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Afghanistan: The Politics of the Resistance Movement

An Intelligence Assessment

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Afghanistan: The Politics of the Resistance Movement

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An Intelligence Assessment

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Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and
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**Afghanistan:
The Politics of
the Resistance Movement**



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Key Judgments

The Afghan resistance movement consists of hundreds of independent groups, many of which have no goal beyond that of driving out the Soviet occupation force and ending Communist rule in Afghanistan. Those with longer term political goals range from Maoists to Islamic fundamentalists, and the number of organizations espousing regional and ethnic interests is growing.

At present there appears to be little chance that the insurgent groups will unite into a single organization. Former King Zahir might have the best chance of unifying the resistance, but it is questionable that even half of the insurgents would accept his leadership.

Substantial external support might provide one insurgent leader with the prestige and influence necessary to combine several groups into a National Liberation Movement, but such a group would still be plagued with divisions and jealousies.

Any government formed by the resistance would be weak. If broadly based, it would face serious internal tensions. If dominated by a single group, it would face intense competition from other insurgent organizations. In either case it would have little influence in large parts of Afghanistan.

The absence of central authority, however, has not prevented the development of cooperation among insurgent bands in the field.



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**Afghanistan:
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Introduction

The Afghans are engaged in a spontaneous and essentially nonideological resistance against the Communist regime of Babrak Karmal and his Soviet masters. There is no central organization. There are hundreds of independent resistance organizations, some with long-range plans for Afghanistan, many more with no goal beyond keeping Soviet and government forces out of a single valley or village. Many of the bands fighting in Afghanistan recognize no higher authority. Others are associated to some degree with larger organizations—either exiles or groups based within Afghanistan. [redacted]

The Insurgents in the Field

Many insurgents—probably the majority—belong to independent bands representing a village, valley, tribe, clan, or family and feel little identity with a national movement. These bands are fighting to preserve Islam and tradition from outside interference, just as Afghan rebels have done for centuries. Commanders of these bands often cooperate with other leaders against a common enemy; joint operations are becoming more common, intelligence is being exchanged more regularly, and assistance is extended more frequently in moving supplies. The cooperation is between equals, however, with neither commander willing to surrender his independence in a common cause. [redacted]

These bands are often critical of the larger political organizations, which they see as corrupt, inefficient, prone to intrigue and petty squabbling, and useful only as potential sources of externally supplied arms. To obtain arms they may give nominal allegiance to a political organization without actually allowing it any control over their actions. A political organization may also count among its followers any who receive its help. [redacted]

Other bands have more genuine relationships with the political organizations. In some cases an organization has direct control over a band's operations. For

example, some raids by bands based in Pakistan are organized and directed by exile leaders in Peshawar. Other bands are under the direct control of political organizations based inside Afghanistan. More common, however, is a situation in which an insurgent commander acknowledges his allegiance to a political leader but is largely left on his own in conducting military operations. Some commanders receive neither guidance nor assistance from the political leaders. [redacted]

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The Exiles

Most of the resistance leaders with a national outlook are in exile. Among the dozens of exile groups, the most prominent and the only ones recognized by the Pakistani Government are six based in Peshawar, Pakistan. Since late 1978 much time and effort has been devoted to forming alliances among various combinations of these Peshawar parties. The latest alliance, announced in August 1981, will probably not be any more durable or genuine than the preceding three (see table 1). This particular effort is noteworthy, however, because for the first time it includes Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's fundamentalist Islamic Party and excludes Ahmad Gailani's moderate National Islamic Front (see appendix). Gulbuddin, who has previously shunned attempts at unity, has come under increasing pressure from religious leaders and insurgent field commanders to curb his intransigence. Gulbuddin's precondition for joining this time was the exclusion of Gailani's moderate party. [redacted]

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Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's disunifying influence has been felt in Afghanistan as well as in Peshawar. Increasingly, Gulbuddin's men, long resented for their gangster-like tactics, have been involved in attacks on other insurgents and have intimidated villagers while in search of supplies and "donations" for their party treasury. On occasion the situation has gotten so bad that village elders have been forced to call on the hated government forces to help. [redacted]

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Afghan insurgents

In the early days of the insurgency the Peshawar parties minimized their ideological differences to concentrate their efforts against the common enemy. During the past year, however, polarization between fundamentalists and moderates has increased. [redacted]

Fundamentalists advocate a revolutionary Islamic state and the elimination of modern social trends—such as equality for women—for post-Soviet Afghanistan. Although opposed to the radical Iranian brand of Islamic revolution, the fundamentalists are adamant in their opposition to the return of the monarchy. [redacted]

The moderates, representing for the most part the urban, educated elite of the pre-Communist era, envisage a secular state under democratic institutions

with a member of the exiled royal family as a figurehead king or president. The moderates are also amenable to friendly relations with the West. [redacted]

The Regional Organizations

The growing belief among insurgents in the field that the Peshawar parties are self-seeking and hopelessly divided has led to the formation in various areas of insurgent organizations based on tribal or ethnic rather than political ties. These groups, some very effective militarily on their own home ground, hope to bypass the Peshawar parties in securing external aid and have begun to send representatives to Iran and Europe, as well as Peshawar and Islamabad, in search of assistance. Many insurgent commanders hope that eventually these organizations can coalesce into an organized national consensus. [redacted]

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Table 1**Past "Alliances" of Peshawar-Based Political Parties**

Organization and Dates	Parties Participating	Not Participating
National Front for the Salvation of the Homeland Late 1978 or early 1979	Revolutionary Islamic Movement Islamic League of Afghanistan Afghan National Liberation Front National Islamic Front	Islamic Party (Hekmatyar) Islamic Party (Khalis)
Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan March 1980–March 1981	Islamic Party (Khalis Faction) Islamic League of Afghanistan Revolutionary Islamic Movement National Islamic Front Afghan National Liberation Front	Islamic Party (Hekmatyar Faction)
(Moderate) Islamic Alliance May 1981–August 1981	National Islamic Front Afghan National Liberation Front Revolutionary Islamic Movement	Islamic Party (Hekmatyar) Islamic Party (Khalis) Islamic League of Afghanistan
Alliance of Islamic Freedom Fighters of Afghanistan 16 September 1981	Islamic Party (Hekmatyar) Islamic Party (Khalis) Islamic League of Afghanistan Revolutionary Islamic Movement Afghan National Liberation Front	National Islamic Front

The Outlook for Insurgent Unity

In the near term the prospects for unity among the disparate elements of the insurgency are not good. Among the Peshawar exile groups—despite their periodic alliances—the trend seems to be toward more factionalism both between parties and among the leaders of individual groups. In the various party headquarters in Peshawar there is increasing strife as the party leaders fend off the power moves of their subordinates. Without the occasional intervention of the Pakistani Government, the situation would be considerably worse. [redacted]

Some tribal groups in the field have been able to pool their military efforts under the auspices of regional organizations, but such cooperation rarely extends across ethnic lines. Non-Pushtun tribes still harbor a deep-seated enmity against their Pushtun neighbors—historically the dominant ethnic group in Afghanistan—and are unwilling to return to the pre-Communist status quo. Additionally, these regional groups might succeed in organizing the insurgency in a given area, but in so doing they would solidify ethnic and regional differences and in some areas become de

facto governments unlikely to surrender their authority to a broad national resistance movement or to any non-Communist government in Kabul. [redacted]

Former King Zahir Shah, who may have the best chance of uniting the various tribal and political elements of the resistance, has so far shown little inclination to attempt this. Furthermore, such an action would draw extreme opposition not only from fundamentalists but from many others in the resistance unwilling to lessen their own authority. [redacted]

The situation would change if one insurgent leader or group were to secure a disproportionate share of foreign assistance in obtaining weapons. In Afghan tribal society the power and prestige of a leader is still a matter of patronage and of the exercise of reciprocal rights and obligations between “feudal lord” and “vassal.” The leader of a Peshawar political party who could demonstrate a consistent ability to supply his men in the field with enough weapons and ammunition to continue the fight against the Communists would assume greater stature in the eyes of insurgents. Other groups would lose support if they too were not able to obtain such aid. [redacted]

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The Pakistani Government provided a practical demonstration of this principle when it decided to recognize only six major insurgent groups in Peshawar. Literally dozens of other would-be insurgent groups, lacking the official blessing and materiel support of Islamabad, disappeared overnight. [redacted]

In the Afghan countryside, tribal groups and insurgent commanders would quickly acquire renewed respect for and confidence in a party leader who could provide significant military support for their efforts in the field. Afghan tribesmen who know and care little about abstract political or ideological concepts would respect and follow a strong leader with powerful backing. Such a leader may be able to draw together enough support to form a national liberation movement. [redacted]

Post-Soviet Government?

Should the resistance somehow come to power in Kabul, the resulting government would be weak. Afghan governments historically have had full control only in the major cities and nearby rural areas. In most of the country, government authority has been tolerated only so long as there was no serious interference with local affairs. In the past few years, central authority has been virtually nonexistent in much of the country, leaving local leaders in complete control. It seems unlikely that these leaders will give up their new power easily, and any future government may have even less authority outside Kabul than its pre-Communist predecessors. [redacted]

The government also would probably be divided. Infighting in any coalition government would make the formulation of coherent policy difficult and would probably lead to attempts by the various groups to eliminate their rivals. Frequent coups, purges, and assassinations would be likely, a situation Afghanistan's neighbors—including the USSR—would be greatly tempted to exploit, whatever agreement they had reached about noninterference. [redacted]

A government representing only one faction of the insurgency might be no better. If it made a serious effort to implement its policies, it would meet resistance from both its ideological rivals and regional groups opposed to any extension of central authority. Perhaps the best the Afghans could hope for would be a government headed by a member of the royal family and administered by experienced and well-known politicians from the monarchy and Daoud's republic. The leaders of such a government might have enough tribal and political status to survive, but only if they succeeded in avoiding serious offense to any of the contending groups in Afghanistan. [redacted]

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Appendix: Afghan Dissident Groups

Peshawar-Based Political Parties

Fundamentalists

Hizbi Islami (Islamic Party). The oldest, best organized, most dedicated and efficient of the Peshawar-based political parties, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizbi Islami is the only group that resembles the ruthlessly dedicated cadre usually associated with guerrilla movements. The organization began in 1969 as a student group at Kabul University, founded by Gulbuddin to oppose King Zahir Shah, and after his fall, President Mohammad Daoud. [REDACTED]

At 36, younger than most other exile leaders, Gulbuddin is ambitious and opportunistic. An impressive orator who fits the conventional image of a stern Islamic traditionalist, he has in the past refused to deal with other groups because his own preeminence within the insurgent movement might be diminished. Under pressure from religious leaders and perhaps seeing personal advantages in unity, he joined an alliance with four of the other main exile groups in August 1981. He remains convinced that the others will eventually acknowledge his leadership. [REDACTED]

Gulbuddin is uncompromising in his opposition to the pro-Soviet regime of Babrak Karmal, and if he came to power in Afghanistan, he would almost certainly remain staunchly anti-Soviet. [REDACTED]

He has, however, also been critical of the United States and other Western countries, probably to avoid strings he believes would accompany any help, to emphasize his independence to the Afghan people, and because he doubts Washington's willingness to continue support for an extended period. Recently his representatives have been more friendly to US officials and have indicated a desire for "friendly ties" with the United States. [REDACTED]

He strongly opposes any role for the royal family in either the insurgency or any future Afghan Government. His plans for a post-Soviet Afghanistan include the establishment of an Islamic theocracy and the



Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of the Islamic Party

UPI ©

outlawing of education for women. His supporters insist, at least in dealing with Westerners, that a Khomeini-like "dictatorship of mullahs" is neither possible nor contemplated by Gulbuddin, and they profess horror at the excesses of Islamic fundamentalism in Iran. [REDACTED]

Hizbi Islami claims to have 27 autonomous provincial organizations in Afghanistan and support from an equal number of offices in Pakistan—24 in Peshawar and three in Quetta. The central organization is divided into functional committees dealing with subjects such as politics, military operations, culture, education, and refugees. These committees meet regularly, work hard, and appear to be productive. [REDACTED]

Gulbuddin's propaganda apparatus is undoubtedly the most professional that the exiles have. Its press releases are published in the Pakistani press more frequently than those of other groups, and it has had

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Ethnic Groups in Afghanistan



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
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considerable success convincing Western newsmen that Gulbuddin is the most important of the insurgent leaders. The cultural committee puts out a wide range of relatively slick publications aimed at a number of different audiences, including Pakistanis, Arabs, Iranians, and Russians. [redacted]

Other indications of the organization's effectiveness are a pool of articulate and well-prepared spokesmen, an effective medical program, a zealous recruiting program in the refugee camps, and—in contrast to most exile groups—tight security and a smoothly functioning central headquarters. [redacted]

It is difficult to gauge Hizbi Islami strength and military accomplishments, but the organization appears to have its greatest strength in Paktia and Nangarhar Provinces, where it maintains arms caches and field headquarters. Some of the best trained and equipped insurgent bands in this area are under its control. In other parts of the country, Hizbi Islami's activities appear to be limited to collecting donations and spreading Gulbuddin's party line. Gulbuddin's image throughout Afghanistan has been enhanced by Afghan Government propaganda, which tends to portray him as the most dangerous of the "rebel bandit" leaders. [redacted]

Hizbi Islami's relations with other insurgent groups in both Peshawar and Afghanistan have been poor. Gulbuddin's self-serving public relations efforts, his favored position with the Pakistani Government, strong-arm recruiting in refugee camps, and his refusal to cooperate with other organizations have created extreme resentment among Afghans in Pakistan. Within Afghanistan his men have earned a reputation for intimidation and taking supplies without payment. Reports of armed clashes resulting from Hizbi Islami efforts to eliminate rival insurgent leaders and to claim exclusive "turf" are growing. In addition Gulbuddin's rivals in the resistance are trying to convince the people that he is actually a leftist—a claim that has some basis in the beliefs he professed when he was a student. [redacted]



In August 1981 rumors circulated about personality and policy differences within the party's leadership. Tension between the hot-tempered Gulbuddin and his deputy Qazi Mohammad Amin appears to be simmering. Qualified observers describe the smoothly running party offices as disrupted by the maneuvering for power of the two men. [redacted]

Hizbi Islami (Islamic Party—Khalis Faction).

Mohammad Younus Khalis' Hizbi Islami broke away from Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's group in the spring of 1979 in protest over Gulbuddin's temporary merger with Burhanuddin Rabanni's Islamic League. Khalis probably believed that the moderately fundamentalist Rabanni would compromise the Islamic Party's religious purity. Khalis's small but effective fighting force of about 800 men concentrates more on waging holy war in the hills of Afghanistan than on political maneuvering in Peshawar. [redacted]


Younus Khalis, 60 years old, is admired by men of almost all political parties and is the closest thing in the Afghan insurgency to being the traditional tribal role model—the warrior-poet. A fiercely traditional leader who believes that the Koran is the only constitution Afghanistan needs, Khalis in his early days was an editor of religious magazines and later a teacher of Islamic thought in Kabul. He was eventually forced to flee to Pakistan in 1974 after the publication of a book that was critical of former President Mohammad Daoud. He subsequently joined the original Hizbi Islami and became a member of its advisory committee. [redacted]

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Mohammad Younus Khalis, leader of the Islamic Party—Khalis Faction



Burhanuddin Rabanni, leader of the Islamic League of Afghanistan

Syema ©

Khalis's influence is strongest in his home province of Nangarhar and to a certain extent in the adjoining province of Paktia, where his forces are commanded by the renowned fighter, Jalaluddin Hakani, who serves as Khalis's second-in-command at Peshawar.

Khalis's headquarters in Peshawar has long suffered from disorganization, lack of professionalism, and an inability to master the political aspects of the insurgency. Recently, however, Khalis reportedly tightened up his organization considerably and extended the geographical scope of his operations. His group has smuggled more arms across the border than any other.

Jamiat-i-Islami-Afghanistan (Islamic League of Afghanistan). Professor Burhanuddin Rabanni's Jamiat-i-Islami is second only to Gulbuddin's Hizbi Islami in its adherence to fundamentalist rhetoric and political philosophy. The two groups share a desire to establish rule based on the Koran and the traditional precepts of Islamic law, although Rabanni would not oppose the return to power of the monarchy.

Rabanni, a former professor of Islamic law and theology at Kabul University, began his political activism while working on his doctorate in Islamic philosophy at Al-Azhar University in Cairo. While in Cairo in 1968 he helped establish a clandestine organization to oppose the rule of King Zahir Shah. After returning to Kabul, he worked to expand the new organization through active recruitment and was finally elected secretary general of the group in 1972. Rabanni fled to Pakistan in 1974, when President Mohammad Daoud ordered his arrest for antigovernment activity. There Rabbani founded the Jamiat in July 1978.

Rabanni's group, mainly non-Pushtun in composition, is probably strongest in his native province of Badakhshan. It has limited contacts in Tajik and Uzbek areas and some support among the Shia tribesmen of the Hazarajat region in central Afghanistan. The organization's military strength is thin even in these areas, and many insurgent bands who acknowledge Rabanni's leadership rarely receive either guidance or support from him.

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Rabanni's group, like Gulbuddin's, is organized into committees. But the Jamiat's committees are much less effective. Jamiat's "public relations" committee, recognizing the need for media exposure, regularly releases articles and photographs to the local and international press. [redacted]


Rabanni receives substantial outside backing from the Jamiat-i-Islami-Pakistan as well as from Arab Gulf states and Iranian sources. Rabanni has recently spent considerable time improving his strained relations with the Khomeini regime and soliciting aid from sympathetic Arab sources. [redacted]

In July 1981 the Jamiat suffered significant internal upheaval when the number-two man, Ahmad Shah Ahmadzai, withdrew from the party along with a number of others. The move seems to have been motivated by personality conflicts, not ideological differences. The Jamiat does not seem to have been seriously hurt organizationally and reportedly has even benefited from defections from Gulbuddin's Islamic Party. [redacted]

Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami (Revolutionary Islamic Movement). Maulvi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi's party, basically fundamentalist in ideology, began as an attempt to bring Gulbuddin's Hizbi Islami and Rabanni's Jamiat together in one organization and under one neutral leader. The coalition fell apart within a month. Nabi subsequently formed his own political party, the Harakat. [redacted]

The Harakat has been less specific about its ideology than other groups, and it appears to have only a rudimentary political structure. In the past, however, Nabi has been more willing to cooperate with secular groups than with other fundamentalist leaders. The support of large numbers of fighters throughout Afghanistan which Nabi claims seems to be based on the rural population's perception of him as a staunch protector of Afghan tradition and religious belief, rather than actual control of military operations [redacted]

Nabi, from the Khowst area in Paktia Province, was a member of the Afghan parliament and later went into voluntary exile during the regime of President Daoud.



Maulvi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi, leader of the Revolutionary Islamic Movement

Nabi is thought by many to carry the extremely prestigious blessings of the mullah of the Shor Bazaar as the chosen standard bearer for the holy war against the infidel. [redacted]

In early 1981 Nabi dealt his party a severe blow by briefly aligning himself with two moderate party leaders, Ahmad Gailani and Sibghatullah Mojadedi, precipitating a showdown with the extreme fundamentalist wing of his party led by Mansoor Nasrullah. Nasrullah and his followers were ejected from the *Harakat* after they attempted to remove Nabi from his party leadership. [redacted]

The Pakistani Government was finally forced to intervene and bring back a semblance of unity to the Harakat, with Nabi remaining as titular head of the party and Nasrullah brought back into the fold. The administrative efficacy of the Peshawar headquarters has been shattered, however, by the party's internal squabbling. Within Afghanistan the quarrel is reflected in partisan divisions between Harakat's fighters and a slow melting away of support to other

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parties. Seriously diminished in strength, Nabi's party may face further challenges as other fundamentalist leaders maneuver to undercut Nabi's position. [redacted]


Moderates

Mahaz-i-Milli-Islami (National Islamic Front). If impeccable Islamic credentials were the true mark of a powerful and effective insurgent leader, then Pir Syed Ahmad Gailani and his party would be a credible force in the insurgency. Gailani, 48 years old, is a descendant of Afghanistan's principal "saintly" family and traces his ancestry back to the Prophet Mohammad. He thus commands a considerable religious following from Sufi Muslims throughout Afghanistan. [redacted]

Gailani, a well-educated, well-dressed, well-traveled, extremely Westernized gentleman, is considered too ineffectual and too tainted by Western liberal ideas to count for much with the only constituency that matters in the insurgency—the fighting tribesmen. Furthermore, Mahaz officials are widely regarded in fundamentalist circles as effete intellectuals who harbor dangerous ideas about social reform and modernization. Reportedly the Mahaz is supporting two socialist/leftist groups, Sama and Afghan Mellat. His Western attitudes, however, have made Gailani appear much more attractive to many Westerners than other exile leaders. [redacted]

Gailani's scheme for a post-Communist Afghanistan includes the separation of church and state and a parliamentary form of government with the possible participation of the king as a figurehead. He also sees an Afghanistan led by intellectuals instead of religious figures and a constitution guaranteeing a multi-party system and a mixed economy with opportunity for eventual industrialization. Gailani's foreign policy would consist of nonalignment—friendly relations with the USSR, but a decided "tilt" toward the United States. [redacted]

The Mahaz maintains no permanent guerrilla forces in Afghanistan, although it occasionally sends raiding parties across the border and a few insurgent groups look primarily to Gailani for support. Its principal usefulness, and the reason many insurgent tribesmen



*Pir Syed Ahmad Gailani,
leader of the National
Islamic Front*

submit themselves to its nominal leadership, is that it serves as a conduit for externally supplied arms. [redacted]

Jabha-i-Najat-i-Milli Afghanistan (Afghan National Liberation Front). Pir Sibghatullah Mojadedi, like Gailani, is a member of a prominent Islamic family, claiming direct descent from Umar, the second Caliph of Islam. Family members have held important government posts and had considerable wealth, and the Hazrat of Shor Bazaar, one of the most prestigious and influential religious leaders in Afghanistan, is always a member of the family. Although Mojadedi may be the senior surviving member of his family—many have been jailed or executed by the Afghan Government—he has not claimed to be the current Hazrat. [redacted]

Both the family's religious prestige and—at least in the Kabul area—its past political and economic prominence give Mojadedi some potential for a sig-

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*Pir Sibghatullah Mojadedi,
leader of the Afghan
National Liberation Front*

nificant following in Afghanistan. His organization, however, appears to be the least important militarily of the main exile groups. His spokesmen in Peshawar make the usual grandiose claims of major victories, but these claims are at best exaggerations and sometimes take credit for the work of other insurgent leaders. [redacted]

The organization is primarily a family operation, with Mojadedi relying principally on his sons to carry out administrative and policy functions. [redacted]

[redacted]

Mojadedi maintains ties with Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Kuwait, where he often goes in search of financial aid. His feelings toward the West are generally friendly. [redacted]

Opposed to the strict Islamic fundamentalism of Gulbuddin, Khalis, and others, Mojadedi's vision of a post-Communist Afghanistan consists of an Islamic republic under the aegis of a restored monarchy. (Mojadedi is distantly related by marriage to the royal family.) [redacted]

Mojadedi is a scholar by profession, specializing in Koranic studies and Islamic politics. Although an open-minded moderate on most Islamic issues, he objects strongly to Western dress for women and the consumption of alcohol. A widely traveled man, Mojadedi speaks excellent English. [redacted]

Marxists-Socialists

Shola-i-Javaid (Eternal Flame)—Afghan Maoist Party. This party, long opposed to the pro-Soviet Communists, is generally more Maoist than the present Chinese leadership—one faction of the party still supports the Gang of Four. It claims the loyalty of only a few insurgent bands, however, and receives no appreciable support from Beijing. In August 1981 the party was decimated when the Karmal regime arrested up to a 1,000 of its members after a countrywide roundup. [redacted]

Suzamane Azadelbarche Mardo Me Afghanistan [SAMA](The Organization for the Liberation of Afghanistan). Probably the most effective nationalist political group after the six major Peshawar-based parties, SAMA has reportedly carried out numerous sabotage and assassination operations within the city of Kabul and is also said to be active in the neighboring province of Parvan to the north. [redacted]

A party with a disciplined cadre, SAMA is an offshoot of the pro-Beijing Marxist party, Shola-i-Javaid. SAMA, however, does not appear to have maintained its Chinese connections. [redacted]

SAMA's leader is Abdul Qayyum, a self-proclaimed "independent Marxist" who took over after the "disappearance" of its founder, Agha Majid. Majid is presumed to have been murdered at Pul-i-Charki Prison by the Afghan secret police.

Afghan Mellat (Afghan Nation). Afghan Mellat, led by Rahim Pushtunyar, is descended from the Afghan Social Democratic Party, a progressive socialist, ultranationalist, pro-Pushtunistan party that managed to win a few local elections in Kabul during the reign of King Zahir Shah. Largely a collection of intellectuals, Mellat is most effective in Kabul and has a few isolated bands fighting occasionally in Nangarhar and Paktiar provinces. In no place, however, is it an important factor in the resistance. [redacted]

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In Peshawar the group is seen as basically socialist with a commitment to the establishment of democratic institutions, separation of church and state, and the complete reform of Afghan "feudalism." [redacted]

Tribal-Based Regional Organizations, Proroyalist Groups, Religious Leaders

Shora-i-Itifaq Islami (United Council of Islamic Revolution)

The Hazara tribes of central Afghanistan were the first to unite into a regional grouping to defend their homeland from government and Soviet incursions. The Shora is a "cooperation" of 31 separate Hazara groups under the elected leadership of Syed Ali Behishti. The organization serves as the governing body of the Hazarajat with two vice chairmen and a secretariat subordinate to the chairman of the United Council (Behishti). The council is directed by 42 representatives from various districts who form an executive committee. The committee handles its affairs through five departments—law, public relations, military affairs, finance, and friendship affairs.

[redacted]

Not particularly well-armed, the Hazaras have not received any aid from the Peshawar parties, although they have been able to buy arms from them on a few occasions. Iran has provided the Hazaras with relatively small quantities of weapons, including American M-1 semiautomatic rifles and West German G-3 automatic rifles. The Iranians reportedly have also provided a few military advisers to teach the Hazaras—with whom the Iranians share the Shia brand of Islam—weapons handling and basic tactics. It is unlikely that the Khomeini regime, beset with numerous problems of its own, is providing a significant amount of aid. [redacted]

Regardless of their supply problems, the Hazaras have turned their mountain strongholds into a virtually autonomous region with Kabul in control of only about a half dozen isolated garrisons. The fact that very few refugees in either Pakistan or Iran are Hazaras testifies to their success. [redacted]

The Hazaras are also conducting nighttime raids into Kabul with a force called the "Kalibdad Freedom Fighters Corps," said to have 3,000 fighters based as close as 30 kilometers outside Kabul. [redacted]

The Hazara resistance to some extent may be an independence movement. The Hazaras resent their second-class status in a country in which all governments—including the present one—are dominated by Pushtuns. According to one Hazara leader, when the Soviets are driven out, the "real war" between the Pushtuns and Hazaras will begin. [redacted]

The Panjsheris

The Tajiks of the strategic Panjsher River valley have organized themselves into a self-reliant and formidable thorn in the side of the main Soviet supply line, playing havoc with military convoys on the main highway from Kabul northward to the USSR and posing a potential threat to Bagrami, one of the main Soviet airbases. As a result the Soviets periodically have sent powerful columns up the valley to eradicate resistance. None have penetrated farther than the end of the motorable road—about 30 kilometers—and some suffered heavy casualties. The Soviets reportedly at one point even tried to block the narrow entrance to the valley with a wall. [redacted]

The valley, now an autonomous entity in the hands of its people, runs its own public services, including a bus line. The Panjsheris have not been hindered by the lack of outside support. [redacted]

Konar-Nuristan Organization

The leader of this tribal-regional group, Dr. Syed Shamsuddin Majrooh, served as Minister of Justice during 1963-65 and briefly as Deputy Prime Minister in 1965. In spite of his governmental experience, Majrooh has become an outspoken advocate of the primacy of tribalism over political leadership as a driving force for the resistance movement. He believes that only a coalescence of tribal and regional groups within Afghanistan can forge a true national consensus. [redacted]

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There is very little real cooperation between the Nuristanis and the Pushtuns of the Konar Valley, traditional tribal enemies. The tribal confederation is more a theoretical formulation in the mind of Majrooh than a political or military reality. He, however, has the support of the well-respected insurgent field commander, Anwar Amin. The Nuristani resistance, like that of the Hazaras, is to some degree a reaction to Pushtun domination. [redacted]

Durrani Pushtun Tribes

Azizullah Wasifi, Minister of Agriculture under Daoud, heads a coalition of Durrani Pushtun tribes in southwestern Afghanistan from Farah Province to the Pakistani border east of the Qandahar. The group appears to be proroyalist. (The Afghan royal family comes from one of the Durrani tribes.) The collective military forces of the group are under the command of Ismatullah Achikzai, a former major in the Afghan Army. Achikzai reportedly operates three training and resupply camps in Pakistan. The degree to which he controls the resistance in this area is unclear; many insurgent bands do not recognize his authority. [redacted]

Central Tribal Confederation

This loose union of central Afghan tribes encompasses the areas of Qonduz, Samangan, Bamian, Ghazni, Lowgar, and Kabul Provinces. The central headquarters is in Khawaat, Chaki Vardak district. As with other tribal coalitions, a major reason for uniting regionally is frustration with the political maneuvering and intrigues of the Peshawar political parties. [redacted]

Islamic Union of Northern Afghan Provinces

This newly formed organization of Uzbeks living in the northern provinces appears to be very successful in raiding military convoys coming into Afghanistan from the Soviet Union. Numbering about 800 men, the group has received some aid in the form of four 12.7-mm DSHK anti-aircraft guns from Rabanni's Jamiat. [redacted]

Afridi Tribe

The Afridi tribe, long known for its warlike exploits against governmental authority in the area of the Khyber Pass, has now joined the fray under the leadership of Anwar Afridi, grandson of the famous tribal leader, Ajab Khan. The tribe's political sympathies are proroyalist. [redacted]

Quetta-Qandahar Group (National Islamic Union)

Led by Sardar Mohammad Akram, who is said to be related to the royal family, this group is headquartered in Quetta, Baluchistan. It conducts insurgent operations in Qandahar and Helmand Provinces. [redacted]

Sazman-i-Jihad-i-Akbar-i-Islami (Organization for the Great Islamic War)—Baluch Tribe

This organization, headed by Dost Vakeel Gorgaij Baluch, is intended primarily to draw attention and support to this ethnic minority in southwestern Afghanistan. The Baluch, residing in Qandahar, Helmand, Nimruz, and Farah Provinces, are weak militarily because of their small numbers, lack of supplies, and the open country in which they operate. They could, however, because of their kinship ties with Pakistani and Iranian Baluch communities, become vital conduits for external assistance to insurgents in western Afghanistan. [redacted]

Afghanistan Islamic National Revolution

This group is headed by Fazle Rahman Hussanini, called Pir Muqtadar Sahib by the faithful, an acknowledged Afghan religious leader. The Pir claims a following of a million fighters, mostly Pushtuns from Paktia Province and Pakistan's Waziristan agencies. The group receives no arms from the Peshawar groups but depends entirely on captured weapons. There is nothing to confirm the size of the Pir's group or to show that it constitutes a cohesive organization. Also, as a political/military leader the Pir leaves much to be desired. [redacted]

Unity Ulema—Organization of Afghan Mullahs

This group of Afghan religious leaders is applying considerable pressure for an alliance between the six major Peshawar political parties. Although we know very little about the group's membership or organization, it was the primary force behind the alliance formed in August 1981 of five of the six major Peshawar groups. The exclusion of the moderate Gailani party may mean that the group is controlled by the fundamentalists and designed to cut out those having any connections with the regimes of King Zahir Shah or Mohammad Daoud. [redacted]

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Dr. Mohammad Yusuf's Group

For some time a proroyalist faction has coalesced in Hamburg, West Germany around Dr. Mohammad Yusuf, who was Prime Minister during the period of 1963-65. Yusuf, a well-known and respected figure, and other intellectuals have attempted to lure King Zahir Shah and other members of the royal family out of exile in Italy and into participation in a government-in-exile. Under this plan the King would assume the role of President with Yusuf as Prime Minister and Prince Abdul Wali, the King's son-in-law, serving as Minister of Defense. The proposed organization is seen as a rallying point capable of drawing together the regional/tribal confederations and producing a viable government of national consensus. King Zahir Shah, the only man who could realize the plan, has so far declined to leave his refuge in Rome or lend his name to the enterprise. [redacted]

Loya Jirgah (Grand Assembly)

During times of crisis in the history of the Afghan people, the Loya Jirgah has been convened. Originally an assembly of tribal leaders, it fills roughly the same role in Afghanistan that a constitutional convention does in the United States. The last one that met in Afghanistan ratified the constitution presented by President Daoud and formally elected him President. [redacted]

Convened again in the early summer of 1980, the Loya Jirgah carried some promise of bringing together the disparate elements of the insurgency, both political and tribal. It soon became clear, however, that the fundamentalists, especially Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Islamic Party, would not tolerate a challenge to their privileged position in the insurgent movement. The lack of support from the fundamentalists and the inability to weld the moderates and the regional/tribal groups into a working union ensured that the Loya Jirgah would slowly fade into dissolution. There are occasional reports that either the Jirgah will reconvene or a new Jirgah will be held. [redacted]

Qaum-i-Itihad (Tribal Union)

This is nothing more than a catchall phrase expressing the intense frustration of the indigenous Afghan insurgent leadership with the inability or unwillingness of the Peshawar political parties to provide significant assistance to the fighters in the field.

Although an expression of the popular will, this effort is doomed without the support of a powerful patron, such as the King. [redacted]

Others

Several individuals and groups connected with the Afghan insurgency operate between legitimacy and fraud. Some appear to be well-meaning people who lack the resources and support to contribute effectively to the resistance; others limit themselves to propaganda in Western countries and do not claim a role in the insurgency. But some are simply confidence men. [redacted]

Sadudin Schpoon and Bahauddin Majrooh

Both professors, Schpoon and Majrooh (son of Dr. Syed Shamsuddin Majrooh of the Kunar-Nuristan Organization) are well-known Afghan intellectuals and articulate spokesmen for the insurgent cause both in the media and on occasion in the halls of the US Congress. They identify most closely with the political philosophy of Ahmad Gailani, although Schpoon has ties with Younus Khalis, and Majrooh has some links with Mojadedi. Reportedly they have formed an organization called AGEL (an acronym derived from its Pushtun name), which enlists expatriate "adventurers" to train recruits in guerrilla tactics and the use of weapons. Nothing much should be expected from this particular effort. [redacted]

Alliance of Former Afghan Generals (Group Still Unnamed)

[redacted] the following exiled Afghan generals are prepared to form a new Afghan resistance group:

- Alam Omar Olomi, former Deputy Chief of Staff and commander of forces in Paktia Province, is a leader of the Mohammad tribe in Helmand Province.
- Abdul Kariim Mustaghni, former Chief of Staff and Defense Minister, purports to have influence in Vardak Province.
- Mohammad Arif, a former Army general, has followers in Paktia Province.

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- Abdul Salam Malkyar, former Deputy Chief of Staff, has followers in Ghazni Province.
- Qamruddeen Nassri, former commander of the 7th Division stationed in Kabul, claims to have influence in Lowgar and Laghman Provinces as well as around Jalalabad.
- Mohammad Hussein Abassi, former chief of personnel affairs of the Ministry of Defense, has influence among the Hazara tribes.
- Mohammad Akram, former commander of forces in Nahrin Province, has a number of followers in Baghlan Province, including the area around the Chinese border. [redacted]

Itihad-i-Mujahiddin-i-Islami Afghanistan (Union of Islamic Freedom Fighters of Afghanistan)
The Itihad is a Hazara insurgent group founded in Quetta two years ago and led by Haji Rasul. The group's representatives complain about the Pakistani Government's aid to the Pushtun-dominated political parties in Peshawar to the exclusion of non-Pushtuns like the Hazaras. The group also claims that it receives no aid from Iran and is opposed to the Khomeini brand of Islamic fundamentalism. [redacted]

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This Hazara group appears to be of little importance when compared to the much larger and effective Shora-i-Itifaq led by Syed Ali Behishti. [redacted]

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The group claims to be opposed to the corruption and ineffectiveness of the six major Peshawar political parties and to have no connection with royalist factions. The group's claims to widespread tribal influence within Afghanistan are suspect, however, because most of the generals have been absent from tribal areas so long that ties with tribesmen have eroded. Furthermore, many tribesmen are deeply suspicious of professional military men. [redacted]

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Col. Mohammad Zarif Qader

Living in Frankfurt, West Germany, former Col. Mohammad Zarif Qader represents himself as the chief of the major Peshawar insurgent groups, with a strength of 3 million followers and 100,000 fighters. There is nothing to substantiate the Colonel's grandiose claims. [redacted]

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Table 2

The Afghan Resistance

Group	Ethnic Composition	Areas of Major Strength	Comparative Military Strength	Political Orientation	Religious Orientation	Foreign Support
Hizbi Islami (Islamic Party-Hekmatyar)	Predominantly Pushtun	Paktia, Nangarhar	Strong in limited area	Extreme fundamentalist, anti-monarchist, theocratic	Extreme Islamic fundamentalist	Libya, Iran, Muslim Brotherhood
Hizbi Islami (Islamic Party-Khalis)	Predominantly Pushtun	Nangarhar, Paktia	Strong in limited area	Theocratic	Extreme Islamic fundamentalist	Undetermined
Jamiat-i-Islami (Islamic League of Afghanistan)	Mainly non-Pushtun	Badakhshan with limited contacts in Tajik and Uzbek areas	Thin	Not opposed to return of king	Moderate fundamentalist	Arab Gulf states, Iranian sources
Harakat-i-Iqilab (Revolutionary Islamic Movement)	Mainly Pushtun	Thinly spread	Thin	Willing to cooperate with secular groups	Basically fundamentalist	Undetermined
Mahaz-i-Milli (National Islamic Front)	Mainly Pushtun	NA	NA	Believes in secularized, Western-oriented democratic institutions	Conservative Islamic	Undetermined
Jabha-i-Najat-i-Milli (Afghan National Liberation Front)	Mainly Pushtun	NA	NA	Islamic Republic, under restored monarchy	Conservative Islamic	Saudi Arabia, Libya, Kuwait
Shola-i-Jauaid (Eternal Flame)	Various	Thinly spread	NA	Maoist, opposed to pro-Soviet Communists	Secular	No appreciable support from Beijing
SAMA	Various	Kabul	Effective terrorist infrastructure within Kabul	Originally pro-Chinese Marxist, now more apolitical	Secular	NA
Afghan Mellat	Various	Kabul	NA	Socialist, nationalist, reformist	Secular	Undetermined
Shora-i-Itifaq (United Council of Islamic Revolution)	Hazara	Bamian, Ghowr, Oruzgun	Moderate	Primarily concerned with local affairs, antiexile, anti-Pushtun	Shiite, but basically secular	Iran
Panjsheris	Tajik	Panjsher River Valley	Strong in limited area	Concerned with local affairs	Basically secular	NA
Konar-Nuristan Organization	Pushtuns of Konar Valley, Nuristanis	Konar Valley, Nuristan	Thin	Antiexile, pro-tribal union	Basically secular	NA
Durrani-Pushtun Tribes	Pushtun (Durrani Tribe)	Southwestern Afghanistan	Moderate	Proroyalist	Secular	NA
Central Tribal Confederation	Mainly Pushtun	Qonduz, Samangan, Bamian, Ghazni, Lowgar, Kabul	Thin	Antiexile	Secular	NA

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Table 2 (continued)

Group	Ethnic Composition	Areas of Major Strength	Comparative Military Strength	Political Orientation	Religious Orientation	Foreign Support
Islamic Union of Northern Afghan Provinces	Uzbek	Northern provinces	Strong in limited area	Locally oriented group	Secular	NA
Afridi Tribe	Pushtun	Area of Khyber Pass	Moderate	Proroyalist	Secular	NA
Quetta-Qandahar Group (National Islamic Union)	Pushtun	Qandahar, Helmand	Thin	Proroyalist	Secular	Undetermined
Organization for the Great Islamic War	Baluch	Qandahar, Helmand, Nimruz, Farah	NA	Pro-Baluchi Nationalist	Secular	Some from Pakistani and Iranian Baluch
Afghanistan Islamic National Revolution	Pushtun	Paktia and Pakistan's Waziristan Agencies	NA	Undetermined	Religiously inspired	NA
Unity Ulema	Various	Peshawar based, no strength in field	Nonmilitary	Prounity	Composed of Afghan religious leaders	Undetermined
Dr. Mohammad Yusuf	Various	No strength in Afghanistan	Nonmilitary	Proroyalist	Secular	Undetermined
Loya Jirgah	Various	Nonmilitary	Nonmilitary	Traditional Afghan conclave	Secular	Undetermined
Qaum-i-Itihad (Tribal Union)	Various	Nonmilitary	Nonmilitary	Antiexile movement	Secular	NA
Schpoon and Majrooh (AGEL)	Undetermined	Undetermined	NA	Prowestern, Liberal	Secular	Undetermined
Alliance of Afghan Generals	Various	NA	NA	Antiexile	Secular	Undetermined
Colonel Mohammad (Zarif Qadar)	Undetermined	NA	NA	Undetermined	Secular	NA
Union of Islamic Freedom Fighters of Afghanistan	Hazara	Undetermined	NA	Antiexile, Anti-Pushtun	Shiite, but mostly secular	No aid from Iran

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