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3 OCTOBER 1979

- 1 -

## U S S R - C U B A - U. S.

Moscow's reaction to President Carter's 1 October TV address on the issue of Soviet combat troops in Cuba has been relatively restrained and balanced. In the only substantial treatment thus far, a TASS account issued on the 2d was predictably critical of the military measures the President announced but went to some length to play up his appeal in behalf of SALT II. This treatment contrasts with the sharper reaction to the President's remarks on the troop issue in Queens the previous week, which had drawn the first Soviet criticism of the President personally since the issue arose. An authoritative assessment of the current state of Soviet-U.S. relations may be forthcoming when Brezhnev makes his scheduled speech in East Germany this weekend.

Havana wasted little time in issuing its own direct indictment in a GRANMA editorial on the 3d which criticized the speech as contradictory and ambiguous. Ticking off the military measures announced by the President, GRANMA assailed the presence of U.S. forces in Guantanamo in traditional rhetoric, mentioning without comment Washington press reports that the United States will soon deploy 1,500 Marines to the base "as part of the Caribbean maneuvers." GRANMA saw the maneuvers and other measures as an attempt to intimidate the "revolutionary" countries in the Caribbean and Central America. It branded his statements on the Soviet troop presence as half-truths, in effect shutting the door President Castro had left ajar a few days earlier when he had said the President could extricate himself from the situation by "telling the truth." Apparently stung by the President's remarks in Queens, Castro had broken his silence on the issue in two interviews with American newsmen in which he refused to "lower" himself by explaining Cuba's military installations and regretted having to conclude that President Carter had "not been honest."

## MOSCOW REACTS TO PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS ON USSR TROOPS IN CUBA

Following brief initial reports on President Carter's address, Moscow issued its only substantial account in a Washington-dated TASS report on the 2d that was disseminated to both domestic and foreign audiences. The TASS account balanced criticism of the President for intensifying the arms race and international tension with an implicit

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FBIS TRENDS  
3 OCTOBER 1979

- 2 -

endorsement of his appeal for nuclear arms control and specifically ratification of SALT II. Moscow's guarded approach was reflected in remarks by Brezhnev to visiting Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis on the 2d. After stressing the importance of European efforts toward achieving detente, according to TASS, Brezhnev took note of recent developments "causing grave alarm" that made imperative further efforts by all states to promote detente and arms control.

The TASS account of the President's address carefully skirted sensitive issues such as increased surveillance of Soviet activity in Cuba, the 1962 understanding, and recent Soviet assurances, while taking note of those military measures--a permanent Caribbean task force, increased military maneuvers, and an enhanced rapid deployment capability--of the type Moscow normally exploits to denigrate U.S. policies.

TASS went to some length to replay the President's appeal on SALT II. Thus, after citing the President as saying the Soviet troop issue is no reason for a return to the cold war, TASS quoted the passage from the early part of the speech on the U.S.-Soviet relationship and the two countries' shared interests in nuclear arms control, and it juxtaposed to this his call in the concluding section for ratification of SALT II. The account ended by citing the President's remarks on the dangers of playing politics with these basic issues of national security and arms control.

TREATMENT OF PRESIDENT      Less than a week before the President's speech, Moscow had sharply attacked him personally for his remarks on Cuba and the Soviet Union at a town meeting in Queens on 25 September. Moscow previously had carefully refrained from associating the President by name with the "campaign" over the Soviet troop issue and had ignored his 7 September statement in which the President said the "status quo is not acceptable." The strong criticism came on the 27th--the day Secretary Vance and Foreign Minister Gromyko held their second meeting in New York--in back-to-back items: a widely broadcast commentary by TASS political observer Goncharov and a TASS dispatch from New York, published in PRAVDA the next day.

Goncharov complained that President Carter's remarks contained "unfounded and crude attacks" on Cuban policy and a "demand in an ultimatum-like tone" that the status quo be changed. Noting that the President at the same time expressed the intention to keep U.S. troops and military bases in "close proximity" to Soviet borders, Goncharov characterized this approach as "unlawful" and "inconsistent." The even more caustic TASS account of the President's remarks complained that he "resorted to a number of rude and tactless sortings" against Cuba and warned his audience "in a threatening tone" that the United States could take some action to change the situation. TASS added briefly that after all "these fabrications, attacks, and

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FBIS TRENDS  
3 OCTOBER 1979

- 3 -

threats" the President, in a later speech, called on the Senate to ratify the SALT II treaty and not play politics with the nuclear arsenal.

The criticism was echoed the following day, when TASS Director General Losev, in an English-language broadcast, said the President's language "sounded like an ultimatum." But by the 29th, after the announcement of the upcoming television address, Moscow shifted attention away from the President and began publicizing remarks and views of Vice President Mondale, Senator Byrd, George Ball, and various groups decrying any linkage between the Cuban problem and SALT ratification. PRAVDA's weekly international review on the 30th suggested Soviet cooperativeness--on SALT--and rigidity--on Cuba: The Soviet Union has never refused to take into consideration the national interests of its partners for negotiations, PRAVDA said, and Soviet policy in detente and curbing the arms race is based on principles of "reciprocity, observance of equal security of the sides, and consideration of their legitimate interests." However, it cautioned, "attempts at dictating" norms of international conduct to the USSR on the plea of the principle of reciprocity are "obviously without prospect."

#### HAVANA ASSAILS PRESIDENT FOR "HALF-TRUTHS," "INCONSISTENCIES"

A stinging response to the President was issued by the Cuban party daily GRANMA in an editorial on the 3d, broadcast in full by Havana radio in view of "the importance of the article." GRANMA said that while the President had "pulled back cautiously" from his previous statements on the length of time the military installation has existed in Cuba, he failed to make the "pertinent conclusions" and resorted to "half-truths which are also falsehoods." The editorial called the President's statements "profoundly contradictory": on the one hand, he affirms that the current problem does not warrant a return to the cold war, but on the other hand, he adopts cold war measures. GRANMA contrasted the President's "dramatic" appeal for the ratification of SALT II--which the paper said had been jeopardized by President Carter himself--with the military measures outlined in his 1 October speech, saying these measures constituted "a policy of blackmail, pressure, and threats of power in open antagonism of world peace."

The initial Cuban reaction came in a short PRENSA LATINA report--four hours before Moscow's first mention of the speech--which highlighted the President's "admission" that the Soviet "training center" poses no threat to the United States. Subsequently, Cuban media have provided fairly detailed accounts of the President's remarks relating to Cuba. GRANMA, as reported by Havana's international service on the 2d, noted that the President "reported on his talks with the Soviet Government"--an aspect ignored by

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FBIS TRENDS  
3 OCTOBER 1979

- 4 -

TASS--and cited him as saying the Soviet "replies" were "significant" but that several measures would be taken. Like GRANMA, Havana's domestic service enumerated the measures, and both reports noted the President's remark that the controversy does not justify a return to the cold war and cited him as urging the Senate to ratify the SALT II treaty.

CASTRO INTERVIEWS Prompted by President Carter's remarks in Queens, in which he called Cuba "in effect a puppet" of the Soviet Union, President Fidel Castro responded sharply in a press conference on the 28th followed by an interview with CBS' Dan Rather on the 30th--his first public statements on the Soviet troop issue. Havana's domestic service on the 30th carried a recording of the press conference, and the interview with Rather was televised for Cuban viewers on 1 October.

In rejecting the U.S. charges, Castro asserted that Soviet military "personnel" were in Cuba to train Cuban troops, that what the United States called a "brigade" was "in fact a training center," and that there had been "absolutely no change" in this "facility," which he said had been established following the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 in conformance with U.S.-Soviet agreements. Castro stressed, however, that since Cuba was not bound by the 1962 U.S.-Soviet understandings, he felt no obligation to justify the Soviet presence in Cuba or to explain Cuba's military facilities or defense to the United States. As usual, Castro pointed to the U.S. base at Guantanamo to support his argument that the United States has "no legal or moral right" to question any Soviet military presence in Cuba.

While Havana in the past had generally avoided direct criticism of President Carter, Castro labeled as "dishonest, insincere, and immoral" what he termed attempts by the President to portray Cuba and the Soviet Union as taking "some new and irresponsible steps" to change the status quo. He called it "inconceivable" that President Carter--"unlike previous U.S. presidents from Kennedy to Ford"--could have been unaware of the existence of the "training center." Despite his criticism, Castro portrayed President Carter as a victim of "bad information" and suggested that the President could extricate himself from the situation by "telling the truth." Like Moscow, Castro contended that the issue had been contrived in an effort to discredit Cuba during the nonaligned summit conference in Havana last month. And in what amounted to a reverse linkage, Castro also suggested that the Carter Administration was now trying to use the SALT II treaty to "make demands on Cuba."

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FBIS TRENDS  
3 OCTOBER 1979

- 5 -

## LIMITED PRC REACTION TO PRESIDENT'S SPEECH ON USSR BRIGADE

Chinese attention to the President's address has thus far been limited to brief, straightforward reports on the speech's main points and on steps taken to increase the U.S. troop presence at Guantanamo. With an eye toward SALT II treaty ratification prospects, XINHUA on 3 October briefly summarized both favorable and unfavorable Senate reaction to the speech.

Beijing had given considerable play to the Soviet brigade issue prior to the President's address, portraying the unit's presence in Cuba as a clear Soviet challenge to U.S. interests and depicting the Administration as vacillating in the face of Soviet intransigence on the issue. Chinese treatment of this issue has paralleled that of previous instances of what Beijing has characterized as weak Administration responses to Soviet tests of American resolve, most notably over the neutron bomb deployment issue and over conclusion of the SALT II treaty itself.

Initial Chinese comment, carried in RENMIN RIBAO on 4 September, had suggested that the Administration, beset with domestic economic difficulties and concerned about the SALT II debate in the Senate, was adopting a "low-key" approach toward a new "test" of the Administration's firmness in dealing with Moscow. Subsequently, a XINHUA commentary on 16 September characterized talks between Secretary Vance and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin as a facesaving device for the Administration to evade the consequences of its earlier statements on the unacceptability of the brigade's presence in Cuba. Shortly before the President's address, XINHUA on the 28th reported that Secretary Vance's talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko had produced no sign of Soviet flexibility on the issue, but noted that the President had pledged to change the status quo on the issue; XINHUA predicted, in a separate dispatch, that the success of the President's efforts to promote ratification of the SALT II treaty would depend on his subsequent handling of the Soviet brigade affair.

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FBIS TRENDS  
3 OCTOBER 1979

- 6 -

## U S S R - C H I N A

## MOSCOW MARKS PRC ANNIVERSARY IN STANDARD FASHION

With the delegations to the Sino-Soviet political negotiations having opened "preliminary" meetings, Moscow's guarded approach to the prospect of better relations was reflected in its observance of the PRC's 30th anniversary on 1 October. The Soviet greeting message and other formalities accorded with established practice in recent years, and Soviet commentary on the occasion followed standard lines in recalling the importance of Sino-Soviet cooperation in earlier days while deploring changes in Chinese policies since the late 1950's.

Following the format used over the past decade, Moscow sent a state-to-state greeting message, which contained expressions of goodwill toward the "Chinese people" and reaffirmations of Soviet intent to pursue improved bilateral relations on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence. Typically, in enumerating those principles, the message included nonuse of force, an element that is not a part of Beijing's standard version and has been a subject of contention in recent years.

Commentary on the anniversary, including articles in PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA, and the academic quarterly PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST, has essentially adhered to the line taken in recent years. Thus, a 1 October PRAVDA article, by I. Lebedev, played up the Soviet role in the Chinese revolution and the early development of the PRC and deplored the sharp turn in Chinese policies in the late 50's when Mao Zedong's nationalistic faction set out on a great-power, "hegemonistic" course hostile to the Soviet Union. The article recited a series of Soviet proposals over 15 years for improving bilateral relations, proposals to which Beijing's response has been "invariably negative." The article concluded by noting the opening of negotiations in Moscow, but it made the outcome contingent on a change in the Chinese approach.

Moscow has taken only tentative note of the changes in Chinese policies being adopted by the post-Mao leadership, though these changes to a large extent mean the repudiation of many of the Maoist policies that Moscow has castigated. Thus, PRAVDA observed that it "is now starting to be said in China" that 20 years have been wasted in the country's development because of Maoist policies, but the article offered no suggestion that this reassessment might augur a more propitious setting for Sino-Soviet relations. This issue was addressed in an editorial article in the latest

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FBIS TRENDS  
3 OCTOBER 1979

- 7 -

issue of PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST (No. 3, signed to press 31 August), an academic journal where a more forthcoming Soviet assessment of Chinese developments might be signaled. The article acknowledged that Mao's successors had shifted the focus of internal policy from ideological revivalism to economic development, but it complained that this shift was still subordinate to "militarist" and "hegemonistic" foreign policy goals and hence inconsistent with China's genuine interests. Moreover, the article stressed that the new leaders had made no change in the anti-Soviet, militaristic course established by Mao. Consequently, the "international progressive community" has no doubt that present-day China is a "dangerous instigator of world war."

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FBIS TRENDS  
3 OCTOBER 1979

- 8 -

## K O R E A - V I E T N A M - C H I N A

## CHINESE TROUBLES WITH DPRK, SRV REFLECTED ON ANNIVERSARY

The PRC 30th anniversary on 1 October has provided a measure of Beijing's troubles with its Asian communist neighbors. As to be expected, the event received only the barest minimum observance by Hanoi, which reciprocated Beijing's move a year ago by removing party ties from its greeting message. Pyongyang's treatment of the anniversary, while correct in form, reflected the current cooling trend that may derive from differences of attitude toward the U.S. presence in East Asia.

PYONGYANG      There have been no clear indications of what issues may underlie the six-month-long cooling trend in DPRK-PRC relations, but the question of U.S. troops in Korea appears to be a source of contention. Last month the Chinese editorial on DPRK national day failed to call for the withdrawal of U.S. forces.\* The 1 October NODONG SINMUN editorial on PRC national day recalled Chinese support for Korea but failed to claim Chinese backing for a U.S. pullout, as editorials on this anniversary in 1977 and 1978 had done. And for the first time since 1973, NODONG SINMUN failed to characterize Chinese backing as a source of encouragement or inspiration to the Korean struggle.

In line with this more subdued approach, the NODONG SINMUN editorial seemed to play down China's overall importance. Unlike editorials on this anniversary in recent years, this time the editorial omitted any reference to the importance of Korean-Chinese friendship for the situation in Asia, and it failed to make the usual claim that Chinese successes encourage the "world people." NODONG SINMUN may even have been diminishing the significance of the Chinese revolution by reviving a Kim Il-song quotation, last used in an anniversary editorial in 1971, which ranks the Chinese revolution second in significance behind the Great October Revolution.

Signs of apparent cooling in relations appeared throughout Pyongyang's treatment of the anniversary, many of them similar to those that appeared on the same occasion in 1977, when Sino-Korean relations also seemed troubled. The Korean leadership turnout at the PRC ambassador's reception in Pyongyang on 1 October was higher than usual--appropriate for a decennial--but the rank of the Korean speaker at the event, a Political Committee candidate member, was below the norm. From 1970-78 full members filled that role, except

\* See the TRENDS of 12 September 1979, pages 16-17.