



**Directorate of  
Intelligence**

~~Secret~~

25X1

# **Pakistan: Trouble Along the Afghan Border**

25X1

**An Intelligence Assessment**

~~Secret~~

*NESA 86-10045  
November 1986*

Copy **332**

**Page Denied**



**Directorate of  
Intelligence**

**Secret**




25X1

# **Pakistan: Trouble Along the Afghan Border**



25X1

**An Intelligence Assessment**

This paper was prepared by   
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis.  
Comments and queries are welcome and may be  
directed to the Chief, South Asia Division, NESAs, on

25X1



25X1

*Reverse Blank*

**Secret**

*NESA 86-10045  
November 1986*

Secret  
[Redacted]

25X1

**Pakistan: Trouble Along the Afghan Border** [Redacted]

25X1

**Key Judgments**

*Information available as of 3 November 1986 was used in this report.*

The Soviet-inspired destabilization and intimidation campaign in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, which is intended to erode Pakistani support for the Afghan insurgents, has had only modest success. Islamabad is likely to continue to support the insurgents and provide a safehaven for Afghan refugees in spite of escalating Soviet and Afghan pressure. The Pakistanis view the unsettled conditions in the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan as grave but not a serious threat to the political integrity of the state. The Pakistanis believe steadfast US support for Pakistan is vital in allowing them to resist Soviet coercion.

[Redacted]

25X1

- The Soviet intimidation campaign is proceeding along three avenues:
- Soviet and Afghan aircraft have escalated cross-border airstrikes directed at Pakistani and insurgent targets.
  - The Soviets are using KHAD, the Afghan secret police, to suborn Pakistani border tribes into reducing their support for insurgent forces.
  - KHAD has directed a wave of terrorist bombings and assassinations, particularly in the North-West Frontier Province, designed to sow dissension between Afghan refugees and Pakistani civilians.

[Redacted]

25X1

Although the spillover of the Afghan war into Pakistan is viewed as increasingly worrisome by Pakistani citizens in the northwestern frontier, Islamabad remains committed to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and the return of the approximately 3 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Pakistani Army officers support the government's Afghan policy and do not appear to be overly concerned about the Soviet-directed violence in the border areas. Islamabad continues to provide sanctuary and training and to facilitate logistic flows to the insurgents.

[Redacted]


25X1

Islamabad is likely to ask the United States to provide more and better military equipment to help withstand the destabilization campaign. The Pakistanis want improved air defense weapons and air warning equipment to enable their Air Force and Army to counter escalating air violations and attacks. Islamabad will press for Stinger Post surface-to-air missiles, additional supplies of AIM-9L air-to-air missiles for its F-16 fighters, and more sophisticated air defense radars for placement along the border. Islamabad will almost certainly insist that any US training of its armed forces in Pakistan have a low visibility; it would probably prefer that the training be done in the United States. The Pakistanis also will continue to


Secret




25X1

be chary of accepting a more overt US role in support of the insurgency. They are sensitive to foreign and domestic critics who charge that the government is acting at the behest of the United States and neglecting Pakistan's national interests. 


25X1

Pakistan has adjusted its military posture on the Afghan border in response to the destabilization campaign. Islamabad has improved its antiaircraft capabilities and allowed Army and Air Force officers more latitude to engage Soviet and Afghan aircraft that intrude into Pakistani airspace. Pakistan also has sent regular Army troops to augment paramilitary units in the border area and has given more weapons and training to the Frontier Corps and regional police forces. At the same time, Islamabad has intensified efforts to combat Afghan-directed subversion of Pakistani tribes through judicious use of bribes and force, confiscation of weapons supplied by Kabul, and establishment of special antiterrorist squads. 

25X1

Pakistan's responses have been reactive in nature and aimed at damage limitation. The show of military force along the border is probably intended as much to convince the region's civilian population of Islamabad's commitment to oppose the Soviets as to present Moscow with a military challenge. Islamabad is probably reluctant to sharply increase its military presence in the border region lest this provoke a negative reaction from the highly autonomous tribal groups. 

25X1

Moscow is not likely to abruptly accelerate the level of its activity or expand the scope of the destabilization campaign against Pakistan because of the possibility of driving Islamabad into a closer relationship with the United States. If, however, the Soviets were to decide that they could obtain either a decisive military advantage over the Afghan insurgents or a separation of the Afghan insurgents from their Pakistani hosts by increasing the pressure on Islamabad, they may choose such an alternative. 

25X1

Secret

**Secret**

25X1

**Contents**

	<i>Page</i>
<b>Key Judgments</b>	iii
<b>Soviet Pressures</b>	1
Air Violations and Attacks	1
Meddling With Pushtuns	2
Sabotage	4
<b>Agent Training and Infiltration</b>	5
<b>Islamabad's Response</b>	5
<b>Is Soviet Pressure Working?</b>	9
<b>Outlook</b>	10
A Worst Case Scenario	11
<b>Implications for the United States</b>	11
<b>Appendix</b>	
<b>Chronology of Selected Major Destabilization Activity</b>	13

Secret



25X1

### Pakistan: Trouble Along the Afghan Border



25X1

Until August 1984 the Soviet effort to defend the Communist regime in Kabul and extend the regime's control throughout Afghanistan was largely contained within the country's borders. Pakistani officials told officers in the US Embassy that few incidents occurred in the border regions and that air violations appeared to be accidental.

The Pakistanis conclude—and we agree—that the Soviets decided by the fall of 1984 that the lack of progress in pacifying Afghanistan required a new approach. Islamabad believes that, because Moscow holds Pakistan responsible for the lack of progress, the Soviets adjusted their strategy to combine military pressure on the insurgents with military pressure and subversion in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and, to a lesser degree, Baluchistan. Pakistani officials report that, beginning in late 1985, their border posts and cities and Afghan refugee villages increasingly became targets of Afghan bombing attacks. Since then, Moscow and Kabul have stepped up the pressure by increasing terrorist bombings in the NWFP and Baluchistan.


#### Soviet Pressures

A three-pronged Soviet strategy to put pressure on Pakistan and the Afghan insurgents has been evident over the past two years:

- Soviet and Afghan air violations and cross-border airstrikes directed at Pakistani and insurgent targets have increased in number and intensity.
- The Afghan secret police, KHAD, has attempted to suborn Pakistani border tribes and reduce their support for Afghan insurgent forces.
- KHAD has directed a wave of terrorist bombings, particularly in the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, to sow dissension between Afghan refugees and Pakistani civilians.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The majority of terrorist bombing incidents take place in the North-West Frontier Province. Only a relatively small number occur in Baluchistan. Pakistani authorities believe KHAD has drawn up plans to conduct terrorist operations in Punjab and Sind Provinces.

**Figure 1**  
**Air Violations in Pakistan, 1984-86**



25X1

25X1

311033 11-86

25X1

#### Air Violations and Attacks

Air violations of Pakistani territory began to increase after August 1984 and escalated rapidly in 1986. During the first six months of 1986, the number of violations by Soviet or Afghan aircraft increased to about 500—nearly a 50-percent increase from the same period in 1985.

Pakistani officials told US Embassy officers that the number of airstrikes on refugee camps, insurgent training camps, and Frontier Corps border outposts more than doubled. The Pakistanis say that many of the air attacks are apparently intended to force the insurgents to move their support facilities farther from the border. Pakistani officials are also concerned about the increasing number of penetrations of more than 10 kilometers this year, according to press reports.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1  
25X1

Secret

Secret

---

**Pakistan's Troublesome Pushtuns**

*The Pakistani Government exercises only loose control over the Pushtun tribes in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). Upon gaining independence in 1948, the Pakistanis observed the late 19th-century treaties that granted limited autonomy to the tribes. Islamabad has allowed the tribes to maintain their own tribal jirgas (councils) and to cross the frontier with Afghanistan relatively unimpeded. Administratively, the NWFP is divided into two basic jurisdictions—settled areas and tribal territories. Islamabad has direct access to the settled areas and exercises full sovereignty over them. The central government exercises considerably less control over the tribal territories and has been forced to maintain peace by a judicious use of bribes—in the form of both guns and cash—to tribal leaders for good behavior followed by periodic forays by paramilitary armed forces. The tribal territories include the Bajaur Agency (inhabited by Utman Khel and Tarkhani tribesmen), Mohmand Agency (Mohmand and Safi), Khyber Agency (Afridi and Shinwari), Orakzai Agency (Orakzai), Kurram Agency (Turi, Mangals, and Bangash), and North and South Waziristan (Wazirs, Utmanzai, and Mahsud).*

*The Pakistani Pushtuns are a martial group of 13 autonomous tribes numbering nearly 2.2 million people who are loosely associated by language and social customs to the approximately 7.5 million Pushtuns in Afghanistan. The Pushtun tribal structure stresses individualism and egalitarianism. The combination*

*of widely shared social customs and individualism gives rise to numerous and endemic internecine squabbles. These tribes have opposed all efforts to limit their freedom of action and movement.*

25X1

*One of the legacies of the British colonial presence is the existence of international boundaries that do not reflect ethnic or cultural divisions. The Durand line—the 19th-century border dividing Pakistan from Afghanistan—was the outer limit of British control at that time. The line cuts deeply into the Pushtun tribal area that was the traditional home of the dominant Afghan ethnic group and gives rise to periodic irredentist claims.*

25X1

*Since the beginning of this century, Pushtun tribesmen have sought to create an independent Pushtunistan encompassing the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan and neighboring territory in Afghanistan where they form a majority. Pushtun-dominated Afghan governments have periodically espoused the cause of their separated brethren—more to apply pressure on the Pakistani Government than to unite the Pushtuns in one state. The issue of Pushtunistan was revived by Afghan leader Babrak Karmal in April 1985 when he spoke of supporting the liberation movement of fraternal Pushtun peoples in Pakistan. The campaign has been continued and strengthened by Afghan Communist Party leader Najib, who is himself an ethnic Pushtun.*

25X1

25X1

We believe the majority of violations are Soviet and Afghan aircraft penetrating Pakistani airspace after conducting airstrikes on targets along the border or are reconnaissance flights observing Pakistani border defenses and insurgent training, resupply, and infiltration activities. Most violations involve aircraft penetrating Pakistani airspace by less than 10 kilometers, remaining over Pakistani territory for 15 minutes or less, and expending no ordnance.

Pushtun tribes and Islamabad. The Soviets have publicly acknowledged that the manipulation of the tribal groups was a useful option. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Kapitsa said in October 1985 that, unless Pakistan immediately changed its position on the Afghan insurgency, the Soviets would be willing to play the tribal card.

25X1

**Meddling With Pushtuns**

Kabul has had some success with both bribes and propaganda in stirring up trouble between Pakistani


The Afghan Government tried to use a traditional Pushtun institution, the *jirga*—a council of tribal leaders that decides on issues of importance to the

25X1

Secret



**Figure 2**  
**Pushtun Tribes Along the Afghan-Pakistani Border**



25X1

Secret

entire community—to undermine Pushtun sympathies for Islamabad and the Afghan insurgents. In September 1985 and April 1986, the Afghan Government convened tribal *jirgas* that Pakistani Pushtun tribesmen, including Afridis and Shinwaris, were well paid to attend, [redacted]

Kabul used the *jirgas* to boast that the Afghan Government was Islamic, the Communist Party leaders were good Muslims, and the Afghan insurgents did not have the support of the local population, [redacted]

[redacted] The Afghan Government focused on the need to end Islamabad's meddling in the Pushtun tribal areas, [redacted]

Kabul provided weapons and financial support to the tribal leaders in exchange for their pledge to oppose insurgent passage through their territory. [redacted]

[redacted] the Kabul regime distributed thousands of Kalashnikov, Kalakov, and Vietnam-vintage US-made M-16 rifles to the Pushtun participants in the Kabul *jirgas*. The border region was to be "flooded" with arms, and [redacted]

[redacted] arms were in fact given to the tribes. The Afghan Government was not particularly concerned about which dissident groups obtained the arms, [redacted]

We believe that the Afridi and Shinwari tribes are particularly attractive targets for Soviet and Afghan manipulation because their members reside on both sides of the border and control access to several of the more important crossing points used by the insurgents. Both tribes historically have resisted central government control and have maintained their independence by selling their loyalty to the highest bidder. [redacted]

Many tribal leaders who took Kabul's guns and money have made peace with Islamabad following a combination of Pakistani threats and probably some bribes. Kabul was unhappy with the failure of the tribal leaders to keep their pledges made at the *jirga* in September 1985, [redacted]

[redacted] Most of the weapons passed out by the Afghan regime were confiscated by the Pakistani Government

or were voluntarily turned over to the Afghan insurgents. Many Wazir and Mohmand tribesmen who took part in the *jirga* in September later declared their intention to take part in the insurgent campaign against Soviet forces in 1986, according to the US Consulate in Peshawar.<sup>2</sup> [redacted]

**Sabotage**

Hoping to force Islamabad to reduce its support for the insurgents, Kabul has stepped up bombings and related sabotage to create tension between Afghan refugees and the local Pakistani population. [redacted]

[redacted] bombing incidents in the NWFP by midsummer 1986 occurred at more than double the rate of 1985 (see appendix for details of the 1986 incidents). An official in the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs told a US Embassy official that 108 incidents occurred in 1985—resulting in 82 dead and 178 wounded—a nearly 20-percent increase in incidents over 1984. During the first six months of 1986, 148 incidents resulted in 108 dead and 397 injured. Between October 1985 and June 1986, the number of bombs of Soviet manufacture found in the Khyber and Kurram Agencies of the NWFP and as far away as Lahore and Karachi increased significantly, according to Pakistani press reports. [redacted]

Pakistani officials note that Afghan saboteurs are increasingly focusing their attacks on economic targets—bridges, culverts, roads, railways, power transmission lines, and communication facilities—according to US Embassy reporting. The bombing of the control room of the Peshawar center of Pakistan Television on 16 October 1985 and the bombing of the Pakistan International Airlines offices in Peshawar on 23 January 1986 attest to the ability of the saboteurs to strike at conspicuous and well-protected Pakistani Government facilities. [redacted]

<sup>2</sup> We do not have any information that would indicate whether those individuals who participated in the Afghan-sponsored tribal *jirga* fought against Kabul or with the Afghan insurgents during the summer of 1986. The US Embassy in Islamabad indicates, however, that Afridi, Shinwari, and Mohmand tribesmen who had undergone Soviet training in Afghanistan joined insurgent groups in fighting the Soviets west of the Khyber Pass in early 1986. [redacted]

25X1

25X1  
25X1  
25X1

25X1  
25X1

25X1  
25X1  
25X1  
25X1

25X1  
25X1

25X1  
25X1

Secret



Figure 3. Pakistani F-16 fighter aircraft [redacted]

**Agent Training and Infiltration**

Afghan agents sent into Pakistan receive training in the Soviet Union and from the KGB in Kabul.

[redacted] the KGB supervises the training of Afghans in Kabul who are sent under KHAD auspices to infiltrate refugee camps and to carry out disinformation and sabotage activities. Other groups of young Afghans are being trained in the Soviet Union and infiltrated into Pakistan, [redacted]

[redacted]

Pakistani authorities believe that Kabul also has opened training bases in Afghanistan for dissident Pakistani nationals, according to US Embassy reporting. These bases are used to instruct tribesmen and other political opponents in the art of sabotage and terrorism. Other bases are used to train dissidents in the use of small arms and landmines, [redacted]

[redacted]

KHAD recently tasked five groups of its officers—each group composed of 20 to 25 men—to enter Pakistan and carry out sabotage and subversive operations, [redacted]

[redacted] members of one of these groups crossed into Pakistan in early May 1986 disguised as bazaar traders. The majority, however, entered Pakistan disguised as refugees, [redacted]

[redacted]

Apprehended KHAD saboteurs are generally well armed, trained, and equipped with sophisticated explosives and timing devices. [redacted]

[redacted] these agents were instructed to establish contact with other KHAD agents in Pakistan, stockpile arms and explosives, and await orders. The Afghan Consulate in Peshawar is responsible for



Figure 4. Wreckage of downed Afghan SU-22 aircraft [redacted]

providing a list of individuals for the KHAD infiltrators to contact and areas where they can operate, [redacted]

[redacted]

**Islamabad's Response**

Islamabad has adjusted its military posture on the Afghan border in response to increased air violations. F-16 pilots have been more aggressive in challenging Soviet and Afghan aircraft over Pakistan. Islamabad publicly acknowledged shooting down an Afghan aircraft that crashed inside Pakistani territory in May 1986. Pakistani F-16s shot down at least two intruding aircraft—and possibly another—with five

AIM-9L missiles in two incidents in April and May 1986, [redacted] The Pakistanis began flying combat air patrols along the border in February 1986 to position themselves better for intercepting intruding aircraft. [redacted]

[redacted] orders requiring headquarters permission before firing upon intruding aircraft were lifted in 1986, and response times to penetrating aircraft have been significantly reduced. [redacted]

Pakistan has augmented its anti-aircraft capabilities along the border since late 1985, and its anti-aircraft gunners have become more active in engaging penetrating aircraft. [redacted]

[redacted]

25X1

25X1  
25X1

25X1  
25X1  
25X1

25X1  
25X1

25X1

25X1  
25X1  
25X1

25X1  
25X11

25X1  
25X1  
25X1

**Secret**

**Figure 5**



25X1

25X1

**Secret**




Figure 6. Crotale missile launcher [redacted]



Figure 7. Pakistani soldier with Stinger SAM [redacted]

25X1  
25X1

[redacted]  
[redacted] Stinger and Redeye portable surface-to-air missiles were sent to the border in late 1985. [redacted]  
[redacted] Five Afghan aircraft have probably been downed by Pakistani gunners in 1986. [redacted]

The Pakistani Army has fired at least 16 Stingers and probably an equivalent number of other air defense missiles at intruding aircraft, with one confirmed kill and one probable hit, [redacted]

[redacted] Because of technical and training problems with the Stinger missiles, which were acquired under the current US security assistance package, the Pakistanis removed them from the border in March 1986 for a three-month refresher course for the crews, [redacted]

Although the Pakistanis are more willing to engage Afghan aircraft, they lack an integrated air defense warning system that would alert them to intruding aircraft before they appear over Pakistani territory. [redacted]

and the rugged terrain in which they are required to operate severely limits their effectiveness. According to US Embassy reporting, the Pakistanis have indicated that increasing their air warning capabilities along the Afghan border is their first military priority. Islamabad has expressed an interest in acquiring aerostats—balloons or dirigibles with long-distance

radars attached—as a stopgap measure until it obtains a modern AWACS (airborne warning and control systems) aircraft to fill its defensive requirements. [redacted]

Islamabad has devoted resources to improving the capabilities of the paramilitary Frontier Corps in the border region. The Pakistanis have told US Embassy officials that they must improve the Corps' military training, logistic support, and weapons in order to counter the increasing Afghan military pressure. Frontier Corpsmen have begun to receive training on modern field radios, mortars, and artillery. [redacted]

[redacted] An effort has also been made to improve the responsiveness of Frontier Corps units by supplying them with transport vehicles. [redacted]

[redacted] regular Army units have augmented Frontier Corps forces, particularly in the major Frontier Corps garrisons in the Khyber and Kurram Agencies. We do not believe the improvements and additions significantly increase Pakistan's defensive capabilities along the border. In our judgment, they were intended as a public relations gesture as much to assuage Pakistani civilian fears of Soviet-inspired attacks in the border region as to provide a credible deterrent to those attacks. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

**Pakistani Radar Coverage Along the Afghan Border**

Current Pakistani radar coverage along the Afghan border is extremely limited, with only six short-range Siemens MPD 45 gap-filler radars located in the most vulnerable areas. [redacted]

[redacted] have augmented these radar sites with visual observers in remote locations, but the observers generally are not trained to recognize fast-flying aircraft. Moreover, they are not equipped with modern communications gear that would allow them to contact air defense units quickly. [redacted]

Pakistani air defense personnel believe that only a small percentage of intruders are detected. According to US Embassy reports, Pakistani officials report that one defecting Afghan pilot landed at a deserted World War II airstrip in Baluchistan, and the air defense command learned of his existence only the next day when the pilot turned himself in to authorities. Inadequate radar capabilities are also cited in the case of a MIG-21 pilot who attempted to land at the Sumungli Military Airbase near Quetta without the base being aware of his presence until he crashed off the end of the runway. [redacted]

The US Embassy in Islamabad reports that Pakistani authorities have stepped up efforts to combat KHAD subversion of Pakistani tribal groups through a judicious use of pressure and force. The Pakistanis organized a number of tribal *jirgas* in the Khyber, Kurram, Orakzai and North Waziristan Agencies beginning in September 1985 in which the participants expressed solidarity with their insurgent brothers and condemned Afghan subversive activities. Those who had visited Afghanistan and received weapons and funds from the Afghan Government were instructed to hand their arms over to their tribal elders. The local press reported that these *jirgas* declared that any Pakistani found to be involved with KHAD would face an enormous fine, have his house burned, and be handed over to the Pakistani authorities for trial and punishment. [redacted]

Islamabad has used paramilitary forces on a selective basis to oppose suborned Pushtun tribes. In late 1985 Pakistani authorities concluded that Wali Khan

**Pakistan's Frontier Corps**

Responsibility for the security of Pakistan's border with Afghanistan rests primarily with the paramilitary Frontier Corps. Units of this corps are lightly armed troops drawn from the local population of the NWFP—generally ethnic Pushtuns commanded by regular Army officers. The Corps is organized into some 70 battalion-size wings of 750 men each, with small units manning the hundreds of border crossings and observation posts along the 2,240-kilometer frontier. Corpsmen are familiar with the rugged terrain, are considered proficient in small-unit infantry tactics, and are highly motivated, according to US Embassy reporting. [redacted] they lack heavy weapons or means of transportation, which limits their ability to confront a conventional Afghan or Soviet incursion into P [redacted]

Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan has increased the size of the Frontier Corps by more than 20,000 and improved its weaponry and communications equipment. Beginning in 1980 regular Pakistani Army units have shared garrison duty at important Frontier Corps posts and probably manned artillery and heavy anti-aircraft guns. The expansion of the Frontier Corps, we believe, was intended as much to help police the large number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and punish unruly Pushtun tribes as to strengthen border defenses against an Afghan or Soviet attack. [redacted]

Frontier Corps militiamen have fired at intruding Afghan aircraft and have been subjected to cross-border airstrikes and artillery fire, according to Embassy reporting. Because the bulk of Pakistan's Army units in the NWFP and Baluchistan are still positioned in cantonments at least 15 to 65 kilometers from the border, the presence of the paramilitary Frontier Corps on the border allows Islamabad the flexibility of responding to air violations and limited ground incursions without resorting to regular Army units. [redacted]

25X1  
25X1  
25X1  
25X1  
25X1  
25X1  
25X1  
25X1  
25X1

Secret

Secret



Figure 8. Khyber Rifles militiamen, Frontier Corps [redacted]



Figure 9. Wali Khan Kukikhel [redacted]

Kukikhel—leader of a fractious clan of the Afridi—had been co-opted by Kabul, according to the US Consulate in Peshawar. Islamabad sent 3,000 men from the Frontier Corps who, at least temporarily, subdued the Afridi and Shinwari tribes that had come under the sway of Wali Khan. Although the sweep was ostensibly aimed at capturing Wali Khan and curbing his narcotics smuggling trade, the US Consulate in Peshawar reports the campaign also was intended to signal to the Pushtun border tribes that challenging Islamabad's authority in the NWFP and Baluchistan and cooperating with Kabul would not go unpunished. [redacted]

We believe the forceful Pakistani response to Wali Khan's challenge successfully undermined the support that he had from other tribal leaders:

- Many tribesmen blame him for instigating the Pakistani military effort by accepting money and arms from Kabul. [redacted]
- The increased presence of the Frontier Corps in the Khyber and Kurram Agencies created economic hardship by inhibiting the customary smuggling trade with Afghanistan and the loss of unimpeded freedom of movement.
- Prominent Muslim religious leaders denounced the apparent alliance of Wali Khan with the atheistic Communist government in Kabul. [redacted]

Pakistan has also sought to counter KHAD subversion and sabotage by setting up special antiterrorist squads. [redacted] We believe that these units will be used to stalk and eliminate KHAD agents. The Pakistani Government also has sought to have the insurgent parties tighten their own security to limit the opportunity for KHAD agents to stir up trouble. [redacted]

#### Is Soviet Pressure Working?

The Soviet-Afghan destabilization campaign has not forced Islamabad to reconsider its primary goals—the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and the return of the approximately 3 million refugees in Pakistan to Afghanistan. Indeed, [redacted] Pakistani military officers do not appear overly concerned about the current level of violence or air attacks in the NWFP or Baluchistan. The Pakistani military—which continues to play a key role in policymaking under civilian rule—sees support for the insurgency as an integral part of Pakistan's defense against the Soviet threat, according to US Embassy reporting. Although opposition political leaders have pointed to the increased bombings and air attacks in the NWFP to criticize the government of Prime Minister Junejo, most members of the National Assembly do not see an "honorable" alternative to support for the insurgency. [redacted]

Secret

**Secret**

The Soviet and Afghan efforts, however, are having repercussions for Islamabad among the local population. The US Consulate in Peshawar recently reported that the attitudes of urban residents toward the refugees have shifted since the beginning of 1986. Some local people now see the refugees as a threat to their personal safety because Afghans are considered potential terrorists. The refugees are perceived to be the major contributors to the breakdown of law and order because they are armed and their arms are falling into the hands of Pakistani bandits. [redacted]

Pakistani officials have belatedly focused on the growing problem in the border area. In recent months, committees have been formed in the region to drum up support for the government's stand, according to Pakistani press reports. [redacted]

The Junejo government is concerned that the terrorist bombing campaign in the border areas could become a major political issue for the opposition parties.

[redacted] members of the opposition Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) coalition hope to use Pakistani fear of Soviet retaliation and the underlying Pakistani hostility toward the Afghan refugees as a weapon against the government. These MRD officials believe that the Junejo government is politically vulnerable on this issue, particularly in view of increasing Soviet hostility. Suspicions that Washington may severely curtail or cut off aid because of Pakistan's alleged nuclear weapons program or US budget constraints add to the government's vulnerability. Benazir Bhutto, the principal opposition leader, has not directly addressed the terrorist problem in the NWFP and Baluchistan but has expressed concern about the refugees' social and economic impact on the NWFP and Baluchistan.

### Outlook

We believe that the Soviets will continue their three-pronged campaign against Pakistan. It is a relatively low-cost operation that can be carefully calibrated, keeps the Pakistanis on edge, and has not prompted significant international reaction. We believe Afghan Communist Party leader Najib will want to continue

the destabilization effort, which, according to the US Embassy in Kabul, he masterminded as KHAD chief.

In our judgment, the Soviets will not expand the campaign significantly in the next 12 months, mainly because a greatly increased destabilization campaign holds the possibility of strengthening the US security role in the area. If that happens, the Pakistanis might seek a more visible US presence in Pakistan—a training mission, AWACS aircraft and crews, and US naval fleet visits—to counteract Soviet pressure. The Soviets probably also worry that an expanded program would alienate elements within Pakistan that Moscow has cultivated, according to the US Embassy in Moscow. [redacted]

We do not believe the Pakistani efforts to curtail Kabul's infiltration and sabotage campaign will significantly improve security in the border region over the next year. The Pakistan-Afghanistan border is extremely porous, with numerous unguarded entry points, and Pakistani security officials cannot check the bona fides of all of the refugees among whom agents could hide. Moreover, [redacted] the efficiency and morale of internal security forces in the border region are impaired by low salaries, politically inspired criticism, and interference by government bureaucrats. Internal security authorities are concerned that KHAD agents may be obtaining legitimate Pakistani entrance permits from corrupt politicians. The mutually antagonistic nature of the Afghan resistance organizations often thwarts the identification of KHAD agents by the insurgent groups, [redacted]

Should Soviet pressure coincide with a decline in US or international support, we believe Pakistan would adjust its Afghan policies. In our judgment, Islamabad's willingness to withstand Moscow's pressure is partly predicated on having the moral support of much of the international community—particularly the Muslim world—and a decline in that support would shake Pakistani confidence. We believe, moreover, that the leading contenders to replace Pakistani President Zia—including Prime Minister Junejo and

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

**Secret**



opposition leader Bhutto—do not share Zia’s strong commitment to the Afghan insurgents’ cause and would be more willing to compromise with Moscow and Kabul to gain a settlement of the conflict and a return of the refugees to Afghanistan. [redacted]

obtain additional US funding over and above the nearly \$2 billion in military aid in the recently negotiated US six-year assistance program. US estimates of the costs of the additional military package have run as high as \$500 million. [redacted]

25X1

**A Worst Case Scenario**

We believe that under some circumstances the Soviets might drastically increase their subversive and military pressure—short of an invasion—against Pakistan:

- If Moscow decides to go all-out for a conclusive military victory.
- If the Soviets decide that the war has reached a critical juncture and that additional pressure on Pakistan would force a rupture between the insurgents and the Junejo government or within the Junejo government.
- If Moscow believes that the Pakistanis are about to increase significantly their political and military support to the insurgents. [redacted]

We believe Islamabad will focus on improving its air warning radar and air defense weapons to enable the Pakistani Air Force and Army to counter Soviet and Afghan air violations and attacks. The Pakistanis have already requested Stinger Post advanced surface-to-air missiles, additional supplies of AIM-9L air-to-air missiles for their F-16 fighters, and Copperhead laser-guided artillery shells for the defense of the border, according to US Embassy reporting, and they may ask for expedited delivery. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

[redacted] wants to acquire an airborne early warning capability, preferably E3A Sentry aircraft. The Pakistanis looked at the E2C Hawkeye in 1985 and will observe tethered aerostats in Saudi Arabia in late 1986 but have not decided to purchase either system. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] and again this year for US equipment and training to convert Boeing 707 commercial aircraft into aerial tankers that would allow its aircraft to remain airborne for longer periods. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

We believe that the Soviets have developed contingency plans for air and ground attacks on Pakistan. On several occasions beginning in 1980, Zia received messages from Moscow warning that, if Pakistan continued to be a staging area for military support to the rebels, it would pay the price, [redacted]

25X1

We believe Pakistani authorities may approach the United States to provide counterterrorism training—bomb disposal, surveillance techniques, and electronic communications interception, for example—for its police and paramilitary units that are combating KHAD agents in Pakistan. Islamabad also may ask Washington to contribute funds to help defray the escalating costs of underwriting payments to Pakistani tribal leaders necessitated by Soviet efforts to co-opt them. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Even in this scenario, we do not foresee a deep Soviet airborne or armored attack into Pakistan. Besides concern about a US military response, the Soviets would face difficult terrain and logistic lines from Afghanistan subject to disruption by insurgent activity, and they would have only a limited ability to surprise the Pakistani Army. [redacted]

Unless the Soviets dramatically escalate their pressure, Pakistani officials will seek to avoid increased US visibility in providing training and support for the Pakistani military or the insurgents. Islamabad has been careful not to officially admit support to the insurgents and is sensitive to criticism that its interests have been subordinated to Washington’s. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

**Implications for the United States**

We expect Pakistan to ask the United States to provide more and improved military equipment to help it withstand the Soviet threat. According to US Embassy reporting, the Pakistanis may attempt to

## Appendix

### Chronology of Selected Major Destabilization Activity

1 January–1 November 1986

- 7 January KHAD terrorist planted a mine that exploded on a road in Kurram Agency, killing 15 Afghan refugees.
- 23 January KHAD terrorist bombed Pakistan International Airlines building in Peshawar, killing five and injuring 25 Pakistanis.
- 2 February KHAD terrorist bombed a power grid station in Mardan, interrupting the electric supply to surrounding areas.
- 15 March KHAD terrorist planted a mine that exploded on a road in Parachinar, killing 16 Afghan refugees and three Pakistanis and injuring 11 Afghan refugees.
- 22 March Afghan army artillery fire hit Mata Sangar refugee camp in Kurram Agency, killing five Afghan refugees and injuring 19 others.
- 27 March KHAD terrorist bombed a restaurant in Peshawar, killing three Afghan refugees and one Pakistani and injuring 17 Pakistanis.
- 16 April Afghan aircraft bombed civilian targets in Saidgi, killing four Pakistanis and injuring eight.
- 20 April Terrorist bombed the British Airways office in Peshawar, injuring one Pakistani.
- 3 May Afghan army artillery fire hit civilians in Kurram Agency, killing three Afghan refugees and 11 Pakistanis and injuring 22 Pakistanis.
- 5 May Afghan aircraft bombed civilian targets in Parachinar, killing 12 Pakistanis and injuring 14 others.
- Afghan aircraft bombed civilian targets in Kurram Agency, killing two Afghan refugees and one Pakistani and injuring three Afghan refugees.
- 6 May Afghan aircraft bombed a militia post in Teri Mangal, casualties unknown.
- 8 May Afghan aircraft bombed refugee camps in Kurram Agency, killing nine Afghans.
- 9 May Afghan aircraft bombed Kotri militia post in Kurram Agency, destroying post; casualties unknown.
- 13 May Afghan army artillery fire hit civilians in Kurram Agency, killing 13 Afghan refugees and one Pakistani and injuring 22 Afghan refugees and eight Pakistanis.

**Secret**

14 May Afghan aircraft bombed militia posts in Kurram Agency, injuring 20 Afghan refugees.

19 May Afghan army artillery fire hit civilians in Kurram Agency, killing four Pakistanis and injuring two others.

21 May Afghan aircraft bombed militia posts in Kurram Agency, casualties unknown.

27 May KHAD terrorist bombed the post office in Parachinar, casualties unknown.

4 June KHAD terrorist planted a mine that exploded on a road near Parachinar, killing five Afghan refugees and injuring two others.

5 June Afghan aircraft bombed refugee camp in Parachinar, killing five Afghan refugees and injuring one Pakistani and five Afghan refugees.

7 June KHAD terrorist planted a bomb that exploded in a market in Peshawar, killing three Pakistanis and two Afghan refugees and injuring 40 Pakistanis.

17 June Afghan army artillery fire hit the power grid station in Karik, disrupting power to Quetta—the first attack on an economic facility in Baluchistan.

22 June KHAD terrorist planted a bomb that exploded near the police station in Peshawar, injuring 21 Pakistanis.

11 July KHAD terrorist planted a bomb that exploded in an Afghan refugee hotel in Teri Mangal, killing 10 Afghan refugees and injuring 15 others.

13 July KHAD terrorist planted a bomb that exploded on a road near an Afghan refugee camp in Kurram Agency, killing eight Afghan refugees and injuring 12 others.

25 July Afghan army artillery fire hit civilians in Chaman, Baluchistan, killing seven Pakistanis.

26 July Afghan aircraft bombed refugee camps in Domandai, Baluchistan, killing 16 Afghan refugees.

27 July KHAD terrorist planted a mine that exploded on a road in Kurram Agency, killing six Afghan refugees and injuring six others.

16 August KHAD terrorist planted a bomb that exploded near the office of the supervisory medical officer for Kurram Agency, no casualties reported.

26 August Afghan aircraft bombed refugee camps near Domandai, Baluchistan, killing 16 Afghan refugees.

13 September KHAD terrorist planted a bomb that exploded, destroying three UNHCR ambulances; no casualties reported.

**Secret**

16 September	Afghan aircraft bombed militia posts at Shadal in Kurram Agency, killing six Afghan refugees and injuring 10 others.
19 September	Afghan army artillery fire hit civilians in Chaman, Baluchistan, killing two Pakistanis and injuring 12 others.
22 September	KHAD terrorist planted a bomb that exploded in Hangu, killing one Pakistani and injuring nine others.
30 September	Large explosion occurred in Peshawar, no casualties reported.
16 October	KHAD terrorist planted a bomb that exploded in a hospital in Peshawar, injuring 15 Pakistanis.
19 October	KHAD terrorist planted a bomb that exploded in a train in Peshawar, injuring two Pakistanis.
25 October	Afghan army artillery fire hit civilians in Bajaur Agency, killing one Pakistani and injuring another.
28 October	KHAD terrorist planted a bomb that exploded in a bazaar in Peshawar, killing six Pakistanis and injuring 20 others.
1 November	KHAD terrorist planted a bomb that exploded in a bus in NWFP, killing five Pakistanis and injuring 13 others.



25X1

**Secret**

**Secret**