



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**The Center for Strategic Technology
The Texas Engineering Experiment Station
The Texas A&M University System**

SOVIET COMMAND CHANGES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

RAPID REPORT NO. 30

THE SOVIET-CUBAN MILITARY ALLIANCE:
THE ROLE OF THE SOVIET MILITARY ADVISER,
1961-1986

RICHARD WOFF

October 1986

This study was prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defence/Net Assessment in partial fulfillment of Contract No. MDA 903-85-K-0323, Project RF 5308. The views, opinions, and findings contained in this report are those of the author and should not be construed as an official Department of Defence position, policy, or decision, unless so designated by other official demonstration.

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College Station, TX

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Rapid Report No. 30

THE SOVIET-CUBAN MILITARY ALLIANCE:
THE ROLE OF THE SOVIET MILITARY ADVISER,
1961-1986

Summary

The 25-year Soviet/Cuban relationship based on "accord" rather than Treaty of Friendship.

During Castro's visit to Angola in August 1986, he disclosed that there were 30,000 Cuban troops in Angola, some 10,000 more than was suspected by Western observers. He gave no indication of any scale-down.

Reports indicate Cuban economy in ruins. The Soviet Union imposed "stiff terms" in the 1986-90 trade and economic cooperation agreement between them. Nevertheless, Castro awarded Order of Lenin on his 60th birthday.

The presence of Senior Soviet Military Advisers in Cuba since early 1960 together with the visits of high ranking Soviet officers, serves as barometer to measure Soviet/Cuban relations and, in some cases, to signal significant shifts in Soviet foreign policy objectives.

Since 1961 the relative importance of Cuba in achieving Soviet objectives abroad appears to have declined. However, the 25th Party Congress in Moscow signalled a fundamental shift in Soviet foreign policy and a probable reassessment of the Soviet/Cuban alliance.

Biography of Lieutenant General I. N. Shkadov, first Senior Military Advisor in Cuba. He retains close interest in and influence upon Cuba.

Biography of Lieutenant General I. N. Verbitsky, who followed Shkadov.

Probable role of Soviet Senior Military Advisor is threefold:

- Adviser in military training
- Acts as procurement and monitoring agency for military equipment and weapons systems
- Observer on behalf of the Soviet General Staff

The appointment of Colonel General V. N. Konchits in August 1981, the most senior Soviet officer to occupy the post, indicated a reassessment of Soviet policy options in Latin America and the initiation of a new long-term training programme.

Colonel General A. N. Zaitsev succeeded Konchits probably in July/August 1985, some months after the election of Gorbachev to the Soviet leadership. Zaitsev holds a lower rank than Konchits and lacks a staff background. This indicates a realignment of the role of the Senior Soviet Military Adviser, with an emphasis, once more, on training and administration, but there is no discernible decrease in the level of Soviet/Cuban military ties.

Recent changes within the General Staff Foreign Relations Directorate and the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, together with signs of a willingness on the part of the Soviet leadership to reduce Soviet force levels in sensitive areas could have wider implications.

Introduction

1986 has been a vintage year for the Communist bloc, marked by a number of significant events and some nostalgic anniversaries. In late February, attention was focused upon the 27th Party Congress of the CPSU in Moscow, on the performance of the Soviet leader, M. S. Gorbachev, and on his vision of a new "dynamic" Soviet society. The Party Congress was followed in subsequent months by those of the Communist Parties of all the leading members of the Warsaw Pact. The succession of anniversaries, on the other hand, is a reminder of past achievements and also of notable blemishes on the record: the Poznan riots (June 1956), the Berlin Wall (August 1961) and the Hungarian uprising (October 1956).¹

The most poignant reminder in 1986 of past achievements, however, was provided by Cuba, first in April with the celebrations to mark the 25th Anniversary of the Bay of Pigs (April/May 1961), which set the seal on the Cuban Revolution. Three months later, on 13 August 1986, Fidel Castro, the Soviet wunderkind of the 1960s, celebrated his "official" 60th birthday. Both events serve as reminders of the apparent inalienable ties of "brotherly friendship" and of Castro's "outstanding services" to the cause of the Soviet-Cuban alliance throughout almost three decades.² That the alliance is essentially military in character was emphasized by an event of mid-1985, namely, the appointment of a new Senior Soviet Military Adviser to the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces, Colonel General A. N. Zaitsev. He joined a select but, in the main, obscure group of senior Soviet officers who have played a key role in the development of close Soviet-Cuban military ties since the early 1960s, and, more recently, in the evolution of Cuba's role abroad as a leading surrogate in Soviet military adventures throughout the world.

This paper describes briefly the background of the Soviet-Cuban military alliance and assesses the role of some of the outstanding officers who have served as Head of the Soviet Military Adviser Group on Cuba in the period 1964-68.

The Forging of a Military Alliance

Since the late 1950s the Soviet Union has gradually established a powerful, in some cases predominant, influence in a number of Third World states. The pace of Soviet encroachment has been accelerated by a number of factors: Soviet championship of the postwar process of "decolonisation"; overt and covert support of national wars of "liberation"; economic and military aid to developing countries, and, finally, the image of the Soviet Union as a "super-power", underpinned by Admiral Gorshkov's Navy. This does not mean, however, that the expansion of Soviet influence throughout the world in the last thirty years has evolved according to a divine "master plan" charted by successive Soviet leaders for there have been setbacks. While many emerging Third World or "non-aligned" states are dedicated to a vague ideal of a "world socialist order", others pursue narrower, more immediate "national" aims, in some cases fired by fundamentalist belief. Indonesia, Egypt and Somalia, in the course of time, have become disenchanted with their Soviet mentors. The People's Republic of Vietnam, Kampuchea, the Yemen, Ethiopia and Iraq remain loyal to their bonds with the Soviet Union, while in the last decade Syria and Libya have developed closer ties with Moscow.

Cuba, on the other hand, may claim a record of virtually unbroken and untarnished allegiance to its Soviet god-father. After twenty-five years, a unique combination of factors continues to bond Cuba and the Soviet Union into a close alliance.³ Geography has played a predominant role in the shaping and

the maintenance of the Soviet-Cuban accord. The shadow of the United States has been and remains the vital factor underpinning Cuban loyalty to the Soviet Union. In return, Cuba has remained a firm springboard from which the Soviet Union can launch Marxist subversion and revolution in Central and Southern America. Furthermore, since the mid-1970s Cuba has maintained a sizeable force of troops to bolster the Marxist government in Angola, while remaining a valuable surrogate for Soviet policy objectives in the Horn of Africa. The "alliance for revolution", nonetheless, has in the past been subjected to the constraints imposed by the priorities of the global US-Soviet relationship. There have also been the strains emanating from Castro's unique, volatile personality. Moreover, at sixty, the "revolutionary greybeard" now presides over a country whose sugar-dominated economy, according to a number of experts, is in ruins. Reports in the West indicate that the Soviet Union has imposed stiff terms on Cuba in the 1986-90 trade and economic cooperation between them involving, above all, a drop in the price of Cuban sugar exports to the Soviet Union. Despite these ominous signs, Castro's sixtieth birthday was marked in the Soviet Union by the award of the Order of Lenin, and a message of congratulations from the Soviet leadership to "the sincere and great friend" of the Soviet people.⁴ Visits by Soviet military delegations, regular calls by Soviet naval squadrons in Havana and other Cuban ports, and the presence of senior Soviet military advisers in Cuba since the early 1960s, have served as a barometer to measure the scale of Soviet-Cuban relations and, in some cases, to signal significant shifts in Soviet objectives regarding Latin America.⁵

Following the crisis of October-November 1962, and the climb-down by Nikita Khrushchev over the deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba within 100

miles of the US mainland, the relative importance of Cuba in the achievement of Soviet objectives abroad appears to have declined. Subsequently, Khrushchev's Caribbean venture, among others, was attacked after his fall in October 1964 as "hare-brained" by the Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshal M. V. Zakharov.⁶ Furthermore, throughout the 1960s and early 1970s the Soviet Union had other problems nearer home, in Eastern Europe and with China. While a number of senior Soviet officers visited Cuba during the 1960s, the visit by Marshal A. A. Grechko, the Soviet Minister of Defence, in November 1969, appeared to herald a new and significant chapter in Soviet policy. It was, however, the 25th Party Congress of the CPSU, held in Moscow in March 1976, which signalled a fundamental shift in Soviet foreign policy, wrapped up in Brezhnev's "peace offensive". Brezhnev himself had emerged from the Congress as undisputed "leader" following a decade of manoeuvre within the Party apparatus.⁷ But there were other factors of equal significance which enticed the Soviet Union into foreign ventures after a lapse of over a decade: the end of US involvement in Vietnam; the final eclipse of the former Portuguese colonial administration in Africa (Mozambique and Angola) and the installation of a Marxist regime in Ethiopia. Consequently, a reassessment and reevaluation of the Soviet-Cuban alliance would have been undertaken in Moscow in the mid-1970s, together with the setting of long-term aims.

In late October 1976, Army General V. G. Kulikov, Chief of the Soviet General Staff, paid a ten day visit to Cuba, ostensibly to represent the Soviet Armed Forces at the celebrations to mark the founding of the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces. It was a significant event, the first official visit to Havana by a Chief of the Soviet General Staff. Marshal Zakharov, Kulikov's predecessor, had viewed precipitate Soviet involvement in Latin

America with great caution, judging that Soviet military and logistic capability could not support such major strategic ventures at that time. Kulikov's visit, therefore, was to signal a new dimension in Soviet-Cuban relations; the mobilisation of Cuban socialist ideals in the defence and support of national liberation movements in Ethiopia and Southern Africa. Of equal significance was the visit to Havana, in December 1977, by Admiral S. G. Gorshkov, a Deputy Minister of Defence and Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy. The next visit to Cuba by a Chief of the Soviet General Staff took place in February 1981, on the eve of the 26th Party Congress of the CPSU. Marshal N. V. Ogarkov's visit was programmed at a time when Soviet and Cuban aspirations may have been shifting towards Latin America, with the germination of insurrectionary movements in Central America and the Caribbean region. Ogarkov's visit was followed in May 1981 by a call in to Havana by a Soviet naval squadron under command of Vice Admiral V. A. Samoilov, First Deputy Commander of the Black Sea Fleet. In November 1981, Marshal of Aviation A. I. Koldunov, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Air Defence Forces, attended the 25th Anniversary of the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces. Each of these visitors signalled new accents. Ogarkov's visit not only put new life into the Soviet-Cuban military accord; it also indicated that the role of Cuba as the militant surrogate of Soviet policy in the Third World was to be expanded. Ogarkov visited Cuba at the invitation of Army General Raul Castro, the Cuban Minister of Defence, who later visited Moscow, in May 1981, for talks with both Marshal D. F. Ustinov, the Minister of Defence, and Ogarkov to discuss "subjects of mutual interest".⁸ Koldunov's visit was the first to Cuba by a Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Air Defence Forces, and took place against a

background of growing Soviet apprehension over the so-called US "anti-Cuban campaign" directed against the "Cuban-Nicaraguan Axis".

Important as these visits were, another event in 1981 was of potentially greater significance in the context of Soviet-Cuban military relations. This was the appointment in August 1981 of a new Senior Soviet Adviser to the Cuban Armed Forces, Colonel General V. N. Konchits, an event which was almost unnoticed at the time.⁹ Nevertheless, the dispatch of a senior Soviet officer with close links with the General Staff, signalled a reassessment by the Soviet leadership of policy options in Latin America in the first half of the 1980s. It also indicated that the Soviet High Command was about to embark on a new long-term training programme, which aimed to organise and equip the Cuban Armed Forces for an expanded role in the next decade. Consequently, the appointment of Konchits raised, for the first time in two decades, the question of the role of the Senior Soviet Adviser as well as that of the group of senior Soviet officers who had served in Cuba since Castro overthrew the Batista regime.

The Soviet Senior Military Adviser to the Cuban Armed Forces -- 1961-68:

Today the Soviet High Command maintains in most Third World states, Military Adviser Groups which are controlled by the General Staff in Moscow. As a rule, each Group is under the command of a senior officer of Colonel General (three star) rank, others are under the control of a Lieutenant General (two star) while some are controlled by an Army General (four star), depending on the circumstances at the time and the importance, from Moscow's point of view, of the individual post.

The role of the Military Adviser Group is probably threefold: advisers in matters of military training; acting as a procurement and monitoring agency

for the delivery of military equipment and weapons systems, and thirdly, acting as observers on behalf of the General Staff.¹⁰ In the main, therefore, their role is similar to that of the Senior Representative of the Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces, attached to the Armed Forces of each of the Member States of the Warsaw Pact. While little is known about the exact size and complement of the respective Military Adviser Groups, the Senior Adviser appears to have a large team of senior assistants covering all aspects of military affairs, including political work and ideological indoctrination. Most Senior Advisers are Ground Forces officers with long experience in command and training. In the past many have withdrawn into obscurity on returning to the Soviet Union, but today an increasing number are subsequently appointed to key posts within the Soviet High Command. There has been a Group of Soviet Military Advisers, under the command of a Senior Adviser, in Cuba since the early 1960s. The post is perhaps the most sensitive and prestigious of the senior Soviet military appointments abroad. This is due, above all, to the proximity of the United States and to the role of the Cuban Armed Forces as a Soviet surrogate in Africa, the Caribbean and Latin America.

One of the most prominent, and possibly the first Senior Soviet Military Adviser in Havana, was Lieutenant General I. N. Shkadov, a former Deputy Commander for Combat Training of the Carpathian Military District (1961-64). Born in 1913, Shkadov joined the Red Army in 1935 and graduated from a tank school in 1938. Some months later he commanded a tank platoon during the Battle of Lake Khasan against the Japanese, for which he was awarded the Order of the Red Star "for outstanding bravery".

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During the Great Patriotic War (1941-45), after a brief period as a regimental intelligence officer, he commanded, in turn, a tank battalion, an independent tank regiment, and an Independent Tank Brigade (November 1944-June 1945). Throughout his career Shkadov "demonstrated organisational ability and professional skill of a high order" and he took part in many of the crucial wartime events: the Battle for Moscow, the Battle of Stalingrad, Operations in the Ukraine (Second and Third Ukraine Fronts) during late 1943 and 1944, and the liberation of Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.¹¹ After the war Shkadov rose steadily. He became commander of a tank division in 1953 in East Germany (under Marshal A. A. Grechko) and commander of a tank army also in East Germany in late 1959 shortly after passing out of the General Staff Academy. As Deputy Commander for Combat Training in the Carpathian Military District, commanded by Army General A. L. Getman (1958-64), Shkadov was responsible for all aspects of training at a time when there was a renewed emphasis on "combat and mobility readiness" with an expanded programme of field training exercises "in conditions of modern warfare".¹² Shortly after taking up his post, Shkadov addressed a meeting of the District Military Council on the "difficult tasks before the troops serving in the District arising from the revolutionary changes in military affairs and the increasing necessity for improving the style and methods of troop control, training and education of personnel."¹³ The link with Getman, a veteran of the Battle of Khalkin Gol (1939) against the Japanese, was also significant. It was probably Getman's close link with Marshal M. V. Zakharov, Chief of the General Staff, from November 1964 to September 1971, which played a role in the choice of Shkadov for the post of Senior Military Specialist and Chief Military

Consultant to the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Republic of Cuba.¹⁴

The appointment of Shkadov as Senior Soviet Military Adviser to the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces was possibly the first crucial decision affecting the future of Soviet-Cuban relations by the Soviet leadership following the fall of Khrushchev in late October 1964. Shkadov's own professional experience and reputation as a training expert placed him in a unique position to influence the shape of the fledgling Cuban Armed Forces, a role all the more important in the aftermath of the missile debacle of November 1962. While little emerged during Shkadov's period as Senior Adviser, the fact that he subsequently held a succession of senior posts within the Soviet High Command on his return to the Soviet Union in 1966 and that he was awarded a number of Cuban honours, testified to a notable degree of success. From 1967-69 he was Commander of Northern Group of Forces (Poland), Chief of Ground Forces Training Establishments between 1969-72, and since 1972 Chief of the Main Personnel (Cadres) Directorate of the Ministry of Defence, with the rank of Deputy Minister of Defence since 1983. Shkadov was promoted to Army General in 1975 and made a Hero of the Soviet Union in February 1978 in recognition of his "services to the development of the Soviet Armed Forces".¹⁵ As Chairman of the Soviet-Cuban Friendship Society he retains close interest in and influence upon Cuba.

Following Shkadov's departure in 1966, there was little or no detailed information regarding subsequent Senior Military Advisers in Cuba until the appointment of Lieutenant General I. N. Verbitsky in late 1974. His immediate predecessor was of a much more junior status (one star), and the apparent increase in the Soviet military profile in Cuba was possibly due to an

expansion in Soviet military assistance and a reassessment of training programmes to prepare the Cuban Armed Forces for a more active role abroad. By late 1975, following the granting of independence by the Portuguese to their former colonies in Africa, some 20,000 Cuban troops were believed to be in Angola assisting the Marxist government in the struggle against insurgents supported by South Africa.^{16*} While Castro has always insisted that the decision to intervene, like that in Ethiopia in 1977, was Cuba's alone, nevertheless military operations were closely controlled by the Senior Soviet Military Adviser and his staff in Angola. In assessing the role of Senior Soviet Military Adviser in Cuba at this time, it is of some significance that Verbitsky, like Shkadov, was a former Deputy Commander for Combat Training in the Carpathian Military District (1969-73). Verbitsky, furthermore, was one of a group of senior officers serving in the Carpathian Military District, many of whom had played a key role during the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, and who were later to occupy senior posts in the Soviet military educational system -- i.e. Lieutenant General P. V. Mel'nikov (Head of the Frunze Academy, 1978-83), and Major General G. V. Sredin (Head of the Lenin Military Political Academy since 1981). Colonel General G. I. Obaturov, Commander of the District from 1970 to mid-1973, subsequently served as a Senior Military Adviser abroad, and was Head of the Frunze Military Academy from 1983 to late 1985. Verbitsky himself was among a number of senior officers (including S. F. Akhromeev, Chief of the General Staff since late 1984) commended for raising training standards of units of the Carpathian Military District in 1972.¹⁷ Very soon after the visit to Cuba by Army

*See Note 4.

General Kulikov, the Chief of the Soviet General Staff, in October 1976, Verbitsky was replaced by Lieutenant General S. F. Krivoplyasov, a senior officer who also had a combat training background and specialised knowledge of new generation weapons. Krivoplyasov, in turn, departed in late July 1981, but not before he received a new Cuban medal, the "International Combat Medal", in recognition of his "contribution to the deepening of Soviet-Cuban relations."¹⁸

The arrival of the new Senior Soviet Military Adviser, Colonel General V.N. Konchits, was announced in a Cuban broadcast on 26 August 1981, the announcement being an unusual departure from official Soviet-Cuban secrecy.¹⁹ Konchits was the most senior Soviet officer to date to occupy the post of Senior Military Adviser to the Cuban Armed Forces. The background and career of the new appointee, however, also indicated that the Soviet High Command had not only reassessed the role of the Senior Military Adviser in Cuba but had realigned Soviet policy objectives concerning Latin America with the future role of Cuba throughout the Third World in general.

There is scant information on the early background and career of Konchits. He was born in 1925, the son of a veteran of the Civil War and a Red Army officer, who for a brief period was a Senior Military Adviser to Chiang Kai-shek in the later 1920s.²⁰ That year he also joined the Communist Party. He graduated from the Frunze Military Academy in 1950 and from the General Staff Academy in the early 1960s. In 1974 he was appointed Chief of Staff of the Belorussian Military District, and in 1978 he was promoted to the post of Commander, Volga Military District. A similar career pattern occurred in the case of Marshal Ogarkov (Chief of the General Staff 1977-84), who also was a Chief of Staff of the Belorussian Military District before being

appointed as Commander, Volga Military District in 1965. While in Cuba, Konchits adopted a noticeably more prominent profile, in effect, acting more or less as a senior member of the Cuban High Command, although in Soviet uniform. Nevertheless, despite the public image reflected in the Cuban military press, Konchits, like his predecessors, remained an elusive figure. However, this does not alter the fact that 1981 was a milestone in Soviet-Cuban military cooperation, a point emphasized by Konchits' appointment as Head of the Frunze Military Academy on his return to the Soviet Union sometime in mid-1985.²¹

The first indication that a change was imminent was a report in the Cuban press of a ceremony held to mark "the end of Colonel General Konchits' period of service as Senior Adviser to the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces Ministry" in June 1985.²² There was no reference to a successor until June 1986, when Colonel General A. N. Zaitsev (wearing the uniform of a Colonel General of the Cuban Armed Forces) gave an interview to the Cuban press to mark the 45th Anniversary of the German invasion of the Soviet Union.²³ He was described in this interview as the "Senior Adviser to the Revolutionary Armed Forces Ministry".

Aleksei Nikolaevich Zaitsev was born around 1925, and joined the Red Army in early 1942. He took part in the liberation of Hungary as an intelligence officer (October 1944) and in the Budapest Operation (29 October 1944 -- 13 February 1945).²⁴ A former wartime comrade is Marshal V. I. Petrov, a First Deputy Minister of Defence until July 1986.²⁵ As Senior Military Adviser in the Ogaden (Somalia) in 1977, Petrov was in a good position to assess the capability and weaknesses of the Cuban soldier, and he probably passed on some firsthand impressions to Zaitsev before he departed for Cuba. A graduate of

the General Staff Academy in the late 1960s, there is little other information on Zaitsev until 1975, when he was identified for the first time as First Deputy Commander of the Soviet Southern Group of Forces (Hungary).²⁶ He remained in this post until mid-1981, when he was appointed First Deputy Commander of the Odessa Military District.²⁷ A report in the Soviet press in January 1986 was the first indication that Zaitsev had been transferred to another post.²⁸

As far as can be ascertained, the changeover of Senior Soviet Military Advisers in Cuba probably took place in July/August 1985, some months after the election of Gorbachev to the Soviet leadership (March 1985), a fact which could have ultimately influenced the choice of Konchits' successor. With the appointment of Colonel General Zaitsev, the status (three star) of the Senior Adviser was retained. Nevertheless, Zaitsev ranks lower in professional terms than his immediate predecessor, as he had never commanded a military district or Group of Soviet Forces or held a post of equivalent status. He also lacks Konchits' "staff" background. Consequently, this could indicate a subtle realignment in the role of the Senior Soviet Military Adviser, with the emphasis, once more, being on "training" and administration, both areas of expertise in which Zaitsev excels. / Indeed, he has published a number of articles on battle training extolling, among other things, the importance of "physical fitness" as a basis for "command aptitude". In Zaitsev's view "too many junior commanders regard sport and physical training as of secondary importance". Nevertheless, "the fact should not be ignored that in modern warfare the role of physical training and organised sport in the improvement and maintenance of combat readiness has increased in importance. It is impossible to escape this fact".²⁹

Conclusion:

A Soviet Senior Military Adviser, together with a large staff of specialists and assistants, has been assigned to the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces Ministry since at least the early 1960s. The post has always been one of the most important and sensitive of the senior Soviet military appointments under General Staff control in Third World states. Consequently, Soviet influence in the philosophy, evolution, organisation, arming and training of the Cuban Armed Forces has been paramount for almost three decades. The appointment of Colonel General Zaitsev in mid-1985 as Senior Soviet Military Adviser indicates that for the foreseeable future there will be no discernible decrease in the level of Soviet-Cuban military ties under Gorbachev. However, while giving their approval, the Soviet leadership may be expected to exert tight control over Soviet General Staff relations with "friendly states". Indeed, recent changes within the General Staff Foreign Relations Directorate and the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, together with signs of a willingness on the part of the Soviet leadership to reduce Soviet force levels in sensitive areas, such as Afghanistan and the Sino-Soviet border, could possibly have wider implications. Any apparent change in the calibre, professional background and status of the Senior Soviet Military Adviser in Havana, could indicate, as in the past, that the Soviet leadership has embarked on a reassessment of its traditional ties with Cuba and its view of Castro's role as an ally in Soviet military and political ventures throughout the world. Castro's Grenada debacle of October 1983, the economic trends and future political developments throughout both Latin America and the African continent and, finally, Soviet-US relations in the later 1980s will, in turn, exert a significant influence on Soviet thinking.

References and Notes:

1. The events of October 1956 in Hungary have been commemorated in a Budapest radio series entitled "Moments of Destiny" which, in the words of the official commentator, are "intended to illuminate the events of the 1950s", including "the events of 1956 and the Kadarist consolidation which lasted until 1963" (Budapest Radio, 1 September 1986). In East Germany, the 25th Anniversary of the building of the Berlin Wall was marked by the official announcement of the arrival of the new Commander-in-Chief GSG, over three weeks after the departure of his predecessor (ADN, 12 August 1986).
2. The Times, 14 August 1986.
3. It would be more correct to describe Soviet-Cuban relations since the early 1960s as based on an accord. No "Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance" similar to those with other Third World states (i.e. India), has ever been made public. The "instrument" regulating mutual relations between the two states is the Soviet-Cuban Declaration of "Unity, Brotherhood, Solidarity", signed at the close of L. I. Brezhnev's visit to Cuba, 27 January -- 3 February 1974, and published in the Soviet press on 5 February 1974.
4. Pravda, 14 August 1986. Castro's 60th birthday was marked in a number of other ways. An article by Aleksandr Alekseev, Soviet Ambassador to Cuba 1962-68, published in the Cuban Armed Forces journal Verde olivo (No. 32/1986), recalled the early struggles and Castro's final triumph in 1959, in which Soviet moral support (and military assistance) played a crucial role. In August 1986 Castro paid a visit to a number of African states, and addressed the 8th Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in Harare. The highlight of his tour, however, was a three-day "working visit" to Angola, Castro's second to this country in ten years. During the visit Castro himself disclosed that the number of Cuban troops at present deployed in Angola was 30,000, some 10,000 more than had previously been suspected by Western observers (Havana Radio; 10 September 1986). No indication was given of an impending scaling down of Cuban military assistance to the Angolan Marxist government. Castro's visit was the subject of a lengthy article in Verde olivo (No. 37/1986), demonstrating that "the revolutionary greybeard" has apparently lost none of his legendary vigour and rhetorical venom. (The Soviet-Cuban Military Alliance paper).
5. A visit to Havana by a Soviet naval squadron is an annual event. The number of Soviet naval vessels which visit Havana and other Cuban bases (Cienfuegos and Manel) has increased each year since 1967 (five vessels). Peak years have been 1970 (42), 1972 (89), 1973 (84), 1974 (70), 1977 (66), 1978 (66), 1981 (61) and 1984 (58). In 1985 the figure dropped to 40, while the total to date for 1986 (August) stands at ten vessels. Overall, it represents a unique example of Soviet diplomacy.

6. Krasnaya zvezda (KZ), 4 February 1965. In October 1965, nonetheless, a Cuban military delegation visited Moscow for the first time and met both Marshal Malinovsky (Minister of Defence) and Marshal Zakharov. The presence of senior officials from the General Staff and the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations suggests that talks between the two sides also involved military and economic aid (KZ, 13 October 1965).
7. Brezhnev is the only Soviet leader ever to have visited Cuba (27 January-3 February 1974).
8. Raul Castro has attended a number of Joint Warsaw Pact Exercises (i.e. Shchit (Shield)-76 in Poland).
9. Havana Radio, 26 August 1981.
10. Economic aid and the supply of military equipment is the direct responsibility of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, headed from late October 1984 to November 1985 by Colonel General M. A. Sergeichik, the only soldier to hold the post. It is now headed, once again, by a Party official. The activities of Soviet Military Advisers abroad is controlled by a Directorate of the General Staff. Soviet military assistance to Cuba (and other states) is much more extensive and includes courses at all senior Soviet military schools and Academies, and exchange in such fields as pre-military training and Civil Defence.
11. Sovetskaya voennaya entsiklopediya (SVE), Vol. 8, p. 520. (Moscow, 1980).
12. Krasnoznamenny Prikarpatsky (History of the Carpathian Military District), p. 139 (Moscow, 1982).
13. Slava Rodiny (Carpathian Military District), 16 June 1962.
14. Army General was appointed Chairman of the DOSAAF Central Committee USSR some months previously, in June 1964.
15. TASS, 21 February 1978 (on 60th Anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces).
16. The Times, 14 August 1986. Shkadov published an article on the evolution and role of the Cuban Armed Forces in the Soviet Ground Forces journal, Voenny vestnik, No. 12/1976.
17. Krasnoznamenny Prikarpatsky, p. 182.
18. Havana Radio, 17 July 1981.
19. Havana Radio, 26 August 1981.
20. KZ, 7 March 1975.
21. KZ, 13 April 1986. Konchits was listed among senior officers who attended a conference on military education in the Ministry of Defence.

22. Verde olivo, No. 24, 1985.
23. Verde olivo, No. 14, 1986.
24. Nephadsebag, 4 April 1980.
25. Voенно-istorichesky zhurnal, No. 5, 1986.
26. KZ, 29 August 1976.
27. Kommunist vooruzhennikh sil, No. 15, 1981, p. 95.
28. KZ, 9 January 1986.
29. KZ, 7 June 1979: "The result depends in the last resort on the approach".