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
APPENDIX

ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF INDIVIDUAL INTELLIGENCE ENTITIES

Collection Tasking Staff

- \* Exercised the transfer of the DCI's tasking responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense to be prepared should the President direct such a transfer in time of crisis.
- \* Established the Collection Tasking Staff/National Intelligence Tasking Center which centralized the intelligence requirements processes through which prioritized guidance and tasking are levied on the Program Managers.

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**NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER**



WASHINGTON, D. C. 20503

3 December 1980

STAT  
NOTE FOR:



STAT

The attached document is a brief description of some of the accomplishments of NFAC during the Carter Administration. Action Officer in NFAC is  extension  We only received your request on 2 December. I hope this is helpful.

STAT



STAT

C/PMES

3 December 1980

NFAC Accomplishments

## I. Organizational accomplishments:

A. The creation of the National Foreign Assessment Center in October 1977, that brought together in one new organization:

- the intelligence production and support elements of the Intelligence Directorate;
- the national intelligence production capabilities of the National Intelligence Officers; and
- the scientific and weapons research and resources of the Directorate of Science and Technology. [redacted]

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B. The establishment of the National Intelligence Council (NIC), to function as a central Community body for the coordination and collegial review of National Intelligence Estimates and the creation of the Analytic Group to give the NIC an interagency staff to draft NIEs and other interagency papers. [redacted]

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C. The consolidation of intelligence production resources devoted to military and non-military science and technology into the Office of Scientific and Weapons Research. [redacted]

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D. The establishment of the Senior Review Panel:

- to provide substantive review of major interagency and other finished intelligence publications;
- to conduct independent reviews of Community performance on key foreign policy issues;
- to advise DD/NEA on substantive matters pertaining to finished intelligence. [redacted]

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E. The creation of the Environment and Resource Analysis Center that pioneered efforts to manage interdisciplinary research, analyses, and reporting; subsequent formation of other multidisciplinary teams including the Cuba Analytic Center, the International Narcotics and Terrorism Center, the Southwest Asia Analytic Center [redacted]

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F. The establishment of the Arms Control Intelligence Staff to provide a central point for staff oversight of the intelligence aspects of all arms control activities involving the U.S. Government. [redacted]

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G. The appointment of a Special Assistant for Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence to provide a focal point for Community intelligence research and production on problems relating to nuclear proliferations. [redacted]

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II. Improvements in analytical capabilities:

A. The comprehensive assessment of analytical capabilities and the formulation of a systematic five-year plan to improve them. [redacted]

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B. The establishment of a Senior Intelligence Analyst Program that allows Intelligence Officers to progress to GS-15 and SIS-1 rank on the basis of superior analytic performance rather than managerial responsibility. [redacted]

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C. [redacted]

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D. The development of the Advanced Analyst Development Program to combine domestic graduate training and TDY travel focusing on priority/regional or topical intelligence problems. [redacted]

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E. The appointment of special NFAC recruiters to attract to the analytic corps, qualified women and other minority candidates and individuals with skills that are critical to NFAC's mission and are currently in short supply. [redacted]

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F. The establishment of analytic and intelligence production process courses; a re-emphasis on the maintenance of foreign language skills. [redacted]

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G. The use of econometric techniques to forecast the impact of decisions of major countries or organizations (OPEC) on the global economy. [redacted]

H. The addition of substantial analytic resources to analysis of Third World countries. Their relationships to each other, and to the major industrial nations. [redacted]

25X1

I. The development of a programmatic and systematic approach to examining socio-cultural factors that affect prospects for political instability and societal change. [redacted]

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III. Analytic production process accomplishments:

A. The increased experimentation with application of new analytical techniques and methodologies to better analyze military, economic, geographic, and political intelligence in general and on such specific topics as Soviet petroleum reservoirs, agricultural production in foreign countries, and Soviet defense spending. [redacted]

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- B. The increased participation by the intelligence production offices in the tasking of collection capabilities, both human and technical. [redacted] 25X1
- C. The development, refinement, and testing of Project SAFE to update and upgrade the current manual information handling system. A massive computerized system, the SAFE system will allow analysts to read and transfer daily intelligence traffic electronically, build private analytical files, create bibliographic records, and ultimately draft, review, and edit intelligence production via a CRT. [redacted] 25X1
- D. The initial development and periodic updating of the National Intelligence Topics (NITs), which established, pursuant to E.O. 12036 of January 1978, Community-wide requirements and priorities for national foreign intelligence. The "current" topics inform intelligence collectors and procedures of the nature of senior policymakers' needs for information and analysis over the current six-nine month time period. The "continuing" NITs guide collection, research, and analysis over the longer term. [redacted] 25X1
- E. The establishment of a new approach to integrated production planning that is designed to promote more extensive and effective interdisciplinary research as well as more efficient use of analytic resources. It makes use of interoffice teams to develop comprehensive research programs on selected high priority foreign intelligence topics. [redacted] 25X1
- F. An increase in the number and variety of topics NFAC publications address, and an ever widening audience for the intelligence product. [redacted] 25X1
- G. The development of an enhanced warning capability; the appointment of a National Intelligence Officer for Warning and the creation of a warning network to include a Warning Working Group and procedures to direct the work of other NIOs in this area. [redacted] 25X1
- H. The increased use of tailored ADP-support to help analysts manipulate large quantities of data quickly, perform analysis of it, and present it effectively and efficiently. [redacted] 25X1
- I. The greater responsiveness of the intelligence production process to the increased requirements of traditional customers. [redacted] 25X1

#### IV. Substantive accomplishments:

- A. Increased production of integrated analyses that examine the political, economic, military, geographic and sociological considerations of complex issues (nuclear proliferation questions, prospects for democracy, nationalist movements, potentials for war and peace). [redacted] 25X1

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B. Production directed increasingly toward current policy deliberations, both in Washington and abroad:

- support for trade negotiations;
- support for arms negotiations (MBFR, SALT, Nuclear, BW/CW, ASAT);
- support for international issues negotiations (LOS, CSCE, Middle East socio-cultural factors).

25X1

C. Increased and enhanced analytical work that deals with specific issues of international import (terrorism, narcotics, uses of outer space, arms transfers, technology transfers, food supply in weather-impacted area, crop forecasts).

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E. Even deeper investigation of the Soviet, East European, and Chinese economies, both in the aggregate and by sector.

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F. The addition of substantial resources to the analysis of worldwide energy supply and demand with emphasis on petroleum.

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G. The more rapid production of high quality maps and graphics on the entire spectrum of intelligence topics and for close support for negotiations and contingency force activities.

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H. The development of an enhanced warning capability to alert policymakers to developing crises and monitor events thereafter (China-Vietnam-USSR, Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq, Poland).

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I. The integration of highly technical engineering analyses of weapons with analyses of force doctrine and strategy, principally with respect to the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries. (Major military NIEs, intelligence analyses in support of policy deliberations and arms control negotiating teams.)

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J. The assessment of quantitative measures of force effectiveness of the USSR, China, and Third World countries whose conflicts might affect US interests. (Arabs-Israel, Iraq-Iran, Sino-Soviet border.)

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K. The projection of likely changes in the composition of Soviet military forces a decade ahead, including both qualitative changes and changes in technical characteristics.

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L. The improved analysis of US and Allied intelligence to monitor compliance with proposed and agreed terms of arms-limiting treaties.

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SECRET [redacted]

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- M. The increasingly sophisticated examination of the impact of the transfer of critical technologies from the West to the USSR, the PRC, and other countries. [redacted] 25X1
- N. The production of foreign conventional and strategic weapon assessments that provide information for the direction and development of U.S. weapons system. [redacted] 25X1
- O. The refined analysis of the physical and emotional health of world leaders and political successors. [redacted] 25X1
- P. The improved analysis of foreign civil technology capabilities of a variety of countries, especially the OECD, as they impact on the U.S. international economic position. [redacted] 25X1
- Q. The assessment of developments in the life sciences that might impact politically, economically or militarily on the U.S. or its allies. [redacted] 25X1

SECRET [redacted]

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**COLLECTION TASKING STAFF**

1 December 1980

NOTE FOR THE DCI

Executive Registry  
88-5485/6

FROM:   
Acting D/DCI/CT

SUBJECT: Report of Administration

REFERENCE: NFIB-2.1/40, 18 November 1980

Per your request (reference), attached is a brief accomplishment statement for the Collection Tasking Staff to be included in your report to the President.

Attachment:  
As Stated

**INFORMATION**

STAT

STAT

1 December 1980

[Executive Order 12036, January 1978, charged the DCI with responsibility for the coordination and tasking of national foreign intelligence collection activities, the production of intelligence, and approval of the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget. Responsibility for implementing the DCI's tasking authorities was vested in the Deputy to the DCI for Collection Tasking/Director, National Intelligence Tasking Center (NITC).]

[The establishment of the Collection Tasking Staff/NITC centralized the intelligence requirements processes through which prioritized guidance and tasking are levied on the Program Managers. Such tasking is normally developed with a Community consensus but utilizes the new DCI authority when a consensus cannot be acquired. In addition, in accordance with Executive Order 12036, we have conducted an exercise transfer of the DCI's tasking responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense to prepare ourselves should the President direct such a transfer in a time of extreme world crisis.]

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ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF INTELLIGENCE

DATE: 2 Dec 80

MEMORANDUM FOR: Capt Teboe

*If you need more detail  
on any of these points, don't  
hesitate to give me a call.*

*My*



*Bob Anderson*

25X3

ROBERT D. ANDERSON, Major, USAF  
Special Asst for External Affairs

**COVER SHEET FOR**  
**CLASSIFIED**  
**INFORMATION**

**COVER SHEET FOR**  
**CLASSIFIED**  
**INFORMATION**

**AF FORM 144a**

**U.S. Government Printing Office: 1970-721-118**

**SECRET**



**DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE**  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

2 DEC 1980

REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: IN

SUBJECT: Report for the Administration (NFIB-2.1/40)

TO:

25X1

In accordance with your request, a report on Air Force Intelligence accomplishments is attached.

*John B. Marks*  
**JOHN B. MARKS, Maj Gen, USAF**  
Asst Chief of Staff, Intelligence

- 2 Atch
- 1. AF Intelligence Accomplishments (S)
- 2. AF Intelligence Accomplishments (U)

*ATTACHMENTS ARE  
AHEAD OF LETTER  
& ARE DECLASSIFIED*

*SP*

When Atch 1 is/are withdrawn  
or not attached, the classification hereon  
is downgraded to Unclassified

**SECRET**

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AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE ACCOMPLISHMENTS  
(Unclassified Version)

[Air Force Intelligence made several significant contributions to the Intelligence Community over the past four years. The Foreign Technology Division, for example, identified rapid improvements in Soviet weapons technology. Further, Air Force elements provided national decision makers with information vital to nuclear treaty monitoring. The Air Force has also made a concerted effort to improve the interface between operations and intelligence within the Air Force and the Department of Defense. Among other things, these initiatives have included <sup>inclusion of</sup> greatly expanded support to electromagnetic combat and the development of a concept for integrated application of near real-time, all source intelligence to directly support air combat operations. In addition, the Air Force Intelligence Service established a Soviet Awareness Program which has been presented to over 100,000 personnel at some 200 bases worldwide, to educate Air Force members to Soviet military doctrine, strategy, force structure, and combat employment.

Marine Corps

- o Obtained observer status and participated in NFIB activities.
- o Contributed to ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ National Foreign Intelligence Program ~~Support~~ <sup>by</sup> ~~to operational commanders.~~
- o ~~Obtained benefits by the creation of the Tactical Cryptologic Program (TCP), giving visibility to~~
- o ~~Contributed to~~ Improved tactical cryptologic capabilities.



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20380

80-5485/4

IN REPLY REFER TO

INT:JJG:rap  
3800  
26 Nov 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Subj: Report for the Administration

Ref: (a) DCI Memo NFIB-2.1/40 dtd 18 Nov 1980

1. This memorandum provides the Marine Corps response to your request forwarded by reference (a).
2. Obtaining observer status on the National Foreign Intelligence Board, as recommended by the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and approved by the Director of Central Intelligence, was the signal accomplishment for Marine Corps intelligence during the past four years. Marine Corps participation in NFIB activities subsequently contributed to increased National Foreign Intelligence Program support to operational commanders which, from the perspective of this Headquarters, was the major accomplishment of the Intelligence Community during the period. This increased support has been manifested in various forms, several of which are described below:
  - a. Increased availability and capability of national intelligence systems to support operational commanders. The inclusion in the NFIP decision process of Service impact statements on proposed national intelligence systems, as directed by Congress, ensures consideration of the intelligence requirements of operational commanders.
  - b. Specific attention of the Intelligence Community Staff to the needs of operational commanders, as reflected in the CY 1980 study on NFIP Support to Contingency Forces.
  - c. Participation of an Intelligence Community Staff member in the annual development of the DoD Plan for Intelligence Support to Operational Commanders.
  - d. Intelligence Community Staff support to Service TENCAP (Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities) Programs.
  - e. Increased awareness of, and NFIP resources devoted to, Third World intelligence gaps.
3. The Marine Corps obtained significant benefits from the creation of the Tactical Cryptologic Program (TCP), which gave necessary visibility to tactical resources and permitted them to compete more effectively in the PPBS process. Further contributing to improved tactical cryptologic capabilities was the internal NSA reorganization which created a Tactical Resource Management Structure. These actions, both of which will ultimately

Subj: Report for the Administration (U)

improve cryptologic support to operational commanders, are considered positive and significant accomplishments of the Intelligence Community.

4. In summary, the Marine Corps commends the Intelligence Community for significant accomplishments in improving national intelligence support to operational commanders and expresses sincere appreciation for your support for these initiatives and for Marine Corps participation on the National Foreign Intelligence Board.

*Very respectfully,*  
*C. D. Dean*

C. D. DEAN  
Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps  
Director of Intelligence

Copy to:

Director, DIA  
Director, NSA  
DNI  
ACSI, DA  
ACSI, USAF  
DUSD (PR)  
ASD (C3I)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350

IN REPLY REFER TO

Ser 009Z/S325

2 December 1980

SECRET (Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (2))

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL FOREIGN  
INTELLIGENCE BOARD

Subj: Report for the Administration

Ref: (a) DCI memo, NFIB-2.1/40, subject as above, of  
18 November 1980

Encl: (1) Naval Intelligence Highlights, 1976-1980 (Unclassified)  
(2) Naval Intelligence Highlights, 1976-1980 (Secret)

Enclosures (1) and (2) are forwarded in response to  
reference (a).

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "S. Shapiro".

S. SHAPIRO  
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy  
Director of Naval Intelligence

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En

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NAVAL INTELLIGENCE HIGHLIGHTS

1976-1980

SECURITY

An automated system (RANKIN) for rapid promulgation of security guidance throughout the Department of the Navy has been established which has permitted annual savings of \$260K. Administrative procedures for controlling and adjudicating access to compartmented intelligence have been greatly improved, and major progress made in Navy security education and management programs.

Counterespionage operations by the Naval Investigative Service and FBI resulted in: (1) the arrest, trial, and conviction for espionage of two Soviet U.N. employees (ENGER and CHERNYAYEV) and expulsion of a third Soviet; and (2) the arrest, trial, and imprisonment of a USN enlisted man (MADSEN) for espionage.

SUPPORT TO USN OPERATIONS

Major strides have occurred in providing intelligence support, including data derived from national systems, to Navy operating forces. Increased cooperation has also occurred with other Service reconnaissance elements and foreign intelligence services.

Major upgrades were made in Navy's automated intelligence processing systems (NIPS) for tactical users in forward areas, including future support for the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. Upgrades include improved hardware for imagery interpretation and processing and communications systems for battle group commanders in such areas as the Indian Ocean. Navy's Integrated Automated Intelligence Processing System (IAIPS) now under development will offer major efficiencies in providing intelligence support to all consumers, national and tactical.

To improve maritime intelligence, particularly in Third World areas, a series of bilateral intelligence agreements with selected foreign navies have been initiated, and others are being aggressively pursued, which involve extensive data exchanges and hardware support. Consequently, major gaps in intelligence data bases are being reduced.

New procedures have been developed for providing all-source indications and warning data to tactical forces as well as national command authority. Unique data bases on worldwide merchant and fishing fleets, including major improvements in daily locational reporting and on arms deliveries to Third World

Enclosure (1) to CNO memo  
ser 009Z/S325 of 2 Dec 1980



nations, also have been developed. The significant potential threat to USN forces posed by Third World nations supplied with sophisticated weaponry has resulted in a new analytical and production effort.

SUPPORT TO RDT&E

Specialized procedures developed within Naval Intelligence for providing threat support to the weapon systems planning and acquisition community have made major resource savings available, in excess of \$750M to Navy program managers and sponsors, and have been recognized by award of an Intelligence Community Meritorious Unit Citation to an element of the Naval Intelligence Support Center.

Encl.

(2)

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
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NAVAL INTELLIGENCE HIGHLIGHTS

1976-1980

SECURITY

(S) A series of Naval Investigative Service (NIS) counter-espionage (CE) operations, designed to neutralize espionage activities against the Department of the Navy have been highly successful. In one case, with the cooperation of the Spanish government, GRU Brigadier General SVESHNIKOV was expelled from Spain with considerable adverse publicity. In April 1979, a five-year, joint NIS-FBI operation resulted in the return to the USSR of a Soviet intelligence officer and his family.



Currently, NIS has 59 active CE operations underway and 128 in the development stage which have produced extensive data, shared with other CE agencies, on Soviet, Polish, PRC, and Bloc military intelligence priorities, activities, and methods.

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(S) To identify the security vulnerability of U.S. ports to visits by Bloc merchant and public vessels, a major port survey effort was conducted of 120 areas, which resulted in closure by the NSC of several ports to Bloc shipping. In a related counterintelligence effort, during Operation COAST WATCH conducted during November 1978 each Soviet merchantman with Long Beach, California or New York City as first U.S. port of call was boarded and searched by an augmented Coast Guard team to identify its intelligence collection capabilities.

SUPPORT TO USN OPERATIONS

(S) An intense, concurrent RDT&E program funded through the NFIP to improve submarine SIGINT capabilities (PRAIRIE WAGON) succeeded in 1979 in the first operational deployment of a significantly enhanced and sophisticated system aboard US nuclear attack submarines. Additional systems are being procured.

(S) Navy's worldwide, all-flag merchant and fishing fleet tracking system now includes over 39K ships and has provided unique intelligence, unavailable elsewhere, on types and quantities of arms deliveries, Cuban troop deployment to Ethiopia, shipping in the Persian Gulf, compliance with the U.S. grain embargo,

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REVIEW ON

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Enclosure (2) to CNO memo  
ser 009Z/S325 of 2 Dec 1980

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and drug smuggling. Highly specialized and innovative analytical efforts by Naval Intelligence elements have resulted in major improvements in U.S. abilities to predict Soviet ballistic missile submarine deployments, plus data on Soviet naval readiness and military equipment deliveries to other nations, merchant and special interest ship activities, and the ability of the Soviet Navy to mount and sustain extended operations distant from Soviet territory. The latter ability has proven critical during the current hostilities along the Persian Gulf.

SUPPORT TO RDT&E

(S) Specialized threat intelligence support to Navy's weapon system planning and acquisition community has made great strides in recent years. Innovative procedures developed by the Naval Intelligence Support Center have pioneered foreign maritime threat projection efforts and made major contributions to ensuring the long term effectiveness and survivability of USN systems. For example, data developed on Soviet submarines resulted in restructuring of Navy's Propelled Ascending Mine Program, as well as modification to the target acquisition and exploder systems of the Mark 48 Torpedo. Similar information on Soviet naval air defense systems resulted in modifications to the HARPOON antiship cruise missile flight trajectory to enhance survivability. NISC's threat intelligence support has been credited with saving the Navy more than \$750 million.

(S) Additional critical scientific and technical intelligence provided during the period to National, Defense, Departmental and Fleet customers include: identification of the design and operating characteristics of the world's first 40 knot, titanium pressure hull submarine, the Soviet ALFA class; identification of the capabilities of a Soviet underwater reconnaissance system targeted against U.S. ASW surveillance systems; determination of a significant reduction in tonal levels in the primary noise source of the YANKEE class SSBN which effects U.S. ASW system capabilities; and data on Soviet surface combatant construction programs, including a possible nuclear-powered Soviet aircraft carrier.

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~~Department of the Army~~

[As the result of the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study, many recommendations were approved and implemented with far-reaching significance. Some of the highlights are:]

- o Placed tactical intelligence units directly under the authority of Army commanders instead of being attached to tactical units from larger Military intelligence organizations.
- o Established the US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) to provide command and control of intelligence units above the corps level.
- o Organized the combat electronic warfare intelligence (CEWI) battalions at the division level and ~~CEWI~~ groups at the corps level.
- o Established the Tactical Intelligence Readiness Training (REDTRAIN) Program, with the objective of <sup>to</sup> achieving ~~ing~~ and maintaining ~~ing~~ readiness of Army tactical intelligence personnel and units.
- o Implemented the Opposing Force (OPFOR) Program.
- o Developed and implemented an automated security program ~~which~~ <sup>to</sup> ensure that all sensitive defense information handled by automated systems is protected.
- o ~~Closely~~ Coordinated with FBI, CIA and Air Force in the debriefing and processing of Cuban refugees.
- o Contributed ~~significantly~~ to the National/Tactical interface arena through the Army's Tactical Exploitation of National Sapce Capabilities (TENCAP) Program.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

80-5485/7

DAMI-RMB-M

01 DEC 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Report for the Administration

1. This is in reply to your memorandum for NFIB Principals, dated 18 November 1980, subject as above.
2. A summary of unclassified major Army intelligence accomplishments during the 1977 through present period of President Carter's administration are described below. This summary is not all inclusive and includes only those accomplishments which may be discussed at the unclassified level and are deemed of such significance that they merit mention at the national level.

a. In 1974 the Army began a broad study of its intelligence activities known as the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study (IOSS). Many of its recommendations were approved in 1976 with implementation in 1976, 1977, and continuing through 1983. These were of far-reaching significance. Some of the highlights are:

- (1) Placing tactical intelligence units directly under the authority of Army commanders instead of being attached to tactical units from larger Military Intelligence (MI) organizations.
- (2) Establishment of the US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) on 1 January 1977 to provide command and control of intelligence units above the corps level.
- (3) Organization of combat electronic warfare intelligence (CEWI) battalions at the division level and CEWI groups at the corps level.

b. As mentioned above, one of the more far-reaching results of the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study was the development of fully integrated combat electronic warfare and intelligence battalions and groups to support divisions and corps. The first such unit, the 522d Military Intelligence Battalion (Division) was organized and tested at Fort Hood, Texas. The concept has proved to be valid and is being

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01 DEC 1980

DAMI-RMB-M

SUBJECT: Report for the Administration

implemented Army wide. The new consolidated units are more responsive to field commanders, easier to command and control, and able to provide concentrated collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence by having access to other defense and civilian intelligence sources.

c. Army accomplishments during the period were also highlighted by major innovations in the field of intelligence training. In 1979 the Tactical Intelligence Readiness Training (REDTRAIN) Program was established with the objective of achieving and maintaining readiness of Army tactical intelligence personnel and units. REDTRAIN is the application of all operational and training techniques necessary to preclude the erosion of highly technical and perishable skills gained during institutional or other training. As initially conceived and implemented, REDTRAIN was concerned with tactical Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) but has been revised to include the other intelligence disciplines, Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and Imagery Intelligence (IMINT). REDTRAIN has had a favorable impact not only on skills development and maintenance but also on job satisfaction and soldier retention.

d. Additionally, in late 1976 the Chief of Staff, US Army, approved the establishment of the Opposing Force (OPFOR) Program. Implementation of OPFOR began in 1977 and continues as one of the significant accomplishments of the past four years. It is an Army-wide training program which focuses peacetime preparedness training on the tactical vulnerabilities of potential adversaries mainly at the division level and below. OPFOR is designed to provide commanders with a training mechanism for emphasizing the competition inherent in battle through use of a realistic and credible opposing force, using the doctrine, tactics, and weapons systems of actual potential adversaries.

e. Organization and training were not the only areas of Army accomplishment. In an ever increasing world of automation, Army intelligence insured that automated support, and automation security procedures were available Army wide. The Army System for Standard Intelligence Support Terminals (ASSIST) was actually inaugurated in 1973 to modernize and improve intelligence data handling systems (IDHS). This involved the standardization of both computer hard- and software, interconnecting computers, providing access to national intelligence data bases, and achieving compatibility between Army and DOD computerized command and control systems. These improvements were to be made over several years. However, a major milestone was attained in FY 1978 when system software was installed at Army and Army-supported IDHS sites worldwide. This action provided the US Army, Europe (USAREUR), and the US Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) intelligence analysts common software for exchanging data, analyst-to-analyst communications, and full time access to the central host computers at Headquarters, US European Command (EUCOM). In FY 1979-80 linkage with the computer systems of the Defense Intelligence Agency

01 DEC 1980

DAMI-RMB-M

SUBJECT: Report for the Administration

(DIA) was achieved. The enhancement of the Army's intelligence data handling capabilities through ASSIST represents a significant accomplishment of great value to the Army, the Department of Defense, and the national interest.


f. On the security side of automation, a formal Army automation security program was developed and approved for Army-wide implementation in 1977. This program is intended to ensure that all sensitive defense information handled by automated systems is protected against espionage, sabotage, fraud, misappropriation, misuse, or inadvertent or deliberate compromise.

g. Finally, Army analysts also contributed to national level substantive intelligence issues which had direct effects on the national foreign intelligence policymaking process and decisions that were promulgated at the highest levels. Two cases in point were Army intelligence analytical efforts which uncovered major changes in North Korean troop levels and dispositions and Army research and analysis which, along with other intelligence community inputs identified and clarified the purpose of Soviet combat forces in Cuba. These were only two of the many national level contributions of Army intelligence production; however, they serve here to show that Army's intelligence efforts during the period were oriented equally at support for the soldier in the field and aid to the decision and policymakers of the nation. Army intelligence accomplishments for 1977-1980 were many. What has been described above and in the inclosure only serves to show that the period was marked by national level successes by Army intelligence.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE:

1 Incl  
Classified Edition

Copies Furnished:  
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense  
for Policy Review

  
SIDNEY T. WEINSTEIN  
Colonel, GS  
Executive

**SECRET**

MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF ARMY INTELLIGENCE (U)

(Classified Version)

(U) A summary of major accomplishments (classified) of Army Intelligence during President Carter's administration is provided below. The items highlighted in this report are those considered to be of national level interest and by no means represent the sum of accomplishments significant to the Army.

a. (S) During the past four years, the Army's vigorous Tactical Exploitation of National Space Capabilities (TENCAP) Program has made a significant contribution in the National/Tactical interface arena. The ultimate objective of TENCAP is to exploit the tactical potential of pertinent current and future assets of our national space programs. To that end, the Army has expeditiously fielded interface equipment and demonstrated the utility and effectiveness of this exploitation through exercises and JCS sanctioned special projects such as GRAVITY SCORE and POST OAKS I & II. (Classified by: DAMI-IS, HODA. Declassify 25 Nov 86).

b. (S/NOFORN) The Carter Administration's decision to accept Cuban boat refugees in the Spring of 1980 facilitated US intelligence collection efforts on Cuba. Refugees were debriefed to provide, among other things, order of battle on Cuban forces, the Soviet presence in Cuba, and related military information. The debriefings were a closely coordinated effort between the FBI, CIA, Army and Air Force teams assigned to the five Cuban refugee processing centers. They provided significant reporting of a first-time, unique nature which had a substantial impact on activities of the DOD Cuban Task Force. (Classified by: DIAM 58-11. Review on: 25 Nov 2000. Reason 2.301e(3))

**SECRET**

NOT RELEASABLE TO  
FOREIGN NATIONALS

TWCC 1

Department of Justice

- o Achieved <sup>Success</sup> in espionage prosecutions of Dedeyan, Moore, Boyce-Lee, Kampiles, and Truong-Humphrey, ~~In-addition~~, Rogalsky, Enger-Chernayayev and Barnett.
- o Achieved <sup>Success</sup> in civil actions in the Snepp, Stockwell and Agee cases.
- o Established the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, centralizing the Department's intelligence-related functions.
- o Participated in extensive discussions between ~~and among~~ representatives of the Executive and Legislative Branches concerning the proposed legislative charter for the intelligence community.
- o Implemented the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
- o Provided recommendations to the Attorney General of counterintelligence cases requested by the FBI.
- o Reviewed and approved, modified or disapproved FBI foreign counterintelligence activities for which the Attorney General has delegated approval authority to the Office of Intelligence and Policy Review.



Office of Intelligence Policy and Review


Washington, D.C. 20530

DEC 03 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR  
Central Intelligence Agency

Re: Summary of Major Accomplishments  
1976 - 80

This is in response to your November 18 request for a summary of major accomplishments of the Department of Justice as a member of NFIB during this Administration. Because of the nature of the Department's role in the intelligence area and the fact that the substantive aspects of that role are likely to be reported by the intelligence agencies involved, we are submitting only an unclassified version. Please advise us if additional information is necessary or desirable.

  
for Kenneth J. Bass, III  
Counsel for Intelligence Policy  
Office of Intelligence Policy & Review

Attachment.

SUMMARY OF MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE  
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE RELATING TO U.S.  
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

General

The Attorney General and the Department of Justice have become full, recognized participants in the U.S. intelligence and national security affairs area during the past several years, largely as a result of the development and implementation of Executive Order 12036, entitled "United States Intelligence Activities" and authorizing the conduct of those activities, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and other statutes affecting the Intelligence Community. Under Executive Order 12036, the Attorney General is a member of the National Security Council's Policy Review and Special Coordination Committees and the Department is represented on the National Foreign Intelligence Board.

Attorneys from the Department played substantial roles in the drafting of Executive Order 12036 and the PRM/NSC-11 studies that preceded that Order. Department representatives were also called upon to contribute heavily to the development of Executive Order 12065, entitled "National Security Information" and governing the handling and processing of classified information, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, authorizing electronic surveillance for intelligence purposes in the U.S., and the consideration and negotiations concerning the proposed National Intelligence charter legislation.

The latter effort, involving representatives of the intelligence agencies as well as the White House and the Justice Department, culminated in the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1980. Provisions of that Act amended the Hughes-Ryan Amendment so as to narrow the required reporting of covert action findings to only two committees of Congress instead of eight and to preserve the existing balance between the Executive and the Congress in the area of Congressional oversight and access to intelligence information. In addition, the Department was primarily responsible for the enactment of new legislation to protect the Government and national security information from "Greymail" - a term that was apparently first coined by former CIA Deputy General Counsel John Morrison - whereby defendants in criminal proceedings would use the threat of disclosure of classified materials to evade prosecution.

Representatives of the Department also were called upon to provide views and added support to proposed legislation that would provide criminal penalties for enterprises intended to expose the identities of U.S. intelligence officers operating undercover. The Department also helped develop and advocated significant amendments to the Freedom of Information Act that would serve to alleviate the burdens imposed on the intelligence agencies by that statute.

Although the underlying circumstances were unfortunate, it should also be noted that the Department also litigated, with the assistance of the various general counsels, a number of cases of extreme significance to the Intelligence Community during the past four years. Among the successful espionage prosecutions were the Dedeyan, Moore, Boyce-Lee, Kampiles and Truong-Humphrey cases. Additional successes for the Government were registered in the Rogalsky, Enger-Chernyayev, and Barnet espionage cases. The Department also achieved success in civil actions affecting and preserving the integrity of intelligence pre-publication review agreements in the Snepp, Stockwell and Agee cases, and defended the agencies' interests in a host of other civil actions and FOIA cases.

#### OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE POLICY AND REVIEW

It became increasingly apparent in early 1979 that, while the involvement of the Attorney General and the Department in intelligence activities and national security affairs was growing, no organization with the Department was well suited in terms of expertise, experience, continuity and function to assist the Attorney General in performing the broad range of responsibilities and functions that were spread at that time between personnel in the Attorney General's Office, the Office of Legal Counsel and, to a lesser degree, the Civil and Criminal Divisions of the Department. After considering a variety of options, it was determined that a new component was required, headed by a senior official reporting directly to the Attorney General and staffed with attorneys devoted entirely to the study and resolution of the legal and policy issues that arise in this area. Accordingly, Attorney General Bell, in April 1979, appointed the first Counsel for Intelligence Policy and directed the establishment of the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review. In the interim, many of the functions that were to be assigned to the new Office began to be performed by personnel in the Office of Legal Counsel and the Investigation Review Unit which had been engaged in the review of certain

intelligence activities for the previous several years.

In February 1980 Attorney General Civiletti signed a DOJ Order establishing the new Office, consisting of ten attorney and four secretarial positions and absorbing the Investigation Review Unit. In addition, the centralization of the Department's intelligence-related functions continued. Personnel were recruited during 1980 and the Office reached full strength for the first time in November 1980.

The Office serves as the principal legal adviser on intelligence matters to the Attorney General, Deputy and Associate Attorneys General, other Departmental components and other agencies in the Executive Branch concerning the development, interpretation and application of statutes, Executive Orders, regulations, procedures and other directives and guidelines relating to U.S. intelligence activities. The Office also represents the Attorney General on the National Foreign Intelligence Board.

During the past year, the Counsel and other members of the Office represented the Attorney General and the Department on a large number of other boards, committees, subcommittees and working groups dealing with various types and facets of issues relating to intelligence activities, including the Interagency Coordinating Committee for U.S.-Soviet Affairs, the DCI Committee on Exchanges, the NSC Ad Hoc Technology Transfer Group, the Intelligence Charter Legislation Working Group and the NSC/SCC Counterintelligence Working Group.

Executive Order 12036 requires that the intelligence agencies promulgate, and the Attorney General approve, over thirty separate procedures and guidelines to regulate various intelligence-related activities of the FBI, NSA, CIA, DoD and Treasury. In 1980, the last of these procedures was promulgated and approved, and a lengthy process of review, reevaluation and revision of the majority of these procedures and guidelines was initiated and will be substantially completed by the end of 1980.

The Office participated in extensive discussions between and among representatives of the Executive and Legislative Branches concerning the nature and content of a proposed legislative charter for the intelligence community. This participation included interpretation, coordination, drafting and analysis of existing and proposed policy and statutory standards. Additional efforts were made by the Office in connection with the development of DOJ positions regarding amendments proposed to the Freedom of



Information Act by the intelligence agencies and the proposed enactment of a new criminal statute to bar the revelation of undercover U.S. intelligence officials.

During the past year, the Office has rendered numerous formal and informal opinions for various Executive branch officials and has provided the Attorney General and other senior Justice officials with a large number of policy papers and recommendations. The Office has been involved in several initiatives to increase the coordination and flow of information between and among the intelligence agencies and other agencies of the Federal Government.

The Office has provided legal and policy advice on various intelligence-related matters, including issues and options, during the past year to the Attorney General, the Special Coordination Committee of the NSC, the State Department, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Commerce Department, the FBI, the NSA, the CIA, the DoD, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Office of the DCI, the Treasury Department, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, and various components in the Justice Department.

In the area of intelligence operations the Office's accomplishments primarily involve implementation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. Due to the time required for members of the court to be appointed, and to make the administrative arrangements to support the Court, implementation of the Act did not occur until May, 1979. During the 1978-79 transition period the Office created an entirely new series of forms for applications under the Act, as well as special procedures to minimize electronic surveillance, and associated legal papers. New administrative procedures were developed by which applications for electronic surveillance could be considered by the Attorney General to obtain his authorization for filing. Security procedures issued by the Attorney General and the Director of Central Intelligence to protect Court orders for electronic surveillance were prepared for issuance to communication common carriers. Office attorneys also participated in the drafting of security procedures for the Court which were promulgated by the Chief Justice of the United States. The Office is now part of the inter-departmental task force drafting procedures for the protection of classified information in the custody of federal courts pursuant to the Classified Information Procedures Act of 1980.

In a few instances, the Office brought applications to the Court for the exercise of its inherent authority to approve physical searches for intelligence purposes. A legal memorandum also was developed by the Office for the Director of the FBI

explaining the legal basis for this exercise of jurisdiction. This memorandum has been the subject of some discussion between the Department, the Congress, and the FISA Court.

A substantial number of FBI requests to conduct undercover activities in counterintelligence cases were reviewed as required by the Department of Justice Appropriation Acts for FY 79 and FY 80. Recommendations for Attorney General approval of these operations were developed by OIP&R in appropriate cases. In addition, a substantial number of other counterintelligence activities were considered by the Office and appropriate recommendations furnished to the Attorney General. The Office also reviewed, and approved, modified, or disapproved a substantial number of FBI foreign counterintelligence activities for which the Attorney General has delegated approval authority to OIP&R.

Finally, as part of its oversight responsibilities, OIPR attorneys conducted field evaluations in 1979 and 1980 for the Attorney General concerning implementation of the minimization procedures governing electronic surveillance in foreign intelligence and counterintelligence cases. This study involved trips to field facilities, interviews of operational personnel and review of surveillance logs. In addition, the Office participated in a 1979 study by the Deputy Attorney General regarding the guidelines for Drug Enforcement Administration domestic investigations. The study involved visits to some 10 major DEA field offices and interviews and file reviews pertinent to guidelines compliance.

*Classify T's*

Department of Energy

- \* Developed intelligence assessments which furthered national non-proliferation goals of delaying acquisition by Pakistan of weapons-usable nuclear materials.
- \* Directed Taiwan's nuclear research into areas not useful in potential weapon work.
- \* Altered the direction of South Korea's spent fuel reprocessing plant acquisition.
- \* Slowed the pace of the Iraqi nuclear program.
- \* Secured assurances from South Africa as to the peaceful nature of its nuclear program.
- \* Improved the US capability to characterize foreign nuclear tests and weapons, including new calculational methodologies which provide more precise estimation of underground nuclear test yields, advanced nuclear event detection technology and hardware which will accomplish worldwide coverage and assessments of Soviet nuclear weapon design which permit a greater precision in operational yield estimates.
- \* Established an International Energy Technology Assessment Program.
- \* Developed a current intelligence capability, including the establishment of a 24-hour Watch Office, to monitor and evaluate fast-breaking international energy developments having a significant impact upon national or Department energy policies.
- \* Established an independent political/economic analytical capability which provided intelligence assessments of the impact of the Iran-Iraq War and OPEC's long-term strategy on national energy and security policy and which

Department of Energy, continued:

identified alternative approaches to dealing with oil supply disruptions.

\* ~~Formalized an innovative approach~~ to protecting sensitive DOE facilities  
and classified technologies <sup>by</sup> establishing an Operations Security Program.

TURNER 5824



Department of Energy  
Washington, D.C. 20585

December 1, 1980

Executive Order  
80-5485/3

Admiral Stansfield Turner (Retired)  
Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Admiral Turner:

Enclosed for your use in preparing the Summary for the President of the major accomplishments of the Intelligence Community during this Administration is an unclassified and classified statement of the major achievements of the Department of Energy Foreign Intelligence Program.

I am confident that your Summary will reflect proper credit on the many significant contributions of the Intelligence Community to increased National security. I am proud that the Department of Energy could play a part in some of these accomplishments, and I look forward to reading your Summary.

Sincerely,

M. H. Yredell  
Deputy Assistant Secretary for  
International Intelligence Analysis  
Senior Intelligence Officer

Enclosures

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

Department of Energy Intelligence Community Accomplishments

Since its establishment in 1977, the Department of Energy (DOE) has responded to the increasingly important energy crisis by expanding the foreign intelligence program of its predecessor, the Energy Research and Development Administration, to include a current intelligence capability and the ability to assess foreign political and economic developments related to energy security. At the same time, DOE has continued the on-going program of assessing foreign energy technologies, especially those related to the development of a nuclear weapons capability, and providing space-based nuclear event detection sensors. (U)

Specific accomplishments of the Department of Energy Foreign Intelligence Program during this Administration include:

- \* <sup>Developed</sup> - Intelligence assessments which furthered National non-proliferation goals of delaying acquisition by Pakistan of weapons-usable nuclear materials;
- \* <sup>ed</sup> directing Taiwan's nuclear research into areas not useful in potential weapon work; <sup>ed</sup> altering the direction of South Korea's spent fuel reprocessing plant acquisition; <sup>ed</sup> slowing the pace of the Iraqi nuclear program; and <sup>ed</sup> securing assurances from South Africa as to the peaceful nature of its nuclear program. (C)
- <sup>ed</sup> Improvements in the U.S. capability to characterize foreign nuclear tests and weapons, including new calculational methodologies which provide more precise estimation of underground nuclear test yields, advanced nuclear event detection technology and hardware which will accomplish worldwide coverage, and assessments of Soviet nuclear weapon design which permit a greater precision in operational yield estimates. (C)
- <sup>ed</sup> Establishment of an International Energy Technology Assessment Program, which offers potential cost savings for the Department by providing information that would reveal new approaches to technical problems and by allowing DOE to avoid experimental approaches that have failed in foreign countries, and which provides intelligence support for the negotiation and implementation of international agreements for cooperation. (U)
- <sup>ed</sup> Development of a current intelligence capability, including the establishment of a 24-hour Watch Office, to monitor and evaluate fast-breaking international energy developments which would have a significant impact upon Department or National energy policies, and to provide direct intelligence support to DOE Secretarial Officers. (U)

DECLASSIFY 12-1-86  
ON (date of rev)

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- Establishment<sup>ed</sup> of an independent political/economic analytical capability, which provided intelligence assessments of the impact of the Iran-Iraq War and OPEC's long-term strategy on national energy and security policy and which identified alternative approaches to dealing with oil supply disruptions. (U)
- Formalization<sup>ed</sup> of an innovative approach to protecting sensitive DOE facilities and classified technologies by the establishment of an Operations Security Program, which controls or eliminates vulnerabilities through the use of counterintelligence, computer security and technical measures. (U)

Department of Energy Intelligence Community Accomplishments

Since its establishment in 1977, the Department of Energy (DOE) has responded to the increasingly important energy crisis by expanding the foreign intelligence program of its predecessor, the Energy Research and Development Administration, to include a current intelligence capability and the ability to assess foreign political and economic developments related to energy security. At the same time, DOE has continued the on-going program of assessing foreign energy technologies, especially those related to the development of a nuclear weapons capability, and providing space-based nuclear event detection sensors.

Specific accomplishments of the Department of Energy Foreign Intelligence Program during this Administration include:

- Intelligence assessments which furthered National non-proliferation goals of delaying foreign acquisition and reprocessing capabilities of weapons-useable nuclear materials, and directing nuclear research into areas not useful in potential weapon work.
- Improvements in the U.S. capability to detect and characterize foreign nuclear events and to estimate weapon yield.
- Establishment of an International Energy Technology Assessment Program, which offers potential cost savings for the Department by providing information that would reveal new approaches to technical problems and by allowing DOE to avoid experimental approaches that have failed in foreign countries, and which provides intelligence support for the negotiation and implementation of international agreements for cooperation.
- Development of a current intelligence capability, including the establishment of a 24-hour Watch Office, to monitor and evaluate fast-breaking international energy developments which would have a significant impact upon Department of National energy policies, and to provide direct intelligence support to DOE Secretarial Officers.
- Establishment of an independent political/economic analytical capability, which provided intelligence assessments of the impact of the Iran-Iraq War and OPEC's long-term strategy on national energy and security policy and which identified alternative approaches to dealing with oil supply disruptions.



- Formalization of an innovative approach to protecting sensitive DOE facilities and classified technologies by the establishment of an Operations Security Program, which controls or eliminates vulnerabilities through the use of counterintelligence, computer security and technical measures.

CONFIDENTIAL

Department of State

Central and Latin America

- o Produced detailed historical narrative of the Panama Canal Treaty negotiations for use by policymakers in responding to Senate requests.
- o Closely Followed the evolution of the dispute between Argentina and Chile over sovereignty in the Beagle Channel and provided background and analyses needed by policymakers.
- o Formulated tasking requirements which produced information needed to confirm the presence of troops in Cuba.
- o Provided detailed political-military service to State Department principals on the Nicaraguan civil war and a policy review paper assessing the various international roles in the Nicaraguan crises.

Near East and South Asia

- o ~~Devoted considerable attention from early 1978 on to the Iran situation and~~ maintained a major effort to analyze events and discern trends during the Iranian revolution.
- o ~~Closely and acceua~~
- o Monitored events preceding the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
- o Provided essential intelligence back-up to the Camp David talks.

East Asia

- o Analyzed reports of the political, economic and social changes in China and their implications for US-PRC relations.
- o Delineated Japan's constitutional and political problems.
- o Assessed events in North and South Korea following the assassination of President Park and accession to power of President Chun.
- o Provided analyses on The Sino-Vietnamese conflict; Hanoi's strategy toward Kampuchea and Laos; the Indochinese refugees; and the political problems and tensions in Thailand and the Phillipines.

## Africa

- o Provided in-depth analytical support on problems in:
  - Rhodesia. Analyzed negotiating strategies, military and political situation on the ground, the role of various external parties, and prospects for negotiations;
  - South Africa. Pretoria's regional role, the government's intentions with respect to the separate development policy and nuclear policy;
  - The Horn of Africa. The military situation in the Ogaden and Eritrea, the Soviet-Cuban presence, the outlook for Ethiopian-Somali relations, and the implications for regional issues. (S)

## Political-Military Issues

- o Shared intelligence with other nuclear suppliers of the need to limit the export of sensitive nuclear technology and facilities through aggressive use of intelligence information on the nuclear weapons intentions of various threshold proliferation states. (S)
- o Assessed warning situation relative to the initiation of hostilities in Europe by the Warsaw Pact, as reflected in NIE 4-1-78. (S)
- o Tightened focus on world arms trade.
- o Recognized and surfaced as a policy issue the Soviet backed use of chemical warfare in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia. (S)
- o Increased capability for monitoring and interpreting force build-up in advance, e.g., the Sino-Vietnamese border in 1978 and early 1979. (S)

## Economic Issues

- o Improved expertise in energy field, resulting in continuing analyses and forecasts of high quality.
- o Improved econometric capabilities, with particular attention given to effects of oil price changes.

SECRET

December 2, 1980

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Report for the Administration: INR Contribution

Listed below are items that could be included in the DCI's summary for the White House of major accomplishments during this Administration's term of office:

Central and Latin America

Panama Canal Treaty. In the midst of efforts to secure ratification of the treaties in 1977, INR produced a detailed narrative of the history of the Treaty negotiations for use by policymakers in responding to Senate requests: (U)

Beagle Channel. In the fall of 1978, INR closely followed the evolution of the dispute between Argentina and Chile over sovereignty in the Beagle Channel. When the crisis reached near-war proportions in 1978, INR provided the background and analyses the policymakers needed and participated in working group discussions of policy alternatives, including the option of having the Vatican mediate the dispute. (C)

Cuba. During the latter part of 1978, INR noted a number of anomalies in Cuba, especially in the military area. Utilizing incomplete data, INR formulated tasking requirements which eventually produced the information that was needed to explain the anomalies and, in turn, confirm the presence of troops in Cuba (C)

Nicaragua. During the height of the Nicaraguan civil war in 1979, INR provided a detailed political-military briefing service to State Department principals. After the Sandinista victory, INR prepared a policy review paper that assessed the roles of the various international actors in the Nicaraguan crises from 1978 forward. (C)

Human Rights. Since Latin America has been subjected to scrutiny under the human rights policy, disagreements often have emerged over the degree of human rights compliance in specific countries. INR has fulfilled the role of unbiased analyst, providing information, analyses and evaluations. (C)

Political-Military Issues

--One of the major successes of the Carter administration in the intelligence field has been the aggressive use of intelligence information on the nuclear weapons intentions of various threshold proliferation states. This intelligence has been shared to convince other nuclear suppliers of the need to limit the export of sensitive nuclear technology and facilities. (S)

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- 2 -

- A more realistic assessment of the warning situation relative to the initiation of hostilities in Europe by the Warsaw Pact is another important accomplishment during the past four years. This is reflected in NIE 4-1-78, which moves away from the minimum-warning, standing-start appreciation to a more balanced recognition of what the USSR would have to do to prepare for an initiation of hostilities and of the political conditions that would precede such an event. (S)
- A tighter focusing of the intelligence community on the world arms trade, including efforts to develop realistic measures of comparison between major producers, is another important contribution of the Community. (C)
- The Community has done a good job in recognizing and surfacing as a policy issue the Soviet-backed use of chemical warfare in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia. (S)
- Finally, the capability for monitoring and interpreting force build-up in advance of the use of such forces, e.g., the Sino-Vietnamese border in 1978 and early 1979, has been increased. (S)

#### Near East and South Asia

- The Intelligence Community devoted considerable attention from early 1978 on to the chaotic situation in Iran and maintained a major effort to analyze events and discern trends during the Iranian revolution. (U)
- The events that preceded the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 were closely and accurately monitored by the Intelligence Community. (U)
- The Community, especially INR and OGCR, provided essential intelligence back-up to the Camp David talks. (U)

#### East Asia

- INR devoted particular effort to analyzing reports that broadened US understanding of the political, economic, and social changes that have occurred in China and their implications for US-PRC relations. (U)
- It also delineated Japan's constitutional and political problems with a more active foreign policy and increased defense spending.
- INR played a useful role in assessing events in North and South Korea following the assassination of President Park and the accession to power of President Chun. (U)

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

Other notable INR analytical efforts included analyses on: the Sino-Vietnamese conflict, particularly relating to Chinese intentions in invading Vietnam; Hanoi's strategy toward Kampuchea and Laos; the plight of the Indochinese refugees, and the politics of humanitarian relief; and the political problems and tensions which have arisen in Thailand and the Philippines. (U)

Africa

INR has been heavily tasked over the last four years to provide in-depth analytical support to policymakers on African issues. INR's efforts have focused on several thorny problems, including:

- Rhodesia, where INR analyzed negotiating strategies, the military and political situation on the ground, the role of the various external parties, and the prospects for the negotiations;
- South Africa, where INR gave special attention to Pretoria's regional role, the government's intentions with respect to the separate development policy, and nuclear policy;
- The Horn of Africa, where INR has devoted special attention to the military situation in the Ogaden and Eritrea, the Soviet-Cuban presence, the outlook for Ethiopian-Somali relations, and the implications for regional issues. (S)

Economic Issues

- INR, during the last four years, has acted to ensure its ability to respond to the needs of the policymakers for current analyses. Early in this period, INR moved to improve its expertise in the energy field. The result has been a continuing flow of analyses and forecasts of high quality that were of considerable use to policymakers. Indeed, INR probably now has the best continuity of energy expertise in the Department. (U)
- Over the same period, INR has improved its econometric capabilities, making extensive use of the global Link model and other econometric systems for simulations of economic contingencies. Particular attention has been given to studies on the effects of oil price changes. Work done in INR's econometric unit, and the facilities which it has made available, have been recognized throughout the Government. (U)
- INR has also seen the need for greater attention to the long-term implications of current economic trends and has attempted to focus some of its limited resources in this direction. (U)

SECRET

Federal Bureau of Investigation

- o Improved the production and dissemination of foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and counterintelligence studies and reports.
- o Developed a computerized Intelligence Information System (IIS) insuring retrieval of necessary research data.
- o Coordinated with US Dept of State a system of arbitration on visa issuance.
- o Initiated a field office wide Development of Counterintelligence Awareness Program (DECA) designed to develop information concerning hostile intelligence services targeting of classified industrial products.
- o Coordinated with the Dept of Justice and the Export Control Community in the improvement of export control enforcement.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

BY LIAISON

Date: December 1, 1980

To: Director  
Central Intelligence Agency

From: *WWS* William H. Webster, Director

Subject: *WWS* REPORT FOR THE ADMINISTRATION

Reference is made to your letter of November 18, 1980, requesting significant FBI accomplishments during this Administration's term of office.

During this period, the FBI, recognizing the need to upgrade its research and analysis capability, has taken significant steps to improve the production and dissemination of foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and counterintelligence studies and reports. In addition to the employment of professional Intelligence Research Specialists (IRSS), the FBI developed a computerized Intelligence Information System (IIS) insuring retrieval of necessary research data. These steps have enhanced the FBI's counterintelligence analytical capability. As a further step, the FBI has recently established a positive intelligence production element to provide other U.S. Government agencies positive foreign intelligence collected as a by-product of our counterintelligence activities.


Before and during this period, disagreement between the FBI and the U.S. Department of State (USDS) on the question of visa denial based on association with a hostile intelligence service existed and, at times, seemed inherent to the work of each agency. A system for arbitrating disagreement between the FBI and USDS on visa issuance was initiated by the U.S. Department of Justice, and developed by USDS and the FBI over several months during the Fall of 1978. The system of arbitration established by this committee and its operation during the past year is satisfactory from the FBI standpoint.





Director  
Central Intelligence Agency

In deciding whether to interpose an objection to issuance of a visa to a visitor, the Intelligence Division (INTD) of the FBI weighs the available information concerning the applicant against the requirements of paragraphs 27 and 29 (8 USC 1182). If the available information indicates that the applicant presents a serious threat as described in paragraphs 27 or 29, then an objection to issuance will be raised.



25X1

handling classified documents.

At the request of the National Security Council (NSC) the INTD has worked quite closely with the Department of Justice and the Export Control Community examining ways to improve export control enforcement. The FBI actively participated in an ad hoc interdepartment working group which reported its findings to the NSC ad hoc Technology Transfer Group on means to improve compliance with export control laws. These efforts over the past two years have led to improved coordination among agencies involved in this area.

DCI/RM-80-0074  
8 December 1980

NOTE FOR:   
Special Assistant to the DCI

STAT

FROM:   
Executive Officer, RMS

STAT

SUBJECT: Report for the Administration

1. Following is the information we spoke about for inclusion in Admiral Turner's submission to the President.

Using zero-based budgeting, the DCI in this Administration was able for the first time to submit a consolidated National Foreign Intelligence Program and Budget which expressed Intelligence Community needs in priority order. By introducing a sense of priority to the process, ZBB helped the DCI to manage more effectively a decentralized budget process. Heretofore, the intelligence budget had contained only program totals and explanations of selected issues. The new method not only makes it possible for the DCI to produce a more rational, more coherent, and more efficient program and budget for the Intelligence Community, but it also makes it possible to defend more effectively the intelligence budget that the President proposes to the Congress.

2. George, please call if I can provide any additional information.

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