



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23 AUG 1978



MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: John F. Blake
Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT: Compartmentation

25X1 1. Action Requested: None; for your information only. I have reviewed your memorandum on this subject and will attempt to provide you with a perspective on where we now appear to stand in the compartmentation arena.

25X1 2. Background: Marv Gentile commented, in effect, that there were too many cooks stirring the compartmentation pot and that we suffered from a lack of central management and common standards. He focused on the fact that collectors, with their own vested interests, were establishing compartments and writing their own implementation rules. In the past year we have seen two steps that, hopefully, will take us a long way toward regularizing that situation. In June 1978 DCID 1/19 established uniform procedures for the handling of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). Secondly, a proposed DCID on compartmentation is currently being floated with the NFIB members. When passed it will, in keeping with your desires, establish the DCI Security Committee as the "honest broker" who can recommend to you when compartments should be created, continued or closed out.

25X1 3. Executive Order 12065 decrees that all special access programs which involve sources and methods must be approved in writing by you. Benchmarks which must be satisfied to qualify for compartmentation status include: a) the normal management and safeguarding procedures are not sufficient to limit need-to-know or access, b) the number of persons who will need access will be reasonably small and commensurate with the objective of providing extra protection for the information involved, and c) the special access controls balance the need to

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protect the information against the full spectrum of needs to use the information. All such programs must be reviewed regularly and will automatically terminate in five years unless fully rejustified. Additionally, all extant special access programs must be revalidated prior to 1 June 1979.

25X1 4. [] The DCI Security Committee has an initiative underway with its current review of the NRP Compartmentation Review. This review, just getting off the ground, will, of course, review the General Tigue concern over use of BYEMAN project names in the TK world, but will use this exercise as its first attempt to revalidate BYEMAN projects and the system itself as special access programs, using as a baseline the standards imposed by the Executive Order.

25X1 5. [] Additionally, the DCI Security Committee has received recent confirmation from Collection Tasking that they are ready to start the dialogue on determining what space project can be decompartmented. As we develop what SIGINT and COMIREX feel can be taken out from special system protection we would propose to confer with intelligence consumers to test the adequacy and completeness of the committees' judgments. We believe the resultant product of this joint effort will help to satisfy the balance required of customer needs versus collection sensitivities, fulfill the charge of Presidential Directive-37 to selectively relax space product controls and, as a bonus, lay firm foundations for the later revalidation program of the COMINT and TALENT-KEYHOLE special access programs.

25X1 6. [] You also noted that you hoped that rules would be established to ensure that you are kept posted of bigot lists. We are preparing a memorandum on the subject of bigot lists for you as a result of our review of the DDO "Blue Border" documents. In it you will find that we argue for compartmentation only for sensitive activities which involve a relatively greater volume of activity and personnel. The point expressed is that, if any activity is quite small and highly sensitive, it can be provided better protection through a bigot list than by formally compartmenting it. In those cases we believe security is better served if the activity manager, whether it be the DDO, CI Staff, or a Department of Defense entity, deals directly with you on the management of the bigot list approach with no centralized system

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management or list of cleared personnel being maintained by the DCI Security Committee or Office of Security/Compartmented Information Branch. An instruction will be prepared indicating your interest in personally monitoring "bigot list" activity.

John F. Blake

John F. Blake

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Compartmentation

John F. Blake
Deputy Director for
Administration
7D 24 Hqs

23 August 1978

Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence
7D 6011 Hqs

To 3:

Stan:

Director of Central
Intelligence
7D 5607 Hqs

Recent events tend to have overtaken parts of the attached memorandum on "Compartmentation." The conversation you and I had on this issue on Wednesday, 23 August, is one of those events. I do believe, however, it is worth your time to read this document.

/s/ Jack Blake

John F. Blake

Att:

DDA 78-3216/1

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