, the situation in the capital of the province, Olsztyn, is characteristic; though some 40 per cent. of the town was destroyed, on June 1st, 1946, the population was 70 per cent. of the 1939 figure, and towards

the end of that month it had risen to 80 per cent. This town is the more attractive to settlers because, like other capitals of various provinces, it is not only an administrative, but also a cultural centre. For instance the Vilno theatre, which has a fine tradition behind it, has settled in the town, and there is a music school of high standard, etc.

When speaking of the towns of former East Prussia it has to be remembered that before the war the German authorities in this province aimed at a far-reaching urbanization, since for political reasons they were concerned with the formation of as many administrative and military centres as possible. In this connection every settlement where the population exceeded two thousand became a "town." Obviously we shall not depict the state of all these "towns." Among the most important, one must mention Elblag, which in 1939 had about 86,000 inhabitants. The first group of Poles who arrived there, wandering through the deserted town found it very badly damaged, and in fact only the suburbs (15 per cent. destroyed), and part of the modern centre (30 per cent. destroyed) were saved, while the old part of the town, where a large part of the economic life was concentrated, was destroyed up to 95 per cent. Down to June, 1946, 2,000 houses had been rebuilt and repaired, and 90 per cent. of the water-mains and sewers that had been badly damaged, were in operation. The restoration of the power station already mentioned made it possible to put the tramways into working order, after the lines had been repaired; two small shipyards were completed (together they employ 770 workers), a railway truck works, so necessary at the present time (170 workers), was started, and so on. In June, 1946, the town had a population of 33,000, of which one-third were Germans. It has to be stated that the evacuation of the German population from this province has proceeded at a slower rate than in the previously discussed areas (in June, 1946, they still amounted to about 25 per cent. of the total population), owing to the above-mentioned extremely serious destruction of communications, which can only be restored with great difficulty. Down to

September, 1946, eight railway lines and 62 station buildings, had been restored, over 186 miles of permanent way had been built anew, over 620 miles of track had been brought into service, and 35 per cent. of the railway electro-technical and telephonic equipment had been repaired. Obviously the work is not yet completed. Simultaneously work is going ahead on the intensive repair of rolling stock. On March 1st, 1946, there were 55 locomotives working in the area, in September there were 120; a similar development is to be observed in regard to trucks, of which there were over 6,800 in March, and there were some 250 carriages.¹ As communications were progressively restored, the Polish settlement of the area could begin to make progress.

At the time of the population census, on February 1, 1946, there were some 470,000 inhabitants in the Polish part of former East Prussia, this figure corresponding to some 66 per cent. of the area's absorption capacity after the destruction of living accommodation has been taken into account. Between that date and June 1st, 1946, despite the efflux of Germans, the population rose by some 10 per cent., owing to the systematic arrival of Poles in large numbers from beyond the Curzon Line, and especially from the Vilno district. When considering the actual absorption capacity of the area one has to remember two factors. First, there is the comparatively large number of great agricultural estates (some 1,300 of over 250 acres), very many of which will be broken up and parcelled out, and then there is the fact that investigations are being made and various plans are being very seriously considered for making the best use of the poorest land in the province.

As in Western Pomorze, the educational system was only in its initial phase during the 1945/46 school year. On April 1st, 1946, there were, in the Olsztyn province (which, as we have said, accounts for about 82 per cent. of the total area) 367 elementary schools with about 27,000 pupils, 11 general secondary schools with over 1,200 pupils, and five secondary technical schools with 240 students. It has to be pointed out that

¹ *Statistical News*, No. 8, 1946; pp. 111/112.

at Ketrzyn (Rastenburg) a "Mazurian Lycée" was being set up on the model of the former Krzemieniec Lycée, and it will continue the traditions of that ancient and greatly honoured Polish educational institution.

9. CONCLUSION

In the foregoing pages we have presented what Poles think of the territories placed under Polish administration at Potsdam, and also a summary of what they are doing there. The Potsdam decision was preceded by numerous promises, and also declarations on the part of Allied statesmen. By way of example we need only mention the speech made in the House of Commons on December 15th, 1944, by Mr. Churchill, then British Prime Minister, who officially stated that the Poles "are free so far as Russia and Great Britain are concerned, to extend their territories at the expense of Germany to the West."¹ Several weeks after this statement a declaration was jointly signed at Yalta in the Crimea by President Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin, in which these three statesmen stated in the names of the nations they represented, "that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the north and west."² Finally, there was the Potsdam decision which we have already discussed, which in addition to the economic, demographic and political aspects already presented had undoubtedly one other aspect of considerable significance, namely the psychological one.

The four-fold diminution of the Polish-German frontier to a length of some 250 miles gives the Polish people a generally appreciated increased feeling of security in regard to the Germans. It is difficult to explain this feeling. It can be fully understood only by a nation which, having an open and completely undefended frontier with a much stronger, better armed neighbour, has for all its 1,000 years of history been subject to continual attacks, ending sometimes with a temporary partial, or complete loss of independence. These attacks were all through

¹ *Hansard*, Vol. 406, December 15, 1944.

² *Crimea Communiqué*, February 11, 1945, chapter 6, section 7.

those 1,000 years right down to the last war, accompanied by the murder of the Polish civilian population, pillage, and devastation carried out on a great scale, and in the age-old popular tradition were associated with the conception of gigantic bandit invasions, and not wars of chivalrous knights. The carrying off of Poles to forced labour, which during the years 1939/45 was organized "scientifically" on an enormous scale, or the carrying off of little boys in a time of formal peace, to be put into special "schools," where they were Germanized and trained as Prussian soldiers (as happened in the times of Frederick II in the 18th century), for Poles these are not only facts of history: they still live in the popular tradition, and right down to the outbreak of the last war they were passed on with dread from generation to generation. That is precisely why such a considerable reduction of the Polish-German frontier is undoubtedly leading to a feeling of greater certainty of the morrow in Poland, of that morrow for which it is worth working, since it is not threatened at any moment by an invasion which will destroy all that has been achieved.

For Poles, access to the sea along a coast of over 300 miles will have at least as far-reaching psychological importance as the diminution of the Polish-German frontier. Even after the passing of only a few months the first manifestations of this feeling were to be observed in Poland, especially among the youth, in their bearing and in the interest they were displaying. One sentence justly printed in *The Economist* applies to the Poles to an enormous extent. Writing about the Slavs, *The Economist*¹ said: "That they have suffered from insufficient access to the sea, from dependence on overland communications and from the inconvenience of river routes." And that is precisely why they "belong to the hinterland of Europe, they are an inland people, and for this reason have had little share in the main movement of European history which has been closely related to sea traffic and communications . . ." Poles have long realised this. One need only refer to the fact that this theme

¹ *The Economist*, September 28, 1946; p. 486.

was taken up in Polish literature as early as the 16th century. This explains why such great importance is attached in Poland not only to Silesia and the Oder, the waterway leading from Silesia to Szczecin, but also to Western Pomorze, to the entire sea coast.

So it is not to be wondered at that all suggestions of reservations as to the new Polish western frontier cause such great exasperation in Poland. There has been talk of making recognition of the frontier dependent on the question of elections.¹ That attitude to the question was quite unintelligible to the Poles. Even ignoring the previous solemn declarations, promises, statements, the man in the Polish street cannot for the life of him see how these two matters are connected. For in Potsdam the Provisional Polish Government made in fact a unilateral declaration in the matter of holding elections, which was taken into cognisance, but there is no suggestion in the Potsdam declaration of any connection of the question of elections with the problem of the frontier. On the contrary. In chapter nine of that declaration both these questions (concerning the Polish Government and concerning the frontier) are clearly treated separately, two quite distinct sections (a and b) are devoted to them. And furthermore, the section concerning the Government laid down the "attitude" of the members of the conference to it, whereas in section (b) it states that the question of the frontier has become a matter of "accord" and it is clearly stated that the administration of the "former" German areas is transferred to the Polish State (there is no mention of the Government). And so it is clearly stated that the connection of these areas with the German State has been broken, and the Polish State administers them in its own name and not in the character of an occupying power. The final delimitation of the frontier at the Peace Conference, as foreseen at Potsdam, also would appear to leave no suggestion of doubt. One of the pronouncements of the Hague Tribunal states that the function of delimitation is restricted

¹ Mr. Bevin in the House of Commons, October 22nd, 1946; *Hansard*, Vol. 427.

to small frontier changes, and not to essential shifts in the frontier line.¹ And so the conviction reigns in Poland that the Potsdam decisions concerning the Polish-German frontier are clear, definite, and contain nothing equivocal. For in Potsdam it was decided that the entire German population still remaining to the East of the Oder and the Western Neisse was to be evicted. By December 7th, 1945, the State Department in Washington published a plan for evacuation of the Germans *inter alia* from the Polish Regained Provinces.² Finally, on February 18th, 1946, an agreement was concluded in Berlin between Great Britain and Poland, concerning the settlement in the British Zone of Occupation of all those Germans from the Polish Regained Provinces, who are not deported to the Soviet Zone.³ In other words, if any probability previously existed, despite the promises and obligations, of the Anglo-Saxon Powers questioning Poland's new western frontier, it has been formally cancelled by these three acts.

Moreover, it must be pointed out that such reservations do not seem desirable, either from the point of view of reassuring the people of Poland, or from that of achieving tranquillity in Europe generally. Ignoring all political considerations, they lead to the destruction of faith in the existence of morality, the existence of justice.

And the recognition of Poland's right to the Regained Provinces is understood by many precisely as a kind of act of historical justice. For it must not be forgotten that the Germans deprived Poland of her independence after it had been recovered for barely twenty years, and furthermore crushed the Polish

¹ The Hague Tribunal expressed its opinion on the subject, in connection with a dispute concerning the powers of one of the delimitation commissions, in the following words, namely, that delimitation relates only to "Such modifications, which had to be justified by the interests of individuals or of communities in the neighbourhood of the frontier line and to have regard to special local circumstances, were bound to preserve the character of 'modifications' and could not involve a complete or almost complete abandonment of the line fixed"
Annual Report of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Series E, No. 1, pp. 218/219.

² *Kessing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. VI, p. 7644C.*

³ *Ibid., p. 7738A.*

nation with a fury perhaps not to be found in their attitude to any other country. All those Poles who have come through the ordeal have behind them 5½ years of, at the best, systematic undernourishment, of having to hide themselves, of living under the continual threat of death, torture, or being sent off to forced labour or the concentration camp. Millions of children who throughout those 5½ years were undernourished (in many cases this meant undernourishment from birth) were robbed of their childhood, saw death continually around them and scenes which were so monstrous that they are not to be committed to paper.

To this must be added the material destruction. The destruction of the achievements of many generations, which, in the difficult conditions of a State deprived of independence were much more difficult to achieve than in countries where there were normal conditions of economic development. Accepting estimates so far made as our basis, we can already state, as we have said, that about a third of the pre-war Polish national capital no longer exists, partly as the result of military operations, but to a much greater extent as the result of the systematic destruction carried out by the German authorities on a scale unknown in Western Europe. The secretariat of the Sub-commission set up by the Economic and Social Council for investigation of the question of reconstruction of war-devastated areas estimated the damage in Polish agriculture and industry alone at a sum of about £1,069,200,000. In a memorial presented by the Polish Government to this same Sub-commission, giving an estimate of the value of effective destruction (not taking into account the lack of maintenance of equipment and so on), adding to agriculture and industry the loss of municipal buildings and bank values also, a sum equal to about £1,609,720,000 is given. And this does not include the cost of the enormous destruction in transport, communications, trade, crafts, forestry not to mention hospital services, or cultural values, scientific centres, etc., which are difficult to estimate.

For all these crimes and wrongs the Germans have been compelled to give back to Poland territories which once formed

part of the Polish State, from which that State was expelled in the course of centuries as the result of German expansion.

These areas had a social income which was almost equal to the sums expended by the Germans in preparation for the last war.¹ And this in material respects constitutes a partial recompense for the damage suffered by the Polish people as the result of the German devastations.²

Here it must be pointed out that from the economic aspect the Germans are suffering a comparatively small sacrifice. They have lost an area in which the national income was only half the average for the German Reich as a whole. Obviously these areas were of great strategic and political significance to Germany, as a sally-port for attacks eastward. The natural riches of Silesia were a tremendous help during the war in the decentralization of the armaments industry, which in consequence was not exclusively dependent on the resources of the Ruhr. None the less, as we have said, these areas were not of great economic significance. The Germans did not even regard it as worth while exploiting their potential economic possibilities to the full.

And so one can say with confidence that, while being forced to make at least a partial act of justice towards the State which

¹ Burkheiser: *Finanzierung des totalen Krieges*, states that the German expenditure on armaments in the years 1927-1939, amounted to 94 milliard Reichmarks, which constituted some 11.3 per cent. of the national income during this period. The German statistics give the national income of the various provinces, from 1926 onward, only for the years specified below. In calculating the income of the areas lying east of the present frontier, in the case of provinces part of which have remained in Germany, the percentage of territory now under Polish administration has been taken on basis. The income of that part of former East Prussia which has been incorporated with the U.S.S.R. is not taken into account. The national income of the Polish Regained Provinces, which constituted 22.2 per cent. of the pre-war area of Germany, was as follows, by comparison with the entire German national income: 1926: 10.5 per cent.; 1928: 10.5 per cent.; 1932, 11.0 per cent.; 1934, 10.8 per cent.; 1936, 9.9 per cent. Vide *Statistisches Jahrbuch*, 1928, p. 743; *ibid*, 1937, p. 533; *ibid*, 1939/40: p. 578.

² As we have said, the value of these areas was estimated to be some £2,250,000,000. At that time the war damage in the areas was not taken into account, and this, judging by estimates made so far, reduces the pre-war value of the area by 50 per cent., reducing the value in monetary terms to £1,125,000,000 at most.

they have wronged most of all, the Germans are doing it at small cost. For them the most painful aspect of it all is that the German population of the former eastern provinces, who fled from them before the approaching front, will never return there, while those who remained are being evicted. In other words, in accordance with the just decision of Potsdam the same principle of conduct is being applied to the Germans as they for many years applied to others. However, the method by which it is being carried out is different.¹ Ignoring the demographic aspect of this problem, which has already been dealt with, i.e., the necessity of finding a place of settlement for the people repatriated from beyond the Curzon Line, one other very important consideration has to be taken into account. Namely, there is the question of peace in Europe. Painful experience has taught us that every national minority, but above all any German minority, is in the present phase of development of humanity not only the cause of serious internal difficulties for the State within whose borders it resides, but also is a constant source of international disputes and misunderstandings. The existence of a national minority as a factor tending to provoke international conflict greatly facilitates the inflammation of passions, and provides a convenient pretext for provoking the fires of war. And so it has to be stated that all those who for humanitarian reasons regret the Potsdam decision to evacuate the German minority from these areas are not taking into account the fact that it is the lesser evil, which will avert the greater. That it is the cause of a minor amount of suffering which will avert a major amount of suffering, both qualitatively and quantitatively, in the future. They do not take into account the circumstance that this operation, so painful for many, will

¹ Impartial observers testify that no manifestations of brutality are to be discerned in connection with the evacuation of the Germans, such as was a characteristic feature of the method systematically adopted by the Germans in deporting Poles. In his book: *Russia's Neighbour—the New Poland* (London, 1946), Bernard Newman writes in a very interesting way about this question; the writer specially investigated this problem in September, 1945, during personal studies in the Polish Regained Provinces.

reduce the tension which is hindering the work of raising the general standards of existence on the Continent, which, in the conformation of the conditions of the age in which we are living will have a positive reaction in all the rest of the world.

It must not be forgotten to-day, that, as experience demonstrates, the Germans question every frontier on the East. For twenty years between the First and Second World Wars the then existing Polish frontier was described by them in political slogans as the *Brennende Grenze* (the burning frontier), and even in the days of the Weimar Republic was declared in German propaganda to be "unbearable." And that is quite understandable: German, and above all Prussian expansion has for centuries been directed eastward, seeking in the territories brought under subjugation in that direction a basis of support rendering possible German hegemony first in Europe, and then in the world. And so, so long as it is not made absolutely and convincingly clear that the era of German conquests in the East has come to an end, that it is the inflexible will of the Powers that Germany should not only renounce territorial expansion, but should return these areas to Poland, from whom she took them in the days of the "*Drang nach Osten*," there can be no talk of stabilization of European conditions, there can be no talk of lasting peace. For, as experience also demonstrates, in these days it is impossible to localise war on Germany's eastern frontiers. Any fires of war kindled in that direction will inevitably spread not only all over the Continent, but to the British Isles, and will reach North America.

