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Islamic Fundamentalism in the Middle East and South Asia: Looking Ahead



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A Research Paper

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Islamic Fundamentalism in the Middle East and South Asia: Looking Ahead




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A Research Paper

This paper was prepared by 
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It
was coordinated with the the Directorate of
Operations. 

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Division, NESA, 

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


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Summary

Information available as of 1 October 1986 was used in this report.

Into the next decade fundamentalist groups in the Middle East and South Asia will be able to exploit an array of political, economic, and social problems—such as declining oil revenues, the unresolved Palestinian issue, and the disruptive impact of Western values on Muslim culture—to gain followers, exert pressure on governments, and influence policy. The most serious challenge will come from more moderate fundamentalists, who outnumber the extremists and seek to establish Islamic states through legal means in countries such as Egypt and Jordan. The imposition of Islamic orthodoxy would probably increase persecution of religious minorities throughout the Middle East and South Asia.



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The threat of an Islamic revolution on the Iranian Shia model has declined. Sunni Muslims have grown wary of the revolution's excesses, and governments in the region have stepped up their surveillance of Islamic militants.



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Islamic fundamentalism appeals primarily to young, urban, well-educated Muslims from middle-class backgrounds because they are most affected by social and economic dislocation. Given rapid population growth, continued urbanization, and increasing emphasis on education in Muslim countries, the audience most responsive to fundamentalist ideals will probably grow. The lower classes are likely to remain an untapped pool of potential fundamentalists unless they are galvanized into action by a charismatic leader or a major blunder by an area regime.



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Key countries in the region will face varying degrees of threat from fundamentalism:

- Egypt and Jordan run a high risk of serious fundamentalist unrest in the next few years. Radical fundamentalism will probably gain strength in both countries because of their seemingly intractable economic and social problems, particularly the dim employment prospects for increasing numbers of university graduates and workers returning from jobs in the Persian Gulf. The moderate Muslim Brotherhood will probably use its influence in business, education, and social services to press the Mubarak government for such measures as the adoption of Islamic law.

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- Saudi Arabia is likely to face growing pressure from young university graduates and clerics to limit the spread of Western culture. There is no immediate fundamentalist threat to the already conservative regime, but a continuing economic slump could heighten the appeal of religious radicalism. An Iranian victory in the Iran-Iraq war would escalate sectarian militancy in the predominantly Shia Eastern Province, providing a potential base for antiregime activities.
- The rising appeal of fundamentalism on the West Bank will be a growing irritant to the Israeli Government. The Israelis thus far have allowed fundamentalism to flourish because they see it as weakening Palestinian nationalism. This policy is risky because Jewish settlement in the West Bank and attempts by Jewish zealots to seize control of Muslim holy places in Jerusalem are radicalizing West Bank fundamentalists.
- Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria must deal with the growing appeal of fundamentalism among young people who view it as an alternative to regimes that seem to offer no alternative to dim employment prospects and deteriorating social conditions. Of the three, Tunisia will probably have the most difficulty containing the expansion of fundamentalism because ailing President Bourguiba is losing control of the government.
- Radical fundamentalism is unlikely to gain a strong foothold in Syria despite severe economic problems. Most Syrians have benefited from President Assad's rule, and intense ethnic, class, and sectarian loyalties inhibit the development of a popular religious opposition movement. Moreover, Assad's crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood in 1982 is a brutal reminder of the risk involved in any challenge to his authority.
- In Pakistan—a self-proclaimed Islamic state—political, social, and economic realities will eventually force the government to become less rigidly Islamic. The regime's imposition of one interpretation of Islam on a religiously and ethnically diverse population has been a continual source of domestic unrest. Shias—sometimes with Iranian support—and other Muslim minority sects will continue to protest that the government's Sunni Islamic ideology has made them second-class citizens. The country's Islamic system has complicated the tax structure as well as Pakistan's international finance.

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The diversity of Islamic fundamentalism reduces the chance of widespread cooperation across borders. Despite contacts between branches of the Muslim Brotherhood, between Shia groups in the Gulf, and between Shias in Iran and Lebanon, there is little organized cooperation among radical Islamic groups. This diversity reduces the likelihood that a single leader will emerge to unite fundamentalists into a powerful political force. [REDACTED]

Governments in the region are attempting, with only limited success, to curb fundamentalism through a combination of co-optation, suppression, and acceptance of some fundamentalist demands. In the long term, fundamentalism's revolutionary appeal will be blunted only by the emergence of leaders inclined to deal realistically with the region's many economic, political, and social problems. Tackling these problems will be risky because some solutions may involve unpopular measures such as family planning programs or reduced food subsidies. So far, leaders have been reluctant to institute such measures for fear of giving fundamentalist opposition groups even more ammunition to attack the government. [REDACTED]

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Fundamentalists of all stripes resent the United States because of its identification with Western culture and its support for Israel. They usually view US assistance and economic development projects as attempts to spread Western culture at the expense of Islamic traditions. [REDACTED]

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The growth of Islamic fundamentalism will probably increase the tendency toward nonalignment among Muslim Middle Eastern and South Asian nations. The fundamentalist threat will make regional governments even more wary of increased political or military cooperation with the United States. The Soviet Union is unlikely to benefit directly from fundamentalism—which is anti-Communist—but Moscow will be able to exploit the political instability of moderate regimes through its support of radical Arab states. Moscow will also gain because the United States and the West—with their heavy security, economic, and political commitments in the region—have more to lose by a general cooling of relations with the Islamic states. [REDACTED]

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
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Figure 1
Near East-South Asia




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Islamic Fundamentalism in the Middle East and South Asia: Looking Ahead



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The rise and fall of Islamic fundamentalist influence continues to be a recurring feature of Middle Eastern and South Asian history. Fundamentalist movements have become politically important during times of social turmoil and economic uncertainty and often have a lasting impact. Saudi Arabia's strict interpretation of Islam, for instance, is largely the outgrowth of an 18th-century fundamentalist movement. Most scholars agree that fundamentalism today is driven by the long-term reactions to the Arab defeat by Israel in 1967, the failure of secular ideologies to address political problems adequately, and the social and economic dislocations that have accompanied the boom and bust in oil revenues.




Economic Contraction

The current economic downturn in the Middle East is providing fertile ground for the growth of Islamic fundamentalism. Falling oil revenues are contributing to unemployment and to deteriorating social services in such diverse countries as Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria. Fundamentalist rhetoric is especially appealing to many of the educated youth. They have come to expect increasing prosperity and a rising standard of living but are also committed to ideals of social justice.



Unemployment and Unfulfilled Expectations. Declining economic opportunities, especially in the Middle East, are frustrating university students and graduates, who have been the mainstays of radical fundamentalist groups in the past. In Saudi Arabia, for example, educated youth are finding job opportunities shrinking. This contrasts with the boom years of the 1970s and early 1980s, when nearly all youth with a secondary education could find a well-paying job. In Egypt the downturn is undermining the widely held notion that education is the key to a better life.¹ Good

¹ Despite the bleak job prospects, Egyptians persistently pursue higher education. Even poor Egyptians pay tutors up to \$4 per hour to enhance their children's education and to compensate for overcrowded facilities and poor teaching, according to the US Embassy in Cairo. University medical students pay as much as \$400 per course for supplementary individual instruction.




Islamic Fundamentalism Defined

We define Islamic fundamentalism as a religiously motivated movement that attempts to rebuild society according to what the fundamentalists regard as a divine plan. Typically, fundamentalists accept scripture, mythology, and traditions as literal truth without consideration of their historic or symbolic context. Adherents are committed to a world view in which all events have religious significance. This definition encompasses a wide range of Islamic groups, including the relatively moderate Muslim Brotherhood and radical groups such as Egypt's al-Jihad.



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Both radicals and conservatives advocate rule by Islamic law and the elimination of all Western influences, but they differ greatly on tactics to achieve their goals. Radical groups strive for an Islamic revolution on the Iranian model in which the political, social, and economic organization of the country is dramatically altered to conform to Islamic tenets. Such groups have been responsible for the assassination of Egyptian President Sadat in 1981, the takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979, and recent clashes with police in Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, and Pakistan. Radical groups are generally small, with most probably numbering fewer than 500 members.



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Moderates, who seek to establish Islamic states through legal means, offer a more complex challenge. Moderates are usually older and more established in business and the professions. They seek to gain wider followings through their support of social welfare programs and education. Thus, the Sunni Islamic Call Party, a hitherto nonpolitical religious education society based in India and with more than 1 million members worldwide, recently has been calling attention to its branches in the Gulf states by adopting goals similar to those of other fundamentalist groups.



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Economic Expansion and Islamic Fundamentalism

Ironically, Islamic fundamentalism seems to grow during periods of both economic growth and decline. Even if the Middle East rebounds soon from its current recession, governments threatened by fundamentalist movements will not be able to relax their guard. The rapid social and cultural changes that accompanied the economic boom in the Middle East in the 1970s and 1980s also created an environment for the growth of radical religious movements:

- *Migration of the rural lower classes to major cities exaggerated the disparity in living conditions between the cities' poor and wealthy. Conservative migrants were dismayed by the un-Islamic values of the urban, Westernized elite.*
- *Expanding educational opportunities and the media exposed the masses to foreign ideas and culture. Many Middle Easterners who studied or traveled in the West became disillusioned with Western culture.*

jobs are increasingly scarce, and salaries even for educated Egyptians are usually low.

Social tensions are increasing as contracting economies in the Arab oil-producing states are forcing workers from other Arab countries to return home at the same time that universities in their home countries are turning out increasing numbers of jobseekers. In Jordan, for instance, engineers and doctors, who have been prominent in the Islamic fundamentalist movement, are being hit hard by the return of overseas workers. Approximately 30 percent of Jordan's 16,000 engineers are unemployed, according to the US Embassy in Amman. The increasing job shortage will probably most affect recent graduates who must compete with experienced workers returning from the Gulf. Physicians in Amman told the Embassy that as many as one-third of Jordan's 3,000 doctors are unemployed. In Algeria, a population growth rate of more than 3 percent per year—one of the highest in the world—is outstripping the sagging economy's ability to create jobs.

Strained Social Services. We believe the appeal of fundamentalism is further enhanced by widespread perceptions that Arab societies are disintegrating. In Egypt and Algeria, for instance, falling government revenues are making it impossible to meet the increasing demand for housing, education, and other social services:

- The US Embassy in Cairo reports that low-cost rent-controlled apartments in Cairo and Alexandria are scarce. The price of a new apartment, which ranges from \$6,000 in a poor neighborhood to \$30,000 in a middle-class area, makes purchases unaffordable to all but the wealthiest young people.²
- Untreated sewage flowed in the streets and backed up in homes and factories in Alexandria last summer because the rickety municipal waste treatment system could not handle the burden of extra visitors during the Ramadan holidays. Demonstrators in Alexandria protested the sewage problem by overturning government buses and stopping trains until security forces quelled the disturbances, according to the US Consulate in Alexandria.
- In Algiers, the continued deterioration of the overcrowded Casbah—the historic residential district where a building's collapse in 1985 produced major antigovernment demonstrations—characterizes the severity of the housing shortage, according to the US Embassy. The government determined that 4,000 families in the Casbah needed to relocate because their homes were in danger of collapsing. Thus far, fewer than half of these families have found alternative housing.
- Limited space has forced Algerian universities to use rigorous examinations for admission. Last year fewer than one-fourth of the nearly 150,000 students who took the exams passed, according to

² An Egyptian primary school teacher may earn as little as \$60 per month, and a university graduate with a degree in business can expect to earn about \$180 per month in a public-sector corporation.

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diplomatic reporting. The nation's vocational schools can absorb only about 10 percent of the youth who do not attend a university. [redacted]

The Effects of Modernization³

Governments in Muslim countries face the dilemma of trying to use modern Western technology to expand their economies while attempting to appease fundamentalists by limiting penetration of Western ideas and values. Although fundamentalists throughout the region denounce what they perceive as the moral decay caused by modernization, we believe this dilemma will be most acute in Saudi Arabia, which remained isolated from Western influences longer than most Muslim countries and whose wealth has sparked particularly rapid expansion of education and industry. [redacted]

Although Saudi Arabia has been remarkably stable for the past 20 years, this expansion probably will increase tension between modern and traditional elements of Saudi society. Increasing higher education in Saudi Arabia—35 years ago Saudi higher education consisted only of two high schools—is exposing thousands of Saudis from rural as well as urban backgrounds to new ideas that are often perceived as inconsistent with traditional Islamic values. More than 57,000 Saudis attend universities in the kingdom, and the number will grow to nearly 100,000 by 1990, according to the US Embassy in Riyadh. In addition, thousands of other Saudi youths are receiving university educations in Western countries. [redacted]

Impact of the Iranian Revolution

We believe the appeal of the Iranian revolution has diminished over the past few years because of the poor economic performance of the Tehran regime and such excesses as mass arrests, torture, and executions. The Iran-Iraq war also is reawakening traditional Arab enmity toward Persians. Even among Iraqi Shias this ethnic antipathy is proving stronger than the religious beliefs they share with the Iranians. In addition,

³ We define modernization as growth in the capacity to apply science to industrial, commercial, and human endeavors. It implies a cultural and psychological willingness to search continually for knowledge as well as tolerance for abstraction and uncertainty. Fundamentalists criticize modernization because it is based on secular scientific knowledge rather than revealed religious truth. [redacted]

Sunni fundamentalists reject rule by the clergy, mysticism, the concept of sainthood, and the cult of martyrdom, all of which are central to Khomeini's Shia fundamentalism. [redacted]

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Despite the dark side of the Iranian revolution, Muslim fundamentalists have drawn inspiration from Khomeini's ability to topple an unpopular, pro-Western regime. Khomeini's model is still attractive to Shias in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia, many of whom are of Iranian extraction and have been treated as second-class citizens. Some Sunni fundamentalists probably believe the performance of other Islamic regimes would be better than that of the Iranian clerics. [redacted]

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Who Are the Fundamentalists?

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Fundamentalists generally are young, well educated, and from lower middle- or middle-class backgrounds, although there are variations from country to country. Many fundamentalist leaders received their educations in Europe and North America, [redacted]

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[redacted]⁴ Most moved from country to city and became committed fundamentalists while living in large, depersonalized urban areas such as Cairo or Casablanca. We believe fundamentalism does not have widespread appeal among the more numerous, religiously conservative lower classes and rural populations of the Middle East and South Asia. The lower classes are a pool of potential fundamentalist support, but they are unlikely to join middle-class fundamentalists in great numbers unless they are motivated by a charismatic leader or galvanized into action by a major political blunder by a regime. Historically, the emergence of a charismatic leader who could gain such broad-based support is uncommon. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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the profile of Egyptian fundamentalists derived from

⁴ In contrast to the close security monitoring at universities in most Middle Eastern and South Asian states, Western institutions provide Muslim students freedom of association and thought, which could nurture antiregime movements such as fundamentalism. [redacted]

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Sunni and Shia: Islam's Major Divisions

Islam has undergone numerous splits, rivalries, and conflicts over the interpretation of the Koran and Muhammad's messages on social and religious behavior among believers. The major division is between the Sunni and Shia branches. Numerous sects and schools of interpretation are included in these two basic divisions. [redacted]

have rarely posed a political threat to the regime, as they accept a secular leader's right to rule the state. They have often legitimized authoritarian rule through their support while moderating the leader's secular policies. [redacted]

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Sunni

More than 80 percent of all Muslims are Sunnis. They are followers of the Sunnah, the way of the Prophet, and recognize the first four caliphs (successors to Muhammad) as temporal leaders of Islam. Within two centuries after Muhammad's death, however, no central authority remained to interpret Islamic religious law. Instead, four schools of interpretation evolved, based on the individuals who first espoused a doctrinal version of the hadiths (traditions of the Prophet). These schools—Hanbali, Hanafi, Shafii, and Maliki—are considered equally valid, and a Sunni Muslim may follow any one of them. [redacted]

Shia

Shia Islam is based on the belief that the legitimate leadership of the Islamic community rests exclusively among the descendants of Ali, Muhammad's son-in-law. Shias ascribe supernatural qualities to these descendants and believe they are the rightful leaders of the Muslim community. Over time the line of succession came into dispute, with Shia Islam dividing into several sects, usually over the interpretation of when a messianic Imam would appear to rule mankind. [redacted]

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Although Sunni Muslims have religious scholars and clerics, they place greater stress on community consensus than on the pronouncements of religious elders. The religious establishments in Sunni states

Shias accept literally the doctrine of indivisibility of religion and politics. They view all secular rule as illegitimate but tolerate it until the return of the last Imam. Having disappeared in 873, this so-called Hidden Imam is believed to be living and will reappear at the Day of Judgment. Iranian leader Khomeini altered this view by introducing the concept that clerics should rule the state in the absence of the Imam. [redacted]

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interviews and trial records in that country is representative of Islamic activists in many parts of the region:

- Ninety percent of the members of radical groups were in their twenties or thirties.
- Eighty percent were either university students or graduates. Usually they were the first in their families to receive higher education.
- Sixty percent were students or graduates in science, engineering, and medicine—subjects in which admissions standards are toughest and in which students are confronted squarely with the inconsistencies between traditional religious beliefs and modern science.

- Most came from lower middle-class backgrounds. Many of their fathers were teachers or middle-level civil servants. [redacted]

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The profile of moderate fundamentalists generally differs from that of the radicals only in age, according to academic studies. The moderates are usually at least 20 years older; their tactics have been tempered by time, experience, and expediency. For example, leaders of the relatively moderate Muslim Brotherhood, who are now in their sixties and seventies, espoused violence when they were much younger. [redacted]

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Exporting the Iranian Revolution

Exporting the revolution is a central tenet of the clerical regime in Iran. Khomeini believes his message is valid for all Muslims and supports extensive efforts to promote the revolution throughout the Islamic world. Iran's goal is to establish an organizational and ideological base for the creation of Islamic republics. Its efforts are most intense in the Gulf states with large Shia populations—Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. Iran has recently increased its efforts to export the revolution to Muslims in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.

Iran recruits directly from the large pool of devout Shia youth in the Gulf states. Shia youth who show fervent support for Khomeini are taken to Iran for training and returned to recruit like-minded youth into fundamentalist organizations, according to diplomatic reporting. For instance, the Islamic Call Party of Bahrain (Dawa) draws recruits from among those attending meetings of the Islamic Enlightenment Society, and the screening can take up to two years as background information is gathered on potential members.

this process has been effective in preventing Bahraini security infiltration of Dawa.

- Crime, drug abuse, sexual permissiveness, and spiritual malaise are caused by the infatuation of political elites with Western culture and political ideas.

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Both Sunni and Shia fundamentalists have well-developed radical theologies that provide appealing alternatives to such "failed" secular ideologies as nationalism, Marxist socialism, and Western capitalism. The theologies also articulate the frustrations faced by many Muslims:

- Radical Sunni theology blames modernity and Western civilization for the Muslim world's decline into a state of "barbarism" (*jahiliyya*). A true Muslim, in this view, must rebel against modernity as well as governments that allow modern values to penetrate Muslim society. These true believers will form the leadership for the new just society.

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- Shia Islam has a long history of political involvement by activist clerics, who have argued for the establishment of a theocratic state. To these older traditions, Khomeini added the concepts of direct clerical rule as well as immediate spiritual redemption through political action.

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Governmental Responses

A regime's response to the fundamentalist challenge depends on the degree of its legitimacy, wealth, self-confidence, coercive potential, and perception of the fundamentalist threat. Although some regimes have stressed suppression, most have resorted to a combination of appeasement and coercion.

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Public Devotion. Many government leaders increase their public religious practices in hopes of strengthening their Islamic legitimacy. Even secularists such as Iraqi President Saddam Husayn and Syrian President Assad resort to displays of devotion to undercut claims by fundamentalists that they are not believers. We believe these ploys only increase the fundamentalists' conviction that these secular leaders are trying to manipulate religion for political benefit.

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
Fundamentalism's Drawing Power

We believe Islamic fundamentalism will continue to appeal to Muslims because it transforms political, economic, and social problems into moral absolutes that are drawn from their own religious traditions. Fundamentalism provides simplistic answers to complex problems by asserting that:

- Islam as outlined in the Koran and practiced by the early Islamic community provides the only legitimate model for Muslim life.
- Society is disintegrating and the economy is worsening because some Muslims are imitating un-Islamic Western models.
- Israel, the United States, un-Islamic Arab regimes, and Western culture are responsible for the recent decline in oil revenues.

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Figure 2
Youth Population Projection, 1970-2000^a



^a Ages 15-24.

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Regimes are turning to other techniques to prove their Islamic credentials:

- Before the downturn in the oil market, almost all Muslim governments generously funded their religious affairs ministries. Large new mosques sprang up in capital cities, and existing structures were upgraded to meet the needs of growing populations.
- Many countries, particularly in the Maghreb and Persian Gulf, use the government-controlled media for extensive religious programming and messages.

Almost all regimes have paid renewed attention to the restrictions of Ramadan, the Muslim month of fasting, partly by readjusting work and school hours. Saddam Husayn's regime, for instance, surprised many hard-drinking Iraqis this year by announcing a ban on alcoholic beverages and the closure of all nightclubs during Ramadan, according to the US Embassy in Baghdad.

Co-opting the Religious Leaders. Co-opting the clerical establishment as well as opposition fundamentalist leaders has been one of the most effective policies in blunting fundamentalism. In most Muslim countries a Ministry of Religion or Islamic Affairs or a religious consultative body such as council of religious elders (*ulema*) functions to spread the state-controlled version of Islam. The most powerful tools for governments include control of the salaries of mosque preachers as well as the mosques themselves. Close association with the regimes, however, can discredit the *ulema* and cause them to become a target of fundamentalist opposition.

Some *ulema* use their official positions to challenge the regime and preach the fundamentalist line. [redacted] the deputy director of the Jordanian military chaplaincy, Ali al-Fakir,


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Figure 2 (continued)



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took advantage of King Hussein's liberal policies in late 1985 to criticize the King for not promoting Islam. He also described the King's advisers as infidels, and Americans and Westerners as enemies. Fakir's popularity in the military, [Redacted] is growing. [Redacted]

establishment gives it more influence than the Islamic radicals, [Redacted] Cairo, in our view, sees the alliance as an opportunity to undermine the radicals without requiring the government to play a direct role in doing so. The government may also believe that better relations with the Brotherhood improve the ability of the security forces to monitor the organization's activities. [Redacted]

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The Egyptian Government gained the cooperation of the moderate Muslim Brotherhood to suppress Islamic radicals at universities in late 1985. The government allowed the Brotherhood to mount and finance a victorious campaign by moderate Islamic students for the powerful university student council positions that had been dominated by radicals, [Redacted]

Applying Islamic Law. Governments in most Muslim countries have increased the application of *sharia* (Islamic law) in recent years. Most have striven for a middle ground to balance fundamentalist demands for a vigorous application of *sharia*—including amputation, stoning, and interest-free banking—and the wishes of Islamic moderates and secular elites. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Pakistan attempt to enforce

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The Brotherhood and the Mubarak government each use this marriage of convenience for its own aims. The Brotherhood believes the alliance will recoup some of its waning popularity among younger fundamentalists by demonstrating that its access to the Egyptian

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The Muslim Brotherhood

Within the Arab world, the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin) is the most prominent Sunni fundamentalist Islamic organization. Founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna, a visionary Egyptian schoolteacher, it became an important political group in Egypt in the 1940s. After World War II it spread to other Arab states through Arab students who had studied in Egypt and through Egyptian exiles who sought haven in other Arab countries such as Syria, Jordan, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states. Many Egyptian Brothers remain as teachers in neighboring states, conveying their philosophy along with their academic knowledge to their students.

During its sometimes tempestuous history, the Brotherhood has adapted to regimes' suspicions of it by a mixture of cooperation with governments, infiltration of security services, co-optation of student organizations, and propaganda campaigns. We believe that these tactics and the clandestine nature of its methods have given it a more sinister reputation than it deserves. Only in Syria is the Brotherhood a declared revolutionary force determined to overthrow the regime.

A common set of objectives underlies Brotherhood activities in all countries:

- *Substitution of sharia (Islamic law) for Western legal systems.*
- *An economy based on Koranic principles, including the abolition of interest and the replacement of tax codes by the traditional zakat (alms tax) to help the poor.*
- *The relegation of women to the home to fulfill their divinely ordered function of bearing and raising children.*

sharia in all sectors of personal, criminal, and commercial activities. But many countries that inherited Western legal codes from colonial powers are attempting to apply *sharia* only in areas relating to personal behavior, such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance. Morocco, Sudan, Egypt, Algeria, the United Arab Emirates, and North Yemen have made

concessions to the *sharia* interpretations of personal law to soften criticism of their "Western standards." The Mubarak government has put off fundamentalist demands for implementation of *sharia* by embarking on a drawn-out process of examining every Egyptian law for its adherence to the letter and spirit of *sharia*.

Coercion. Several regimes use coercion against fundamentalists. Over the short term this is generally effective, but draconian measures have a high potential to backfire. Egyptian President Sadat, for example, was assassinated by Islamic extremists shortly after he ordered a crackdown on them. Earlier, President Nasir had been unable to stop the growth of antigovernment Islamic activities, despite jailing Muslim Brotherhood leaders and executing prominent Brotherhood member Sayyid Qutb, whose writings are a guide for Islamic radicals. In Syria, President Assad all but annihilated the Muslim Brotherhood in 1982 after uncovering a plot against him. The US Embassy estimates that 20,000 soldiers, civilians, and Muslim Brothers were killed in the siege of the Brothers' headquarters. Even so, surviving members continue to plot against Assad,

Some Arab governments that had tolerated limited fundamentalist agitation have recently turned to harsher measures. As part of King Hussein's new policy to curb religious excesses, the Jordanian parliament last year approved a measure to license and regulate Islamic preachers. Those who do not follow the government's guidance will be imprisoned and fined. The government is also beefing up security at universities to monitor fundamentalist activities and prevent a recurrence of the antigovernment demonstrations at Yarmuk University in May 1986 that left three students dead and 18 policemen injured. Last summer Egypt nationalized all private mosques that were considered centers of radical, antigovernment Islamic activities.

Other governments, including those of Tunisia and Kuwait, have increased their surveillance of fundamentalists.

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and Islamic sects, such as the Ahmadiyya in Pakistan, would come under pressure—sometimes violent—to conform to the rising tide of Islamic orthodoxy. [redacted]

We believe that Pakistan's experience with an Islamic government illustrates the pitfalls that will face countries officially adopting more orthodox tenets: 25X1

- Islamization has highlighted the theological differences between Sunnis and Shias, between Sunni sects, and between Pakistani ethnic groups. 25X1
- Pakistan has had difficulty coordinating an Islamic interest-free banking system with international financial networks.
- The reinstatement of Islamic punishments (flogging, amputations, and stoning) has drawn strong criticism from human rights activists in Pakistan and throughout the world. [redacted] 25X1

Outlook

We believe Islamic fundamentalism will remain a major force in the Middle East and South Asia into the next decade because governments will be unable to solve their complex social, economic, and political problems or isolate their citizens from the negative impact of Western culture. Fundamentalism will remain attractive to frustrated Muslims because it offers solutions to seemingly intractable problems.



Fundamentalism poses both indirect and direct threats to the political stability of the region. [redacted]

Direct Threats. We judge that the violent overthrow of existing governments on the model of the Iranian revolution will be a declining threat in most of the region. In recent years large-scale rioting, such as the police riots in Egypt in February 1986, have not been 25X1

Indirect Threat. The most likely impact of Islamic fundamentalism into the next decade will be a gradual shift toward a more conservative Islamic culture of the kind advocated by moderate fundamentalists in the Middle East and South Asia. Increasing pride in the region's Islamic heritage and the hope for a brighter future offered by fundamentalist ideology will draw more individuals toward moderate fundamentalism. Governments will contribute to this shift through their efforts to deflect fundamentalist pressure by restricting Western movies, textbooks, birth control programs, and alcoholic beverages. Evidence of this kind of shift already exists. Interest-free banking and enforcement of Islamic punishments are widely practiced or advocated today. The secular government in Algeria is adding Islamic tenets to its constitution, and Jordan is changing some of its Western-style educational institutions to include traditional Islamic instruction. [redacted]

inspired by fundamentalist issues, although such disturbances will give radical fundamentalists opportunities to exploit. Direct threats will be diminished by increasing government vigilance toward fundamentalist activities and self-styled religious leaders. Nevertheless, some clandestine groups are bound to go unnoticed and are likely to become sources of militant agitation and perhaps assassination plots against "un-Islamic" leaders. [redacted] 25X1

Although radical fundamentalist movements will continue to agitate for the creation of Islamic regimes based on *sharia*, we believe they will fail to develop a clear picture of how such a state would be governed or provide workable solutions for economic and social problems. Paradoxically, failure to find workable solutions will intensify the fervor of some fundamentalists who will blame the failure on "impure" applications of Islamic law. Some of these Islamic radicals probably will turn to international terrorism to dramatize their demands. [redacted] 25X1

We believe this cultural evolution will be politically destabilizing because of its tendency to divide society. The imposition of an orthodoxy on Islam's diverse practices would be difficult to enforce. It would also probably result in the persecution of religious minorities. Increasing numbers of Christians, Jews, Bahais,

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In our view, evolutionary shifts will continue to dominate the Islamic political scene in the absence of a dramatic development such as the economic collapse of a major oil-producing state or the seizure of or damage to Muslim holy places in the West Bank by Jewish extremists. If such events were to occur, we believe that the resulting turmoil would become particularly acute if a radical fundamentalist leader with the popular appeal of a Khomeini were to emerge and give religious significance to the crisis. [redacted]

Without such a crisis, we believe radical fundamentalist groups will gradually weaken politically, with some members adopting a more moderate outlook. Failures of their utopian theology to adequately address modern political, economic, and social problems will probably cause fundamentalist groups to break into competing factions. Although true believers will continue to preach that only strict adherence to fundamentalist Islam will solve these problems, other members will adopt conventional political and economic tactics. Pragmatic groups such as Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood might acquire a greater stake in stability and push for Islamic measures in a more restrained fashion. The remaining radicals, such as the Brotherhood splinter group Takfir wa Hijra, would continue to oppose the moderate fundamentalists as well as the government. [redacted]

A clear victory by Iran in the Iran-Iraq war would be likely to arouse enthusiasm for fundamentalism among Shia Muslims in the Gulf states. We believe that governments in the Gulf and throughout the region will redouble their efforts to contain fundamentalist movements by any means if Iran wins the war. Although radical Sunni fundamentalists will probably interpret an Iranian victory as another message that God is on their side in the battle against "un-Islamic" leaders, more moderate Sunnis are not likely to be inspired by an Iranian victory because of their increasingly critical view of radical Shia doctrines. [redacted]

Implications for the United States

As they adopt a more fundamentalist outlook, increasing numbers of Muslims will find the culture of the United States repugnant because of what they perceive as a lack of morality, a breakdown in family life,

and materialism. As fundamentalism gains strength, the belief that the United States is a sworn enemy of Islam will grow. The more that fundamentalists can propagate this negative image of the United States, the more it will contribute to:

- The denunciation of the Camp David accords and other US peace initiatives.
- Increasing wariness on the part of even moderate Muslim governments of close association with the United States. Military cooperation such as the periodic US-Egyptian exercises will become difficult to carry out in the face of fundamentalist objections.
- Criticism of the United States by Muslim governments in such international forums as the United Nations, the Nonaligned Movement, and the Islamic Conference on issues significant to the Muslim world. The incidents on Jerusalem's Temple Mount in January 1986, for example, ended with a denunciation by the Islamic Conference of the United States for vetoing a UN Security Council resolution condemning the actions of some Israelis. [redacted]

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Physical danger to US personnel and interests gradually will increase in countries where a fundamentalist evolution is taking place. US personnel will find themselves required to keep a lower profile as these countries pay stricter attention to conservative Islamic decorum. [redacted]

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We expect the climate for US business to depend more on local economic conditions, such as the strength of the oil market, than on fundamentalist fortunes. Governments at any point on the fundamentalist spectrum will be interested in improving the standard of living of their citizens, an area in which the United States and other Western nations will be well positioned to help. Projects with quick and visible payoffs, such as low-income housing, will have a greater chance to benefit friendly regimes than more grandiose schemes. [redacted]

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The US loss will not necessarily mean the Soviet Union's gain because fundamentalism is ideologically even more inconsistent with atheistic Soviet Communism than with Western capitalism. The United States, however, comes in for more fundamentalist criticism because of the conspicuous US economic and cultural presence throughout the Muslim world. The Soviet presence is almost exclusively confined to military assistance.

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The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and meddling in the internal affairs of states such as South Yemen have used up much of the political capital Moscow had in the Muslim world. Some fundamentalist groups, notably the Muslim Brotherhood, train volunteers to fight with the Muslim insurgents in Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states have provided considerable financial assistance to the Afghan resistance. Even if the USSR were to withdraw from Afghanistan, we do not believe Soviet stock among fundamentalists would rise quickly or significantly.

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Appendix A

Prospects for Key Countries and Regions

Saudi Arabia

We expect the influence of moderate Islamic fundamentalism in Saudi Arabia to increase over the next few years in reaction to the economic downturn and modernization. Slow economic growth probably will also provide opportunities for religious radicals, but fundamentalism poses no immediate threat to the regime, which maintains strong conservative Islamic credentials. [redacted]

Social Problems. Social instability in Saudi Arabia has been more limited than in other Arab states, but it is rising. Serious crime is on the upswing, and narcotics abuse and drug dealing have risen dramatically over the past year. [redacted] The government has tacitly admitted the extent of the drug problem by requiring every public hospital to open units for the treatment of addicts. [redacted]

Students. Fundamentalism is most pronounced on Saudi university campuses, according to the US Embassy in Riyadh. Attendance at mosques has increased, and more students are adopting Islamic dress. Fundamentalist students often accuse professors of failing to stress Islamic tenets in their classes, and they frequently harass more secularized classmates. Professors of Islamic studies are monitoring other disciplines to ensure that religion is being included in classes, according to the Embassy. [redacted]

Young Clerics. Zealous young Saudi clerics are increasingly critical of government officials for allowing a weakening of Islamic values in the face of modernization, being corrupt and extravagant, and following practices inconsistent with Islam, according to diplomatic reporting. They also criticize older Saudi *ulema*, whom they believe—correctly, in our view—to be an arm of the regime rather than independent-minded protectors of Islamic values. These young clerics criticize the government through innuendo to avoid arrest, according to the US Embassy. Their criticism has grown despite King Fahd's public commitment to

Islamic values and practices. Ironically, Fahd's efforts have strengthened the legitimacy of the religious conservatives. [redacted]

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Shias. Fundamentalism is increasing in the predominantly Shia Eastern Province, particularly among the young, despite widespread recognition that government efforts have improved economic conditions there. An increasing number of pious young Shias are going to Syria and Iran to study to become imams, and virtually all of them are followers of Khomeini, [redacted]. The influence of several young radical imams from Al Qatif—including Shaykh Hassan Musa al-Safar, who was a leader of violent demonstrations in 1979 and 1980—is increasing. [redacted]

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We believe young Shias may become more outspoken in their criticism of the regime if their economic position erodes. Although no Shia opposition movement has emerged to directly threaten the regime, such a movement would be a major irritant for the government and could provide a base for Iranian-supported sabotage against key Saudi oil installations and attacks on the 20,000 Americans associated with Aramco who live in the province. [redacted]

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Fundamentalist Groups. A puritanical Sunni group, Jamiat al-Dawa (Societies of Propagation), which is increasingly evident in science departments in at least three Saudi universities, represents a new wave of fundamentalist thinking. [redacted]

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[redacted] This group aims to become more conversant with science and technology in order to use them against the West. [redacted] The group numbers about 500 of the student body of 4,000 at the University of Minerals and Petroleum in Dhahran. [redacted]

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
[redacted] its influence reaches far beyond its membership because the university administration has caved in to such demands as

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Figure 3. The University of Minerals and Petroleum in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. [redacted]

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installing loudspeakers in each classroom to broadcast the call to prayer, excusing pious students from classes and examinations during prayer time, and barring US and European films from campus.

[redacted]

The Tehran-supported Islamic Revolution Organization of the Arabian Peninsula, founded by Saudi dissidents in the mid-1970s, promotes the revolutionary change of governments in the region. The organization uses propaganda in European newspapers and its own publications, such as *Mecca Calling*, to target the Saudi Government, which it criticizes for moral and material corruption and repression. The group has not claimed responsibility for specific antigovernment acts, but members of the organization probably were involved in the siege of the Grand Mosque of Mecca in 1979 and the disturbances in the Eastern Province in 1979 and 1980.

[redacted]

Fundamentalism Versus Social Change. For the past two years, the government has made limited attempts to accommodate social change, but major issues of concern to Islamic fundamentalists remain untouched. King Fahd has repeatedly called on the *ulema* to use independent judgment (*ijtihad*) to determine correct Islamic methods to adopt new technology. In a meeting in April the *ulema* approved such

narrow issues as the storage of the text of the Koran in computers and the performance of autopsies on females by male personnel but skirted the greater social implications of technological change. By involving the religious establishment in the process of cultural change, the King probably believes he can neutralize future fundamentalist criticism as well as appear to be responding to the demands of modernizing technocrats.

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The government has tried to devise ways to deal with the increasing number of educated Saudi women who are trying to find satisfying roles in the male-dominated society. The Saudis have mounted a media campaign aimed at finding jobs for educated women. The campaign has been given considerable legitimacy by featuring the wives of royal family members in newspaper stories advancing women's education and employment. Although the effort to expand the role of women is not an attempt to challenge the established order, the US Embassy in Riyadh has speculated that it is part of an effort to cope with new economic and social realities in the kingdom. The government is probably attempting to find additional opportunities for families and individuals who are being forced to seek new sources of income as government largess and economic opportunities shrink.

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Figure 4. Muslim fundamentalists holding copies of the Koran and shouting slogans in Cairo in 1985.

Egypt

Protests and violent demonstrations in early 1986 by Islamic groups reflect the growing militancy of Egyptian fundamentalists, whose appeal is strengthened by the government's poor economic performance. A prolonged surge in fundamentalist unrest would probably strain any Egyptian government's ability to maintain its measured—and thus far successful—response to Islamic protests. Although Egyptian fundamentalist groups are divided over their tactics to achieve an Islamic state, we believe fundamentalists of all stripes will remain a serious threat to government stability into the next decade.

The stagnant economy, rapid population growth, and migration to Cairo, Alexandria, and other burgeoning urban areas are taxing social services and Egyptians' legendary patience with their rulers. The lack of housing, for example, is forcing many male Egyptian

university graduates to abandon their aspirations for their own housing, which traditionally has been equated with high status and enabled a man to arrange for a higher class marriage partner. Most graduates are forced to accept one of several unpleasant—and, to some, humiliating—options:

- Borrow money, if possible, from family or friends to buy an apartment.
- Live with parents after marriage and hold several jobs to save enough to buy an apartment.
- Postpone marriage and compete for the declining number of jobs in the Gulf states.

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Despite the fertile soil for the growth of fundamentalism, we believe Egyptian fundamentalists cannot overcome their differences to pose an immediate threat to Mubarak's government. The moderate Muslim Brotherhood, which advocates evolutionary tactics to achieve an Islamic state in Egypt, has the patience, financial resources, and organization to remain a powerful Islamic force over the long term. Small, radical groups, such as al-Jihad, seek an Islamic revolution to impose an Islamic state but lack the organization, financial backing, and clear goals to appeal to a wide spectrum of Egyptian society.

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The Muslim Brotherhood. With as many as 500,000 members and sympathizers, the Brotherhood is working to assert its preeminence among Islamic fundamentalist groups and to create a stronger fundamentalist Islamic network in the country. To achieve these goals, the Brotherhood is seeking to strengthen its diverse—and profitable—business interests and to infiltrate the education system, labor unions, professional associations, and the military.

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We believe the Brotherhood's potentially most effective tactic is its infiltration of the Egyptian educational system. The Brotherhood targets, recruits, and financially supports pious university students who plan to be teachers, according to the US Embassy in Cairo. The Brotherhood believes that as teachers they will be well positioned to instill fundamentalist values in their primary and secondary students.

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Figure 5. Hamid Abu Nasir, Supreme Guide of Muslim Brotherhood. [redacted]

highly motivated and in many cases the most talented. They were involved in a series of violent confrontations with the government in early 1986. Although they lack strong leadership and are split into competing groups such as al-Jihad and Takfir wa Hijra, their significance lies in their ability to exploit the combination of increased religious devotion and a falling standard of living. They stand the best chance of focusing public outrage against the government through the use of propaganda that brands unpopular government actions as unjust and un-Islamic. [redacted]

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The Brotherhood is having some success penetrating professional organizations, [redacted] Brotherhood members are leaders of teachers' and lawyers' unions, and they have gained influence in the engineers' union and the press syndicate. Despite heavy recruiting efforts, the Brotherhood has had little success penetrating blue-collar labor unions, which traditionally have been a leftist stronghold. We believe the organization has members in the military who meet clandestinely, but it probably cannot attract a steady supply of recruits in the armed forces.

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Mubarak's Response. The Mubarak government will probably adhere to its flexible policy toward fundamentalism. Mubarak has been conciliatory to the moderate Muslim Brotherhood but has not hesitated to crack down on radical demonstrations before they got out of hand. Despite his success in containing fundamentalism, Mubarak is highly vulnerable to criticism from all opposition elements because of Egypt's severe and chronic economic problems, all of which need politically unpalatable cures. [redacted]

Jordan

In our view, the Islamic movement in Jordan does not threaten the regime, but the moderate fundamentalist movement is gaining momentum and serious confrontation will be more likely in the near future. Young people in particular are seeking solace in Islam from the frustrations of unemployment and the stress of rapid social change. Moderate fundamentalists historically have operated openly and have secured powerful positions in education and government, but King Hussein's increasingly tough stand against fundamentalist influence is likely to radicalize some fundamentalist elements. [redacted]

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We do not believe the death of Brotherhood leader Talmasani last May will lead to major tactical changes by the organization. Hamid Abu Nasir, a follower of Talmasani, has been elected Supreme Guide, [redacted] Abu Nasir is aged and in frail health, and the day-to-day activities of the Brotherhood are being run by Mustafa Mashur, who we believe will prove more aggressive in pursuing the Brotherhood's agenda than Talmasani or Abu Nasir. At least for the time being, the Brotherhood appears to be heeding the government's warning that it will not tolerate increased Islamic militancy. [redacted]

Fundamentalist Influence. The Muslim Brotherhood, which operates legally in Jordan, has gained influence in key government ministries. Supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood are particularly numerous in the Ministries of Education, Youth, Interior, and Islamic Affairs, [redacted] The Brotherhood considers the Ministry of Education to be its most important stronghold because Brotherhood

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Radical Fundamentalists. Islamic radicals—estimated [redacted] to number between 20,000 and 30,000—are gaining strength in Egyptian universities, particularly among the students who are the most

members can help like-minded individuals obtain jobs throughout the Jordanian educational system.

[redacted]

We believe the fundamentalists' role in the educational system is raising the Islamic awareness of Jordanian youth. Proselytizing has become intense. The US Embassy in Amman reports that children are pressed by teachers and other children to join Koran study groups, and girls are admonished if they do not wear Islamic dress. Nearly half of the female students at the University of Jordan wear the head scarf and long garments associated with fundamentalists, according to the US Embassy. Fundamentalist students demand that the government conform with Islamic law and reduce Western influence in the curriculum. [redacted]

Fundamentalists gained a psychological victory last year by reducing foreign influences at the troubled Yarmuk University. Fundamentalists in Jordan's parliament appealed to Jordanian nationalism to achieve a change in the university charter to restrict the use of English as the primary language of instruction and rely on Islamic revelation rather than scientific inquiry as the ultimate source of knowledge, according to the Embassy. [redacted]

Social Services. The Muslim Brotherhood is expanding its influence in Jordan by providing educational, medical, and welfare services to the needy. The Brotherhood's Islamic Beneficent Center, which was established in the early 1970s, operates a hospital, the Islamic Society College, primary schools, and religious publishing houses, and it is planning to build an Islamic university near Zarga, [redacted]

[redacted] The Beneficent Center provides free health care to about 1,000 patients a month and distributes approximately \$100,000 yearly in food and welfare payments to the poor. [redacted]

Governmental Response. King Hussein's attempts to reduce fundamentalist influence in government and education probably will have only a temporary impact because fundamentalists are entrenched in the country's bureaucracy. Late last year the government arrested, transferred, and demoted fundamentalists in a number of ministries and schools. Five ranking

Brotherhood members in the Ministry of Education were fired, as were several university professors. Parliament passed legislation that requires imams to register with the government and forbids them to preach on political issues. Another measure allows the government to draw electoral district lines to limit the number of fundamentalists elected to the parliament.

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West Bank

We believe the failure of secular Palestinian nationalism to achieve self-determination, fears that Jewish settlers are taking control of the best farm lands and urban neighborhoods, and attempts by Jewish zealots to assert sovereignty over Muslim holy places in Jerusalem are increasing the appeal of fundamentalism among the 750,000 Muslims on the West Bank. Because the West Bank fundamentalists are weakened by disunity, we believe the Israeli Government sees fundamentalism as a divisive force it can use, particularly on campuses, to weaken Palestinian nationalism. Israeli authorities have sometimes refused to interfere in campus disturbances even when university authorities appealed to the military government for help, according to the US Consulate General in Jerusalem. [redacted]

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Fundamentalism and Nationalism. The West Bank branch of the Muslim Brotherhood is promoting fundamentalism among youth as an alternative to secular Palestinian nationalism, according to the Consulate General. Brotherhood activities such as operating recreation facilities, granting university scholarships to pious village youths, and supporting Islamic-oriented organizations on university campuses are yielding significant results. For example, the Consulate General estimates that about one-third of the schoolgirls in East Jerusalem and one-third of the female students at An Najah University in Nablus wear Islamic garb. [redacted]

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
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The growth of fundamentalism on university campuses is challenging the dominance of the PLO and Palestinian nationalism, according to the Consulate General. In the past, the fundamentalists usually

Figure 6. The Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem.



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supported pro-Arafat students against more leftist forces, but fundamentalists are now attacking all secular nationalists. Fundamentalists constitute 20 to 25 percent of the student population and dominate the departments of science, Arabic, English, and Islamic studies, according to the Consulate General. A professor at An Najah estimates that as many as 60 percent of the students support fundamentalist goals, according to the press.

Gush Emunim. About 64,000 Jews live in the occupied territories—an increase of 20 percent since 1984, according to the US Consulate General.

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Jewish Settlement and the Holy Places. We believe that increased Jewish settlement as well as the threats to the sanctity of the Temple Mount, one of Islam's holiest sites, are contributing to increased fundamentalist activity.⁵ Muslim West Bankers probably fear the accession of Likud leader Yitzhak Shamir to the prime ministership will lead to increased settlement activity by such Jewish ultranationalist groups as the

Even with Shamir in power, the Israeli Government will have only limited resources to spend on settlements, according to the Consulate General. Ironically, however, the failure of the Israeli Government to expand settlements on the West Bank might significantly increase ultranationalist Jewish militancy, which in turn will escalate fears among Muslims that the West Bank will be absorbed permanently into the Jewish state.

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⁵ The Dome of the Rock, from which Muslims claim the Prophet Muhammad ascended to heaven, and the al-Aqsa mosque are on the site where the temples of Solomon and Herod once stood. Jewish zealots believe that the Muslim sites must be destroyed and the Jewish temple rebuilt before the messiah will appear. Last January a series of confrontations occurred between Jews and Muslims when a group of Israelis, including some Knesset members, attempted to raise the Israeli flag and take photographs in restricted areas on the Temple Mount. The incidents led to a UN Security Council debate and condemnation of Israel throughout the Islamic world.

We expect Islamic fundamentalism to be more a source for tension within the Palestinian community than a catalyst for violent anti-Israeli protests in the short term. Continued attempts by Jewish ultranationalists to assert control over holy places in Jerusalem and at other sites such as the tomb of Abraham in Hebron, which are revered by Muslims and Jews alike, would probably cause many Palestinians to respond to calls for action from militant fundamentalists. Under such conditions, Tel Aviv would probably drop its permissive policy toward fundamentalist activities.

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Morocco

We believe King Hassan recognizes that he is losing some of the traditional Islamic legitimacy he has derived from his descent from the Prophet Muhammad. He is shifting to a more flexible security policy in hopes of better controlling radical fundamentalist activity. The fundamentalists' lack of central leadership and a unified political organization, however, will prevent them from posing a serious challenge to the King in the next few years. [redacted]

Fundamentalist Players. The leading role that well-placed, educated professionals play in the fundamentalist movement in Morocco increases fundamentalist influence there. Over a quarter of the doctors at the central hospital in Rabat, for instance, espouse radical fundamentalist beliefs, according to the US Embassy in Rabat. [redacted] fundamentalist beliefs are strongest among professors and students of science and mathematics, who spread their views through their students and colleagues. [redacted]

These educated fundamentalists are idealists who are dissatisfied with what they perceive as social and economic injustice, corruption, and favoritism, according to the US Embassy. The fundamentalists, who number as many as several thousand, believe that the path of reform is strict adherence to the Koran. They differ from most fundamentalists in the Middle East in that they do not subscribe to the widespread fundamentalist belief that Western culture must be rejected, according to the Embassy. They believe that some modern elements—such as Western medical technology, computers, and communications systems—can be incorporated into Moroccan society without disturbing Muslim values. [redacted]

Fundamentalism is also gaining support among the urban unemployed and underemployed, who believe they have been unjustly denied opportunities to advance in Moroccan society, according to the Embassy. Moroccan scholars argue that youths who have either dropped out or failed in universities are potential fundamentalists, and that the country's rapid population growth—nearly 3 percent annually—would prevent prosperity among this group even if the declining economy made a dramatic turnaround. The US Embassy reports that members of this underclass—which

probably number in the thousands—lack an intellectual appreciation of fundamentalist tenets but are comforted by the panaceas offered by fundamentalism. [redacted]

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Changing Response. Earlier this year the King began changing his approach to fundamentalism by relying less on his Islamic credentials and on repression and more on accommodation and a flexible public line. The King probably decided to appear more moderate to offset fundamentalist charges that his repressive tactics were evidence that his aura of holiness—supposedly transmitted through the Prophet's descendants—was fading. He set the tone for the policy change when he remarked in a magazine interview that he took into consideration the difference between the few radicals and those fundamentalists who are "reflective and self-disciplined." [redacted]

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The new public line, however, has not lessened the regime's vigilance. The government—wary of the continued influence of radical, Iranian-inspired fundamentalists on Moroccan emigrants in Western Europe—has increased the number of teams of religious scholars it sends to Europe to reinforce Sunni orthodoxy. [redacted]

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Algeria

Moderate fundamentalist sentiment will probably continue to gain in popularity among young Algerians faced with economic and social problems worsened by the decline of oil revenues. University students, urban unemployed, teachers, skilled tradesmen, and intellectuals, in particular, are attracted to fundamentalism. President Bendjedid's skillful carrot-and-stick tactics, however, reduce much of the potential challenge, at least in the short term. [redacted]

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Economic and Social Problems. Although unemployment has not yet led to major political problems, the more than 2.5 million unemployed Algerian youth are beginning to respond to fundamentalist themes. Some youths, according to the US Embassy in Algiers, are attracted to fundamentalism's promise of social justice and are criticizing modernization programs that have brought US and French television shows, rock

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music, and materialism, which they believe erode the Islamic principles of Algerian society. [redacted]

Many Algerians—two-thirds of the population is under 25—do not understand the sacrifices made by their elders during the struggle for independence, according to the US Embassy. To them, government promises of a better life sound shopworn against the backdrop of poor housing, bleak job prospects, and austerity policies that restrict imports of consumer goods. [redacted]

Fundamentalist Groups. The small Algerian Muslim Brotherhood—led by Egyptian professor Muhammad al-Ghazali—is taking advantage of popular dissatisfaction with economic austerity to build support for the organization. Relatively inactive in the past, the Brotherhood early last summer was involved in anti-government incidents. [redacted]

[redacted]

- In Algiers, Brotherhood activists shouted down the government-appointed imam and denounced the government, demanding adoption of an Islamic national charter and criticizing the lack of concern for the poor.
- In Oran, police quelled a fight between Brotherhood supporters and opponents when the Brotherhood demanded that the government provide housing for poorer workers and move to stop rumored layoffs in local industries. [redacted]

In our view, other fundamentalist groups are unorganized and without leaders capable of rallying widespread support. Mustafa Bouiali, a former member of the guerrilla Algerian Liberation Army, advocates the use of violence to establish an Islamic republic [redacted]

[redacted] In May 1986,

Bouiali was sentenced in absentia to a life term for raiding a police armory in which he and about 25 followers seized numerous weapons and fled into the mountains. The group al-Qiyam, which was banned by the government in 1968, now operates clandestinely as al-Dawa but has not been implicated in recent antigovernment activities. The US Embassy believes other militant fundamentalist groups are springing up, but they appear to be small. [redacted]

Coping With Fundamentalism. Bendjedid has used a combination of coercion, co-optation, and political maneuvers such as insertion of Islamic tenets into the National Charter to blunt the appeal of fundamentalism. Fundamentalists probably will point to these attempts to exploit Islam as further evidence of the spiritual bankruptcy of the regime, according to the US Embassy. Bendjedid made a large show of force in the failed attempt to apprehend the armory raiders [redacted]

[redacted] He is trying to rally Islamic sentiment against opposition Marxists who still hold sway in the universities and in government-controlled trade unions. [redacted]

Tunisia

We believe moderate fundamentalism is a serious threat to the government because of growing dissatisfaction with the regime's secular modernization policies, rising unemployment, and the perception that aged and ailing President Bourguiba is losing control of the government. Bourguiba has bottled up normal outlets for political opposition, leaving only religious channels for popular dissent. For instance, in early 1986 the regime virtually dismantled the country's main labor union and jailed the union's leader to avoid independent union participation in the elections, according to the US Embassy in Tunis. [redacted]

Fundamentalist Activity. The moderate Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI), which emerged as a potent force in the late 1970s, is taking advantage of the political turmoil to expand its influence in key opposition labor and student organizations. We believe that the MTI has become more popular because its leaders are not—like other opposition groups—tainted by association with Bourguiba. It draws much of its support from the growing ranks of Tunisian students who are having trouble finding jobs. About two-thirds of the population is under 25 and has no memory of the 20 years of economic growth and prosperity that followed independence in 1956. [redacted]

Impatience with the MTI's moderate views probably will lead more radical students and professors to adopt militant tactics against the regime. Radicals are

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already drifting away from the MTI into such shadowy groups as the Islamic Cooperative Movement, the Islamic Liberation Party, and the Islamic Progressive Movement, according to the Embassy. [redacted]

The moderate Islamic Student Union, which was created in late 1985 at Tunis University, received over 90 percent of the vote during student elections in 1985 in some of the university's departments. Government and university authorities have refused to recognize the organization, and its leaders have been followed, arrested, and forcibly drafted for military service in the southern Tunisian desert. The group is using the police shooting of a fundamentalist student last April to bolster its appeal among other students, according to the Embassy. Members of the group were implicated in two bank robberies in May 1986 in Sfax, Tunisia's second-largest city, [redacted]

The Regime's Response. Although the government is becoming more wary of fundamentalists, particularly in the wake of the arrest of three military officers in April 1986 for fundamentalist activities, it probably will be unsuccessful in containing religious extremism unless it directly addresses fundamentalist concerns.

[redacted]

It also issued guidance to local party leaders that they, rather than mosque preachers, should organize 10-minute evening religious services to prevent political agitation. [redacted]

Syria

Despite severe economic and political problems that have contributed to strong fundamentalist movements elsewhere in the Arab world, Syria probably will not experience a ground swell of support for radical fundamentalism. Syrians generally appreciate the political stability President Assad has given the country since he came to power in 1970. He has maintained tight control of the military and security services and capitalized on Syrian fears of Israel. [redacted]

Ba'thism, although a secular ideology, generally does not conflict with Islamic values and culture. Many Sunnis may be satisfied with the intrinsically Islamic

nature of Ba'thism while ignoring its secular dogma. Nonetheless, in the absence of organized opposition groups, the Muslim Brotherhood could become a focal point for secular as well as Sunni opposition to the minority Alawite regime.⁶ [redacted]

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Barriers to Fundamentalism. Most Syrians' loyalties rest with their families, clans, and sects, and the concept of a popular religious movement that transcends these boundaries is poorly developed. Ethnic and sectarian divisions run deeply in the country, according to the US Embassy in Damascus. Moreover, we believe divisions within Syria's majority Sunni community will lessen the chance of the development of a powerful fundamentalist movement. Sunnis, who are divided by enduring social and political cleavages, fall into several groups, [redacted]

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- The Sunni landowning and business elite, who survived the early years of Assad's rule by taking on Alawite partners. These Sunnis now have a stake in stability and are unlikely to rise to a religious call against the government.

- Sunni religious leaders who have retreated into silent opposition or submitted to government restrictions on their activities.

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- Sunnis who hold top-level positions in the government, the Ba'th Party, and the military and security services. Most of these Sunnis share the Alawites' rural background and have risen to positions that would have been beyond their reach in the days before Assad. [redacted]

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Conditions Promoting Fundamentalism. We believe that the prospects for the growth of fundamentalism will remain poor in Syria as long as Assad remains in the picture. The post-Assad period, however, is likely to present fundamentalists with greater opportunities to press their case. Fundamentalists may be able to

⁶ President Assad is a member of the minority Alawite sect, which is regarded as heretical by orthodox Sunnis. Until Assad came to power, Alawites were relegated to the lowest rung of Syrian society. [redacted]

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exploit poor economic conditions, but ethnic and sectarian cleavages will probably continue to prevent the growth of a significant fundamentalist opposition.

[redacted]

Muslim Brotherhood. We believe the Muslim Brotherhood is the only significant organized opposition group in Syria and may benefit from a power vacuum in a post-Assad period. At present, however, it is capable of only isolated attacks against the government, such as the bombings of bridges and other public facilities that occurred last summer. The battering the Brotherhood received at Hama in 1982 left it in disarray and no longer capable of serious armed resistance to Assad's regime. [redacted]

The Brotherhood had been weakened by internal divisions even before the crackdown in 1982, according to the US Embassy. The organization split into three opposing groups during the late 1970s and remains divided today:

- The "Political Group" pursues the traditional Brotherhood goal of establishing a state based on Islamic law. During the 1970s this faction embraced paramilitary operations to achieve its goal.
- The "Military Group" uses terrorist tactics to gain political power. Composed of younger Brothers, this faction rejects all Western ideas, compromise or cooperation with secular political movements, and any mercy for the Alawite sect. The current leader of the group, Adnan Uqla, is in prison.
- The third faction, the Brotherhood exile group, which is headquartered in Aachen, West Germany, has become increasingly irrelevant to the politics of Syria. Its West German facilities, however, still serve as a major planning center for Muslim Brotherhood groups from other Arab countries. [redacted]

Assad has unsuccessfully sought to entice exiled Brotherhood members—most of whom live in nearby Arab countries such as Jordan and the Gulf states—back to Syria. His offer in 1985 of a limited pardon fell flat. [redacted] We believe additional attempts in early 1986 to lure Brotherhood exiles back to Syria with promises of full pardon, job

reinstatement, and even backpayment of salaries will not attract many members. Some Brotherhood exiles, particularly those who fled to avoid false accusations of antigovernment activity, have been tempted by these offers. [redacted] Brotherhood leaders, however, do not trust Assad and believe—correctly, in our view—that he is engaged in a ploy to bring Brotherhood members back to Syria where they can be closely watched. [redacted]

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Despite Jordanian King Hussein's claim in late 1985 that he would stop aiding the Syrian Brotherhood, Jordan continues to be a haven for Syrian exiles. Although some members of the military wing of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood have left Jordan for the Arab Gulf states, other Brotherhood elements have been assured by Jordanian officials that they can remain in Jordan, according to the US Embassy in Amman. [redacted]

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The Regime's Response to Fundamentalism. We believe the obstacles to the development of a politically significant Islamic fundamentalist movement in Syria outweigh the conditions that encourage its growth. President Assad's tactics are largely responsible for the lack of widespread fundamentalist activity. His inducements have included:

- Placing many non-Alawites in the government, particularly those from the provinces who did not have power or wealth before the rise of the Alawites.
- Improved living conditions, particularly in the countryside, where the regime enjoys its greatest support. [redacted]

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Assad has coupled these moves with the ruthless use of force and an extensive internal security network. His regime nearly annihilated the Muslim Brotherhood and destroyed the city of Hama in 1982 in response to Brotherhood terrorist acts against the government. [redacted]

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Pakistan

Although the Islamization program instituted by Pakistan's President Zia in 1977 has been a divisive force, we expect it to continue as long as Zia remains in power. The probable passage of legislation to

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Figure 7. Pakistani Shia Muslims flailing their bodies during the Ashura religious celebration. [redacted]



adopt *sharia*—based on Sunni doctrines—as the official legal system is arousing fears among religious minorities, particularly the Shias, that their beliefs are being ignored. For their part, Sunni fundamentalists allied with the government fear that the return to Pakistan of opposition leader Benazir Bhutto will lead to Zia's overthrow and reinstatement of the secular and socialist policies of her late father, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. [redacted]

Escalating Sectarian Strife. The imposition of ethnic Punjabi—Deobandi sect—interpretations of Islamic law in Pakistan will renew sectarian strife in Pakistan, according to the US Embassy in Islamabad:

- Shias, who make up 15 to 20 percent of the population, are denouncing the bill as a vehicle for establishing a Sunni theocracy.
- Application of the Deobandi view of Islamic law is likely to arouse protests from members of the Sunni Bareilvi sect, who insist the legislation should show more veneration of the Prophet Muhammad, and Sufi mystics who worship saints.
- The Ahmadiyya, a sect numbering approximately 500,000 that orthodox Muslims regard as heretical, fear that their religious and civil rights will be

further eroded. Anti-Ahmadi groups over the past years have demanded—sometimes violently—that the government remove all Ahmadis from sensitive civil and military positions, require them to carry identity cards, and forbid them to possess Korans or to recite Islamic prayers. [redacted]

Foreign Involvement. We believe Iran will continue to exploit heightened sectarian tensions to foster Shia extremism in Pakistan. Iranian President Khamenei, during a visit to Pakistan in January 1986, aroused anti-US sentiment among Pakistani Shias, according to the US Consulate in Lahore. [redacted]

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Substantial evidence points toward Iranian involvement in violent incidents in Pakistan over the last few years, according to diplomatic reporting:

- In Quetta last summer violent clashes between Shias and authorities broke out after the Iranian Consul General urged Shias to take to the streets. The Pakistani Government claims to have intercepted during the disturbances four truckloads of arms on the road from Iran, according to the US Embassy.
- Eight Iranians—three of whom were in Pakistan illegally—were arrested for the bombing of Pan American Airlines offices in Karachi in July 1985, according to press reports.
- Several Iranians were arrested at the Karachi airport in December 1984 for smuggling weapons, explosives, and foreign currency to Shia groups in Pakistan, according to the press.

Outlook. Internal political problems stemming from Zia's Islamization policy will increase as long as the regime insists on imposing an ethnic Punjabi interpretation of Islam on Pakistan's diverse population. This policy inflames already serious ethnic tensions. The majority Punjabis, who have held power since Pakistan's creation, are distrusted by the other major ethnic groups. These groups, including the Sindhis, Pathans, and Baluch, see Islamization as yet another method of extending Punjabi control over the nation.

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To counter Iranian influence among Pakistani Muslims, the Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad on occasion has funded the radical Sunni organization, Sawad-e-Azam, according to a Pakistani journalist. An Iraqi diplomat confirmed to US officials that his government bankrolled the Sunni organization in 1984. Sawad demands the banning of such Shia practices as the Muharram procession because it is un-Islamic. The organization also has been involved in anti-Shia disturbances in Karachi over the last few years.

[Redacted]

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Islamic Banking. We believe Pakistan's experience with interest-free Islamic banking continues to reveal the difficulties of reconciling Islamic ideals and the hard realities of modern international finance. To secure loans from international lending institutions, Pakistan must juggle its lending policies to conform with both Islamic and international financing practices. To circumvent the Islamic prohibition on charging interest, some banks have instituted profit-and-loss systems, while others pay or charge fees that tend to be keyed to interest rates non-Islamic banks charge for financial services.

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Appendix B

The Development of Religious Movements

Scholarly study of religious movements in a variety of cultures has revealed a recurrent pattern of development. A religious movement typically arises when individuals or groups believe the normal problem-solving mechanisms of their culture cannot cope with changing social, political, or economic challenges. Under these circumstances, a prophetic individual who has undergone an ecstatic revelation often arises and leads a movement aimed at providing a new and more effective culture.

A movement usually passes through four stages, each of which represents a different response to stress:

- *Increasing individual stress.* Rapid social, economic, or political change decreases a society's ability to cope with problems. Increasing numbers of people are placed under what is to them intolerable stress by the failure of the system to accommodate their needs. Anomie and disillusion become widespread as the culture is perceived to be disorganized and inadequate.
- *Cultural distortion.* Some members of the society ineffectually attempt to restore personal equilibrium by adopting antisocial behavior, such as crime, drug abuse, or scapegoating. These reactions are likely to lead to further social disorganization.
- *Revitalization.* This stage has five aspects:
 - *Formulation of a code.* An individual or group adopts a utopian plan, such as total adoption of *sharia* or re-creation of the Muslim community at the time of Muhammad. The code or blueprint is frequently formulated by one individual in the course of a supernatural vision.
 - *Communication.* The code is preached as a salvation for those trapped in the evils of existing society. Benefits of the new code need not be immediate or material. The basis of the code's appeal is its simple organization. The change in

values renders pointless the promises of material benefits made by advocates of the old system. The code offers spiritual salvation, identification with God, and elect status. Refusal to accede to the code usually is believed to place the nonbelievers in immediate spiritual peril.

- *Organization.* As the group of converts expands, it divides into two parts: disciples and mass followers. The disciples become the executive organization, responsible for administering the evangelistic program, protecting the leader-prophet, and combating heresy. The leader becomes regarded as a supernatural being or at least an individual who has a source of wisdom unavailable to the masses that justifies his claim to the unquestioned belief and obedience of his followers.
- *Adaptation.* The new group is a revolutionary organization because it threatens the interests of any group that benefits from the status quo. Because the religious group continually finds new inadequacies in the existing culture and because inconsistencies are found in the new code, the formulators and disciples subtly rework the code and defend the movement by political maneuver or force. The general tendency is for the code to harden gradually and for the tone of the movement to become increasingly militant, nativist, and hostile toward nonbelievers, who ultimately are defined as enemies of the movement.
- *Cultural transformation.* If the movement attracts a large, stable following and achieves economic self-sufficiency, the goals of the movement can be implemented. Most radical Muslim fundamentalist groups, however, do not reach this stage of development because they are continually weakened by factionalism.

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
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- *Routinization.* If the movement is successful, it becomes conservative. It loses its dynamism and eventually becomes an accepted sect or denomination in the religious establishment. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, whose businesses and other financial endeavors benefit from social and political stability, is nearing this phase in the development cycle.

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