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The Pakistan People's Party: Search for Power

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An Intelligence Assessment

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The Pakistan People's Party: Search for Power

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An Intelligence Assessment

*Information available as of 8 September 1981
has been used in the preparation of this report.*

The author of this assessment is [Redacted] of the
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
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**The Pakistan People's Party:
Search for Power**

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Key Judgments

The Pakistan People's Party—which ruled Pakistan from 1971 until it was overthrown by General Zia-ul-Haq in 1977—is the strongest opposition political force in Pakistan. The broad constituency originally put together by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1970 is basically intact and would probably lead to a PPP victory if a national election were held today. But no such elections are in prospect, and the position of the party is deteriorating.

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Deep divisions between PPP moderates and leftwingers have intensified since the hijacking of a Pakistani airliner by pro-Bhutto terrorists last March and are threatening the unity of the party. This situation gives President Zia an opportunity to split the party and broaden the base of his regime by negotiating a political settlement with moderates in the PPP. Since last fall, however, Zia has shown no interest in such negotiations.

PPP moderates are ready to deal with Zia and want the government to hold national elections on a nonparty basis. A civilian government with PPP participation would have greater legitimacy than the present Martial Law Administration and would not alter Pakistan's present foreign policy. PPP moderates see the Soviets in Afghanistan as a long-term threat and support Zia's efforts to strengthen Pakistan by expanding ties with the United States.

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The PPP's left wing hopes to scuttle any negotiations between Zia and the moderates, but Bhutto's wife and daughter—who agree with the left on this issue—may no longer have the strength to stop the moderates. The PPP left believes it can take power through a revolutionary mass movement. It hopes to orchestrate such a movement using discontented students, interest groups, civil servants, and military officers. The more extremist groups in the PPP and on its fringes—including the terrorist group Al-Zulfikar—believe the interplay of regional tensions and instability inside Pakistan will lead to outside intervention by the Soviets and possibly the Indians and to the creation of a radical PPP regime in Islamabad.

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A left PPP regime—whether put in power by a mass movement, by some form of outside intervention, or through a combination of these—would quickly reverse Islamabad's policies on Afghanistan and ties with the United States and would effect an accommodation with the Soviets.

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Neither the PPP nor its factions has much chance, however, of dominating the Government of Pakistan in the near term. Internal divisions, ineffective leadership, and the government's ability to break up party initiatives have kept the PPP from transforming its popular support into political power. The party also lacks an issue around which to galvanize opposition to Zia and faces a public that believes domestic conflict now would only benefit Pakistan's enemies: the Soviets and the Indians. Moreover, the airliner hijacking last March has hurt the PPP's popularity and undermined the public standing of its top leaders: Bhutto's widow and his daughter.

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**The Pakistan People's Party:
Search for Power**

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The Pakistan People's Party is the most powerful opposition political force in Pakistan. The broad constituency originally put together by the party's founder, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, is basically intact, but lacks a leader who can dominate it, invigorate it, and direct its energies toward the recapture of power. The party's populist program—"bread, clothing, and shelter"—still holds the imagination of the rural and urban poor, the groups that form the base of the PPP's electoral strength.

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Bhutto—who was executed in 1979—is for many a heroic and martyred leader who by his death absolved the PPP of its sins. His crimes are of little concern to rural folk, who are used to seeing their tribal and clan leaders eliminate people who get in their way. They still believe Bhutto understood them, spoke for them, and made them feel for the first time a part of Pakistan's polity. They acknowledge that the PPP failed to live up to all its promises, but argue that Bhutto made a start at social reform and gave urban workers, rural tenants, and small farmers unprecedented leverage with the privileged groups that in the past had controlled their lives. Much of the loyalty they gave Bhutto has been transferred to his widow, Nusrat, and his daughter, Benazir.

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The PPP would emerge the strongest party if an election were held today. President Zia probably postponed the election he promised in 1979 because he feared the PPP would win. Its greatest strength, however, is among the rural poor, who are too dispersed and powerless to exert pressure except at the polls. The party lacks the organization necessary to mount by itself a successful movement in the streets against the Zia regime, although it is capable of taking advantage of such a movement if started by others. The PPP suffers from poor leadership, sharp internal divisions, and the absence of an exploitable issue. The martial law regime has consistently outmaneuvered the PPP and spoiled its plans for agitation by arrests and intimidation.

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The hijacking of a Pakistani airliner to Kabul last March and the murder of a Pakistani diplomat on board by terrorists owing allegiance to "Bhuttoism" and directed by Bhutto's oldest son, Mir Murtaza, has clouded the long-term future of the party. The incident has severely damaged the political credibility of the Bhutto family—the incontestable repository of the Bhutto legacy and perhaps the sole force holding the party's factions together. The widespread belief that the Bhuttos are committed to the "politics of revenge" and would deal with the country's enemies to gain their ends could eliminate the Bhuttos as acceptable national leaders for the foreseeable future.

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Moderates in the PPP want the Bhutto women to step down from the party leadership and leave Pakistan. They are prepared—even at the risk of splitting the party—to negotiate a political settlement with Zia that would lead to a civilian government elected on a nonparty basis. They argue that Zia needs to broaden the base of his regime and gain legitimacy for it by demonstrating public support. They see Pakistan's future endangered by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and strongly support Zia's efforts to gain US assistance. The moderates believe the party's left wing and the Bhutto women—by insisting that Pakistan accommodate to Soviet aims in Afghanistan—are playing into the hands of the country's enemies who seek permanent leverage over Pakistan.

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Search for Power

The PPP has always been more a coalition of factions, interest groups, and patron-client networks than a tightly organized political party. Its two major wings—moderates and leftists—represent discrete social groups that have clashing views about the interests that should be served by a PPP government. Debate within the party is intense because the interests of powerful party constituencies will be affected by the way in which the PPP returns to power. A

¹ Appendix A discusses the background and development of the PPP.

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PPP Factions and Related Groups

Group	Leader(s)	Strength	Remarks
Moderate Groups			
Sindhi landlords	Ghulam Mustapha Jatoi; Makhdum of Hala	strong	Mainline landlord group in Sind and strongest landlord group in the PPP. Base is mostly in Sind interior east of the Indus. Has strong relations with other elite groups both inside and outside the PPP.
Karachi-Larkana group	Mumtaz Ali Bhutto; Abdul Hafiz Pirzada	moderate	Represents landlords west of the Indus and has support among Karachi professional groups. Both leaders have poor personal relations with the Bhutto women. Mumtaz is Zulfikar's cousin.
Punjab centrists	Malik Meraj Khalid; Sheikh Rafiq Ahmad; Anwar Aziz Chaudhry	moderate	Represents urban professionals and interest groups. Not a very cohesive faction and includes some leftist elements. Opposes US tie.
Punjab landlords	Ghulam Mustapha Khar; Hamid Raza Gilani; Anwar Ali Noon	declining	Khar is in exile in London, and many formerly pro-PPP landlords in Punjab have left the party. Group is sensitive to whichever direction political winds are blowing and always attempts to join the winner.
NWFP group	Aftab Sherpao	moderate	Has support among urban professional and student groups. PPP influence probably has been growing in Frontier Province, although most tribes follow traditional—and conservative—leaders.
Nonpoliticians	Gen. (Rtd) Tikka Khan; Aziz Ahmad; Major Gen. (Ret.) N. Babar	weak	Former military and civil officers that support the party. Have little popular following or personal support in the PPP. Most important function is to serve as channel of communication to potentially dissident army officers and civil servants.
People's Progressive Party	Maulana Kausar Niazi	weak	Founded—possibly with Zia's initial encouragement—by PPP leaders to attract government support and gain a role in the cabinet. Rejected by both Zia and PPP leadership, group has little strength.
Pakistan Musawat Party	Haneef Ramay	weak	The old "Islamic Socialism" group of the PPP. Ramay, a PPP Chief Minister of Punjab, broke with Bhutto in 1975. Has some localized support in and around Lahore.
Leftist/Extremist Groups			
Punjab leftwing group	Sheikh Rashid; Ghulam Hussain	strong	Substantial support in Punjab heartland and rich agricultural districts among rural tenants, small farmers, students, and workers. Rashid has Begum Bhutto's confidence as the only major Punjabi leader to consistently remain loyal to Bhutto.
Pakistan Student's Federation	?	moderate	PSF gained a string of student election victories in Sind, the NWFP, and parts of Punjab during the winter of 1980-81, often defeating entrenched Islamic student groups. Has moderates as well as leftists, but latter tend to dominate at present.
Al-Zulfikar	Murtaza Bhutto	weak	Terrorist underground loyal to memory of former Prime Minister. Capable of occasional dramatic acts of terrorism.
Pakistan Liberation Movement	Brig. (Ret.) Usman Khalid; Lt. Col. Ilyas Shamim	weak	Headquartered in London and financed by Libya, group represents pro-PPP exiles and expatriates.

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PPP Factions and Related Groups (continued)

Group	Leader(s)	Strength	Remarks
National Liberation Front	Mairaj Mohammed Khan	moderate	Strong support in Karachi labor and student circles. Mairaj fell out with Bhutto in 1973, but since 1979 he has become a trusted adviser to Begum Bhutto.
Jiya Sind Student's Front	?	weak but growing	Sindhi separatists—mostly students—who support Bhutto and blame Punjab for his death. Anti-Punjab sentiment has been growing in Sind.
National Progressive Party	Azaz Nasir; Afrasiab Khattak	weak	The orthodox core of the old pro-Soviet Communist Party of Pakistan.
Kisan Mazdoor Party (Peasants-Workers)	Afzal Bangash; Major Ishaq	weak	Formerly a pro-China party, but is now shifting to a pro-Moscow stand. Bangash is in Kabul. KMP has support in parts of the NWFP and currently is aligned with the PPP and is a member of the MRD.
Awami Jamhoori Party (People's Democratic)	Khurshid Hasan Meer; Taj Khan Langah	weak	Ex-PPP left socialists, the group has some support in Punjab. AJP probably has some links with Al-Zulfikar, but is rejected as a PPP ally by Nusrat Bhutto, who believes it betrayed her husband.

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peaceful transition—through elections or a deal with Zia—would give established interests command of a PPP government, but a violent transition would markedly strengthen the left, which thrives on confrontational politics.

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The debate over the best route to power marks both conflicts over domestic policy and arguments about foreign policy. The distinctions between PPP groups and the strategies they promote are the key to understanding the dynamics of the PPP.

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The Moderates

The moderates would prefer to negotiate with the Zia regime for a share in power and a promise of future elections. If caught between pressures from below and an intractable regime, however, the moderates could support a mass movement strategy. They would first look for a credible guarantee from the Army that Zia would be quickly removed if serious unrest broke out and that the next general would agree to their demands.

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The moderates are uncomfortable with Nusrat Bhutto's refusal to bargain with the regime, have established interests to protect, and are eager for the benefits of cooperation with the government. They agree that the Bhutto land and industrial reforms went too far and support more cautious social policies. They are deeply disturbed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the weakness of their own country. They support a strengthened relationship with the United States and welcome the provision of sophisticated weapons.

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But the moderates believe Zia is dangerously isolated inside Pakistan and seek US help in convincing the regime to broaden its political base. They want Zia to include moderates from the PPP and other centrist parties in his cabinet, end martial law, schedule elections, and restore judicial independence. They believe that external threats make open confrontation with the government both dangerous and unpatriotic. They warn that a mass movement would only benefit the political extremes in the country and fear they could be swept away along with Zia.

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The moderates are not a monolithic group, but a collection of factions and interest groups. A fairly strong figure—such as Ghulam Mustapha Jatoi, a former Federal Minister under Bhutto—could, however, unite PPP moderates behind a deal with Zia for an orderly transition to elective government. Among the concessions the moderates would require would be the appointment of an interim prime minister with the authority to select his own cabinet and appoint the provincial chief ministers. The Zia regime sounded out Jatoi along these lines in August 1980, but a deal failed because of opposition from both military hard-liners and PPP Chairman Nusrat Bhutto. [redacted]

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In the aftermath of the PIA hijacking last March by pro-Bhutto terrorists, the PPP moderates are again indicating an interest in a deal with Zia. They believe the involvement of Bhutto's sons with the hijackers precludes Bhutto family members from future national leadership. They want the Bhutto women to step down from their party positions and would be relieved if Zia released the women from jail and sent them out of the country. With the Bhutto women out of the way, the moderates believe they could then reach an understanding with Zia. [redacted]

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The Leftists

The leftists in the party favor confrontation with the Zia regime. They believe an increasing cycle of violence and repression will undermine the regime and consolidate the opposition. They look forward to the coalescing of a broad opposition movement that can overthrow Zia, much as President Ayub Khan was toppled by the PPP and its allies in 1969. The more committed leftists, however, insist that this time the movement should go beyond a change of government to destroy the postcolonial establishment—the Army and civil service—and create a revolutionary army to protect the movement's gains. Leftist influence has been on the rise in the PPP—particularly since the execution of Bhutto and the postponement of the 1979 elections—as more party activists have become convinced that Zia can be toppled only through violent confrontation. [redacted]

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The Bhutto women are somewhat responsive to leftist advice. Nusrat moved the party to the left in 1978 and 1979 because she believed that only the left could save

her husband. More recently, Nusrat and her daughter have said that other left parties will drain away PPP supporters and activists if the party appears too passive. Like the leftists, they believe Pakistan cannot defend itself against the Soviets or Indians. They hold that the country would be better served by scaling down its military establishment, accommodating with its neighbors, and using its resources for economic development. [redacted] 25X1

The two leftists who have the most influence with Nusrat Bhutto are Sheikh Mohammed Rashid, a leader of the Punjab PPP left wing, and Mairaj Mohammed Khan, a Karachi-based leader with a following in labor and student circles. [redacted] 25X1

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Both leaders say they are “independent Marxists,” though Rashid has the stronger claim to this status. Leader of the Punjab PPP left wing since the beginning, Rashid has Nusrat Bhutto's confidence as the only prominent left leader to remain consistently loyal to Bhutto. He probably has indirect links to the Al-Zulfikar group through Punjabi radicals formerly associated with his faction, but his real source of strength is the Punjab PPP organization, with its roots among rural tenants, urban workers, professionals, and students. Sheikh Rashid has long regarded himself as a peasant leader and admires Asian brands of Communism. He opposes the United States, but also has eschewed overtures by Soviet diplomats and their representatives. [redacted] 25X1

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After a notable career as a radical student activist, Mairaj rose to prominence during the early PPP years. Bhutto once singled him out—along with Ghulam Mustapha Khar—as his political heir. Mairaj left the PPP in 1973 after Bhutto had ruthlessly put down labor unrest in Karachi and was jailed a year later for leading a union demonstration. After the fall of Bhutto, he organized the National Liberation Front and patched up his differences with the Bhutto family. In mid-1979 he organized a “working alliance” between the PPP, his own NLF, the Kisan-Mazdoor (Worker-Peasant) Party, and the National Progressive Party—the overt manifestation of the underground Communist Party of Pakistan. At the time, encouraged by Soviet diplomats, these small leftist parties

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PPP Chairman Nusrat Bhutto with daughter Benazir.



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wanted to take advantage of the steadily growing preelection popularity of the PPP. They have remained associated with the PPP since the postponement of the elections and have been urging the party to take to the streets against the Zia regime.

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Benazir shows flashes of her father's brilliance and has an effective speaking style. She

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has shown a capacity to learn from mistakes.

Some of this criticism is a result of frustration with factors beyond the control of the party leadership.

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Both women have shown dedication and courage.

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Although neither has grown to dominate the political scene like Bhutto in his heyday, either or both could be catapulted into a position of national leadership if the political tide turns against Zia.

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The Party Leadership

Both major groupings are represented in the party leadership, but the balance is held by the Bhutto women. Although party decisionmaking is collegial, Nusrat and Benazir have the last word. No other party leader has their countrywide electoral appeal or so commands the loyalty of the party faithful. Thus far they have been able to veto any effort to negotiate with the Martial Law Administration.

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Toward Confrontation: Growth of the PPP Left

The influence of the left wing has been growing in the PPP since the elections were postponed in October 1979. The party leadership was initially reluctant to pursue an openly confrontational policy inside Pakistan but reportedly endorsed the anti-Zia activities of PPP exiles in the UK, the Middle East, and Afghanistan. This included the activities of the Bhutto sons—Murtaza and Shahnawaz—who moved the headquarters of their group—the People's Liberation Army (PLA)—to Kabul in mid-1980.

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The Bhuttos tend to agree with the moderates on domestic policy and say they would follow more conservative social policies than the late Prime Minister. On foreign policy, however, they side with party leftists and argue that Pakistan must find an accommodation both with Moscow and New Delhi. Like the left, they believe the political power of the Army must be broken. They want the Army scaled down to the point where it offers no threat to its neighbors and absorbs fewer national resources.

The moderates had initially gone along with the endorsement of exile activities—probably because

Some PPP leaders have not been satisfied with the leadership of the Bhutto women.

² See appendix B on Al-Zulfikar

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they believed they could use any significant results to gain leverage with Zia. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, however, the moderates became concerned that the Bhutto sons would come under Soviet influence. They were also alarmed that Afghan, Libyan, and Syrian patronage of the PLO would enable it to exceed its limited mandate and attempt a violent confrontation with the martial law authorities. They were strongly critical of PPP exiles who went to New Delhi seeking support, and they objected to Nusrat's announcement in May 1980 that a PPP government would recognize the Babrak regime in Kabul and would stop Afghan insurgents from using Pakistani territory. Some moderates believe Nusrat and the PPP left wing would welcome Soviet-aided instability in Pakistan because the country would then have to turn to them as the only alternative to a Soviet puppet regime in Islamabad [redacted]

background, protect its activists from arrest, and wait for the tide of public opinion before emerging to lead the opposition movement. [redacted]

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It is doubtful Nusrat would have endorsed the leftist plan without acquiescence of the moderates. Frustrated by failure of their approaches to Zia, the moderates probably agreed because they feared the loss of influence with the party activists and believed the military would have to turn to them if the leftist effort appeared to be succeeding. Both major groups in the party agreed it was essential to isolate Zia from other political parties to prevent the movement from being undercut by a restoration of the anti-Bhutto alliance. Convinced the PPP could dominate any opposition coalition, they urged the Bhutto women to put aside their demands that the other parties apologize for their roles in the overthrow of Bhutto and agree to restore the precoup status quo [redacted]

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Under pressure from PPP moderates, and aware that her public support for Babrak had been widely criticized in Pakistan, Nusrat backed away from her statement, but continued to argue [redacted]

The Movement for the Restoration of Democracy
Protracted negotiations between various political parties resulted in the formation of the nine-party Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) on 6 February 1981. Composed of centrist and leftist parties—but clearly dominated by the PPP—the MRD called for the immediate end of martial law, the resignation of Zia, and elections within three months.³ [redacted]

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that Pakistan would eventually have to accommodate its policies to the Soviet role in Afghanistan. She also let it be known she did not approve of her sons' activities and sent messages urging them to leave Kabul. [redacted]

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Although links between leftwing leaders and PPP exiles probably exist, the main leftist leaders recognize that if the Zia regime is to be overthrown, it will have to be from within Pakistan. Encouraged by sweeping victories by PPP student groups in university elections throughout Pakistan in late 1980, the left wing won Nusrat Bhutto's approval to broaden the party's support among leftist activists in the National Liberation Front and Kisan Mazdoor Party and among strongly disaffected interest groups like lawyers, journalists, students, and industrial workers. The effort—headed by Sheikh Rashid—sought to trigger a violent response by the martial law regime by using these groups to take control of the streets. Government repression, they believed, would help unify the opposition. The PPP would stay in the

Encouraged by the emergence of an opposition front and by protests and strikes by lawyers and doctors, PPP student groups—which had maintained a campaign of low-level unrest since the previous fall—moved to defy the government openly. On 10 February 1981 students in Multan protesting an increase in bus fares and the new Universities Ordinance clashed with police. Student protests quickly spread to the country's major cities—Karachi, Lahore, Rawalpindi, Hyderabad, Faisalabad, Quetta, Peshawar—and to

³ Parties signing the MRD joint declaration were: the PPP, the Pakistan Democratic Party, the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal, the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam, the Muslim League (Khairuddin Group), the NLF, the National Democratic Party, the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, and the Pakistan Kisan Mazdoor Party. The JUI shortly thereafter renounced its participation in the MRD. [redacted]

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many district and industrial towns. The most violent incident occurred on 21 February in Peshawar when students raided the university armory and fought pitched battles in the streets with police. [redacted]

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The February student movement was the most serious challenge Zia has faced. Its rapid spread revealed serious discontent in all four of the country's provinces. Nervous civil servants began to make quiet approaches to the PPP. [redacted]

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The movement failed to gain support from crucial social groups—the clergy, the bazaaris, industrial workers, and the urban lower middle class—although these groups might have joined had the movement gained stronger momentum. The government, however, was able to break up the movement by exercising restraint with violent protesters, closing campuses, dispersing students, detaining party leaders in their rural villages, and jailing party activists. The MRD sought to identify itself with the students, but found it was not prepared to lead a movement. Party organizations were weak and lacked lower echelon leaders capable of taking over when the top leaders were detained. [redacted]

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The PIA Hijacking

The hijacking of a Pakistani airliner to Kabul and Damascus on 2 March was a serious blow to the already faltering movement. Perpetrated by members of Murtaza Bhutto's Kabul-based Pakistan Liberation Army—now renamed Al-Zulfikar—the drawn-out incident and killing of a Pakistani diplomat on board the aircraft shocked public opinion in Pakistan. The connection between the Bhutto sons and the hijackers reminded Pakistanis that things had not been so rosy under the Bhutto regime. [redacted]

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[redacted] Support for the hijackers by the Kabul regime—inevitably acting with the knowledge of its Soviet advisers—while the plane was in Kabul refocused Pakistani fears of the Soviet threat. [redacted]

Al-Zulfikar's terrorism and its perceived Soviet links suggested to many that the Bhuttos were consumed by the "politics of revenge," that they viewed Pakistan as their own feudal preserve, and that they had no wider political program for the country. These perceptions severely damaged the public standing of the Bhutto family and—temporarily at least—diminished the authority of the Bhutto women and the left wing within the party's councils. [redacted] 25X1

Charges by other opposition parties that the PPP left wing was in league with Al-Zulfikar and the PPP was using the MRD for its own ends nearly wrecked the opposition alliance. MRD leaders noted that Nusrat Bhutto had not seen fit to condemn the hijacking and murder and demanded the PPP issue a statement denying any involvement in the incident. PPP moderates belatedly issued a tepid condemnation—it blamed the government for creating conditions that lead to such incidents—in an effort to limit the damage to the PPP's standing with the public and within the MRD. The faltering MRD canceled demonstrations it had scheduled for Pakistan Day on 23 March. Apart from several meetings to remind Zia and the public of its continued existence, the MRD has been quiescent. [redacted] 25X1

The incident—and President Zia's handling of it—markedly strengthened public backing for Zia and consolidated his position in the Army. Officers who had been wavering in their support pulled strongly behind Zia as the country's only political alternative. His position restored, Zia moved strongly against the opposition, jailing its leaders—including the Bhutto women—and expanding the authority of the Martial Law Administration by ending the historic independence of the judiciary. [redacted] 25X1

External Support for the Party

A socialist party, the PPP has always looked to the nonaligned and radical Muslim blocs for support and has identified with the "Nasserite" tradition in the Islamic world. Under Bhutto the party adopted a 25X6 decidedly pro-China stand and promoted the loosening of ties to the United States. In recent years, however, Beijing's strong support for Zia has disillusioned the party's leftwing activists and led to the emergence of a pro-Moscow lobby in the party. [redacted]

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Murtaza Bhutto with brother
Shahnawaz. [redacted]




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The Soviets unquestionably preferred Prime Minister Bhutto to his predecessors, but they showed no interest in supporting the PPP against its domestic opponents until after the Afghan revolution in 1977.

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Pakistani publications through journalistic contacts,



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Since the invasion of Afghanistan, Moscow probably has come to regard a PPP victory over Zia as its best hope for a reversal of Pakistan's policy on Afghanistan. Soviet propaganda and covert activities in Pakistan probably are directed at strengthening the PPP and consolidating the PPP-dominated Movement for the Restoration of Democracy. Islamabad is mindful of the threat and has attempted to neutralize it by banning Soviet propaganda publications, limiting diplomatic travel, and ordering a reduction in the number of Soviet diplomats in the country. Nevertheless, Soviet propaganda continues to find its way into

Both Moscow and Kabul were embarrassed by international criticism of their actions during the hijacking. Moreover, the incident only strengthened Zia and severely set back the growing

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Al-Zulfikar guerrillas at training camp. [redacted]

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opposition movement. [redacted]

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Evidence of Indian backing for the PPP is harder to uncover. Prime Minister Gandhi would undoubtedly prefer to deal with a PPP government in Islamabad, but realizes that overt Indian support would be counterproductive.

PPP attitudes toward the US continue to suffer from former Prime Minister Bhutto's accusations of US complicity in his overthrow. These charges are widely believed by PPP activists, who also hold the US responsible for using its assistance to strengthen Zia. Although the Bhutto women have sought to assure US diplomats that they do not blame the United States for Bhutto's fate, they harbor deep suspicions of US actions and motives, past and present. Like the moderates in the party, they want US help in pressing Zia to hold elections. Unlike the moderates, however, they do not want closer US-Pakistan ties. This, they believe, would make it impossible for Pakistan to reach any understanding with the Soviets and Indians.

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[redacted] 25X1 [redacted]

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[redacted] New Delhi recently has forbidden transit through its territory to the hijackers but has become more open about allowing Murtaza Bhutto to stop off in India on his way to and from Kabul. For his part, Murtaza recently expressed his group's "great respect for Indira Gandhi, who has taken up the matter of the people of Pakistan."

Prospects

The PPP is a party in crisis. The PIA hijacking by pro-Bhutto terrorists and the association between Bhutto family members and Pakistan's enemies have severely damaged the credibility of the party inside Pakistan and make less possible its accession to power by mass movement politics in the near term. [redacted]

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[redacted] 25X1

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Internal stresses in the party are bound to intensify as the major factional groupings polarize around basically conflicting demands. The leaders of the moderate landlord wing will step up their pressure for a deal with Zia to return the country to some form of civilian rule. They have lost confidence in the leadership of the Bhutto women but have been reluctant to approach the government as long as the Bhutto women remain in prison. Now that Nusrat Bhutto has been released, however, the moderates will probably insist on her agreement to negotiations with the Zia regime or face a major split in the PPP. One prominent leader—Abdul Hafiz Pirzada, a Federal Minister throughout the Bhutto years and the PPP's top parliamentarian—has already begun to act independently of the Bhutto women in an attempt to pull together an all-party coalition of moderates from the minority provinces. [redacted]

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The mainline PPP left wing will find itself under increasing pressure from pro-Soviet activists, Al-Zulfikar extremists, and Sindhi separatists to support covert activities and terrorist operations. These groupings already regard the moderates as betrayers of Bhutto and his legacy and will feel less restrained in attacking them if they break with the Bhutto women. The February student movement—particularly its rapid spread—was sufficiently successful that the left wing will be looking for ways to restart it this fall and winter. [redacted]

25X1

The Bhutto women will be hard pressed to maintain party unity in the face of these pressures. They could attempt to avoid making decisions, hoping both to hold off a party crisis and convince the government they intend to lie low. They might also find it convenient to travel or live abroad for awhile—if Islamabad permitted their departure. In the recent conviction in absentia of Murtaza Bhutto for treason, the government now has a powerful legal tool to use against the Bhutto women. It could confiscate the Bhutto residences in Karachi and Larkana and a substantial portion of the family's agricultural land—all inherited by Murtaza. These actions would make life much more uncomfortable for the women. [redacted]

25X1

To an important degree the direction the PPP takes will be determined by Zia's willingness to negotiate with the PPP moderates. The latter want Zia to declare that all future political activity in Pakistan will be on a nonparty basis. This would enable them to function independently of the PPP and seek a share in power based on their local strength. In such a format, the moderates are prepared to help form a new national coalition. They do not trust Zia, who has gone back on his promises in the past, and would require that Zia demonstrate his good intentions by withdrawing martial law, restoring judicial independence, and setting a date for nonparty elections. [redacted]

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25X1

If Zia spurns the moderates, the party probably will maintain a facade of unity. The moderates will come under increasing pressure to actively oppose the MLA or suffer an erosion of their support. They will attempt to avoid a confrontation while Zia is strong, but will back a movement if Zia—through an economic downturn or some miscalculation—becomes politically vulnerable. Their hope will be to negotiate a share in power, and their participation in mass movement politics will be a means of gaining leverage with Zia or whoever would replace him. Their fear, however, is that a mass movement would quickly go beyond their control and force the MLA to negotiate with more radical elements, thus excluding them from a political settlement. [redacted]

25X1

It is unlikely the Pakistan People's Party will come to power by any means other than negotiation in the near term, although a successful PPP movement cannot be entirely ruled out. Some party leaders may still look for a coup by anti-Zia officers in the military or hope that some unforeseen event will remove Zia and open the way for a political settlement. Party radicals hope that the Soviets and Indians will seriously destabilize Pakistan—or perhaps move against it militarily—in which case the country would turn to the PPP as its best hope. In these circumstances, however, the PPP would have little legitimacy and probably could not maintain itself in power without outside support. [redacted]

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Should the PPP succeed in regaining a role in government, the circumstances through which the party comes to power will largely determine which faction dominates the new government and what foreign policy options that new government chooses to exercise. An indirect PPP accession through a negotiated settlement with the military would not appreciably affect the country's foreign policy. PPP moderates, who would probably dominate a civilian cabinet under Zia, favor US support for Pakistan. A PPP government in which the party's left wing was dominant, however, would work out accommodations with Moscow and New Delhi. It would also attempt to curb the Afghan insurgents' use of Pakistani territory and would reverse the trend toward closer US-Pakistan relations. Such a government, if threatened by massive opposition, might also seek outside support in order to maintain itself in power.

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Appendix A

PPP: Origins and Development

Founded in November 1967, the Pakistan People's Party was from the beginning a party of personal loyalty to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Scion of a wealthy landed family of Sind Province, Bhutto had already earned an international reputation for brilliance and showmanship as Pakistan's Foreign Minister when he broke with President Ayub Khan over the latter's decision to negotiate an end to the 1965 war with India. His move into opposition and his combining of intense nationalism with demands for the radical reform of Pakistani society tapped powerful undercurrents in Pakistan and quickly brought Bhutto support from a wide range of social groups excluded from Ayub's bureaucratic, centralized political system. [redacted]

25X1

The Anti-Ayub Movement

Bhutto and the PPP played the central role in the anti-Ayub movement begun by pro-Bhutto students at Rawalpindi in November 1968. This movement gathered momentum in all parts of the country over a five-month period and amounted to a mass uprising against the Ayub regime. Although the movement was substantially broader than the PPP, Bhutto dominated it and kept it focused on the removal of Ayub—in contrast to other politicians who attempted to call off the agitation and negotiate. The anti-Ayub movement ended only when the Army under General Yahya Khan stepped in and forced Ayub to retire, abrogated his constitution, and promised early elections. [redacted]

25X1

Internal Party Groups

The most influential groups within the PPP during this period were secular leftist groups that had their roots in radical student, worker, peasant, and professional organizations. Strongly ideological, they responded to Bhutto's socialist critique of Pakistani society, his authorship of Pakistan's China connection, and his demand that Pakistan pull out of its alliances with the West. Although he was never completely comfortable with the committed leftists in the PPP, Bhutto appreciated their organizing skills,

their willingness to confront the regime, and their capacity to keep the movement going while he was in prison. Adept at operating in an agitational environment, the party's left wing gained control of most of the early party organizations, including the important Punjab Provincial Organizing Committee. [redacted]

25X1

The approach of elections in 1970 aggravated the basic factional conflict in the PPP between its left wing and the more moderate groupings around Bhutto. The left—led by Mairaj Mohammed Khan—argued that conditions were ripe for a revolution in Pakistan and that the PPP's popularity resulted from its program for land reform and the nationalization of industry. The party, he urged, should forgo the elections and take power through a revolutionary worker-peasant movement. The left pressed Bhutto to base the party organization on disciplined activists and refuse membership to all who were not ideologically acceptable. They particularly distrusted the wealthy landlords around Bhutto and believed they would use their wealth to buy party election nominations, take control of the party organization, and subvert the party's reform program. [redacted]

25X1

The moderates—a diverse collection of Islamic socialists, landlords, interest group leaders, political professionals, and Bhutto cronies—argued that the Army would crush any quixotic attempt at revolution and that the only way the PPP could come to power was through elections. The PPP was, they insisted, not a "class party" but a "mass party," open to all who accepted the party manifesto regardless of social background. They believed that Bhutto was the real reason for the PPP's popularity and that electoral support could best be mobilized through tours by Bhutto and by the wholesale incorporation into the party organization of rural notables, interest groups, and patron-client networks. In their view, the party needed the wealth and local influence of the landlords in order to win in the countryside—the key to any election victory in Pakistan. [redacted]

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Bhutto's Approach

Bhutto sided with the moderates. He agreed the anti-Ayub movement was a mass popular awakening, but perceived that most Pakistanis' aspirations were nationalist, participatory, and economic, not revolutionary. He believed that he—like a Nasser or Ataturk—could dominate Pakistan through the force of his personality. This could be achieved by forging a permanent personal link with the masses through a skillful manipulation of nationalist symbols and Islamic socialist ideology. Once he had demonstrated his unchallenged position as leader of an aroused, politicized populace, Bhutto would have the leverage he needed to counter elite opposition and bargain for a share in power. [redacted]

25X1

The immediate object was to win the elections by making the PPP, in effect, a broad electoral coalition. A tightly organized ideological party would only create tensions between disparate internal groups and force Bhutto to adopt uncompromising stands on major policy issues, thereby restricting the flexibility he needed to orchestrate his grand coalition. In order to gain maximum support, Bhutto enlisted anybody who pledged loyalty to him and who paid lipservice to the PPP manifesto. The PPP thus attracted diverse groups, including rural tenants, peasants, industrial workers, rural-to-urban migrants, urban professionals, wealthy landlords, and several industrialists—all competing for Bhutto's favor and all adroitly manipulated by one of the most skillful political tacticians of his day [redacted]

25X1

The 1970 Elections

The PPP won a clear majority of the West Pakistan National Assembly seats in the 1970 elections and captured control of the provincial assemblies of Sind and Punjab. Landlord support was crucial to the PPP victory in Sind, but in Punjab—the country's politically dominant province—economic aspirations clearly overrode old parochial loyalties. [redacted]

25X1

Bolstered by the unexpected extent of his victory, Bhutto used his clout to block the assumption of power by the Awami League—it had swept the more populous East Pakistan—and lobby for a share in power for himself. Although his machinations helped

to set off the East Pakistan crisis, Bhutto sidestepped his share of responsibility for the debacle that ended with Pakistan's defeat by India and the emergence of Bangladesh. After the fall of Dacca, the PPP remained the only political alternative in Pakistan to the totally discredited military regime, and Bhutto became President and Chief Martial Law Administrator of what was left of the country in late December 1971. [redacted]

25X1

The PPP in Power

Bhutto's rule began well. He pulled the defeated country together, ushered in a period of reform, negotiated an honorable peace with India, and provided Pakistan with a constitution (1973) based on a broad consensus. After these high points, however, his rule began to go sour. His efforts to monopolize all the country's political and economic resources and build up his personality cult as the savior of Pakistan increasingly aroused the opposition of key power groups in the army, bureaucracy, and urban middle class. These groups also had deep misgivings about the disintegration of public morality and institutions, chronic economic mismanagement, and the alienation of tribal minorities under Bhutto. Rapid inflation and the growing penetration of the bureaucracy into the countryside and into district level party organizations began to erode Bhutto's popularity among his most committed supporters. [redacted]

25X1

The assumption of power did not fundamentally change Bhutto's approach to the Pakistan People's Party, although it gave him the means, through the vast spoils system he now operated, to reinforce his personal control. Bhutto's manipulation and his harsh treatment of the opposition disillusioned many of those who had helped him found the PPP. Aware that Bhutto would only minimally fulfill the PPP's manifesto, most of the party's committed leftists broke with Bhutto shortly after he took power. More moderate groups also became disenchanted. A few of them—mostly urban professionals—served in federal or provincial cabinets, but eventually lost their places to landlords and newcomers in the party. Those who went into opposition usually ended up in prison or in concentration camps. Bhutto's effort to eliminate one early supporter led to the killing for which he would later hang. [redacted]

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Never a strong organization, the PPP was unable to cope either with the vast numbers of new members or the emergence of intense factional and parochial conflicts engendered by the competition for patronage. As party structures broke down, Bhutto increasingly relied on the landlords and the bureaucracy to operate the party, in effect depending on social groups that had little intrinsic love for the PPP and no permanent loyalty to Bhutto. [redacted]

25X1

The Prime Minister ⁴ used the landlords and bureaucracy to ensure and enlarge his party's election victory in March 1977, although he could have had a lesser, but credible, victory through fair means. Without an effective party organization, however, Bhutto lacked the means to counter the urban riots set off by the Islamic parties and the widely believed charges that Bhutto had rigged the elections. The unprecedented intensity of the violence and the need to rely on the Army to quell the disturbances solidified an anti-Bhutto alliance among the Army, the Islamic parties, the industrialists, and the urban middle class and set the stage for the coup of 5 July 1977. [redacted]

25X1

Bhutto's Last Days

Led by the Army Chief of Staff, General Zia-ul-Haq, the coup was greeted with widespread relief in Pakistan. Despite the high drama of his long trial, sentence of death, and judicial appeal, Bhutto's passing from the scene was surprisingly quiet. He had, by his own actions, given too many key groups, including some in the PPP, a stake in his final removal. The left, both inside and outside the party, probably could have mounted an agitation, but preferred to wait and benefit from Bhutto's death rather than risk its activists in an open clash with the Zia regime. The PPP moderates depended too much on the bureaucracy for the security of their economic interests and suggested Bhutto look to the courts for justice. Bhutto in jail was unable to exert the magnetic personal leadership on which the party had come to depend. Urged on by the Bhutto women, some Bhutto loyalists attempted to agitate for his life, but these efforts were tenuous, ill led, and quickly contained by the authori-

25X1

⁴ Bhutto became Prime Minister under the 1973 constitution [redacted]

ties. Bhutto's execution on 4 April 1979 caused little more than a ripple of protest, largely confined to Upper Sind, his home area. [redacted] 25X1

The PPP After Bhutto

The Pakistan People's Party emerged from Bhutto's death somewhat strengthened. The outpouring of sympathy for the Bhutto women enabled them to claim unopposed the leadership of the party, thus forestalling a conflict with some party leaders who were opposed to a family succession.⁵ But a more important reason for the PPP's renewed vitality was Zia's announcement that national elections would be held in October 1979. [redacted] 25X1

The prospect of elections produced bitter intraparty haggling over the disposition of election nominations. The leftists and party activists argued that those who had suffered under the Martial Law Administration should receive nominations in preference to the moderates who, they charged, had done nothing to save Bhutto. The Bhutto women, however, quieted these disputes. They recognized the influence that the moderates could exert at the polls and realized that if the PPP became too obviously a party of the left, it would antagonize the Army and the basically conservative populations of Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province. [redacted] 25X1

Having contained its internal conflicts, the PPP turned to activating those groups whose political loyalties had been shaped by Bhutto during the anti-Ayub movement. It also sought to rebuild the broad electoral coalition that had been so successful in 1970. The party benefited from the unpopularity both of the Martial Law Administration and of the shaky center-right coalition—the Pakistan National Alliance—that had held cabinet positions under Zia. The PPP made effective use of its experience as an electoral party and the perception among many politicians and interest groups that Bhutto's party would again come out on top. [redacted] 25X1

⁵ Begum Nusrat Bhutto, the former Prime Minister's widow, was made Party Chairman by the Central Committee. Benazir, Bhutto's daughter and first offspring, was next in line, followed by Mir Murtaza, Bhutto's oldest son. [redacted] 25X1

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The evident coalescing of the broad PPP constituency worried the generals who—too optimistically—had believed the PPP would fall apart without Bhutto. Zia passed complicated election rules clearly aimed at excluding the PPP from the polls. The PPP short circuited the rules by running its candidates as independent *awam dost* (“people’s friends”) candidates. The party’s “independents” did well enough in the local bodies polls in September 1979 to convince the government that the PPP would emerge as the largest party in an elected National Assembly and might even win a comfortable majority. Citing the danger of elections to the country’s security, President Zia postponed the polls indefinitely and expanded the authority of his Martial Law Administration.

25X1

The strong opposition aroused by the postponement had little chance to express itself before the stakes of Pakistani politics were fundamentally altered by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. The advent of a hostile superpower on Pakistan’s restless and lightly defended western border, Soviet efforts to crush the Afghan insurgents, and deep Pakistani suspicions about future Indo-Soviet collaboration enabled Zia to consolidate his position as President and solidified his sometimes uncertain support in the Army. Facing major threats on both its long land borders, few Pakistanis believed the time was appropriate to pursue internal conflicts. This perception, as well as Zia’s success in turning the economy around and his ability to deny the opposition an issue to rally around, has made the recent political environment particularly unyielding for the PPP.

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Appendix B

Al-Zulfikar: Terrorism Comes to Pakistan

Al-Zulfikar, which achieved worldwide publicity by its hijacking of a Pakistani airliner last March, is a self-proclaimed "national liberation movement." It is inspired by the memory of former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and dedicated to the overthrow of the Zia regime through violence. It has promised additional attacks on Pakistani Government installations, property, and personnel. Shahnawaz Bhutto, Bhutto's second son and chief of operations for Al-Zulfikar, reportedly has promised a major strike against the Zia government in January 1982. [redacted]

25X1

Al-Zulfikar suffers from disorganization, internal disension, and identification with powers hostile to Pakistan. It is not likely to become a credible military threat to the Zia regime, but has the capacity to embarrass Islamabad with occasional dramatic incidents or to mount a low-level campaign of terror. [redacted]

25X1

If Al-Zulfikar succeeded to the point that public and Army confidence was undermined, Zia would probably be replaced by a tougher general rather than the Pakistan People's Party, which is led by Bhutto's widow Nusrat and to which Al-Zulfikar owes allegiance, if not accountability. [redacted]

25X1

A decline in public order in Pakistan would play into the hands of the Soviets, who permit Al-Zulfikar to operate from Afghanistan and who seek ways to press Islamabad to acquiesce in Moscow's aims in Afghanistan. Thus far, however, Al-Zulfikar's actions have strengthened rather than weakened Zia [redacted]

25X1

Origins

Al-Zulfikar was originally the designation for the military wing of the Pakistan Liberation Army, an organization founded by Mir Murtaza Bhutto—the former Prime Minister's oldest son—shortly after his

father's execution on 4 April 1979.⁶ At the time of the hijacking, however, the PLA announced it had changed its name to Al-Zulfikar. Murtaza has subsequently identified himself as secretary general of Al-Zulfikar in public interviews. [redacted] 25X1

The PLA/Al-Zulfikar emerged from the community of Pakistani political exiles in the United Kingdom and elsewhere created in the aftermath of the Bhutto regime. It was preceded by the Pakistan Liberation Movement, an organization founded in September 1979 by Brigadier Usman Khalid, a deserter from the Pakistan Army. Khalid identified himself as a Bhutto supporter, gained Libyan financial backing for his magazine *Inqilab* (Revolution), and sought to recruit a guerrilla army from the Pakistani expatriate community in the UK. He allied himself with Ghulam Mustapha Khar, a governor of Punjab Province under Bhutto, and appears to have cooperated with Murtaza. It is unclear, however, whether the PLM is an umbrella organization of which the PLA/Al-Zulfikar is a part, or is another exile faction with loose ties to the Pakistan People's Party. [redacted] 25X1

In September 1980 Murtaza Bhutto used *Inqilab* to surface his own organization. In an interview headlined "Bhutto's Son Forms Guerrilla Army," he introduced himself as secretary general of the Pakistan Liberation Army. He asserted that his group had the ability to eliminate top Pakistani officials and claimed to have advanced weapons, including anti-aircraft missiles. He specifically warned Pakistanis not to travel on the government-owned Pakistan International Airlines. [redacted] 25X1

⁶ Al-Zulfikar, or "Children of Zulfikar," obviously adopts the first name of the former Prime Minister, but there is additional symbolic significance in the name. Zulfikar was a celebrated sword captured by the Prophet Muhammad in one of his early battles and symbolizes Islamic militance and justice. The PPP adopted the sword as its election symbol soon after its founding in 1967. [redacted]

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The founding of the PLA marked a decisive step for Murtaza into international terrorism. Twenty-two when his father was executed, Murtaza only at the last minute gave up the life of playboy-student to mount an effort among world leaders to save his father's life. Deeply shaken and embittered by the execution, Murtaza and his brother Shahnawaz vowed to avenge their father's death. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted]

By December 1979 Raja Anwar, deputy chief of the PLA and head of its political section, had taken up residence in Kabul.⁷ Murtaza shifted his headquarters there about six months later. [redacted]

25X1

Operations

[redacted]

25X1

The PLA claims to have carried out well over 50 successful operations—bombings, train derailings, attacks on army and paramilitary units, and assassinations. Although these claims are much exaggerated, the Pakistanis admit that some bombings and derailings can be traced to PLA activists. Some of its efforts betray a lack of training and experience, but the group should not be underestimated. As the hijacking demonstrated, at least some of its members are capable terrorists. [redacted]

25X1

⁷ Regarded as a brilliant intellectual, Raja Anwar led the Rawalpindi student movement of November 1968—the movement that brought down Ayub and paved the way for Bhutto's rise. Anwar later served as Prime Minister Bhutto's adviser on student affairs.

[redacted]

25X1

Secret

Exile Factionalism

The PLA has not been free of internal stresses brought about by the differing aims and conflicting ambitions of its members. Loosely organized into two independent wings—military (Al-Zulfikar) and political—supported by a financial group, the PLA already has experienced severe factionalism. The financial and political chiefs—both older and more experienced leaders—were recently thrown out of the PLA. Raja Anwar, the political chief, was accused of being a Pakistani spy by the PLA's radical allies in the Kisan-Mazdoor (Peasants-Workers) Party (KMP). Anwar was condemned to death by Murtaza and reportedly executed in the Kabul jail about 31 March. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Murtaza probably has sided with the military—and more extremist—wing which now appears to have taken over the rest of the PLA. Tensions doubtless remain both within Al-Zulfikar and between Al-Zulfikar and its allies in the Pashtunistan Movement, KMP, and National Progressive Party. Murtaza's highly personalized leadership, his lack of genuine ideological commitment, and his obsession with the destruction of the Zia regime probably conflict with the organizational and ideological aims of more committed radicals around him. Apart from a core group loyal only to the Bhutto name and family, Murtaza can count on little long-term support from other political exiles in Kabul, whose purposes—beyond the fall of Zia—are very different from his own.

[redacted]

25X1

Connections With the PPP

Al-Zulfikar does not operate at the direction or with the explicit sanction of the PPP leadership. Murtaza's decision to accept Afghan assistance and wage guerilla war from Kabul is officially rejected by the PPP leadership. The party's conservative landlord wing is opposed to Murtaza, believing that he has come under Soviet influence and that neither they nor the PPP can benefit from even the remotest connection with Soviet interests. The PPP landlords also know Al-Zulfikar puts part of the blame for Bhutto's fate on them. They are charged with collusion by deliberate inaction in the execution of the PPP leader. Al-Zulfikar has singled them out for elimination after the revolution. [redacted]

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The PPP, however, is a loosely organized agglomeration of factions and interest groups, some of which operate outside the directives of the central party leadership. Al-Zulfikar has ties to some of these groups, principally the radical left wing of the party and its student organizations. These are groups that believe Al-Zulfikar operations can contribute to destabilizing the Zia regime and whose leaders know Al-Zulfikar understands its role and does not need direction. [redacted]

25X1

Like Al-Zulfikar, these groups reject elections, preferring to take power in the streets, and would welcome Soviet protection if they succeeded. At this time, however, they constitute a small minority within the PPP, capable of little more than disruptive street activity and actions to support and protect Al-Zulfikar activists. Their numbers could grow if the Zia regime fails to provide broader channels for political expression. [redacted]

25X1

The relationship between the Bhutto brothers and their mother Nusrat Bhutto—who has replaced her late husband as PPP chairman—and their sister Benazir is probably more complex. The women have said they oppose Murtaza's activities and support mass movement politics leading to elections as a route to power. [redacted]

[redacted] Government investigators have been unable to find any evidence that the Bhutto women had foreknowledge of the hijacking.⁸ Nevertheless, ties of blood and kinship are strong in Pakistan, and even some in the PPP leadership believe Nusrat is, at best, ambivalent about her son's activities. These leaders believe that she would tacitly welcome the disruption that Al-Zulfikar and a mass movement might bring and that she believes the country would then turn to her as the only alternative to a Soviet-sponsored regime. [redacted]

25X1

⁸ Nusrat reportedly did predict to a kinswoman the killing of Tariq Rahim the day after the hijacking and three days before the Pakistani diplomat was shot on board the aircraft. Rahim had been Bhutto's military secretary during the period of the 1977 coup. He was regarded as a traitor by the Bhutto family. [redacted]

25X1

Links to Foreign Powers

25X1

Al-Zulfikar would not be a credible terrorist organization without the support it receives from foreign sources. [redacted]

[redacted] The Soviets value Al-Zulfikar as a means of gaining leverage with Islamabad, but have begun to doubt its leadership and capabilities. Moscow and Kabul were embarrassed by international criticism of their actions during the hijacking. They realize the incident only strengthened Zia and severely damaged the PPP-based MRD. They may also believe the Bhutto brothers are too distracted by their colorful lifestyles to be effective leaders. Moreover, they must certainly know that Al-Zulfikar's much-touted base camp in Pakistani tribal territory was recently destroyed by the Pakistan Army. The Soviets want Al-Zulfikar to adopt a lower profile in Kabul and are probably insisting on greater control over its operations as a price for allowing it to operate from Kabul. [redacted]

25X1

Outlook

25X1

Al-Zulfikar has so far had only limited success as a terrorist organization, and its actions have tended to strengthen rather than destabilize the Zia regime. The hijacking, while successful in its immediate purposes, has had profoundly negative consequences for the PPP inside Pakistan. The incident—particularly public revulsion at the killing of a Pakistani diplomat—wrecked the growing political movement against Zia led by the PPP and several lesser parties. It enabled him to strike hard at the PPP and gives him the opportunity to split the party and deal with its more moderate leaders to establish a more credible regime in Islamabad. [redacted]

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Al-Zulfikar could mount a lower level campaign of violence against widely scattered targets. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] Thus far the organization has been ineffective in its terror campaign, but this could change with experience and better leadership. [redacted]

25X1

The emergence of Al-Zulfikar is a warning that Zia needs to expand the base of his regime and provide broader channels for political expression. In the long term, the advent of the group changes the terms of politics in Pakistan—a country heretofore largely free of organized terror if not of other forms of political violence. Although Al-Zulfikar has not put together a group that attracts deep emotional support in Pakistan, other terrorist groups could emerge that might more effectively represent the frustrations of Pakistan's vast and growing body of youth.⁹ [redacted]

25X1

⁹ About 60 percent of the Pakistani population is under 25 [redacted]

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