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Libya: The Domestic Challenge to Qadhafi




An Intelligence Assessment

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
Libya: The Domestic Challenge to Qadhafi



An Intelligence Assessment

*Information available as of 12 June 1981
has been used in the preparation of this report.*

This assessment was prepared by 
 Office of Political Analysis. Comments and
queries are welcome and should be directed to the
Chief, Near East South Asia Division, OPA, on


This paper was coordinated with the Offices of
Central Reference, Economic Research, Strategic
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Directorate of Operations, and the National
Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia.




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**Libya:
The Domestic Challenge
to Qadhafi** [Redacted]

Key Judgments

Widespread and growing disaffection with the Qadhafi regime in Libya makes it almost certain that Qadhafi will ultimately be removed from power by means of assassination or coup, probably engineered by the military. Predicting the timing, however, is almost impossible. Qadhafi could remain in power for a considerable period [Redacted]

Unhappiness is no longer confined to the middle and upper classes. Members of the lower classes, too, have been affected by compulsory military service, heavy casualties in Uganda and Chad, utterances and practices that offend traditional Muslim mores, purges and executions for political and economic "crimes," confiscation of savings, and murders of dissidents abroad. The military, in particular, objects to the creation of revolutionary committees within the officer corps—which has destroyed discipline—and to casualties incurred in pursuit of Qadhafi's foreign adventures. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

We have evidence pointing to a string of attempts against Qadhafi by individuals and groups within the military in recent years. Fragmentary information indicates that groups continue to plot but tells us little about their extent or composition. Potential plotters cannot help but be discouraged by the regime's success in neutralizing coup attempts in advance [Redacted]

Civilian discontent has shown itself in occasional reports of demonstrations, circulated pamphlets, and unspecified unrest, perhaps even violence directed against Libyan officials. Cyrenaica, especially in its chief town, Benghazi, has been the scene of numerous disturbances. Student dissent peaked last fall when students, including females, were forcibly drafted for service in Chad. Farmers have resisted regime attempts at reform. There have been arrests within the Berber community and among followers of one dissident imam. [Redacted]

[Redacted]


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


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A number of exile groups have organized in opposition to the Qadhafi regime, but they tend to lack local assets and to dissipate much of their energies in intergroup squabbling.

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
There are a number of key factors working in the regime's favor, however: the political passivity of the Libyan people; soaring oil revenues and the social programs they pay for; Qadhafi's extensive precautions for his personal safety; and his successful reliance on fellow tribesmen as spies and informers. In the last two years the regime has begun a systematic policy of intimidation—political purges and murders of exiles—that must give pause to potential plotters

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Qadhafi will most likely exit the scene—in time—as the result of a military coup, perhaps with the participation of disaffected regime figures and leading exiles. A successor regime will probably involve a collegial leadership at first, masking a jockeying for power behind the scenes that will ultimately yield a single leader. Any successor, however, will probably reduce or eliminate Qadhafi's support for world terrorism, pursuit of a nuclear capability, and use of oil to intimidate the West. The Soviet connection would probably be maintained to ensure continued access to weapons and parts, but there might be a significant distancing between Tripoli and Moscow; even an outright breach cannot be ruled out

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**Libya:
The Domestic Challenge
to Qadhafi**

Causes of Discontent

Libya's Mu'ammur Qadhafi—who at the moment holds no official position but is nevertheless sole ruler of the country—has seen popular acceptance of his revolutionary regime erode dangerously in the past few years. Qadhafi was never a friend to the upper class, which had thrived under the monarchy, or to the middle class—the landowners and merchants who became the immediate targets of Qadhafi's reforms. He quickly endeared himself to the lower classes, however, as he set about transforming Libya into a semisocialist state. Staple foods were subsidized. Education was provided at no cost to the young, including thousands studying at US and European universities. Medical clinics were established throughout the country. An ambitious housing program was undertaken. These changes were made possible by the leap in oil profits that began after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. The reforms profoundly altered a country that before the discovery of oil in 1959 was one of the poorest in the world and seemed to solidify Qadhafi's popularity.

But Qadhafi has not been content with modest reforms. Strongly influenced by Nasir, Qadhafi at first remained in his shadow, modeling his revolution on Nasir's. Soon, however, Qadhafi's self-image broadened. With the publication of the three volumes of *The Green Book*, Qadhafi arrogated to himself the stature of Muhammad, uttering "the truth" in the tones of a prophet and even "correcting" flaws in the Koran. This posture has shocked Libya's devout Muslims and their religious leaders—to say nothing of antagonizing Libya's conservative Arab neighbors, Saudi Arabia and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. A domestic reaction to Qadhafi on religious grounds has, however, been slow in developing because Libya—unlike Iran—does not have strong, independent religious leaders. Nor is there a revered, central Islamic institution, like Cairo's Al-Azhar University, capable of taking the lead in orchestrating opposition. Reforms such as the inauguration of compulsory military service for women, as well as men, have generated no organized resistance, but the effect has been deeply disturbing to



Camera Press ©

Mu'ammur Qadhafi

the pious, and there have been scattered instances of dissent and outright defiance.


Qadhafi's doctrines are not the only problems causing discontent among the lower classes, as well as within the ranks of Qadhafi's more traditional opponents. Compulsory military service is universally disliked—particularly among high school and college students, who have seen their schools and universities turned into military barracks for half the year. Often representatives of the regime will march into a classroom and draft all the students on the spot. Qadhafi's foreign adventures and the heavy casualty rate they have brought are widely resented. We have no reliable information on Libyan losses in Chad, or on earlier losses in Uganda. There is evidence that the rate is fairly high, however, and that the effect of the losses has been

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compounded by the regime's clumsy attempts to cover up their extent. [redacted] families are not notified of a death until a government vehicle arrives to deposit a sheep—for sacrifice—at the doorstep. Families are given no details, and the bodies are not returned, depriving the survivors of the possibility of conducting appropriate funeral rites. [redacted]

About two years ago Qadhafi embarked on an all-out attempt to impose his revolutionary doctrines on Libyan society. He may have been spurred by the success of the Iranian revolution and a determination not to be shown up by Iranian zealots who, he was convinced, were modeling their revolution on his own. In early 1978 he published the second volume of *The Green Book*—on economic theory—and began to put its cloudy ideas into practice. In May he nationalized every house not occupied by its owner; renters became owners overnight. In September workers were urged to take over their place of employment, and in December the government nationalized all import industries. In March 1979 Qadhafi announced that he was stepping down from the office of President and dissolving the Revolutionary Command Council, since all power was now in the hands of the people. This enlarged Qadhafi's freedom of action, since it removed whatever restraints the RCC had imposed. The death penalty was announced for undefined "economic crimes" in April 1979, although it was not immediately applied.

[redacted]

The year 1980 saw a qualitative change in Qadhafi's style of rule. Until that time his attempt to impose a new social and economic order, while hard on those who had previously been well off, was tempered by moderation. But in 1980 Qadhafi seemed to lose all sense of restraint. In a lecture in May on his revolutionary doctrines at Fatih University, Qadhafi declared that "the physical liquidation of counterrevolutionary forces everywhere is the last stage in a revolutionary struggle." He thus elevated to the status of doctrine what he had already begun to practice: arrests, show trials, executions of economic "criminals" and political opponents at home, and the murder of dissidents abroad. The "revolutionary committees"—which had been created in 1977 but had maintained a relatively low profile—moved to the fore as agents of the regime's repression. Thousands were denounced, rounded up, tried before courts composed of revolu-

tionary committee members, and sentenced. Some, after dramatic televised "confessions," were released; others vanished. Between April 1980 and May 1981, 11 Libyan exiles were murdered—in Rome, Beirut, London, Bonn, Athens, Milan, and Manchester; other dissidents were seriously injured, including one exile's two children and a student in the United States. [redacted]

Libya's newly repressive atmosphere is widely unpopular with all levels of Libyan society, including the lower classes that had previously benefited from the Qadhafi regime. Some have lost family members, friends, and acquaintances. The regime has used the threat of force against an individual or his family to persuade people to cooperate. Those murdered abroad may not be buried in Libya, depriving the families of the consolation of Muslim rites. The result has been distrust, even of one's own family, and revulsion. Revolutionary committee members—most of them young men, many drunk with power rather than ideological fervor—have been encouraged to act like goon squads, breaking into homes and smashing wine presses, stealing in the name of revolutionary equality, literally getting away with murder. [redacted]

On the economic front, too, the regime launched a last-ditch attack against the vestiges of Libyan capitalism. It nationalized small shops, leading to chronic shortages of foods and other necessities, then turned its attention to individual savings accounts. Declaring as its aim the elimination of "hoarded wealth," it seized control of all citizens' money above a maximum of 1,000 dinars (about \$3,380) per family. So radical was the move that its effects extended well down the economic ladder, again chipping away at the regime's traditional support. [redacted]

The army—especially the officer corps—has particular reasons for disillusionment with the regime. It has borne the brunt of Qadhafi's determination to inject Libyan power into places like Uganda and Chad, which the population considers irrelevant to the country's interests. The regime's decision to introduce revolutionary committees into the ranks of the armed forces meant that junior officers, even enlisted men, were often elevated over the heads of their superiors—a situation that destroyed military discipline and eroded morale. On the other hand, Libya's success in Chad has probably had a positive effect on the mili-

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tary's support for the regime—at least so far. But the military must find duty in Chad onerous at best. The Chadians have started to harass Libyan troops, and if Chadian rebel leader Habre is successful in mounting a guerrilla campaign against the occupying Libyans, stretched thin over difficult terrain, the resulting death toll could quickly change the military's mood.



Areas of Vulnerability Within the Leadership

Qadhafi's Libya is, rhetoric aside, a state ruled by one man. Immediately following his successful coup in September 1969 Qadhafi, who did most of the coup planning, called himself merely the first of 12 members of the ruling Revolutionary Command Council, but the other members of the group were handpicked by him. It quickly became apparent that the civilian Council of Ministers had no real power. Over the years, seven members of the original RCC have fallen by the wayside. At the moment only four—besides Qadhafi—have any political role: Abd al-Salam Jallud, frequently referred to as Qadhafi's second in command (he holds no official position); Mustafa Kharubi, thought to be head of both general and military intelligence, although there is one report that he has lost these posts; Khuwaylidi al-Humaydi, leader of the people's militia; and Abu Bakr Yunis Jabir, commander in chief of the armed forces.



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Abd al-Salam Jallud



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
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
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
For all their long association with Qadhafi and their retention of positions of seeming importance, the actual power exercised by these men is unclear.



A key uncertainty involves the amount of power exercised by Jallud. He is usually regarded as Qadhafi's deputy—and thus Qadhafi's most likely successor.



The positions of Kharubi and Humaydi and their attitudes toward Qadhafi are only slightly less puzzling. There is a fair amount of evidence that the two have disagreed with a number of Qadhafi's policies at different times over the years, and that Qadhafi has come to question their loyalty—although apparently not enough to remove them.



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
Franz Furst ©

Mustafa Kharubi [Redacted]



al-Fajr al-Jadid ©

Khuwaylidi al-Humaydi [Redacted]



Abu Bakr Yunis is the only one of Qadhafi's former RCC colleagues who still seems to be unreservedly loyal. Yunis, one of the few blacks to have made good in a race-conscious country, is the only figure in the leadership besides Qadhafi who has a powerful tribal power base (the Yunis tribe is in Fezzan, near the Chadian border)—a fact that may explain his long tenure, since [Redacted] he is somewhat ineffectual. His attitude toward Qadhafi is

apparently obsequious; he never questions or opposes Qadhafi's policies and takes Qadhafi's side in intraleadership disputes. [Redacted]

Most accounts agree that regardless of their current status, the four remaining RCC members have lost ground in recent years to a group of young, uneducated, and unpolished (some barely literate) firebrands and sycophants from Bedouin tribes—many of them Qadhafi's fellow Qadhafa tribesmen—who feed Qadhafi's ego, tell him what he wants to hear, and encourage his drive to impose his ideology on the country, particularly through the use of "revolutionary violence." Several of these figures, such as Sayyid Qadhaf al-Dam, a cousin and fellow tribesman, Sayyid's brother Ahmad, and Qadhafi's cousin Hassan Ashkal, are very powerful. They tend to move from position to position, often taking on security or intelligence functions or carrying out special missions for Qadhafi. They seem to be fanatically loyal to their leader [Redacted]

[Redacted] These seem to be the people with access to [Redacted]

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Qadhafi, the ones he trusts and turns to for advice.





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Areas of Vulnerability Within the Military

There is considerable evidence that unhappiness with the Qadhafi regime has been mounting within the ranks of the military, but little information on the existence of active plotting groups.




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We can be fairly certain of widespread dissatisfaction within the ranks of the military, but it does not necessarily follow that disaffected officers are prepared to act—particularly in view of the fate that has overtaken so many of their fellows involved in antiregime activity over the years. The fact that Qadhafi has faced—and surmounted—repeated coup and assassination attempts, most of them military, tends to make the existence of current plotting groups more plausible, but does not augur well for their chances.



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


Early in 1979 Qadhafi compounded his problems with the military by committing some 2,000 men—many from the people's militia—to the ill-fated campaign in Uganda. At this point he seems to have realized that steps had to be taken to deal with mounting military discontent. He convened a three-day meeting of Free Officers¹ in April 1979, at which he catalogued the "triumphs" of Libyan policy that could be credited to the Army and simultaneously announced that revolutionary committees were to be organized within the officer corps, obviously as a control mechanism.

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
¹ The Free Officers are the group of young officers who, under Qadhafi's leadership, carried out the coup in September 1969. Those who emerged as leaders, and who subsequently became members of the 12-man Revolutionary Command Council, were, with only two exceptions, part of the 1963 graduating class of the Military Academy, and the total number of Free Officers—many of whom played a peripheral role, if any, in the actual coup—probably exceeds 100.



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There is some possibility that the success of Qadhafi's move into Chad has alleviated the situation within the military to some extent by giving it a successful campaign. The long history of failed coup attempts and subsequent executions, moreover, has no doubt discouraged potential dissidents, as has the current repressive atmosphere: purges at home, murders abroad, and Qadhafi's heavy reliance on spies and informers. At the same time, casualties in Chad have reportedly been high, and few Libyans see any national stake in Chad or have any interest in a merger. There is considerable evidence of significant disaffection in the armed forces; [Redacted]

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The military retains, at least in theory, the capability to act against the regime [Redacted]

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Civilian Dissent

There is no evidence of current plotting by civilian groups within Libya. There are, however, indications of widespread unhappiness on the part of key groups: religious conservatives; students; entrepreneurs and other members of the middle class; and professionals. There are fragmentary accounts of demonstrations, circulated pamphlets, and unspecified unrest, perhaps including protest attacks on regime officials, but Libya is now a closed society and few details have come to light. [Redacted]

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Several generalizations, however, can be made. Qadhafi's power base is in the western part of the country. He draws his strength from his own tribe and those around his birthplace, the Tripolitanian city of Surt, and from the tribes near Sabha, in Fezzan—the place where he attended school. [Redacted]

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Cyrenaica—that portion of Libya closest to the Egyptian border—has traditionally been antagonistic to the Qadhafi regime. Banghazi (in Cyrenaica) has been the scene of numerous disturbances over the years. In 1972 a “Libyan Liberation Movement” in Banghazi was active in distributing tracts and painting slogans hostile to the regime. In April 1979, an assassination attempt was slated to take place in either Banghazi or Tobruk and was uncovered when bombs hidden in a private home exploded.

[Redacted]

In March 1980 violent clashes were reported to have taken place between members of the Tobruk revolutionary committee and local citizens; at least in the beginning they involved members of the Kashat tribe seeking revenge for the rough public interrogation of a fellow tribesman who was also a prominent local businessman. Several people were killed. An assassination attempt against Qadhafi took place in Banghazi in May 1980.

[Redacted]

Student dissent predates the regime’s involvement in Chad, but until the fall of 1980 does not seem to have amounted to much. [Redacted] the circulation of antiregime pamphlets and the boycott of a lecture by Qadhafi’s deputy Jallud at Tripoli’s Al-Fatih University. A subsequent incident involved the defacement of a large portrait of Qadhafi with red paint at the same university. The regime has kept close watch on Gar Yunis University in Banghazi since an April 1976 student uprising there; Qadhafi himself has appeared at Gar Yunis to lecture the faculty on the need to exhibit sufficient revolutionary fervor, and student union elections have been rigged. November 1980 saw a number of serious incidents at Al-Fatih that grew out of demonstrations protesting conscription for military service in Chad; we have few details, but troops seem to have been called out to impose order, and some deaths were reported.

Unrest in conservative religious circles surfaces only rarely. In November 1980, however, Libyan police reportedly arrested 50 worshippers at Tripoli’s Idris

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Mosque after an imam spoke out in criticism of Qadhafi.

[Redacted]

Libya’s Bedouin tribes are generally thought to support the regime, but there are occasional hints of trouble from this quarter. In January 1981 some Libyan Berbers were apparently discovered in possession of revolutionary pamphlets obtained from Algerian Berbers, touching off a campaign of arrests within the Libyan Berber community.

Another disaffected group occasionally heard from are the farmers in the “green belt”—the coastal strip in northwestern Libya that contains most of Libya’s agricultural land. Qadhafi has long intended to implement a land reform limiting landholdings to no less than five and no more than 10 hectares—an arrangement that would dispossess many farmers with holdings less than five hectares. The regime backed down from an attempt to carry out these reforms in 1978.

Another attempt in the fall of 1979 led to such opposition that both the people’s and the revolutionary committees in Zawiyah refused to carry out the redistribution. Violence ultimately broke out, much of it caused by an armed group calling itself the “black cats,” which committed a series of robberies and beatings in and near Zawiyah; one of the first victims was the head of the town’s revolutionary committee. The regime again suspended the land reform, but there were reports in early 1981 that it planned to renew the attempt.

The entrepreneurial and professional classes—hardest hit by the regime’s reforms—seem to have remained quiescent, probably out of a feeling of helplessness.


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
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Qadhafi's more recent actions may be pushing the Libyan people to the limits of their tolerance. In February 1980 a prominent lawyer was arrested in the early phase of the regime's extensive "anticorruption" purge and died in custody. Some 5,000 people chanting antigovernment slogans attended his funeral, prompting the regime to call out the police with orders to shoot. Forty of the mourners were later arrested; anti-Qadhafi slogans were painted on walls around Tripoli, and a portrait of Qadhafi in a central square was smeared with black paint.




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relatives and fellow tribesmen, on whose loyalty he can depend. He early adopted the practice of appointing tribal supporters to sensitive positions, both military and civilian; they also function as informers on colleagues or underlings showing signs of discontent. The military comes in for special attention. Officers are frequently rotated to prevent their developing a body of loyal followers, and revolutionary committees have been installed throughout the officer corps. The system seems to have paid off.

[Redacted]

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Qadhafi, alerted by repeated assassination attempts, takes extensive precautions for his personal safety. He is said to sleep in a mobile van that shifts location nightly and to employ East German bodyguards.

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It is possible that some potential dissidents are deflected by the regime's incessant protestations that, under Qadhafi, Libya alone has realized "true democracy," since it has abolished representative government—considered to be a distortion of democracy—and established direct rule by the masses (hence the coined name for this type of government, "jamahiriya"—republic of the masses). The government has created a system of popular committees and general people's congresses that may foster the illusion of democracy in the eyes of some. Special attempts have been made to recruit women and members of the Berber minority into the structure. Trade and professional unions are integrated into the popular committees, although trade unions are outlawed as unnecessary; in theory, workers have taken over the places of business that employ them. These devices give very few Libyans a sense of control over their destinies, but they serve as a distraction.

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Strengths of the Regime

Despite evidence of mounting discontent with the Qadhafi government in all levels of Libyan society, a number of factors work in the regime's favor. The Libyan people traditionally are politically passive. The country's soaring oil revenues go far to cushion disaffection; per capita income is now about \$10,000 a year—one of the world's highest. Such programs as food subsidies, housing projects, and provision of medical care build support.

Qadhafi has always been careful to guard against a repeat of the coup that brought him to power in 1969. He tends to associate with and rely for advice on

In the past two years, however, the regime has resorted increasingly to government by intimidation—a technique that raises the level of discontent, but clearly discourages people from acting. The atmosphere within the country has grown increasingly repressive. With revolutionary committees encouraged to denounce neighbors and coworkers for lack of revolutionary zeal, with the "confessions" of allegedly corrupt businessmen and officials featured on nightly television, with the confiscation of private savings accounts, businesses, and homes, and reports of dissidents mur-

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dered abroad, few Libyans will be inclined to stick their necks out. Some members of the military have probably met to plot, but many of the most discontented and willing to act have already been arrested and executed—with dampening effect on their colleagues [redacted]

The Libyan exile movement was for a time thrown into disarray by the government-arranged murders of prominent dissidents that took place between April and November 1980, totaling 11 dead and three wounded. A new incident in Rome airport in February 1981 seemed to signal the start of a fresh campaign. Fear of assassination disrupted exile meetings and caused some dissidents to move from Europe to Egypt or Morocco. It is nevertheless doubtful that the exile movement ever posed a significant threat to Qadhafi. Only assets in Libya—if any—are in a position to threaten the regime, and a disruption of exile politicking is of little consequence. Qadhafi's main motive was presumably intimidation—a demonstration that no quarter is beyond his reach. In this he was successful, and the lesson was probably also effective domestically [redacted]

Outlook

Qadhafi will almost certainly be removed from power by means of assassination or coup; the main questions are when and by whom. Predicting a date is almost impossible. We are certain that disaffection in Libya has laid the groundwork for action against the regime, but we lack information about any particular plotting group or groups with assets and a specific plan. The fact that we do not have the information does not mean that such a group does not exist, or that plotting may not have reached an advanced stage; an unknown group probably has a better chance of success. Qadhafi's ouster will probably come sooner rather than later—perhaps in the neighborhood of a year or two—but this prediction is little more than a hunch. Qadhafi's intelligence and security services are able and still loyal to the regime; previous plotters have been inept. Qadhafi's tenure could be a long one. [redacted]

The answer to “who?” is also elusive. The odds are that Qadhafi will be removed by elements of the military, very possibly in cooperation with members of the regime who have military ties—most likely Humaydi, the militia leader, or intelligence chief Kharubi. The

military has produced most of the coup and assassination attempts against Qadhafi over the last 11 years, and it has the ability to take over key posts and solidify the position of a new regime. Several scenarios involving the military are possible. A plot could be in progress now and touched off with little warning.

Alternatively, the current success in Chad may have neutralized some dissidence within the military, and a move might come only after the situation in Chad has deteriorated—perhaps when Habre's guerrilla group gains momentum and is responsible for mounting Libyan casualties. [redacted]

Other figures within the Libyan regime could move against Qadhafi in certain circumstances. A consensus that Qadhafi has finally gone too far could develop, particularly if Qadhafi is bogged down in Chad and suffers a humiliating defeat, or if he embarks on a policy that others regard as potentially disastrous for Libya—shutting down Libyan oil production entirely, for example, as a means of putting pressure on the United States. A move by regime figures could function like a palace coup and be over before the military—loyal to Qadhafi or not—has a chance to act [redacted]

Finally, assassination is a possibility. It probably would occur in connection with one of the above scenarios; most conspirators reason that Qadhafi is dangerous as long as he lives. The assassination could, however, be carried out by a lone gunman acting out of a variety of motives—concern for the future of his country, revenge for a relative lost in Chad—and prepared to give his life in the attempt. Qadhafi, who at one time won popularity by mingling with average citizens on an informal basis, now appears in public only rarely—probably out of fear. But no leader can seal himself off completely, and a simple assassination would in many ways be the easiest scheme to engineer. [redacted]

Each of the above scenarios has different implications in terms of a successor to Qadhafi. The possibility that Qadhafi will rule for decades and die a natural death, having groomed a successor, cannot be wholly eliminated; but such an event would take place so far in the future—Qadhafi is 39—that speculation is worthless. Succession because of natural death in the short term, for whatever reason, would closely resemble succession because of assassination by an individual acting alone. There would be considerable initial confusion, since no

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dissident group would be poised to act. Oddly enough, one immediate outcome might be business as usual, while jockeying for power continued behind the scenes. Since Qadhafi holds no official position, there is no immediate need to name a successor. Muhammad al-Zarruq Rajab, named General Secretary of the General People's Congress in January 1981, is technically chief of state and could exercise the powers of that office, perhaps in conjunction with Jallud, who customarily stands in for Qadhafi. The backstage struggle for power would, however, be intense. Regime figures would try to consolidate their position, and the military might be tempted to step in. This scenario yields the most unpredictable outcome. [redacted]

A military coup would probably result in some sort of collegial rule, patterned after the Revolutionary Command Council established by Qadhafi after his own seizure of power. As in the RCC's case, it would undoubtedly serve as a facade for behind-the-scenes maneuvering, which would ultimately lead to the emergence of one or at most two leading figures. Humaydi or Kharubi could end up on top. If the military acts in connection with leading exiles or subsequently invites them to return—a logical step toward winning general acceptance of the new regime—several of these men could be given posts. Most likely candidates would be Dr. Muhammad al-Magaryaf, the religious conservative who has recently assumed considerable prominence in the exile movement; former Foreign Minister Abd al-Munim al-Huni, long involved in exile activities; and Umar Muhayshi, former member of the Revolutionary Command Council and leader of an abortive coup in 1975. [redacted]

If figures within the Libyan regime move against Qadhafi, a collegial situation is also likely to result in the near term. The cast of characters would be different from the above and would include the people surrounding Qadhafi now. As in the case of a natural succession, Jallud would have an edge, since he tends to stand in for Qadhafi on public occasions and has more stature in the eyes of the general public. Armed forces commander Abu Bakr Yunis, though considered closer to Qadhafi than anyone outside his circle of relatives, would as a black have difficulty winning general acceptance. The tribesmen and relatives on whom Qadhafi has increasingly relied—men like Qadhaf al-Dam and Hassan Ashkal—are heavily implicated in

the regime's most unsavory policies and would be hard put to win support. Men with access to military power, however—Humaydi, Kharubi, and Yunis—could come out on top after a period of maneuvering. [redacted]

Virtually any of these scenarios would result in considerable improvement in terms of the threat posed by Libya to US interests. No one other than Qadhafi is likely to pursue his *Green Book* ideology with any kind of conviction. Efforts to project Libyan influence and protect Libyan interests in the Middle East and Africa would continue, but Libyan support for subversion virtually worldwide and indiscriminate training of subversive groups in terrorism and sabotage would cease. Qadhafi's successors are unlikely to be as single-minded in their pursuit of a nuclear capability for Libya and are less likely than Qadhafi to use oil as a political weapon against the West, particularly the United States. [redacted]

There could be, however, significant variations in the attitudes of possible successors toward the Soviet Union, as opposed to the West, and in their willingness to move closer to the moderate Arab camp. In general, any successor group cooperating closely with the exile movement, particularly one giving leading exiles positions in a post-Qadhafi government, would tend to be somewhat pro-Western and willing to work with such supporters of the United States as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. [redacted]


A coalition drawn from the ranks of the military would probably adopt a nonaligned policy, putting Libya's national interests first and steering a course somewhere between identification with the East or the West. It would probably be far more suspicious than the Qadhafi regime of close cooperation with the Soviet Union, but would not move to jeopardize access to Soviet weapons. There could be exceptions to this generalization. Some groups within the military are known to be strongly anti-Soviet, despite—or perhaps because of—training in the Soviet Union or Bloc countries and the presence of Soviet advisers in Libya. Such a group could adopt an anti-Soviet line—leading to the possibility that the Soviets will react by marshaling whatever assets they possess in Libya in an attempt to bring to power someone on whom they can rely. We have no information on who such a pro-Soviet can-

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
didate might be or the kind of support the Soviets can muster, but any unsettled situation—inevitable after a coup—would give them room to maneuver. 

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If the succession is natural or the current regime moves against Qadhafi, there would be a tendency to emphasize continuity with Qadhafi's policies as a way of stabilizing the country. Moreover, few of Qadhafi's lieutenants utter their thoughts freely—a principal reason for their survival. It is therefore not possible to predict where one or a group of these men will take a post-Qadhafi regime. Most, however, are known to have at least some differences with Qadhafi and to oppose his excesses. Should the successor be Jallud, the likeliest outcome under these two scenarios, the regime would probably pursue a pragmatic rather than an ideological line. Jallud, who received some military training in the United States, is not driven by Qadhafi's philosophical preoccupations. He would probably continue many of Qadhafi's socialist policies, but in modified form. He would be likely to remain close to the Soviet Union, but without Qadhafi's strong distrust, even hatred, of the West 

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