

81-10264

STAFF COPY

Approved For Release 2007/06/05 : CIA-RDP06T00412R000200360001-9



National Foreign Assessment Center

Secret

25

Do Not Remove

# Sudan: Increasing Pressures on the Nimeiri Regime

25

An Intelligence Memorandum

Secret

PA 81-10264  
July 1981

Copy 250

**Page Denied**

Secret  
[Redacted]

25

**Sudan:  
Increasing Pressures on  
the Nimeiri Regime** [Redacted]

25

**Summary**

The next three months—when daily temperatures in Khartoum will reach well above 100 degrees and the antiquated electric power grid will be pushed to its limit—could witness a serious challenge to the government of President Gaafar Nimeiri. The hot weather will coincide with the Islamic fasting month of Ramadan when tempers fray. Necessities will be missing from many shops as a result of foreign exchange shortages. New taxes, imposed to comply with International Monetary Fund demands, and inflation will further erode the standard of living of many urban Sudanese. The country is already witnessing increased labor unrest, and public protests are a distinct possibility.

President Nimeiri has survived several serious challenges to his 12-year rule. The support of the army has enabled him to withstand three major coup attempts, the most recent in July 1976 when an effort led by the Ansar Islamic sect and supported by Libya narrowly failed. In August 1979 widespread demonstrations over commodity shortages took place in Khartoum, and in August 1980 a weeklong power blackout caused public confidence in the government to reach a new low.

As with many other Arab and African regimes, Nimeiri's political survival will depend to a large degree on his ability to maintain the loyalty of the army. We have no indication that any significant group within the military is prepared to move against the regime. There is, moreover, no figure on the political scene who is acceptable to all major opposition groups.

Consequently we believe that, barring a recurrence of serious health problems, Nimeiri probably will remain in power over the next year. Over the next two to three years, however, if the country's economic situation worsens, opposition to the government will intensify and elements in the military will be increasingly tempted to depose Nimeiri and his associates.

[Redacted]

25

*The principal author of this memorandum is [Redacted] Office of Political Analysis. The economic section was contributed by [Redacted] of the Office of Economic Research. The memorandum was coordinated with the National Intelligence Officer for Africa, the Directorate of Operations, and the Office of Strategic Research. Information available as of 26 June 1981 was used in its preparation. Comments and queries are welcome and may be addressed to the Chief, Near East South Asia Division, OPA, telephone*

25

25


[Redacted]

25

Secret



### Sudan: Regions



629887 6-81

Secret

Secret  
[redacted]

25

**Sudan:  
Increasing Pressures on  
the Nimeiri Regime** [redacted]

25

Sudan's significance to the United States has increased markedly since the mid-1970s. Major factors in this development have been the establishment of a Soviet presence in Ethiopia and President Nimeiri's endorsement of the Camp David Accords in 1978 when other Arab leaders condemned Egyptian President Sadat's peace policy. More recently, Nimeiri's efforts to force the Libyans out of Chad, his campaign to rally support for Egypt among moderate Arab states, and his offer to make military facilities available to the United States if Sudan is threatened by another country have caused Sudan to assume even greater importance for the United States. [redacted]

Sudan's moderate foreign policy is to a large extent a product of Nimeiri's perception of the threats to his continued rule. Since an abortive Communist-led attempt to depose him in 1971, he has come to believe that the Soviets are determined to remove Sadat and himself as a first step toward dominating the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf. [redacted]

25X

25

Nimeiri's survivability—he has ruled since May 1969—appears to be due in large part to the absence of a broad, unified opposition to his rule. He exercises almost all real political power although he has taken a number of steps to increase public participation in government, most notably the creation of the Sudanese Socialist Union—the nation's sole legal political organization. His pursuit of national reconciliation with his conservative opponents and governmental decentralization appear popular with most Sudanese. Moreover, his unpretentious approach to government has led many Sudanese to prefer him to more controversial opposition figures. Health problems, which caused him to curtail his activities last year, have been alleviated, and he has resumed his role as an activist leader. [redacted]

25

In each of the past several years the threat to the Nimeiri regime has increased as summer has approached. Temperatures are high, and rain compounds communication, transportation, and supply problems. Ramadan, the Islamic month of fasting when tempers fray, now falls during the hottest time of the year. High inflation, increasing labor unrest, rising unhappiness with the central government in the south and west, and a strong likelihood of major power failures could combine to produce serious public disorders. [redacted]

25

Secret

**Gloomy Economic Prospects**

Political stability in Sudan, especially over the longer run, depends to a considerable degree on the ability of the government to reverse the nation's economic decline. As of early 1981 Sudan's economic outlook was grim. An overall government deficit of more than \$1 billion is predicted for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1981. A current account deficit of \$836 million is also projected for the same period. Inflation, which had receded somewhat last year, is expected to rise again, perhaps reaching the 40-percent level of 1979 and early 1980. [REDACTED]

Ironically, a principal cause of Sudan's economic crisis is the increased development expenditures resulting from Arab and other financial assistance in 1974-78. The wealthy Arab states began investing heavily in Sudan—the only moderate Arab state with large amounts of unused arable land—in order to lessen their dependence on Western food imports. Investment, however, fell short of requirements, while Sudan's limited absorptive capacity slowed disbursements and delayed completion of projects. Sudan's attempt to sustain the development drive through foreign borrowing created a large debt burden. At the same time, an increase in the world price of cereals and domestic economic policy tended to discourage the production of cotton, the nation's largest foreign exchange earner and encourage the production of wheat and sorghum. Export growth has failed to keep pace with rising imports because of the decline in cotton production, increased petroleum imports, and reduced foreign investment. [REDACTED]

The country's financial difficulties have forced it to scrap its six-year (1977-83) development plan and to adopt in May 1979 a three-year economic reform program under International Monetary Fund (IMF) guidelines. As a condition for securing assistance from the IMF, the Sudanese have devalued the pound, encouraged the production of cotton, agreed to defer new development plans pending the completion of outstanding projects, and agreed to tighten government expenditures. In late 1979 an agreement was reached on rescheduling Sudan's debts to official creditors, and in November 1980 repayment agreements were reached with the majority of commercial banks. Nevertheless, Sudan has fallen behind on making payments under those agreements. Renegotiation of the agreement with official creditors is tentatively scheduled for July. [REDACTED]

The government consistently has had difficulty living up to IMF guidelines. Revenue shortfalls and increases in expenditures for petroleum and sugar subsidies in late 1980 led the IMF to delay payment of the second installment of its aid due in February 1981. The effect of such action is compounded by the decision of Saudi Arabia, a major financial supporter of the Nimeiri government, to make its aid contingent on Khartoum's meeting IMF requirements. In late February and early March 1981 the authorities agreed under IMF pressure to increase government revenues by raising

Secret

import and excise taxes on a number of goods, including petroleum but excluding sugar. Failure to agree on additional price increases for next year during recent IMF negotiations in Khartoum may impel the IMF to withhold further aid to Sudan. Saudi aid and debt rescheduling would be jeopardized if agreement with the IMF is not reached. [redacted]

25

Sudanese industry is depressed. It is handicapped by a lack of foreign exchange for spare parts and equipment, an inadequate transportation network, an erratic power system, and a shortage of skilled labor. The government has attempted to limit the loss of skilled labor and management personnel to the oil-rich countries by requiring that all private contracts for work abroad be approved by the government, but the effectiveness of this action is in doubt. [redacted]

25

Given the time required to reverse the decline in cotton production and the probable continued high level of oil imports, it will be several years before Sudan can get its affairs in order. The government's policy of borrowing from the central bank to finance deficits is certain to keep inflation high. Together with IMF-mandated reductions in subsidies, this could increase pressure from public employees for higher wages. Although tough government tactics broke a strike by railway workers in June, further labor unrest is a distinct possibility. [redacted]

25

Positive developments, including oil discoveries by Chevron in southwestern Sudan and exploration activities by other international oil companies as well as the inauguration of the Kenana (Kinanah) sugar factory, will not have a major impact on the economy for some years. Thus, until the mid-1980s the government may be forced to choose between limiting expenditures and risking labor unrest and possible public disorders or violating IMF or debt rescheduling agreements and losing vital financial assistance. [redacted]

25X

**The Domestic Opposition**

The return from exile in September 1977 of Ansar leader Sadiq al-Mahdi culminated a successful effort by Nimeiri to split the opposition National Front, which had mounted coup attempts against the government in 1975 and 1976. Through his policy of national reconciliation, Nimeiri has persuaded the two major opposition groups—the Ansars and the Muslim Brotherhood—to abandon efforts to overthrow his government. At the same time he effectively neutralized those groups that openly oppose the government—the National Unionist Party, the Baathists, and the Sudanese Communist Party. [redacted]

25

The members of the *Ansar Muslim sect*, who comprise approximately one-fifth of Sudan's 18 million people, are no longer openly hostile to the regime, but Sadiq al-Mahdi is frustrated by Nimeiri's refusal to give him an

Secret

**Key Personalities on the Sudanese Political Scene**

Gaafar Nimeiri	Leader of the officers' group that seized control of Sudan in a coup in May 1969, Nimeiri still holds almost all real power. He assumed the presidency in 1971, but has indicated that he may resign when his present term ends in 1983.
Abd al-Majid Khalil	First Vice President since August 1979, Khalil appears to be Nimeiri's choice as heir apparent. A career army officer, he is regarded as highly competent, but lacks Nimeiri's political skill in dealing with Sudan's competing groups.
Sadiq al-Mahdi	Leader of the Ansar Islamic sect and former prime minister (1966-67), al-Mahdi returned from exile in 1977. He has been unhappy over his lack of a significant voice in national policy, but he has not actively opposed Nimeiri in recent years.
Hasan al-Turabi	Leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Turabi, like Sadiq al-Mahdi, accepted Nimeiri's offer of reconciliation in 1977. In 1979 he became Attorney General. He has pushed, thus far unsuccessfully, for the adoption of Sharia law in Sudan.
Umar al-Tayyib	Al-Tayyib played a major role in negotiating the reconciliation with Nimeiri's conservative opponents and since 1978 has been director of the State Security Organization, primarily responsible for foreign intelligence and internal security. Although he has sometimes been identified as a rival of Abd al-Majid Khalil to succeed Nimeiri, al-Tayyib has no base in the military and has said that he would support Khalil as president.
Sharif al-Hindi	Al-Hindi, leader of the National Unionist Party, refused to accept Nimeiri's offer of reconciliation in 1977 and remains in exile in London, where he works actively against the regime. He no longer has the support of the faction of the party identified with the Khatmiyyah Islamic sect and has little real influence inside Sudan, although he serves as a rallying point for exile groups opposed to Nimeiri.

[Redacted]

important role and has withdrawn from direct participation in the government. Reflecting the historic Ansar distrust of Egypt, Sadiq is at odds with Nimeiri over the Sudanese leader's decision to align the country closely with the Sadat government. Sadiq also believes that Nimeiri's decision to openly oppose the Libyan presence in Chad invites retaliation with little positive gain. He has also said that by offering military facilities to the United States, Nimeiri has violated Sudan's longstanding nonalignment. [Redacted]

Despite the increasing hostility between Nimeiri and Qadhafi, Sadiq has continued to visit Libya and probably also receives some financial support from Qadhafi. Sadiq, however, claims to have warned Qadhafi against interfering in Sudanese domestic affairs and reportedly has cautioned his followers against joining Qadhafi's Islamic Legion. Sadiq's attempt to portray himself as a leader of the loyal opposition and to restrain his followers from openly challenging the regime probably stems from a desire to avoid a regime crackdown on his activities. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Secret



Secret

The *Muslim Brotherhood* has actively participated in the government, but is almost certainly maneuvering to place itself in a favorable position if Nimeiri is forced out. The most conservative of all organized Islamic groups in Sudan, its primary base has been the faculty and student body at the University of Khartoum. Despite its small membership—estimated at between 60,000 and 300,000 nationwide—the appeal of the Brotherhood's militant brand of Islam and its willingness to use intimidation to achieve its ends have made it a formidable political force. The Brotherhood operated as a clandestine organization from 1969, when Nimeiri banned all political parties, until 1977, when it accepted Nimeiri's offer of reconciliation. Although its leader, Hasan al-Turabi, serves as Attorney General, Sudanese security officials regard the organization as a threat to the regime and closely monitor its activities. [REDACTED]

The *National Unionist Party*, the most important of those groups actively seeking to overthrow Nimeiri, reflects the views of the better educated and more secular merchants, civil servants, and professionals who oppose the conservative forces represented by the Ansars and the Muslim Brotherhood and resent the dominant role of the army. In the past the party drew much of its strength from the pro-Egyptian Khatmiyyah Islamic sect, the principal rival of the Ansars. The party now appears to have broken into two factions. The Khatmiyyah sect headed by the Mirghani family does not share the leftist sentiments of Sharif al-Hindi, the present leader of the National Unionist Party. [REDACTED]

Al-Hindi is in exile in London. He has received aid from both Libya and Iraq, but since 1980 Libya has been al-Hindi's major backer. Having lost much of his support inside Sudan, al-Hindi probably is not a major danger to the regime. For the most part his activities consist of distributing antigovernment pamphlets and cassettes to anti-Nimeiri groups outside Sudan. In recent months he reportedly has focused his efforts on building antiregime sentiment in the armed forces [REDACTED]

The *Sudanese Baath Party*, with only a few hundred members, seeks a secular Arab nationalist state and has in other Arab countries used violence to achieve its ends. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] More recently, however, Sharif al-Hindi's identification with Libya would appear to preclude close cooperation with the Iraqi-backed Baathists. [REDACTED]

The *Sudanese Communist Party* was at one time the largest Communist party in Africa. It has been seriously weakened by government repression since the disorders in August 1979 in which the Communists played a significant part. The party, nevertheless, has considerable assets in the labor

Secret

Secret

movement and among students. Although it can no longer mount a direct challenge to the regime, it probably can still stimulate unrest. [REDACTED]

25

### The Southern Problem

The north-south cleavage remains the most serious division in Sudanese society. Relations between the two regions were relatively tranquil between February 1972—when the Addis Ababa agreement that ended the 17-year civil war was signed—and early 1980, but traditional southern distrust of the north has intensified during the last year. Southerners have long believed that they have not received their fair share of development funds. The predominately black, non-Muslim southerners also have been concerned for some time over efforts by northern Muslims to give Sharia law greater force. The principal factors souring southern attitudes toward the north are an unresolved regional border dispute and a decision to build a small refinery at Kosti (Kusti) in the north, rather than at Bentiu in the south closer to the newly discovered oilfields. [REDACTED]

25

Southerners see the choice of Kosti as a deliberate northern effort to deprive the south of its natural resources. Some southerners have threatened to use force to prevent oil from being moved to Kosti. Arguments by northern officials that Kosti is a better location for communications and processing have not been persuasive. Although the central government and the Chevron oil company have agreed to increase development investment in the south, to provide training in the oil industry to southerners, and to improve the distribution of oil products to the south and west, most southerners are skeptical of these promises. The endorsement by High Executive Council President Abel Alier (chief executive officer of the Southern Region) of the decision to build at Kosti has also failed to win much support in the south and may have damaged Alier's standing among southerners. Protests by students and other groups against the Kosti decision are continuing.

25

North-south tensions also have been aggravated by a dispute over the Abyei District in the southern part of Kordofan Region. The area was traditionally a southern tribal grazing land before the agreement of 1972, and southerners believe that the area should be returned to the south. Arab tribes who live there, however, insist that it remain part of the Kordofan Region. Nimeiri has been able to avoid open conflict by referring the matter to mediation, which will enable both sides to present their views but is unlikely to resolve the basic conflict over the area. [REDACTED]

25

An increasing number of southerners have come to believe that their fortunes will not improve so long as they are linked with the north—a view that could lead to renewed conflict. The increased availability of weapons in the south (many brought by refugees from Uganda), the possibility of

Secret

6

Secret

renewed support from Uganda and Ethiopia for southern dissidents, and the likelihood that Libya might be tempted to encourage southern secessionists are also factors that could lead to fighting between the northern and southern regions. Nimeiri's decision in early 1981 to permit southern leaders to solicit aid and assistance directly from Arab Peninsula states may help persuade southerners that Nimeiri is still concerned with their interests. The memory of the many casualties suffered in the civil war also deters many southerners from renewing the conflict. [REDACTED]

### External Threats

Libyan leader Qadhafi's efforts to depose Nimeiri constitute the principal external threat to the regime. In 1975 and 1976 Qadhafi backed Ansar attempts to topple Nimeiri. Although relations improved somewhat in 1977 and early 1978, Nimeiri's endorsement of the Camp David Accords in September 1978 led Qadhafi to renew financial support and military training to the followers of Sharif al-Hindi, the only major Sudanese opposition figure to have refused Nimeiri's amnesty. Although the Libyan leader withdrew his support for al-Hindi in 1979, apparently fearing involvement in conflicts with both Egypt and Sudan, he restored it in 1980 and again began training Sudanese dissidents in camps near the Sudanese border. [REDACTED]

Relations between the two states deteriorated sharply after Libyan forces entered Chad in October 1980. The Sudanese have taken the lead in African diplomatic efforts to force Qadhafi to withdraw his troops. Sudanese officials believe, however, that force will be required to induce the Libyans to withdraw. Consequently they have permitted the use of Sudanese territory as a safe haven and supply base for forces loyal to Chadian dissident Hissein Habre. [REDACTED]

Libya intensified its attacks on the Nimeiri regime after Sudan restored full diplomatic relations with Egypt in March 1981 and invited Sadat to attend the 25 May revolution celebration in Khartoum. A public statement by Nimeiri in late March calling for Qadhafi's removal resulted in a stepped-up Libyan effort to bring down the Sudanese leader. The Sudanese believe that there is little likelihood of a direct attack across the Chadian frontier by Libyan forces, but are deeply concerned that Qadhafi will support cross-border operations by groups of Sudanese dissidents. Sudan broke diplomatic relations with Libya in late June, charging Tripoli with responsibility for a bombing at the Chadian Embassy in Khartoum. [REDACTED]

Other radical Arab states also are critical of Nimeiri for his close relationship with Sadat and his support of the Camp David Accords, and in some cases have aided antiregime elements. In 1979 while Sharif al-Hindi was temporarily out of favor with Qadhafi, the Iraqis provided him with assistance. They may still be aiding other anti-Nimeiri groups, especially the

Secret

Secret

Sudanese Baathists, despite a gradual improvement in Sudanese-Iraqi relations [redacted] 25

Following a rocket attack on the Sudanese Embassy in Beirut in May 1981, Nimeiri downgraded relations with Syria, charging that President Assad had come under the influence of Qadhafi. Nimeiri also accused Arafat and the PLO of responsibility for the attack and called on the Palestinians to choose a new leader. The Sudanese for some time had suspected the PLO of planning antiregime terrorist operations. In February 1981 Sudan expelled the four PLO representatives in Khartoum, although Sudanese officials stated that the action was aimed at the individuals involved and did not constitute a severance of relations with the PLO [redacted] 25X

[redacted] 25

As the threat from Libya has intensified, Nimeiri has succeeded in improving relations with Ethiopia, reducing the chances that Sudan will be faced with hostile neighbors on opposite borders at the same time. It is now less likely that the several hundred Ansars who took refuge in Ethiopia after the 1976 coup attempt can be utilized by Nimeiri opponents. [redacted] 25

The Sudanese Government is concerned over the security threat posed by the almost 300,000 Eritrean refugees in Sudan. It is seeking to persuade the three major Eritrean groups to present a common negotiating front to the Ethiopians. The Sudanese attempt to broker a political solution to the Eritrean conflict, however, has been unsuccessful. There is no evidence that the Ethiopians are prepared to grant the Eritreans meaningful autonomy or that the Eritreans are prepared to settle for less than full independence. [redacted] 25

The Sudanese are also concerned over the threat to security presented by the nearly 100,000 Ugandan refugees in southern Sudan. Although Nimeiri had been critical of Ugandan President Milton Obote and the Tanzanian role in his election, he has come to see the Ugandan leader as preferable to any of the likely alternatives, and he is afraid that a continuing deterioration of the security situation could invite Soviet, Cuban, or renewed Libyan involvement. Consequently Sudan has begun to cooperate with other regional states, especially Kenya and Zaire, to strengthen the Obote government. The Sudanese have also disarmed anti-Obote forces in the border area and urged other governments to do the same. [redacted] 25

The USSR, which has seen its position in Sudan deteriorate markedly since the short-lived coup led by the Sudanese Communist Party in 1971, would prefer to see the Nimeiri regime replaced by a more radical government. Although we cannot confirm Sudanese suspicions that the USSR was directly involved in the Libyan-backed effort to depose Nimeiri in 1976 or in

Secret

Secret

the current training of Sudanese dissidents, the Soviets are not displeased by Libyan efforts to topple Nimeiri. Since 1978 the Soviets have made several efforts to improve relations with Sudan, but have been rebuffed on each occasion. Nimeiri has been consistently critical of Soviet activities in the region and has condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan [redacted] 25

**The Military:  
Key To Survival**

The Sudanese armed forces constitute Nimeiri's principal power base. The army helped Nimeiri come to power in May 1969, and it proved loyal to him during the conflict with the Ansars in 1970, despite the fact that many members of the armed forces were nominally members of the sect. It was army support that enabled Nimeiri to regain power following the abortive Communist-led coup in July 1971. [redacted] 25

As with many other Arab and African regimes, Nimeiri's continued survival depends on the willingness of the army to put down serious public disorders. In October 1964 the government of Ibrahim Abbud fell when the army refused to suppress massive street demonstrations. In August 1979, on the other hand, the police and the army rallied behind the government to put down Communist-orchestrated disorders that lasted some 10 days. [redacted] 25X

Morale in the military, possibly the major factor in its willingness to support the regime, appears to be directly related to pay and the ability of the government to provide the armed services with modern arms and equipment. [redacted] 25

[redacted] The acquisition of considerable amounts of new equipment in the spring of 1981 will probably have a positive effect on morale throughout the armed services. The continued inability of the government to improve overall economic conditions, however, could cause dissatisfaction to spread. [redacted] 25

Since the Ansar-led, Libyan-supported coup attempt in 1976, when some officers joined the rebels and only a few off-duty enlisted men reported to their units, the regime has made a concentrated effort to ensure military loyalty. Because an estimated 60 percent of the enlisted ranks came from western Sudan, the homeland of most Ansars, recruitment of northerners and easterners has been emphasized. This policy, however, has left the military understrength—probably less than 60,000 as opposed to an authorized strength of 71,000—because civilian pay is higher in the northern and eastern regions of the country. [redacted] 25

The primary responsibility for maintaining security within the armed forces belongs to the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI). Its personnel are stationed with every unit down to and including battalion level and in some

Secret

Secret

cases smaller isolated units. [redacted]  
[redacted]

25  
25

Intensive efforts are also made to ensure the loyalty of personnel assigned to those units responsible for maintaining order in the Khartoum area—the Republican Guard, two companies of the airborne brigade stationed at Khartoum North, and a group of eight infantry companies stationed at Khartoum South. Periodic arrests and court-martials of dissidents are used to deter others from engaging in antiregime activity. [redacted]

25

The regime's efforts to keep dissatisfaction in the armed forces to a minimum appear to have been largely successful. There probably is isolated opposition to the government within the military, but it does not appear to be a serious threat to Nimeiri. If the regime were threatened, internally or externally, the army would defend it. Over time, however, the loyalty of the military could be eroded by a perceived lack of career opportunities or the government's inability to deal with the nation's economic problems. [redacted]

25

**Outlook**

President Nimeiri has been in office for more than 12 years, considerably longer than any other leader since the country achieved independence in 1956. The prospects for his remaining in power over the next year appear good, provided his health remains satisfactory. Despite some reports of unhappiness in the armed forces, there are no indications that any group in the military is preparing to move against the regime. We believe that the army is probably willing and able to put down most public disorders that might occur. An extended, widespread public uprising, however, could severely test the military's loyalty to the government. Although we cannot predict such an uprising, it is possible that one could occur spontaneously given the extent of public dissatisfaction. [redacted]

25

If Nimeiri died or left office for health reasons, First Vice President Abd al-Majid Khalil would succeed him temporarily. Khalil, who appears to have the support of the military, probably would win the presidential elections if they were held, as constitutionally required, within 60 days. If Nimeiri chooses not to seek reelection at the end of his present term which expires in 1983, the Sudan Socialist Union would select the next president. In this case, Khalil, who has the support of Nimeiri, would appear to be the front-runner. [redacted]

25

Under Khalil, or a government in which he had the strongest voice, Sudanese national policies probably would change very little. Sudan probably would maintain its pro-Western and pro-Egyptian foreign policy.

Secret

Secret

Khalil, who lacks Nimeiri's ability to deal with the disparate Sudanese political and tribal groups, probably would be inclined to treat domestic critics of the regime more harshly than Nimeiri. This approach could end the uneasy truce between the government and its conservative opponents created by Nimeiri's national reconciliation campaign. [REDACTED]

25

In the event that Nimeiri and his supporters were deposed in a coup, elements of the armed forces almost certainly would be involved and probably would dominate a successor regime. If military officers sympathetic to more conservative elements in Sudanese society, especially the Ansars and the Muslim Brotherhood, were to control a successor government, the new regime's foreign policy would shift from the present pro-Western stance toward a more nonaligned position. Such a government would abandon its close identification with Egypt in favor of closer ties with the conservative Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia. Sudanese-US relations would be less close, but the new government probably would continue to seek military and economic support from the West. [REDACTED]

25

In the unlikely—but not impossible—event that officers sympathetic to the goals of Libya and/or other radical Arab states were to control a successor government, US interests in the region would be very seriously damaged and Sudanese relations with the USSR and its allies could be expected to improve dramatically. [REDACTED]

25

Secret

**Secret**

Approved For Release 2007/06/05 : CIA-RDP06T00412R000200360001-9

⊙

**Secret**

CIA-RDP06T00412R000200360001-9