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Talking Points for the NIO/Africa
29 February 1988


QADHAFI'S CONTINUING PROGRAM OF SUBVERSION IN AFRICA

There is compelling evidence that Libyan leader Mu'ammur Qadhafi is actively pursuing a two-track policy in Africa of diplomacy and continued support for terrorism and subversion.

- [REDACTED] 25X1
Qadhafi is interested in repairing relations with some moderate African countries, including Ivory Coast, Niger, and Togo.
- Qadhafi has sent personal envoys to these countries four different times in the past year. These envoys were Ali Hudayri, the Libyan Ambassador in Paris; Sa'id Hafiana, Deputy Foreign Secretary; and Muhammad Ahmad al-Sharif, head of the Libyan Islamic Call Society; and Colonel Yusuf Dibri, a senior Military Intelligence officer.
- The dispatch of a senior officer on a diplomatic assignment to Niger last November was particularly interesting. Colonel Dibri's discussions in Niger were unusual, in that they may have involved Libyan offers of military assistance to the new regime there. The Nigeriens have not accepted such offers, however.
- Libya's hosting of the Foreign Minister of Sierra Leone in late January fits this pattern.

Libyan overtures to African moderates supplement Qadhafi's continued courtship of governments in Benin, Burkina Faso, and Ghana.

- [REDACTED] 25X1
[REDACTED] Tripoli has provided arms to Benin and Burkina Faso and financial assistance to Burkinabe. 25X1



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- The Libyans have long worked to build ties to the Rawlings regime in Ghana. There were over a half dozen meetings between senior officials or delegations of both countries in 1987.
- Libyan relations with Ghana were highlighted by President Rawlings' visit to Tripoli for the 1 September ceremonies commemorating the 19th anniversary of Qadhafi's coup and a joint economic commission meeting in November.

Qadhafi also is interested in improving relations with Tanzania and developing Libyan influence in Uganda.

- Qadhafi sent one of his African affairs advisors-- Bashir Salah Bashir--to Dar es Salaam last September to test Tanzania's interest in improving relations.
- The Libyans are providing Uganda with arms, ammunition, military and intelligence training and advisory support, and economic assistance in a long-term effort to gain leverage over President Musaveni.

Qadhafi's initiatives are intended to keep moderate Africans, France, and the United States off balance. Qadhafi's regional objectives remain unchanged--he continues to seek the establishment of Libyan political leadership and the eradication of the French, US, and Israeli presence in Africa.

- These objectives are based on a mixture of ideological, political, religious, and territorial motivations that inspire Qadhafi to use any means to enhance his influence in the region.
- Above all, Qadhafi's Africa policy is driven by his vision of his unique role in the evolution of society as a whole.
- He sees himself as a leader and agent of historic forces that will reorder both Libyan society and Third World politics. These ideas are codified in his "Green Book" of revolutionary thoughts.
- Qadhafi's "Green Book" provides both a motive and a rationale for providing military and financial aid to radical regimes and for undermining moderate governments by supporting--or creating--subversive groups and abetting international terrorism.

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--Qadhafi is not the madman he is often branded, but his behavior tends to be erratic, and his decisions are heavily influenced by his felt need to be recognized as a major actor on the world scene.

Qadhafi's principal enemies in Africa are Zaire and Chad. However, in both cases, his plans for removing the current leadership have failed.

--Over the past year, Libyan activities have focused on protecting Libyan-claimed territory in northern Chad and removing Chadian President Habre.

--Qadhafi probably regards a pro-Libyan regime in N'Djamena as essential to achieving his aim of spreading Libyan political hegemony farther south in Africa.

--Chadian victories on the battlefield have only reinforced Qadhafi's resolve to remove President Habre.

Zaire's strategic location, its friendship with France, the US, and Israel, and its steadfast resistance to Libya, including its support for Chad, have made President Mobutu a similar high priority target of Libyan subversion.

--Like President Habre, Zaire faces a significant subversive and intelligence threat from Libya.

--Libyan agents are in contact with Zairian dissidents in Brazzaville, Dar es Salaam, Kampala, and, to a lesser extent, in Bujumbura.

--In addition, Tripoli is training Zairian dissidents at various camps in Libya. Although we do not have a count of these Zairois, we believe they number several hundred.

--Training provided these dissidents starts with classroom instruction on Qadhafi's revolutionary philosophy as written in his "Green Book."

--More worrisome is that they are also trained in the use of small arms and explosives.

Much of the classroom instruction and the weapons orientation is conducted at the "7 April Camp" in Tripoli.

--The facility, a converted golf course, allows plenty of room for firing AK-47s, rocket propelled grenades, hand grenades, and heavy machine guns.

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--Because of the number of African, Arab, Latin American, and Asian groups receiving such training has increased over the last few years, the Libyans have also opened up a new facility not far from the "7 April Camp."

--The same basic training is conducted here, but we have not yet been able to confirm whether Zairois have been among the trainees.

Those dissidents identified by the Libyans as being the most radical or having advanced technical skills often go on to receive more advanced training.

--At the Commando Training Facility in Banghazi, they receive commando training.

--This involves a much more rigorous course of military training than is offered at "7 April," including unit tactics for commando raids, a large variety of weapons orientation, and possible terrorist techniques.

Qadhafi generally holds most of these trainees in Libya until he views the time as ripe for an operation inside Zaire.

Qadhafi has also recruited Zairois and other Africans over the years to serve in his so-called "Islamic Legion." Many Africans working in Libya are impressed into this organization.



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--The Libyans have used many of these units in Chad, often sending them ahead of Libyan troops as cannon fodder. Their combat skills and morale have been so poor that they frequently have deserted or quickly surrendered to the Chadian Government troops.

Although Zaire faces a subversive threat from Libya similar to that of Chad, it does not face a significant Libyan military threat.

Qadhafi's only military asset that can reach Zaire from Libya is the TU-22 bomber. Libya has seven of these aircraft, but probably no more than four are operational.

--Libya's TU-22s can reach Kinshasa (barely), but the threat is minimized by the poor skills of

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their crews. They have shown us in Chad and Sudan that their navigation ability and bombing accuracy are poor. Such bombings can have political impact, but they cause little military damage.

The key potential Libyan threat to Zaire derives from increased Libyan influence in Uganda.

- Libya is providing arms, ammunition, training, military and intelligence advisory assistance, and economic aid to Uganda in an effort to gain leverage over President Museveni.
- We believe that the Libyan program is designed to gain unrestricted use of Kampala as a regional center for subversion, most of which will be directed against Zaire.
- The Libyans in Kampala already are supporting infiltrations of Zairian dissidents across the Uganda-Zaire border.
- Qadhafi may even hope eventually to gain access to Uganda for his armed forces to threaten Zaire.
- The Libyan IL-76 at Entebbe is one of several that have delivered such equipment as light aircraft, a few armored vehicles, and some artillery to Uganda.
- This equipment is supported by Libyan military advisers, but their task currently is to support Uganda's counterinsurgency rather than crossborder operations into Zaire. Libyan contacts with Zairian dissidents in Kampala are handled by civilian components in the Libyan People's Bureau there.

For now, any thought of moving major Libyan forces into Uganda would be unrealistic.

- The Libyans' military capabilities are stretched to the limit by the Chad war, where they remain determined to secure the Aozou Strip.
- After their humiliation at the hands of Habre's forces, the Libyans have become preoccupied with their own defense. They have built elaborate defenses to try to hold what they have left.
- They have not, however, moved in the troops or transport that would be needed to recover their old garrisons at Faya Largeau and Fada.

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--We anticipate further Libyan defeats in Chad and it will be a long time before Qadhafi has the luxury to consider sending his brigades as far afield as Uganda.

Libyan frustrations in Chad and Zaire are prompting Qadhafi to undertake subversive operations against other moderate regimes in Africa.

--The apprehension of three Libyan terrorists in Dakar several weeks ago reflects an attempt to increase pressure on President Diouf and force him to curtail Senegalese support for Chad as well as the French and US presence in Senegal.

--Libyan-supported plots in Togo and possible Libyan involvement in plotting in Gambia were designed to achieve similar objectives, even if they failed in their principal goal of removing the existing leadership.

These and other Libyan plots are orchestrated by a cadre of loyal subordinates; these advisors generally play a behind-the-scenes role and are in the best position to influence Qadhafi's decisionmaking on African affairs.

--Qadhafi's key advisers on African policies are:

*Musa Kusa, chief of the Third World Center for Resistance to Imperialism, Zionism, Fascism, Racism, and Reaction (or Anti-Imperialism Center); The Anti-Imperialism Center has operatives throughout Africa.

*Abdullah Sanussi, a senior intelligence officer of Libya's External Security Organization; Sanussi works on special projects of high priority to Qadhafi.

*Abdullah al-Hijazi, a key official in Libyan Military Intelligence, also is a special project officer.

*Ibrahim al-Bishari, the chief of Libya's External Security Organization, controls intelligence collection and many recruitment operations in Africa.

*Abdullah Hijazi, a senior officer of Libya's Military Intelligence service, undertakes highly focused, priority operations in Africa.

--Libyan Foreign Secretary Jadallah Talhi has access to Qadhafi, but little influence over most Libyan

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foreign policies. His role usually is to present a more respectable face to Libyan diplomacy, particularly at international fora such as the Organization of African Unity.

There is little prospect that Qadhafi's objectives will change.

- Qadhafi remains free of domestic pressures in pursuing his interventionist policies.
- Over the years, Qadhafi has largely weeded out his less radical domestic political opponents and surrounded himself with young sycophants having no independent power base.
- Qadhafi's actions helped him establish himself as the sole architect of Libya's Africa policy--a fact that accounts for fluctuations in the priority Africa receives in Tripoli and the seeming incoherence in Libya's activities.

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