ssi ⁄	ified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/10/28 : CIA-RDP06T00412R000707380031-2	
		•
	Talking Points for the DCI	
	17 November 1988	
	The Libyan Chemical Weapons Program: Options for US Influence	
	In our judgment, Libya will resist strongly US political initiatives to undermine its chemical warfare (CW) program and would react violently to a military strike aimed at neutralizing it. Libyan leader Qadhafi has denied publicly that the Rabta Technology Center produces chemical warfare agents—claiming it is a pharmaceutical plant—but has asserted Libya's right to possess any type of weapon it chooses.	
•	Tripoli views a CW capability as essential to keep pace with regional powers also possessing chemical weapons including Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and especially Israel.	
	As in the past, Qadhafi almost certainly will reject US accusations regarding Libya's CW capability by pointing to US and Israeli chemical and nuclear programs.	
	We believe a US effort to prevent Libyan use of chemical weaponsas opposed to their possessionhas a greater likelihood of success:	
	Washington could quietly but strongly warn Tripoliperhaps through a senior emissarythat it will not tolerate Libyan use of chemical weapons or their transfer to third parties and that such Libyan actions would have grave consequences. A similar warning from one or more NATO allies would reinforce the message.	
	Libya is dependent on foreign firms to sustain production at Rabta and Washington could urge foreign governments, especially West Germany, France, Italy, and Japan, to prevent their companies from continuing to support the Libyan program.	
		ê
	·	
		2

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/10/28 : CIA-RDP06T00412R000707380031-2

25**X**1

Reaction to US Attack Qadhafi almost certainly would retaliate for a US military strike on Rabta. The most likely form of retaliation would be terrorist attacks against US personnel and facilities, but attacks by elite Libyan military units also are possible. Tripoli could call on several radical groups, such as the Abu Nidal Organization or Japanese Red Army activists, to mount terrorist operations and hide the Libyan hand. Qadhafi has a small cadre of well-trained elite military units		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Qadhafi almost certainly would retaliate for a US military strike on Rabta. The most likely form of retaliation would be terrorist attacks against US personnel and facilities, but attacks by elite Libyan military units also are possible. Tripoli could call on several radical groups, such as the Abu Nidal Organization or Japanese Red Army activists, to mount terrorist operations and hide the Libyan hand. Qadhafi has a small cadre of well-trained elite military units	d in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved	l for Release 2013/10/28 : CIA-RDP06T00412R0007
Qadhafi almost certainly would retaliate for a US military strike on Rabta. The most likely form of retaliation would be terrorist attacks against US personnel and facilities, but attacks by elite Libyan military units also are possible. Tripoli could call on several radical groups, such as the Abu Nidal Organization or Japanese Red Army activists, to mount terrorist operations and hide the Libyan hand. Qadhafi has a small cadre of well-trained elite military units	\mathcal{C}	
Qadhafi almost certainly would retaliate for a US military strike on Rabta. The most likely form of retaliation would be terrorist attacks against US personnel and facilities, but attacks by elite Libyan military units also are possible. Tripoli could call on several radical groups, such as the Abu Nidal Organization or Japanese Red Army activists, to mount terrorist operations and hide the Libyan hand. Qadhafi has a small cadre of well-trained elite military units		
Qadhafi almost certainly would retaliate for a US military strike on Rabta. The most likely form of retaliation would be terrorist attacks against US personnel and facilities, but attacks by elite Libyan military units also are possible. Tripoli could call on several radical groups, such as the Abu Nidal Organization or Japanese Red Army activists, to mount terrorist operations and hide the Libyan hand. Qadhafi has a small cadre of well-trained elite military units		
Qadhafi almost certainly would retaliate for a US military strike on Rabta. The most likely form of retaliation would be terrorist attacks against US personnel and facilities, but attacks by elite Libyan military units also are possible. Tripoli could call on several radical groups, such as the Abu Nidal Organization or Japanese Red Army activists, to mount terrorist operations and hide the Libyan hand. Qadhafi has a small cadre of well-trained elite military units		
Qadhafi almost certainly would retaliate for a US military strike on Rabta. The most likely form of retaliation would be terrorist attacks against US personnel and facilities, but attacks by elite Libyan military units also are possible. Tripoli could call on several radical groups, such as the Abu Nidal Organization or Japanese Red Army activists, to mount terrorist operations and hide the Libyan hand. Qadhafi has a small cadre of well-trained elite military units		
Rabta. The most likely form of retaliation would be terrorist attacks against US personnel and facilities, but attacks by elite Libyan military units also are possible. Tripoli could call on several radical groups, such as the Abu Nidal Organization or Japanese Red Army activists, to mount terrorist operations and hide the Libyan hand. Qadhafi has a small cadre of well-trained elite military units	Reaction to US Attack	
Rabta. The most likely form of retaliation would be terrorist attacks against US personnel and facilities, but attacks by elite Libyan military units also are possible. Tripoli could call on several radical groups, such as the Abu Nidal Organization or Japanese Red Army activists, to mount terrorist operations and hide the Libyan hand. Qadhafi has a small cadre of well-trained elite military units	Ondback almost soutstall	
against US personnel and facilities, but attacks by elite Libyan military units also are possible. Tripoli could call on several radical groups, such as the Abu Nidal Organization or Japanese Red Army activists, to mount terrorist operations and hide the Libyan hand. Qadhafi has a small cadre of well-trained elite military units	Qadnail almost certainly	would retaliate for a US military strike on
Tripoli could call on several radical groups, such as the Abu Nidal Organization or Japanese Red Army activists, to mount terrorist operations and hide the Libyan hand. Qadhafi has a small cadre of well-trained elite military units	Rabia. The most likely form	of retaliation would be terrorist attacks
Tripoli could call on several radical groups, such as the Abu Nidal Organization or Japanese Red Army activists, to mount terrorist operations and hide the Libyan hand. Qadhafi has a small cadre of well-trained elite military units		lities, but attacks by elite Libyan militar
Nidal Organization or Japanese Red Army activists, to mount terrorist operations and hide the Libyan hand. Qadhafi has a small cadre of well-trained elite military units	units also are possible.	
Nidal Organization or Japanese Red Army activists, to mount terrorist operations and hide the Libyan hand. Qadhafi has a small cadre of well-trained elite military units	Tripoli could coll an	manage and the state of the sta
terrorist operations and hide the Libyan hand. Qadhafi has a small cadre of well-trained elite military units	Iripoil could call on	several radical groups, such as the Abu
Qadhafi has a small cadre of well-trained elite military units	Nidal Organization or	Japanese Red Army activists, to mount
Qadhafi has a small cadre of well-trained elite military units	terrorist operations a	nd nide the Libyan hand.
Qadhafi has a small cadre of well-trained elite military units		
Qadhafi has a small cadre of well-trained elite military units		
the state of well-blatted elice military units	Oadhafi has a small ca	dre of well-trained elite military units
ENAL COULD MOUNT COVERT attacks against US targets along the	that could mount cover	t attacks against NS targets along the
that could mount covert attacks against US targets along the Mediterranean littoral. Navy commandos, for example, could	Made Court mount Cover	o googens against as carkers arough the
attack US ships in port with limpet mines, or mine sea lanes.	Mediterranean littoral	Navy commandes for example sould

--Either Libyan response would be accompanied by a vigorous diplomatic effort to obtain condemnation of the United States in international fora.

25X1

25X1 25X1

25X1