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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-21NEW YORK TIMES
18 SEPTEMBER 1980

Senate Panel Acts to Narrow Intelligence Identity Bill

By CHARLES MOHR
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 17 — The Senate Judiciary Committee today approved amendments intended to narrow the scope of a bill protecting the identities of covert intelligence agents from disclosure.

The amendments, proposed by liberal Democrats on the committee, are expected to come under strong attack however, from powerful forces in the House and Senate who are eager to demonstrate support for the Central Intelligence Agency.

The legislation, as approved earlier by both the Senate and House Intelligence Committees, would make it a crime for officials and former officials who had access to secrets to name covert agents of this country. Both bills, in slightly different language, extended the criminal sanction to private persons, including journalists, who repeatedly disclosed such names in an effort to impair covert intelligence operations.

Critics of the legislation argue that it is

unconstitutional.

One key amendment passed by the Senate Judiciary Committee today would make it a legal defense against prosecution if the disclosure of the identities of agents "is an integral part of another activity such as news reporting of intelligence failures or abuses, academic study of government policies and programs, enforcement by a private organization of its internal rules and regulations, or other activities protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution."

This language was apparently meant to protect so-called "mainstream" journalists while permitting the prosecution of such private citizens as the staff of a Washington newsletter that has printed hundreds of names of C.I.A. officers in what it says is an effort to discourage so-called covert intelligence operations abroad.

The amendment would also permit, for example, a missionary society to identify anyone it discharged for violating its rules by working as a covert agent.

The amendment was approved by a vote of nine to six.

Another amendment, which was approved, 10 to 6, more narrowly defined the crime in question, as an action "undertaken for the purpose of uncovering

the identities of covert agents and exposing such identities."

Immunity for Agencies

The committee also approved an amendment that would apparently give the Peace Corps and the Agency for International Development legal permission to avoid requests that they provide "cover" for C.I.A. agents. Those agencies enjoy such immunity now by regulation, but the intelligence committees' bills had permitted the President to require governmentwide cooperation in furnishing concealment for agents.

Today's amendments, some informed sources conceded, were meant more to encourage good faith bargaining on the agents identities bill by the White House and Justice Department than as finished legislation.

The opposition to the softening amendments came mostly from Republican members of the Judiciary Committee. But in the House and in the Senate as a whole, there is considerable support for the wider-reaching intelligence committee bills.

PRESS CLIPPINGS
SEPTEMBER 1980

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18 September 1980

Kennedy Committee Votes, 8-6, To Ease CIA Protection Bill

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Senate Judiciary Committee voted by a razor-thin margin yesterday to narrow the impact of a controversial new CIA secrecy bill that would make it a crime to disclose the names of U.S. intelligence operatives stationed abroad.

In a hurried afternoon session, the committee decided, 8 to 6, to exempt such disclosures if they are "an integral part" of constitutionally protected activities such as scholarly studies of government policies and programs or news stories about "intelligence failures or abuses."

Judiciary Committee Chairman Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.), who proposed the change, said the bill would still outlaw "the indiscriminate publication of agents' names" by anti-CIA periodicals such as the Covert Action Information Bulletin.

To prohibit such practices, the original bill would make it a felony to disclose any information, even from unclassified sources, that serves to identify a covert agent so long as the government could show this was done with reason to believe it would impair or impede U.S. intelligence activities.

The American Civil Liberties Union and other critics mounted a concentrated attack on the measure in the Senate committee after striking out elsewhere. The House and Senate Intelligence Committees and the House Judiciary Committee have all approved the undiluted bill, which the CIA has been seeking for years.

In approving the original bill, however, the Senate Intelligence Committee insisted in its report that it was not its aim to prohibit news reporting of intelligence failures or abuses, academic studies or other activities protected by the First Amendment.

Kennedy took the wording of the Intelligence Committee report and offered it as an amendment to the bill. Without such a change, a number of law professors have contended it would be unconstitutional. But advocates of a stiff measure, angered by attacks on CIA operatives abroad, are sure to press for the tougher wording on the House and Senate floors.

Also exempted under the Kennedy amendment would be disclosures made by private organizations, such as universities and religious institutions, that might have rules against members working secretly for the CIA.

ACLU spokesman Jerry Berman suggested last night that some negotiated settlement was now possible. "Until now," he said, "the Justice Department has been, in our view, unwilling to try and resolve the constitutional problems that many of us have with the bill." But with the Kennedy amendment on the agenda, Berman said, the administration may find it "difficult to explain why they want to knock out a section that protects the First Amendment."

Most Senate and House Republicans appear to favor a stronger bill in any case and have dismissed the charges of unconstitutionality as exaggerated and unwarranted. Declared Sen. Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.), ranking minority member on Judiciary: "We can't risk having our people killed."

Several other amendments Kennedy offered were also adopted at the meeting, which was sandwiched between a public and private session with White House National Security Affairs Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski on the Billy Carter controversy.

One of the changes was aimed at a little-noticed section of the CIA bill requiring the president to adopt secret procedures that will afford U.S. intelligence operatives better "cover" assignments in American embassies and missions abroad.

The Judiciary Committee, again by a vote of 8 to 6, agreed that the Peace Corps and the Agency for International Development should be exempted by law from the list of government agencies and departments that might be ordered to provide the "cover." An effort was also made to exempt the International Communication Agency, formerly U.S. Information Agency, but that failed.

ARTICLE APPEARED
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17 SEPTEMBER 1980

Compromise Reported On Monitoring Action Of Intelligence Units

By JUDITH MILLER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 16 — Senate and House negotiators have apparently reached agreement with the White House on legislation that would define and restrict the way Congress oversees the nation's intelligence agencies, legislative aides said today.

The agreement, worked out after weeks of intensive discussions, would allow two important bills authorizing funds for American foreign aid programs and intelligence operations for the fiscal year 1981 to be taken up later this week in House-Senate conferences. Both conferences had been delayed by the impasse over the controversial intelligence provisions.

Requiring President to Respond

At issue, according to Congressional aides close to the negotiations, was the question of to what extent the President would be required to respond to questions posed and information requested by the House and Senate committees that monitor intelligence activities.

The White House had been resisting language in Senate and House versions of the bills authorizing funds for intelligence activities that appeared to require the President to respond to any and all inquiries from the two intelligence committees. Both the House and Senate versions of the bills addressed that issue, but the House version was more restrictive.

Under the accord tentatively reached late today, key members of the intelligence committees and the White House have agreed to an amendment that papers over differences about whether the President is obliged under all circumstances to answer all inquiries from the intelligence panels. The amendment is to be offered to the Senate version of legislation authorizing funds for intelligence operations.

The compromise amendment contains language making it clear that nothing in the legislation should be construed as authority to withhold information from the select committees on the grounds that providing the information "would constitute the unauthorized disclosure of classified information or information relating to intelligence sources and methods." This language appears to reinforce the authority of the Congressional intelligence panels to request and obtain information from the intelligence services.

However, the authorizing bill still contains language acknowledging the responsibility of the President to protect classified information from unauthorized disclosure and intelligence sources and methods used to collect that information.

"This is a fig leaf compromise," one Congressional aide said. "But we hope it will enable the committees to share the myriad of legislative proposals on this issue up here on Capitol Hill."

The other dispute that has apparently been resolved involves the question of whether the President must provide the intelligence panels with prior notification of covert actions.

All versions of the legislation would reduce the number of Congressional committees that must be informed of such activities from eight to the two intelligence panels. The bills also concur that, in principle, the committees must be given advance notice of any covert action. However, there were sharp divisions among Congressional committees and the Administration as to whether there should be exceptions to that principle, and over the nature of those exceptions.

The compromise package would enable the President, under some circumstances, to brief a total of eight key members of the House and Senate, and would permit him under very limited circumstances to inform the committees after a covert action has been begun.

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WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
17 SEPTEMBER 1980

White House, Hill Agree On Intelligence Oversight

Senate and House negotiators have apparently reached agreement with the White House on legislation that would define and restrict congressional oversight of the nation's intelligence agencies, congressional aides said yesterday.

The agreement, hammered out after weeks of intense discussions, will enable two important bills that authorize funds for U.S. foreign aid programs and fiscal 1981 intelligence operations to be taken up later this week in House-Senate conferences. Both conferences had been delayed by the impasse over the controversial intelligence provisions.

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 5THE NATIONAL GUARDIAN
17 September 1980

CONGRESS EYES SPY-WATCHERS

Guardian Correspondent

Washington, D.C.

The objections of civil libertarians, journalists and political activists were ignored last week as Congress continued its double-time march toward passage of a bill outlawing the publication of the names of CIA and FBI employees.

The House Judiciary Committee voted Sept. 3 to approve legislation which its sponsors acknowledge is aimed directly at former CIA agent Philip Agee and the three coeditors of the Washington-based *CovertAction Information Bulletin*. As sent to the floor by the panel, the bill mandates a prison sentence of up to three years and/or a fine of \$10,000 for anyone who uses even publicly available, unclassified information to identify a covert CIA employee or FBI agent. By an 18-9 margin, the committee refused to endorse the action of one of its subcommittees which had earlier deleted this provision from the legislation.

The bill will soon be considered by the full House, which is expected to pass it easily. On the Senate side, a similar measure has already been cleared by the Intelligence Committee. The bill is now before the Senate Judiciary Committee, which held hearings on it Sept. 5, and it is also expected to reach the Senate floor within the next few weeks.

In its zeal to "get Agee" and to "nail" Louis Wolf, one of the coeditors of the *Bulletin* who specializes in naming names of purported CIA personnel, Congress is steamrolling contentions that the legislation is bla-

tantly unconstitutional. Indeed, Sen. Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.) noted at last week's Senate committee hearings that he had agreed to receive testimony on the legislation only with the understanding that the bill will be reported out as soon as possible.

The Senate panel thus seemed to be engaged in a largely pro-forma exercise as it listened to several witnesses criticize the measure on a variety of grounds.

The legislation, said Morton Halperin and Jerry Berman of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), is "unconstitutional on its face. It would reach, chill and punish speech which is clearly and unmistakably within the protection of the First Amendment." In a Sept. 5 letter to Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.), the Judiciary Committee chair, the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press called the legislation "a classic 'Official Secrets Act.' It authorizes the virtually automatic conviction of former agents, independent researchers and members of the press if they identify FBI or CIA employees," the committee warned.

DIRECTED AGAINST AGEE

A group of 14 legal scholars added to the chorus of constitutional complaints about the bill when they urged the Senate panel to reject it in an Aug. 30 letter. Several activist organizations have also denounced the legislation, pointing out that it prohibits a group from publicly exposing an FBI infiltrator or provocateur.

The Carter administration, through its Justice Department, meanwhile supports the legisla-

tion. In his Sept. 5 Senate testimony, Deputy Attorney General Robert Keuch said that a slight moderation in the language of the measure met previous Justice Department objections and insured the protection of "mainstream journalists." The provision in question states that an individual must be engaged in "a pattern of activities" involving exposure of covert agents in order for the proposed statute to be applied.

This passage is clearly directed against Agee, a former agent who now works for the dismantling of the CIA from West Germany where he has been living in exile. It is also aimed at Wolf and his colleagues at *CovertAction Information Bulletin* who explain their practice of publishing the names of alleged agents on the grounds that the CIA still engages in "dirty work" around the world and has shown itself invulnerable to reform initiatives.

So blatant is the attempt to, in the words of Sen. John Chafee (R-R.I.), "put away" Wolf that the witness list for the Senate legislation referred to the measure as "the Agee bill."

For its part, the CIA strongly favors passage of the legislation. Frank Carlucci, an agency deputy director, told the Senate Committee last week, for example, that Wolf and other anti-CIA researchers are "deliberately endangering the lives of patriotic men and women." Carlucci cited the 1975 assassination in Athens of CIA station chief Robert Welch and the machine-gunning on July 4 of a U.S. official's house in Kingston, Jamaica, as instances

when revealing the names of alleged CIA personnel has led to "death and extremely close calls."

Wolf, along with coeditors William Schaap and Ellen Ray, has repeatedly pointed out that only unclassified sources are used in developing lists of names. They also say that the only effective way of fighting the CIA is by exposing its employees so that covert action becomes more difficult. Wolf notes, too, that he cautions people not to physically attack anyone named as a CIA agent since personal violence "only plays into the hands of the agency."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A13THE WASHINGTON POST
16 September 1980

Plan to Provide Cover for CIA Operatives Stirs Concern

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

A little-noticed section of a controversial new CIA secrecy bill could lead to a whole new gamut of artificial government titles and phony positions for U.S. intelligence officials working overseas.

Some critics believe the bill could even result in use of the Peace Corps for intelligence purposes, but CIA officials insist that this would never happen.

The disagreement involves some relatively obscure provisions of a pending CIA bill devised primarily to make it a criminal offense to disclose any information that serves to identify U.S. intelligence operatives abroad.

Under language tacked on by the House Intelligence Committee, the president would be required to establish secret procedures ensuring that intelligence officers and employees from CIA station chiefs on down—be given effective cover. Those procedures, the bill adds, "shall provide that any department or agency designated by the president" must render whatever assistance is necessary.

At present, the Peace Corps, the Agency for International Development and the International Communication Agency are all off limits to the intelligence community. The tradition of keeping spies out of its ranks is strongest in the Peace Corps, which has had rules, since its inception in 1961 prohibiting the employment of anyone from the CIA.

The Foreign Service also has resisted the designation of anyone from the CIA as a full-fledged Foreign Service officer (FSO). Intelligence officers usually are confined to an FSR (Foreign Service Reserve) designation, along with others on temporary assignment.

The U.S. government and the Congress have "excluded CIA from a whole lot of official covers," former CIA director William E. Colby protested in House testimony early this year. "[At] the State Department, we cannot use certain nominations, and therefore that is a further exclusion. . . . We have got to open up the possibilities, at least within the government."

When Colby was at the agency, he added in a telephone interview, "we were standing on a shrinking ice floe—as far as cover was concerned." From the intelligence community's point of view, the restrictions also amount to a reproach.

"It suggests there's something dirty about intelligence, when Congress has voted it," Colby says. "Intelligence is an important part of our national structure, by congressional fiat."

From the point of view of other government agencies, however, their integrity is at stake. As the Peace Corps has put it, its rules are meant "to avoid providing any credence to charges that the Peace Corps is a front for intelligence activities of the United States government." But when the Peace Corps proposed consolidating the regulations 2½ years ago with formal publication in the Federal Register, the CIA took umbrage. The new rules were never promulgated.

CIA officials contend that the secrecy bill's call for "better cover" is "purely hortatory," that it doesn't give the president any more authority than he has now. A CIA lawyer insisted that the Peace Corps would never be opened up to intelligence agency operatives.

However, Morton Halperin, director of the privately funded Center for National Security Studies, which is fighting the bill, maintains that its enactment would represent "a very clear signal from Congress to the president, telling him that he should be directing more agencies to provide cover to the CIA."

"I would certainly be worried if I were in the Peace Corps," Halperin said. Because the bill states that the new procedures to be established by the president would be exempt from "publication or disclosure," Halperin

also pointed out that it could result in the undercutting of restrictions that most people would assume were still in effect.

"Our main worry is one of image rather than of substance," added one Peace Corps official. If the bill were enacted, he said, "we could have a problem with people pointing at the Peace Corps and saying it could be used" by the CIA, even if it weren't.

The bill itself has a strong head of steam, in view of the July 4 machine-gunning of the home of the CIA station chief in Jamaica shortly after his name and other personal data were disclosed at an anti-CIA news conference in Kingston. The measure would outlaw the disclosure of any information, even from public documents, that serves to identify CIA officials or any other U.S. intelligence agents who have been working abroad.

Proponents hope to bring it to the House floor for a vote Thursday. A similar version is pending before the Senate Judiciary Committee, where critics who contend it is unconstitutional are concentrating their efforts. In a letter to committee members last week, 51 law professors from across the country charged that the provisions criminalizing the disclosure of unclassified information were a clear violation of the First Amendment.

"The First Amendment does not permit using a shotgun because you may hit something that is punishable," one of the signers, Prof. Laurence E. Tribe of Harvard University's law school, said at a news conference here yesterday. He predicted that the Supreme Court would strike the measure down if Congress should enact it.

In addition, the Center for National Security Studies maintains in a recent study that some of the nation's most prominent journalists—and at least one member of the Senate Intelligence Committee—have written or broadcast articles that could have resulted in their prosecution if the bill had been in effect at the time of publication.

Among the reports that could have resulted in criminal sanctions, Halperin said, were a 1977 Washington Post story by Bob Woodward about secret CIA payments to Jordan's King Hussein over a 20-year period and a 1977 CBS broadcast by correspondent Bill Moyers, who named several CIA officials and Cuban allies in the CIA's campaign against Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.

Also in potential jeopardy, the center concluded, would have been Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.). As former ambassador to India, Moynihan disclosed in a 1975 book that the CIA had contributed money to one of India's political parties and that on one occasion, the payment was made directly to Indira Gandhi. Whether such disclosures would be liable for criminal penalties would, Halperin noted, depend on the conduct and intent of the authors, but he said "there is no doubt that revelations of this kind would be chilled."

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16 SEPTEMBER 1980

Guard Agents and Free Speech

Congress is angry about a few critics of the C.I.A. who are trying to wreck undercover activity abroad by publishing the names of secret agents. Small wonder that there's anger — and anxiety; they have grown since July when the home of an American diplomat in Jamaica was shot up shortly after he was called a spy. Five years ago, a C.I.A. station chief in Athens was assassinated by Greek extremists after being identified by Philip Agee, a former agent. Nonetheless, Congress's anger is confounding its reason.

The Senate and House intelligence committees would make it a crime for anyone, whether in or out of Government, former agent or not, publicly to identify a secret intelligence operative. That legislation would regiment civilians in the name of national security. We look to Congress for better than that — for the courage to act wisely and not simply to play back popular fears.

The law can and should reach someone like Mr. Agee when he betrays former colleagues with information learned as an agent. Spies promise to keep secrets and they can be punished for breaking their contracts of employment.

But it is another matter to apply the same strictures to private citizens who have never been spies and who depend not on secret knowledge but on public information. That only threatens all speech and publishing which may disclose an agent's identity in accurate and responsible ways. It would empower Government

to strangle news reporting and dissent. It would violate the Constitution.

So some members of Congress are trying to limit the sweep of the proposed legislation. One amendment would apply the law only to "a pattern of activities intended to identify and expose covert agents" where there is reason to believe it would "impair or impede foreign intelligence activities." But many a prosecutor could see such a pattern in news reports, including even stories that expose Watergate-type attempts to subvert the intelligence agencies.

Nor is there much comfort in the attitude of the Justice Department, which at first opposed strictures against private citizens but is now egging Congress on. Justice says not to worry, it won't prosecute "mainstream" journalists. But who are mainstream journalists? Who gave Government authority to license some reporters and to proscribe the work of others? Such official licensing of the press is precisely the evil that inspired the First Amendment.

With the intelligence committees running for cover, a special burden for protecting the Constitution falls on the judiciary committees. The House Judiciary Committee passed up that opportunity last week. That makes the Senate Judiciary Committee the best hope for producing a bill that respects free speech and press. The only way to do that is to confine the reach of the law to present and former official agents.

ON PAGE 45

BOSTON GLOBE
16 September 1980

Bill on US spies is criticized

Associated Press

WASHINGTON — Civil libertarians, including 51 college professors, said yesterday that a bill to make it a crime to reveal the names of secret agents would greatly limit reporting about intelligence activities.

"The First Amendment does not permit using a shotgun because you may hit something that is punishable," said Prof. Laurence H. Tribe of Harvard University Law School.

He also said he expected the Supreme Court would declare the measure unconstitutional if it is enacted.

"Anybody gambling on the Supreme Court upholding it is making a mistake," Tribe told a news conference at the headquarters of the Center for National Security Studies, which is lobbying against the measure.

Tribe and 50 other law professors are urging the Senate Judiciary Committee to amend the bill before it reaches the Senate floor. A similar bill was approved on Sept. 3 by the House Judiciary Committee.

The measure would make it a crime punishable

by three years in prison and \$15,000 in fines to publish nonsecret information if it disclosed the name of a covert member of a US intelligence agency or an FBI informer.

Tribe and John Shattuck of the American Civil Liberties Union said the measure would cover a broad range of news articles and research dealing with intelligence activities.

For example, they said it would include a Washington Post article in 1977 that said the CIA made secret payments to King Hussein of Jordan and a book by Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan (D-N.Y.) that said the CIA paid money to Indira Gandhi, the prime minister of India.

"There is no doubt that revelations of this kind would be chilled," said Morton Halperin, head of the Center for National Security Studies.

Shattuck said he hoped the Senate Judiciary Committee would limit the application of the measure to protect journalists.

The bill "is widely misunderstood as protecting lives" of secret agents working abroad, Shattuck said. "It's protecting the entire secrecy apparatus" of American intelligence, he said.

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15 SEPTEMBER 1980

ABROAD AT HOME

Question
Of
Intent

By Anthony Lewis

WASHINGTON — It is 1983, and there are new reports of abuses by United States intelligence agencies. A newspaper series says the C.I.A. is secretly using three notorious gangsters to try to overthrow the government of country X. Another paper names F.B.I. counterintelligence agents who it says have infiltrated domestic civil liberties organizations and are trying to disrupt their work.

Those imagined reports are like the ones that in the 1970's disclosed excesses committed in the name of intel-

ligence and helped bring about reforms. But there would be one difference in 1983. If the C.I.A. has its way, the newspapers that printed the stories would be committing a crime. The reporters and editors involved could go to prison.

A bill that would very likely make it a criminal offense to publish those stories is due for a vote soon in the House. It has strong support, and for a good reason: It is intended to deal with a real problem, the unjustified naming of U.S. covert agents. But the bill is written so that it could sweep dangerously far in its effects.

The immediate targets of the legislation are people who make a business of disclosing C.I.A. identities. The best-known is Philip Agee, the turncoat former agent. And a Washington newsletter, the Covert Action Information Bulletin, carries what it says are the names of C.I.A. employees gleaned from clues in published information.

So far as it deals with the Agees of this world — people who use what they learn in office to betray their colleagues — the bill faces no serious objections. The difficulty arises in the section punishing private individuals who disclose the identity of covert agents.

That section would for the first time in American history make it a crime for journalists or ordinary citizens to publish, or even say aloud, what they know from unclassified sources. And the fact is that C.I.A. affiliations are not always tightly concealed. When I lived in London, the names of successive C.I.A. station chiefs were common knowledge among Britons and Americans. Some critics of the legislation would drop that section entirely, limiting coverage to people like Agee. I do not think that is a defensible position if one really wants to stop the wholesale naming of agents. The Covert Action newsletter is in the same dirty business as Agee, with the same resulting risk to people working for the United States.

The danger is that the bill would reach much farther than the professional publishers of lists of names. The Justice Department itself warned that an earlier draft of the legislation would apply "to disclosures even of publicly-available information by any voter, journalist, historian or dinner-table debater," and "could have the effect of chilling legitimate critique and debate on C.I.A. policy."

The House bill, in an attempt to meet the problem, requires proof that

the defendant acted with "intent to impair or impede" the foreign intelligence activities of the United States. But intent is a slippery concept. Robert L. Keuch, Associate Deputy Attorney General, testified in criticism of this language:

"A mainstream journalist, who may occasionally write stories based on public information mentioning which foreign individuals are thought to have intelligence relationships with the U.S., might be fearful that any later stories critical of the C.I.A. could be used as evidence of an intent to 'impede' foreign intelligence activities."

("Mainstream?" The greatest freedom-of-the-press decision by the Supreme Court, *Near v. Minnesota* in 1931, involved a sleazy anti-Semitic weekly.)

Despite further changes, the House bill still troubles the Justice Department. And some outside critics object not only to the vagueness of the intent clause. They note that the bill would punish disclosure not just of regular C.I.A. employees but of foreign leaders who have been paid by the agency, and of F.B.I. counterintelligence informants inside this country.

In the Senate, the Intelligence Committee has approved a version of the bill that tries in other ways to limit its reach. It requires proof that disclosure of a name was part of a "pattern of activities intended to identify and expose covert agents," and was done with "reason to believe" it would impede intelligence activities.

The Senate bill is better, and the committee report says specifically that it would not cover "news media reporting of intelligence failures or abuses." But doubts remain. An editor who published a story about the C.I.A.'s hiring of Chicago gangsters to assassinate Fidel Castro might well have "reason to believe" that it would impede that "intelligence activity." Judges tend to defer to the Government in these matters, accepting its definition of what is a legitimate "intelligence activity."

It may still not be too late for a critical voice to be heard in Congress. Senator Moynihan of New York is a logical possibility. He opposed an earlier version of this legislation because, he said, it "might have a chilling effect." And he himself published a book in 1975 that named a forbidden name. He wrote that the C.I.A. had once interfered in Indian politics by giving money for the Congress Party to Mrs. Indira Gandhi.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 12PUBLISHERS WEEKLY
12 September 1980**Bill on Agent Disclosure
Moves from House Panel**

A House Judiciary subcommittee has approved a bill that would severely undermine the efforts of the congressional intelligence committees to pass legislation barring journalists and other writers from disclosing the names of secret U.S. agents. But the measure reported by the subcommittee on a 5-1 vote August 26 faces stiff opposition from Republicans as well as the Democratic leadership of the full House.

Bills were rushed through both House and Senate intelligence panels in the aftermath of the attack last July 4 on the home of the CIA station chief in Jamaica. The attack occurred just days after his name was disclosed in the anti-CIA publication, *Covert Action Information Bulletin*.

The House and Senate intelligence committees passed bills that were designed to enable the government to prosecute those who publish the names of covert CIA agents. They thought they had drafted the bills carefully enough to avoid First Amendment conflicts.

To get at the publisher of the *Covert Action Information Bulletin*, Louis Wolf, the bills would allow prosecution of those who establish a pattern of attempting to impede U.S. foreign intelligence activities. The House Intelligence Committee included FBI intelligence in its bill's coverage, an action that sent it to the Judiciary Committee that has FBI oversight responsibilities.

News media groups immediately opposed the two bills, claiming they threatened the freedom of the press to report on intelligence issues.

The bill drafted by the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, headed by Rep. Don Edwards

(D., Calif.), would allow prosecution of present and past government officials who disclose names they learn in their official capacities. But it would ban prosecution of journalists or anyone else.

Both the Association of American Publishers and the Society of Professional Journalists opposed the bills of the intelligence committees.

AAP Vice-President Richard P. Kleeman told the subcommittee in a letter: "It is imperative that distinctions be made between those who intend to undermine U.S. intelligence operations and those who report legitimately and specifically on intelligence matters, whether in newspapers or in books."

He also asserted that "a distinction must be made between those who misuse information contained in classified materials to which they have had access and those who publish information obtained from public or nonclassified materials or who come accidentally into possession of information which may have at one time been classified."

Rep. Robert F. Drinan (D., Mass.), who offered the amendment to exempt journalists, said that the measures written by the intelligence committees presented constitutional problems. "Betrayal of trust is what needs to be punished" by congressional action, he said.

The subcommittee also voted, again 5-1, to eliminate the mention of FBI agents in the bill, the portion that caused the Judiciary to receive the measure in the first place.

The more sweeping versions of the bill approved by the intelligence committees have the backing of the House leadership of both parties. But the bill already has gained controversy, hurting its chances for action in this session of Congress.

HOWARD FIELDS

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15 September 1980

Out In The Cold

Frank Snapp's Survival After A 'Decent Interval' Repayment

By Christian Williams

The Snapp Case is closed, even if Frank Snapp is still ajar.

The Supreme Court slammed his door in February, ruling that Snapp had breached his contract with the CIA by failing to submit "Decent Interval," his critical book on the last days of Saigon, to the agency for pre-publication review. The court ordered him to "disgorge the benefits of his faithlessness." Since his book has sold well, the benefits were \$140,000. Last week he gave the Treasury Department a check for that amount.

The case, which pits the right of the government to conduct certain business in secret against that of a citizen to speak his mind about what he has seen, is a hall of mirrors. What the mirrors reflect, among other things, are the fortunes and misfortunes of citizen Frank Warren Snapp III, late of the CIA.

As for the fortunes, there aren't any. Frank Snapp, as the consequence of the court's instruction to "disgorge the benefits of his faithlessness," is broke. He resides in a \$411-a-month apartment (just raised from \$300) in Arlington. He drives the same Capri automobile he had in Saigon. He is 37 years old and \$40,000 in debt.

He relies on contributions for day-to-day life. They come from sources such as the Author's League Fund, a New York-based organization which a week ago sent him a loan of \$5,000. And from former girlfriends around the world, particularly from a certain woman in Paris, to whom he is grateful, and about whose generosity he is embarrassed. He owns a phone and a typewriter. The typewriter is for the two more books he owes Random House. The phone doesn't ring very often anymore.

On the other hand, he is a free man. Here he is strolling in front of the guitar player at Charlie's, a high-class musical eatery on K Street, to meet a companion for lunch. In his cotton-knit shirt, he looks like a CIA agent whose cover is that of a professional tennis player. He still feels like a member of the agency. But, although Snapp was the CIA's chief strategy analyst in Vietnam and won the agency's Medal of Merit for his work during the panicky final evacuation of 1975, the feeling is no longer mutual.

When Snapp wrote "Decent Interval," he traded the cloak of the spook for the craft of the creep, and to his former intelligence colleagues he is now a pencil-scratching mercenary turncoat, amoeboid slime born of the disorder of confusion and retreat. Snapp hung the agency's dirty laundry out to dry. Now it's his turn.

"The Snapp Case is finished," he says. "Technically, three things could happen now to mitigate the punishment for writing my book. An executive order from the White House. A personal bill passed by Congress. Or the Justice Department could not seek to enforce the law. I have no hope for any of these things.

"There is, of course, an extreme sense of isolation.

Most of my agency friends have long since headed for the hills, and my Vietnamese friends, too. You seek companionship where you can. I get calls from Edwin Moore, a man convicted of espionage. He has invited me to lunch. But I have not gone.

"You see, I am not radicalized. There is a society of whistleblowers here in Washington, but I'm too conservative for them. People lump me with Philip Agee, who exposed the names of agents. I'm totally opposed to Agee. He's a turncoat and a coward. He fled the country, rather than face the consequences of his actions. He should have stuck around, like Martin Luther King."

Snapp is also lumped with Victor Marchetti, author of "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," and with John Stockwell, another former intelligence officer who told about the agency's activities in Angola. All spies who went out in the cold.

"It's interesting," Snapp says, "that each of those guys had a deep religious background. Agee is a devout Catholic. Marchetti originally trained to be a priest. Stockwell's parents were missionaries. When they saw the agency, not fitting into their view of things, their reaction was strong."

The James Bond Ethos

Snapp's model was different. His father is a superior court judge in North Carolina. ("He's a political appointee, and I believe you could say his upward career is finished. I do him the favor of staying out of North Carolina.") Recruited by a professor of his at the Columbia School of International Affairs, he says he always had great respect for the law, but a pragmatic point of view.

"I believe you have to have a clandestine service. The CIA's nefarious activities are okay—as long as they get the truth to Washington. When that principle was no longer served, as in Saigon, in the end, we became the mafia."

CONTINUED

In Saigon, Snapp served as an agent, an analyst and as an interrogator of prisoners in refrigerated rooms. There were guns and whores and blackmail and terminations with extreme prejudice, all of which Snapp adjusted to well enough. What he did not adjust to, toward the end, was the CIA's disinclination to forward home what he saw as absolute proof that the war was unwinnable.

And he did not adjust well at all to the desperate pull-out of April 29-30, 1975, when the last hundreds of Americans were plucked by helicopters from embassy rooftops, and thousands of Vietnamese employes and friends were left behind. When he got home, he blew the whistle.

Snapp, who describes his own self-image of the time as "that of the James Bond romantic ethos," was a tough guy prepared to tell a tough story. He was prepared for trouble, he was prepared for the trials and tribulations of the contemporary American whistle-blower.

What he was not prepared for was for the CIA and the Justice Department to land on him with both feet. Or for the Supreme Court eventually to find him not a brave maverick worthy of First Amendment protection but merely a government employe who had misused his office. An "errant fiduciary." The penalty was civil, not criminal. Disgorge the benefits.

The specifics of the disgorgement are these. In 1975, Random House advanced him \$22,000 for "Decent Interval." The book had to be written and even printed in secret, because the CIA was intent on obtaining it for review. The book came out, Mike Wallace did a piece on "60 Minutes" and sales took off. But because a suit by the Justice Department had been filed, all Snapp's earnings went into escrow.

By last month, the escrow account contained \$111,000, \$29,000 short of the amount he owed the government. Random House loaned him the extra cash—at 10 percent interest. In the past two years, he says, he has lived on exactly \$22,000—"most of it in the form of advances or quasi-advances against the next two books."

Not all of his misfortunes were monetary, however. When he started writing the book he had a girlfriend named Daphne Miller, who at the time also worked for the agency. The documents of the Snapp case show Daphne Miller's role in helping the agency determine who Snapp's publisher was.

Was he surprised?

"Surprised? I was appalled," Snapp says.

"The funny thing is," he adds, "she told them my publisher was Random House, which was what they needed to know if they were going to stop publication. They didn't believe her."

Two documents introduced in Snapp's court records lend credence to his claim. In a CIA internal memo dated Jan. 14, 1976, covering an interview with Miller, it is noted that Snapp was "dealing with Random House in New York."

In an agency "routing and record sheet" titled "Mr. Frank Snapp's Literary Activities" and dated March 10, 1977, it is noted that "Mr. Snapp has written a book on Vietnam that is just about finished. The original manuscript that Snapp is working with consists of about 900 pages. The publisher of the book is unknown but is located in the New York area."

Court records also contain a memorandum dated Jan. 5, 1976, and signed by Leo J. Dunn, chief of operations of personnel security investigations for the CIA, in which Miller's situation is discussed. How she was "initially reluctant to discuss the matter." How she related a "rather sudden break-off" in her relationship with Snapp. How she had promised to keep his project secret, but feared "that the book could do damage to individuals who remain in Vietnam." How, Dunn wrote, she "stressed that the Subject is an extremely intelligent individual who likes the James Bond type adventure. He is said to be very calculating, and Miss Miller speculated that he might enjoy writing the book under the noses of security."

"The 'atmospherics' were very strange," Snapp recalls. "I was being painted as a mercenary, as a wild man, and never once was there an open hearing. Never was there a jury. My best friends in the agency—men who were painted as heroes in the book—were simultaneously giving me classified information and working for the agency."

Snapp insists—contrary to the popular notion of secret operatives as friendless paranoids—that such lack of personal loyalty to him and his project came as a shock.

"The agency breeds paranoia, certainly," he says. "But it is paranoia of outsiders. You tend to invest more belief in your friends than you otherwise would. So I gave a great deal of information to Daphne Miller and to others. I was devastated by what they did with it."

The Veneer of Fiction

Disgorge the benefits of your faithlessness.

In Arlington, his pencil continues scratching. He is "writing for his life," he says. Or at least for his bank balance.

"What Random House and I did was to strike a two-book deal. They wanted a book about the case itself. I wanted to do the novel." The case book, titled "Irreparable Harm," is finished in draft form. The novel is called "Convergence of Interests." It turns on the old question of whether there was a CIA operative involved in the assassination of President Kennedy.

Snapp says the publishing house has stuck by him throughout—but that as a result, he now finds himself in a peculiar position.

"Because they've loaned me \$40,000, I'm sort of an indentured servant. My novel is written in the 'In Cold Blood' style, like nonfiction. But my editor, who I'm afraid is very good, feels it needs to be more set scenes, more dialogue, etc. Because of the massive legal problems involved, it needs a veneer of fiction. It goes beyond that, because the editor believes in the Warren Commission report, and I don't believe the Warren Commission report. But because I have all these debts, I'm in a very poor negotiating position."

The banquet in Georgetown is very quiet, except for the sounds of the guitar. Snapp likes the place, although he says it gets pretty expensive in the evening. He goes occasionally to Clyde's, the polished-brass watering hole of the semi-young, "because there is a girl there I knew in Saigon." But most of the time, he works.

"I write in the mornings on the case book, then in the afternoons on the novel. Or vice versa. Every day, I either run between 7 and 10 miles, or I swim timed laps for 45 minutes. I take Saturday afternoon off. I don't go to the beach, I don't go to cocktail parties, I don't reach out to people. Since 'Decent Interval' came out, I've gone through three or four girlfriends because of this regimen. There is currently a girl in New York who doesn't understand my travails, and she would like to pin me down. But I wouldn't subject anyone else to my life just now."

Life in the hall of mirrors. Snapp feels the Justice Department painted him as a gun-toting kook, a writer-mercenary, and that such "atmospherics" contributed to all aspects of his case. He thinks the image is wrong. And yet...

"When this all started, a magazine photographer was taking my picture, and he said: 'You'll have a lot of trouble. It's because you look the part.' And he was right, in a sense. I saw myself as a romantic figure."

CONTINUED

With a nod, he confirms a story of Vietnam. He and a friend are in a bar in Saigon, and two Vietcong come in shooting. Snepp flips a whore over his shoulder and runs upstairs. The whore is bleeding because she has been hit in the leg, but she says to him, 'Your friend is still down there.' Snepp goes back down, and he and his friend grab the rifles from the Vietcong and beat them to death on the spot.

"It was different over there," he says. "If you look at it objectively, though, I do seem to continue even now to live life at the edge of crisis. But I don't enjoy it. I read George Meredith's 'The Egoist' not long ago. Meredith says 'cynics are disillusioned romantics.' I've certainly become cynical, more cynical than I ever was in the agency. I've ended up disillusioned. But not to the point of repudiating the agency, you understand. That's what confuses people. One girl I met at a party looked at me and said, 'I know, you're a double agent.' No, I'm not.

"I was in Vietnam 4½ years," he says. "During that time I took 12 vacation days. I was dedicated, and I believed in my job. We carried weapons, yes. Vietnam was a community of the heart, it's very hard to articulate if you weren't there. If you were there in the CIA, it's even harder. It changed you. Most of the women I've known since then are like me. They've been through some cataclysm. One friend of mine had cancer. One way or another, any friend of mine has emotional scar tissue."

'The Agency Always Wins'

Whatever it is that comes over his eyes at such times is not a faraway look. It is a look of frankness. A willingness to complicate his own equation. It is also a warning: You are not going to figure out Frank Snepp over lunch.

"The war provided certain cataclysmic moments," he says. "I used to make an effort to go out in the field, like the grunts, so as to understand it. I was in a helicopter one morning with other helicopters spread out against the sky, down in the Delta. We're flying along, and there on the horizon is the war. Artillery, columns of smoke. We're flying toward it, full of helicopter noise. I'd been reading 'For Whom the Bell Tolls,' where Hemingway is telling you over and over how great war is. And I remember think-

ing, watching the tracer bullets coming up, how I wouldn't give up that moment for anything.

"You went over there looking for answers, and came back with questions. You know that scene in 'The Best Years of Our Lives' in which Dana Andrews is walking among the carcasses of the B17s? A lot of us are doing that now. We'll always be doing it."

Victor Marchetti, who lives in McLean and who continues to write articles, recognizes the syndrome. He made "a quarter-of-a million dollars" on his book (shared with his agent and his co-author), but he remains ostracized, and says that's "something you never get beyond."

"When you buck the system, it doesn't matter whether you go right, like Frank, or left, like Agee, or whether you stay middle-of-the-road, like I did. You were picked for the agency in the first place because of certain personality traits, and they're going to give you big personal problems. You're buffeted between guilt and the feeling that what you've done is worthwhile. The agency always wins in court. The loser in the end is going to be the guy who spoke out. He's going to get stomped. It's a goddamned lonely feeling."

Frank Snepp must know he lost. He has already submitted his new novel to the CIA for approval, and the CIA has already embarrassed itself by ordering a name out that it had previously approved in another manuscript, and then having to change its order to a "request."

John Stockwell has settled out of court, promising to pay any further royalties from his CIA-in-Angola book to the government. And to submit further writings to the CIA for review. And the Justice Department is also after the profits of Philip Agee's two books, though they may be hard to collect. As for less problematical CIA writers, they are flocking to the review board. The CIA has examined 95 manuscripts so far this year, and 293 since 1977.

The agency's point of view on Snepp, as expressed by public information officer Dale Peterson, is this: "Mr. Snepp knew the rules. When he did not let us review his book, we felt we had to find out whether our secrecy agreement would stand up in court. It did. We intend to use that agreement against other former employes who attempt to publish without review. We will try to get injunctions, and stop their books."

"But look, the Marchetti case was a long time ago, and we've learned our lesson from it. We now know that we can delete only classified intelligence material, not just stuff that's embarrassing to us. We're very careful, we have specific guidelines. You have to understand that the agency has matured. It's 30 years old now, and people are ending their terms of service. There are going to be a lot of books. We felt that with Snepp, we had to make a stand."

The strange thing about the whole business, despite the issues and the people who are reflected in the hall of mirrors, is that you can buy "Decent Interval" in downtown Washington right now. When it came out in 1974, it was \$14.95. Now it's on sale at \$3.99.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 11THE WASHINGTON POST
14 September 1980

VIP

The Search for Frank Terpil

By Maxine Cheshire

WHEN THE IRS tacked a \$2.8 million tax lien on the door of his house in McLean, Va., international arms dealer Frank Terpil shaved off his mustache, packed his Idi Amin T-shirts and said his farewells to the girls at "The Apple Tree" disco.

Now the former CIA agent is missing, feared by the government to be a fugitive who fled the country to avoid prosecution on charges of training terrorists, selling guns and exporting high-powered explosives.

What a plot twist for the film companies, including 20th Century-Fox, that were dickering to buy his life story.

The British producer who outraged the Saudi Arabian royal family with the television movie "Death of a Princess" was one of those bidding on a Terpil script. The movie might even placate the Saudis somewhat, since that country is one of the places some Terpil watchers think he might go.

That's where Terpil's buddy, Amin, is hiding out with his wives and children. The two men have talked regu-

larly by trans-Atlantic phone, kidding about the day Terpil will mount an invasion of mercenaries to return "Big Daddy" to power.

"Not this year, Excellency," Terpil told Amin recently when it became obvious to both of them that Terpil's own problems in this country would have to take precedence.

Terpil has flaunted his closeness to Amin. His favorite attire was a T-shirt emblazoned with the number "7" on the back. Amin is a believer in numerology. A likeness of Amin decorated the front with the proclamation: "King of All Africa and Conquerer of the British Empire."

Terpil had boxes full of the shirts. Amin had ordered them from the U.S. to be worn by his soccer team at the Olympics. He insisted that every player had to be a "7."

On the library wall of his half-million-dollar house in McLean, directly across the road from Ethel Kennedy and her "Hickory Hill" estate, Terpil had a huge framed picture of Amin riding a bicycle.

He felt that bicycle showed the crafty intelligence of a man most of the world considers to be either a madman or a monster, or both.

According to Terpil, a neighboring African country had been refusing to allow gasoline supply trucks to cross borders into Uganda. Amin supposedly said nothing until the country's ruler arrived for a state visit.

Amin showed up with an entourage on bicycles and invited the potentate to peddle back to the capital with him.

"It's only 22 kilometers," he said. "We would have brought the limousines, but of course with the gas shortage."

The trucks were rolling again that night.

When Amin fled Uganda, Terpil ended up with five expensive automobiles, including a vintage Rolls Royce that had been built for a member of the British royal family and given to the king of Uganda. All were flown to London aboard a C-130, where Terpil claims to have them still in storage. If Scotland Yard and U.S. law enforcement sources are to be believed, Terpil owns a lot of things in England, including a hotel "safe house" for spies and assassins and terrorists.

He is a man accused of many things. Described by almost everyone everywhere as "one of the world's major international arms dealers," he has been accused in print of supplying arms to Uganda and Libya and the PLO.

Stories of all kinds spring up around such a flamboyant figure. He denies all of the following claims, which have appeared in the press:

- He trained Amin's dreaded State Research Bureau in espionage and sabotage.

- He trained Carlos, the Venezuelan-born terrorist who some intelligence sources believe planned the 1972 Olympics massacre of Israeli athletes.

- He has been charged in the indictment with recruiting American mercenaries to assassinate one of Libyan dictator Col. Muammar Qaddafi's political enemies for \$1 million. The assassination was never carried out.

Terpil, indicted in New York last January and again in Washington in April, is a man about whom much has been written abroad. Yet most Americans had never heard of him until his name surfaced in "Billygate" in bizarre references that have never been cleared up.

Billy Carter, in Senate hearings, identified Terpil as someone who had acted as an "interpreter" for him during one of his visits to Libya but denied FBI allegations that Terpil had ever tried to involve him in a deal to sell machine guns.

The 40-year-old Terpil, a native of Brooklyn, speaks no foreign language that anyone who knows him knows about, except for a few words of Swahili that translate roughly: "Drunken White Trash."

Since Terpil doesn't seem, at the moment, ever likely to stand trial in this country, fact may never be separated from fiction in all the stories about him. Even when he is telling the stories himself, the truth is sometimes hard to track.

He has photographs of Che Guevara, taken seconds before his death and seconds after, along with a lock of his hair.

Was he there?
He left one listener in doubt, but assures another, hearing the same story on another occasion, that another American CIA operative gave him the mementoes.

He said he once "stole" a Russian missile for the U.S. on contract, only to have the American ship that was supposed to rendezvous for pickup and delivery fail to show up.

"I promised the crew of a Russian patrol boat more money than they had ever seen in their lifetime," he said. "I had promised them we would ram their boat and sink it after we got the missile off. Then our guys didn't show up. I think they probably thought I was setting them up."

At one point, Terpil got himself a literary agent and was talking about writing a book because his legal bills were getting enormous. The IRS was watching, he complained, to see if he spent any income for which he had not accounted in his tax returns. The book may never be written now.

He claimed to know the names of congressmen paid off by free-lance "spooks for hire." He claimed to know active-duty CIA officials who were willing to accept fees to moonlight commercial "reports" based on classified intelligence data.

He could cite instances in which American intelligence agencies were cheated of millions of dollars by one contract employe with a vivid imagination.

CONTINUED

"He got \$75,000 once for a Russian crab mine (land mine) that didn't exist," Terpil says. "He convinced them it did exist and said he was going to Lebanon to get one and got as far as the Bahamas, where he wrote his report on how he tried and failed. He still got his \$75,000."

With delight Terpil will tell you that he is an "amoral" man. Ask why he left the CIA and he will answer:

"For fun and profit... to start my own little agency... why should I give money away to those other people when I can make it for myself? ... I did not print bogus money in Beirut and get fired, as one story claimed."

The government has claimed that he has made millions, all now stashed in Swiss bank accounts. But the house in

McLean isn't titled in his name. Neither is an office building on Connecticut avenue.

Two sons, and two Filipino servants, are living in the house.

Terpil's wife, Marilyn, who was herself a high-ranking CIA operative, has been abroad for months.

"They think she's in Geneva, counting my money," Terpil said at one point.

One law enforcement source says Mrs. Terpil does not appear to know her husband's whereabouts. "She called the states last week, frantically trying to locate him herself," the source said.

There are those who think Terpil may be in Syria, which last week signed a merger agreement with Libya. Terpil is believed to have had a multimillion-dollar deal pending with his Syrian connection.

Wherever he is, he doesn't look the same, since he shaved his mustache.

The "Bob Guccione" of the FBI was asked last week to take an airbrush to a mug-shot, and touch it up in the same way that nude centerfolds in Penthouse are improved, to show Interpol how Terpil probably looks now.

Not that there were that many people who knew what he looked like before.

British publications were offering \$100,000 for a photograph of him at one point.

There are a few people who fear that Terpil may not be alive. He says the Israelis would like to see him dead, and claims Massad agents have already tried to kill him at least once in a hotel in Norway. He claims one former associate sent someone here to kill him several months ago. His friends believe him. Prosecutors don't.

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ON PAGE A9

THE WASHINGTON POST
13 September 1980

Judge Makes Offer in Agee Lawsuit

Reuter

A judge proposed yesterday that former CIA agent Philip Agee submit all future writings on U.S. intelligence operations for screening by the Central Intelligence Agency.

In return, he said, the government would drop a lawsuit to confiscate profits from two of Agee's books on CIA operations.

U.S. District Judge Gerhard Gesell also suggested that Agee withdraw his demand for information that the CIA has gathered about his activities since he left the agency in 1964.

Gesell made the proposal during a hearing on Agee's suit and the government's countersuit to collect profits from the sale of Agee's books, "Dirty

Work: The CIA in Western Europe" and "Dirty Work II: The CIA in Africa."

There was no indication whether Agee, who lives in West Germany, or the government would agree to Gesell's proposal.

The government alleges that Agee repeatedly breached a secrecy agreement he signed with the agency.

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ON PAGE A-2

WASHINGTON STAR
13 SEPTEMBER 1980

People

Threatened With Contempt

U.S. District Judge Gerhard Gesell has proposed a settlement under which he would put outspoken ex-CIA employe Philip Agee under threat of contempt if he fails to clear with the CIA future writings about his days as an agent. Under Gesell's proposed settlement of a government suit against Agee, the Justice Department would drop a claim for damages against him, and Agee would dispense with a Freedom of Information suit seeking 43,000 pages of CIA files on him. Agee lives in Hamburg, West Germany, and was out of the Justice Department's legal jurisdiction until he filed the Freedom of Information suit last year.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-8

NEW YORK TIMES
13 SEPTEMBER 1980

Judge Offers Way to Settle U.S. Suit Against Ex-Agent

WASHINGTON, Sept. 12 (AP) — A Federal judge today suggested a way to settle the Government's suit to recover the profits from books published by Philip Agee, a former agent for the Central Intelligence Agency, who is now an outspoken critic of the agency.

Federal District Judge Gerhard A. Gesell said the Government could agree to drop its claim to Mr. Agee's profits in return for a pledge from Mr. Agee that he would not publish anything further about the agency without its approval.

The judge said that if the case went to trial, it could take years to resolve and the Government could be forced to disclose secrets it would prefer to keep.

Judge Gesell made his remarks at a hearing on a motion by Mr. Agee to dismiss the Government's suit.

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"ROYAL"

Approved For Release 2009/05/05 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501420001-2

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 43NEW REPUBLIC
20 SEPTEMBER 1980

Washington Diarist

Secrecy is coming back into fashion. The *New York Times* reported on September 7 that the Carter administration has created a new security designation, higher even than the once-forbidding "Top Secret." Tippy Top Secret stuff will now be stamped "Royal." Although the word has unpleasant overtones, it is short and to the point. (Try to fit "Top Secret, And We Really Mean It This Time" on a tiny rubber stamp.) Access to documents stamped "Royal" will be limited to a star chamberish group consisting of two dozen White House aides and 10 members of Congress. Some will say that the new security designation is an attempt to stop press leaks and accidental declassifications such as the one that led to the story in the *Progressive* on the building of nuclear bombs. This is not true. The new "Royal" stamp is just a clever way to get important people to read Top Secret documents. They stopped years ago, when they discovered that everything at the White House was stamped "Top Secret," including many coffee pots and a couple of water coolers. The new designation should restore their thrill of inclusion until inflation necessitates the creation of a new stamp, marked "Divine."

T. N.

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ON PAGE A16

THE WASHINGTON POST
16 September 1980

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

'Royal' Secrets

The new system of intelligence called "royal" sounds great. The title might be a bit pompous, but it is clearly for the people.

I note from the description of "royal" in The Washington Post that the new system cuts off most congressional, military and other government officials. Since nothing is said about common citizens, I assume we have open access to these great secrets.

Could you arrange an appointment

and place so I can begin immediately to read this material? Thanks.

It is always nice to have someone looking after the interests of the common man.

RISTO MARTTINEN,
Gardener

Falls Church

Next—a "Divine" secret classification?

MALCOLM WINDHAM

Arlington

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INTELLIGENCE REPORTS/UNCLASSIFIED STUDIES/
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17 September 1980

When it comes to military madness, U.S. still on top

The myth of Soviet arms superiority

By KEVIN J. KELLEY
Guardian Correspondent
First of two articles

Washington, D.C.

Who's ahead in military strength—the U.S. or USSR?

The majority sentiment on the U.S. political spectrum now seems to hold that Washington is at best a precarious equal to Moscow in military might.

A smaller but quite vocal section of the ruling class even maintains that the Soviet military build-up of the past several years has reduced the U.S. to second rate status.

The election-year prescription being offered from moderate Democrats to hawkish neoconservatives is a crash "rearmament program" by the U.S. Virtually all the specific steps advocated to build the Pentagon's military machine this year are now being implemented: registration for the draft; deployment of the MX mobile-missile system; assemblage of a Rapid Deployment Force; development of a new fleet of nuclear-armed bombers, and a bolstering of sea warfare capabilities. All of this is to be financed by multi-billion dollar increases in the Pentagon budget that can only be obtained by proportional cuts in social spending.

This unrestrained militarism also involves some significant shifts in U.S. nuclear war policy and a general lessening of the chances for avoiding World War 3. Talk of arms limitation and detente is rarely heard here these days. The drive to "regain U.S. superiority" is well underway, its consequences both ominous and unconsidered.

—Only a courageous few now question the central rationale on which this build-up is based. The terms and tenor of debate have shifted so far in favor of the hawks in the past couple of years that the underlying premise of an all-out Soviet military effort is seldom even questioned any more. It therefore seems essential to scrutinize what has become an axiom for all bourgeois politicians and for many liberals and a few leftists.

BASIS OF CLAIMS

What, first of all, is the basis for the claim that the Soviet Union has outspent the U.S. significantly in the last few years?

It is certainly not the Soviet government, which consistently maintains that it is not engaged in any push to become the top superpower. In claiming that it seeks only parity and thus security, the Soviets point to their published figures on defense spending which represent, in dollars, about one-fourth of the U.S. annual expenditure. Allegations that the USSR is actually spending more than the Pentagon are routinely denounced by Moscow as "malicious falsehoods."

Confirmation for the claim of enormous Soviet military outlays does not come from somewhat impartial analysts such as the London-based Institute for Strategic Studies and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The British research institute refuses to affix any firm dollar figure to the Soviet defense program, explaining that any estimate would be based on large amounts of guesswork. SIPRI meanwhile acknowledges that "the scale and momentum of Soviet military activities are scarcely modest." But, the Swedish group adds, precise computations are "very uncertain" and "lack credibility."

Even sections of the U.S. government are reluctant to certify the huge sums that have been attributed to the Soviet military machine. In an October 1979 report on world armament expenditures, for example, the State Department's Arms Control and Disarmament Agency points out that "estimates of this type probably overstate the relative size of

CONTINUED

Soviet military expenditures compared to the military spending of the U.S."

In the end, it becomes clear that the sole source of astronomical figures on USSR defense outlays is the CIA. Beginning in the late 1950s, the CIA developed an annual assessment of Soviet military spending which the agency says is based on its thorough and impartial intelligence-gathering operations. Until the mid-1970s, these yearly estimates produced little controversy or concern since they always showed that the U.S. was well ahead of the Soviets—both in terms of military spending and weapons stockpiling.

DRAMATIC CHANGE IN 1976

All this changed dramatically in 1976 when the CIA suddenly announced that it was doubling its estimate of the percentage of gross national product (GNP) which Moscow directed toward defense endeavors. Instead of allocating about 5% or 6% of its comparatively modest GNP to the military, the USSR was now judged by the CIA to be channeling between 11% and 13% of its total national output to various defense programs.

CIA officials explained their massive revision on the basis of "improved intelligence" and a major reassessment of the efficiency of the Soviet military production system. Essentially, the CIA was saying that the USSR may not really be getting more weapons for its money but could instead be spending a lot more than previously thought because their factories and bureaucracies turn out to be surprisingly inefficient. This elucidation, however, was treated as a footnote to the revelation of a "doubling of Soviet spending," and has since been completely forgotten and concealed.

It is probably no coincidence that the year of this revised estimate also saw the initial upturn in the U.S. military outlay following a 5-year reduction as involvement in Vietnam was decreased and eventually halted altogether. Since 1976, the Pentagon has been the site of a gold rush, with appropriations soaring each fiscal year. In the last two years alone, according to the Center for Defense Information here, the U.S. military budget has risen \$39 billion, or 6% annually above and beyond the inflation rate.

The CIA was at it again last week. In testimony before the House Intelligence Committee's oversight subcommittee Sept. 3, CIA strategic research director Robert Huffstutler predicted that "Soviet defense spending will continue to increase in real terms at least through 1985." The rate of projected growth, Huffstutler added, is anticipated to be roughly the same as "the 4%-5% a year in real terms" which Moscow has added to the military budget "since at least 1965."

The net effect of this alleged bonanza for Soviet military programs is quite alarming, according to the CIA. For the period 1970-1979, "our dollar valuation of Soviet defense exceeds U.S. outlays by about 30%," Huffstutler said. "By 1979," he added, "the Soviet total was about \$165 billion—about 50% above U.S. outlays." Over the last 10 years, the CIA contends, Moscow has poured \$1.460 trillion into the military while the U.S. has allocated a mere \$1.135 trillion, a 30% differential.

The 1976 change in Soviet GNP-defense estimates is not even referred to now by the CIA. It simply assumes, as does Congress, that the revised ratio is correct and valid.

Even if the Soviet economy is growing rather slowly, the CIA

does not believe that this would in any way affect Moscow's militarization effort. "We think it highly unlikely that, even in the longer term, economic difficulties will force a reversal of the Soviet leaders' longstanding policy of continuing to improve their military capabilities," the CIA research chief said.

The intelligence agency thus covers all its flanks. The USSR has been spending on defense for the past 15 years like there's no tomorrow, the CIA says. This trend will certainly continue, it adds, even though the Soviet economy is performing poorly. The obvious implication is that the U.S. must move far and fast to catch up with a weapons machine that has been in high gear since 1965 and which shows no sign of slowing down.

CIA officials also insist, whenever challenged, that their estimates are quite accurate for almost every category of Soviet defense expenditure. They admit a rather slim margin of possible error for a few areas where intelligence is said to be somewhat imprecise, but generally the figures—computed in both dollars and rubles—are claimed to be reasonable guides to U.S. policy.

Indeed, the importance of these annual projections as a rationale for U.S. defense budgeting and weapons programs cannot be overstated. Huffstutler noted at the outset of his Capitol Hill testimony last week, for example, that "U.S. policymakers often require comparisons between U.S. and Soviet defense activities. Though such comparisons sometimes require measures of military effectiveness, they frequently entail no more than a simple summing-up of the forces belonging to each side."

This simplistic yardstick is also cited by high government officials as their basis for preparing the U.S. defense budget. Defense Secretary Harold Brown told Congress in January that "the general magnitude of the Soviet defense effort, and the continued uncertainties in international relations, account to a considerable extent for the size and composition of the U.S. defense budget." In its Dec. 13, 1979, account of President Carter's request for a massive Pentagon budget hike, the New York Times observed: "The principal rationale for the increased military budget proposed by the President was the Soviet Union, which he said has been increasing its real military spending by 3% or 4% a year for 'nearly 20 years.'"

In addition, the 1976 CIA revision of Soviet spending is regarded as a milestone in U.S. military attitudes by no less an authoritative source than Armed Forces Journal, the quasi-official magazine on Pentagon developments. In its August 1980 issue, the Journal notes the CIA revelation of superior Soviet spending for 1977 and 1978. When presented to Congress, the publication says, this projection "had a profound effect: for the first time in 20 years Congress passed a defense budget almost identical to the one the administration had requested."

Despite the very significant impact of the CIA's estimates, no one outside the intelligence agency is permitted to review the data on which they are based and thereby challenge the CIA's raw figures. Because of this secrecy, the only questioning of CIA computations must be based on the formulas which the agency uses to arrive at its final and public claims of Soviet spending.

A few specialists have carefully examined the little material on this subject that is available, and some of them have openly and strongly condemned the CIA's methodology and its product.

CONTINUED

"My conclusion," says Franklyn Holzman, a Tufts professor and fellow at the Harvard Russian Research Center, "is that the Soviets have not been outspending us on defense as the CIA has argued for almost a decade." Holzman argued before the same House Intelligence subcommittee at which Huffstutler spoke Sept. 3 that the CIA analysts "consciously or unconsciously apply worst-case analysis" to their estimates. "The CIA does a great disservice to our policymakers and to our nation when it presents us with such misleading information on such an important matter," Holzman added.

He and other critics of the CIA's estimates attack the agency's statisticians on the esoteric procedures whereby rubles are converted into dollars for economic computations that are, in turn, based on shadowy premises. Holzman told the subcommittee, for example, that the CIA made mistakes in five key areas when it developed its figures, and he noted that the agency admits to the possibility of error in four of these categories.

"Adding up these five exaggerations," he explained, "leads to the following approximate revision of the CIA estimates for 1976-77 [the key year in which the agency doubled its estimated ratio of Soviet military-GNP figures]. Instead of outspending the U.S. by 40% a year per the CIA," Holzman said, "the Soviets outspent us by only 20% in dollars. In rubles, which are just as valid as dollars, the picture changes from the CIA view that the Soviets outspent us by 25% to my estimate the U.S. outspent the USSR by some 25%-30%."

FLAWED METHODOLOGY

Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.), an acknowledged military expert in Congress, also disputes the CIA on its mathematical methodology. He points out that the agency arrives at its estimate of money spent by the USSR on military personnel by simply putting Soviet soldiers on the same pay scale as their U.S. counterparts. This practice results in gross distortions, Aspin explains, noting that "the Chinese would be spending us into oblivion" if the same pay-scale equivalence were applied.

One other major flaw in the CIA comparisons of U.S.-USSR outlays was also emphasized by Holzman. "The CIA," he testified, "concentrates almost all its analysis and publicity on the U.S. vs. the USSR. The rest of NATO and the rest of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), not to mention the People's Republic of China, are dealt with as afterthoughts. The fact is that even in dollars, NATO [excluding the U.S.] outspends other WTO [excluding the USSR] by four or five to one. Moreover," Holzman noted, "20% of the Soviets' military expenditures are directed at China, not the U.S. or NATO."

Arguments and analyses such as Holzman's, for all their logic and forcefulness, today make scarcely a dent in the hawkish shield thrown up by U.S. politicians and bellicose propagandists. One reason for this is the media's complicity in playing up the CIA estimates and taking as gospel the constant claims that the U.S. is being buried under an avalanche of Soviet military spending.

The Washington Post, for example, in its Sept. 4 story on the Intelligence Committee hearings, headlined and stressed the CIA's projection of a 4%-5% annual real increase in Soviet military outlays. It made no mention whatsoever of Holzman or his testimony.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 14-1LOS ANGELES TIMES
17 SEPTEMBER 1980

Soviets Make New Oil Find, Seek U.S. Drilling Gear

By ROBERT GILLETTE, Times Staff Writer

MOSCOW—The Soviet Union has struck oil in Central Kazakhstan, far from existing fields, and is trying to buy American drilling equipment to explore the new deposit, informed sources said Tuesday.

Three exploratory wells have produced significant but unspecified amounts of oil near Lake Tengiz, 200 miles northwest of the industrial city of Karaganda, these sources said. Lake Tengiz lies in a geological depression near the southern edge of the so-called virgin lands, a vast dry plains region of more than 100 million acres opened to grain cultivation in the mid-1950s.

Oil from all three test wells was said to contain large amounts of hydrogen sulfide and carbon dioxide, two gaseous contaminants that could pose problems in drilling and refining.

The sources stress that little information is available on which to judge the importance of the Kazakhstan discovery. It

is considered significant, however, that Soviet officials in recent weeks have approached an American firm with an initial offer to buy 10 new drilling rigs for a total of about \$10 million to extend exploration in the Lake Tengiz area. The sources refused to identify the American company.

Sale of the drilling equipment is likely to be permitted, even under trade restrictions the Carter Administration imposed after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan last December, so long as the American firm provides only drilling equipment and not the technology for manufacturing it.

Kazakhstan covers an expanse more than one-fourth the area of the United States, stretching 1,900 miles from the Volga region of the European Soviet Union to the Altai Mountains on the Chinese border. It supplies 12% of the country's grain and huge quantities of metals and phosphate fertilizers.

But Kazakhstan has little oil of its own to support an ambitious program of industrial growth which Soviet planners have set for this mostly arid region sandwiched between Western Siberia and Central Asia. On a map of Soviet oil resources, Kazakhstan is virtually blank.

Small fields at Emba, near the northeast Caspian Sea shore, and at Mangyshalk on the eastern Caspian shore, produce a combined total of less than 500,000 barrels a day, and not without problems. The Emba fields have been pumped since late czarist times and are wearing out. And the Mangyshalk oil is heavily laden with paraffin, which requires special equipment and hot, desalted water for production—a scarce commodity in the barren Kazakh desert.

The Caspian fields are almost 600 miles from the strike at Lake Tengiz and are used mainly to supply the European part of the Soviet Union, not Kazakhstan. Instead, the Kazakh Republic's main petroleum artery is a pipeline from the swampy and trouble-plagued fields of

western Siberia, 800 miles to the north. The planners of Kazakh industry would undoubtedly welcome more conveniently situated oil to save the enormous cost of transportation. And with the possibility of a general Soviet oil shortage looming in the 1980s, incentives to discover new reserves—especially in areas more hospitable than the bogs and permafrost of Siberia—are doubly strong.

The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has maintained since April, 1977, that Soviet oil production would peak no later than the early 1980s and then begin a steep decline. Any such decline would put serious stress on the stagnating Soviet economy and, in the view of many U.S. experts, could drive the Soviet Union to seek oil from the Middle East, particularly from a chaotic and vulnerable Iran.

Oil production has fluctuated this year, but Soviet statistics through May show output running about 2% ahead of last year's average figure of 11.7 million barrels a day.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE I/12CHICAGO TRIBUNE
- 16 September 1980

Milton J. Rosenberg
**Interpreting the military intentions
of the Soviet Union**

[Mr. Rosenberg, professor of social psychology at the University of Chicago, is the author of "Vietnam and the Silent Majority."]

How much are we placed in peril by the Soviet Union? What are their intentions? How will they pursue the realization of those intentions? These questions are posed and answered by Norman Podhoretz, the well-established, neo-conservative editor of Commentary Magazine, in his new book, "The Present Danger."

"The Present Danger" answers these questions in much the same way as does the organization from which the book borrows its title, the Committee on the Present Danger. Are we imperiled by the Soviet Union? Yes, and we are almost at the point of irreversibility. What are their intentions? To neutralize us ["Finlandize" is Podhoretz's favored word] and then work their will upon the world.

How do they plan to get from here to there? By achieving [they have done so already] and maintaining vast military superiority in both conventional and nuclear modes and then confronting us with the choice between yielding or dying.

Interesting and very frightening, if true. Since the whole argument hangs on the "fact" that the Soviets have surged ahead in military power, an evaluation of the "Present Danger" position [both book and organization] must begin with an examination of the available quantitative data.

It is a matter of considerable surprise

that nowhere in the commentary on Podhoretz's recent book has anyone noted what must be the most telling misstatement in all of the recently renewed debate about Soviet and American power.

Almost as surprising is that in a book focused on the danger posed by Soviet military superiority all the quantitative comparisons offered up in support are contained within merely one paragraph over the book's range of 101 pages. In that paragraph [page 40] Podhoretz says: "Through the entire decade of the seventies, the Soviets spent three times as much as the United States on defense, and in 1979 alone . . . they outstripped the United States by 50 per cent."

Podhoretz has always been notable for his ability to advance his convictions in essays that are both vigorous and lucid. But lucidity is not a substitute for accuracy, and convictions should be carefully tested against such data as may be available. On the crucial question of actual Soviet military expenditure one should rely on some source other than [or in addition to] the one upon which Podhoretz depends: a single article by Drew Middleton in the New York Times.

The Military Economic Analysis Center of the Central Intelligence Agency in

January of this year issued a detailed study under the title "Soviet and U.S. Defense Activities, 1970-79: A Dollar Cost Comparison." They report that the total defense costs from 1970 through 1979 were \$1,135 billion for the United States and an estimated \$1,460 billion dollars for the Soviet Union. This includes all military spending in the categories of research, development, engineering and total operating costs and excludes only pensions, on which we do significantly outspend the Soviets.

Instead of the 200 per cent advantage that Podhoretz claims for the Soviet Union the figures I have cited compute out to a 28.6 per cent advantage.

The difference between 200 per cent and 28.6 per cent is great enough to suggest that the "present danger" is posed not only by Soviet arms and geopolitical ambitions [both of which are surely worrisome] but also by a tendency, on the part of some organizations and their publicists, toward alarmist interpretations of Soviet intentions.

In the face of distorted and error-laden representations of the "Present Danger" are hopes that the American public will remain capable of resisting the true danger of hysteria uncontrolled by realism.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A8THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
15 September 1980

New 5-Year Plan To Call for Cut In Soviet Growth

MOSCOW (AP) — The Soviet Union's master economic plan for the next five years, now in the final stage of drafting, will call for one of the lowest rates of industrial growth in Soviet history, Soviet and diplomatic sources predict.

At the same time, the plan is likely to put heavy pressure on farmers and the nation's energy industry to reach high production targets in 1981-85.

Main points of the plan probably will be published by the end of this year. It will be the yardstick for the Soviet economy into the mid-1980s and will help set the economic pace for a decade beyond that.

Some figures already released show the plan calls for ambitious increases in grain production — more grain in each of the five years than in any previous year in Soviet history. But the plan for industrial growth is expected to be far more sober and in line with actual results in recent years.

It is expected to stress the further development of all kinds of energy, but particularly oil and atomic power. Planners are deeply committed to further growth of atomic energy, which is expected to account for more than 10 percent of the nation's electricity by the mid-1980s.

The CIA has claimed that Soviet oil production will peak in the early 1980s. But many Soviet specialists assert that production can be raised throughout the decade if the Soviet government is prepared to pay the huge costs involved for labor and technology.

According to Soviet and diplomatic analysts, the new plan is likely to call for an industrial growth rate of around 3.5 to 4.5 percent annually. Soviet statistics show growth has averaged about 4.7 percent a year under the current five-year plan, which ends this year.

The original goal for 1976-80 was a 6.3 percent annual growth, but that goal was never reached and last year's growth was only 3.4 percent.

At the start of the 1960s, growth rates were more than 8 percent a year, but such rates are rare for mature economies.

Some analysts say Soviet industrial growth is slowing because the economy already produces the basic quantities of needed goods. Current steel production is about 150 million metric tons a year, and that is considered adequate.

There are Western specialists who attribute the slowdown to a lack of qualified labor and high technology rather than a decision to limit industrial expansion.

They also note that Soviet light industry, which produces most consumer goods, is still underdeveloped when compared to heavy industry.

Grain production is planned to average from 238 million to 243 million metric tons a year in 1981-85, compared to the record 237.2 million tons in 1978. The average over the past five years has been only about 209 million tons, and planners are counting on good weather as much as new technology to reach the high targets.

"We think the bad weather of the 70s was an anomaly," said one Soviet specialist. "We think it has to be better in the 1980s."

"But then, it could be like the 70s again. God forbid."

In energy, oil production is roughly on target toward the goal of 606 million metric tons (about 12.1 million barrels) a day in 1980. The oil production target for 1981-85 is not yet known, but some Soviet observers believe production could level off late in the decade at 630-660 million tons as oil is replaced by other fuel sources.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-2NEW YORK TIMES
13 SEPTEMBER 1980

CONGRESS RELEASES AID TO NICARAGUANS

President Guarantees That They Are Not Supporting Violence

By **JUAN de ONIS**

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 12 — After President Carter guaranteed today that Nicaragua's revolutionary Government was not supporting violence or terrorism in Central America, Congress released \$75 million in long-delayed economic aid for the Nicaraguans.

A White House statement said that the funds would provide support for private businesses that stand for political pluralism and free enterprise in the economy. "The Administration does not intend to abandon the vital Central American region to Cuba and its radical Marxist allies," the statement continued.

Administration sources said that the granting of aid to a Government that shows strong Marxist influence represented a risk but that failure to provide the funds "would work against our strategy of support" for moderate elements.

Release of the aid, authorized by the Congress on May 31, had been delayed by a requirement that the President certify that Nicaragua was not aiding guerrilla movements in such troubled nearby countries as El Salvador and Guatemala.

Intelligence reports, circulated by conservative opponents of the Administration's policy, contained allegations that Cuban arms had been shipped into Nicaragua for transfer to guerrillas in Central America. Nicaragua has denied this.

Administration sources said that after a careful study of reports from United States embassies in Central America and the Central Intelligence Agency, representatives of the State Department, the Defense Department and the National Security Council had concurred that the evidence was insufficient.

The delay in getting the aid, initially requested by the Administration last November, has caused criticism from Nicaraguan political leaders and misgivings among private businessmen there.

State Department sources said that loan agreements would be signed in Managua next week, providing \$54 million in credits, mainly for industrial imports, farm loans and commercial activity.

The release of the United States aid came after a group of about 120 United States private banks reached agreement with Nicaragua on refinancing about \$600 million in debts, largely accumulated under the Somoza dictatorship.

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ON PAGE 29

OIL & GAS JOURNAL
8 September 1980

Soviet oil decline likely despite surge in drilling

THE U.S.S.R. has scheduled record drilling increases during its next Five Year Plan spanning 1981-85.


But these gains aren't expected to prevent near-term erosion of Soviet oil production.

Negative effects of a sluggish, poorly planned, generally unsuccessful exploration program during the 1970s probably will have their greatest impact on Soviet crude/condensate production in the early 1980s. Benefits achieved from continuation of the current unprecedented growth in Soviet development drilling for oil will be more than offset by the past decade's exploration failures.

While crude/condensate output—recently more than 12 million b/d—and total drilling are at all-time highs, several of the most important indices of future U.S.S.R. oil industry trends point to rough times ahead. The Soviet Union will have to drill far more holes and sharply increase investment to find and produce a barrel of crude during the 1980s, compared with the 1970s.

The 1970s, in turn, saw annual additions to oil reserves fall substantially below those achieved during the late 1960s. Oil drilling and production costs rose at a record pace during the past decade.

During 1966-70, total capital investment in the oil industry averaged only 2.2 billion rubles/year (about \$2.4 billion/year at the then-prevailing exchange rate). By 1978 the figure was 5.27 billion rubles (\$7.6 billion)/year, and current outlays are believed to be close to 7 billion rubles (\$11 billion)/year.




SOVIET PERSONNEL work on rig in Tyumen Province, which accounts for the bulk of western Siberia's oil production and drilling.

Whereas oil industry capital investment claimed 9.2% of all Soviet industrial capital investment during 1966-70, it currently is estimated to be about 13%.

Costs also are up substantially in the Soviet gas industry, mainly because of high outlays for pipelines. But further impressive hikes in gas flow are

CONTINUED

How Soviet oil drilling has climbed*



certain during the 1980s even if gas drilling gains are minimized.

Reserves required to keep gas production soaring already have been found. The huge average yield of gas wells presently being placed on production in western Siberia and Central Asia indicates that little or no increase will be necessary in the less than 3 million ft/year of development wells and slightly more than 1 million ft/year of exploratory hole being drilled by the U.S.S.R. Ministry of the Gas Industry.

Only 1,030 development wells were completed in Soviet gas fields from 1976 through 1978. Another 360 wells were scheduled to go on production in 1979, when production vaulted nearly 1.23 trillion cu ft.

Current drilling program. Total Soviet drilling for oil and gas this year, including exploration work conducted by the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Geology, is projected at about 24 million m (78.7 million ft) but probably will fall short of target.

By comparison, total U.S. drilling is estimated at 273 million ft for 1980

(OGJ, July 28, p. 155).

Development drilling for oil in the U.S.S.R. as a whole rose from 28.77 million ft in 1975 to 37.98 million in 1978. This year's target is 56.3 million ft.

Drilling by the U.S.S.R. Ministry of the Oil Industry, including exploratory hole, climbed from 29.53 million ft in 1970 to 38.39 million in 1975 and 44.94 million in 1978. Goal for 1980 is 64.96 million ft (see chart).

It's estimated that the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Geology during the late 1970s drilled about 3 million m (9.84 million ft)/year in search of oil and gas.

By 1985, the U.S.S.R. hopes to be drilling 120-130 million ft/year of hole, with much of the hike resulting from development of many relatively small oil fields in western Siberia's Tyumen and Tomsk provinces. Western Siberia is the key to Soviet oil industry success in drilling and production during the next Five Year Plan, as it has been throughout the 1970s.

Soviet officials hope to boost development drilling for oil in western

Siberia nearly 150% during 1981-85, compared with 1976-80.

The task will be very hard—although not impossible—if the Soviets continue to pour money, personnel, equipment, and supplies into western Siberia on the same crash basis of the past 3 years.

Western Siberia production. Western Siberia probably will produce more than 6.3 million b/d of crude and condensate in 1980. That's up from 5.66 million b/d in 1979.

Tyumen Province accounts for more than 96% of western Siberia's oil production and about the same percentage of the area's drilling.

Gary Marchuk, vice-chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, declared recently that plans call for western and eastern Siberia oil production to increase until 2000. The statement appears wildly optimistic.

Western Siberia oil flow has risen far above the 5.2 million b/d that western observers predicted would be peak output in the area. This, however, was achieved by pushing production in some giant fields, such as Samotlor, above levels of maximum efficiency.

Prospects are that western Siberia oil flow will crest by 1985 even if drilling goals are attained.

Eastern Siberia has practically no commercial crude production, and little is in prospect through 1990.

Some bottlenecks. Vladimir Dolgikh, the U.S.S.R. Communist party's secretary for heavy industry, said in an article published early this year that oil production plans for western Siberia are unrealistic without major improvements in technology and productivity.

He added that with existing technology operated at current rates, production goals can only be achieved by increasing the number of drilling personnel by hundreds of thousands.

While Dolgikh cited labor shortages as the main bottleneck in western Siberia, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency believes insufficient rigs for exploratory and development drilling are the major constraint on raising the area's oil production.

Moscow hasn't recently revealed how many operating rigs are available in western Siberia or in the entire Soviet Union. But the latter figure probably is more than 2,500.

CIA estimated the number of operating Soviet rigs in 1975 at 1,800, up only 40 from 1970. Other non-Communist observers believed the U.S.S.R. had more than 3,500 rigs of all types in working or nonworking condition during the mid-1970s.

Through 1978, at least, Soviet rig

production changed little from 1965, when 520 units were turned out. Official figures put the number of rigs manufactured for "development and deep exploratory drilling" at 480 in 1970, 544 in 1975, 511 in 1976, 503 in 1977, and 505 in 1978.

The same source also reported that production of turbodrill sections increased only slightly—from 8,439 in 1965 to 9,780 in 1975, 9,354 in 1976, 9,700 in 1977, and 9,016 in 1978.

Production of electric drills fell from 220 in 1965 to 97 in 1975, 108 in 1976, 96 in 1977, and 81 in 1978.

Western Siberia drilling. Oil ministry data spotlight the leading role western Siberia has taken in Soviet drilling.

In 1970, the Soviet oil ministry drilled only 1 million m (3.28 million ft) of hole in the western Siberia basin.

The figure rose to 2.8 million m (9.19 million ft) in 1975 and 5 million m (16.4 million ft) in 1978. The ministry's western Siberia drilling goals were 7.5 million m (24.61 million ft) in 1979 and 10 million m (32.81 million ft) this year.

By contrast, total oil ministry drilling in all other regions of the U.S.S.R. moved up grudgingly from 8 million m (26.25 million ft) in 1970 to a planned 9.8 million m (32.15 million ft) this year.

In 1970, western Siberia represented slightly more than 11% of the oil ministry's drilling. This year's plan called for the ministry's drilling in the region to reach 50.5% of the national total.

By far the biggest oil drilling gains in western Siberia have been made in development footage.

In 1975, this area drilled 8.97 million ft of oil development hole—31.2% of the nation's total. The figure rose to 16.55 million ft (43.6% of the total) in 1978 and is targeted at 31.43 million ft (55.8%) this year.

However, western Siberia's 1979 development drilling plan was only 82% fulfilled. And another shortfall is expected in 1980.

The U.S.S.R. Ministry of Geology drilled 2.5 million ft of exploratory hole in western Siberia's Tyumen Province in 1979. That was only 70% of its target of 3.56 million ft.

Production outlook. CIA continues to doubt that the U.S.S.R.'s drilling program has been adequate to keep nationwide oil production on the upswing beyond this year. It notes that the volume of exploratory drilling has stagnated since 1965, the wildcat success rate has declined, and emphasis has been placed on development drilling to meet oil production goals.

In 1970, when the oil ministry drilled 29.53 million ft of hole, 9.29 million ft, or 31.5%, was exploratory. By 1975 only 8.97 million ft—23.4% of the total of 38.39 million ft—was exploratory.

This trend is continuing. The oil ministry's 1980 plan calls for about 8.66 million ft of exploratory drilling, or 13.3% of the 64.96 million ft of total hole.

According to CIA, the Soviet Union has large potential oil reserves, but most of them are relatively inaccessible or in complex, difficult geological formations. Promising areas include the Barents and Kara seas (where drilling hasn't started), deep Caspian Sea waters (largely beyond the reach of the U.S.S.R.'s few mobile rigs), eastern Siberia, and the deep onshore Caspian depression.

"None of these areas has been explored intensively," CIA observes.

"Any oil finds will have little impact on oil production until the late 1980s or early 1990s at the earliest.

"In the short run, reserves in existing producing areas must be relied on.

"F. K. Salmanov, chief of the Main Tyumen Province Geological Administration, decried the cutback in western Siberia exploratory drilling during the late 1960s and early 1970s because it lowered the rate of oil discoveries needed for future growth."

The intelligence agency says the problem of reduced exploratory drilling is intensified by the imbalance between drilling to confirm reserves in existing fields and wildcat drilling to locate new fields. The Soviet incentive bonus system encourages the industry to concentrate on more profitable confirmation drilling.

CIA said, "Exploration also is hampered by inadequate geophysical and drilling equipment.

"The average depth of exploratory drilling increased from 2,540 m (8,333 ft) in 1970 to 2,774 m (9,101 ft) in 1976. An average of 3,180 m (10,433 ft) is anticipated for 1980.

"At these greater depths, higher pressures are encountered, and drilling speeds are reduced. Moreover, as the largest, most easily accessible, and geologically simple structures are found, an increasing share of remaining reserves lies in smaller, more complex stratigraphic traps which are more difficult to locate.

"In mid-1977, the Soviets admitted that the search for stratigraphic traps in western Siberia was proceeding blindly because of inadequate exploration equipment. The lack of sophisticated seismic equipment and digital computerized processing equipment

are the major shortcomings."

An increasing number of Soviet economists and geologists now concede that CIA's gloomy prediction concerning the U.S.S.R.'s near-term crude output may have some validity. Contrary to continued optimistic statements by government officials, these authorities admit that the Soviet oil industry faces serious—possibly insurmountable—problems in maintaining 1980 flow during 1981-85.

A. P. Krylov, chairman of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences' scientific council for oil field development, said that, according to preliminary data, "Soviet petroleum output will peak in a comparatively short time and then begin to fall if the present annual rate of increase in the number of new producing wells and the current rise in depletion rate remains unchanged.

"We can alter this trend of events and achieve the planned volume of oil production either by increasing the rate of growth in the number of new development wells (which would require additional capital expenditures and use of pipe) or change over to technologically and economically sound systems of exploitation which would result in lowering well density and reducing the depletion rate (a course that wouldn't involve additional capital outlays).

"Proponents of high well density to obtain the greatest possible oil recovery ratio consider it necessary to use the same density in drilling an entire field rather than employ wider spacing in suitable sectors of the field. This leads to drilling of many wells which have no effect on increasing the recovery ratio and only serve to reduce oil production efficiency and slow overall development.

"Despite all the technological and economic arguments against this practice, it's clear that well densities are still being increased above all sensible limits."

Krylov concluded that unless prompt measures are taken to improve present drilling and production practices, "we risk making serious mistakes that will require much time, money, and labor to correct."

More exploration urged. Vladimir Filanovsky, head of the U.S.S.R. state planning committee's oil and gas industry section, says it is clear that immediate "forced tempo" expansion of oil exploration in western Siberia is urgently required to prevent the government-recommended ratio of production to proved reserves from being exceeded. He noted that wildcat drilling in western Siberia, which produces more than half of the U.S.S.R.'s

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Soviets seeking to improve design of Arctic area rigs


THE SOVIET Union is offering awards for design and introduction of the best ways to improve operating and working conditions at drilling rigs used in Arctic conditions.

First prize is 7,000 rubles (\$11,000) plus the privilege of buying a car without placing one's name on the usual long waiting list. Second and third prizes are 3,000 rubles (\$4,710) and 1,000 rubles (\$1,570).

Contest rules set forth by the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic's Ministry of Geology call for application of the proposed technical advancements to Uralmash-3D, 125-BD, and BU-75-80 rigs used in deep drilling at temperatures as low as -55° C. (-67° F.). Such frigid readings occur during the winter in northern sectors of western Siberia.

Submitted proposals must meet existing safety regulations and provide a high level of labor mechanization. In addition, they must include provision for:

- "A rational method of enclosing the derrick, its foundation, and adjacent structures.



SOVIET RIG operates in tundra area of western Siberia's northern Tyumen Province, where officials are seeking to improve drilling equipment.

ing the derrick, its foundation, and adjacent structures.

- "Delivery of heat to working areas inside the derrick, adjacent structures, and space under the rig floor, including the blowout prevention equipment.
- "Improved conditions for operating the hoisting system.
- "Heating water and lubricants before starting the diesels.
- "Melting the ice beneath the

rig's foundation.

- "Fast removal (melting) of ice on threaded connections and inside drillpipe during round-trip operations.
 - "Standardized assembly methods with maximum mechanization."
- Special attention must be given to reducing costs and labor involved in providing heat for the rigs.

oil, continues to lag and that radical improvements must be achieved within 2 years.

"During recent years the material and technical base for western Siberia geological exploration has developed unsatisfactorily. Good repair facilities, supply bases, and garages for equipment haven't been provided.

"But the problem of increasing western Siberia exploration work can't be solved solely by adding to material resources. Geologists in Tyumen and Tomsk provinces must also make a greater effort to improve economic and technical indices with respect to drilling."

Filanovsky cited statistics provided by the Main Tyumen Geological Administration showing that annual footage per exploratory drilling rig fell from 12,319 ft in 1975 to 10,846 ft in 1978.

Labor productivity in drilling dropped more than 16% during that period.

Time required to drill and complete the average well rose to 216.5 days from 155.8 days.

Average production per new west-

ern Siberia oil well slumped from 1,183 b/d in 1975 to 661 b/d in 1978 and is expected to be only 519 b/d in 1980. This contributed to a reduction in average yield of all Soviet wells from 427 b/d in 1975 to 353 b/d in 1978 and a projected 328.5 b/d in 1980.

Filanovsky said the government's program for developing new western Siberia fields during 1976-80 isn't being fulfilled.

"Main reason is the lack of infrastructure. Drilling goals can't be fulfilled if approach roads aren't built, power lines strung, and production bases established."

Slower production growth. A. Lalayants, deputy chairman of the state planning committee, asserts flatly that the rate of oil production growth in western Siberia will be lower in 1981-85 than during 1976-80 despite big gains in exploratory and development drilling.

He points out that the approximately 60 new, relatively small western Siberia oil fields that will be placed on stream during the next Five Year Plan will have "significantly worse

geological characteristics" and lower per-well production than fields developed during the 1970s.

Lalayants says, "During 1976-80, average output from new western Siberia wells has been about 93 metric tons (679 bbl)/day. But productivity of such wells during 1981-85 will be only 38 tons (277 bbl)/day."

Even to maintain a smaller production growth rate, it will be necessary for western Siberia to increase development drilling for oil from an average of 18.8 million ft/year in 1976-80 to 49.6 million ft/year in 1981-85, Lalayants says. The area's exploratory drilling for oil will have to leap from an average of 3.2 million ft/year to 8.2 million ft/year.

"To achieve these gains in drilling volume we must make significant improvements in the quality of our rock bits. We must also improve the drilling rigs themselves and methods employed in moving them.

"Plans call for increasing the average productivity of drilling brigades by almost 60% by the end of 1985. That means two men will then be doing the work now requiring three."

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FBI TRIAL

Approved For Release 2009/05/05 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501420001-2

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE II-6LOS ANGELES TIMES
17 SEPTEMBER 1980

Freedom as a Security Issue . . .

The current trial in Washington of two former high officials of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is concerned only with their guilt or innocence. They are accused of conspiring to violate the civil rights of citizens by authorizing in the early 1970s a series of clandestine break-ins to help capture fugitives associated with the Weather Underground, a radical antiwar organization.

But the larger issue implicit in the proceedings raises a fundamental question: How can a democracy strike a proper balance between security and individual freedom?

One view of the prosecution of the two officials—W. Mark Felt, the bureau's former acting associate director, and Edward S. Miller, its former assistant director—is expressed by Harry W. Anderson, president of the Society of Former Special Agents of the FBI. He described the two officials as "victims of a post-Watergate backlash, loyal government employees who were doing the job they thought was expected of them to protect the security of the nation."

Dep. Atty. Gen. Charles B. Renfrew, a former federal judge in San Francisco, has another view: "If the message is to get out that constitutional rights are to be maintained, there is no better way to do it than within the family"—that is, to prosecute officials who violate them.

Another Justice Department official put it the same way with more emphasis: "If you go after the premier federal law-enforcement agency, then guys in the Chattanooga Police Department start thinking they can't get away with illegal operations. That's been in our thinking from the start."

But is it fair at this late date to make examples of

two FBI officials acting to protect the country from terrorist bombings by approving tactics that had long been routinely used by the FBI? Routinely used? Yes, routinely used, a former FBI agent and ex-California state senator said in an amazingly candid interview with this newspaper.

Dennis Carpenter, an FBI agent from 1954 to 1958, explained that he and other FBI agents never paid much attention to the requirements of the law. In Mexico, he said, he bribed the police to arrest and deliver U.S. fugitives for "instant extradition." He added, "It was so practical and so reasonable . . . It wasn't something I invented. I learned those tricks from another agent, an old-timer."

On wiretapping, Carpenter said, "We had so many wiretaps it would have taken a busload of judges to take care of them. That wasn't a requirement. I'm positive of it." But in most cases he thought the taps were done with the knowledge of bureau supervisors. If most agents were *not* involved in wiretapping and bag jobs (slang for break-ins), he would be shocked, Carpenter said. "It was a good, clean, easy investigative tool."

What was the justification? The targets were vicious criminals, Carpenter explained, so he did not think it was "some kind of tragedy" to tap their telephones.

It was a remarkable confession. In brief, Carpenter, his fellow agents and his superiors decided that the FBI was above the law because their actions were intended to protect this country from "evil elements."

That is a philosophy that can never be accepted in a democratic country. □

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A12THE WASHINGTON POST
16 September 1980

Nixon Is 'Likely' Defense Witness In Break-In Trial

United Press International

Two former high FBI officials went on trial yesterday on charges they approved illegal break-ins in a hunt for fugitive radicals in the early 1970's—and one of their lawyers said it is "very likely" Richard M. Nixon will be called to testify in their defense.

The trial of W. Mark Felt, the FBI's former associate director, and Edward S. Miller, its former intelligence chief, opened after 30 months of legal haggling over procedures to prevent release of classified information during testimony.

While U.S. District Court Judge William Bryant began the process for empaneling a jury from more than 100 candidates, Felt's attorney disclosed the former president could be called to testify—apparently about his role in approving the illegal surveillance.

"If we ask him to come, he will come," Brian Gettings Jr. told reporters. Gettings said he and several other defense lawyers have interviewed Nixon twice, once about two months ago at his New York office.

"We said, 'we may need you as a witness,' he said 'I don't have any problem. . . If you want me to come, I'll be there.'

"He can help us," Gettings said.

Asked about chances he would call Nixon to testify, Gettings said, "It's very likely. That's the way I put it."

Nixon apparently could be useful to the defense in describing a 1970 telephone conversation he had with FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover about a plan for conducting illegal break-ins, mail-opening and wiretaps to find fugitive members of the terrorist Weather Underground group.

Felt and Miller are accused of conspiring to approve warrantless break-ins—so-called "black bag jobs"—in violation of the civil rights of friends and relatives of members of the terrorist group in 1972 and 1973.

Former acting FBI director Patrick Gray faces the prospect of a separate trial later on charges, but federal sources have expressed doubt the government has a strong enough case to prosecute him.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE **A-19**NEW YORK TIMES
16 SEPTEMBER 1980

Nixon a Possible Witness for F.B.I. Break-Ins Trial

By ROBERT PEAR

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 15 — Former President Richard M. Nixon, seven former Attorneys General and dozens of high-level Government officials were listed today among possible witnesses as a Federal judge began the trial of two former Federal Bureau of Investigation officials indicted 29 months ago on charges of conspiring to violate the constitutional rights of citizens.

Brian P. Gettings, an attorney for one

of the defendants, W. Mark Felt, said it was "very likely" that he would call Mr. Nixon to testify on behalf of his client, who was formerly the bureau's acting associate director.

In an indictment returned in April 1978, Mr. Felt and Edward S. Miller, former chief of the bureau's intelligence division, were accused of authorizing agents to break into homes in New York and New Jersey to help find fugitives associated with the Weather Underground, a radical antiwar organization. The break-ins were carried out in 1972 and 1973 without search warrants or the owners' consent, according to the indictment.

Mr. Felt, a tall man with wavy white hair and thick glasses, and Mr. Miller, a shorter man with sandy hair and a weathered face, sat quietly as Judge William B. Bryant began what he described as the "tedious" process of selecting a jury from a pool of 132 prospective jurors.

To screen out possible bias, he asked whether any of the potential jurors knew the defendants or lawyers, whether they had friends or relatives employed by law-enforcement agencies and whether, for that reason, they might give extra credence to the testimony of law enforcement officers.

Judge Bryant, the chief judge of the Federal District Court here, also read aloud 120 names drawn from lists of possible witnesses submitted by the Government and the defendants. They included Attorneys General stretching from Griffin B. Bell back to Herbert Brownell Jr., who served in the first Eisenhower Administration; James J. Angleton, former chief of counterespionage activities for the Central Intelligence Agency; William H. Webster, Director of the F.B.I., and Dr. Timothy Leary, the drug-cult leader

who escaped from prison in California, allegedly with help from the Weathermen.

Fourteen former F.B.I. agents have obtained Government security clearances so that they can help Mr. Felt and Mr. Miller prepare for the trial by reviewing classified documents and interviewing potential witnesses.

In addition, agents and former agents have raised \$1.2 million in a legal defense fund to assist Mr. Felt, Mr. Miller and more than 100 other agents questioned at some point during the Justice Department investigation of political surveillance.

Today's proceedings represented a significant achievement, coming after months in which prosecutors and defense attorneys haggled over access to classified documents.

Judge Bryant has taken elaborate precautions to protect the secret data, carefully editing documents to be used as evidence and ordering lawyers to avoid all reference to 22 "categories of intelligence information."

The chief prosecutor, John W. Nields Jr., was hired as a special attorney for this case. From 1977 to 1979, he was chief counsel for the House ethics committee's investigation of South Korean influence buying. He is assisted by Francis J. Martin, a former member of the Watergate special prosecution force.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-12WASHINGTON STAR
14 SEPTEMBER 1980

Protecting Secrets Complicates Trial of Ex-FBI Aides

By Kenneth R. Walker

Washington Star Staff Writer

More than two years after being charged with conspiring to violate Americans' rights by ordering illegal burglaries in the search for fugitive radicals, the trial of two top former FBI officials opens here tomorrow in U.S. District Court.

W. Mark Felt, the former No. 2 FBI official, and Edward S. Miller, once the agency's domestic intelligence chief, were indicted 29 months ago along with former bureau director L. Patrick Gray III. They were accused of approving the burglaries, or "bag jobs," of the homes of relatives and friends of Weathermen members being sought in connection with several bombings, including one in 1971 at the U.S. Capitol.

Investigators have reported that the "bag jobs," along with illegal wiretaps and mail openings, occurred mostly in the early 1970s and were carried out primarily by members of the FBI's New York Squad 47.

U.S. District Judge William B. Bryant last January ordered Gray tried separately from the other two. However, following recent admissions by government attorneys that the case against Gray is now too weak to go to trial, Bryant is considering whether to drop the charges against him.

Most of the delay in the Felt and Miller trial has resulted from unprecedented negotiations between defense and government lawyers over the handling of top secret information at the trial.

The negotiations, along with unusual court-ordered trial procedures, mark the first comprehensive attempt by the government to map a standard prosecution strategy for so-called "graymail cases," according to lawyers associated with the trial. That designation refers to concern over the possibility that government officials accused of office-related crimes might force dismissal of the charges

against them by disclosing or threatening to disclose state secrets in connection with their defense.

The problem has proved difficult in prosecuting some officials. It figured in the government's decision in 1971 to let former CIA director Richard Helms plead no contest to a charge of testifying falsely before a Senate committee investigating agency activities in Chile, according to Justice attorneys. The government recommended that the judge in the case not impose any of the potential two-year jail term on Helms and that the former director only pay a small fine.

The three former FBI officials turned down a similar government offer just before their indictment was returned in 1978.

If these new prosecution and trial procedures are to become a model for earning convictions in "graymail" cases, it will not be before surviving a number of legal challenges by defense attorneys who have vigorously fought the novel techniques as unconstitutional infringements on rights to a fair trial.

Essentially, the new procedures involved negotiations over what classified evidence must be afforded defense attorneys in preparation for trial and ways to introduce the sensitive material without harming national security interests.

Before those talks could even begin, defense attorneys had to receive government clearance to review top secret information.

Judge Bryant first ordered opposing attorneys to try and reach agreement about which of thousands of requested classified documents would be needed during the trial. Bryant resolved any disputes.

The lawyers were then ordered to "redact" all the relevant documents so that sensitive data would be either reworded or eliminated from the material. Again, the judge resolved any disagreements.

Felt's and Miller's attorneys, Brian Gettings and Thomas Kennerly respectively, have opposed the measures as unconstitutional.

"These rules require a mental juggling act for even lawyers to understand," said one defense lawyer. "Some of the evidence has been redacted beyond recognition, and even those other changes that maintain the integrity of the core data, imposes a burden of trying to remember which redaction refers to what information. It's like trying a case in two different languages."

The defense resistance to the procedures culminated last month with the filing of a motion "to relieve defense counsel of the obligation to protect classified information during trial."

About the same time, government attorneys Frances Martin and John Neal, filed a motion to require defense attorneys during the trial to give prior notice before eliciting testimony or mentioning material concerning a score of classified categories. Also, prosecutors sought an order barring defense attorneys from raising the sensitive data, in arguments, objections, and direct and cross-examinations. The judge granted the government motion.

The extraordinary security procedures will embrace the trial also. The jury will be sequestered for the entire trial, which is expected to last for several weeks. Bryant has even ordered that jurors cannot attend religious services unless the minister assures deputy U.S. marshalls that the case will not be mentioned.

As for Gray's case, although prosecutors conceded last month that the evidence against the former director would not now support a conviction, the government still opposes a defense request to dismiss the indictment.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-30NEW YORK TIMES
14 SEPTEMBER 1980

Long-Delayed Trial Over F.B.I. Break-Ins to Start in Capital Tomorrow

By **ROBERT PEAR**

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 13 — The long-delayed trial of two former officials of the Federal Bureau of Investigation accused of conspiring to violate the civil rights of citizens is scheduled to begin here Monday, with extraordinary procedures in place to protect top-secret information.

W. Mark Felt, former acting associate director of the bureau, and Edward S. Miller, former assistant director for intelligence, the second- and third-ranking officials of the agency in 1972-73, were accused in a one-count indictment of authorizing clandestine break-ins to help find fugitives associated with the Weather Underground, a radical antiwar organization. The nine "surreptitious entries" described in the indictment all occurred in New York or New Jersey.

The case is more than a footnote to three decades of F.B.I. history. It could have consequences for the future performance of law-enforcement and intelligence agencies because it raises fundamental questions about the legitimate use of police power and the difference between domestic and foreign intelligence, questions with which Congress is still wrestling.

Frank J. Donner, author of the recently published book "The Age of Surveillance," described the trial as "an allegory about the problem of authority in an intelligence situation which is compromised — who is to blame when something goes wrong, the top officials, the middle-level people or the agents at the bottom of the hierarchy?"

Break-Ins Linked to Gray

Mr. Felt, 67 years old, and Mr. Miller, 51, have publicly acknowledged authorizing some break-ins but have said they did so on the authority of L. Patrick Gray 3d, the Acting Director at the

time. Mr. Gray has denied giving "generic" or specific authorization for any of the "black bag jobs." He was indicted with Mr. Felt and Mr. Miller but his case was separated and may never be tried if they are acquitted.

The trial has been postponed at least eight times since the indictment was returned April 10, 1978. But lawyers for the Government and for the two defendants said this week that they expected the trial to go forward Monday with William B. Bryant, chief judge of the Federal District Court here, presiding.

The judge has already ruled, over the defendants' objections, that the jury must be sequestered throughout the trial, which is expected to last six weeks.

Judge Bryant has ruled that Mr. Felt and Mr. Miller may use the "Barker-Martinez defense," named for the Watergate burglars who said they had reason to believe their actions had been authorized by their superiors.

Bear May Leave His Cage

The F. B. I. and other intelligence agencies have imposed many restrictions on themselves in recent years. But if Mr. Felt and Mr. Miller are acquitted, Mr. Donner said, it becomes more likely that "the bear," meaning intelligence operations, "will come out of the cage again."

Henry W. Anderson, president of the Society of Former Special Agents of the F. B. I., described Mr. Felt and Mr. Miller as "victims of a post-Watergate backlash, loyal Government employees who were doing the job they thought was expected of them, to protect the security of the nation."

Describing his defense in his autobiography, "The F. B. I. Pyramid," Mr. Felt said: "As I understood it, intelligence-gathering is not intended to result in criminal charges and is there-

fore not limited by the Fourth Amendment prohibition against 'unreasonable searches and seizures.'" In particular, he said, traditional warrant procedures "need not be followed in situations where the intelligence-gathering relates to agents of foreign powers."

Government lawyers have argued in other cases that the President and the Attorney General had the power, for national security reasons, to authorize warrantless searches. At the Felt-Miller trial, the prosecutors are expected to argue that the Weathermen were not a proper target or that the bureau failed to get the necessary "specific approval" from the Attorney General.

Mr. Felt and Mr. Miller, if convicted, would each face a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison and a \$10,000 fine. A legal defense fund established by former agents will help them pay lawyers' fees and other trial costs, expected to total \$200,000 to \$250,000.

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PRM FORGERY

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-19NEW YORK TIMES
18 SEPTEMBER 1980

U.S. CALLS DOCUMENT ON AFRICA A FORGERY

Black New Yorkers Got Purported Federal Report That Calls for Support of South Africa

By RICHARD BURT

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 17 — The White House asserted today that an unidentified group had sought to sow racial discord and complicate American relations with Africa by circulating in this country a forged United States document calling for American support for South Africa and surveillance of black leaders.

The document, copies of which were distributed to reporters at a briefing, also calls for a policy of inhibiting "coordinated activity of the black nationalist movement in Africa and the black movement in the United States." It suggests that American intelligence agencies monitor the activities of black American leaders and "black African representatives, and collect sensitive information on those, especially at the U.N., who oppose U.S. policy toward South Africa."

Jody Powell, President Carter's press secretary, told reporters that he was taking the unusual step of distributing the document "in order to put this story down."

"This document is indeed a forgery," he said, adding that it had been "fabricated with some skill and disseminated in a calculated and orchestrated manner" to black newspaper and radio stations in New York City yesterday.

'A Professional Job'

Mr. Powell said the document bore "all the earmarks of a very professional job done to discredit the President, the Administration's policy toward Africa, relations with blacks and the President's adviser for national security affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski.

"The material is racist in its tone and is completely inconsistent with this Administration's domestic and foreign policies," he said.

The long document, entitled "Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC46," purports to be a study of "Black Africa and U.S. Black Movement" ordered by Mr.

Brzezinski on March 17, 1978. Marked "secret," it is addressed to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence and bears what purports to be Mr. Brzezinski's signature.

Exercising obvious care in discussing the possible source of the alleged forgery, Mr. Powell said that it was unclear whether the document was the work of "a hostile power" or of domestic political opponents of the President.

He said that the Central Intelligence Agency and the Justice Department had been asked by the White House today to investigate the matter.

'Disinformation' Effort

In private, other officials familiar with the document said that it was possible it represented a "disinformation" effort by the Soviet Union or a Marxist country in Africa. However, the officials said that it was more likely that the alleged forgery had been produced by a domestic group, either on the left or the right.

White House aides expressed concern that the document would damage relations with a number of black African nations.

Officials said that the document was obtained by the White House after it was discussed on two radio stations in New York late yesterday. At a news conference at the United Nations Church Center this morning, a group of black leaders, including the Rev. Bill Jones, leader of the Progressive National Baptist Convention, referred to the document in criticizing the Administration's policy toward Africa.

In an effort to discredit the document, Mr. Powell released the cover page of what was described as the actual "Presidential Review memorandum/NSC-46," which carries a date of May 4, 1979, and is said to deal with "U.S. Policies Toward Central America." The contents of the document were deleted.

Comparison of Documents

Mr. Powell said that a few aspects of the document circulated in New York demonstrated that it was a fake. He noted, for example, that while "the NSC Political Analysis Committee" is assigned the task of reviewing the document's proposals, no such body exists within the Government.

Randall Robinson, director of TransAfrica, a lobbying group favoring a tougher policy toward South Africa, said, "It certainly is possible that the Administration could be responsible for the document. But other groups could also be responsible. It's too early to tell."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A1-13THE BALTIMORE SUN
18 September 1980

African policy document denounced as 'a forgery'

By Gilbert A. Lewthwaite
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—The White House went to unusual lengths yesterday to expose as a forgery a document laying racist overtones on U.S. policy toward Africa.

The action was taken to forestall a possible domestic and international furor over what purportedly amounted to a reversal of the Carter administration's pro-black African policy.

The document proposed using government agencies to influence public opinion against black African nationalists in order to protect strategic interests in Africa and avoid possible of turmoil among black Americans.

The administration immediately requested the Justice Department and the Central Intelligence Agency to investigate the source of the document, which was distributed to news media representatives.

The CIA will investigate whether those responsible for the document are foreign intelligence operatives seeking to upset U.S. diplomacy, while the Justice Department will investigate whether they are Americans seeking political advantage in an election year.

Jody Powell, the White House press secretary, said he released copies of the document to "head off the kind of discord and division in race relations that this forgery is obviously intended to provoke."

Mr. Powell said, "It is a forgery. It has all the hallmarks of a very professional job, done to discredit the president, the administration's policy toward Africa, our relations with African black leaders, and the president's adviser on national security affairs."

The cleverly crafted document, under a facsimile of the signature of Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's National Security adviser, was circulated to a radio station in Washington and a New York station.

It purported to be a presidential review memorandum from the National Security Council's Political Analysis Committee, and it claimed that the administration's major aim was to avoid "social upheaval" in black Africa. It was entitled "Black Africa and the U.S. Black Movement."

The memo was dated March 17, 1978, a time when the administration was actively and publicly seeking majority black rule in Rhodesia and pressuring change in the apartheid (rigid separation of the races) system in South Africa.

The document said that U.S. access to southern Africa's enormous mineral resources as well as control of the strategic oil-route round the Cape of Good Hope were at stake in maintaining the region's stability.

"Apart from the above-mentioned factors adverse to U.S. strategic interests, the national liberation movement in black Africa can act as a catalyst with far-reaching effects on the American black community by stimulating its organizational consolidation and by inducing radical actions," said the memo, which warned of black demonstrations "recalling the days of Martin Luther King" and the Black Panthers.

It suggested "specific steps" to inhibit coordination between black nationalists in Africa and the black movement here. The document suggested using CIA clandestine operations to influence opinion here and abroad against an alliance between American and African blacks.

It said: "The FBI should mount surveillance operations against black African representatives and collect sensitive information on those, especially at the U.N., who oppose U.S. policy toward South Africa."

Mr. Powell refused to speculate on the origins of the document or the motives of the forgers, saying: "We don't know who fabricated and distributed this document. We do know that it was fabricated with some skill and was disseminated in a calculated and orchestrated manner to a number of media outlets in the New York city area."

The White House obtained the document from the radio stations, after Alfred Friendly, spokesman for the NSC, was called about midnight Tuesday by media representatives. The forgeries were apparently delivered anonymously, either by being pushed under the door or left on the receptionist's desk at the radio stations.

Mr. Powell said: "It is important to point out that to a layman this forgery would not be immediately obvious."

Administration officials said there were several mistakes in the document, but none were likely to be detected by outsiders. They included:

- The omission of the vice president's name from the top of the list of the memo's recipients;
- The placing of the date in the top right hand corner of the memo, instead of in the center-page as is normal typing practice inside the NSC.
- The instruction for the review to be sent to the NSC Political Analysis Committee, a body which has not existed under the current or any recent previous administration.

The direction of the president that the review be performed by an NSC interdepartmental group. Carter administration policy reviews are usually prepared by a NSC policy review committee.

Mr. Powell said that some of these format changes had been introduced by the current administration in place of the practice under previous administrations. A thorough check, both physical and by computer, of NSC records showed that no such review memorandum had been prepared on the U.S. black movement.

"It will be obvious to you finally in reading this document, the forgery, that the material is often racist in its content, and is completely inconsistent with both the substance and the direction of this administration's domestic and foreign policies."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A10THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
18 September 1980

NSC Report Forged By Unknown Persons, Administration Says

By Jeremiah O'Leary
Washington Star Staff Writer

The Carter administration yesterday charged that unknown persons have distributed a forged National Security Council document that contains racist material about Africans and American blacks among black journalists.

White House press secretary Jody Powell distributed copies of the forgery yesterday, along with a portion of a genuine NSC document for comparison.

He said the forgery, which was marked "SECRET" and was entitled "Presidential Review Memorandum/NRC-46," "has all the earmarks of a very professional job to discredit the president, administration policy towards Africa, black leaders and national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski."

Powell said the administration has asked the attorney general and the CIA director to investigate the forgery, but he repeatedly said he has no basis for knowing who was responsible for distributing the forged documents.

"If this is an attempt by a hostile foreign government intelligence service to discredit U.S. foreign policy in Africa," said Powell, "that is a matter to be dealt with by appropriate agencies. But if it relates to the domestic political situation, I cannot make a judgment, but the Department of Justice can."

Black journalists, including those from WHUR, Howard University's radio station, and a New York station were among the persons who got the forgeries.

Powell noted that the forgery headed PRM-46 was dated March 17, 1978, and then showed parts of two pages, but not the text, of what he said was the real PRM-46 which was dated more than a year later on May 4, 1979. The forgery was entitled, "Black Africa and the U.S. Black Movement," while the genuine PRM-46 is entitled, "Review of U.S. Policies Toward Central America."

The forgery contains recommendations reminiscent of the worst days of intelligence agency "dirty tricks." Some of the proposals in the forgery include:

- A recommendation that the FBI mount surveillance operations against black African representatives at the United Nations and their links with the leaders of the American black community to neutralize such activity.
- Putting into effect programs to perpetuate divisions in the black movement and to stimulate dissension between different social strata in the black community.
- Supporting the nomination of "loyal" black public figures for federal and local offices to make it easier to control such "loyal" figures.
- Launching special CIA clandestine operations to generate mistrust and hostility in American and world opinion against joint activity by black African nationalists and American blacks.

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BRZEZINSKI

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A1-16THE WASHINGTON POST
18 September 1980

Thurmond's Barbs Anger Brzezinski

By George Lardner Jr.

Washington Post Staff Writer

White House national security affairs adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski angrily denied yesterday that he had simply been serving as "the president's political troubleshooter" in privately warning Billy Carter last spring against a projected Libyan oil deal.

The accusation was leveled by Sen. Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.) during an acrimonious exchange about the administration's handling of top-secret intelligence information concerning Billy Carter's Libyan activities.

Thurmond contended that the hearings of the special Senate subcommittee investigating the matter had turned up substantial evidence that, instead of keeping national security uppermost in his mind, Brzezinski had been trying to prevent Billy from doing something that would hurt the political fortunes of the president.

Testifying at a day-long session, Brzezinski hotly denied the charge, calling it "a highly improper insinuation, an innuendo not justified by the facts."

His voice quivering with emotion, he told Thurmond: "I resent the allegation that you're making regarding my motives."

Evidently annoyed at what he considered Brzezinski's evasive answers on another point, Thurmond was undeterred.

"We're trying to get the truth, but we're not too sure you're telling it," he told Brzezinski.

"Excuse me, senator," the White House aide responded. "You may not be sure. I know I'm telling the truth."

The dispute was a highlight of the subcommittee's last scheduled public hearing on the controversy about the

president's brother's dealings with the Libyan government since 1978 and his refusal to register as a foreign agent until after Justice Department investigators discovered in June that he had received \$220,000 from the Arab regime. The subcommittee has not decided whether to press for President Carter's testimony.

Brzezinski told the senators that he knew nothing of the \$220,000 payments until Billy Carter publicly reported them when he registered under court order July 14. But Brzezinski said he was informed last March 31 by CIA Director Stansfield Turner of Billy Carter's efforts to secure an increased allocation of Libyan oil for the Charter Oil Co. of Jacksonville.

The projected deal, which would have produced a multimillion-dollar commission for Billy Carter, was mentioned in an intelligence report that Turner noticed and brought to Brzezinski's attention. The report did not mention either Billy Carter or Charter Oil by name, but Turner learned those details on asking for them from the originating intelligence agency. Then he went to the White House, noting in a memo for the record:

"I delivered an intelligence report concerning a relative of the president. Brzezinski agreed to show it to the president and return it to me."

Brzezinski said he believes he had it turned instead. He said he couldn't recall Turner's asking for the document's return. He said Turner lingered in his office around noon last March 31 after a highly sensitive meeting on another issue.

He said he had a piece of information which he felt ought to bring to the president's attention," Brzezinski testified.

He said he decided to call Billy Carter first to admonish him about the deal and warn that it could be exploited politically by the Libyans. Brzezinski said he felt he would serve the president better if he did that before marching into the Oval Office.

Brzezinski said last month in a White House report to the subcommittee that he informed President Carter the next morning, April 1, but records obtained by the subcommittee indicate he probably did so on April 2 instead. Meanwhile, Billy Carter, according to other records, appears to have been busy placing calls to a hotel in Libya where his associate Randy Coleman was staying at the time.

Brzezinski said he summarized the intelligence report for the president instead of showing it to him. Brzezinski said he also informed the president of his call to Billy Carter and Billy's "somewhat less than gracious" reaction, telling Brzezinski to mind his own business.

"I distinctly remember the president saying, 'You did the right thing,'" Brzezinski recalled.

Subcommittee Chairman Birch Bayh (D-Ind.) asked why Brzezinski did nothing further to block the oil deal when Billy Carter was apparently adamant about it.

Brzezinski attributed the lapse partly to the press of other business, including planning for the aborted mission to rescue the hostages in Iran. He said he also felt he may have helped change Billy Carter's mind despite his initially sour reaction.

"In retrospect, we know the whole thing fell through," Brzezinski observed. He said he thinks his call "might have had some impact."

Thurmond asked whether Brzezinski alerted U.S. intelligence agencies to be sure to pursue the matter and to be on the lookout for any other information regarding Billy Carter's Libyan activities. Brzezinski insisted that it wasn't necessary.

"I cannot alert someone to do what they were already doing," he insisted. "I concluded they were already monitoring the issue." He said the intelligence report he got from Turner had also gone to law enforcement authorities.

According to reliable sources, however, FBI officials were not informed, as Brzezinski was, that the unidentified individual mentioned in the intelligence report was Billy Carter, and no one brought that fact to their attention.

Sen. Charles McC. Mathias Jr. (R-Md) suggested at one point that the inquiry had failed to uncover any real improprieties in the drawn-out government investigation of Billy Carter's activities, but it had produced considerable evidence of incompetence.

For instance, he said, as a result of Brzezinski's call to Billy Carter about the Charter Oil deal, "Billy gets intelligence information while the assistant attorney general has to wait until June to get it." In another bizarre stroke, he said, the president of the United States didn't find out about the \$220,000 paid to his brother until he read it in the papers, even though the billion-dollar intelligence apparatus over which he is supposed to preside heard of the payments months and weeks earlier.

"It just seems to me," Mathias said, "that what we're dealing with here is a perhaps wholly innocent series of blunders—but they add up to an appearance of incompetence."

On another issue, Brzezinski defended the White House decision last November—at the prompting of Rosalynn Carter—to use Billy Carter as an intermediary in enlisting Libyan support for release of the hostages in Iran. He said the meeting Billy Carter set up last Nov. 27 between Brzezinski and Ali Houderi, the chief Libyan diplomat here, was useful but of no great moment in the international scheme of things.

"The suggestion that our purpose was to enhance Billy Carter's opportunity for commercial advantage in his relations with Libya is preposterous," Brzezinski said.

Subcommittee members, however, seem convinced that this was the result, whether intended or not. The Libyans made their first payment, of \$20,000, to Billy Carter exactly one month after he and Coleman brought Houderi to the White House and sat in on the meeting with Brzezinski.

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"What was a routine meeting to you," Sen. Bob Dole (R-Kan.) told Brzezinski "turned out to be worth a quarter of a million dollars for Billy Carter."

Brzezinski, who began testifying shortly after 8 a.m., left the Capitol at 5:45 p.m. after an hour-long secret session that followed the public hearing.

Chief subcommittee counsel Philip Tone told reporters later that "loose ends" still to be pursued include a number of telephone calls that need to be explained "to try to complete the story."

Tone said the staff will conduct more interviews and depositions but added, "I doubt very much there will be much news until we file our report."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A12THE BALTIMORE SUN
18 September 1980

Brzezinski first defends, then regrets exploiting Billy Carter link to Libya

By Curt Matthews
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski defended yesterday his use of Billy Carter in trying to gain Libyan support in the early days of the Iranian hostage crisis.

However, Mr. Brzezinski told the Senate subcommittee investigating Mr. Carter's ties with the Libyan government that in retrospect he should not have involved the president's younger brother in the Iranian crisis because it has caused too much controversy.

"The hostage situation was so unorthodox that it called for unusual approaches," Mr. Brzezinski told the subcommittee. "The thought was that we could use Billy Carter because the Libyans knew him and had friendly relations with him."

Mr. Brzezinski said that the idea to use Mr. Carter as an ad hoc envoy to gain support for release of the 53 Americans taken hostage at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran came from Rosalynn Carter shortly after the Americans were seized November 4.

Mr. Brzezinski said he called Billy Carter November 20 and sought his help. Mr. Carter came to Washington the same day and arranged a meeting November 27 with Ali el-Houdari, the secretary of the Libyan People's Bureau (the Libyan embassy) in Washington.

"The meeting was an attempt to get the Libyan government to say publicly what they were saying privately in diplomatic discussions," Mr. Brzezinski told the subcommittee.

He added that although there had been press support of the Iranian seizure of hostages before November 20, two days after the meeting with Mr. Houdari the official position of the Libyan government called for release of the hostages.

Senator Dennis DeConcini (D, Ariz.) asked why Mr. Brzezinski himself had not arranged the meeting with Mr. Houdari and not involved the president's brother. Mr. Brzezinski said, "The issue was not one of making contact . . . it was to encourage a more friendly relationship with someone representing a country unfriendly to the U.S."

According to the national security adviser, he consulted with Secretary of State Cyrus R.



ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
testifies before Senate panel

Vance before asking for Billy Carter's help and was told, "Anything is worth a try."

Mr. Brzezinski said the strategy was to "isolate" Iran by gaining support in Libya, a country that had in the past supported revolutionary activities in the Middle East.

Regarding Mr. Carter's involvement in the hostage crisis, Mr. Brzezinski said he did not know whether the president's brother helped.

At one point during his testimony, Mr. Brzezinski came under bitter attack from Senator Strom Thurmond (R, S.C.) who suggested that rather than concerning himself with national security matters, Mr. Brzezinski was "a political trouble shooter" trying to prevent Billy Carter's Libyan connections from becoming a problem for the president.

"I consider that to be a highly improper insinuation, and innuendo not justified by the facts," Mr. Brzezinski said in an angry retort. "I resent the allegation you're making regarding my motives."

Senator Thurmond replied, "We're after the truth, we're trying to get the truth and we're not sure you're telling it."

"You may not be sure, senator, but I am," Mr. Brzezinski said.

Mr. Brzezinski, the last scheduled public witness in the subcommittee's probe of Mr. Carter's ties with Libya, insisted that the president's brother had no influence on U.S. policy toward Libya. He also rejected the suggestion by Senator Thurmond that the White House decision to draw Billy Carter into the hostage crisis was intended to enhance his opportunity to profit from dealings with the Libyan government.

Mr. Brzezinski testified that when he learned from Adm. Stansfield Turner, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, that Billy Carter was trying to get an increased allocation of Libyan oil for a Jacksonville (Fla.) firm, he called Mr. Carter and admonished him not to exploit his relationship with the president.

Mr. Carter turned aside the admonition and, in effect, told Mr. Brzezinski to mind his own business, according to testimony by both men.

Although the public portion of the subcommittee's investigation has concluded, the subcommittee staff continues to sift information gathered in recent days, particularly a set of telephone logs that show a flurry of calls between Billy Carter and a number of U.S. and Libyan officials.

Investigators have focused especially on calls Mr. Carter made December 6 to the Charter Oil Company in Jacksonville and the Libyan embassy. On that date, President Carter met with the chief Libyan diplomat in the U.S.

Other records obtained by the subcommittee show that on the day Mr. Turner informed Mr. Brzezinski of Mr. Carter's ties with Charter Oil, a call was placed from Mr. Carter's office in the Best Western Motel in Americus, Ga., to Libya. Similar calls were made over the next several days, according to the logs.

The subcommittee has invited Mr. Carter to testify in executive session to clear up some portions of his previous public testimony and perhaps to explain the purpose of some of his telephone calls.

The final report of the committee is due early next month.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 11WALL STREET JOURNAL
18 September 1980

Angry Brzezinski Denies Compromising Intelligence in Warning to Billy Carter

By a WALL STREET JOURNAL Staff Reporter

WASHINGTON—Zbigniew Brzezinski vigorously denied that he compromised intelligence information or was politically motivated when he warned Billy Carter against a business deal with Libya.

Mr. Brzezinski, President Carter's national security adviser, also denied that he used the President's brother as an emissary to Libyan diplomats in order to enhance Billy's status in his business dealings with Libya.

Mr. Brzezinski's comments came in a day-long appearance before a special Senate subcommittee investigating the Billy Carter

affair. The combative presidential adviser sprinkled his testimony with indignation and sarcasm regarding allegations that he had done anything improper with regard to Billy Carter and Libya.

Mr. Brzezinski's testimony concluded the last phase of planned public hearings at which private citizens, Justice Department officials and State Department and White House personnel have testified. Mr. Brzezinski's testimony and that of other White House officials in recent days failed to bring any significant retractions or new disclosures in the inquiry, but the inquiry is continuing and investigators are expected to take more private depositions from witnesses.

Justice Department officials have said that Mr. Brzezinski may have divulged secret intelligence information in a phone call to Billy Carter last March 31. In the call, he has testified, he said he knew Billy Carter was attempting to get added Libyan oil for a U.S. oil company, and he warned that such a transaction could embarrass the President and the country.

"I was very careful that nothing I said to Billy Carter would convey to him the source of the information," Mr. Brzezinski told the Senators yesterday. "And I'm absolutely confident," he said, "that the source hasn't been compromised."

"I have dealt with intelligence information for several years," Mr. Brzezinski said. "I think I know how to handle it and how to protect it." He added that his warning to Billy Carter was "necessary and justified."

Sen. Strom Thurmond (R., S.C.) told Mr. Brzezinski he saw "substantial evidence that you were acting as the President's political trouble-shooter," instead of guarding national security, when the White House aide warned Billy Carter against the oil transaction.

Bristling, Mr. Brzezinski called that an

"improper insinuation," denied it and said he resented it.

"We're trying to get the truth," said Sen. Thurmond, "and we're not sure we're getting it."

"You may be sure I'm sure," Mr. Brzezinski replied.

Sen. Charles Mathias (R., Md.) questioned Mr. Brzezinski on why he mentioned his knowledge of the oil deal, derived from an intelligence report, to Billy Carter while Justice Department attorneys were denied even that much information from the intelligence report until June.

Mr. Brzezinski disavowed any responsibility for the decision by Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti against sharing the intelligence report immediately with his investigators. "I presume there were good reasons for handling it the way it was handled" at the Justice Department, Mr. Brzezinski said.

Mr. Civiletti has said he withheld the information to prevent any danger that its source would be discovered. Mr. Brzezinski denied yesterday that the different handling of the information was politically motivated.

Mr. Brzezinski defended his participation in using Billy Carter as an emissary to set up a meeting with a Libyan diplomat at the White House Nov. 27, 1979.

Sen. Patrick Leahy (D., Vt.) contended that the effect of that meeting "was to enhance" Billy Carter's reputation and financial prospects in Libyan eyes, whether that was intended or wasn't. Mr. Brzezinski, however, insisted that it was "preposterous" to contend that such was his purpose in using Billy Carter to set up the meeting.

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ON PAGE A1-6THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
18 September 1980

Brzezinski Challenged About Billy

Adviser's Judgment Questioned by Panel

By Roberta Hornig
and Phil Gailey
Washington Star Staff Writers

A Senate subcommittee investigating Billy Carter concluded its public hearings yesterday by sharply questioning the judgment of Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national security adviser, in using Billy Carter's Libyan ties in a diplomatic initiative during the early days of the Iranian hostage crisis.

Five of the nine senators on the panel charged that Brzezinski, by asking the president's brother to arrange a White House meeting with a Libyan diplomat last November, had encouraged Libya to try to buy Billy Carter's influence with the promise of a lucrative oil deal and \$220,000 in payments.

"What may have just been a routine meeting to you turned out to be a quarter of a million dollars for Billy Carter," Sen. Robert Dole, R-Kan., told Brzezinski.

Echoing Dole's charge, Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., said: "I think having sat here for several weeks listening to testimony and reading depositions, one could easily reach the conclusion that the result of the meeting was to enrich Billy Carter whether intended or not."

In an unprecedented appearance before a congressional investigating panel, Brzezinski spent eight hours sparring with senators as he defended his dealings with Billy Carter. The session was marked by temper flareups and theatrics that made it the most spirited day of hearings since the star witness, Billy Carter, appeared before the senators last month.

In other developments, the subcommittee:

- Announced that it will take a deposition from Billy Carter next week in an effort to resolve discrepancies between his testimony and that of top Justice Department and other officials.

- Released new telephone records showing that Billy Carter was in contact with oil company officials minutes after Brzezinski, on the basis of intelligence reports, admonished him for attempting to negotiate an oil deal with Libya.

- Produced a deposition in which former Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance differed with Brzezinski's version of how Vance took the news of Billy Carter's role in arranging a White House meeting between Brzezinski and a Libyan diplomat to discuss the Iranian hostage crisis.

In his testimony, Brzezinski called "preposterous" any suggestion that he or anyone else in the White House ever intended "to enhance Billy Carter's opportunity for commercial advantage in his relations with Libya."

Brzezinski said his first contact with Billy Carter was late last November when, at the suggestion of First Lady Rosalynn Carter, he asked the president's brother to set up a meeting between himself and the chief Libyan diplomat in Washington, Ali Houderi.

The meeting was held in Brzezinski's office Nov. 27. Nine days later Houderi returned for an Oval Office meeting with President Carter.

Brzezinski said the Nov. 27 session "was a part of our international campaign to enervate pressure on behalf of the safety, and, if possible, the release of the hostages. This contact was undertaken with the knowledge of both the president and the secretary of state at a time of extreme danger to the hostages."

He said that when he informed Vance of Billy Carter's role in arranging the meeting, the then-secretary of state said "something like, 'Well, no harm in trying.'"

In his deposition to the subcommittee, however, Vance has a different recollection of his reaction. Vance told Senate investigators that he assumed Billy Carter was off on a private initiative and at the time he said he was skeptical of the attempt.

Brzezinski replied: "Skepticism describes a state of mind. He did not show skepticism to me. He said it was worth trying, or something like that."

The national security adviser said Billy Carter's effort had a "negligible impact" on the situation and "on balance I would have been happier if it had not taken place."

He said he still considers the use of Billy Carter's Libyan contacts "justified under the prevailing circumstances" and added that "we had an obligation to try every orthodox and unorthodox means" of trying to win release of the American hostages.

"There was a clear risk in using him, but I had no idea at the time whatsoever that he was engaged in financial dealings (with Libya)," Brzezinski said.

Asked by one senator why he had not used normal diplomatic channels to set up the Houderi meeting, Brzezinski replied: "The issue was not the absence of contacts with the Libyans. The issue was that the contacts up to that point had not produced results."

Brzezinski, asked for his assessment of Billy Carter's Libyan activities, called them "counterproductive, uncalled for and in some respects reprehensible."

He added, "I see some potential harm to our national interest, given the relationship of brother to brother."

Brzezinski said his second major contact with Billy Carter came on March 31 when he received an intelligence report from CIA Director Stansfield Turner on the oil deal the president's brother was negotiating between Libya and the Charter Oil Co. of Jacksonville, Fla.

He said he telephoned Billy Carter in Georgia and told him: "In the course of my work a lot of information flows across my desk, and I've recently seen information that you are engaged in business activities" that could be embarrassing to the president.

Carter's response, he said, was "somewhat less than gracious in the substance and in the tone."

Some senators, including Chair-

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man Birch Bayh, D-Ind., challenged Brzezinski's judgment on the propriety of using sensitive information in this case.

"I was very careful that nothing I said to him would convey my source of information," Brzezinski replied. "I'm absolutely confident my source was not compromised."

He added: "I can say to you — I hope without sounding boasting — that I've dealt with intelligence information for several years. There's probably no one else in the White House more sensitive than I am on intelligence matters."

The telephone records released by the subcommittee yesterday showed that Brzezinski's call immediately triggered a series of previously undisclosed phone calls from Billy Carter to Jack McGregor, a consultant for the Charter Oil Co., and six calls to the Libyan Peoples' Bureau.

Sen. Strom Thurmond, R-S.C., lectured Brzezinski for not passing the intelligence information on to the U.S. law enforcement officials.

"I consider that to be a serious and groundless assertion," Brzezinski said.

Pressed by Thurmond on why he had not asked U.S. intelligence agencies to keep a close watch on Billy Carter after the March 31 disclosure of his oil deal, Brzezinski said that they had already been doing that.

The subcommittee's final day of public hearings erupted in an acrimonious exchange between Brzezinski and some of the senators who questioned his judgment and motives. And at one point, subcommittee members angrily clashed with one another over the scope of the investigation.

Brzezinski, surrounded by a coterie of White House aides, lawyers and security agents, responded to some Republican questions with bitter sarcasm and scorn.

The president's national security aide and Thurmond tangled angrily after the senator accused Brzezinski of acting as a "political trouble-shooter" in his handling of intelligence information on Billy Carter's oil dealings with Libya.

Brzezinski snapped: "I consider that to be a highly improper insinuation and innuendo not supported by the facts. I resent the allegation you are making regarding my motives."

Thurmond replied: "We're after the truth; we're trying to get the truth, and we're not sure you're telling it."

A red-hot Brzezinski shot back, "You may not be sure, senator, but I am."

A few minutes later, Dole set off tempers again. His efforts to question Brzezinski about a 1980 trip made by Atlanta lawyer Charles Kirbo, the president's confidant, to Saudi Arabia were blocked by White House counsel Alfred Moses, who insisted that waiver of Executive Privilege for Brzezinski applied only to questions about Billy Carter and Libya.

"That's the most ridiculous thing I've heard asserted," interrupted Sen. Dennis DeConcini, D-Ariz., who argued that the subcommittee's mandate was broad enough to include Dole's question. "You had better go back, Mr. Moses, and look at your law books."

At this point, Bayh took exception to Dole's suggestion that the subcommittee was being "hemmed in" in its work by restrictions on the use of intelligence information in the panel's hands.

Bayh told Dole he resented the suggestion and then lectured his Republican colleague for springing the Kirbo question out of the blue.

"We certainly wouldn't want to surprise anyone, would we?" Dole retorted.

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18 SEPTEMBER 1980

Text of Statement by Brzezinski

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 17 — Following is the text of a statement today by Zbigniew Brzezinski, the President's national security adviser, before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary:

I submitted a statement to the committee on Aug. 4. That statement is now part of the public record, along with a considerable body of other evidence the subcommittee has assembled. I would like to offer this morning a few observations about what has emerged from that record.

The inquiry has, of necessity, explored classified matters. Some aspects of the case, therefore, can only be discussed in executive session, if we are to protect extremely sensitive intelligence and diplomatic confidences.

The facts relating to my contacts with Billy Carter, however, are on the public record. There were three contacts involving Libya. Each was extremely brief, and notably narrow in scope:

The first, in late November of last year, was a part of our international campaign to generate pressure on behalf of the safety and, if possible, the release of the hostages. This contact was undertaken with the knowledge of both the President and the Secretary of State, at a time of extreme danger to the hostages. The suggestion that our purpose was to enhance Billy Carter's opportunity for commercial advantage in his relations with Libya is preposterous.

The second contact was my call to Billy Carter in late March, to admonish him that his commercial activities involving Libya might be exploited by a foreign power. That he might be contemplating such an arrangement was unknown to me in November or at any time before Admiral Turner brought this intelligence to my attention late in March. I considered, and to this day consider, it my duty to be careful, but not passive, with respect to such information.

The third contact, in June of this year, was initiated by Billy Carter. He wanted to know whether it would affect national security for him to disclose to the Department of Justice the fact that he had assisted in our earlier efforts regarding the hostages.

I have cooperated with this inquiry in every possible way. The President has determined that it is appropriate, for the first time in recent memory, that the assistant for national security affairs appear and testify under oath before a Congressional committee. The facts of the matter have been placed under intense scrutiny. Some have searched in all this for hidden motives, evasions, a maneuver to signal a secret change of course in our Middle East peace efforts — even a disregard for national security. Such speculation is groundless. Three elemental points are beyond cavil:

(1) Billy Carter had no influence whatsoever on my views, actions or policy toward Libya. I have seen not a shred of evidence that he had such an effect on the President, the National Security Council staff or the Department of State.

(2) In none of my meetings with the Libyan officials did I discuss overall United States policy toward the Middle East.

(3) As Admiral Stansfield Turner is reported to have testified, our intelligence was not compromised in my admonishing call to Billy Carter.

I will be pleased now to respond to any questions to the extent I can do so in this open session. To the extent I cannot, I will be happy to respond more fully in the closed session that is to follow.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 16-21TIME
22 September 1980

Nation

Almost Everyone vs. Zbig

But the National Security Adviser hangs tough

Zbig-niew Brzezinski. For most Americans the name is still a tongue twister, but it has become well known nonetheless, just as the proud, ambitious and dynamic Polish-born professor hoped it would when Jimmy Carter appointed him White House National Security Adviser nearly four years ago. But with his fame has come more notoriety and criticism than he expected. Aside from the President himself, Brzezinski is the most controversial member of a highly controversial Administration. He is widely blamed for many of the troubles that have beset the U.S. since he came into office.

Citing the delicacy of ongoing efforts to secure eventual liberty for the hostages, Brzezinski refuses to respond point by point to Sullivan's bill of particulars. (Khomeini last week specified the conditions for freeing the 52 captives: the return of the Shah's fortune to Iran; release of Iranian funds now blocked in American banks; cancellation of U.S. claims against Iran; and guarantees that the U.S. will not interfere in Iranian affairs.) But in an interview with TIME last week, Brzezinski characterized the Sullivan charges as "totally self-serving." He also denied one charge that, if true, would be espe-



The embattled Brzezinski in his office in the West Wing of the White House
Dazzling intellectual virtuosity, but theories sometimes too clever by half.

During a brief appearance at last month's National Democratic Convention in New York City, Brzezinski was booed by many of the delegates. Last week Brzezinski was the target of a scathing indictment by William H. Sullivan, former U.S. Ambassador to Tehran. In the latest round of one of Washington's favorite parlor games, "Who Lost Iran?" Sullivan pins the tail squarely on Brzezinski, accusing him of undermining diplomatic efforts to open contacts with the Ayatollah Khomeini and thus blunt the anti-Americanism of the revolutionary regime. Writing in the fall issue of *Foreign Policy* magazine, Sullivan also claims that Brzezinski first scuttled a U.S. plan to mediate between Khomeini and the Iranian armed forces, then tried to organize by remote control an anti-Khomeini military coup, even after the Shah had fled the country.

cially damning. Sullivan writes that in November 1978 Brzezinski dispatched Ardeshir Zahedi, then the Shah's envoy to Washington, on a fact-finding mission to Iran; thus circumventing and humiliating Sullivan, and that Brzezinski consulted with Zahedi every day over an open long-distance telephone line, with the Soviets presumably listening in. According to Brzezinski, however, Zahedi returned to Tehran on his own initiative and phoned only two or three times. "I have no regrets," says Brzezinski.

This week Brzezinski is preparing to defend another aspect of his performance during the Iran crisis, and he is scheduled to do so in an inquisitorial setting that his predecessors have been spared. The White House has waived the Executive privilege that normally protects National Security Advisers from congressional summonses, and Brzezinski has

agreed to testify before the special Senate Judiciary subcommittee investigating Billy Carter's ties with Libya.

In November Brzezinski asked the President's brother to invite a Washington-based Libyan diplomat to the White House. The purpose of the meeting was to persuade the Libyans to press Khomeini on the release of the hostages. "It was a reasonable thing to do in very trying circumstances," Brzezinski maintains, adding that soon after—and perhaps because of—Billy's intercessions, Libyan Strongman Muammar Gaddafi did indeed send the desired message to Khomeini, although Gaddafi's appeal had no discernible impact on the crisis.

But the question remains: Why was it necessary for either the President's brother or his National Security Adviser to act as intermediary with a member of the Libyan embassy in Washington? Such contacts are routinely handled by the State Department. This case, like that of Brzezinski's dealings with Zahedi, left an inescapable impression that he was attempting an end run around his supposed colleagues in Foggy Bottom and the Foreign Service. As a result, Brzezinski was more mistrusted and even despised than ever at the State Department and among career diplomats—hardly a desirable attitude toward the official who is supposed to coordinate the various agencies of U.S. foreign policy.

Brzezinski also faces questions from the Senate panel on why, in late March, he warned Billy that one of his Libyan business deals—an attempt on behalf of the Charter Oil Co. to obtain additional quotas of Libyan crude—could be embarrassing to the Administration. Brzezinski knew about the deal because he had received from CIA Director Stansfield Turner a top-secret report based on intelligence sources who would be extremely vulnerable if their identities were revealed, or even guessed.

Once again Brzezinski has no regrets. "I would have been in a reprehensible position if I had sat on it," he says of the report. Besides, "no classified information was conveyed to Billy. He knew what he was doing." Justice Department officials, looking into the possibility that Brzezinski may have violated the nation's espionage laws, say privately they think there is little chance he will face criminal charges. But they question his judgment.

So do many others, on many other issues. A man of dazzling intellectual virtuosity and erudition, Brzezinski has sometimes seemed to be badly served by his brilliance. He is so deft at formulating fancy theories, and he so likes to hear himself spin them out, that he has tended to pay less attention than he should to making those theories work in practice—and, indeed, to figuring out whether they can work. Brzezinski was a principal author of the Carter human rights

campaign, which has survived only in drastically modified, and more modest, form after its collision with Realpolitik in South Korea, Iran and the U.S.S.R. Early in the Administration he promoted the idea that the U.S. should relegate Soviet-American relations to a less central position in the seamless web of international affairs. Trouble was, the Kremlin refused to accept the demotion.

It was Brzezinski who unveiled in 1977 the concept of Iran and Saudi Arabia becoming "the regional influentials" on whom the U.S. could rely in the Persian Gulf. Now that Washington's relations with Tehran are severed and those with Riyadh are strained, Brzezinski is fascinated by the potential of radical, traditionally pro-Soviet Iraq as "the new regional influential."

Brzezinski's labels too often seem facile, even interchangeable, and his theories too flexible, too clever by half. In 1977-78 he argued that the U.S. must learn to live with revolutionary change in Third World countries. Then, in 1979, without admitting a major shift in policy, he pushed vigorously, though unsuccessfully, for a policy of backing Nicaraguan Dictator Anastasio Somoza to the bitter end.

Brzezinski has also shown poor judgment in indulging his visceral anti-Russian sentiments and his combative, provocative personality in public. During a trip to China in 1978, he challenged an aide to a race up the Great Wall, saying, "Last one to the top has to fight the Cubans in Ethiopia." It would have been a harmless joke, except that the Soviets as well as some State Department officials were already quivering with anxiety about the anti-Soviet overtones of the trip, and the reporters gathered round were sure to overhear the quip and make news out of it. They did.

Similarly, on a visit to the Afghan-Pakistani border in February, he allowed himself to be photographed posing with a Chinese-made AK-47 automatic rifle. Good fun, maybe, but definitely not statesmanship.

In private, Brzezinski is far less pugnacious. Says former Aide Samuel Hoskinson, "He's a gentleman and a scholar in the true sense of the words." Seweryn Bialer, a fellow Polish-American who succeeded Brzezinski as director of the Research Institute on International Change at Columbia University, calls him "extraordinarily decent and honest." Bialer says he has profound disagreements with the Carter Administration, particularly over its difficulty in promulgating clear and steady policies, but he does not blame Brzezinski alone: "It's the President's fault. My disappointment with Brzezinski

is that he cannot change the President to make him less spasmodic."

Brzezinski believes that he is under attack because of the politically supercharged atmosphere and because he is vulnerable to both the left and the right: the left resents him, in his view, for being correct about the dangers of Soviet expansionism, while the right criticizes him for supporting the embattled SALT II treaty and the human rights policy. Brzezinski argues that despite the setbacks of the past few years, the Administration has laid the ground for effectively countering the Soviets, for repairing frayed ties with Western Europe and Japan, for consolidating the new Sino-American relationship (for which Brzezinski takes personal credit, with some justification), and for improving its dialogue with the Third

tended to take off for long weekends at his seaside home in Maine. Brzezinski, by contrast, is an indefatigable, even exuberant worker. Between now and the election, Muskie can get his way by going public with his annoyance at Brzezinski's methods, as he did last July when the National Security Adviser completed plans for the Administration's revised nuclear targeting policy without consulting the new Secretary of State.

Despite the problems he causes, presidential political advisers are not likely to press for Brzezinski's ouster. The reason, according to a close aide: "Zbig may be feeling some heat, but Ronald Reagan is his best insulation. Carter is not going to dump the house hard-liner just as he is fighting to prove he is tough on defense."

BILL PIERCE

By all accounts, the bond between the President and his adviser is still strong. Carter remains loyal to and dependent on Brzezinski as his mentor in foreign affairs, a role he acquired in 1973 when the Columbia professor met and hit it off with the Georgia Governor. Brzezinski's name is still the first on the President's daily calendar, and he is often the last adviser Carter speaks to at night. Says Defender Huntington: "Brzezinski retains the President's confidence, and that is what is important." Leslie Gelb, who fought numerous battles with Brzezinski when he was a State Department official and has criticized him publicly since leaving the Government last year, says, "I think Brzezinski has been damaged irreparably everywhere except with Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter."

As he demonstrated in his stubborn support for Bert Lance three years ago, Carter tends to re-

ject even the most persistent and often justifiable criticisms of a close friend and trusted adviser. The President's loyalty is more commendable than his wisdom in Brzezinski's case, just as it was in Lance's.

While the National Security Adviser cannot be blamed for the recent misfortunes that have befallen the U.S. or for the President's own failures of leadership, Brzezinski is personally responsible for exacerbating institutional tensions within the Government, needlessly agitating foreign leaders with his penchant for braggadocio, and sowing confusion with pronouncements that too often sound like geostrategic gobbledygook. Thus he has contributed to the impression so widespread at home and abroad of an Administration that is impetuous and in disarray. In that sense, Brzezinski is unquestionably part of Carter's overall political problem; now as the President faces the election and later if he gets a second term.

—By Strobe Talbott, Reported by Gregory H. Wierzynski and Roberto Suro/Washington



Former Ambassador William Sullivan

Pinning the tail on Zbig in the game of "Who Lost Iran?"

World—if, of course, Carter gets another four years.

Whether Brzezinski, too, would be around that long is an underlying issue in the current controversy about him. Says Harvard Professor Samuel Huntington, a former colleague at the White House, and one of his few public defenders: "A lot of this criticism has erupted now because people who disagree with his views are trying to keep him out of a second Carter Administration." Certainly there are many people at the State Department who hope Brzezinski will go even if Carter stays. But there is a good chance that if Carter is re-elected, Brzezinski will prevail over Edmund Muskie's State Department as decisively—and sometimes brutally—as he did over Cyrus Vance's.

For one thing, Muskie has been something of a disappointment to his own troops. He has the ego and the stature to compete with Brzezinski, but so far he has not shown the energy. He has complained about the amount of paperwork and the complexity of the problems, and he has

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15 SEPTEMBER 1980

ESSAY

No Ado
About
Plenty

By William Safire

WASHINGTON, Sept. 14 — On Dec. 18, 1979, White House motor pool logs will show, the President's brother summoned a White House limousine to take him and aide Randy Coleman to the Libyan Embassy. The check for arranging meetings that led to "assurances" of a pro-Arab Carter policy was not yet ready; a few days later, Coleman returned to pick up \$20,000. (Neither man has yet been asked about that Dec. 18 visit.)

In an equally obscene combination of the sale of influence and the abuse of Federal perks, Billy Carter again demanded and got a White House limo on March 4 of this year to drop off Ron Sprague, the accountant under drug investigation, to press the Libyans on Billy's behalf for more money.

Common taxicabs are not prestigious enough for First Brother on his private business: the White House cars, chauffeured by members of the armed forces, demonstrated to Libyan officials that the President's brother was a man of influence.

Billy's illegal peddling of that influence, made possible by a brother who knew about his lawbreaking and would not stop it, is a scandal of Teapot Dome proportions. However, the new standard of political ethics is now "Is it as bad as Watergate?" Unless impeachable offenses are proved, the already-demonstrated abuse of trust, misprision of felony and outright lying are dismissed as "much ado about nothing."

Some interesting nothings:

1. *The tennis court meeting.* On June 11 of this year, when Joel Lisker of Justice told Billy Carter that the Government knew of secret Libyan payments, the President's brother then admitted to a \$200,000 "loan" and announced he was going to the White House to complain about harassment.

The Qaddafi agent then hurried for protection to Dr. Brzezinski, who called in Presidential counsel Lloyd Cutler, who in turn arranged for lawyers sensitive to White House public relations needs. But in testimony last week, a hitherto concealed fact popped out: that same day, Billy also had a "brief" meeting on the tennis court with Jimmy Carter. (Strange how the President's most delicate meetings are at first forgotten, then described as "brief.")

On the tennis court that June 11, Billy was in the biggest panic of his life. I wonder: did he not complain to his brother, as he warned Lisker he would, of harassment? Did he not mention to his brother the meetings just held with Brzezinski and Cutler, or the fact that his Libyan payments were known?

2. *Brzezinski's selective memory.* The normally meticulous National Security Adviser insists he kept no record of the historic White House meeting on Nov. 27 with Billy and the Libyan official. But now it develops that three days later, Zbig had a telephone conversation with Billy Carter — and maintains he has "no recollection of the call." Was nobody listening — or was anybody told not to listen?

One curious conflict in Brzezinski's public statement concerns the sequence following his receipt of the top secret intelligence report about Billy Carter's impending oil deal. Brzezinski attests this took place "in March," followed by his call to Billy Carter "on the afternoon of the day I received the report," followed by his briefing of the President "the next day."

But dope this out with me: The White House says the President was briefed by Brzezinski about the intelligence report, as well as Zbig's call to Billy, on April 1 (Wisconsin primary day). That would mean that Zbig received the information from C.I.A.'s Admiral Turner on March 31 (which Turner will confirm) and called Billy that same afternoon.

Billy Carter has testified, however, that he thinks he returned the call from the Best Western Motel in Americus on April 1, not March 31 — and has supplied a wealth of corroboration, including a vivid recollection of his return that morning from an April 1 meeting with Charter Oil in Jacksonville.

Here's the significance: If Brzezinski's telephone conversation with Billy took place after, rather than before, Zbig briefed the President — then we have been misled. Then Justice's investigation of the Zbig leak would have to include the President.

Perhaps Zbig will change his story from "the next day" or perhaps the telephone toll records of the motel in Americus will clear this up, but right now the published dates do not jibe. And somehow, the notion of any White House staffer directing the President's brother to pass up a huge oil deal without first talking to the President stretches credulity.

3. *The gaps in the President's diary.* Jimmy Carter has made public 16 diary entries covering an 18-month period on the subject of Billy and Libya. Curiously, there were no entries for April 1, when starting news about his brother's oil fortunes became known to the President, or on June 11, when his brother dropped by at the tennis court after his devastating experience at Justice. Not important enough to note perhaps?

This week, as Appointments Secretary Philip Wise exhibits his own forgettery — (Appointments Secretary Dwight Chapin went to jail for saying "I don't recall"), Chairman Birch Bayh will press to cut off the inquiry. If he succeeds, the exposure of the Billygate scandal will be postponed until after the election — leaving it to special prosecution in the spring.

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STEALTH

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THE WASHINGTON POST
17 September 1980

Carter Blamed In Stealth Leak

Associated Press

Retired Adm. Elmo Zumwalt, a supporter of Republican Ronald Reagan's presidential candidacy, quoted unnamed high-level sources as saying President Carter made the decision to leak the "Stealth" program as part of his presidential reelection effort.

The former chief of naval operations, testifying under oath to a House Armed Services investigations subcommittee, quoted the sources as saying David Aaron, a National Security Council aide, leaked the information to The Washington Post after Carter gave his approval.

A White House spokesman, queried about Zumwalt's charges, said: "The accusation is a lie. Adm. Zumwalt is either being misled or consciously playing gutter politics."

[The Post published a story on Aug. 14 about administration plans to go public during the presidential campaign with Stealth technological breakthroughs. George C. Wilson, author of the story, said yesterday that Zumwalt was "incorrect" in his assertions about the source.]

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16 September 1980

The Political Report

Beard to Call Key Officials In Probe of 'Stealth' Leaks

By Lance Gay
and Walter Taylor
Washington Star Staff Writers

The senior Republican on a House Armed Services subcommittee says he will seek the testimony of the top aides to the president's National Security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Defense Secretary Harold Brown about rumors surrounding "Stealth" technology leaks.

Rep. Robin Beard, R-Tenn., said that he has no evidence linking the two aides to the leaks but wants to investigate "rumors and many comments."

He said there have been reports of a memo to Brown purporting to advocate leaking the information

for President Carter's political gain.

"I do not have any substantial evidence to support these allegations," Beard said.

Beard said that he will ask the investigating subcommittee to call David L. Aaron, deputy to Brzezinski, and Peter Hamilton, a special assistant to Brown, to testify on the issue.

A White House spokesman last night insisted that there was no such memo.

"I'll give you a flat denial on that," the spokesman said. "It's hard to escape the feeling that they are pursuing this matter as a conscious political distortion."

Thomas Ross, a spokesman for Brown, also denied knowledge of any such memo. "There was no such memo," he said.

In the meantime, Sen. Malcolm Wallop, R-Wyo., said he wants to broaden the Senate Intelligence Committee's investigation into the Stealth leaks to other intelligence leaks from the NSC as well.

"These leaks are too much," Wallop said.

Wallop said he was concerned about a report in the current issue of New York magazine that quotes a "staff member of the National Security Council" as saying that since January 1980 the United States has been providing communications equipment and technical advisers to China under the terms of a secret, unofficial agreement.

The report says that in exchange for the equipment and advisers, the United States is getting Chinese intelligence about Soviet activities and that the monitoring posts on the Sino-Soviet border have become crucial to U.S. operations because of the loss of listening posts in Iran.

The magazine story said the statements of U.S. officials were sparked "by Ronald Reagan's recent pro-Taiwan comments, which have upset the Chinese."

Separate investigations in the House and Senate into leaks began two weeks ago as Republicans charged that the Carter administration was leaking information on the Stealth technology to demonstrate the wisdom of Carter's decision not to go ahead with the B-1 bomber.

Stealth technology reportedly "hides" a bomber from an enemy's radar screen.

Senate Minority Leader Howard Baker, R-Tenn., said he is concerned that there appears to be a pattern in the intelligence leaks which, he said, may be politically motivated. If this were true, Baker said, it would be unpatriotic. Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan, D-N.Y., said he also is concerned about some of the leaks.

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CHICAGO TRIBUNE
13 SEPTEMBER 1980

Michael Kilian

Top secrets flow like campaign promises

The Carter administration has been accused of revealing details of the Stealth bomber and other military secrets to improve the President's defense image.—News item.

SERGEI SHLEPOVICH trudged back to the Russian embassy — the brim of his slouch hat pulled down, the collar of his heavy overcoat turned up — hot and tired after a hard day of spying.

He was hot because it was 101 degrees in Washington. He was tired because his spying assignment for the day — tailing a high-ranking member of one of the congressional intelligence committees — had taken him to seemingly every adult movie theater and massage parlor in the capital. He must have gone through 10 rolls of microfilm with his pocket spy camera.

Once inside the embassy, Sergei trudged toward his office in the Cultural Affairs Section, hungering for the moment when he could sit down and take off his roller skates. Sergei's cover as a KGB agent in America was as a roller disco cultural exchange officer.

UNFORTUNATELY, HE had to pass before the open door of his chief KGB rival in Washington, Igor Imbecilsky, who was seated behind his desk in his furry dog costume. Igor's embassy cover was as a talking animal cultural exchange officer, and he had been working on getting the Soviet rights to "Benji."

"Hallo, Igor," said Sergei grumpily. "Is you finding nice fire hydrants?"

"Am finding much better than that," said Igor, scratching his ear. "Am finding without ever leaving cool office that U.S. government is changing entire nuclear strategy from massive retaliation to selective military targets."

"You is finding that, Igor? You is finding very big stuff."

"Am finding it straight from Zbigniew Brzezinski's office," said Igor, licking his paw.

THE NEXT DAY, Sergei's spy assignment was to follow a high-ranking Pentagon general on a hush-hush trip to Atlantic City. At last, he thought; he was in luck, for the general proved to be attending a big party thrown by some defense contractors in a luxury casino hotel, and all the rooms were crawling with high ranking officers — and female friends. But though he shot 24 rolls of microfilm, Sergei learned nothing more than that American military officers were in really good physical shape.


When he returned, once again trudging by Igor's office in his roller disco skates, Igor once again called out to him.

"I am finding very, very big secret," said Igor, biting at a flea on his back. "I am finding U.S. has developed hot new 'Stealth' bomber that is completely foiling Sovietski radar."

"Is true, Igor? Such a bomber as that?"

"Is completely true, Sergei. I am getting this straight from office of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown. I am getting this quicker than Novak-Evans."

The day after that, Sergei was assigned to tail a high-ranking Central Intelligence Agency official, who picked up a statuesque blonde at a Georgetown tea party and drove immediately to motel, where they stayed for 12 hours. Sergei



Soviet conception of 'Stealth' bomber.

shot 50 rolls of microfilm, but all in vain. The CIA official spent the entire 12 hours searching the motel room for hidden microphones.

"Tomorrow they'll probably send me to a G. Gordon Liddy book-autographing party," sighed Sergei.

Back at the embassy, Sergei tried sneaking past Igor's office, but his skates made too much noise.

"Well, Sergei," said Igor, sitting up on his hind legs as his secretary fed him a shot of vodka. "I am finding whole new plans for reorganizing American infantry. I am getting this straight from office of chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff."

"TELL ME, IGOR," said Sergei, whirling Igor's secretary around the floor in a roller disco number. "How you finding out all this hot stuff without ever leaving office?"

"Is simple," said Igor, scampering over to the television set and turning it on with his teeth. On the screen was a four-star Air Force general telling a news conference at Carter campaign headquarters about a laser beam satellite the U.S. planned to have deployed in 1999.

Just then, both Sergei and Igor were summoned to the office of Yuri Yogurtchunko, the head KGB man in the United States.

"Comrades, I am having great news," said Yuri. "Sergei, you are being named KGB spy of month. Also, you are being promoted to lieutenant colonel and being given all-expense-paid two weeks' vacation at seashore in Murmanek next January."

"But Comrade Head KGB Man," said Sergei. "I am providing you no worthwhile information."

"Yes," said Yuri. "But, except for motel room stuff with nutty CIA official, you microfilm is being terrific! Everyone in Kremlin is seeing it twice."

"WAITING A minute," said Igor. "I am being one with hot information: New nuclear strategy, Stealth bombers."

"Nincompoopsky!" said Yuri. "Your information is being worthless!"

"But is coming from all those news conferences!" said Igor, his tail between his legs. "Is coming from Harold Brown, from..."

"Stupidsky," said Yuri, going to his wall calendar. "Look at month. Is being September! If they still are holding these news conferences after November election, then maybe then am I sending your-hot information on to Kremlin."

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CUBA

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NEW YORK TIMES
14 SEPTEMBER 1980

Police Query 5 Who Noted 'Commotion'

By JOSEPH B. TREASTER

Police investigators said yesterday they had found five persons who noticed "a commotion" at the Queens intersection where an aide to the Cuban mission to the United Nations was assassinated early Thursday evening, but none who actually saw the shooting.

Detectives continued to question merchants and residents in the vicinity of Queens Boulevard and 58th Street, where the killing took place, and Federal Bureau of Investigation agents were interviewing Cuban exiles in the large Cuban communities in Union City and West New York, N.J.

But so far they have been unable to find any members of Omega 7, the anti-Castro organization that has claimed responsibility for killing the aide, 41-year-old Félix García-Rodríguez, as he drove alone in a 1978 maroon Pontiac station wagon with simulated wood-grain paneling westbound on Queens Boulevard.

And they have no "strong leads" as to the identity of the gunman, the police said. They asked anyone with information on the crime to telephone (212) 520-9200.

Detectives said they had not yet received laboratory reports on the three .45-caliber shells that were found in or near a crosswalk at the intersection, but they said they believed the weapon had been an automatic pistol.

Dr. Elliot M. Gross, the city's Chief Medical Examiner, said he had not found any powder burns on Mr. García's body, and the police say they believe he may have been shot from about 10 feet away, probably from another car.

Mr. García was listed as an attaché in the Cuban Mission to the United Nations, but fellow employees and the police said he worked mainly as a chauffeur and messenger. He lived in the Cuban mission at 315 Lexington Avenue at 38th Street.

Both the F.B.I. and the New York police said they had nothing to indicate that Mr. García had been an intelligence agent, as had been suggested in some reports.

Cuban officials said Mr. García had been at the mission Thursday afternoon between 4:45 and 5:15 and had left there to have dinner with friends from the Cuban delegation in Queens.

The police said he had been shot at 6:20 P.M. in the left temple and left side of the neck. They said they had been able to trace his movements through the day until 6 P.M. when he stopped at a gasoline station at Northern Boulevard and 76th Street.

Police Seek Public's Help

Employees at the mission said Mr. García frequently bought gas at that station. They said the station was not on the way to the home where he was to have had dinner and that he would have had to double back toward Manhattan. This, they said, seemed to explain early speculation that Mr. García had been returning to Manhattan from Queens.

Where Cuban Aide Was Slain

Initially, the police had said that a man who had been driving behind Mr. García on a moped had reported that there had been no vehicles on either side of the station wagon when it veered out of control and slammed into a Volkswagen that was leaving the driveway of a service station on Queens Boulevard.

But detectives said yesterday that the moped rider later said he had seen cars on both the left and right side of Mr. García's station wagon. The moped rider, however, did not see anyone firing at Mr. García, nor could he describe either of the cars flanking his vehicle.

Between 6 P.M. and 7 P.M. Friday evening, the police diverted traffic from the three westbound lanes of Queens Boulevard at 58th Street into the westbound service road of two driving lanes and a parking lane. As the vehicles slowed, detectives and F.B.I. agents handed drivers a leaflet in Spanish and English describing the killing and asked if they had any information about it.

Five persons said they had "seen a commotion and activities," the police said. But what they were apparently referring to, the police said, were the collision that followed the shooting and the crowd that gathered. None of the five persons had seen a gunman or heard shots fired, the police said.

"We are very angry but we are not afraid," said Israel Olivera, building manager for the Cuban Mission to the United Nations. "When somebody kills your friend, it makes you angry — very, very angry. Maybe they are trying to make us afraid, but I don't have fear."

Mr. Olivera's sentiments were repeated by other employees yesterday inside the mission, on Lexington Avenue near 38th Street. They said they were determined that their lives would be as "normal" as before the slaying of a mission aide Thursday evening.

The aide, Félix García Rodríguez, whose duties at the mission have been described as that of a driver and a messenger, was gunned down as he drove his car along a busy street in Queens early Thursday evening.

Omega 7, an anti-Castro terrorist group, claimed responsibility for the murder in statements to news organizations that evening. The group has also claimed responsibility for a score of bombings and two murders in New York, New Jersey and Miami since 1975, and has threatened more assassinations.

Security Precautions Taken

As a precaution, the head of the mission, Dr. Raúl Roa Kouri, and his family have moved into the mission from his apartment on East 81st Street. Police protection outside the mission has been doubled to six uniformed officers at all times, and a visitor must pass through police barricades and a series of three locked doors before gaining entry.

Some mission members said yesterday that they did not feel that increased police protection was the answer to the threats Omega 7 had made.

"A cop outside my door will not solve my problem," said Miguel Alvarez, second secretary of the mission. "I still have to go outside. You have work — that cannot stop. To protect our people here, they have to find and prosecute the people who killed Félix García."

In an interview yesterday at the mission, Dr. Roa, the chief Cuban delegate to the United Nations, denied reports that the slain aide was a spy.

"He was a protocol officer at the mission — that is all," Dr. Roa said in an interview at the Cuban mission. "The media is trying to invent all these fabrications to justify what has happened, and that is that Félix García has been murdered in plain daylight."

Dr. Roa reaffirmed charges he made earlier this year that the members of Omega 7 — believed by law enforcement officials to number less than a dozen — were trained by the Central Intelligence Agency and that they are "known to the C.I.A. and the F.B.I."

"They are a small bunch of people that are engaged in active terrorist acts in the United States," Dr. Roa said at the time. "You see, these people have been trained by the C.I.A. to participate in actions of sabotage in Cuba and to assassinate our leaders. That's why they know how to use plastic explosives, sophisticated weapons; they have been trained in secret warfare."

"Many are ex-agents," he asserted. "They have all been C.I.A.-trained in the 60's and 70's."

Told of Dr. Roa's allegations that the Federal Bureau of Investigation knew the identities of members of Omega 7, Larry E. Whack, an F.B.I. agent who has been investigating the terrorist group for five years, said:

"Knowing and proving are two different things," Mr. Whack said in New York yesterday. "We are investigating the activities of people who we have information or reason to believe may be connected with Omega 7, but that's just one small aspect. Tying them directly to Omega 7 is another story. You need evidence and you need witnesses."

CONTINUED

Bombing Attempt Failed

"It's a wild allegation," said Herbert E. Hetu, a spokesman for the C.I.A. "I cannot comment on something like that."

Last March, Omega 7 took responsibility for attaching a magnetic explosive device underneath Dr. Roa's car. The envoy escaped unharmed, however, when the remote-controlled device apparently fell off as the car started. An aide discovered the device and called the police.

The Cuban mission is a narrow, 12-story building flanked by two smaller buildings. About half of the more than 40 Cubans attached to the mission live and work and send their children to school in the red-brick compound at 315 Lexington Avenue.

Some mission members voiced concern yesterday about the effect of Mr. Garcia's death on their children. In the small living-room of her two-bedroom apartment in the mission, Esther Pérez, an attaché whose husband is a first secretary, sat smoking a cigarette on a chrome-framed couch.

"I still have to take my son outside," she said. "He has to lead as normal a life as possible under the circumstances. We have some duties that take us outside the building. If we can't carry them out, why should we be here?"

A Picture of an Assassin

Another woman who dropped by Mrs. Pérez's apartment yesterday afternoon agreed, but said that her 5-year-old son had drawn a picture the night before of an "ugly person" and asked her to write "asesino" — the Spanish word for "assassin" — at the bottom of the picture.

Many mission employees remembered Mr. Garcia as a friendly, outgoing man who waited to give the children candy or cookies when they came out of school.

"It was very hard to tell the children that Félix is dead," Mrs. Pérez said. "He was the most widely known and the most widely liked. It seems a paradox to have him killed."

Many of the staff members stressed that while they were not afraid, they did have concern for their families.

"I can defend myself and my children," said the wife of one mission employee who asked that her name not be used. "When I came here, I knew what the dangers were. But, of course, I worry about my husband. I feel his life is in danger but we are not afraid."

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ON PAGE A-24NEW YORK TIMES
13 SEPTEMBER 1980

McHenry Terms Slaying A 'Stain on United States'

By BERNARD D. NOSSITER

Special to The New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., Sept. 12 — Donald F. McHenry, the chief United States delegate to the United Nations, today called the murder of a Cuban diplomat in Queens yesterday "a stain on the United States."

Commenting on the failure of law-enforcement agencies to root out Omega 7, the terrorist group claiming responsibility for the killing, Mr. McHenry told reporters: "We are dealing with a very tight group of fanatics and it is very difficult for the F.B.I. to crack that group because it is so small and such a tight unit."

While some United Nations diplomats expressed outrage over the killing yesterday of Félix Garcia-Rodriguez, a driver who had been given the rank of attaché by the Cuban mission, others seemed resigned.

One of the most respected envoys, Tommy Koh of Singapore, said: "It will be very bad for the U.S. if they don't find the killer and bring him to justice. The U.S. Has received the active support of the whole world on their plea that Iran release the hostages and respect the time-honored code of diplomatic immunity. They cannot expect to do less than they expect others to do for them."

The British delegate, Sir Anthony Parsons, voiced the more common view. "This could have happened anywhere. We're not blaming anyone. We are extremely upset."

However, few senior diplomats identified themselves with Mr. Garcia, who was gunned down in his car in Queens. A South Asian envoy who asked that his name not be used, said: "I have talked to 100 people here today. Not one of them mentioned the killing until I asked. We are not Cubans and there is a certain antipathy towards them."

An Insulated Life

For the most part, senior diplomats at the United Nations live an insulated life, largely bound by Fifth Avenue and the East River, from 42d Street to 86th Street. They tend to move in chauffeur-driven limousines from luxury apartments owned by their Governments to offices, parties and dinners in the same grid.

On weekends, they are usually found in the Hamptons on Long Island or at country homes in Westchester or Connecticut. They are probably in far less peril than citizens who regularly ride the subways.

Lesser diplomats are scattered in less fashionable streets in Manhattan, Roosevelt Island and Queens. They are unlikely to become terrorist targets unless they are thought to be intelligence agents.

Several Arab diplomats, including one whose country is said to employ killer squads abroad, shrugged their shoulders and said the murder could happen anywhere. But a senior Latin American envoy called the killing "a danger to us all."

"It is like Iran," he said. "The immunity of diplomats is essential to international relations. No one is responsible. But how can we change the climate?"

Zehdi Labib Tarzi, the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which has claimed hundreds of terrorist killings in Israel and elsewhere, insisted that the United States must take the blame for the Cuban murder.

"The host country is primarily responsible," he said, "especially since it was informed several times by Cuba [of threats to the mission]. This speaks very poorly of the system that can't find people who plant bombs and things. I am impressed by the F.B.I.'s failure to find anything."

One of the leading South Asian diplomats, Shirley Amerasinghe of Sri Lanka, was equally bitter. "The expression of regret over the event is a poor substitute for the prevention of it. They [the police] had full warnings of it." Mr. Amerasinghe is currently president of the United Nations Law of the Sea conference and he formerly presided over the General Assembly.

Salim A. Salim of Tanzania, the Assembly's current president, called a unique open meeting of the 153-nation body so that envoys could publicly voice their indignation over the killing. The Cuban delegate, Raul Roa-Kouri, implied that the killers were products of the Central Intelligence Agency. The assassins, he said, "acted with impunity, with the treachery, expertise and security of those who were trained to commit all kinds of criminal acts against the Cuban revolution."

The Cuban delegate charged that Mr. Garcia "has died because his cowardly assassins were not punished for their previous crimes."

Speaking for the Soviet bloc, Boris Tsvetkov of Bulgaria called on the United States "to observe international law" and take steps to protect diplomats and their missions here.

In a separate statement, Kurt Waldheim, the United Nations Secretary General, "strongly condemned this wanton act of terrorism" and said he had urged Mr. McHenry to take "all necessary measures" to insure the safety of the Cuban mission.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A12THE WASHINGTON POST
13 September 1980

Police Step Up Security, Hunt for Envoy's Killers

NEW YORK, Sept. 12 (AP)—As diplomats condemned the slaying Thursday night of a Cuban attache, the city today tightened police protection for the Cuban U.N. Mission, and a task force hunting the killers vowed to increase its efforts.

"If they thought the heat was on before, they ain't seen nothing yet," the head of the FBI police task force said of the anti-Castro terrorists who claimed responsibility for the murder of Feliz Garcia-Rodriguez, who was shot as he drove through Queens.

[The New York Daily News quoted law enforcement sources as saying that Garcia-Rodriguez was a high-level spy for Cuban President Fidel Castro.

Garcia-Rodriguez, whom officials first described to police as a low-level administrator and then as a chauffeur, actually was a high-ranking intelligence officer sent to this country two years ago by the head of Castro's internal security office. The News quoted the sources as saying they said that he was responsible for keeping surveillance on a Cuban drug-smuggling ring in Miami, the newspaper reported.]

U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim urged the United States to take all necessary measures to protect Cuban diplomats here. He condemned the killing as the first here of a diplomat assigned to the 135-nation world body as a "wanton act of terrorism, which is a further and tragic illustration of the increasing violence to which diplomats have been subjected around the world."

Officials focused on the anti-Castro terrorist group Omega 7. A man called the Associated Press within minutes of the shooting and said Omega 7 had committed "the execution." He also warned that Raul Roa, Cuba's U.N. ambassador, would be next.

Roa complained before the U.N. General Assembly today that "these groups of professional assassins" operate with "impunity"—they hold public office, convene public meetings and publish their statements in New York's Hispanic press.

Mayor Edward I. Koch met today with Roa and ordered extra police protection for the remaining 39 members of the Cuban U.N. delegation.

Donald McHenry, the American U.N. ambassador, expressed "sincere regret for this cowardly act resulting in a tragic loss of life."

Havana Radio termed Garcia's slaying a "cowardly murder" and said it "tragically confirms the reiterated denunciation of our country before the United Nations, pointing out the impunity with which terrorist counter-revolutionary groups act in the United States."

Granma, Cuba's official newspaper, said "at no time have those guilty of

attacks on Cuban diplomats been brought to justice in the United States."

The Soviet news agency Tass said in its report that anti-Cuban activities occur in this country with "the full connivance" of U.S. authorities.

FBI officials repeated an offer of a \$25,000 reward for information leading to the arrest and conviction of Omega 7 members. Later in the day, the city put up a \$10,000 reward of its own.

Meanwhile, across the street from the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, about 300 members of the Committee to End the U.S. Blockade Against Cuba chanted, "FBI, CIA, we demand justice today."

Michelle Frank, a committee spokesman, said the group was protesting the slaying and "the unconscionable blockade of Cuba by the U.S. government."

In Boston, 30 persons picketed outside the federal building in protest of the slaying. "The protest is to call attention to the assassination and to inspire the government to make a full investigation," said Cornelia D'Mils, spokesman for the Boston Community to End Terrorism in the Cuban Community.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 21

NEWSWEEK
22 September 1980

PERISCOPE

Cuban Spies at the U.N.

Many Western diplomats believe that Cuba's U.N. mission is indeed a nest of spies—a charge made by the anti-Castro terrorist organization Omega 7, which claimed responsibility last week for murdering a New York-based Cuban diplomat (page 35). Westerners point out that Cuba's U.N. mission numbers 43, while countries of comparable population such as Madagascar, Belgium and Greece maintain staffs of a dozen or under. "If the Cubans are not spying, what do they need all those people for?" asks one suspicious European diplomat. "There just isn't that much paperwork for a nation that small."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 35NEWSWEEK
22 September 1980

Omega 7's Killers Strike in New York

Felix García Rodríguez, a low-ranking aide at the Cuban mission to the United Nations in New York, was driving through Queens early one evening last week in his maroon Pontiac station wagon. Suddenly, shots were fired from a nearby car. García was hit by two bullets, one below his left ear and one above it, and died instantly—the first U.N. diplomat ever assassinated on the streets of New York. About ten minutes later, a Hispanic-sounding man called several news organizations, claiming that the assassination had been carried out by Omega 7—a violently anti-Castro group of Cubans that the FBI has labeled the most dangerous terrorist organization operating in the United States.

Spree: It was the second murder in a year laid to Omega 7, which has also claimed to have set off at least twenty bombs in the past five years—five of them in attacks on the Cuban U.N. mission and one against the Soviet mission. The FBI feared that last week's shooting might launch a new spree of violence, and officials worried about the possible international implications of the murder. Secretary of State Edmund Muskie expressed "deep regret" over the slaying and promised a "vigorous investigation." U.N. Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim denounced the killing as "a wanton act of terrorism," and both the FBI and New York police pledged tighter security for diplomats. The official Cuban newspaper Granma, meanwhile, charged that the terrorists acted with "impunity," and the Soviet news agency Tass propagandized that the murder was accomplished with the "full connivance" of American authorities.

Justice Department officials believe that Omega 7 draws its membership from the Cuban Nationalist Movement, an above-ground anti-Castro group with headquarters in Miami and in Union City, N.J. Some of its leaders are CIA-trained Bay of Pigs veterans who are still dedicated to the overthrow of the Castro regime. Three CNM members are now in prison in connection with the assassination of former Chilean Ambassador Orlando Letelier in Washington four years ago. Two others were charged in that case but remain fugitives; they are also wanted for questioning in a 1979 bombing at Kennedy airport, for which Omega 7 claimed responsibility. Earlier this year, after police found a bomb outside the residence of Cuba's U.N. Ambassador

Raúl Roa Kouri, the Federal government began a grand-jury investigation of CNM and Omega 7. One key line of questioning: does the movement extort money from local businessmen or receive aid from foreign and domestic organizations?

The leader of the New Jersey branch of the CNM is Armando Santana, 29, who once served a jail sentence for placing a bomb in front of a New York theater where a pro-Castro festival was to be held. In an interview with NEWSWEEK last year, Santana explained the group's objective. "We should be rulers of our own destiny," he said. "Cuba has never been free. We are not looking to turn the clock back to Batista. We're not Western oriented and do not look to the Soviet mode. We're looking for a new, third position." Santana refused to confirm or deny any connection with Omega 7, but last week CNM member Alfredo Chumaceiro insisted that "there is no connection" between the movement and García's assassination.

Efforts to crack the terrorist ring are hampered by the support CNM receives within the passionately anti-Castro Cuban community of Union City. "I know nothing about the assassination or Omega 7, but it's OK with me," said businessman Guido Guirado. "We cooperate with the movement freely. Any penny we have we happily give to them," added his wife, Felicia, sister of one of the Letelier fugitives. The hard-line Cuban nationalists reject any attempt to deal with Castro. Omega 7's activities picked up sharply after a group of Cuban moderates, called the Committee of 75, began dialogues with Castro two years ago that led to the release of 3,000 Cuban political prisoners and the visits of hundreds of thousands of Cuban exiles to their homeland. Last year, committee member Carlos Muñiz was shot to death in San Juan, and another member, Eulalio Negrín, was murdered later on the streets of Union City. Officials believe Omega 7 is responsible for the Negrín killing.

A Cuban Spy? One unanswered question about last week's shooting was why García was picked as the victim. One officer at the Cuban mission in New York said that García "was just a gofer. He was not important." But other sources suggested that García was actually a spy sent to counter anti-Castro militants and to keep watch over a Cuban drug ring in Miami. Whatever García's true role, lawmen seemed at a loss in the search for his killers. Without more cooperation from the Cuban community, they may be hard pressed to put an end to the terror of Omega 7.

DENNIS A. WILLIAMS with SUSAN AGREST
and HELENA JOSHEE in New York

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IRAN

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A13THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
18 September 1980

CARL T. ROWAN

The Shah's Fall: Sorting Out the Blame

There is nothing surprising about politicians exploiting the hostage situation in Iran, but there is something shabby about that self-serving and less-than-accurate article in which our former ambassador to Iran gives his version of Who Lost Iran.

William H. Sullivan, who presided over the Tehran embassy during the fall of the shah, writes in *Foreign Policy* magazine that this near-calamity for U.S. interests occurred because "U.S. policy formulation broke down." The culprit in the whole mess was President Carter's national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, according to Sullivan.

It is not possible to determine whether Sullivan is merely engaging in a few recriminations against Brzezinski, who is the favorite villain of the Foreign Service pros, or whether he is trying to bludgeon the Carter administration to the benefit of Ronald Reagan. Whatever his intentions, he misleads the American people in several important respects.

Sullivan writes: "By November 1978 Brzezinski began to make his own policy and established his own embassy in Iran. That embassy materialized in the person of Ardešir Zahedi, the shah's ambassador in Washington, who returned to Tehran at Brzezinski's behest with the explicit mission of pulling the shah's resolve together so that he could suppress the revolution."

Brzezinski denies vehemently that he sent Zahedi to Tehran, and I believe him, because I know why Zahedi rushed home.

In October 1978, I had the last on-camera interview that the shah granted before he was overthrown. When I left that interview, a friend and aide of Zahedi, a man named Dowlatshahi, asked me: "How did it go?"

"The shah is a beaten man," I replied. "He is not the same man I interviewed a couple of years ago. The shah has given up."

The following night members of my TV crew and I went to a party at Zahedi's house, hosted by one of his

This country faces enough dangers and difficulties regarding Iran without any election-year spasms of instantly revised history.

relatives. When I walked in, I was stunned to see Zahedi.

"Dowlatshahi telephoned me to tell me what you said about the shah. I have come home to hold my king's hand," Zahedi said. He then apologized for leaving the dinner and went to the palace where, he told me later, he spent the entire night trying to stiffen the monarch's resolve.

This country faces enough dangers and difficulties regarding Iran without any election-year spasms of instantly revised history determined to blame one party or another for "losing Iran."

On Dec. 13, 1978, on my return

from Tehran, I wrote this: "Before I went to Iran in October to do a television special on the impending crisis, officials here gave me an incredibly rosy report. When I returned with a report about 'Our Crisis in Iran,' a senior State Department official called the Iranian Embassy to apologize for my pessimism. Fortunately, he got an Iranian who said: 'If you don't believe Rowan's warning, you don't know anything about Iran.'"

Belatedly, that American official and many others are now trying to figure out what the future holds.

When I first talked to Sullivan during that trip to Iran, he gave me the same rosy view of the situation that the CIA had given. After I went to Isfahan and interviewed students and others opposing the shah, I returned to Tehran and said to Sullivan: "Your people sure as hell aren't talking to the same Iranians I'm talking to."

Not just the Central Intelligence Agency, but Sullivan's entire embassy, must share the blame for a report to President Carter that the shah was secure and Iran was "not even in a pre-revolutionary stage," a report that led the president to utter unprecedented public criticism of U.S. intelligence operations.

I write this simply to warn Americans not to be misled, in an election year, by one man's tendentious treatise about a development for which he and many others must share some blame. And that includes those who presided over U.S. policy toward Iran and the shah long before Jimmy Carter and Brzezinski assumed power.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A19THE WASHINGTON POST
18 September 1980Philip Geyelin.'A Mean-Minded Mini-Memoir'

Consider how the stage was set in late summer. The 52 American hostages were still locked up somewhere in Iran. Sensitive initiatives were under way to secure their release. Iranian militants were still threatening show trials and demanding, among their terms, American repentance for a long history of deep intervention in Iran's internal affairs.

Enter (in print) William Sullivan, career diplomat. His final, thankless post before retirement last year was that of U.S. ambassador in Tehran at the time of the decline and fall of the shah and the emergence of Ayatollah Khomeini as the impenetrable father figure of a revolution composed of many disparate parts.

Does he practice a professional's discreet restraint? No way. He charges, head down, into the latest issue of Foreign Policy magazine with a mean-minded mini-memoir. In it, he chronicles in minute detail his and rival Carter administration strategies and master plans for intervening in the internal Iranian power struggle in the most intimate and all-pervasive way.

There is much loose talk of secret cables and telephone conversations "in the clear," of irreconcilable schemes for military coups to save the shah or to preempt the revolution. Out of it, Sullivan emerges, not surprisingly, as a diplomatic paragon, farsighted, tough-minded, unfailingly right. The villain in the piece is President Carter's national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski—uniformly impulsive, uninformed, indiscreet and wrong.

Sullivan sees what he calls the "Brzezinski factor" in almost everything. When Carter, on a deep-sea fishing trip, made the "irretrievable" mistake of canceling a mission by a U.S. official to parlay with Khomeini at a critical juncture, only Brzezinski was with

him, Sullivan pointedly reports. (Brzezinski says the decision was approved by Secretary of State Vance.)

At another point, Sullivan reports that he replied unprintably to a relayed inquiry from Brzezinski about chances for a military coup. (Brzezinski says a coup was not even his first choice; among three on which the embassy's opinion was being solicited by a National Security Council subcommittee of which Brzezinski happened to be chairman.)

And that, we are supposed to believe, is how we lost Iran.

All right, I've oversimplified a bit. But that is pretty much the burden of the political tract Sullivan has chosen to throw into the thick of the presidential campaign. And the irony of it is that it actually does shed quite a lot of light on how things went so terribly wrong for American interests in Iran—though not, of course, the light that Sullivan had in mind.

At some critical points, Sullivan's blinkered, self-serving account is overwrought or demonstrably inaccurate. But for the same reasons that Sullivan should not have started the argument, the administration's hands are tied in trying to answer it.

In any case, Sullivan's strategy of easing the shah's departure, maneuvering to hold the armed forces together and seeking accommodation with Khomeini was never really tested. Neither was the Brzezinski strategy to save the shah (or a front man for him) by manipulating the armed forces to suppress the revolution.

That's the point: no clear course of action was ever put to a fair test. There was a profound division among the president's principal advisers, and the president never did resolve it. But Sullivan has his teeth so firmly clamped on

Brzezinski's ankle that he offers only fragmentary glimpses of this administration-wide collapse in crisis management.

Far more valuable evidence is available, however, in a cogent and comprehensive analysis of the administration's handling of the Iranian crisis. In a recent issue of the Washington Quarterly, published by the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, Michael A. Ledeen and William H. Lewis painstakingly trace the developments leading up to the departure of the shah and the triumphant return of Khomeini from exile.

The picture is of a policy-making process put pretty much on automatic, with the loudest voice (more often than not Brzezinski's) prevailing and the president's hand scarcely visible. Defense Secretary Brown "never took a strong position during the crisis." CIA Director Stansfield Turner "generally took cautious positions. . . ." Supportive messages from Brzezinski to the shah via Sullivan were simply not delivered. An important Sullivan proposal for Washington's approval was not even acknowledged.

At one point, Ledeen and Lewis do suggest, in extenuation, that perhaps the crisis managers were trying to manage the unmanageable. "The most important part of the outcome of the Iranian crisis," they write, was "the political dynamics of the country itself, and the critical role of the shah and his associates."

But their conclusion—the one Sullivan never gets around to—is an indictment of presidential management. With a choice between promoting gradual evolution to a "reformist government" and encouraging use of the "iron fist," the administration "did neither—it hoped for the best, and got the worst."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A1-3WILMINGTON EVENING JOURNAL
9 September 1980

FBI fears Iranians using terror here

By Joe Trento

Staff writer

WASHINGTON, D.C. — The FBI is investigating two shootings that it fears may be the start of Iranian terrorist attacks against U.S. government officials.

Between Aug. 15 and 18, the quiet of two suburban Washington neighborhoods was shattered by gunfire directed at the empty houses of two top officials of the federal Bureau of Prisons.

The FBI and the Secret Service were called in by the Bureau of Prisons to investigate the assault against federal officials but the shootings weren't made public. Fairfax County police weren't informed until the investigation was well under way.

Sources close to the investigation told the Evening Journal they now believe the shootings could have been in retribution for government treatment of Iranian demonstrators.

About 200 Iranians were arrested during a demonstration in Washington on July 27. The U.S. Department of Justice yesterday said it is investigating whether District of Columbia police used excessive force and violated the demonstrators' civil rights.

The Evening Journal learned of the shootings from a former CIA employee who has close connections to Washington's large Iranian community. The incident was confirmed yesterday by Roger Young, a spokesman for FBI Director William Webster, and by Michael Aun, a spokesman for the Bureau of Prisons.

Anti-terrorist experts in the FBI's Washington Field Office and the Secret Service are investigating and both of the prison officials and their immediate families have been placed under 24-hour guard by the U.S. marshal's service.

While federal investigators would give no details beyond confirming that the attacks took place, the former CIA employe said one of the weapons was an M-16 rifle, an American-made weapon widely used during the Vietnam war.

The M-16 can be used for automatic and semi-automatic fire and numerous copies of the semi-automatic version are available. The FBI refuses any comment on the types of weapons used.

The attacks were on the homes of Norman A. Carlson, director of the Bureau of Prisons, at 8702 Piccadilly Place in Springfield, Va., and James A. Meko, the bureau's executive director, at 4500 Andes Court in Fairfax.

Police in Fairfax County, where both incidents took place, say they have been told of the incidents but the entire investigation is in federal hands. The exact date of the attacks isn't known because the men weren't home at the time.

Young refused to say who was under investigation in the shooting. Sources in the FBI and the intelligence units of several cooperating police agencies told the Evening Journal that the main target in the probe of Iranian-inspired violence is Gen. Hossein Fardoust, current head of SAVAMA, as the Iranian secret police and intelligence service are now called.

In a recent speech before retired intelligence officers, former CIA director Richard M. Helms called Fardoust's activities "one of the great mysteries." Fardoust was "a great friend of the shah" and "his most trusted adviser," Helms said.

FBI officials, including Young, confirmed that the bureau is searching for Fardoust, who was

reported to be in the United States to direct a series of large-scale demonstrations, including the July 27 demonstration which led to the mass arrests of Iranian demonstrators.

The demonstrators were freed on Aug. 5 in Otisville, N.Y. The attacks on the prison officials' homes occurred within the next two weeks.

Fardoust has been linked to the unsolved assassination of Ali Akbar Tabatabai, 49, who until his murder in Bethesda, Md., on July 22, headed an anti-Khomeini group of Iranians called the Iran Freedom Foundation.

Former CIA operative Donald E. Deneselya says Fardoust has been carrying out "his acts of terror to get back in the good graces of the Khomeini regime after documents obtained in the (American) embassy proved that he had been in contact with the CIA prior to the fall of the shah."

Deneselya insists that Fardoust has been conspiring with the CIA and that his terrorist activities in the United States are a direct result of a concerted plan to convince the Khomeini regime that the CIA will look the other way if attacks are made on followers of the shah.

Deneselya, who operates six tax cabs using Iranian drivers, has himself been the subject of at least two Washington area murder investigations involving Iranians.

It was Deneselya who first informed the News-Journal paper of the shooting incidents that FBI and Bureau of Prisons spokesmen say had been withheld from the press until yesterday.

Deneselya, 44, was in the new last spring when he threatened to release the names of hundreds of CIA covert operatives if federal prosecutors didn't withdraw charges against an Iranian friend of his, Shahrokh Bakhtiar. The government refused, Bakhtiar was convicted and sentenced to 15 years in prison and Deneselya attempted to release the names. This newspaper refused to print them.

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MISCELLANEOUS

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DETROIT NEWS
25 August 1980

The Shrinking U.S. Navy

The authoritative British publication on world sea power, "Jane's Fighting Ships," says in its 1980-81 forward that the Soviet Union is now engaged in the largest naval and merchant shipbuilding program of the century.

Hitherto, the Soviet navy has been a coastal force of small, well-armed ships. That's changing. The first of the Kiev-class small aircraft carriers recently emerged, giving USSR airpower longer reach.

Now, Jane's says, the USSR is building its first supercarrier, a nuclear-powered vessel in the 75,000-ton class. Further, Jane's reports three more are planned, to challenge, ship for ship, America's four-ship, nuclear-carrier fleet.

Further, Russia is well along with four new classes of battle cruisers and is building 10 submarines a year. The present sub force includes 70 nuclear-powered boats with ballistic-missile capability, and 32 are armed



with missiles of sufficient range to hit North American targets when fired from Soviet waters.

The United States has 41 nuclear submarines with ballistic-missile capability. Most of the boats are nearing obsolescence. Seven replacements are under construction.

The Soviet Union is moving at sea from a defensive posture to the projection of naval power around the world. It intends to match the American carrier group as an instrument of power, to deprive the United States of superiority in this area.

The developments become truly alarming when compared with the present state of the U.S. Navy and future budget allotments for it. Instead of growth, the prospects are for erosion of strength.

The American Navy is under inordinate strain, a one-and-a-half ocean fleet trying to operate in three oceans. Short of ships, it is

also losing trained men because pay and benefits are scandalously low. Ship departures are delayed until officers can literally press sufficient hands from other vessels to make up a minimum crew.

Stanfield Turner, the retired admiral who directs the CIA, notes in the Navy publication, "Proceedings," that the fleet has declined in the past decade from just under 1,000 to 450 ships, and combat aircraft have dwindled from 2,700 to 1,700.

Says Adm. Turner: "The mathematics of inadequate procurement spells shrinkage. If we take the number of ships that we have actually procured over the last 10 years and which are programmed for the next five, it averages about 15 ships a year. Average ship life, minesweeper to carrier, is about 22 years. Twenty-two times 15 is 330. We are today, for the last decade, for the next five (years), planning to sustain a Navy of 330 ships. If 22 is too conservative, make it 25. You now have a 375-ship navy. Stretch it to 30 years. You now have a 450-ship navy, the same as we have today. We are not growing in ships and the story in aircraft is much the same."

How, then, is the Carter administration moving to deal with this dangerous trend?

"Sea Power," published by the Navy League, says in a recent issue that the services are working on 1982 financial plans, and all face severe restraints imposed by Defense Secretary Harold Brown.

Navy Secretary Edward Hidalgo told Mr. Brown, the magazine reports, that these restraints will cost the Navy 10 new ships, leave it short of "hundreds" of aircraft, and do nothing to reverse the exodus of underpaid personnel.

Specifically, Mr. Hidalgo says the Navy must postpone building three attack submarines, two fleet missile-defense cruisers, and five frigates, all proposed by Congress in previous planning. In addition, the Navy normally buys 230 aircraft annually, "about 100 short of what is needed to meet attrition and to maintain force structure. We buy only 199 in FY (financial year) 1982, including 74 trainers, and 185 in FY 1983."

President Carter says he will never allow America to become No. 2, in any area of defense. Jane's says America would already fight at a numerical disadvantage in some categories of ships if a sea war occurred today. And the Soviets' massive building program is designed to give them total superiority.

Mr. Carter appears to be incompetent in simple arithmetic. The Navy is shrinking and all he does is pronounce baseless words of reassurance.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A12THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
18 September 1980**LETTERS TO THE EDITOR****Recalling
The U-2's
Downfall**

Carl Rowan's column on this current campaign's "low blows" (Sept. 10) raises several questions about the administration's revelation of the "Stealth" project but overlooks one fact, thankfully supplied on page A-3 of your paper that same day. Campaigning in New Jersey, Carter stated that "nothing has been revealed about the 'Stealth' project except that it exists."

That is precisely the point, and both Carter and Rowan skirt the issue when they note that rumors of the project's existence have been published by *Jane's* and other aerospace publications. In the procurement of intelligence, the basic problem is to sort information from disinformation. This is done through confirmation from many sources. By confirming the project's existence, President Carter has made the KGB's task so much easier. Now all that remains is for Soviet aerospace technicians to get going on countermeasures or perhaps implement their contingency projects for countering "Stealth."

Rowan may not remember, but the United States once before flaunted a "radar-proof" plane. It was the U-2, and, as the late Francis Gary Powers found to his dismay, Soviet technology was not so primitive after all.

Carter's campaign slip will speed the Soviets towards improved detection techniques. That is why Gerald Ford, Henry Kissinger, Gen. Ellis, Adm. Moorer, Adm. Zumwalt, Ray Cline (former deputy director of the CIA), Gen. Skowcroft and Ronald Reagan criticized the ill-advised publicity on "Stealth."

Hunter Hurst,
Brigadier General, USMC (Ret.)
Alexandria, Va.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
17 SEPTEMBER 1980

Afghanistan Troops Ring U.S. Embassy

Soviets Demand Defecting Soldier

By Walter Taylor
Washington Star Staff Writer

Afghan security guards have clamped a tight security ring around the U.S. Embassy in the capital city of Kabul, apparently in an effort to keep a defecting Russian soldier from fleeing the country, according to U.S. officials.

At the same time, these officials said, the Soviet Union formally has demanded that the United States "free" the soldier.

U.S. officials said yesterday that there is no consideration being given to returning the Russian, and that efforts are being made through the United Nations to secure passage for the man out of Afghanistan.

"I don't know precisely how this is going to turn out," said one administration official yesterday, "but we're not going to give him back to the Russians, that's for sure."

The soldier, an enlisted man who evidently was part of the 85,000-man Soviet occupation force in Afghanistan, walked into the embassy early Sunday morning and asked for asylum. According to U.S. officials, the man reached the compound by strolling nonchalantly through an Afghan security cordon in full Russian military uniform and carrying an AK-47 rifle.

Although the Russian was described as an ordinary foot soldier with no particular intelligence value to the United States, his presence in the embassy could serve to exacerbate already strained U.S.-Soviet relations on the eve of a scheduled meeting between Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. The two diplomats are scheduled to meet at the United Nations next week to discuss arms control negotiations.

U.S. officials said yesterday that the Russians had summoned American diplomats in Moscow to demand the soldier's return. The American response, officials here said, was that the man was free to leave the embassy anytime he chose.

The United States also asked the Soviets to intervene with the Afghan government to permit the soldier to leave the country.

The matter also was discussed during a meeting in Washington on Monday between David D. Newsom, undersecretary of state for political affairs, and the Soviet ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin.

Security around the embassy in Kabul, already tight because of the generally deteriorating situation in war-torn Afghanistan, was stepped up following the defection, administration officials said. They said the Afghan troops who allowed the man to pass through their lines apparently realized when he did not emerge a short time later that something was amiss and called for reinforcements.

U.S. officials discounted the possibility that the troops, reportedly all Afghans, had been called in to protect the embassy from possible invasion from the outside. "It looks like the opposite is true . . . they want to make sure their man doesn't get out," said one informed administration official.

The sources said the guards are stopping automobile and pedestrian traffic from the embassy to make sure the defector is not being smuggled out.

Although the United States has no plans to turn the soldier back to the Soviets, the State Department said yesterday, there has been no decision on whether to assign him official political refugee status. That could be done, officials said, if Afghan authorities allow officials from the office of the U.N. High Commissioner on Refugees to question the man.

The United States has approached the refugee office in Geneva requesting such an interview in hopes that certification by the international body that the soldier genuinely seeks asylum will persuade the Russians and Afghans to let him leave the country.

In the meantime, State Department spokesman John Trattner said, he will be given "temporary refuge" in the embassy. Privately, State Department officials said the United States was prepared to let the soldier stay in the embassy indefinitely if safe passage out of Afghanistan is not quickly secured.

U.S. officials declined to reveal the man's name or any other personal details about him except to say he speaks only Russian and rudimentary German.

This has made a detailed interview by the American Embassy staff difficult, Trattner acknowledged. Nearly nine months after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the State Department still has not assigned any Russian-speaking diplomats to the embassy, he said.

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NEW YORK TIMES
16 SEPTEMBER 1980

Campaign Report

Reagan Turns Down Carter Intelligence Briefings

CORPUS CHRISTI, Tex., Sept. 15 (AP) — Ronald Reagan has turned down a Carter Administration offer to give him intelligence briefings on the Iran hostage situation and other issues, the White House press secretary, Jody Powell, said today.

Mr. Powell said that Mr. Reagan had been offered the briefings customarily extended in recent years to candidates by incumbent Presidents. Lyn Nofziger, Mr. Reagan's press secretary, said that they had been rejected because "we felt we didn't want to compromise our ability to use information we got from other sources."

When President Carter was the Democratic nominee in 1976, he was briefed several times by George Bush, then Director of Central Intelligence and now Mr. Reagan's running mate.

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ON PAGE A25

THE WASHINGTON POST
16 September 1980

JACK ANDERSON

The Mystery Flash: Bomb or Phenomenon?

Although it happened almost a year ago, the mysterious flash detected off the coast of South Africa by a U.S. spy satellite is still a matter of dispute among intelligence experts.

The Defense Intelligence Agency, as might be expected from its military orientation, is convinced the mysterious flash was a nuclear explosion of some sort. Navy experts agree with the DIA's conclusion.

On the other hand, a White House panel of experts from the Office of Science and Technology hashed over the admittedly scanty evidence and decided the most likely explanation was that the flash was a natural phenomenon—in other words, a mystery.

A closely guarded Central Intelligence Agency report comes down almost in the middle of these two divergent assessments. It gives the edge to DIA and the Navy. The flash detected by the orbiting spy satellite was "most likely" a nuclear explosion, though it possibly could have been nothing more ominous than a gigantic lightning bolt or other natural occurrence.

As I reported earlier, the CIA has suspected for years that both South Africa and Israel have the capability to produce nuclear weapons. The CIA thinks it quite possible that the two nations are collaborating on the development of nuclear devices, and have been working on this with still a third beleaguered nation—Taiwan.

What the CIA experts think most probably happened, according to the secret report, is that the South Africa-Israel-Taiwan trio tested a relatively small-scale, tactical nuclear weapon,

about one-sixth the size of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima 35 years ago.

The advantage of tactical nukes to the three nations, as intelligence experts see it, is that they could be used for limited, defensive purposes to forestall invasion from aggressive neighbors without inviting massive retaliation from the nuclear superpowers. Taiwan, for example, could repel an attack from Red China by detonating tactical nuclear devices in the Strait of Formosa without blasting the Chinese mainland and touching off a holocaust.


While this relatively moderate use of nuclear weapons is reassuring, U.S. intelligence agencies do not overlook the ominous possibility that the small, tactical nuclear devices might be more tempting to use simply because they are less destructive. Once nuclear weaponry was used even on a limited scale, it might be impossible to stop a chain reaction.

In its secret report to the National Security Council, dated June 20, 1980, the CIA raised the distinct possibility that the "mystery flash" of September 1979, was part of a tactical nuclear weapon test in the joint South Africa-Israel-Taiwan program.

If that's what it was, the CIA reported, technical improvements needed to make the device ready for combat use could be expected "by late 1980 or early 1981."

WASHINGTON STAR
16 September 1980

Ziggy



ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE B15THE WASHINGTON POST
15 September 1980**JACK ANDERSON**

South Africa's Secret Uranium Process

South Africa is sitting on one of the hottest military secrets of the Nuclear Age: a cheap, efficient process for obtaining U-235, the radioactive form of uranium used in weapons.

The South African government has guarded its secret jealously from the United States, though not, apparently, from other friendlier nations. As a result, U.S. espionage agencies, particularly the CIA, have been trying every trick in the book to pry the process loose.

"We have as much as told them we know they've got it behind the garage door and we're after it," one CIA source told my associate Dale Van Atta. "We've done everything but go up to the door, bang on it and demand they turn it over."

While this straightforward approach has not actually been contemplated, the intelligence agencies have attempted more clandestine methods. One technique was covert aerial photography of South African nuclear installations. This was done by installing a camera under the copilot's seat on the Beechcraft plane that flies the American ambassador around.

The South Africans soon caught onto this rather rudimentary device, and expelled the pilot, the copilot and the ambassador's military attache.

The CIA also tried human penetration. Possibly inspired by the Pakistani scientist who stole nuclear bomb secrets from the Western European nation he was working

for, the CIA tried to persuade an American nuclear physicist to go to work for South Africa. The scientist, a distinguished alumnus of the Lawrence Livermore laboratory in California, turned the spy agency down. "He didn't want to get killed," a source explained.

The CIA is still trying to ferret out the South African secret, and here's why: The key step in building a nuclear bomb is the extraction of U-235 from uranium ore. Usually there's less than 1 percent U-235 in the ore, so extraction has been a costly process until now.

The United States uses an old but reliable method of extraction called gaseous diffusion. This entails moving the uranium through miles of buildings.

The South Africans achieve the same result in a single room. Their secret process is called "split-nozzle gaseous diffusion," according to intelligence sources.

A second reason the United States wants South Africa's nuclear secret — and thus have a hand in controlling its use—is that the South African government is believed to be sharing its process with other countries.

According to intelligence analysts, an informal alliance has taken shape between South Africa, Israel and Taiwan to produce a nuclear bomb. All three are beleaguered "underdog" nations surrounded by enemies of overwhelming numerical superiority.

The CIA and the National Security

Agency became aware of the cooperation between Israel and South Africa when sensitive Israeli weaponry began turning up in South Africa.

Intelligence sources believe that South Africa has shared its one-room extraction process with Israel and Taiwan—and that the three embattled nations already may have tested a nuclear bomb.

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ON PAGE E-9

NEW YORK TIMES
14 SEPTEMBER 1980

Headliners



C.I.A. Unfair to Spies?

In all the books, a spy expects to win a few and lose a few, and remain silent about both. Carmen Mackowski apparently failed to read those books; she is suing the Central Intelligence Agency, charging that she was inadequately trained before being sent to Cuba in the mid-1960's to spy on her then husband, a high officer of Cuban counterintelligence, and that as a result the Cubans caught her and imprisoned her for nearly nine years. Moreover, one of Mrs. Mackowski's attorneys said last week, the Government promised her that if she was caught her liberation would be speedily arranged, and that didn't happen. For these and other broken promises, Mrs. Mackowski is asking more than \$1 million. The Government, which possibly doesn't want public testimony about how the C.I.A. works, has asked for dismissal.

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LOS ANGELES TIMES
12 September 1980

Destroying Huge Soviet Sub Fleet Has Top Navy Priority

Most Flexible Weapon
Is Sleek, Silent, Fast

By **NORMAN B. CHANDLER**

Times Staff Writer

*O God, Thy sea is so great,
And my boat is so small.*

So reads a brass plaque on the wall of Cmdr. Gilbert Wilkes' small stateroom just off the fire control center of the USS Cincinnati, a potent nuclear attack submarine of the United States' "Los Angeles" class, its most modern.

The quote does not refer to the skipper's feelings of inadequacy or fear, but rather to the qualities that enable subs to hide in the vast oceans—qualities that probably give them more flexibility than any other weapon in America's arsenal, and great ability to survive in wartime.

A Winnebago minus windows—that's what the living quarters of Wilkes and his 127-man crew look like but the rest of the interior of the "boat," as submariners call it, is all business. Cramped in are a computer "attack center" with two periscopes, torpedoes and cruise missiles in the bow, air and water generators, ballast tanks, and the secret, nuclear-powered steam-driven turbine engines astern.

It's all packed into a sleek, black and ominous hull shaped like a perfecto cigar that reportedly can cruise at well over freeway speeds underwater, dive nearly a mile and attack other subs, surface ships and land targets more than a thousand miles away.

Unlike ballistic missile-launching submarines such as the older Poseidons and the huge new Tridents, and unlike the ship-killing subs of World War II, modern attack subs have many functions. The primary one is to destroy Soviet submarines. The Russian undersea force outnumbers America's 120 submarines by a 3-1 margin, although many of the Soviet subs have noisier and shorter-range diesel electric battery propulsion. Of the 120 U.S. boats, 114 are nuclear and about 80 are strictly attack submarines. The Soviet fleet is

composed of varying combinations of attack, cruise-missile and ballistic-missile submarines.

Wilkes, whose vessel is based in Norfolk, Va., has a clear-cut job if war should break out with the Soviets: Find and destroy as much of their huge underwater force as possible. Subs, it appears, are much better at finding and killing each other than any other modern weapons systems.

Sophisticated Hunting Tools

The tools of this deadly hunting game include sonar "ears" of amazing power and accuracy, computers, satellites, decoy "noise makers," and cruise missiles and noise-seeking torpedoes, both launched underwater and both armed either with nuclear or conventional warheads.

A new cruise missile, the Tomahawk, is being added to the arsenal of attack subs like the Cincinnati.

With a range of 1,500 miles, nuclear or conventional warheads, and a "smart" guidance system, it will destroy either ship or tactical land targets with accuracy that is said to be uncanny.

Frogman operations, mine-laying, landings of small parties on enemy shores and reconnaissance are other functions of attack subs, but the firing of nuclear warheads for strategic purposes is left to the United States' 44 ballistic missile subs. Their function is to remain hidden during their 60-day patrols. They cruise slowly and silently, staying away from shipping lanes and constantly on the alert for instructions to launch their multi-warhead nuclear missiles toward Soviet targets.

Silence Is Essential

Like ballistic boats, U.S. attack subs never surface or talk back to headquarters while on patrol. To do so would mean losing their all-important assets—secrecy and unpredictability—and hence their ability to survive.

Reflects Wilkes: "The degree of autonomy we have at sea at times boggles the mind. They (his commanders) can talk to us. We just don't acknowledge or talk back."

Wilkes says that if war comes, he believes the command posts ashore will be the first to go, so "we'd be on our own anyway."

A system of checks and balances among a submarine's officers prevents a commander from launching his missiles without authorization. "It's a high stress environment, but we've trained for that."

"I don't think you can beat the record: 26 years without a nuclear accident. If there's going to be another war, I don't trust it to be fought by anything else. That's what keeps me in it."

For security reasons, Wilkes will not say how his craft spends its months-long patrols, besides training and engaging in fleet maneuvers.

Although a torpedo or cruise missile has not been fired in anger since World War II, U.S. subs reportedly were involved in the 1960s and early 1970s in a long-term electronic and photographic spying exercise known as Operation Holystone.

Some Close Calls

American attack subs reportedly have gone close to the shores of the Soviet Union and other countries to take pictures, to tap into undersea cables and to monitor and track Soviet submarine and ship operations.

The USS Pintado crashed head-on into a Russian sub off its Far East port of Petropavlovsk in 1974, according to newspaper reports. And another "Holystone" spy sub was reportedly damaged when it tried to surface under a Soviet ship engaged in fleet exercises. Both U.S. subs made it back to base under their own power.

A 1976 congressional report listed nine U.S. nuclear sub collisions, five with Soviet subs. The report also listed "110 possible detections" by Soviets in the previous decade of patrolling U.S. submarines.

Given this knowledge, speculation about fin-to-fin "submarine races" may not be all that far-fetched.

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LONDON OBSERVER
7 September 1980

NEWS

The spies who fear Britain spies on them

by PETER DEELEY

SOUTH AFRICAN security officers, based in London under diplomatic cover, are being hampered in clandestine activities by fears that they are under surveillance by British intelligence.

Their problems result from the rupture of previously close relations between the two services four years ago after the campaign to smear leading Liberal Party personalities.

The campaign, which included as its targets the then Liberal leader, Jeremy Thorpe, and the anti-South African campaigner, Peter Hain, was allegedly masterminded by South African Spy Service BOSS, now called the Department of National Security.

A Labour Government directive was sent to British security chiefs — and to the Special Branch of the police — ordering an end to liaison with the South Africans except on matters of common interest or where it was felt to be advantageous to Britain.

When Ivan Himmelhoch, a young Cape Town law student, arrived in London to study for the Bar and spy on anti-South African groups for BOSS, he was told by the station head (the chief BOSS agent in Britain) at South Africa House never to ring the embassy or diplomats' homes.

Himmelhoch — who, it was revealed last week, changed sides and passed information to the British when he was working in the Department of Foreign Affairs in Pretoria — says: "BOSS believed all phone conversations were bugged by the British authorities."

BOSS's fears that its agents were also being watched and followed by Special Branch officers led to the setting up of a complicated rendezvous system for Himmelhoch to pass on information.

Intelligence sources indicate that the 1976 non-collaboration directive has never been cancelled. One told me: "Although you might expect the Conservatives to have a more sympathetic attitude towards the South Africans, the order still remains in force today as far as we know."

It seems that British security will not pass on any information about South Africans living in Britain and will not give Pretoria access to police records except where the individual is suspected of criminal — as opposed to political — acts.

Where common interest prevails, liaison has continued. In September 1978, at a critical moment in Rhodesia, the British wanted South Africa to play the role of intermediaries and per-

suaide Ian Smith to throw his support behind the guerrilla leader, Joshua Nkomo.

Two senior BOSS men arrived secretly in Britain for discussion with British security officers and were housed by the British service in a large country home near the South Coast. The two men have been identified to me as H. J. Brummer, holding the role of deputy secretary (effectively number two man in BOSS), and A. A. N. Knoetze, a vice-secretary.

That plan collapsed, however, after the shooting down of an Air Rhodesia airliner, the death of all on board, and Mr Nkomo's open approval of the crash.

Britain's tougher line towards BOSS has virtually ended South Africa's use of British freelance operatives and has hampered its efforts to spy on political exiles and what it regards as 'enemy' groups.

According to one source, BOSS had an informer — known only as '110' — inside a leading anti-South African movement in London for around 10 years, passing on membership names and information about funding and internecine splits. That, too, ended in 1976, at the time of the British clampdown.

Today, if the South Africans want to carry out a covert operation in Britain,

they must bring in their own men.

The CIA is said by some intelligence sources to have a more open attitude towards the South Africans. The Americans are prepared to pass on information about anti-apartheid activists there as long as it does not blow the cover of their own infiltrators.

In return, South Africa is prepared to offer facilities to the Americans. At one stage the United States was allowed to base spy planes outside Pretoria.

From there, they operated photographic reconnaissance missions over Africa and would pass on picture copies to their hosts — keeping secret only those photographs they took over South Africa itself.

At rare moments, all intelligence services — irrespective of their political colouring — share information, for example when confronted with assassination threats and international terrorism.

Early last year, the KGB picked up the trail of Carlos — the man responsible for many acts of terrorism in recent years — in Eastern Europe.

They photographed him before Carlos went to ground and disappeared. The picture was circulated to all major intelligence services, and a copy reached BOSS headquarters in Pretoria.

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THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
25 September 1980

Senate Investigators Won't Ask President to Testify in Billy Case

By Roberta Hornig
Washington Star Staff Writer

The Senate subcommittee probing Billy Carter formally decided yesterday not to question President Carter about his brother's Libyan connection, either in person or in writing.

"The general consensus of the committee is that asking questions of the president should not be done lightly and that it should be done only when we feel we need his response," Chairman Birch Bayh, D-Ind., said after emerging from an hour-long subcommittee executive session. "There are no areas where that is necessary."

Both Bayh and vice chairman Strom Thurmond, R-S.C., also said that the subcommittee's report to the Senate, due by Oct. 4, will be an interim one and not final as hoped.

"I am not sure we will be through," Thurmond said.

Special committee counsel Philip Tone said, however, that he plans to leave the committee Oct. 4 to return to his law practice in Chicago, and pledged that the report "will be as complete as we can make it at the time."

Bayh said that instead of questioning President Carter, as the committee initially said it would, the subcommittee will have its staff investigators submit written questions to the White House staff and White House legal counsel Alfred Moses. The idea, he said, "is to draw loose ends together and to cover areas that have not been fully covered."

He said that President Carter may contribute to the answers but that information would "be filtered back" from the president only indirectly through Moses.

"There is no reason to believe the president has information that might be helpful," Bayh said, adding that the president has already answered most questions in the "white paper" the White House released early last month outlining its involvement in the Billy Carter affair.

The leaders of the Senate probe acknowledged that they cannot consider their work finished until the Justice Department completes its investigation of Billy Carter — an investigation whose nature has not been disclosed.

But a "sanitized" declassified transcript of a session of the subcommittee held with CIA Director Stansfield Turner on Sept. 7 reveals that the Justice inquiry is based, at least in part, on a CIA tip.

According to the transcript, a subcommittee member, Sen. Dennis DeConcini, D-Ariz., asked Turner: "Does your agency have additional information in relation to this ongoing investigation . . . at Justice."

Turner replied "yes," and reported that he had turned over this information to the Justice Department.

"Now, are you prohibited from discussing that with us also?" DeConcini asked.

"Yes, sir," Turner replied, and when asked why, he replied "because of source protection."

The Turner transcript, released by the subcommittee yesterday, reveals little new information in the Billy Carter affair.

Turner was a key player in only one instance. On March 31 Turner turned over to President Carter's national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, an intelligence report he had received five days before indicating that Billy Carter was negotiating a lucrative oil deal with the Libyans on behalf of a U.S. oil company.

After receiving the information, Brzezinski almost immediately telephoned Billy Carter and told him he was aware of the oil deal and that it could be politically damaging to his brother.

Most of the questioning by the Senate probers involved the propriety of the Brzezinski telephone call and inquiries about why Turner had chosen to give the information only to Brzezinski and not to federal law enforcement officials as well.

Turner told obviously skeptical senators that he kept the report from the Justice Department because he had no idea it was investigating Billy Carter.

Tone asked Turner: "Do you believe your actions in that regard might have been different if you had learned that Billy Carter was the subject of a foreign agents registration act investigation?"

Turner said that Tone's question was "hypothetical" but said, "I believe that I would have acted differently."

At another point Turner said that had he known of the Justice probe, "I would have then appreciated that this did relate to a law enforcement problem which was ongoing, and I would have been sure that the attorney general received it."

Justice Department investigators on the Billy Carter case did not learn of the oil deal on their own until three months later.

Turner also said that he saw nothing wrong with Brzezinski's relaying the intelligence information to Billy Carter. His insistence that Brzezinski's action was proper displeased some senators.

A poll of the subcommittee members last week showed that eight of the nine members believed that Turner, Brzezinski and Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti exercised bad judgment in their handling of the Billy Carter case.

The Senate probers have a deadline of tomorrow to tell the subcommittee staff what conclusions they have reached up to now on the Carter case for the writing of the interim report.

Meanwhile, Billy Carter was again questioned yesterday by Senate investigators in his lawyer's office in Washington.

The lawyers attempted to jog Billy Carter's memory and to have him explain why so much of his testimony differed from the testimony of Justice and other U.S. officials.

The biggest discrepancy was Billy Carter's testimony under oath that the entire \$220,000 he received from the Libyan government was part of a loan.

In July, Billy Carter had told Justice investigators that \$20,000 was a repayment of expenses he incurred while hosting a delegation of Libyan officials in Atlanta in early 1979.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A1-8THE BALTIMORE SUN
25 September 1980

Panel on Billy won't call Carter now

Washington (AP)—A special Senate subcommittee looking into the affairs of President Carter's brother, Billy, agreed yesterday not to question the president, at least for the time being.

Senator Birch Bayh (D, Ind.), the chairman, said the panel had decided instead that staff investigators would submit questions to White House lawyers, who would obtain the requested information from the president and others.

The answers to the questions will not be given under oath.

Senator Strom Thurmond (R, S.C.), vice chairman of the subcommittee, told reporters, "I don't think there was any dissent" over the decision not to question President Carter directly.

But both Mr. Thurmond and Mr. Bayh indicated that the panel might eventually question the president directly.

Special counsel Philip Tone said the panel's inquiries would be factual questions designed to "fill in gaps in the record." "I would say there would be no questions of earthshaking consequence," he added.

He said the answers would be made public after the subcommittee had studied them.

Mr. Bayh also announced that the subcommittee's report, due October 4, would be an interim account, leaving open the possibility of a fuller report later if the panel decided one was needed.

The subcommittee also released an edited transcript of closed-door testimony given September 9 by Adm. Stansfield Turner, director of central intelligence, in which he said the CIA was providing information to the Justice Department regarding money Billy Carter had received from the Libyans.

Admiral Turner was asked about testi-

mony by Joel Lisker, chief of the foreign agents registration unit of the Justice Department, that Mr. Carter's receipt of \$220,000 from the Libyans was still under investigation.

Senator Dennis DeConcini (D, Ariz.) asked Admiral Turner, "Are you furnishing additional information. Do you—does your agency have additional information in regard to this ongoing investigation that Mr. Lisker mentioned?"

"Yes," the CIA director replied. He said that the information was being turned over to the Justice Department, but that he could not discuss it even in a closed session because of the danger of disclosing intelligence sources.

Earlier, Mr. DeConcini, who is chairman of a separate subcommittee looking into possible links between Billy Carter and fugitive financier Robert Vesco, asked the Justice Department to reconsider its refusal to negotiate Mr. Vesco's return to the United States so he could testify before the panel.

Mr. Vesco fled the United States in 1972 after being charged with defrauding a mutual fund of more than \$200 million.

Mr. DeConcini and Senator Orrin G. Hatch (R, Utah) interviewed him this summer in the Bahamas, where he now lives. They said he told them he "orchestrated" Libya's \$220,000 loan to Billy Carter in order to embarrass the administration for not negotiating a settlement of his legal problems.

Mr. DeConcini asked the Justice Department to talk to Mr. Vesco's lawyers about terms for his appearance before the subcommittee in Washington.

Alan Parker, an assistant attorney general, said the department refused because such a move would involve "conditions which would immunize him, a fugitive from justice, from arrest."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE B7THE WASHINGTON POST
25 September 1980

Billy Probe Winds Down; President Needn't Testify

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Senate investigation of Billy Carter hurried toward an uncertain conclusion yesterday as members of the special subcommittee in charge of the inquiry decided there was no need for President Carter's testimony.

Subcommittee Chairman Birch Bayh (D-Ind.) said the panel agreed at an executive session that there were no areas that demanded either an "eyeball-to-eyeball" meeting with the president or even a sworn statement from him in response to written questions.

Instead, Bayh said, the subcommittee will hand White House lawyers a rundown of what information it still needs and let them compile whatever answers the president or anyone else at the White House can supply.

Facing an Oct. 4 deadline for a report to Congress, the senators also decided yesterday to make it just an "interim" report, but with little expectation that there will be any need for another. The record will be kept open, however, in the event of some unforeseen development.

"The report will be as complete as we can make it at this time," the subcommittee's chief counsel, Philip Toner, told reporters. "We're going to treat it as if it were our last report."

The investigation of Billy Carter's dealings with the Libyan government and the Carter administration's awareness of those activities has thus far produced more evidence of what one senator has described as bumbling and incompetence than of any real impropriety.

Bayh said yesterday that what remains to be done consists primarily of "drawing loose ends together" and clearing up contradictions in some of the testimony.

As part of that effort, several of the subcommittee's lawyers spent the day taking a new deposition from Billy Carter at the offices of his Washington lawyers.

Looking relaxed, the president's brother emerged in late afternoon to tell reporters that much of the questioning was devoted to telephone conversations he made on key dates.

When President Carter met with Libya's chief diplomat in the Oval Office Dec. 6, for example, Billy Carter was busy on the phone through the day, calling the Libyan Embassy and the Charter Oil Co., a Florida-based corporation for which he was seeking an increased allocation of Libyan oil.

Billy Carter called the sequence pure "happenstance" and said it was "ridiculous" to think the calls might have been intended to give the Libyans the impression that he had a hand in the White House meeting. He said he was not even aware of it until the president publicly disclosed it this summer after Billy registered as a foreign agent.

The president's brother said the December phone calls merely reflected a continuing effort on his part to swing the Charter oil deal, independently of what was going on in Washington.

In other developments yesterday, Subcommittee officials refused to comment on the Atlanta Constitution's disclosure that civil rights leader Jesse Jackson was named as another potential Libyan oil broker in the same intelligence report that CIA Director Stansfield Turner brought to White House attention March 31.

Jackson denied being a Libyan agent, but told the newspaper he had written the Libyan Embassy in Washington on behalf of the Wallace Co. of Tuskegee, Ala., a black-owned oil company. He also told The Washington Post several weeks ago that the chief Libyan diplomat here, Ali Houderi, had made a \$10,000 contribution to Jackson's Operation PUSH in Chicago at its annual fund-raising event Dec. 18.

The subcommittee made public a sanitized version of Turner's testimony Sept. 9 when the CIA director defended his decision to alert the White House to Billy Carter's Libyan oil project. Turner declined to say whether he thought it proper for White House national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski to have, in turn, warned Billy Carter against the project, but he said he saw no reason why Brzezinski could not have done so without jeopardizing the source of the intelligence information.

ARTICLES APPEARED
ON PAGE 14.NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
25 September 1980

Probers won't quiz Carter face to face in Billy affair

By HARRISON RAINIE

Washington (News Bureau)—The special Senate panel investigating Billy Carter's ties to Libya decided today not to question President Carter directly about his links to the case and instead agreed to have a written exchange of questions and answers with White House lawyers to clear up any "loose ends."

The decision not to confront the President and take sworn testimony from him appeared to signal that committee members feel there is no evidence of wrongdoing that merits cross-examination of the President himself.

"It is fair to assume that the President has already said what he has to say on the important issues," committee counsel Phillip Tone said. "We expect nothing more of major consequence."

After a nearly two hours in a closed-door meeting, panel chairman Birch Bayh (D-Ind.) emerged to say that no formal vote had been taken on how to get additional information from the White House. He said that those at the session decided that committee lawyers should deal with White House lawyers to get the last bits of factual information the probers feel they need.

BAYH AND THE committee's vice chairman, Sen. Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.), left open the possibility that future developments in the case could cause them to change their minds and seek a direct confrontation with the President. However, they indicated this was not likely.

Thurmond confirmed that the

panel's report to Congress on Oct. 4 will only be an "interim report" about Billy and his dealings with Libya and the White House and that it might not contain final conclusions about the propriety of actions by Carter administration officials toward Billy and the Libyans.

Not all committee members were pleased with the outcome. Bayh said at least one wanted to have the President questioned directly under oath. But he added that he felt "this was not the time to raise these questions."

One unhappy committee member was Sen. Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.), who charged that the Justice Department was impeding his probe of fugitive financier Robert L. Vesco and Vesco's possible ties to the case. DeConcini had tried to work out arrangements to have the fugitive allowed to reenter the United States from his Bahamas hideout to give Senate testimony, but the department refused to promise Vesco would not be arrested if he set foot on U.S. soil.

MEANWHILE, BILLY came to the Capitol to give his final deposition to committee staffers. He dismissed as "ridiculous" a suggestion that he made a flurry of telephone calls intended to capitalize on a meeting the President held with a Libyan official.

The questioning covered a number of discrepancies between Billy's public testimony this month and evidence from other witnesses.

In addition, the committee released a sanitized version of the testimony given by CIA Director Stansfield Turner two weeks ago in closed session.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 1-8THE ATLANTA CONSTITUTION
24 September 1980

Jesse Jackson A Libyan Oil Agent, CIA Report Says

By Seth Kantor

Constitution Washington Bureau
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WASHINGTON — The Rev. Jesse Jackson, the Chicago-based black civil rights leader, was identified as a special Libyan oil broker along with Billy Carter in a highly classified message secretly passed from Central Intelligence Agency Director Stansfield Turner to President Carter's security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski last March 31, The Atlanta Constitution has learned from informed sources close to the Senate investigation of President Carter's brother.

Reached Tuesday night in Florence, S.C., where he was speaking at the Trinity Baptist Church for President Carter's re-election, Jackson denied being an agent of Libya, but said he

had written to the Libyan embassy in Washington in behalf of "a black (owned) oil company. The Wallace Co., in Tuskegee, Ala."

Jackson said he "would accept no financial deal from Libya and none has been offered."

While Jackson denied entering into any such deal, he said he had "sent several letters" to the Libyan government in support of "opening trade routes between that country and black America."

A copy of the secret CIA document has been made available to members of the Senate Intelligence Committee and the special Judiciary subcommittee investigating Billy Carter's private dealings with the radical Libyan government of military strongman Moammar Khadafy.

Besides naming Billy Carter and Jesse Jackson, the document, considered by the White House to be super-sensitive, also mentioned a national agriculture lobbying force known as "The Farmers Union" as a Libyan-blessed broker of crude oil from that nation.

Spokesmen for the Farmers Union — also known as the National Farmers Union and as the Farmers' Educational & Cooperative Union of America — immediately denied any connection with Libya.

Reuben L. Johnson, the Washington-based director of legislative services for the old-line Denver co-op, labeled any connection made between his group and Libya as "ludicrous."

Instead, it was another group, the large and politically conservative American Farm Bureau Federation, which had active negotiations under way with Libya in 1979.

Allan Grant, a wealthy Visalia, Calif., farmer-rancher, was president of the federation in 1979, a year in which he made two separate trips to Libya.

Reached Tuesday night in Ottawa, Canada, Grant told The Constitution that he "wouldn't be surprised" if the CIA considered his group to be an agent of the Khadafy government.

Grant strongly denied that any official of that government ever talked to him about brokering Libyan crude oil in the United States.

But after he visited Tripoli in early May 1979, Grant was reported by "The Farm Bureau News," official weekly organ of the federation, as saying that his organization "has

begun direct trade negotiations with Libya which... could include arrangements for crude oil to be handled by farm cooperative refineries."

"This is not an attempt to reach agreement to trade a bushel of wheat or any other grain for a barrel of oil," Grant said. "We are talking about a number of separate possibilities — about the direct purchase of oil for farm needs and about selling high quality grains at market prices."

While in Libya, Grant had his picture taken with high-ranking officials of that North African government, and with Khadafy's brother-in-law.

Grant said Tuesday night in Canada that he had soured on Libya as a trade partner.

"I don't like their external politics at all," he said.

Jesse Jackson made no such assessment of Libya. He stressed that black American muslims "started dealing with the Libyans about five years ago, before becoming interested in relationships with most other Arab countries."

"Our relations with those countries have been a matter of peace," Jackson said. "We have been challenging them to open up trade routes with black America."

Jackson has made trips to the Arab world in 1979 and 1980 to pursue those goals, but he said he had not visited Libya, "although I have been invited there several times."

Jackson said he has never met or talked with Billy Carter or Carter's business associate in Libyan negotiations, Henry R. "Randy" Coleman of Plains.

The black social reformer who heads PUSH (People United to Save Humanity) said he has talked several times with Ali Houdari, Libya's highest ranking diplomat in America.

Jackson said he has talked with Houdari in Washington, "two-three times at the Libyan embassy," and has met with Houdari in Chicago, where the diplomat spoke last December in behalf of PUSH.

It was last December that Billy Carter received \$20,000 from Libya in what he since has described as "an advance on a loan." And it was last December, according to a little-noticed published account in the Jan. 17, 1980, issue of Newsweek, that President Carter reportedly headed off an intended military strike into Libya by Egypt.

It had been "a long-planned move" by Egypt's Anwar Sadat, according to Newsweek, and President Carter intervened "either directly or indirectly" to keep the rift from widening between Cairo and the rest of the Arab world, while the president's Camp David accords between Israel and Egypt were struggling to blossom.

The Senate subcommittee investigating Billy Carter has received a sworn deposition from an unidentified witness who has said that Ahmed Shahati made a special gift to a black Muslim church in Atlanta early in 1979.

Shahati is Libya's foreign minister and he headed that country's delegation to Georgia, hosted by President Carter's brother. According to the witness, at one point Shahati ordered an aide to withdraw \$25,000 from a satchel to pay for the special gift to the black church.

Jesse Jackson said he was not aware of that episode.

Both Jackson and Grant said they had not talked at any time with anyone from Charter Oil Co., the Florida firm which entered into negotiations through Billy Carter to purchase excess allotments of Libyan crude oil.

REUTER

WASHINGTON, SEPT 24, REUTER - THE SENATE PANEL PROBING BILLY CARTER'S LIBYAN TIES HAS DECIDED NOT TO ASK PRESIDENT CARTER TO TESTIFY; CHAIRMAN BIRCH BAYH SAID TODAY. THE INDIANA DEMOCRAT TOLD REPORTERS FOLLOWING A BUSINESS MEETING THAT PANEL LAWYERS WOULD SEND WRITTEN QUESTIONS TO WHITE HOUSE COUNSEL SEEKING TO FILL IN GAPS IN THE EVIDENCE. HE SAID THE COMMITTEE HAD FOUND NO REMAINING QUESTIONS THAT REQUIRED AN 'EYEBALL TO EYEBALL CONFRONTATION' WITH THE PRESIDENT.

SUBCOMMITTEE COUNSEL PHILIP TONE SAID THE PANEL WOULD SHORTLY BEGIN DRAFTING AN INTERIM REPORT; DUE TO BE MADE PUBLIC BY OCTOBER 4. HE SAID THE PANEL WOULD DECIDE LATER WHETHER TO SUPPLEMENT IT WITH A FURTHER REPORT.

PUBLIC HEARINGS IN THE INVESTIGATION CONCLUDED LAST WEEK WITH TESTIMONY BY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI.

THE PANEL TODAY ISSUED A CENSORED TRANSCRIPT OF CLOSED-DOOR TESTIMONY BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DIRECTOR STANSFIELD TURNER WHO HANDED AN INTELLIGENCE REPORT TO MR BRZEZINSKI SHOWING THAT BILLY CARTER WAS TRYING TO MAKE A DEAL TO GET EXTRA LIBYAN OIL FOR AN AMERICAN REFINER.

ADMIRAL TURNER SAID THAT WHEN HE PASSED ON THE INFORMATION HE HAD NO IDEA THAT MR BRZEZINSKI WOULD CALL THE PRESIDENT'S BROTHER TO WARN HIM AGAINST THE DEAL.

BUT HE SAID THE ODDS WERE 'PRETTY SLIM' THAT THE CALL COULD HAVE COMPROMISED AN INTELLIGENCE SOURCE.

HE SAID HE DID NOT PASS THE INFORMATION ON TO THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT BECAUSE HE DID NOT CONSIDER IT TO BE A LAW ENFORCEMENT ISSUE.

THE DEPARTMENT WAS INVESTIGATING BILLY CARTER'S LIBYAN TIES AND LATER BROUGHT SUIT TO REQUIRE HIM TO REGISTER AS A FOREIGN AGENT.

AT ONE POINT IN THE HEARING SENATOR DENNIS DECONCINI (DEMOCRAT; ARIZONA); REFERRING TO MR BRZEZINSKI'S CALL; EXPLODED: 'I DON'T CARE HOW HE DISGUISES IT; HE IS TELLING SOMETHING OF A SENSITIVE NATURE; AND I JUST RESENT THE HELL OUT OF THE DOUBLE STANDARD AND WHAT APPEARS TO ME TO BE PEOPLE PROTECTING BRZEZINSKI AND THE PRESIDENT.

'I AM TELLING YOU; IT JUST GOES BEYOND MY BELIEVABILITY.'

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-JACKSON-LIBYA

ATLANTA (AP) -- CIVIL RIGHTS LEADER JESSE JACKSON AND BILLY CARTER WERE IDENTIFIED AS LIBYAN OIL AGENTS IN A SECRET CIA MEMO TO THE WHITE HOUSE IN MARCH; THE ATLANTA CONSTITUTION REPORTED TODAY.

JACKSON DENIED BEING A LIBYAN AGENT; THE CONSTITUTION SAID IN A COPYRIGHT STORY; BUT ACKNOWLEDGED HE HAD WRITTEN THE LIBYAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON ON BEHALF OF THE WALLACE CO. IN TUSKEGEE, ALA., A BLACK-OWNED OIL CONCERN.

JACKSON, HEAD OF OPERATION PUSH, FOR PEOPLE UNITED TO SAVE HUMANITY, A CIVIL RIGHTS GROUP BASED IN CHICAGO, SAID HE ALSO "SENT SEVERAL LETTERS" TO THE LIBYAN GOVERNMENT IN SUPPORT OF "OPENING TRADE ROUTES BETWEEN THAT COUNTRY AND BLACK AMERICA."

THE MEMO WAS SENT ON MARCH 31 FROM CIA DIRECTOR STANFIELD TURNER TO ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, PRESIDENT CARTER'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER; THE NEWSPAPER SAID, QUOTING UNIDENTIFIED SOURCES CLOSE TO THE SENATE INVESTIGATION OF BILLY CARTER'S DEALINGS WITH THE LIBYANS.

A SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE HAS RECEIVED A COPY OF THE MEMO; THE NEWSPAPER SAID.

THE NEWSPAPER REPORT CARRIED NO ELABORATION ON WHAT WAS IN THE MEMO OR WHAT MADE THE CIA BELIEVE THAT JACKSON WAS A LIBYAN AGENT.

UNDER PROTEST, BILLY CARTER REGISTERED WITH THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT AS A LIBYAN AGENT ON JULY 14. HE HAS ACKNOWLEDGED RECEIVING A \$220,000 PAYMENT FROM THE LIBYAN GOVERNMENT.

LAST OCTOBER, JACKSON TOOK A CONTROVERSIAL TOUR OF THE MIDDLE EAST IN WHICH HE MET WITH EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT ANWAR SADAT, SYRIAN LEADER HAFEZ ASSAD AND PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION LEADER YASSER ARAFAT. JACKSON EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THE PLO, AND ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER MENACHEM BEGIN REFUSED TO MEET WITH HIM. JACKSON LATER CALLED BEGIN A "RACIST."

(over)

JACKSON DID NOT GO TO LIBYA, BUT THE CONSTITUTION QUOTED JACKSON AS SAYING, "I HAVE BEEN INVITED THERE SEVERAL TIMES."

ON OCT. 13, JACKSON RECEIVED A \$10,000 PLEDGE FOR OPERATION PUSH, FROM CHICAGO'S ARAB-AMERICAN COMMUNITY AND JACKSON OUTLINED A JOINT ARAB-BLACK PROGRAM TO COMBAT RACISM.

THE TRIP AND THE CONTRIBUTION DREW CRITICISM FROM JEWISH GROUPS.

IN THE CONSTITUTION STORY, JACKSON SAID HE "WOULD ACCEPT NO FINANCIAL DEAL FROM LIBYA AND NONE HAS BEEN OFFERED."

BLACK AMERICAN MUSLIMS "STARTED DEALING WITH THE LIBYANS ABOUT FIVE YEARS AGO, BEFORE BECOMING INTERESTED IN RELATIONSHIPS WITH MOST OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES," JACKSON SAID.

"OUR RELATIONS WITH THOSE COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN A MATTER OF PERCE. WE HAVE BEEN CHALLENGING THEM TO OPEN UP TRADE ROUTES WITH BLACK AMERICA," HE SAID.

JACKSON SAID HE HAD NEVER MET OR TALKED WITH BILLY CARTER OR CARTER'S BUSINESS ASSOCIATE IN HIS LIBYAN NEGOTIATIONS, HENRY R. COLEMAN OF PLAINS.

AP-WX-0924 1145EDT

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE **A-27**NEW YORK TIMES
22 SEPTEMBER 1980

ESSAY

Needed: A Special Prosecutor

By William Safire

WASHINGTON — Carterites have set up a straw-man question to help them denigrate the Billygate probe: Did the President's brother influence our Libyan policy? That has never been the real issue — President Carter, if re-elected, would need no urging to tilt Arab and recognize the P.L.O. The central question is: Did the Carter Administration permit the President's brother to sell illegally his apparent influence?

To be more specific:

1. *Did the President's brother get White House help in his profiteering on the hostage crisis?*

Yes. Even the most see-know-evil Carter partisans admit that Billy Carter used his ability to set up a White House meeting with his Libyan clients, ostensibly about the hostages, for his personal profit.

The White House claims that Billy Carter merely set up a "semi-social" meeting with Dr. Brzezinski and a Libyan representative on Nov. 27 of last year. But belatedly acquired telephone logs show how closely Billy was clued in to his Libyan client's visit to his brother in the Oval Office on Dec. 6.

That December morning at 10:06, Billy called the Libyan Embassy. At 10:08, Billy called Appointments Secretary Philip Wise at the White House. (Wise, who has the notation "10:10 Billy" on his telephone log, professes no recollection of the call.) At 10:30, Dr. Brzezinski called the Libyan Embassy to invite Ali el Hou-dari to the White House immediately.

At 10:36, Billy called Jack McGregor, the man who was setting up his multi-million dollar deal between Charter Oil and the Libyans. At 10:39, Billy called the Libyan Embassy again. From 11:02 to 11:12, the Libyan meets with President Carter. At 2:22 P.M., Billy calls the Libyans again, and makes three follow-up calls to Charter Oil.

That was the meeting that the White House claims Billy Carter had nothing to do with. A couple of weeks later, Billy Carter summoned a White House car, impressively chauffeured by a uniformed member of the U.S. Armed Forces, to take him to the Libyan Embassy. He there dunned Libya for money; that state gratefully turned over \$20,000 within a week. A month later, Billy lied to Government investigators about his hostage profiteering.

2. *When the President learned of his brother's unlawful activities from an Intelligence report in April, did he act to enforce the law?*

He did not. The President claims that he merely approved of Dr. Brzezinski's call to Billy warning of embarrassment, and did nothing for three months as his brother's deal moved forward. Dr. Brzezinski — who, lest we forget, glibly lied to me about his conversations with Billy about Libya before the Senate hearings — offers the excuse that President Carter was very busy those days.

3. *Did Dr. Brzezinski's April 1 call to Billy Carter — revealing Intelligence too secret to be given the F.B.I. — alert the President's brother and the Libyans to secret surveillance?*

Yes. "He got no information from me that he didn't know," Dr. Brzezinski explains. "He knew what he was doing." That is pure deception; as Senator Charles Mathias observed sweetly, "He didn't know that anybody else knew that he was doing it."

Within four minutes of Dr. Brzezinski's revelation to Billy that the unlawful deal was being monitored, the President's brother was on the phone to oil lobbyist McGregor — the same man who was given an audience with President Carter for picture-taking purposes, and who testified that he told the President how badly Billy needed money. The morning after Brzezinski's alert, Billy was on the phone to his associates in Tripoli.

As predicted here, Dr. Brzezinski has had to change his story under oath about when he briefed the President on Billy's oil deal. In order to back up the President's assertion about learning of Zbig's call after the fact, the date has been moved to April 2; we are now asked to believe that this hot family news was withheld from the President, down the hall, for 36 hours.

The Director of Central Intelligence asked Dr. Brzezinski to return the incriminating document, instead, Zbig burned it.

4. *Was Justice obstructed by a White House tipoff to Billy Carter about a grand jury in June?*

We do not yet know. The man whose office is closest to the President's — Philip Wise, who once worked with Billy in the warehouse — stonewalled with so many "I don't recall" and "no recollections" that one Democratic senator called his testimony "outrageous." The young man who ducked repeated F.B.I. calls denies everything specific and forgets everything embarrassing: he is not so stupid as he would have us believe.

What's going to break this case? Answer: one witness cooperating under prosecutorial duress. After the Senate phase is finished, the sworn testimony, with its many conflicts — will be sent to Justice. A special prosecutor will be required, not only to examine potential perjury but to review the expected internal whitewash of the Attorney General by Michael Shaheen.

The break in this case will come long after the election. At that time, voters will be asking: Why were we told that this was "much ado about nothing?" Where were the watchmen in the night?

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1WASHINGTON STAR
21 SEPTEMBER 1980

Most on Billy Probe Panel Feel Libya Money Was Gift

By Roberta Hornig
Washington Star Staff Writer

A majority of the Senate subcommittee investigating Billy Carter's Libyan activities is convinced that the \$220,000 he received from Libya was a gift, and not a loan as he claims.

They have also concluded, after 10 public and about a half-dozen executive sessions, that top administration officials, including Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national security adviser, Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti and CIA director Stansfield Turner, showed questionable judgment in the roles they played in the Billy Carter affair.

Finally, while deciding that the president's brother had no influence on U.S. foreign policy, they concluded that Billy Carter attempted to use his White House connection and that Brzezinski enhanced his stature with the Libyans by asking him to broker a meeting with the chief Libyan diplomat in Washington.

This is the consensus that emerged from interviews with eight of the nine subcommittee members who have been probing Billy Carter's Libyan ties since early August. The ninth, Sen. Dennis DeConcini, D-Ariz., could not be reached.

The senators appear to be in general agreement on these key points, without any sign of partisan bickering.

For example, on the key question of whether the money that went to Billy Carter was a gift or a loan — a question on which Billy Carter and the chief Justice Department investigator of his case differed sharply — three Republicans and two Democrats says it was a gift. The remaining two Democrats and one Republican believe it doesn't matter because the terms were so generous that the payment — even if it was a loan — was tantamount to a gift.

The only hints of partisan disagreement are on the importance of the inquiry and on how long it should continue.

Most of the Democrats believe the probe has run its course. "We've been stretching to find issues," says subcommittee Chairman Birch Bayh, D-Ind.

But several of the Republicans interviewed say many questions remain unanswered and that the panel will be hard-pressed to complete a final report for the full Senate by the Oct. 4 deadline.

"There's a good many things that need to be tied down and explored," Vice Chairman Strom Thurmond, R-S.C., said. The sentiment was echoed by Sen. Robert Dole, R-Kan.

"We're still learning, that's the problem," said Dole. "We've finished the first round of public hearings and we're just now getting important information—like telephone logs."

He was referring to subpoenaed telephone records which, when recently compiled, revealed a flurry of phone calls by Billy Carter to the Libyan Embassy and to the Charter Oil Co. — for which he was trying to negotiate increased oil allocations from Libya for handsome profits — after Carter arranged a meeting between Brzezinski and a Libyan envoy, Ali Houderi.

There were similar flurries of phone calls on several other key days. One was on Dec. 6, after President Carter met with the Libyan diplomat in the Oval Office. Another was on March 31, when the national security adviser alerted Billy Carter that he was aware of his oil deal effort and warned him that it could embarrass the president.

"In my view, the hearing is not ended," Dole concluded. "If we go on, we'll learn a lot more."

There is bipartisan agreement, however, on the basic conclusions reached by members of the investigating panel.

Bayh said that both Billy Carter and his confidant and business associate, Henry (Randy) Coleman, "were trying to make a fast buck, and to suggest they didn't try to use influence they had is not borne out by the record."

"I see no evidence the money (paid to Carter by the Libyans) was a loan," said Sen. Richard Lugar, R-Ind.

"I think it (the \$220,000) was a payment to Billy," Sen. Max Baucus, D-Mont., agreed. But, he added, "I don't think it matters anymore because it's been exposed. By and large, the air's been cleared of this matter."

The eight panel members were unanimous in their belief that top Carter administration officials had exercised bad judgment in their dealings with Billy Carter. They cited Brzezinski and Civiletti most often.

But CIA Director Turner was also criticized by two of the investigators, Lugar and Sen. Charles Mathias, R-Md.

Brzezinski is singled out for asking Billy Carter, at the suggestion of First Lady Rosalynn Carter, to arrange a White House meeting between him and the Libyan diplomat last Nov. 27 for a discussion on the plight of the American hostages in Iran.

"I don't care how long Brzezinski pontificates about the hostages, that was a bad mistake," says Dole.

"Inadvertently or otherwise, that meeting played into Billy's hands," said Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-Vt.

Mathias echoed the sentiment, saying: "I still don't understand why he felt it was useful or desirable for Billy Carter to broker that meeting. It's inexplicable."

Civiletti was faulted by several of the Senate probers for withholding from his own Justice Department investigators information he got from a high-level intelligence report early last April to the effect that Billy Carter was on the verge of receiving money from Libya.

Civiletti, in his testimony before the subcommittee, said he did not want to divulge the intelligence source and that he knew that the Justice investigators would find out the same information from their own sources.

However, it took until June for the chief Billy Carter prober, Joel S. Lisker, head of the foreign agents registration unit, to come up with the information.

Lisker's confrontation with Billy Carter on June 11 led to Carter's acknowledgement of his receipt of money, and subsequently to his registration as a foreign agent for Libya.

In his testimony, Billy Carter claimed that the \$220,000 he took from Libya was part of a half-million dollar loan he was trying to negotiate.

But Carter had told Lisker in June that \$20,000 of it was a repayment of expenses he incurred while hosting a delegation of high-level Libyan officials in Atlanta in early 1979.

The Senate probers are scheduled to re-question Billy Carter on this discrepancy sometime this week.

Turner is cited for bad judgment for going only to Brzezinski with information that Billy Carter was negotiating a lucrative oil deal with the Libyans, and not passing on the news to federal law enforcers.

"If better judgment had been exercised all around, this whole Billy Carter episode might have been avoided," conjectured Mathias.

Two of the senators — Dole and Lugar — were also critical of testimony by White House officials during the open hearings of the probe. They directed most of their criticism at Phillip Wise, President Carter's appointments secretary and Billy Carter's closest White House friend.

CONTINUED

According to testimony from a former White House National Security Council Middle East specialist, William B. Quandt, and Brzezinski's former aide, Karl Indurfurth, Wise had arranged briefings for Billy Carter and his friend, Randy Coleman, before the two made their first trip to Libya in September 1978.

There was also testimony — some of it by Billy Carter — that Wise was the chief telephone contact at the White House for the president's brother.

But Wise's testimony during his appearance last week was a series of "I don't recall's," concerning both the briefings and the numerous phone calls.

"If someone has responsibility to serve the president of the United States, people would expect more intelligence and alertness," Lugar said.

Snapped Dole: "If President Carter asked him what happened on a certain date, he'd better know or find out. If not, I'm really concerned about the Carter administration."

A Democratic senator, who asked to remain unidentified, called Wise's testimony "outrageous."

"He's either dumb or he's lying. Either way he hurts the president," he said.

Lugar said he believed several of the key witnesses, including Wise, Coleman and the star, Billy Carter, were "superbly coached" by their lawyers.

Lugar also complained that none of the top administration witnesses, from Wise to Civiletti, had been "forthcoming."

"Even if the White House did not evoke executive privilege (and refuse to testify), there was no particular attempt to shed light," Lugar said, adding that administration witnesses only testified to what the committee already knew.

Lugar and Dole also complained that the Billy Carter hearings had moved so swiftly, and with so few investigators to probe the facts, that, as Lugar put it, "the committee was not well-prepared either individually or collectively."

The Senate probers differed on the importance of the investigation.

"We didn't know when we started out whether we had a bear by the tail or a mouse by the tail," said Sen. Claiborne Pell, D-R.I. "I think we've ended up as far as national scandal goes, with a mouse."

Said Baucus: "Up to this point, no crimes have been committed as far as we can tell. It boils down to regrettable decisions that are significant but not consequential."

Lugar reported he believes the Carter affair, even if its implications are more ethical than legal, "is a setback in the government of the country. That's the sadness."

Lugar said he believes the Carter episode only fuels cynicism among the citizenry toward government.

"Hopefully," he added, "investigations like this place a chilling effect on this kind of conduct."

The subcommittee is expected to meet privately within the next two weeks to determine whether its report to the Senate should be final, or whether it should be an interim report, with the investigation continuing.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 22-23TIME
29 September 1980

Brzezinski Keeps His Cool

He defends talking with Billy

Senator Strom Thurmond: We're trying to get the truth, but we're not sure you're telling it.

Zbigniew Brzezinski: Excuse me, Senator. You may not be sure. I know I'm telling the truth.

That acerbic exchange was the high—or low—point of an eight-hour sparring match last week between the special Senate subcommittee investigating Billy Carter's profitable dealings with the Libyans and Brzezinski, who became the first National Security Adviser ever to testify before Congress.

The subcommittee wanted to know why in November he had used the President's none too diplomatic brother as a go-between to arrange talks at the White House with the Libyans about the American hostages in Tehran. Brzezinski replied that at the time, the White House was desperately searching for help in any quarter to free the hostages. He felt that using Billy was worth a try since Arab societies tend to put blood ties above formal positions in government. In fact, after Brzezinski met with Ali Houderi, Libya's top diplomat in Washington, the Libyan government issued a statement condemning the Iranian action. That move, Brzezinski claimed, "certainly prevented the jelling of a radical front at the time." He felt that it may have saved American lives.

Skeptical Senators wondered if Billy gained anything from his diplomatic mission. Vermont Democrat Patrick Leahy asked if the "effect of the meeting, intended or not, was to enhance the commercial value of Billy Carter." Replied Brzezinski, clearly bristling: "Our motive was not to help Billy Carter but to help the hostages." Billy served as "another limited source of leverage." At the time he asked for Billy's assistance, the Na-

tional Security Adviser said, he was unaware of the First Brother's business links with the Libyans.

The Senators wanted to know why Brzezinski felt free to use information from a classified CIA report in warning Billy that his actions in Libya might embarrass the Administration. Brzezinski explained that on receiving the damaging report from CIA Director Stansfield Turner, he pondered the matter over lunch in his office, then concluded that "I would serve the President better if I first admonished Billy." According to Brzezinski, the President later told him, "You did the right thing." There was no breach of security, said Brzezinski, nor did he risk revealing the source of the CIA's information. Said Brzezinski: "Lots of people knew about Billy's business attempts, and certainly he did."

Not satisfied with this explanation, South Carolina Republican Thurmond complained that Brzezinski appeared to have been acting as the President's "political troubleshooter." Visibly tensing and almost spitting out his words, Brzezinski replied: "I consider that to be a highly improper insinuation, and it doesn't adequately or accurately describe my motives—to protect the national interest."

While Brzezinski was an open and often persuasive witness, some of his interrogators thought some of his actions were symptomatic of an Administration in disarray. Said Maryland Republican Charles Mathias: "It seems to me that we're dealing with a series of innocent blunders, but they all add up to an appearance of incompetence." With Brzezinski the committee's last public witness, the Democrats are in a hurry to wrap up the investigation by the subcommittee's Oct. 4 deadline and get Billy out of the news.

But that may prove difficult. Still another of Billy's business ventures was disclosed last week. Billy and a California businessman, Terry Barnes, have been peddling souvenir \$2 bills and Inaugural envelopes bearing facsimiles of the President's signature for \$150 each. The entrepreneurs aim to gross as much as \$5.5 million. Barnes has already sold 13,000 of the envelopes, even though dealers say their real value is no more than \$12. ■

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Filatov

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1NEW YORK TIMES
24 September 1980**SPY, THOUGHT DEAD,
NOW REPORTED ALIVE****Soviet Said to Commute Sentence
of Subject of Senate Inquiry**By **CRAIG R. WHITNEY**
Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Sept. 23 — A former Soviet official whose unmasking as an American spy is now under investigation by a Senate committee in Washington was not executed after his conviction but is still alive in a Soviet prison, his lawyer said today.

The underground agent, Anatoly N. Filatov, was sentenced to death on July 14, 1978, after a closed military trial in Moscow on charges of spying for an unnamed foreign power, according to the Soviet press agency Tass.

But his lawyer at the trial, Leonid M. Popov, said today that the sentence was never carried out. "It was commuted to 15 years in prison," he said after being reached by The New York Times. Mr. Filatov gave a full confession at the trial, Tass said.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is investigating how a United States agent in Moscow with the code name Trigon was compromised in 1977. Trigon is widely believed to have been Mr. Filatov, although other possibilities have been suggested in Washington.

There have been unsubstantiated rumors that a high American official inadvertently revealed Trigon's identity. The rumors, which said David L. Aaron, deputy assistant to the President for national security affairs, was that official,

have been investigated by both the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and both agencies said they could find nothing to support the allegation that Mr. Aaron unmasked Trigon. The White House also called the allegations "completely unfounded."

There are indications that the Soviet Union may be saving Mr. Filatov to trade for Soviet spies uncovered in Washington, which might explain the bizarre twists the case has taken.

Two months after Mr. Filatov's reported conviction, a woman who said she was his wife, Tamara, materialized in the darkness of Red Army Park in downtown Moscow and told this correspondent and a colleague: "My husband worked for the Americans as an agent. Now he is counting on the mercy of President Carter to save him."

She said then that she had met her husband twice at Moscow's Lefortovo Prison after his trial. He told her he had tried to send a letter to President Carter from the jail but that it had been intercepted by the Soviet authorities. Her husband could face a firing squad "any minute" unless the Americans moved to save him, she said.

At the time, two Soviet officials in New Jersey were about to be tried on espionage charges, and diplomats in Moscow speculated that Mrs. Filatova's mysterious appearance was intended to suggest a swap for them.

Tass Gave Account of Trial

The two, Valdik A. Enger and Rudolf P. Chernyayev, were convicted and sentenced to 50 years each. In April 1979 they were traded for five imprisoned Soviet dissidents, including Aleksandr Ginz-

burg, who went to New York on the same plane that then took the two spies to Moscow.

Meanwhile, Mr. Filatov's sentence was commuted, although this fact has never been published in the Soviet press.

The Tass account of his secret trial, which began on July 10, 1978, said Mr. Filatov, who was born in 1940, had worked as a spy from February 1974 until his arrest in 1977.

He confessed at his trial, Tass said, that he had been blackmailed by a foreign intelligence service while on an official mission in Algeria. The agents, apparently American, set him up with a "loose woman," the account said, took detailed photographs and after recruiting him, trained him to use radio codes, ciphers, miniature cameras disguised as cigarette lighters and secret mail drops for passing on Soviet political, economic and military secrets.

In exchange, he allegedly confessed, he received money in cash and in secret foreign bank accounts.

Two committee members, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Democrat of New York, and Malcolm Wallop, Republican of Wyoming, have asked the intelligence committee staff to examine the case.

Trigon disappeared in 1977, the year Mr. Filatov was arrested, after supplying the C.I.A. with abundant intelligence information.

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FAM-INTELLIGENCE PROBE:290

SENATE PANEL REPORTEDLY WILL LAUNCH INTELLIGENCE PROBE

WASHINGTON (AP) - THE SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE HAS AGREED TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF A POSSIBLE "MAJOR INTELLIGENCE" FAILURE BY U.S. OFFICIALS; SOURCES SAID MONDAY NIGHT.

THE PROBE WAS REQUESTED ON SEPT. 10 BY SEN. MALCOLM WALLOP; R-WYO; AND DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN; D-N.Y.; TWO MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE WHO VOICED CONCERN OVER REPORTS THAT U.S. ERRORS MAY HAVE COST THE LIFE OF AN SOVIET OFFICIAL WHO WORKED AS A SPY FOR THE UNITED STATES IN MOSCOW.

SEN. BIRCH BAYH; D-IND.; THE COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN; AND SEN. BARRY GOLDWATER; R-ARIZ.; THE RANKING REPUBLICAN; AGREED TO THE PROBE IN A WRITTEN RESPONSE TO THE REQUEST BY WALLOP AND MOYNIHAN; THE SOURCES SAID.

THE SOURCES; WHO ASKED NOT TO BE IDENTIFIED; SAID THE LETTER AGREEING TO UNDERTAKE THE INVESTIGATION WAS CLASSIFIED SHORTLY AFTER IT WAS RECEIVED BY WALLOP AND MOYNIHAN.

IN REQUESTING THE PROBE; WALLOP AND MOYNIHAN CITED PUBLISHED REPORTS THAT "DISCUSS DETAILS OF WHAT APPEARS TO BE A MAJOR INTELLIGENCE FAILURE WHICH THE U.S. HAS SUFFERED - THE LOSS OF AN IMPORTANT HUMAN SOURCE IN THE SOVIET UNION. ACCORDING TO ONE OF THESE ARTICLES; SUSPICION HAS EVEN ARISEN THAT A MISTAKE BY A SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THIS PROBLEM."

BECAUSE OF SUCH REPORTS; THE TWO SENATORS ASKED BAYH AND GOLDWATER "TO CONVENE A SERIES OF CLOSED HEARINGS TO EXPLORE WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO OUR HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION IN THE SOVIET UNION IN RECENT YEARS; WHAT EFFECT THIS HAS HAD ON OUR INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES; WHAT EFFORTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO DETERMINE THE CAUSES OF WHAT HAS HAPPENED; AND WHAT MIGHT BE DONE TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE OF SIMILAR EVENTS."

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 1NEW YORK TIMES
23 September 1980

Capital's Rumor Mill: The Death of an Agent And the Talk It Started

By PHILIP TAUBMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 22 — The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence began last week trying to separate the truth from the rumors in a case that developed in that twilight world in Washington where intelligence, politics and journalism intersect.

Acting at the request of two committee members, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Democrat of New York, and Malcolm Wallop, a Wyoming Republican, the committee staff started investigating allegations that in 1977 a senior official in the Carter Administration accidentally exposed the identity of a Soviet official serving as a United States spy in Moscow, leading to the arrest and death of the agent, whose code name was Trigon.

If the charges are true, the case will be serious political embarrassment. Even the existence of a preliminary Senate inquiry into the matter raises questions about the conduct of the Administration in a highly sensitive area.

For weeks, rumors have been circulating in the intelligence community about

the exposure of Trigon. In public, officials have carefully avoided naming any individual suspected of unmasking the spy, but in private, intelligence analysts, Senate staff members and reporters all repeat the same name: David L. Aaron, deputy assistant to the President for national security affairs.

However, according to officials at the Central Intelligence Agency, which conducted its own investigation into the exposure of Trigon, there is no evidence to support the allegation that he was unmasked by Mr. Aaron.

Mr. Aaron declined to comment publicly on the case. Alfred Friendly Jr., spokesman for the National Security Council and White House associate press secretary, called the charges against Mr. Aaron "completely unfounded."

Deputy Attorney General Charles B. Renfrew said in an interview that the F.B.I. had investigated the charges against Mr. Aaron and "found them without any support of substance."

Mr. Renfrew said he had directed the F.B.I. to broaden its inquiry to determine whether there had been any other indications or leaks of classified information by Mr. Aaron and that the F.B.I. had concluded there had not been.

How Washington Works

This is the story of how that unsubstantiated rumor became part of a Senate inquiry into how Trigon was compromised. It is also a story of how Washington

works. The sources were more than a score of intelligence officials, Senate staff members, White House aides and journalists.

There are different accounts about the origins of the Trigon case. According to one group of intelligence officials, Trigon was the code name for a cable clerk in the Soviet Foreign Ministry who was recruited by the C.I.A. when he was stationed in Argentina in the early 1970's.

When Trigon returned to Moscow, by this account, he provided the C.I.A. with classified Soviet cable traffic.

The other, more widely accepted version is that Trigon was the code name for a higher-ranking Soviet official named Anatoly N. Filatov. In this version, Mr. Filatov, who was first recruited in either South America or the Middle East, returned to work at the Foreign Ministry in Moscow in 1973 and began supplying the United States with abundant intelligence information, some of considered very valuable by C.I.A. analysts.

Then, starting in about 1976, analysts began to question material coming from Trigon because it was not confirmed by other C.I.A. sources. According to intelligence officials, the C.I.A. suspected that Mr. Filatov had been discovered by the Soviet security service, the K.G.B., and had become a double agent.

Cable About Kissinger Arrives

In April 1977, after a period of silence, Mr. Filatov provided a copy of a cable to the Soviet Politburo from Moscow's Ambassador to Washington, Anatoly F. Dobrynin. In the cable, Mr. Dobrynin reported on a conversation with former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, quoting Mr. Kissinger as being critical of the March 1977 bargaining position of President Carter in nuclear arms talks. Mr. Kissinger has vigorously denied ever making such remarks to the Soviet Ambassador.

When the microfilm of the cable reached C.I.A. headquarters outside Washington, most officials doubted its authenticity. But a small group of analysts argued that there was no reason for the Russians to embarrass Mr. Kissinger by planting false information. Eventually, a bitter dispute about the cable's authenticity developed.

Meanwhile, Trigon disappeared in Moscow. In 1978, the Soviet press reported that Mr. Filatov had been tried for treason and executed. Some C.I.A. officials doubt that report, believing that Trigon committed suicide.

How and when Mr. Filatov was uncovered remains unclear. His loss was considered a major blow to American intelligence operations, and the C.I.A. investigated extensively to try to pinpoint how he was exposed. In the investigation, C.I.A. officials said, an unsubstantiated rumor that Mr. Aaron had exposed Mr. Filatov by inadvertently mentioning his activities to a Rumanian diplomat at a Washington reception proved to be completely unfounded.

A C.I.A. Man Pursues Case

Not everyone at the C.I.A., however, was satisfied with the conclusion that the Dobrynin cable was a fraud.

David S. Sullivan, a strategic analyst at the intelligence agency until mid-1978, told colleagues in 1977 that he was convinced that the C.I.A. had prematurely dismissed the cable and had failed to take the necessary steps to determine its authenticity. He suggested that information about the case was being intentionally suppressed, and he participated in an effort to pursue the case within the agency.

In the summer of 1978, Mr. Sullivan was forced to resign from the C.I.A. after admitting that he had supplied copies of a top-secret agency report on the arms limitation talks to a staff aide of Senator Henry M. Jackson, according to intelligence officials. Mr. Jackson, Democrat of Washington, was a leading critic of the arms negotiations. Mr. Sullivan told friends he felt obliged to give Mr. Jackson the report because he thought it was being withheld by Adm. Stansfield M. Turner, Director of Central Intelligence, in an effort to suppress information damaging to the arms talks.

Reporters Are Told About Case

Mr. Sullivan went to work as a staff aide to Senator Lloyd Bentsen, Democrat of Texas, in 1979 and later joined the staff of Senator Gordon J. Humphrey, Republican of New Hampshire.

Earlier this year, Mr. Sullivan began calling reporters to tell them about the Trigon case. These conversations, according to several of the reporters, followed the unwritten rules of Washington journalism when sensitive information is being offered by a source. Mr. Sullivan said he would provide information on the condition that he not be identified by name or position in any article.

Staff aides for several other senators, including Jesse Helms, Republican of North Carolina, also called reporters about the Trigon case, suggesting that they call Mr. Sullivan for a briefing.

Several reporters said they were now willing to say that Mr. Sullivan had talked to them because they felt the information he provided was misleading. Concerned about their own future contacts with officials, however, these reporters asked not to be identified.

Sullivan Denies Giving Information

They said that Mr. Sullivan had described the history of the Trigon case, including his role in it, and had reported that Mr. Aaron was suspected of having exposed Mr. Filatov.

In an interview with The New York Times this month, Mr. Sullivan denied that he had ever discussed the Trigon case with any reporters except for a brief conversation earlier this month with Charles Mohr of The Times. Mr. Sullivan said that conversation dealt only with previously published material.

"I am not involved in this matter," Mr. Sullivan said. "I am fully conscious of the secrecy contract I signed with the C.I.A. and have religiously abided by it."

The first major article about Trigon appeared in the July 21 issue of Newsweek on the eve of the Republican National Convention. David Martin, who wrote it, declined to discuss his sources.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
23 September 1980

Hill Probe Reported Set On Intelligence Source

Associated Press

The Senate Intelligence Committee has agreed to investigate allegations of a possible "major intelligence" failure by U.S. officials, sources said last night.

The probe was requested on Sept. 10 by Sens. Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.) and Daniel P. Moynihan (D-N.Y.), two members of the committee who voiced concern over reports that U.S. errors may have cost the life of a Soviet official who worked as a spy for the United States in Moscow.

Sen. Birch Bayh (D-Ind.), the committee chairman, and Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.), the vice-chairman, agreed to the probe in a written response to the request by Wallop and Moynihan, the sources said.

The sources, who asked not to be identified, said the letter agreeing to undertake the investigation was classified shortly after it was received by Wallop and Moynihan.

In requesting the probe, Wallop and Moynihan cited published reports that "discuss details of what appears to be a major intelligence failure which the U.S. has suffered—the loss of an important human source in the Soviet Union. According to one of these articles, suspicion has even arisen that a mistake by a senior government official may have contributed to this problem."

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Iran - Iraq

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 5.NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
25 September 1980

Carter calls aides on Iraq conflict

By LARS-ERIK NELSON

Washington (News Bureau)—President Carter summoned his senior advisers to a National Security Council meeting this morning to assess the consequences of the Iran-Iraq war and determine whether to trigger an international oil-sharing agreement.

Secretary of State Muskie, who is to meet Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko tomorrow at the United Nations, flew to Washington from New York for the meeting at the White House.

Statutory members of the council are the President, the vice president, the secretary of state and the secretary of defense. Other senior advisers, including Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security adviser, and CIA Director Stansfield Turner, also attended.

Carter's review was hampered in advance by the lack of U.S. influence over either Iran or Iraq. He has professed U.S. neutrality in the dispute, and called on the Russians not to interfere.

"The President has already outlined the only policy we can adopt," one official said. "Even if we changed it, neither Iran nor Iraq would listen."

U.S. officials are more or less resigned to the fact that the fighting has halted Iranian movement toward resolving the fate of 52 American hostages. Several Iranian leaders have accused the United States of being somehow behind the Iraqis, even though Iraq and the U.S. have no formal diplomatic relations.

UNDER A MECHANISM worked out after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Western nations and Japan can share oil if supplies become cut off by embargoes or war. At the moment, the West's oil stocks are in good shape, but the destruction of the Iranian refinery at Abadan and Iranian attacks on the Iraqi oil facilities at Basra could lead to

cuts of as much as 7.5% in the world's oil exports—enough to trigger the sharing mechanism.

The cut-off of oil from Iran and Iraq would most directly hurt Western Europe and Japan. The United States has halted oil purchases from Iran and buys only minimal amounts from Iraq. The sharing arrangement could, therefore, oblige the U.S. to divert all its imports from other nations to its allies in the International Energy Agency.

The State Department, meanwhile, made routine plans to shut down its diplomatic interests section in Baghdad if the fighting continues. The official American community totals 21 diplomats and their dependents. An estimated 700 other Americans live in Iraq—about 300 temporarily on oil-related assignments and the rest dual-nationals or the spouses of Iraqis.

A STATE DEPARTMENT spokesman said the United States was trying to check an Iranian claim that four Americans had been captured with Iraqi troops on Iranian soil. "We don't know of any Americans there," the official said.

On Capitol Hill, Rep. Benjamin Rosenthal (D-Queens) called for the halt of the sale of eight General Electric engines to be installed in Italian-built naval frigates destined for Iraq. Rosenthal said two of the engines had already been shipped to Italy for installation in one of the four frigates.

Muskie's meeting with Gromyko tomorrow was to have centered on general East-West relations and the possibility of resuming nuclear arms-control negotiations next month. But now, the Iran-Iraq fighting has risen to the top of the agenda, officials said.

The Russians are in a quandary, a U.S. official said. "They are alarmed at any kind of instability near their borders, and they know that if they get involved in any way they will antagonize the West."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A11THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
24 September 1980

Iraqi Army Seen as Probable Winner in a Long W

Iran's Force Called Poorly Motivated

By Dean Brelis
Time-Life News Service

"In any prolonged military confrontation between the armies of Iraq and Iran, Iraq's army is most likely to win, according to an intelligence report made by West European military analysts who were in both countries six months ago.

The report describes the Iraqi army as "aggressive and professionally skilled." It rates Iran's military prowess as "second class, poorly led and motivated."

At the core of the assessment was the lackluster performance of the Iranian army against the Dhofar rebels in Oman. The report noted the further decline of the Iranian army in south Lebanon, where some of its units were part of the UNIFIL peace keeping force. The Iranian contingent was rated lowest in its ability to perform its mission. Security was described as "sloppy," dis-

cipline as slipshod, even down to such basic details as sanitation and maintenance of basic transport.

The report says the Iranian army continued to decline overall in the aftermath of the Islamic revolution, which overthrew the shah.

The Iranian army has been plagued by desertion in the wake of the shah's ouster, and many top military officers have been executed under the regime of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

The report says that by contrast the Iraqi army is combat-tested, having experienced heavy combat during the long struggle with the Kurdish uprising in Iraq. The Iraqis have gained important experience in close support between air and front-line infantry and armor.

But the Iraqi army was not able to deliver the killing blow to the Kurdish rebellion until it was able to seal the Iranian border, which provided sanctuary and a supply route to the Kurdish rebels.

A deal was finally made between the late shah and the ruling Baathist regime in Baghdad, which finally closed the Iranian sanctuary and

ended the Kurdish rebellion. It was abrogation of this treaty, in which Iran received half of the Shatt al-Arab estuary crucial to Iraq for its shipments, that led to the current fighting.

The intelligence report also cites the experience of the Iraqi combat brigade with the Syrians on the Golan front during the October 1973 war. It found the Iraqi combat performance against the Israelis was "commendable." The investigators also were impressed with a battalion of Iraqi commandos who in the spring of 1978 were in the front lines with Palestinians fighting the Israeli incursion of southern Lebanon.

An important consideration, said the report in its positive evaluation of Iraqi military superiority, is the caliber and the quality of the officer corps and the enlisted ranks. They are described as overwhelmingly Sunni Moslem. One of the deciding factors anticipated by the report for an Iraqi decision to take on Iran militarily is Iraqi fear of the Shia-dominated Iranians spreading their Islamic revolution into Iraq, where nearly half of the population belongs to the Shiite branch of Islam.

Thus the Sunni army of Iraq, says the report, can be counted on to fight hard in any showdown battle with the Shiites of Iran.

It also describes several secret understandings with Saudi Arabia, which give Iraq military superiority "in a strategic sense."

The Iraqi army, continues the report, is well versed in insurgency and counter-insurgency warfare. It can count on support from the large Arab population in the Iranian oil fields of Khuzistan, who have been fighting against the Khomeini regime.

The present fighting appears to be developing with Khuzistan as the crucial battleground. The report says Iraq desires the area of Khuzistan as a buffer between itself and Iran. The Arab workers in the oil fields of Khuzistan do not hold any love for their Iranian overlords. They have long agitated for a separate state. They see Baghdad as their natural ally.

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7PM-PERSIAN GULF OIL; BJT; 540

7IRAN-IRAQ WAR SEEN HAVING LITTLE EFFECT ON US OIL SUPPLIES

7BY STAN BENJAMIN

7ASSOCIATED PRESS WRITER

WASHINGTON (AP) - THE BORDER WAR BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ COULD TEMPORARILY BLOCK SHIPMENT OF ABOUT 7.5 PERCENT OF THE WORLD'S DAILY OIL SUPPLY BUT WOULD HAVE LITTLE DIRECT IMPACT ON THE UNITED STATES; GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND OIL INDUSTRY SOURCES SAY.

DEPUTY ENERGY SECRETARY JOHN SAWHILL TOLD A SENATE HEARING MONDAY THAT WHILE THE UNITED STATES GETS MUCH OF ITS OIL IMPORTS FROM PERSIAN GULF NATIONS; IT BUYS NONE FROM IRAN AND VERY LITTLE OF THE 3.2 MILLION BARRELS A DAY EXPORTED BY IRAQ.

INDUSTRY SOURCES; WHO ASKED NOT TO BE IDENTIFIED; SAID HIGH WORLD INVENTORIES COULD HELP CUSHION THE BLOW OF A PERSIAN GULF OIL CUTOFF.

OIL INDUSTRY EXPERTS SAY THE IRAN-IRAQ CONFLICT SO FAR HAS CAUSED NO REDUCTION IN OIL PRODUCTION OR EXPORTS BY EITHER COUNTRY; BUT AN INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS PREPARED FOR THE ENERGY DEPARTMENT BEFORE THE FIGHTING BROKE OUT SAID ABOUT 4.7 MILLION BARRELS OF PERSIAN GULF OIL A DAY COULD BE BLOCKED.

FREDRIC S. FEER; SENIOR ANALYST OF ANALYTICAL ASSESSMENTS CORP. OF ARLINGTON; VA.; WHICH PREPARED THE REPORT; NOTED THAT MOST OIL PORTS AND REFINERIES IN THE AREA "ARE WITHIN LESS THAN 200 MILES OF EACH OTHER - CLOSE ENOUGH TO MAKE AIRBORNE OR NAVAL THREATS TO SHIPPING MORE THAN CREDIBLE ENOUGH TO HALT TANKER TRAFFIC EVEN IF NO DAMAGE IS DONE TO FACILITIES."

FOR THAT REASON; HE SAID; A CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ COULD INDIRECTLY BLOCK OIL SHIPMENTS FROM KUWAIT AS WELL.

THAT COULD MEAN A LOSS TO THE WORLD OIL MARKET OF 1 MILLION BARRELS A DAY FROM IRAN; 1.1 MILLION FROM IRAQ AND 2.6 MILLION FROM KUWAIT; FEER SAID. THE OTHER 2.1 MILLION BARRELS EXPORTED BY IRAQ ARE DELIVERED BY PIPELINE AND PRESUMABLY WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED; HE SAID.

ENERGY DEPARTMENT FIGURES SHOW THAT THE UNITED STATES GETS LESS THAN 1 PERCENT OF ITS OIL FROM A GROUP OF COUNTRIES INCLUDING IRAQ; KUWAIT; QATAR; ECUADOR AND GABON. SHIPMENTS OF IRANIAN OIL TO THE UNITED STATES WERE HALTED AFTER THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES WERE SEIZED AT THE U.S. EMBASSY IN TEHRAN LAST NOV. 4.

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ASSOCIATED PRESS

FEER, A FORMER CIA ANALYST, SUGGESTED THE DISRUPTION WOULD
"THREATEN ONLY ONE AREA OF CONCERN - KUWAIT, WHICH IS A FRIENDLY
STATE, SUPPLIES EUROPEAN AND JAPANESE ALLIES AND PRODUCES A
SUBSTANTIAL QUANTITY OF OIL."

BUT HE SAID IT IS UNLIKELY THAT AN IRAN-IRAQ CONFLICT, AND ANY OIL
DISRUPTION THAT ACCOMPANIED IT, WOULD LAST MORE THAN A FEW WEEKS.
A FAR MORE PESSIMISTIC VIEW, HOWEVER, WAS PRESENTED MONDAY BY SEN.
CHARLES H. PERCY, R-ILL.

PERCY WARNED THE SENATE GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS INVESTIGATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEE THAT FIGHTING BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ MIGHT RESULT IN
QUADRUPLING CRUDE OIL PRICES TO \$100 OR MORE A BARREL, \$5-A-GALLON
GASOLINE AND HOME HEATING BILLS OF \$1,000 A MONTH.

PERCY SAID HIS PREDICTION WAS BASED ON THE NATION'S EXPERIENCE WITH
THE 1973 ARAB OIL EMBARGO, WHICH "WAS ACCOMPANIED BY BAD GAS LINES
AND A QUADRUPLING OF CRUDE OIL PRICES WITHIN A YEAR."

HE SAID THE 1979 CUTOFF OF IRANIAN OIL EXPORTS "CAUSED EVEN MORE
BAD LINES THAN THE STATISTICALLY MORE SERIOUS (1973) EMBARGO, AND IT
ALMOST TRIPLED CRUDE OIL PRICES WITHIN A LITTLE MORE THAN A YEAR."
THE FLASHPOINT OF THE IRAQ-IRAN CRISIS IS THE 120-MILE-LONG SHATT
AL-ARAB WATERWAY FLANKED BY VULNERABLE OIL INSTALLATIONS AND PIPELINES
VITAL TO BOTH COUNTRIES.

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1NEW YORK TIMES
20 SEPTEMBER 1980

Iraq Said to Take Land From Iran In Tense Fighting

By WERNER WISKARI

Arab diplomats in Beirut said yesterday that Iraq, by using a strike force of 10,000 troops and canceling a border agreement with Iran, had accomplished the objectives of its current conflict and was preparing to repulse any Iranian counterattack.

The informants said that the Iraqis had seized 90 square miles of territory they considered rightfully theirs from Iran in a military operation that began Sept. 4 and that was officially proclaimed to have ended last Monday, although clashes were continuing. The Iraqis also claimed full control of the Shatt al Arab, the waterway that formed part of their joint border.

Intelligence officials in Washington said, however, their information from the scene was that no military operation of such a magnitude had taken place. They said that there were some border clashes this month and that the Iraqis had apparently been getting the better of the Iranians. But they said they saw no sign of a major conflict.

Reports of continued heavy fighting are being issued daily by both Iran and Iraq and are being circulated by Arab

diplomats. While the reports cannot be independently verified, the Iraqis are apparently taking advantage of Iranian disarray to try to retake territory that they regard as theirs.

The diplomats in the Lebanese capital said the Iraqis had encountered relatively light resistance in seizing the 90-square-mile area. They noted that the Iraqis easily repulsed an attempt on Wednesday by an Iranian force put at 5,000 troops to retake the territory, which is in the area of Musian, and they said the Iraqis were now bringing up tanks and reinforcements and preparing for another Iranian attempt.

The seizure of the land, the informants said, was the first of two objectives. The second, they said, was the cancellation of the 1975 agreement that gave the Iranians partial sovereignty over Shatt al Arab, the estuary of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers that constitutes the Iranian-Iraqi frontier at the head of the Persian Gulf.

In announcing the cancellation on Wednesday, President Saddam Hussein said the waterway was now part of Iraq. On Thursday, the Iraqi Foreign Ministry said that from now on every foreign ship using the waterway would be required to fly the Iraqi flag in addition to its own.

The Iraqi claim to all of Shatt al Arab was challenged Thursday by Iran with a Foreign Ministry statement vowing never to agree, and yesterday, after Iranian planes had flown over the waterway on what appeared to be reconnaissance missions, the Teheran radio said naval clashes were likely in the next few days.

Iraq reported that its gunboats in Shatt al Arab had fired on the Iranian planes and forced them to withdraw.

The two countries reported intensified fighting all along the border, but these reports were interpreted in both Beirut and Washington as indicating exchanges of small arms and artillery fire.

While the official Iranian and Iraqi reports on the fighting have usually been

contradictory, Iran confirmed yesterday that it had lost two planes in clashes over the provinces of Khuzistan and Ilam. Iraq said earlier in the week that it had downed two other Iranian jet fighters.

The Arab diplomats said Iraq began planning the border attacks about six months ago, mobilizing about 50,000 of its 200,000 troops but using only 10,000 so far. But Washington intelligence officials said the Iraqis had apparently deployed no more than 5,000 troops and the Iranians far fewer than that.

Iraq contended that the 1975 border agreement, signed in Algiers by Mr. Hussein and Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi, included a provision for turning over to Iraq 90 square miles in the area of Musian and nearby Zein al-Qoas and that the Iranians never carried it out. Iran says the pact did not specify such a turnover. Besides, the new Islamic rulers of Iran say, Iraq did not demand the territory while the Shah was in power.

The Shah left Iran in January 1979 and died about two months ago in Egypt.

The Beirut diplomats said the Iraqi offensive began slowly, concentrating on knocking out Iranian artillery emplacements. They said the Iraqis were careful to assign only Sunni Moslems to command the attacking force for fear that Shiites might succumb to Iranian appeals that they defect. In Iran, both the officials and the people are largely Shiite, a minority sect in Islam. In Iraq, about half the people are Shiites, but the Government is run by Sunnis.

A secondary aim of the operation, the diplomats said, was to try to contain the Iranian revolution. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Iranian leader, has appealed to Iraqi Shiites to revolt. Under-scoring Iraqi concerns was a report last week that 10 Iraqis had defected to Iran.

Iraq has reported the loss of 15 men in the fighting; Iran, 70, including 11 on Thursday.

The capture of the Musian area was announced on Monday in Baghdad. Al Thawra, the official newspaper of the ruling Baath Socialist Party, said yesterday that Iraq had no designs on what it considered truly Iranian soil and did not wish to expand the conflict into an all-out war.

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Iran/Hostages

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23 September 1980

Muskie offers Iran respect, but no apologies

By Barry Schweid
Associated Press

UNITED NATIONS — Calling for prompt release of the American hostages, Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie yesterday offered respect but no apology to Iran, saying that nation's security and Persian Gulf stability depend on a settlement.

"We are prepared to do our part in resolving fairly the issues between us," Muskie said in a speech to the U.N. General Assembly. He said Iran could end its isolation "from those nations that live in accordance with international law" and have world sanctions ended by freeing the 52 Americans it has held since last Nov. 4.

While promising not to intervene in Iranian affairs in the future, he did not recant past American support for the late pro-U.S. Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. Muskie emphasized that the Carter administration recognizes the reality of the Iranian revolution that deposed Pahlavi.

"I urge the nation of Iran, its parliament and its people also to consider the human face of the hostage problem," Muskie said.

"These innocent people and their families have experienced acute suffering. I ask this community of nations to join us in urging that their ordeal be brought to a safe, honorable and prompt end."

Muskie called on the General Assembly to support the hostages' immediate release and to adopt effective measures to protect diplomats everywhere from terrorism. However, he made no specific proposal.

U.S. officials said they still considered the commission of inquiry that was appointed last February by U.N. Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim but was rebuffed in Tehran an effective diplomatic channel to Iranian authorities.

In Tehran, Hashemi Rafsanjani, speaker of the parliament, said the

legislative body would take up the issue of the hostages "only when (Iranian) demands are met by the United States." He made the comment as 38 legislators visited the occupied U.S. Embassy where at least some of the 52 hostages are being held.

At the same time, the Arab newsweekly *Eight Days*, which is published in London, said that Iranian leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini has "finally agreed" that the hostages should be released within six weeks. An article in the weekly predicted that negotiations would be resumed early in October in what it termed "a frantic race to beat the November U.S. presidential election."

Muskie, in his speech, did not touch directly on Iran's widening border conflict with Iraq.

However, after a luncheon meeting with West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Muskie told reporters the conflict between Iraq and Iran could be the prelude to a wider war, with new perils for the American hostages.

"The degree of my concern has been pretty high right along. The extent to which the situation becomes less stable, obviously it becomes less predictable, and one's concern rises," he said.

Muskie said that with U.S. intelligence sources in Iran "not all they might be," it was difficult for the

Carter administration to assess developments in the border conflict.

Asked whether U.S. policy was one of neutrality, Muskie avoided a direct reply. He said what was important now was to find out as much as possible about the conflict.

The meeting with Genscher was the first in a series of consultations with allied governments about the Iran-Iraq fighting. They are expected to provide intelligence information unavailable to the United States since its break with Iran.

In the secretary of state's annual statement to the assembly, Muskie took a tough line toward the Soviet Union. He said the United Nations "must confront the continuing assault upon Afghanistan" and he denounced the intervention of Soviet-backed Vietnamese forces in Cambodia.

Muskie insisted on a total withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and called for a political settlement there based on non-intervention, self-determination and non-alignment. There was no indication in the speech of a willingness to compromise with the Kremlin, which seeks to maintain its influence on the Kabul government.

Muskie also reiterated the United States' support for an international conference to deal with Cambodia's future. He said there has been some easing of starvation and disease, but "armed aggression continues."

Muskie offered the Soviet Union a renewed American commitment to arms control, easing of tensions around the world and to peace.

At the same time, he advised the 154-nation assembly, "let us keep in mind two basic purposes for which this body exists — to oppose armed aggression and to assuage its consequences."

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ON PAGE A1-6

THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
23 September 1980

Hostages' Fate in War Worries U.S.

By Walter Taylor
Washington Star Staff Writer

UNITED NATIONS — The escalation in fighting between Iran and Iraq has raised "serious concern" about the safety of the 52 American hostages in Tehran, Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie said yesterday.

Speaking to reporters, Muskie drew a direct connection between continuing reports of hostilities between Baghdad and Tehran and the fate of the Americans who have been held since last Nov. 4 by militant followers of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

"We are concerned, seriously concerned, that any incident of this kind in that area of the world carries possible implications to which one ought not to be blind," Muskie said following a private lunch with West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

The stepped-up fighting between Iran and Iraq was an unsettling development in the 10-month-old hostage crisis and one that could force the United States to consider new strategies for ending it. Previously, U.S. officials have expressed concern that the border dispute between the two Persian Gulf neighbors could divert Iranian attention from the hostage crisis.

Muskie's remarks yesterday indicated that the U.S. worry now goes to the safety of the hostages themselves.

Although the secretary of state did not address the question publicly yesterday, U.S. officials are also known to be concerned that the fighting might endanger supplies of Persian Gulf crude oil to the West.

At a briefing for reporters late yesterday, State Department spokesman John Tratner pointedly noted that the United States will continue to hold the Iranian government "fully responsible" for the safety of the Americans, irrespective of how events unfold in the fighting between Khomeini forces and those of the Iraqi Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein.

Tratner also sought to dispel Iranian suggestions that the United States is supporting Iraq in the fighting. "The United States is not involved," he asserted. "We're taking no side in that dispute."

CBS news yesterday reported that the State Department, through the Swiss, notified the Iranian government that the United States had nothing to do with the Iraqi decision to fight.

Muskie, who earlier in the day had renewed the U.S. call for a speedy, negotiated end to the hostage crisis, said he had asked the West German foreign minister for help in obtaining the best intelligence on the Iran-Iraq fighting, and would request the same information from other Western allies.

"Understandably, our intelligence sources in Iran are not all they might be," he said.

"The first step" for the United States, he said, "is to get all the facts, and undertake to determine what is involved — incidents or the prelude to something broader or more serious."

He sidestepped questions about possible new American strategies in response to the developments over the past few days.

"I don't think it would be particularly useful to chase hypothetical possibilities down separate roads," said Muskie. "I think the important thing is to get your facts well-established and then decide what you've got."

He did not rule out, however, the possibility that the United States might again bring the hostage situation before the Security Council in light of the latest developments in the region. "That is an option if the facts justify it," he said.

The Security Council twice has called on Iran to release the American hostages, but tougher action against Tehran was blocked by the Soviet Union's veto.

In his remarks earlier in the day in an address to the 35th session of the General Assembly, Muskie reaffirmed the Carter administration's willingness to consider Iranian grievances about past U.S. policy in exchange for safe release of the hostages. The speech left fuzzy the question of whether the United States would be satisfied by a commitment to release the hostages or would demand their freedom as a precondition for an airing of Iranian complaints.

Previously, however, U.S. officials have made clear that they would entertain a "package deal" involving an international inquiry into Iranian grievances and a commitment for the release of the hostages.

Quoting extensively from a letter he sent last month to the new Iranian prime minister, Mohammad Ali Rajai, Muskie appealed to the Iranians to "consider the human face of the hostage problem."

"These innocent people and their families have experienced acute suffering," he said. "I ask this community of nations to join us in urging that their appeal be brought to a safe, honorable and prompt end."

Regarding Iranian grievances, Muskie said: "We also know that in Iran, as in the United States, there are deep feelings as a result of grievances and suffering perceived in the past. We are prepared to do our part in resolving fairly questions between us."

In his General Assembly speech, Muskie also renewed sharp U.S. criticism of the continued Soviet presence in Afghanistan and called on the United Nations to investigate allegations that the Russians and their allies have used illegal chemical weapons in Southeast Asia.

"Today, more than one million refugees attest to the human toll of the violence in Afghanistan," he declared. "And more is at stake than the independence of one country."

"If this assault continues, the independence and integrity of every small, defenseless nation will be called into question."

Muskie said an "impartial investigation" of allegations that the Russians and their allies in Southeast Asia had used illegal chemical weapons "could most appropriately be launched under the auspices of the United Nations."

Muskie's address came just three days before his scheduled meeting here with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. The two are expected to hold preliminary discussions on the question of deployment of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe and possibly to agree on the start of full-blown negotiations on that subject.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE ALWASHINGTON STAR
20 SEPTEMBER 1980

Militants Offer Embassy Tour To Parliament

By Raji Samghabadi
Special to The Washington Star

TEHRAN, Iran — The militants who have been holding American hostages will take Iranian parliamentarians on a tour of the occupied U.S. Embassy on Monday to exhibit "equipment of espionage and evidence of crimes."

It is the first time the militants have tried directly to lobby for a tough parliamentary decision on the 52 Americans they hold held captive.

The inspection tour had been arranged for today, but some members of parliament requested a postponement.

The request for the inspection tour was lodged with Ali Akbar Hashemeri Rafsanjani, the speaker of the parliament, the militants' said.

The parliamentarians are to visit the compound between 10 a.m. and noon and 5 and 7 p.m. Tehran time.

They will be shown "the nest of spies, evidence of crimes and equipment of espionage," the militants said, noting that they would answer questions about the hostage-taking.

Contacted by phone, a spokesman for the militants refused to say whether the inspection would include questioning of the hostages as well. "If we wanted to raise that point, we would have done so in the announcement," said the spokesman. After the abortive U.S. raid, the militants said the hostages were moved from the embassy to new, secret locations throughout Iran.

The embassy courtyard is full of furniture which the militants claim is a camouflage for electronic espionage equipment flown in from the United States shortly before the embassy was seized Nov. 4.

The militants also have shown on television what they say are false passports, immigration stamps and itineraries, which they claim the CIA provided to agents.

During the mass prayer yesterday in Tehran, parliamentarian Sakhraddin Hejazi declared that "U.S. intervention against Iran by Iraq will not affect our decision on the captive spies."

Hejazi, who was addressing a crowd at Tehran University, charged that the United States is trying to break Iran's revolution by encouraging Iraq's aggression.

Prime Minister Mohammed Ali Rajai made the same accusation in a television interview that also gave first Iranian sign that mediation between the two neighbors might be accepted.

Rajai claimed that the superpowers had instigated and were supporting Iraq's attacks on Iran to arrest the spread of the Islamic revolution. "All the same, we do not believe in responding to war with war," said Rajai.

He noted that his government would accept mediation for peace if it caused Baghdad "to adopt a humane and Islamic position toward Iran." If this condition were met, Iran would give up its claims against Baghdad for damages sustained "as the price paid for leading heathens to the path of God."

A special envoy from PLO Chairman Yassar Arafat, Hani al-Hassan, is in Tehran with a special message believed to contain a proposal for mediation. Rajai said he has not met the PLO representative.

NEW YORK TIMES
20 SEPTEMBER 1980

U.S. Compiled Data on Ties to Iran, But Calls It Inventory, Not a Study

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 19 — The State Department said today that it had compiled many documents on United States relations with Iran since 1941 in case there was a formal inquiry into those relations because of the hostage situation.

The department insisted, however, that the collection was more of an inventory of materials than a study or report on Iranian-American relations.

Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie told reporters, "I was aware that there were being assembled papers of one kind or another which might be useful at such time as an inquiry into Iran policy, going back some period, might be undertaken by Congress or someone."

"There is no 'document,'" he said. "There is an inventory of papers, as I understand it."

The Washington Post disclosed the existence of the work in today's issue. A long front-page story called it a "top-secret report" that could cause "a furor like the Pentagon Papers" of a decade ago if made public.

The Post account was described by Jody Powell, the White House press secretary, as "sensationalized."

Carter Asked for Compilation

The State Department, asserting that "this is not the Pentagon Papers," said: "There is no such 'study' as such, only a collection of documents and factual summaries on past United States relations with Iran. This compilation did not focus on United States 'misdeeds' and no con-

clusions or judgments were derived. Essentially, it is an inventory and nothing more."

According to Administration officials, President Carter asked for the compilation in December when there was concern that the Iranians might arrange an international tribunal to hear allegations of American crimes against Iran.

The report has a section summarizing relations from 1941 to the early 1970's and a number of smaller sections dealing with such subjects as the Central Intelligence Agency's assistance in the Shah's return to power in 1953, on human rights policy toward Iran, American military aid to Iran, contacts with the Iranian military before the Shah was overthrown and the decision to allow the Shah into this country last year.

One official involved in the work said there were "no bombshells." He said, "The scope of American relations with Iran are pretty well known."

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Pakistan

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THE WASHINGTON POST
23 September 1980

Facility Could Lead to A-Test Next Year

Pakistan Building Secret Nuclear Plant

By Milton R. Benjamin
Washington Post Foreign Service

Pakistani technicians are assembling a clandestine plutonium reprocessing facility near Rawalpindi that U.S. intelligence experts say may enable the country to test its first atomic bomb two years earlier than previously expected.

The small reprocessing plant, whose existence has not been previously disclosed, could give Pakistan enough fissionable material to stage an initial atomic test in the fall of 1981, intelligence experts say.

It may enable Pakistan to stage a symbolically important initial nuclear explosion without waiting for completion of the large uranium enrichment plant under construction at Kahuta, about 25 miles south of the capital, Islamabad. U.S. intelligence experts believe the enrichment plant will not be producing bomb-grade uranium until at least 1983, and more likely not until 1985.

Western experts had thought work on the small reprocessing plant was abandoned years ago, when Pakistan bought a commercial reprocessing plant from France.

But when the French deal was scuttled in 1979, work on the small plant apparently was resumed clandestinely. Sources say that by the time the United States learned of the resumption and alerted European governments to this development, Pakistan had already obtained the items it needed to build it.

Construction of the clandestine reprocessing facility, in a small building just outside the fence of the Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology near Rawalpindi, points up the determination of the government of President Mohammed Zia ul-Haq to join the club of nuclear weapon states as quickly as possible.

The Carter administration, in a declared effort to curb proliferation of nuclear weapons, has attempted to dissuade Western countries with nuclear capability from exporting their technology. It recently suspended nuclear cooperation with Switzerland,

accusing that government of failing to block Swiss firms from selling Pakistani technology that can be used to develop nuclear weapons.

The small reprocessing plant, which intelligence experts say appears designed to provide 22 to 44 pounds of plutonium a year, will give Pakistan only enough fissionable material for "one or two—at the most, three" nuclear bombs annually.

"But fissionable material could be flowing out of the reprocessing plant in 1981," a U.S. government source said. "For Pakistan to have obtained a bomb's worth of plutonium from this facility within a year is probably the worst-case scenario, but we regard it as a prudent target to worry about."

U.S. intelligence experts are also keeping a close watch on a site in northern Pakistan that analysts feel may be the location that has been chosen for an initial underground nuclear test. Sporadic construction has been taking place there on a tunnel for which there appears no other explanation, and analysts note that the site is surrounded by watchtowers.

"Work at the site seems to have stopped again for the moment," a government source said. "But if they do plan to stage a test there, it would not take them long to get it ready."

The clandestine reprocessing plant that experts say is in the final stages of construction is not much more than one-tenth the size of the commercial reprocessing plant that France agreed

to sell Pakistan in the mid-1970s. While France, under American pressure, suspended this deal before any sensitive equipment had been shipped to Pakistan, U.S. sources say French firms sold Pakistan key items for use in the clandestine plant before the new project was uncovered.

The discovery that a clandestine plutonium reprocessing facility—and not the highly publicized uranium enrichment plant—will give Pakistan a nuclear weapons capability much earlier than had been feared has also focused new attention on that country's only atomic power plant, a Canadian-built heavy water reactor located near Karachi.

In almost eight years of not very successful operation, the Kanupp power station has turned out spent fuel containing an estimated 220 pounds of plutonium—enough to produce about 15 bombs. Because of the nature of heavy water reactors, the plutonium contained in spent fuel is better suited for use in weapons than the plutonium produced by light water nuclear power plants such as those in the United States.

One possibility worrying Western intelligence experts is that some of the spent fuel from the Kanupp plant, which is stored in a pool near the reactor, has already been diverted for use in the clandestine reprocessing plant.

The storage pool is nominally monitored under the "safeguards" procedures of the International Atomic Energy Agency—even though Pakistan is not a signatory of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty—as part of the deal under which Canada provided the Karachi reactor.

But agency's "safeguards" consist mainly of photographic surveillance of the storage pool and auditing of records with only occasional on-site inspection—a process that even the agency concedes provides no guarantee against diversion. In an effort to find out whether some material may already have been diverted, the agency has agreed to take a new inventory of the storage pool outside the Karachi reactor.

An even more worrisome path for diversion of fuel, however, was opened with Pakistan's announcement three weeks ago that it is now fabricating its own fuel elements for the Karachi reactor using natural uranium it is obtaining from Niger.

Unlike the light water atomic power reactors in the United States, which have to be completely shut down for a partial refueling, the heavy water CANDU-type reactor operated by Pakistan is designed in a way that permits fuel elements to be inserted and taken out while the plant is in operation.

U.S. experts say that if Pakistan is now manufacturing its own fuel elements, it could fairly easily insert these into the Karachi reactor, leave them in the reactor the relatively short period that is optimum if the aim is to produce plutonium for a weapons program, and then ship them

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to the clandestine plant for reprocessing.

"I think we can be relatively certain that one way or another, the material that they put through the reprocessing plant will come from the Kanupp reactor," a U.S. source said. "And they're going to be getting pretty good quality plutonium, too."

Ironically, construction of the small reprocessing facility now worrying Western governments was started in the mid-1970s, but was abandoned when France agreed to sell Pakistan the commercial reprocessing plant.

The French firm, St. Gobain Techniques Nouvelles (SGN), actually supplied Pakistan with blueprints for the commercial plant—a scaled-down version of the French commercial plutonium reprocessing plant at La Hague—and construction of the plant was begun at Chasma deep in the Pakistani desert.

Even though the French government suspended the contract for the Chasma plant, civilian construction work has continued to limp along at the desert site to this day. Pakistan has also continued trying to buy sensitive nuclear equipment for the Chasma plant from France, Switzerland and other countries — with some modest success. But U.S. intelligence experts say there appears to be no prospect that this plant will be completed in the foreseeable future.

After France suspended the contract for the Chasma plant, it was discovered that Pakistan was quietly buying a variety of components on the

world market to build a uranium enrichment plant from plans stolen in the Netherlands. U.S. efforts accordingly shifted to identifying and attempting to block Pakistani purchases of equipment for the enrichment plant.

U.S. analysts believe that despite continued sales of "gray area" equipment to Pakistan by Switzerland, the American-led effort to deny Pakistan key items it needs for the enrichment plant has set back completion of the facility by a couple of years.

But it was only belatedly, according to sources, that the United States discovered that Pakistan had simultaneously resumed work on the clandestine plutonium reprocessing facility that had been abandoned earlier and it was too late to prevent Pakistan from obtaining the items it needed for the small reprocessing plant from French firms.

Initially, U.S. analysts thought the new reprocessing facility was very small—perhaps not much larger than the laboratory-scale reprocessing facility already in existence inside the Science and Technology Institute — and estimated that it would be able to produce only a couple of kilograms of plutonium a year.

But based on the capacity of the equipment Pakistan has been ordering, officials now believe the reprocessing plant may be able to produce as much as 44 pounds of plutonium annually.

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21 September 1980

U.S. Says Evidence Shows Pakistan Planning A-Bomb

BERN, Switzerland—The Swiss government may not yet recognize it as a possibility Pakistan's ruler, Mohammed Zia ul-Haq, continues to deny it, but most Western experts agree that Pakistan has been working flat-out since the early 1970s to develop what former Pakistani president Zulfikar Ali Bhutto called the first "Islamic bomb."

U.S. experts point to an abundance of evidence: intelligence reports; photographs of construction of an unmistakable uranium enrichment plant at Kahuta; and statements by Bhutto before he was deposed by Zia and executed.

The United States believes it will still take several years for Pakistan to finish the enrichment plant and produce suitable nuclear material for bombs, but they fear the process has become almost irreversible.

U.S. officials are studying closely a recent British Broadcasting Corp. television report on the Pakistan nuclear program that quoted anonymous Pakistani government sources who said Libyan ruler Muammar Qaddafi made an agreement with Bhutto in 1974, after a year of secret negotiations, to finance Pakistan's nuclear weapons program in exchange for Libyan access to its technology.

The BBC's Pakistani sources said a total of \$4 billion in Libyan aid was discussed and that at least several hundred millions of dollars was sent by Libya to Pakistan in cash in 1975 and 1976.

Pakistan, like India has refused to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to monitor its nuclear energy program to safeguard against the development of nuclear weapons. Some foreigners, including journalists, who have ventured too near Pakistan's nuclear installations or the homes of its nuclear scientists, have been beaten.

From the beginning Pakistan's drive to develop an "Islamic bomb" has been a case history of the growing futility of international efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons.

The United States, the Soviet Union, China, France, and Britain all have nuclear arsenals, including U.S.-owned NATO warheads and Soviet-controlled Warsaw Pact weapons deployed on the soil of numerous allied nations.

India has demonstrated its capability to make a bomb and Israel also is widely believed to be able to do so. South Africa, Argentina and Brazil are among a clutch of other nations who have much of the technology to build a bomb in the future.

Pakistan first sought openly to buy a French plant to reprocess uranium used in ordinary nuclear reactors and separate out plutonium that could be exploded in nuclear weapons. A major diplomatic campaign by the Ford and Carter administrations, which included considerable pressure on the French government and a brief cutoff of U.S. economic and military aid to Pakistan, stopped the project.

By the time the French government terminated the contract between Pakistan and the French firm SGN, partly owned by the French government, Pakistan had received most of the plant's blueprints but little of its sensitive equipment.

Nonproliferation experts fear that Pakistan could still try to build the plant from the French plans, with components bought from a variety of countries exporting nuclear technology, or that Pakistan may be building a less sophisticated and costly reprocessing plant as India did.

Pakistan will have available for reprocessing used nuclear fuel containing plutonium from its nuclear power plant reactor at Karachi. Pakistan's atomic energy chairman, Munir Ahmad Khan, announced Aug. 31 that fuel for the Karachi reactor is being manufactured from uranium at another plant built at Chasma by SGN, which also has helped carry-out quality control at the plant.

The French government had made an agreement with SGN to allow it to help finish and start up the Chasma plant so long as it did not provide "sensitive" technology that could directly lead to nuclear weapons development.

But in 1978, just as Washington had decided to restore U.S. aid to Pakistan, it was alerted by British diplomats to evidence that Pakistan was

trying to develop the capability to produce weapons-grade nuclear material in another way: by the gas centrifuge process for enriching uranium.

U.S. experts found that Pakistan was clandestinely buying components for the centrifuge process—sometimes through dummy companies coordinated by Pakistani diplomats in Europe—from nuclear technology firms in the United States, Britain, West Germany, Switzerland and other countries.

The plans for the centrifuge process and lists of sources for components apparently had been stolen by a Pakistani employe of a British-Dutch-German uranium enrichment plant in the Netherlands.

The State Department formed a study group, headed by its top nonproliferation expert, Gerard C. Smith, to try to cut off this new Pakistani route to nuclear weapons.

Washington again cut off aid to Pakistan in March 1979. U.S. experts also began closely tracking international trade in nuclear technology to discover exports to Pakistan that might be used for developing the gas centrifuge enrichment process.

Once alerted, several countries, including the United States and Britain, acted to stop further exports, although not until after Pakistan had already acquired some key components from both American and British firms. Some other countries continued to allow exports of components to Pakistan, according to U.S. officials.

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Turkey

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THE GUARDIAN
21 September 1980

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Coup pleases Washington Generals seize power in Turkey

By CAN ASLAN

The Turkish armed forces seized power on the morning of Sept. 12. A National Security Council made up of the commanders of the army, navy, air and police forces was established as the supreme governing body.

In its first post-coup statement, the military said it had moved to "put an end to the destructive and divisive activities instigated by foreign ideologies and to provide for stability, national unity, security of property and life and internal peace."

The constitution, parliament and the rest of the civilian ruling apparatus were suspended "as a result of the inability of the political parties and the government to govern effectively," the new leaders said.

All democratic mass organizations and trade unions have been shut down, and freedom of the press and all political activity are suspended. The military has divided Turkey into 10 martial law districts, each under the command of a governor from the armed forces.

Through State Department declarations and the major news media the U.S. has lent political support to the coup. Typical of U.S. press comment was the Washington Post editorial which began, "It is possible to have more than a little sympathy for the generals who have just seized power in Turkey."

An attempt is being made to portray the military dictatorship as a neutral authority above class antagonisms, striving to free the country from the grip of corrupt politicians and "terrorists" of both the right and left. This campaign is working to conceal the establishment of fascist rule in Turkey.

INTENSIFYING CLASS STRUGGLE

The takeover was made necessary by the inability of the Turkish ruling class to counter successfully the intensifying class struggle while even the most minimal democratic rights and institutions were still in operation. Turkey's recent history has encompassed oppression, torture, a repressive legal code, neofascist terror gangs, a U.S. CIA-organized National Intelligence Agency and a fierce counterinsurgency drive—all aimed against the mass people's struggles. Towns which were flourishing under organized progressive and left local administrations had in recent months been invaded and placed under full-scale military occupation.

The leader of the new National Security Council, Gen. Kenan Evren, who is also functioning as head of state, told correspondents in Istanbul Sept. 16 that military rule would be temporary, but did not specify any timetable for the return to civilian government.

The armed forces, Evren said, would use this period of power to reshape Turkey's constitution and ruling institutions in order to provide a viable context for its civilian successors. The general indicated in particular that the penal code would be strengthened and the schools and trade unions, the latter when they are permitted to operate again, would be restructured and placed under certain legal constraints so that "anarchy will not be permitted to prosper." Students and organized workers have been the backbone of progressive activism throughout the country. Evren also indicated that a civilian cabinet with unspecified powers would be named later this week.

Meanwhile, amid Western press reports of the Turkish people "jubilantly welcoming" the coup are buried accounts of "massive arrests." According to an AP report from Ankara Sept. 16, "Turkish troops, in a crackdown on leftist intellectuals and professionals [today] swept through every major technical association in the capital, arresting workers and carrying away records."

EXCERPTED

Turkish Military Court Acts Swiftly to Sentence

By JOHN KIFNER

Special to The New York Times

ANKARA, Turkey, Sept. 19 — A military court sentenced a leftist terrorist to death today for the machine-gun slaying of an army captain Sunday.

The swiftness of the action by the military in Adana, Turkey's fourth largest city, as well as the severity of the sentence appeared to indicate that the new military rulers would act vigorously against the gunmen who have brought the country to the brink of chaos.

The generals also face the possibility that, as in the past, the execution of the leftist, Serdar Coyugun, might make him a martyr to his supporters and the occasion of further violence.

The captain, Bulent Angin, was shot as his patrol tried to interrupt a fight between two leftist factions, the authorities said.

A second leftist, Ayhan Cansin, was sentenced to 11 years in prison. The police said the two were arrested when they pulled out weapons as policemen tried to interrogate them.

Other Incidents Since Takeover

The shooting of the captain was one of several incidents since the army takeover last Friday. Two days ago a ranking police officer in Istanbul was shot by leftist terrorists and a captured leftist terrorist was shot in ambush while in police custody, apparently by his former associates.

Despite those incidents the country, which had recently seen an average of 16 people a day killed in fighting between rightist and leftist extremists, has been generally calm since the takeover.

The military rulers still appeared to be having trouble keeping their pledge to appoint a civilian government this week. It was understood that politicians were unwilling to participate in the new government, in part because members of the ousted Government and of Parliament

Leftist Terrorist to Death

are in custody.

The generals, who are calling themselves the National Security Council, met tonight. Included on their agenda was legislation to insure that Turks follow the path of Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey and the hero of the army.

Permission for U-2's Expected

ANKARA, Sept. 19 (Reuters) — Turkey's military rulers are expected to allow American U-2 spy planes to monitor Soviet military activities from Turkish airspace, Western military sources said today.

After losing intelligence-gathering stations in Iran, the United States considered high-altitude U-2 flights along the Turkish-Soviet border essential for

checking Soviet missile activity.

The sources said the new head of state, Gen. Kenan Evren, and the governing National Security Council were considering a request by the United States for the flights, which the former civilian Government had been arguing about for more than a year.

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Poland

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20 September 1980

Soviet troops reportedly active near Poland

Washington (AP)—The United States has detected signs of increased military maneuvers in the Soviet Union and East Germany, prompting concern among U.S. officials over the possibility of Soviet intervention in Poland.

Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie said yesterday that the United States is monitoring the situation closely.

Asked whether he thought there was a danger of a Soviet invasion, Mr. Muskie said, "When there is a coincidence of political developments and these exercises in that area of the world, one would not be wise to overlook the coincidence."

Earlier, John Trattner, a State Department spokesman, had confirmed a *Boston Globe* article saying that unusual military activities were detected near Poland in recent days.

Mr. Trattner said the United States is drawing no conclusions about whether the activities are related to Poland's recent labor unrest and challenges to the Communist monopoly on power in that country.

Mr. Trattner also did not rule out the possibility that the activities might be related to Warsaw Pact maneuvers routinely carried out in the late summer.

"That's something that we're still evaluating," he said. "It could be, or it might not be. I think we have not reached a conclusion on that."

Other officials, who asked not to be identified, said the activities have been carried out in East Germany and in the Soviet Union, both of which have long borders with Poland.

The *Globe* account, citing Western in-

telligence reports, said the military activity could presage either an invasion of Poland or a significant show of force for intimidation purposes.

Two weeks ago, State Department officials said Mr. Muskie had appealed for Soviet restraint in dealing with Poland during a meeting with a Soviet Embassy official.

Mr. Trattner reiterated yesterday that the Soviets have been made aware of the U.S. position that Polish problems should be left to the Poles themselves to resolve. He said the signs of increased activity near Poland were detected a little more than a week ago.

Until yesterday's disclosures, American officials generally have praised the Soviets for exercising restraint.

Nonetheless, there have been indications of Soviet uneasiness about the developments in Poland. Strikes in two Polish coastal cities ended almost three weeks ago with a precedent-setting agreement allowing workers to form their own independent trade unions. The terms of the settlement were attacked in the Soviet press.

Since the Polish strikes began, American officials have been haunted by the possibility that the Soviets might respond by using force—as they did in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

The *Globe* account said the new military activity near Poland is reported to include "preparations to move" by some of the 20 divisions in the Soviet Union's western military districts. Similar activities are taking place in East Germany.

Soviet Maneuvers Near Poland Worry European Nations

U.S. Aide Says Allies Fear Intervention

By Jeremiah O'Leary
Washington Star Staff Writer

Military maneuvers by Soviet and East German forces have created deep concern among some European nations that the Kremlin may not yet have ruled out intervention to erase the new freedoms in Poland, according to a highly placed administration source.

"Because of certain ambiguities detected by Western intelligence sources, it is the informed opinion in Europe that the book is not yet closed on the reforms that came in the wake of the Polish strikes," said the administration official.

"It would be rash to conclude that the Russians will intervene in Poland but we would have to be blind to reach the opposite conclusion."

The official, speaking on deep background, said the annual autumn maneuvers of the Warsaw Pact nations are not of the type to indicate military action nor the presence of significant new forces on Poland's borders. But he said the activities of the Soviet and East German forces are sufficiently ambiguous to concern some of the Europeans and might imply Soviet action in the future. He said the maneuvers might or might not be directed at Poland if the situation there gets further out of hand.

He said an attack on Poland would precipitate large scale fighting in central Europe and noted that the French are especially close to the Poles. France's relations with the Soviet Union could not remain unaffected if the Soviets make a military incursion against the Poles.

"There are no grounds for a war scare," the official told a selected group of reporters. "I cannot say that the Soviets have violated any commitment of the Helsinki pact by which they are pledged to notify the western alliance well in advance of maneuvers by up to 25,000 men."

He said he would describe the attitude of the other European nations as uneasy and somewhat concerned but not as panic in light of their observation of the maneuvers in East Germany.

It was reported yesterday that there have been indications of preparation for movement by up to 20 divisions in western Russia and among some of the 20 Soviet divisions in East Germany. It also has been reported that there are signs of some mobilization of Russian reservists.

The Soviets are known to be distressed by the victories won by Polish labor over the Communist Party leadership in Poland after the successful strike in the Gdansk shipyards and subsequently by Silesian miners. The strike and the concessions won by the workers led to the downfall of the government of Prime Minister Edward Gierk.

The Russians sent their troops into Czechoslovakia and Hungary when the Communist rule was threatened but met almost no resistance. Western observers believe, however, that the Polish army and people would fight in event of an invasion by the Soviets or other satellite nations.

The administration official also said:

The U.S. government has informed the new military regime in South Korea as directly as possible that U.S.-Korean relations would be seriously affected if opposition leader Kim Dae Jung is executed. President Chun Doo Hwan has the power to reverse the death sentence meted out to Kim at his court-martial but the U.S. finds it regrettable that Kim was tried in the first place.

The military confrontation between Iran and Iraq is viewed by the Carter administration as a very serious matter.

The official said that if the two countries go to war over the territorial dispute involving southwestern Iran, the Iraqis probably would defeat the Iranians. But he said the religious balance would be upset in Iraq if that country seized control over the Khuzestan area, where most of the two and a half million Arab inhabitants are members of the Shiite Moslem sect. The population of Iraq is now about evenly divided between Sunni and Shiite Moslems.

In addition, an Iraqi victory over Iran would probably accelerate the fragmentation of Iran, where there are breakaway movements among the Kurds and Azerbaijanis in the northwest and the Qosbgais in eastern Iran.

There is an inventory of U.S. government documents on relations with Iran but they were ordered to be assembled some months ago when it appeared likely there might be a trial of the 52 Americans being held hostage in Iran. He said the documents are not of an urgent nature and that he did not even know if a set of the documents existed in the office of President Carter's National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski.

The Soviet soldier who defected and took refuge in the American Embassy in Kabul is spending his time playing chess with the Marine guards, practicing his English and looking at movies like "The Pink Panther." There are indications that a serious hepatitis epidemic is affecting Soviet troops occupying Afghanistan. There is a growing insecurity among Soviet forces in Kabul and most of the city of Herat is now in rebel Afghan hands.

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20 September 1980

West Is Watching Soviet Maneuvers Close to Poland

By Michael Getler
Washington Post Staff Writer

U.S. and West European governments are keeping a close eye on recently detected signs of unusual military activity by Soviet forces in the western Soviet Union and East Germany that could be aimed at Poland.

Though several U.S. officials said privately yesterday that they do not believe there is an imminent threat of Soviet military intervention in Poland, Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie reflected U.S. wariness when asked by reporters if he has any sense of danger about the reported Soviet moves.

"Whenever there is a coincidence of political developments," such as those that have been sweeping through Poland's labor force in recent weeks, "and these [military] exercises in that area of the world, one would not be wise to overlook the coincidence," he said.

U.S. officials generally are close-mouthed about exactly what the Soviet forces are doing, other than confirming that Western intelligence agencies—presumably including allied sources in Europe—have detected signs of unusual activity that began about a week ago.

One senior administrative official, who asked not to be identified, said the concern, especially among Europeans, centers on Soviet troop maneuvers now under way that have enough "ambiguity" and "flexibility" about them to suggest they could be turned toward Poland.

Officials said the activity does not involve, at this point, a large build-up of Soviet troops near Poland's borders or movement of troops toward

those borders. Rather, they suggested that other unusual activity that triggered the West's caution had to do with signs of a possible mobilization of reserves and with Soviet military equipment, such as electronic gear used for communications and to command and control military units.

One senior official said it is premature to jump to hasty conclusions about Soviet intentions and what the military moves mean. Some Soviet forces are on regular fall maneuvers, but sources said the exercises attracting the West's attention have distinctive aspects to them.

There are no grounds, the senior official added, for a war scare. But economic and political uncertainties in Poland since the strikes that rocked the country and caused a change in Communist Party leadership are viewed here as being far from ended.

"It would be rash to conclude the Soviets are going to intervene, but blind to conclude that they won't," he said.

Another top U.S. expert on Poland said he "wasn't excited yet," feeling that the Soviet actions primarily may be meant as a demonstration of power to Poland's leaders and workers to pressure them to get things under control.

The Soviet Union has about 20 divisions in East Germany, on one side of Poland, and at least another 20 in the western military districts of the Soviet Union, east of Poland.

The Soviets, however, have only two divisions based in Poland and so would need time to make a sizable force ready for combat and move it to the Polish borders. U.S. sources estimate that the West would have

two weeks of additional warning time before an actual attack, because such a large mobilization would be difficult for Moscow to hide.

The stakes for Moscow and Central Europe in such an enterprise, however, would be enormous and the results possibly catastrophic.

When the Soviets moved into Hungary in 1956 to put down an uprising there, the Hungarians fought back, although they had little to fight with. And the Soviet-led thrust into Czechoslovakia in 1968 to put down the liberalization movement there met with little resistance.

But it is believed that the fiercely nationalistic Poles would fight the Soviets if they intervened, and that the 15-division Polish army might turn its guns on the invaders.

Polish workers won extraordinary concessions from their communist government with a disciplined and dignified approach, free of violence. Those tactics were designed not to give the Soviets any pretext to intervene.

State Department spokesman John Trattner yesterday reiterated the U.S. view that the Polish people and government should be allowed to work out their problems on their own. Officials said that Muskie two weeks ago—before the new activities were detected—met with a Soviet Embassy official and appealed for Soviet restraint in dealing with Poland.

U.S. Reports Signs of Soviet Activity On Poland's East and West Borders

By **BERNARD GWERTZMAN**

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 19 — The United States said today that it had noted signs of "increased military activity" by the Soviet Union along Poland's western and eastern borders, raising concern among some officials about Soviet motives.

While the officials cautioned that the data so far was tentative, the increase in Soviet communications traffic and the movement of forces near the Polish borders were unsettling to several officials who only a week ago were reporting no indications of unusual Soviet movements.

"We have noted signs of increased military activity by Soviet forces," said John H. Trattner, the State Department spokesman. "We are monitoring Soviet troop activity very closely. I cannot give you a detailed analysis."

A senior Administration official said: "We don't want to build up a war scare. It is simply that the situation is sufficiently ambiguous to make some Europeans concerned."

Increased Aid for Poland

Formally, the Soviet leaders have welcomed the actions of the new Polish leader, Stanislaw Kania, and have agreed to increase economic aid to Poland.

When a crisis atmosphere existed in Poland during the recent widespread strikes, American officials were relieved that Soviet forces in the western Soviet Union and in East Germany were doing nothing near the Polish frontiers that could be seen as provocative.

There are perhaps 20 Soviet divisions in East Germany and 20 in the western part of the Soviet Union, the officials said. Some units were involved in Warsaw Pact exercises in East Germany and the adjacent Baltic Sea area from Sept. 4 to 12, but the current activity is apparently unrelated to the maneuvers.

The officials said that the Soviet activity was worrying Western European governments more than the United States, which has not raised the matter with the Soviet Union. A Pentagon official said the Defense Intelligence Agency was more concerned than the Central Intelligence Agency or the State Department.

Warning to Polish Workers

Some State Department officials speculated that the Russians might be trying to warn the Polish workers and Government not to assume that Moscow would accept whatever happened in Poland.

Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie said in a recent interview that the Russians had been restrained in the Polish crisis, theorizing that it was because of the worldwide reaction to the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan last December.

Soviet troops were sent into action in East Berlin in 1953, in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968 to reassert Soviet dominance.

Throughout the Polish crisis officials here wondered whether the Russians might move into Poland. It has generally been assumed here that the Soviet Union would intervene only in the most extreme circumstances, because to do so would have a chilling effect on the West and would probably help unify the Western alliance at a time when Moscow is seeking to weaken Western European links to the United States.

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Stealth

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24 September 1980

Disclosures on Secret Plane Remain a Political Football

By CHARLES MOHR
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 23 — In the last three weeks officials of the Carter Administration have had opportunity to reply to charges by Ronald Reagan and others that the Administration dealt a "grievous blow" to national security by disclosing, for political purposes, a secret effort to develop an aircraft capable of escaping radar detection.

The Administration defended its disclosures about the "Stealth" aircraft by arguing that they would have become necessary within months in any case and that unauthorized disclosures of information in August made prompt official disclosure inescapable.

Despite those arguments and despite the indignant denials of high Defense Department officials and President Carter that they or anyone acting on the President's authority had engineered the disclosures to justify the official disclosure, the issue may die hard.

And its ultimate bearing on President Carter's re-election prospects may depend not so much on unproved suggestions of impropriety as on judgments and actions freely admitted by Administration officials.

Body of Information

Days of testimony before the subcommittee on investigations of the House Armed Services Committee, interviews with a variety of sources, the growing printed record and the accumulation of Administration statements have created a body of information that in some ways illuminates but in other ways deepens the shadows of the Stealth controversy. This is the chronology that emerges:

Soon after taking office in 1977, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and the Undersecretary for Research and Engineering, William J. Perry, were reviewing some \$2 billion worth of experimental "technology base" defense programs and found among them a program to develop "low observable" characteristics in aircraft that would enable them to avoid detection by air defense systems, such as radar.

The technical details of the Stealth program were secret, but its existence had been discussed in fragments in aerospace and defense trade journals in 1975 and 1976.

Mr. Brown and Dr. Perry apparently believed that the program had unusual significance and promise. All elements of it, including "program existence," were placed under "compartmented" and "named list" secrecy of the highest order, and to Dr. Perry's many other duties was added that of project manager.

Financing stood at about \$10 million in 1977, according to an article published Aug. 22, 1978 in Armed Forces Journal that was based in considerable part on an interview with Dr. Perry. The article, written by the editor, Benjamin F. Schemmer, said at one point that spending on Stealth had grown to "hundreds of millions of dollars a year."

Cost Put Around \$1 Billion

Because President Carter, Secretary Brown and Undersecretary Perry have all said the program has grown "a hundredfold," there is indirect evidence that financing may now be in the neighborhood of \$1 billion.

Certainly, some Defense Department officials regard the Stealth program as the most promising and important of all experimental military efforts now underway, even though it is far from turning out operation military aircraft, they say.

Dr. Perry himself testified to a Congressional subcommittee investigating the matter that "we set extraordinary goals — performance far beyond what had been achieved, with program schedules moving at a substantially faster pace than we normally expect."

"I take more personal pride in this program than in any other program in which I have been involved," he added.

In June of 1978, Dr. Perry has testified, he prevailed upon Mr. Schemmer not to publish an article on Stealth that had been pieced together from technical records and other sources. Dr. Perry argued that publishing the article would harm the national interests.

Dr. Perry also has testified, however, that by this year he had become increasingly doubtful of maintaining the secrecy of "program existence" much longer and that he had told Secretary Brown so.

The expanding size and expense of the program meant that a growing circle of people, including Senators and Representatives, would have to be informed of the program's existence, the two men say.

Even so, two glancing references in the press to Stealth in June did not provoke any official announcement of the program. And last January an Air Force general, Kelly Burke, was permitted to say in a speech to an aeronautical association meeting in Monterey, Calif., that "high on our list of hardware explorations is radar-absorbing material to reduce radar cross sections" of aircraft, because, Dr. Perry later testified, failure to mention such research would have "created a vacuum which would have been inexplicable" and might have aroused Soviet suspicions of a breakthrough.

Reaction to Post Story

The reaction to a front-page story in The Washington Post on Aug. 14 was starkly different.

That story said that President Carter would "commit himself" to developing a new strategic bomber, perhaps that very night in his acceptance speech at the Democratic National Convention in New

York. Mr. Carter, the story added, would thus be able to argue that he had acted wisely in canceling the B-1 bomber program in 1977 and thereby "steal a march" on Mr. Reagan.

The Republican Presidential candidate's criticism would be blunted, the thinking went, because the President could say that "breakthroughs in technology" would make a newer bomber more capable, and a rudimentary description of the "new bomber" followed.

Although the concerned Defense Department officials were later to deny almost every aspect of the story, and though its description of Stealth was sketchy, Dr. Perry now describes the story as "the major security break" that "irretrievably compromised the existence of the program."

Dr. Perry has testified before the investigations subcommittee of Representative Samuel S. Stratton, Democrat of upstate New York, that the same day the story appeared, Aug. 14, he sent a recommendation to Secretary Brown that "program existence" be declassified and new security guidelines adopted. On Aug. 16 that was done.

Mr. Brown argued before the Stratton subcommittee that to have ignored the Post story was a "totally unworkable option" leading to a "cascade of new leaks, some of them containing much more damaging information about the technical details of the program."

Brown's Reasoning Disputed

That is one of the central elements of the controversy and one that, perhaps, can never be resolved.

Several Republicans, notably Representative Robin L. Beard, Republican of Tennessee, and Senator John W. Warner, Republican of Virginia, say they simply cannot see how Secretary Brown's basic argument is credible. And General Richard H. Ellis of the Strategic Air Command strongly urged against official confirmation, saying it would give Moscow years "of advance warning" of an operational system they must eventually counter and would "sound the death knell of that system."

Whether or not there was merit in the Defense Secretary's basic logic, the actual steps taken by the department to "limit damage" left some Congressmen in both parties dumbfounded.

On Aug. 18 Dr. Perry summoned Mr. Schemmer and informed him that some elements of the program were being declassified. Because Mr. Schemmer had suppressed a story two years before at Dr. Perry's request, he was given permission to publish a new story, the one that appeared on Aug. 22.

Dr. Perry later told the Stratton subcommittee that he had dealt with Mr. Schemmer only partly out of a sense of

CONTINUED

obligation to the editor. Another major factor, Dr. Perry said, was to dissuade Mr. Schemmer from including "damaging" information.

However, Mr. Schemmer has testified that, after re-reading his own story and the information disclosed in other publications, he concluded that the other disclosures were just "smoke." He telephoned Dr. Perry to urge, unsuccessfully, that no disclosure be made.

Mr. Schemmer has said that 20 to 30 percent of his article was new material furnished that day by Dr. Perry, and the article seems vastly more authoritative and revealing than any of the unauthorized disclosures that Secretary Brown described as "deplorable."

It contains considerable information about test flights on several prototypes and mentions that a Stealth version of a strategic bomber is on the drawing boards.

Brown's Aug. 22 News Conference

The 11-page, single-spaced transcript of Secretary Brown's own news conference of Aug. 22 is also apparently a complete confirmation of what Mr. Brown called "a major technological advance of great military significance." The Secretary said that the Stealth technology "enables the United States to build manned and unmanned aircraft that cannot be successfully intercepted with existing air defense systems. We have demonstrated to our satisfaction that the technology works."

It was this emphasis on the success of the program that Mr. Reagan most criticized, calling it a "cynical misuse of power and a clear abuse of the public trust."

In attempting to inform members of four Congressional committees of the decision to declassify the program, Dr. Perry encountered embarrassing resistance, from Senators who strongly advised against declassification and then

from some Representatives who say that they believed they were being admonished to keep the secret that soon flashed across their television screens. Their reaction led to the Congressional investigation, which began on Aug. 27.

The contrast in attitude between the Administration and its critics about the gravity of the security leaks and wisdom of the official disclosure may in fact be the fuel that keeps the controversy alive.

Secretary Brown began his testimony by saying, "I consider it vital that the limited, though necessary, focus on leaks does not divert our attention from the larger reality . . . that this nation has achieved a major technological advance of great military significance."

Mr. Beard, the Republican Representative, responded, "I see a political sham going on." He and others remain convinced that a decision was made to transform a secret success to a public success for political gain.

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HUMAN EVENTS
20 September 1980

The Reagan Campaign

Carter Under Bipartisan Assault for 'Stealth' Leak

EXCERPT

The leak, in and of itself, suggested Scowcroft, was not so critical. But by stressing the program was "doable" and "was of the highest importance," said Scowcroft, the U.S. made it far easier for the Soviets to secure our technology or combat it. There are hundreds of Soviet intelligence analysts trying to track down thousands of leads, he said, so when some information is confirmed, these analysts can then begin concentrating their efforts on what they know to be important.

"It's possible that Brezhnev knew of the program before," he said, "but if he didn't he certainly does now. And what he knows is that it is an important U.S. program." This information is of "enormous significance to them [the Soviets] in their allocation of resources."

Scowcroft also bluntly rejected President Carter's statement that the Stealth project had not even been classified by the Ford Administration. "What I can say," said Scowcroft, "... is that at a critical milestone of the program in 1976, it was not only top secret but had additional restrictive access as well."

Ray Cline, a former CIA official, who appeared with Scowcroft at the National Press Club, said he was upset by the "cavalier disregard" for the security classification involved. "This technology was under intensive study in the CIA and other agencies 15 years ago when I was deputy director of the CIA," said Cline. "It was then given the highest classification possible, with elaborate controls of distribution of information."

Cline said that from his long years of experience he has "no doubt that one of the greatest benefits they [the Soviets] can have is confirmation by officials of the Administration that the program is alive and is considered a technological breakthrough and is of high priority." Whenever the Soviets can turn up something on the progress of

some technological breakthrough, he said, this gives an opportunity for their agents "to crawl a little further into the recesses of our secrets." The Soviets, added Cline, have invested "enormous" sums of money and manpower in trying to penetrate our technology, and in "helping the Soviet Union—the KGB, the GRU—discover more about this technology, we have done serious harm to our national security...."

The most lethal blast, however, may have come from retired Adm. Elmo Zumwalt, a long-time Democrat and former chief of naval operations. In a letter to Rear Adm. William Thompson, which was obtained by Sen. Richard Lugar (R.-Ind.), Zumwalt personally accused President Carter of leaking the information about the "Stealth" technological advance.

Said Zumwalt:

"There appears to be no doubt, based on my contacts with White House staff and Pentagon officials, that the decision was made by the President to disclose the existence of this technology, and that the method chosen was first to 'leak' its existence and then be forced to confirm the leak.

"I have been told by my sources that the decision was a political one designed to diffuse criticism of the President for his decision to cancel the B-1 strategic bomber. The political theory was to establish retroactively a justification for the earlier cancellation, i.e., it can now be asserted that the B-1 was cancelled in order to await the development of Stealth technology.

"The decision to disclose this technology, even if it had been done in response to an inadvertent rather than a deliberate leak, was, in my judgment, unbelievably harmful to the national security. The fact that our government has confirmed at the highest levels the existence and feasibility of the technology, gives the Soviet Union at least a five-year head start in reacting to it, in

comparison to the timing of their reaction had they had to develop the knowledge of its existence and the certainty of its feasibility through their own means.

"I have found no one to whom I have talked within the national security system who disagrees with this view."

The networks gave the Zumwalt letter a bit of a ride, but whether it will make the pages of our most prestigious mass-circulation weeklies is uncertain. What does seem certain, however, is that a large portion of the U.S. defense and intelligence community believes, with Ronald Reagan that President Carter is, in fact, playing politics with our national security.

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ON PAGE A1-17THE WASHINGTON POST
21 September 1980

Carter Orders Own Stealth Leak Probe

By Micael Getler

Washington Post Staff Writer

President Carter has "directed the attorney general, with the assistance of the FBI," to take over the leaks to the press about the Pentagon's Stealth project, in which new aircraft are being developed which supposedly will be largely "invisible" to enemy radars.

The president's order is contained in a letter to Rep. Samuel S. Stratton (D-N.Y.), chairman of the subcommittee on investigations of the House Armed Services Committee.

In that letter, which the congressman's office made available yester-

day, Carter says he "shares the committee's dismay at the rash of disclosures of national security information that recently occurred."

Though the president mentioned a rash of disclosures, the letter seems to indicate that the order of the attorney general and FBI pertains only to the Stealth program and to leaks about that project to The Washington Post, Aviation Week and Space Technology magazine, and ABC News.

Carter said he had asked Defense Secretary Harold Brown to cooperate with the attorney general and with the Stratton subcommittee's own inquiry, and said the results of the

Justice Department's probe will be made available to the subcommittee.

Thus far, the only publicly known investigation of Stealth leaks is an internal one by the defense intelligence service, which has no authority, according to defense officials, to take its probe much beyond the Pentagon.

The controversy over published reports in mid-August about Stealth has turned out to be one of the biggest and longest-running battles of the election campaign.

Republican challenger Ronald Reagan and many of the defense specialists supporting him claim that the Carter administration intentionally leaked enough information about the project to justify a subsequent press conference by Defense Secretary Brown confirming the program and thus making the administration look better on defense matters than its record might otherwise indicate.

The administration has denied this, and in his letter to Stratton the president wrote: "I can, and do, state unequivocally that neither I, nor any member of White House staff, acting under my direction or authority, have engaged in or authorized the leaking of classified information concerning the Stealth program."

The president's disclaimer and other portions of the letter describing administration action came in response to a letter Stratton sent to Carter on Sept. 12 on behalf of the subcommittee.

Stratton asked Carter whether he "directed or approved any release of information by the secretary of defense on the Stealth program" and, if so, to provide the committee "with a full description of the circumstances surrounding his decision."

Concerning Brown's role, Carter replied that the secretary has "scrupulously followed" guidance given him in earlier years to maintain security around the program as tightly, and for as long, as possible.

Carter said that earlier this year Brown expressed the belief that increasing budget demands for Stealth would soon require expanded briefings for Congress about the project in connection with next year's spending.

Then came the major press reports about Stealth in mid-August, shortly before the Democratic convention.

In his letter Carter said that on Aug. 17, Brown advised him that in view of the "serious press leaks" he had concluded that the timetable for acknowledging the existence of Stealth technology had to be advanced while continuing to protect the security of the technical details. Brown's controversial press conference followed soon after.

Carter said that he did not direct Brown to take that step in acknowledging Stealth, but that he approved it, agrees with Brown's decision and "continues to believe that his judgment in this matter was correct."

Carter Denies Directing Disclosure of Stealth Program

By RICHARD BURT
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 20 — President Carter denied today that he or his staff had authorized the disclosure of information on the highly secret Air Force program to develop a radar-resistant aircraft, and said that the Attorney General's office had been ordered to investigate the matter.

In a letter to Representative Samuel S. Stratton, Democrat of upstate New York, Mr. Carter termed the Air Force pro-

gram, known as Stealth, "a major technological breakthrough." Mr. Carter said that early in his Administration, he ordered the Defense Department "to maintain the security of the Stealth program as tightly as possible." He added, "I can and do state unequivocally that neither I, nor any member of the White House staff acting under my direction or authorization, have engaged in or authorized the leaking of classified information concerning the Stealth program."

Meanwhile, a high-ranking defense official, who asked not to be identified, said that Secretary of Defense Harold Brown told a group of aides last month that, prior to the disclosures, the Administration was planning to unveil the existence of the Stealth project late this month.

Mr. Carter's letter is designed to defuse the political controversy that developed last month when Mr. Brown, at a news conference, confirmed that the United States was building a new generation of experimental aircraft nearly invisible to Soviet radar. Mr. Brown and White House aides said the Administration was forced to acknowledge the program's existence after accounts of the project appeared in newspapers and on television news programs.

Political Motive Alleged

However, in hearings in recent weeks held by the House Armed Services investigations subcommittee, which Mr. Stratton heads, political opponents of Mr. Carter have charged that Mr. Brown's news conference was meant to enhance the Administration's image on military preparedness. In private, several Pentagon aides have said that Mr. Brown could have refused comment on the news articles.

There have been suggestions, from Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr., retired, and others, that the White House ordered Mr. Brown to disclose the research program as part of campaign to counter criticism from Ronald Reagan, the Republican Presidential nominee, of Mr. Carter's military record. Admiral Zumwalt, former Chief of Naval Operations, is an adviser to the Reagan campaign.

In addition to denying that the White House had any role in the original disclosures concerning Stealth, Mr. Carter also told Mr. Stratton that the decision to acknowledge the project's existence had been made by Secretary Brown. Mr. Carter said Mr. Brown had been given full responsibility for the program, "including its classification and security aspects."

Mr. Carter said that on Aug. 17, when Mr. Brown told him of his plan to acknowledge the existence of the program, "I agreed with that decision."

Mr. Carter added, "I did not direct him to take that step, but I approved it then, and continue to believe that his judgment in this matter was correct."

Congressional aides said Mr. Carter's letter would probably relieve some of the doubts on Capitol Hill about the White House role in the matter, but they said that additional questions still had to be resolved. For instance, they said, the rationale for Mr. Brown's decision to hold a news conference on the secret program remained unclear.

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Charters/Graymail Legislation

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U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
29 September 1980

Capitol Hill Issues

Protection for Intelligence Agents

A bill making it a crime to publicly reveal the identities of undercover intelligence agents has cleared initial hurdles in the Senate and House.

But backers have run into a buzz saw of controversy over whether the legislation is constitutional.

Alarmed by the recent publication of the names and addresses of alleged CIA agents, many in Congress favor steps to protect secret agents of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other intelligence-gathering units.

Under legislation approved by committees in the House and Senate, anyone with authorized access to

classified information who publicly identifies a covert intelligence agent could be sentenced to up to 10 years in jail and fined as much as \$50,000.

There is little dispute over this portion of the bill. But a battle is raging over an additional provision making it a crime for any private citizen to intentionally expose an agent in an effort to impair or impede the foreign-intelligence activities of the United States. A prison sentence of up to three years and a fine of up to \$15,000 could be imposed.

Opponents charge that such a prohibition could subject private citizens to prosecution even if they used

only publicly available information to identify an agent.

Many journalists and law professors contend that the provision violates the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech and free press. They warn that reporters could be punished for legitimate exposés on CIA corruption or incompetence or misbehavior by other agencies.

Backers scoff at the charges of unconstitutionality. They insist that lives are at stake, pointing to a Washington-based publication, *Covert Action Information Bulletin*, which in July named 15 Americans in Jamaica it said were CIA agents. Two of those on the list were apparent targets of assassins soon thereafter.

The outlook for the bill: Cloudy.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
23 September 1980

House Approves 'Graymail' Curb

United Press International

The House approved legislation yesterday designed to curb the problem of "graymail," cases in which criminal defendants threaten to reveal classified information.

In some cases, the government has been forced to reduce or drop them altogether in order to prevent a defendant from revealing classified information as part of his defense during a trial.

The bill, passed on a voice vote, would establish uniform procedures whereby the government could know in

advance of a trial what information must be disclosed.

The government could then make a decision on whether proceeding with prosecution was more important than the harm that would result from release of the information.

The court would be authorized to order that only a summary of the classified information be introduced rather than all documents cited by a defendant.

Supporters of the legislation said it would not interfere with a defendant's legitimate right to use pertinent classified documents in presenting a defense.

ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH
22 September 1980

Shielding Agencies From Press

Federal intelligence agencies are now lobbying for legislation that would curb public and press monitoring of their activities. The Central Intelligence Agency is pressing for a law making it a crime to disclose agents' names. And the Federal Bureau of Investigation is urging amendment of the Freedom of Information Act to enable the bureau to withhold various categories of information, including that which "tends to identify informants."

Intelligence committees in both the Senate and House have approved bills that make it a crime to name agents of U.S. intelligence organizations, whether the information comes from classified or unclassified sources. Criminal sanctions would extend to private citizens, including journalists, who reveal agents' names in an effort to impair covert intelligence. The obvious big flaw in this legislation is that it would permit the prosecution of those who disclosed names in the course of publishing or broadcasting stories about illegal activities committed by intelligence agencies.

In an effort to improve the legislation, the Senate Judiciary Committee adopted several amendments to the Intelligence Committee bill. One amendment would make it a legal defense against prosecution if the disclosure of the agents' identities was "an integral part of another activity such as news reporting of intelligence failures or abuses, academic study of government policies and programs, enforcement by a private organization of its internal rules and regulations (such as by purging its ranks of CIA infiltrators), or other activities protected by the First Amendment."

Although the amendments (offered by liberal Democrats on the Judiciary Committee) may make the pending legislation seem more acceptable, they apparently have little chance of final approval. They were reported to have been

put forward as bargaining chips and are likely to be weakened or eliminated on the Senate floor, where most members appear so eager to unleash the CIA to resume its dirty tricks abroad that they are willing to sacrifice First Amendment rights. Few Americans would want to expose intelligence agents to danger as a result of publicity. But the Intelligence Committee bills are far too broad. Hope of preventing enactment of legislation that would largely shield the CIA from watchdog observation rests on full debate that will expose the basic thrust of the legislation for what it is — an attempt to give the CIA a freer hand to operate as it sees fit.

As for the FBI, Director William H. Webster contends that more protection for the agency under the Freedom of Information Act is needed because informants — fearing that they will be identified by criminals — are becoming less cooperative. But congressional staffers who deal with the bureau believe it is indeed able to protect its information and that the problem is really one of convincing informants of this fact.

As it stands, the FOI Act already exempts from its coverage investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, disclosure of which would identify a confidential source, reveal investigative techniques or endanger the life or safety of law enforcement personnel. Under this exemption, the FBI can now withhold information that it thinks should be confidential; and a litigant can only obtain it by appeal to the courts, where the bureau would have a good chance of being upheld.

Before Congress passes laws that would further shield intelligence agencies from public and press scrutiny, its members should recall the years of abuse when secrecy was closely maintained. The apparent fact that secret agencies have mended their ways doesn't mean that they have been made immune from future abuse.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE AbTHE WASHINGTON POST
20 September 1980

On Capitol Hill

The Senate gave its final approval yesterday to a long-delayed bill giving Congress statutory oversight authority over the Central Intelligence Agency and the rest of the U.S. intelligence community.

The measure had been bogged down for weeks in a dispute over how much information the executive branch would have to provide to the House and Senate intelligence committees in the course of monitoring U.S. intelligence operations.

Under a compromise reached with House conferees and administration officials, the bill acknowledges the need of the executive branch to protect intelligence sources and methods and other classified information from unauthorized disclosure, but then adds that disclosure to the two select committees should not be considered "unauthorized disclosure." The president's constitutional authority to withhold information, while not defined, is also explicitly recognized.

The House Intelligence Committee's version was stronger and did not contain either of the Senate's caveats. But it had no chance of passage by the full House and never reached the floor.

As a result, the Senate oversight bill was tacked on as a rider to this year's intelligence authorization bill and emerged from a House-Senate conference this week as part of that measure. The House is expected to vote on the conference report next week.

—Richard L. Lyons and
George Lardner Jr.

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ON PAGE **27.**

THE ECONOMIST
20 September 1980

CIA

Secret agents or free press?

On July 4th the home of an American diplomat in Jamaica was raked by gunfire, two days after he had been described as the station chief of the Central Intelligence Agency. On November 4th most members of congress, and President Jim-

"WE HAD TO DO IT — HE PULLED A PEN ON US"



my Carter, are up for re-election. These two events help to explain why the house of representatives may be about to pass a bill that many believe to be unconstitutional; it has already been approved by the house judiciary committee.

Very properly, the bill is intended to protect the CIA's secret agents, many of whom are no longer as secret as they would like to be. For the practice of revealing agents' names is now routine among two groups: a few former government employees—such as the ex-agent, Mr Philip Agee—who have turned against the CIA; and a few freelance crusaders unconnected with government, such as Mr Louis Wolf, a Quaker who did alternative service in Laos in the 1960s as a conscientious objector. Mr Wolf publishes the Covert Action Information Bulletin and claims to have disclosed the identities of more than 2,000 American intelligence agents abroad. It was his publication that gave names for the CIA's men in Jamaica, just before the shooting on July 4th. This incident stirred many congressmen to action, aware no doubt that defence of the CIA would do them no harm in an election year. A similar

realisation may also have come to the administration; its original opposition to a bill making it a crime for anyone to publish information that led to the naming of a CIA agent had by August turned to support.

The main criticism of the bill stems from its failure to distinguish between those who gain their information by virtue of their government service (for instance, Mr Agee) and those who may learn it in other ways (for instance, journalists). It is this blunderbuss approach which concerns experts on the constitution, whose first amendment guarantees freedom of speech and of the press. They argue that the bill would make it a crime for newspapers to publish anything about the sort of CIA abuses that the press helped to expose in the 1960s.

Members of the house intelligence committee, aware of this objection, wanted the disclosure of an agent's name by a private citizen to be a crime only if made "with the intent to impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the United States". But, as Mr Tom Wicker has argued in the New York Times, to try to prevent the CIA from carrying out something like the Bay of Pigs escapade might be perfectly reasonable. Then, said the bill's supporters, let us distinguish between the "legitimate" press and the "illegitimate" press, meaning publications like the Covert Action Information Bulletin. But it was largely to safeguard the "illegitimate" press that the first amendment was originally drafted.

So far nobody has suggested a form of words that would help to protect CIA agents without threatening the freedom of the press. One solution would be for the CIA to cover its traces more effectively, so that people like Mr Wolf cannot unmask its agents merely by reference to government publications. Now that congress and the president have resolved their differences over the extent to which congress—through eight key members of its intelligence committees—can question the president about intelligence matters, it may be possible to improve the oversight of the CIA. That in turn may help the agency to keep its secrets secret.

AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN
8 September 1980

New CIA bill too restrictive

A new bill designed to protect the Central Intelligence Agency's secrecy appears to be too restrictive, perhaps unconstitutional.

The bill would make it a crime to disclose any information, even if obtained from unclassified sources, that serves to identify CIA officials or any other U.S. intelligence operative who has been working abroad.

That sounds patriotic, but senior members of the House Judiciary Committee are among those who believe the bill is unconstitutional. The bill, Chairman Peter Rodino, D-N.J., and five other senior Democrats say in a letter to other committee members, could outlaw the revelation of a wide range of CIA misdeeds. Had it been in force at the time of the Watergate break-in, they argue, it could have prevented investigation and disclosure of the CIA connections with some of the Watergate burglars.

The bill is aimed, the Washington Post Service says, at suppressing anti-CIA periodicals, but it would permit the prosecution of any journalist or other person who discloses operatives' names.

But, as Rodino and the others argue, if private citizens have been able to infer identities from public sources, so have the Soviet secret police.

The bill appears to be repressive, and the Congress should take another look at it to see if it would have any effect other than to restrict freedoms without protecting CIA secrecy.

LOUISVILLE TIMES (KY)
5 September 1980

Congress is far off target trying to protect CIA agents

times opinion

Enraged by the reported attack on a CIA man in Jamaica in July, Congress is about to react as senselessly as a man who blows up the city reservoir because he was overcharged by a plumber.

The attack on the agent came two days after he and other CIA operatives were identified by Louis Wolf, an editor of *Covert Action Information Bulletin*. The publication's stock in trade, as well as that of Mr. Wolf and co-editor Philip Agee, a former agent himself, has been the identification of CIA agents and operations around the world, ostensibly to reform the agency. The chief discernible effect, however, has been to make those identified as agents targets for attack.

Understandably, Congress wants to put an end to this reprehensible activity and provide protection for American agents. But the bills that are being stamped through both houses are as misdirected as the efforts of Mr. Wolf and Mr. Agee. To get at them, Congress is on the verge of shooting the First Amendment full of holes.

Few objections have been raised to prohibiting present and past government officials with access to classified security information

from disclosing the identity of CIA operatives overseas, and providing stiff fines and prison sentences for those who do so. That would cover former agents, including Mr. Agee.

But the present bills would also include every other American, even those who not only have no access to classified information but pass on information that has already been publicized. And the bills also would extend the gag to identifying FBI agents and their informants in this country who are involved in operations designated as "counterintelligence." That was a catch-all word, don't forget, that the FBI once used to cover its infiltration of and spying on American political groups.

An analysis of the proposed bills by the American Civil Liberties Union questions whether, if they had been law a decade ago, the Watergate burglaries could have ever come to light, since the burglars had CIA connections.

There is strong doubt, also, whether the many revelations of

clandestine activities by the CIA, such as its assassinations and attempted assassinations of foreign leaders, could have been revealed, perhaps not even its asinities, like plotting to make Fidel Castro's beard fall out.

It is indicative of just how far these bills go in prohibiting oversight of the intelligence agencies that one of them had to be amended to permit intelligence agents to be identified before the House and Senate Intelligence Committees, or even to identify themselves to each other.

And, as might be expected when Congress panics and starts firing wildly in all directions, it missed the target it wanted to hit. Many of the CIA identifications were gleaned from public, official biographies prepared by the U.S. State Department. They are as readily available to foreign agents and terrorists as they are to Mr. Wolf and Mr. Agee. The bills make them no less available and the identification of CIA agents no less difficult.

Congress should either extensively revise those bills to attack the real problem, instead of the Constitution, or chuck the whole thing.

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FBI Trial

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE B-18NEW YORK TIMES
25 September 1980

F.B.I. Agent Says Cuba Officials At U.N. Instructed Weathermen

By ROBERT PEAR

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 24 — A Federal Bureau of Investigation agent who followed the activities of the Weather Underground organization in the early 1970's testified today that some members of the militant antiwar group "received instructions" from intelligence officers attached to Cuba's mission to the United Nations.

The agent, James L. Vermeersch, was called as a witness for the Federal Government, but much of his testimony appeared to buttress the arguments of the two defendants, W. Mark Felt and Edward S. Miller, who were top officials of the bureau at the time. Mr. Felt and Mr. Miller are being tried in Federal District Court here on a felony charge of conspiring to violate the constitutional rights of citizens by authorizing Federal agents to break into homes without search warrants.

The break-ins were designed to find clues to the location of fugitive members of the Weather Underground, which had taken responsibility for bombings at the Pentagon, the United States Capitol and elsewhere. Defense attorneys have contended that the break-ins were part of a legitimate intelligence-gathering operation.

Mr. Vermeersch, a lawyer who is now the legal adviser in the bureau's St. Louis office, offered the first public disclosure of many of the points contained in a stipulation, or agreement, between the Government and the defendants that was designed to keep national security matters out of the trial. The stipulation was arranged by the trial judge, William B. Bryant, Chief Judge of the Federal District Court here.

In response to questions posed by Mark D. Cummings, a lawyer for Mr. Felt, Mr. Vermeersch testified that "Cuban intelligence officers were attached to the Cuban Mission to the United Nations and that at least some of the Weatherman fugitives and support personnel received instructions from the Cuban mission."

Mr. Vermeersch described the Cuban mission as "a contact point for the Weatherman organization," and he said that the first secretary of the mission in the early 1970's was known to be a Cuban intelligence officer.

Mr. Vermeersch, who said that he had participated in 15 to 20 break-ins without search warrants, asserted that the Weatherman organization had "more contacts abroad" and received more direction from abroad than the Communist Party of the United States.

Mr. Vermeersch insisted, under questioning by the chief prosecutor, John W. Nields Jr., that the searches conducted by the F.B.I. in the early 1970's without search warrants were legal. But he acknowledged that the evidence could never be introduced in court because, he said, it was "tainted." Mr. Nields said that the evidence was contaminated because the searches were illegal.

Mr. Vermeersch said he was aware that one of the leading Weatherman fugitives, Bernardine Dohrn, met in Cuba with representatives of the Vietcong in 1968 and 1969 and traveled to Algeria about 1970 to meet with representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization. At some time in the late 1960's or early 1970's, he said, Miss Dohrn lived in San Francisco at the home of a "Chinese Communist agent."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 417THE WASHINGTON POST
24 September 1980

Searched Homes in Vain, Weatherman Prober Says

By Laura Kiernan
Washington Post Staff Writer

An FBI agent who participated in secret break-ins at the residences of friends and relatives of members of the Weather Underground testified in federal court here yesterday that the searches were no help in either apprehending Weathermen fugitives or solving a series of bombings for which the radical group had claimed credit.

The witness, James Vermeersch, was a member of Squad 47, a team of as many as 50 FBI agents from the bureau's New York office. They were assembled in March 1970 to stop the bombings and to track down Weathermen sought on federal arrest warrants.

Vermeersch testified for the government at the trial of two former high-ranking FBI officials, W. Mark Felt and Edward S. Miller. Both are charged with conspiracy to violate the civil rights of the persons who were the targets of the break-ins, which were carried out in New York and New Jersey in 1972 and 1973. The charges is a felony that carries a penalty of 10 years in jail, a \$10,000 fine or both.

Vermeersch, a lawyer who is now legal adviser to the bureau's St. Louis office, said that while he was a member of Squad 47 he participated in 15 to 20 "black bag jobs"—FBI language for surreptitious entries without a warrant.

The bombing and the pursuit of the Weathermen fugitives, he said, presented "a unique threat to the bureau. All we knew when the squad was formed was that the bombs were exploding and no one knew who was responsible." As a result, Vermeersch testified, Squad 47 focused on persons it believed were connected to fugitives but who were "in fact living as normal citizens above ground."

The government contends that the entries, approved by Felt and Miller, were illegal because they targeted persons who had not been charged

with any crime. Defense lawyers told the jury they will prove that Felt and Miller authorized the break-ins for national security reasons to stop terrorist activities by the Weathermen, who they reasonably believed had significant connections with hostile countries. The government says that even in that case, Felt and Miller did not have the authority that was needed from either the president or the attorney general to authorize the entries.

Vermeersch, who participated in break-ins at four of the five residences listed in the indictment against Felt and Miller, said that the agents were searching not only for clues as to the whereabouts of the fugitives, but also for leads to the people behind the bombings. For example, Vermeersch testified, typewriting specimens found in the residences were examined to see if they matched typewriting on notes in which the Weathermen had claimed responsibility for the bombings.

However, he testified, none of the information collected ever led to an arrest. Its only value, he said, was to help the bureau "structuralize" the Weather Underground.

Vermeersch told the jury that agents usually obtained apartment keys from landlords who were paid about \$50 for their cooperation. Otherwise, an agent who was trained to pick locks obtained entry, Vermeersch testified. Inside, the agents hurriedly searched "just about everywhere" and then photographed documents with a camera concealed in an attache case.

ARTICLE CONTINUED
ON PAGE A-23NEW YORK TIMES
24 September 1980

Agent Says Top F.B.I. Officials Got Advance Word on Break-Ins

By ROBERT PEAR

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 23 — An agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation who secretly entered several homes in New York City without search warrants in the early 1970's testified today that his supervisors usually advised officials at bureau headquarters here before each "surreptitious entry."

The agent, James L. Vermeersch, testified at the trial of two former bureau officials, W. Mark Felt and Edward S. Miller, who are accused of conspiring to violate the constitutional rights of citizens by authorizing at least nine break-ins from May 1972 to April 1973. The purpose of the break-ins was to help locate fugitive members of the Weather Underground, a militant antiwar group that had taken responsibility for bombing government buildings and other public places.

Asked whether the break-ins had been useful, Mr. Vermeersch said, "I can't say they helped us apprehend a fugitive." Mr. Vermeersch, now a legal adviser in the bureau's St. Louis office, said that he had participated in 15 to 20 break-ins while he was an agent in New York.

The hunt for Weatherman fugitives was carried out by Mr. Vermeersch and other agents in a special unit known as Squad 47, which was established in 1970 after an explosion in a Greenwich Village townhouse killed three people.

Defendants Listen Attentively

Mr. Felt and Mr. Miller listened attentively as Mr. Vermeersch testified before William B. Bryant, chief judge of the Federal District Court here.

Mr. Vermeersch, who described himself as the "low man on the ladder," said that typically the special agent in charge

of the New York office "made a call to the Intelligence Division of the F.B.I. in Washington" to notify headquarters that "an entry was about to be conducted." Mr. Miller, who served in the bureau for 24 years, was the Assistant Director in charge of the Intelligence Division in 1972-73. Mr. Felt was the No. 2 official of the bureau at the time.

The chief of the New York office told officials in Washington the name and address of the premises to be searched without a warrant, Mr. Vermeersch said.

The chief prosecutor, John W. Nields Jr., asked Mr. Vermeersch these questions about a break-in at the Brooklyn apartment of Jennifer Dohrn, the sister of a leading Weatherman fugitive:

Q: Did you have a search warrant?

A: Oh, no.

Q: Did you have the consent of any occupant? A: No, of course not.

Miss Dohrn had not been formally accused of any crime and no warrant had been issued for her arrest, Mr. Vermeersch said. The bureau was looking for clues to the whereabouts of her sister, Bernardine, for whom an arrest warrant had been issued.

Mr. Vermeersch said that Jennifer Dohrn had publicly identified herself as a revolutionary dedicated to overthrowing the Government "through force, bombings and assassinations."

After consulting memorandums that he wrote at the time, Mr. Vermeersch testified that he and other agents had also searched, without a warrant, the homes of Frances Schreiber at 217 Thompson Street, Mortimer Bookchin at 325 Second Avenue and Leonard Machtiger at 315 East 86th Street, all in Manhattan.

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THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
23 September 1980

Ex-FBI Agents' Trial Slowed by Secrets

By Kenneth R. Walker

Washington Star Staff Writer

The use of sensitive, top-secret information has substantially slowed the U.S. District Court trial of two former FBI officials charged with approving illegal burglaries, the judge indicated yesterday.

Much of the first four days of the trial of W. Mark Felt, the former No. 2 FBI official, and Edward S. Miller, who headed the bureau's domestic intelligence branch, has been taken up with numerous lengthy bench conferences with Chief Judge William B. Bryant over the handling of the sensitive data.

Felt and Miller are on trial for allegedly approving burglaries, or "black bag jobs," of the homes of relatives and friends of fugitive members of the radical Weather Underground group who were sought in connection with several bombings. Although former FBI Director L. Patrick Gray III was also indicted, he will be tried separately at an as yet undetermined date.

The delays became so apparent yesterday that Bryant was forced to inform the sequestered jury, for the first time, that the interruptions were caused by attempts to tailor the material to avoid unwarranted disclosures.

The tailoring resulted from unprecedented negotiations between prosecution and defense attorneys and lead to the excision or rewording of virtually all the classified documents associated with the trial.

The procedures — the result of the government's desire to ensure that intelligence officials charged with office-related crimes can be brought to trial — have been vigorously opposed by the defense.

The first indication during the trial that the procedures had created a problem occurred last week when Felt's lawyer, Brian Gettings, complained at having to cross-examine a government witness by using one evidentiary document with portions excised for security reasons.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE AbTHE WASHINGTON POST
23 September 1980

FBI's Authority For Break-Ins Called Into Doubt

United Press International

The former head of a Justice Department task force that investigated FBI break-ins in the early 1970s told a jury yesterday he knew of no authority for the bureau to conduct such "black bag jobs" without the attorney general's approval.

The witness, William Gardner, agreed with prosecutors that no court has held that the attorney general could delegate to the FBI the power to approve break-ins or electronic surveillance.

Gardner, the government's lead-off witness, completed three days of testimony in the conspiracy trial of W. Mark Felt, the FBI's former number two man, and Edward Miller, its former intelligence chief.

Felt and Miller are charged with approving — without instruction from the president or the attorney general — nine illegal break-ins in 1972 and 1973 during an FBI search for fugitive members of the radical Weather Underground, an antiwar organization.

Gardner acknowledged to defense attorneys that there is nothing in the Constitution barring the attorney general from giving the FBI authority to order such surveillance.

But prosecutors introduced a June 19, 1972, memorandum in which Attorney General Richard Kleindienst directed acting FBI director L. Patrick Gray to "terminate immediately" all surveillance in domestic criminal investigations.

Despite the Kleindienst directive, which came after a Supreme Court decision that warrants are required for break-ins in domestic investigations, break-ins were conducted later that year and in 1973 in a search for members of the Weather Underground wanted for terrorist bombing, prosecutor John Nields Jr. said.

Defense lawyers argued that the Weather Underground had ties to hostile foreign powers and, therefore, the investigation was a national security probe with less stringent strictures on surveillance.

Defense lawyers introduced a 1954 memorandum from Attorney General Herbert Brownell giving the FBI director authority to conduct break-ins to install electronic listening devices in national security cases.

But Gardner said the Justice Department still reserved the right to review the decisions.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 7/20LOS ANGELES TIMES
20 September 1980

FBI Trial Links Weatherman to Cubans

Break-In Victim Got Advice on Revolution, Defense Asserts

By RONALD J. OSTROW

Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—Jennifer Dohrn, one of several victims of FBI break-ins, discussed "revolutionary activities" with Cuban intelligence officers and received advice from them, jurors in the trial of two former FBI officials were told Friday.

Brian P. Gettings, attorney for W. Mark Felt, one of the two retired officials accused of authorizing break-ins, made the allegation based on intelligence information that the government had sanitized but has stipulated is factual.

The question of foreign involvement with the Weather Underground, the target of the break-ins in 1972 and 1973, is a potentially integral element in the trial of Felt, former No. 2 man in the FBI, and Edward S. Miller, former FBI domestic intelligence chief.

Under a Supreme Court ruling at the time, it was not clear whether agents had to obtain a judicial warrant before installing a wiretap while investigating persons collaborating with or under the direction of foreign powers. Defense attorneys are suggesting that the same murkiness in the law extended to break-ins for photographing documents.

Prosecution Offers Document on Weatherman

As the Felt-Miller trial moved through its second day, prosecutor John W. Nields Jr. countered with a June 30, 1972, FBI document concluding that there was no evidence the Weatherman group had foreign involvement. The memo, titled "Proposals in Furtherance of Apprehension of Weatherman Fugitives," pledged that the bureau would remain "alert and sensitive" to any evidence of foreign involvement.

Aside from its legal significance, the mention of a possible Cuban role in the civil unrest that plagued the United States in the early 1970s had an obvious impact on the jury.

Jurors sat up in their chairs and their attention seemed to sharpen as Gettings raised the subject of Cuban involvement in questioning the former Justice Department attorney who directed the original break-in investigation.

Gettings drew a series of "I don't recall" replies as he asked Gardner whether he had seen FBI documents showing that Cuban intelligence had "extensive contact" with the Weatherman group and that Cuban intelligence provided advice and logistical support to such revolutionary groups and served as "a clandestine communications link" among leaders of the groups.

Quotes Discussions With Cubans

Reading off a list of 11 "new left" leaders that included Jennifer Dohrn, Gettings quoted the document as stating that they "discussed their activities with DGI (Cuban intelligence service) officers attached to the Cuban mission at the U.N. and received advice and in some instances instructions from them."

Over sharp objections from Gettings, Gardner said in response to Nields' questions that he had not seen "a single piece of evidence" linking with foreign powers two other break-in victims, Leonard Machtiner and Mortimer Bookchin.

Nields also cited an FBI document bearing Felt's and Miller's initials reporting that a wiretap on Dohrn was being shut off in June, 1972, because of a Supreme Court ruling that such surveillance of domestic subversive suspects required a judicial warrant.

"Is there any indication that the FBI requested approval by the attorney general for wiretapping Weatherman," after the high court ruling? Nields asked Gardner.

"No," Gardner replied.

"Do the documents show that the FBI determined Weatherman were agents of a foreign power?" the prosecutor asked.

"No," Gardner responded.

Conspiracy Trial Emphasizes Problem of Protecting Government Secrets

By STUART TAYLOR Jr.
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 18 — The trial of two former officials of the Federal Bureau of Investigation on charges of authorizing illegal break-ins will be a major test of the Government's ability to prosecute alleged crimes involving intelligence and national security activities without jeopardizing vital secrets.

The Government has abandoned or settled a number of major cases involving intelligence operations, including the perjury prosecution of a former Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms, because of concern that the defendants would expose classified information they asserted to be relevant to their defenses. The conflict in such cases between the need of the Government to protect classified information and the right of the defendants to obtain and use all relevant evidence has come to be known as the "graymail" problem.

This problem is present in its most acute form in the trial of W. Mark Felt,

former acting associate director of the bureau, and Edward S. Miller, former chief of the intelligence division, which opened here this week.

"Graymail" in its sense refers to the tactics of those who use the threat of exposing national security secrets extraneous to the charges at issue so as to force the Government to drop charges or settle them on terms advantageous to the defendants. Justice Department officials also use the term more broadly. Philip B. Heymann, head of the Department's criminal division, has said in Congressional testimony, "Wholly proper defense attempts to obtain or disclose classified information may present the Government with the same 'disclose or dismiss' dilemma."

Mr. Heymann was testifying in support of proposed legislation to provide for secret pretrial judicial screening of classified information that the defense seeks to use as evidence, as well as pretrial evidentiary rulings on disputed points and expedited appeals of such rulings.

The Justice Department began pushing for such legislation after it was forced to drop perjury charges in February 1979 against a former executive of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, Robert Berrellez, to avoid the disclosure of information about American intelligence activity in Latin America. The dismissal came after Federal District Judge Aubrey Robinson Jr. refused a prosecution request for an unusual form of protective order that would have required the defense to disclose in advance what secret information it planned to introduce and would have called for rulings by the judge in a closed session on the admissibility of such evidence.

The trial of Mr. Felt and Mr. Miller appears to present even more difficult problems regarding national security secrets than those that led to the dismissal of the Berrellez case. The case floats on a "virtual sea of classified information," according to court papers filed by Brian P. Gettings, one of Mr. Felt's attorneys, and much of this classified information is clearly relevant to the issues upon which the defendants rely to justify their actions.

Mr. Felt and Mr. Miller have publicly acknowledged approving warrantless surreptitious entries into the homes of friends and relatives of fugitive members of the radical Weather Underground in 1972 and 1973. In the trial, they will seek to establish that they acted lawfully by proving that they had reason to believe the break-ins were authorized by higher officials, including President Nixon and L. Patrick Gray 3d, who was Acting Director of the F.B.I., in accordance with long-standing bureau practices. They will also seek to prove that they had reason to believe that break-ins were justified by connections between the Weather Underground and hostile foreign governments.

Mr. Gray, who was indicted along with Mr. Felt and Mr. Miller in April 1978, has denied any knowledge of the break-ins. Prosecutors have indicated that Mr. Gray may never be put on trial because of the danger that national secrets would be exposed and because of new evidence that renders the case against him "substantially weaker" than it was thought to be when he was indicted.

Access to Documents Sought

Defense attorneys for Mr. Felt and Mr. Miller have argued with prosecutors for months, amid repeated postponements of the trial date, concerning their efforts to obtain access to and the right to use in evidence thousands of classified documents and the testimony of numerous witnesses. Judge William B. Bryant has been a referee in this process, allowing the defense counsel rather broad access to classified materials for purposes of "discovery," while establishing an elaborate set of procedures for screening out sensitive information from documents to be publicly placed in evidence at the trial.

In order to protect against the possibility of an unwarranted revealing of sensitive information at the trial, Judge Bryant has ordered defense lawyers and witnesses not to disclose any item falling within certain listed categories without first obtaining court approval. The unusual procedure is designed to give the Government an opportunity to object to any disclosures of particularly sensitive information before they have slipped out. Judge Bryant will hear arguments and rule on such objections either in whispered sessions at the bench or in closed session.

Defense lawyers have objected to some of the procedures established by Judge Bryant as unfairly limiting their right to put relevant information before the jury. The rulings are certain to be challenged on appeal, if either defendant is convicted.

The possibility remains that the prosecutors could be forced to drop the case if the judge rules for the admission of particularly sensitive secrets. The prosecutors may be expected to make strenuous efforts to avoid such a result. Mr. Heymann has testified that failure to pursue such cases "promotes concern that there is no effective check against improper conduct by members of our intelligence agencies."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-4WASHINGTON STAR
20 SEPTEMBER 1980

Investigators in FBI Case Checked CIA Also, Break-In Trial Jury Told

By Kenneth R. Walker
Washington Star Staff Writer

The federal investigation that led to the indictment of two former FBI officials for approving illegal burglaries also looked into surreptitious entries allegedly approved by former CIA Director Richard Helms, it was disclosed in federal court here yesterday.

The disclosure was made by the Justice Department official who headed the burglaries investigation.

William Gardner — testifying at the trial of W. Mark Felt, former No. 2 man at the FBI, and Edward S. Miller, former head of the bureau's domestic intelligence — said the Justice Department reviewed cases involving Helms, but decided not to prosecute the former CIA chief. Gardner made the admission under cross-examination by Felt's attorney, Brian Gettings.

Gettings did not ask, and Gardner did not specify, the nature of the illegal entries.

Felt and Miller were indicted 29 months ago, along with former FBI Director L. Patrick Gray III, for approving the burglaries, or so-called "black bag" jobs, at the homes of relatives and friends of fugitive Weather Underground members. Gray was ordered tried separately, but recent prosecution admissions that the case against him is too weak have led to motions to dismiss the charge.

Gardner was called by prosecutors primarily to testify about secretly filed FBI documents concerning the burglaries.

Gardner told the jury of eight women and four men that he discovered documents relating to the break-ins in a locked safe of the secretary to an FBI official in the New York Squad 47 office, from which most of the burglaries were launched.

Gardner said he began his investigation in the summer of 1976 and discovered that the FBI had conducted secret, warrantless burglaries since 1942.

"In some cases," Gardner said, "the entries were approved by attorneys general."

Former Attorney General Ramsey Clark directed the bureau "to discontinue some of the bag jobs in the mid-1960s," Gardner said. "And the Justice Department halted nearly all domestic burglaries following a Supreme Court decision in 1972," the lawyer added.

That decision, Gardner said, drew a distinction between warrantless domestic entries, which the court declared unconstitutional, and those bag jobs concerning individuals acting as agents of foreign powers.

Burglaries aimed at the latter were presumed to be legal under the court ruling, Gardner said.

Under cross-examination by Gettings, Gardner repeatedly said he could not recall reviewing a series of documents referred to by the lawyer which allegedly demonstrated that the Weather Underground was "supported" by foreign governments.

At one point, when Gettings first tried to "refresh" Gardner's memory by showing him a top-secret document, the defense lawyer complained to Chief U.S. District Judge William B. Bryant that "this document is entirely excised."

"I want the document in its entirety so (Gardner) can see whether he remembers seeing it or not," Gettings said.

Bryant, who has chided Gettings on several occasions, interjected: "Now come on up here and let me tell you something," as he summoned the lawyers to the bench.

Following the bench conference, Gardner admitted that he was "generally aware" of the foreign links by some of the burglary victims.

He also conceded under cross examination that determining whether the burglary targets were "domestic" rather than foreign was a judgment call.

Gardner also agreed that the area of the law governing surreptitious entries "is unclear." "It is often difficult to determine whether a person has foreign connections or not," he said.

Later, while being questioned by chief prosecutor John W. Neilds Jr., Gardner identified a June 30, 1972 document from Miller to Felt stating that, "as to the investigation of foreign powers' involvement with the Weather Underground fugitives, there is none."

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The Arms Race

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24 September 1980

Moving rapidly toward first-strike capacity

U.S. not losing arms race

By KEVIN J. KELLEY
Guardian Correspondent
Second of two articles

Washington, D.C.

The majority within the U.S. ruling circles that is demanding an all-out "rearmament program" bases its case on two main premises: Moscow now spends up to 50% more on war preparations than does Washington, and the USSR has attained at least "rough equivalence" with U.S. nuclear might.

In assessing the first of these claims last week (*Guardian* Sept. 17), it was shown that the CIA is the sole source of estimates which place the Kremlin's defense spending at a sum far exceeding the Pentagon's. These computations are unconfirmed by less biased analysts and are strongly challenged by independent specialists familiar with CIA methodology. It was also demonstrated that suddenly inflated figures for the Soviet defense effort coincided with U.S. attempts to dispel the "Vietnam syndrome" and to provide a rationale for a military spending spree that began in 1976.

Most reputable observers, meanwhile, agree that the Soviet Union has indeed been engaged in a significant build-up over the past decade. These nongovernmental sources simultaneously point out, however, that the Soviet initiative was launched from a much lower base point and has proceeded at a pace considerably less precipitous than is depicted by U.S.

What about the U.S.-USSR nuclear balance? Isn't there some merit to the widely held assumption that it has evened out in recent years and has perhaps even begun to tip in favor of the USSR? Unlike CIA estimates of Soviet defense budgets, claims of an apparent advantage for Moscow in nuclear weaponry do seem verifiable.

When the CIA says that the Soviets are allocating \$165 billion a year to their military machine, skeptics are generally able to dispute only the agency's formulas, not its data base, since published USSR defense budgets are universally acknowledged to be gross underrepresentations of actual outlays. For the Soviet nuclear arsenal, no comparable problem exists. During 10 years of negotiations over the two strategic arms limitation treaties (SALT 1 and 2), both sides gave what must be assumed are accurate tabulations of their respective weapons systems.

This cataloging—readily verifiable by sophisticated reconnaissance—is interpreted by many U.S. politicians, media commentators and right-wing academics as indicating "a clear and present danger" of Soviet nuclear superiority. So broad and firmly established is this consensus that it is not really challenged even by some advocates of arms control. Many forces favoring ratification of SALT 2, including the Carter administration, often argued that the ostensible Soviet nuclear momentum could best be checked by accepting "the best possible agreement."

Further to the right, in the think tanks inhabited by the professional militarists and hard-line neoconservatives, the comparison of atomic armaments and delivery systems is presented as proof of imminent Soviet aggression and subsequent victory. When the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is added to the brew, the superhawks go completely hysterical.

MEDIA HYSTERIA

The corporate press has outdone itself in tilting public perception to the view of Soviet superiority. A week does not pass without the appearance in some mass-circulation, "prestige" publication of a table showing the Soviet lead in missile sizes and numbers. This alarming contrast in the superpowers' strategic nuclear triad—ground-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); submarine-launched ballistic

missiles (SLBMs); and piloted bombers—is usually accompanied by the notation that the USSR will soon be able to destroy most U.S. ground-based missiles in their sites.

In the ICBM column—invariably listed first—the much bigger Soviet rockets number 1398, while the U.S. total is listed at 1054. Under the SLBM heading, the U.S. has 41 submarines carrying 656 missiles—a poor second to the Soviets with their 62 submarines and 950 SLBMs. Only for the "air leg" of the triad does the U.S. show a distinct advantage with 348 B-52s to the USSR's 140 "Bear" and "Bison" bombers.

The reader is thus left with the implication that the U.S. lags dangerously in both ground- and sea-launched missiles and manages to outdo the Soviets only in "old-fashioned" subsonic bombers. And as if this situation weren't bad enough, the charts and tables also explain that the huge and powerful Soviet ICBMs are much newer than the "aging" U.S. fleet of Minuteman and Titan missiles.

Other computations and categories are equally instructive, however, and these are often relegated to footnote status or are interspersed among long, technical descriptions that are laden with confusing acronyms and technocratic jargon. But in order to gain a valid comparison and a nonsuperficial understanding of U.S.-USSR nuclear capabilities, it is necessary to review these additional statistics.

Perhaps the most telling is the fact that the U.S. now has 10,000 strategic nuclear warheads (capable of hitting the USSR) deployed in its triad, while the Soviet Union possesses about 6000 of these strategic atomic weapons. In five years, before the U.S. has made its Missile Experimental (MX) and Trident-2 systems fully operational, its arsenal will total 14,000 strategic warheads. Not included in any of these tallies are the 22,000 tactical nuclear weapons deployed by the U.S. in Western Europe, many of which can reach targets in the Soviet Union west of the Ural Mountains. By definition, none of the USSR's tactical nukes can threaten the U.S.

The almost 2-1 differential in strategic nuclear warheads results from the U.S. lead in multiple individually-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs). Because of this technology, which the U.S. developed five years before the USSR, nearly all U.S. SLBMs, most ICBMs and the B-52s carry multiple warheads. Due to MIRVs, a single U.S. submarine carries atomic weapons which can hit 160 different targets in the USSR.

When assessing relative nuclear strength, it is also important to gauge the significance assigned to each leg of the triad. With the development of pinpoint MIRVs and maneuverable reentry vehicles (MARVs) by both sides, the ground-based missiles of the U.S. and the Soviet Union are becoming increasingly vulnerable to a preemptive first-strike. Only 21% of the 10,000 strategic nuclear warheads in the U.S. arsenal are affixed to these endangered ICBMs. Almost four-fifths—79%—of the Soviets' 6000 strategic nukes are mounted atop their ground-based missiles.

More than half the U.S. strategic atomic arsenal—45%—is assigned to submarines, compared to 21% of the Soviet stockpile which is so deployed. Submarine-based missiles are described by no less an authority than Defense Secretary Harold Brown as "essentially invulnerable" to any preemptive strike. One-quarter of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons are loaded on the 349 B-52s which are also equipped with special missiles that can hit targets more than 100 miles from the bomber's line of flight. The Soviet Union places only a very few atomic weapons on its bombers.

Readiness for actual use must also be considered in any examination of the triads. The U.S. nuclear force is constantly on the verge of being deployed, with 48% of its strategic warheads (4650 bombs) on "alert" status. Only 3% of the USSR's arsenal (160 warheads) is ready to go at any given time. In the event of any surprise attack, it is therefore the U.S. which will be able to move very rapidly from "normal" conditions to full wartime footing.

CONTINUED

As with almost every other category of nuclear might, the Soviet advantage in ICBM size is largely illusory. Moscow has concentrated on building enormous blockbuster missiles primarily because it has not yet duplicated the U.S. ability to miniaturize guidance systems and warheads. Soviet atomic weapons also have a generally higher yield because they lack the surgical precision of the smaller U.S. bombs.

Once the MX and Trident-2 are deployed in 1986, these MIRVed missiles will be capable of destroying the entire Soviet ICBM fleet (79% of its nuclear arsenal) in its hardened silos. The USSR, conversely, will not be able to match this potential for the remainder of the century.

Based on this accounting, it seems clear that the U.S. continues to enjoy a significant degree of superiority in nuclear weaponry. Such a summation however, is mostly theoretical and somewhat meaningless since both sides possess the assured capacity of incinerating each other under almost every conceivable scenario for a nuclear war.

The hypothetical advantage for the U.S. becomes practical only if it can develop the means of launching a first-strike which is so effective that it prevents any significant retaliation by the USSR. Under these circumstances, it is quite likely that the U.S. would indeed attempt to eliminate its chief rival once and for all. Ample evidence is now available that Washington is seeking to produce both the targeting doctrine and the actual weaponry which will enable it to obliterate the Soviet nuclear force and ward off any attempt at retaliation.

A thorough and convincing documentation of this U.S. push for a "disarming first-strike capability" is provided by Robert Aldridge in his 1979 booklet, "The Counterforce Syndrome." Aldridge worked for 16 years for the Lockheed Corporation where he helped design some of the more macabre weapons systems now deployed by the Navy. He resigned in 1973 to protest the Pentagon's shift toward a more aggressive nuclear policy.

"I must reluctantly conclude," Aldridge writes in this Institute for Policy Studies publication, "that the U.S. is ahead now and is rapidly approaching a first-strike capability—which it should start deploying by the mid-1980s. The Soviet Union, meanwhile, seems to be struggling for second-best. There is no available evidence that the USSR has the combined missile lethality, antisubmarine warfare potential, ballistic missile defense or space warfare technology to attain a disabling first-strike before the end of this century, if then."

Five elements are necessary, Aldridge explains, for the development of a first-strike configuration with a reasonable probability of destroying the enemy's capacity to retaliate. The U.S., he demonstrates, is now working hard in each of the five categories.

First, the Soviet's surveillance and communications systems will have to be knocked out entirely or at least be badly crippled if a surprise attack is to catch the USSR's ICBMs in their silos and the SLBMs in their submarines. This requirement is being met through rapid development of antisatellite warfare weaponry such as laser beams, charged-particle rays and super-secret "directed energy" systems.

Next, the U.S. must have a high guarantee that its missiles will deliver nuclear bombs so accurately that no hardened silo can withstand the explosion. The MX and Trident-2 are both explicitly designed for this

purpose, as are cruise missiles which can be launched from the ground, sea and air to fly at an altitude below radar detection and strike within 90 feet of a target. The recently revealed Stealth bomber, supposedly invisible to radar, is also a component in this first-strike element.

Third, Aldridge notes, submarines must no longer be "invulnerable" to preemptive attack if the first-strike is to succeed. Through its intensive research and development of underwater sensors, satellite reconnaissance and nuclear depth charges, the U.S. is widely conceded to have an enormous lead in the area of antisubmarine warfare.

Even when all these elements are in place, the prudent Pentagon planner must assume that a few Soviet missiles will survive a first-strike. It is therefore necessary to develop a fourth element, a missile/bomber defense network. The U.S. is moving in this direction, Aldridge says, by exhaustive testing of various antiballistic missile (ABM) systems. The 1972 treaty limiting ABMs comes up for renewal in two years, and several advisers in both the Reagan and Carter camps are advocating its abrogation.

A credible civil defense effort (see story page 7) is also part of this fourth element, Aldridge adds.

Linked to this requirement is the fifth and final step toward a first-strike capability—the guaranteed survival of command, control and communications systems which will integrate and direct the preceding four elements. The U.S. technological communication apparatus is already stretched around the globe with an ultra-sophisticated computer-relay mechanism. Above all else, this command-center network must be preprogrammed with a targeting strategy that delineates the first-strike missions.

It is in this context that Presidential Directive 59 emerges in its full significance. This recently revealed nuclear war doctrine, which involves the targeting of Soviet military installations and command centers as well as industries and cities, provides the planning basis for the first-strike capability. Although Aldridge wrote "The Counterforce Syndrome" prior to the signing of Presidential Directive 59, it is apparent from his examination of U.S. nuclear doctrine from 1954 to 1979 that this order represents an explicit adoption of first-strike strategy.

"It is my observation," Aldridge concludes, "that only a small portion of the people who even recognize this lethal momentum are motivated to do anything about it. Yet the risks to personal freedom and security those few are taking are minute compared to the risk of nuclear cremation which faces all of us if the arms race continues to its ultimate conclusion. The importance of their efforts cannot be overstated."

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THE WASHINGTON POST
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U.S. May Seek On-Site Monitoring of Soviet Atomic Tests

By Walter Pincus

Washington Post Staff Writer

An apparent Soviet violation this month of an agreement to limit the size of underground nuclear tests may lead the White House to demand that American electronic monitoring equipment be placed at the major Soviet test site, according to informed sources.

The Carter administration has been looking for a forceful response to the Soviet explosion of a test device "that probably was around 500 kilotons," a source said yesterday.

Since 1976, both the United States and the Soviet Union have said they would abide by the 150-kiloton limits of the still-unratified Threshold Test Ban Treaty. The treaty was signed in Moscow in the summer of 1974.

Establishment of a U.S. unmanned seismic station at the Soviet test site near Semipalatinsk in south-central Russia is only one of several proposals that will go before a White House committee this week.

Another plan calls for the United States to explode a 500-kiloton device of its own.

The Carter administration, sources said, appears determined to do something beyond the formal complaint that was lodged with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin.

The monitoring plan would also permit the Soviet Union to set up one of its own devices at the U.S. nuclear testing site in Nevada and another at the site used by the British.

U.S., British and Soviet delegations have already studied the use of the unmanned seismic stations as part of the negotiations for a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

The U.S. device would be able to measure seismic signals from any Soviet underground explosions at the Semipalatinsk site and then transmit its findings automatically to a satellite. The satellite in turn would carry them on to an American-based receiving station.

The United States has been developing the unmanned station at a West Virginia site for several years. In the summer of 1979, U.S. officials demonstrated it to a visiting Soviet scientific delegation.

This past summer in Geneva, the three negotiating countries agreed in principle on verification measures for a comprehensive test ban treaty that included use of several such unmanned stations in each country.

Sources said yesterday that British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher has been contacted on the idea of putting in the stations and approved it.

During the comprehensive test ban treaty talks, the Soviets told negotiators that if the United States wanted to put one unmanned station inside the Soviet Union, it would have to send two so the Russians could open one up to assure themselves it did not contain intelligence collecting devices.

Sources within the administration and on Capitol Hill who are aware of the proposals now under consideration look on the monitoring plan as the one that is currently most likely to go to the president.

"We could not prepare for a 500-kiloton test before December," one official said. He added that it would not meet any specific program need, although one could be devised.

U.S. analysts are studying recent Soviet defense moves trying to determine why the decision was made to conduct the largest nuclear device test since 1976, an explosion that so obviously exceeded the limits of the agreement.

"It had to have been on purpose," one scientist said after examining the data. He added that additional information may come in from fallout. There is some indication that the explosion vented radioactive material into the air.

One group of analysts believes the explosion is part of a pattern showing a hardening of Soviet defense policies.

There is, however, another interpretation among administration specialists. In this view, the high-yield Soviet test may be an intentional signal by Moscow that Soviet patience is wearing thin with U.S. failure to ratify the Threshold Test Ban Treaty six years after it was signed in Moscow by the Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev, and then-President Nixon.

It could be just a "shot across the bow," one official said, with the Soviets asking the United States, in effect, "why should we go on behaving as though this treaty was in effect?"

The Ford administration delayed sending the threshold treaty to the Senate for approval in 1975 and 1976 in the belief it could not be obtained.

Conservative senators were against it because the 150-kiloton limit was far below the size of the warheads they wanted built. Liberals opposed it on the ground it permitted some testing and would delay consideration of a comprehensive test ban.

While both sides have abided by the threshold levels — overlooking some earlier Soviet shots that could have exceeded them — both sides and the British have pushed ahead with talks on the comprehensive test ban agreement.

The Soviets have backed off somewhat from their initial position against all monitoring and on-site inspection on their soil.

There is, however, strong opposition to the treaty within the United States among the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the government's nuclear weapons laboratories if the Carter administration plan for no nuclear tests of any size is pressed.

Staff writer Michael Getler contributed to this article.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 14-15AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY
22 September 1980

Soviet SALT Violations Feared

USSR engaged in strategic nuclear weapons activities that are causing concern to some intelligence officials

By Clarence A. Robinson, Jr.

Washington—U. S. intelligence officials are expressing deep concern over Soviet strategic nuclear weapons activities they believe overtly violate the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT). Even beyond what appear to be clear-cut violations are other Russian activities that border on treaty violations, or take advantage of loopholes in the agreement.

The recent Soviet strategic nuclear weapons activities include:

■ Testing in the past few weeks of the SA-10 surface-to-air missile acquisition and tracking radars against Russian reentry vehicles in an antiballistic missile mode. The phased-array radar was used as a battle management system for low-altitude defense of ICBM silos. The Soviets have developed and tested a hypersonic interceptor missile known as the SH-8 to destroy U. S. reentry vehicles within the atmosphere. Testing of an air defense system in an antiballistic missile mode is a clear violation of the ABM treaty, according to U. S. officials.

■ Testing in a ballistic missile defense scenario against reentry vehicles of the SA-5 Gammon air defense radars on at least one occasion. SA-5s are operated from fixed, hardened sites in the USSR and use a target tracking radar known as the Square Pair, and the Back Net acquisition radar along with the Side Net height-finding radar. The SA-5 has a range of 100 naut. mi. and a maximum altitude of about 100,000 ft. The Soviets conducted earlier tests with the SA-5 in the ABM mode (AW&ST Oct. 21, 1974, p. 14), and the U. S. brought up the tests to the Standing Consultative Commission as a possible violation. Those tests were halted then and only recently resumed.

■ Tests during recent Soviet and Warsaw Pact war games of a reload capability for the SS-18 ICBM. During the tests in early September, the Soviets simulated firing SS-18s from their silos (launchers), removed the missiles and replaced them with other SS-18s, demonstrating a reload capability. It took the Russians 2-5 days to accomplish the reload procedure.

■ Tests of the new submarine-launched ballistic missile from Nenoksa on the White Sea with encrypted telemetry, preventing U. S. verification of missile performance. The new missile is designed for use with the Typhoon-class submarine. At least 80% of the telemetry data was encrypted during the most recent test, according to U. S. intelligence officials.

■ Tests of a new Soviet air-launched cruise missile from the Tupolev Tu-26 Backfire bomber with a missile range greater than 600 km. (372 mi.). The successful testing of the Soviet version of the USAF/Boeing ALCM should require that the Backfire be counted under the heavy bomber category in the unratified SALT 2 agreement, according to U. S. arms control officials.

The demonstrated reload capability with the SS-18 is causing more concern among U. S. intelligence and arms control communities than any of the other Soviet strategic weapons activities, according to Carter Administration officials, "because it goes to the very heart of SALT; that launchers are counted and not missiles."

Information on Soviet nuclear weapons activities taking advantage of the U. S. in using the SALT agreement to screen testing, or of violations, is emerging just as the U. S. is preparing for meetings in early October by Secretary of State Edmund Muskie with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey A. Gromyko on arms control agreements for theater nuclear forces in Europe.

The U. S. also is moving toward comprehensive nuclear test ban negotiations in Geneva in October despite what U. S. officials call the most flagrant Soviet violation of the existing threshold test ban treaty that limits both sides to underground nuclear testing at the 150-kiloton level.

The test being described by the arms control community as the "hardest violation yet of the threshold test ban" took place in recent weeks at Semipalatinsk. The U. S. received seismic data from 17 locations providing information that the yield of the nuclear device tested was as high as 640 kilotons, with the lowest possible yield 150 kilotons. U. S. officials said they are 95% certain that the yield of the device was between 300 and 400 kilotons, making it a clear violation of the existing test ban treaty.

"We've never had better data than this," one arms control expert said, "and there is no doubt the Russians have violated the treaty. They've gone over the 150-kiloton limit before but not like this with the evidence so clear. At the same time, the U. S. nuclear weapons laboratories are being hamstrung by having to test below a yield of 90 kilotons to make sure we honor the agreement."

Not only are violations alarming the U. S., one Administration official said, "but there is activity which falls outside the SALT agreement, and there appears no way to negotiate an agreement with the Soviet Union which can cover all eventualities. It all boils down to the fact that we got no limit of the Soviets from SALT, especially with this demonstrated SS-18 reload capability. Either this is a vindication of SALT critics or a violation of the agreement."


The Soviet Union, some U. S. intelligence officials believe, has been using spacecraft to survey U. S. ICBM silo locations. One official said there is evidence the USSR has used a beam splitter mirror on its spacecraft to photograph U. S. missile fields in laser light while it simultaneously photographs the satellite against the star background to pinpoint the location of the spacecraft in relation to each U. S. silo.

As the Soviet spacecraft passes over the USSR, it also photographs Soviet missile silos with the star background. This enables Soviet rocket force officers to "hook the arcs together for precision that could enable CEPs [circular error probable] of 50 to 100 ft."

The USSR already has deployed 248 SS-18s in four models. The ICBM has a hard target capability against Minuteman silos. One version has a yield of 24 megatons and a CEP of 0.23 naut. mi. Another version carries 8-10 reentry vehicles, each with a 0.55-megaton yield with the same CEP.

A third version has a CEP of 0.19 naut. mi. and carries a single 20-megaton warhead. The fourth version has 10 MIRVs, each with a 0.50-megaton yield and CEP of 0.14 naut. mi.

Recent U. S. intelligence analysis has determined that the SS-18 is clearly designed to carry 12-14 reentry vehicles in the post boost vehicle, not the 10 limited by SALT 2.



Soviet ballistic missile fields are depicted. About 26 Russian ICBM fields run north and south along the line of the Trans-Siberian railway.

Soviet actions in recent weeks place the arms control community in a position of having to apologize for the Russians, one community member said. "It forces the community to rationalize the Soviet behavior as compatible with treaty language or of having to apologize for the treaty's sloppy language."

The arms control expert added that this defeats any argument against the point that SALT agreements are meaningless by seeking to limit launchers. "The Central Intelligence Agency is arguing that this SS-18 reload drill is no violation of the SALT agreement because from two to five days is not a rapid reload capability," he explained.

In the SALT 2 treaty signed by the U. S. and USSR but withdrawn from Senate ratification when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, each party undertakes:

- Not to supply ICBM launcher deployment areas with intercontinental ballistic missiles in excess of a number consistent with normal deployment, maintenance, training and replacement requirements.

- Not to provide storage facilities for or to store ICBMs in excess of normal deployment requirements at launch sites of ICBM launchers.

- Not to develop, test or deploy systems for rapid reload of ICBM launchers.

The treaty further specifies that the term normal "means the deployment of one missile at each ICBM launcher."

"It's not any one thing that leaps out at us from all this Soviet nuclear weapons effort," one strategic weapons expert said,

"but rather a picture of a very dedicated kind of an effort in the USSR to achieve a clear superiority over the U. S. at the earliest possible date."

Another official explained that while the intelligence agencies argue over what constitutes a rapid reload capability, the SS-18 exercises contravene SALT. "The whole idea of the treaty is one missile per silo. The U. S., however, must take the rap for this because the Soviets have never said one missile, one silo, and they have never said how many ICBMs they have stockpiled for reloading silos."

"There is something much more important here than merely a Soviet SALT violation," one high-level U. S. official said. "The USSR is behaving in a way calculated to give it a clear advantage over the U. S., which is completely enmeshed in mental or legal constraints of its own making."

The Soviet Union is building a new phased-array ballistic missile defense radar 60 mi. north of Moscow. This is completely within the rules in the ABM treaty, according to U. S. arms control officials.

"But it lends great credibility to NIE [National Intelligence Estimate]-11-38, which states that the USSR is capable of deploying a high-quality thick bank of ballistic missile defense systems within one year from the time the U. S. could detect that the deployment was unmistakable," the official said.

The Soviets have designed the SH-4 interceptor missile much like the U. S. Spartan ABM missile designed by the

U. S. Army for intercepts of reentry vehicles in the upper atmosphere. It would be used in an overlay mode by the Soviets as the first line of defense, with the SH-8 for terminal phase intercepts of reentry vehicles.

"With the deployment of the flat twin movable ABM radar system, the new missiles tested against RVs [reentry vehicles] and the battle management radar around Moscow, the Soviets are building toward a capability to break out of the ABM agreement with a clear-cut capability and leave the U. S. behind," one arms control expert said.

A high-level Administration official last week sought to play down the reload capability of the SS-18 ICBMs in response to AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY. He said Soviet textbooks have for years openly discussed the possibility of reloading ICBM silos, and that the Carter Administration position has been that the reload possibility is well known; but that it was agreed not to store missiles in ICBM fields for this purpose, there is no indication this has been done, and it avoids a rapid reload capability.

"In strategic nuclear force balances by Defense Secretary Harold Brown, reloads have not been taken into account," according to the official. He added: "The U. S. already looks so bad in these calculations, why make it look worse? SALT negotiators better wake up. The USSR is obviously thinking in terms of a protracted nuclear war or they wouldn't be testing reloads of four or five days, and the balance is in their favor."

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Jack Anderson Continues Attacks

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE C27THE WASHINGTON POST
24 September 1980**JACK ANDERSON**

U.S. Said to Prepare Mideast Options

In an ominous development, President Carter has issued secret directives to the Pentagon to prepare the option of using nuclear weapons in the volatile Middle East.

There have been hints of such a possibility in the past. Carter's State of the Union address last January, for example, declared that "an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States [and] will be repelled by use of any means necessary . . ."

And Robert Komer, undersecretary of defense for policy, publicly stated that if conventional deterrents in the Middle East failed, the use of nuclear weapons would be considered. But in secret directives, the president has spelled out the nuclear option clearly and explicitly.

In Presidential Decision Memorandum No. 51, Carter outlined a new U.S. nuclear policy for the Middle East. But this memo was ignored in the furor over Presidential Directive 59, which changed U.S. missile targets in the Soviet Union.

The contents of PDM No. 51 and related documents, including a directive to the Strategic Air Command from Defense Secretary Harold Brown, are designed to "significantly degrade Soviet capabilities to project military power in the Middle East-Persian Gulf region for a period of at least 30 days."

To accomplish this, the president ordered the formulation of various military options, my associate Dale Van Atta has learned. The most significant of these was the "limited strategic option" for use by the commander of the Rapid Deployment Force, Gen. P.X. Kelley.

Subject to the usual presidential authorization for use of any nuclear weapons, this option involves 19 nuclear bombs carried by B52 bombers. The aim is to keep Soviet forces from invading Iran, and the weapons include both B57 bombs, with an explosive power about equal to the Hiroshima bomb, and the more powerful B61 variable yield thermonuclear bombs.

Sources said Carter ordered his planners to formulate several additional limited strategic options, as well as a more far-reaching "selective attack option" that would target Russian facilities near Iran, including military bases and airfields inside the Soviet Union.

Military experts noted that with a B52 force — the SAC's 57th Air Division at Minot Air Force Base, N.D. — already earmarked for Middle East deployment, the bombers would be the most likely vehicle for nuclear weapons, rather than long-range missiles in silos in the United States. The bombers are far more flexible, one source pointed out, adding, "If we screw around with our ICBMs, you don't know what the response would be."

"Flexible" does not mean "reasonable," however, in the view of some insiders. They contend that the concept of limited nuclear warfare confined to the Middle East is a child's dream that could become a nightmare for the whole world.

"If we initiate tactical nuclear warfare in that area, we are opening a Pandora's box," said one Pentagon source who is alarmed at the idea of preparing strategic options for the Middle East. "The Soviets could respond with tactical nuclear weapons against our warships in the Persian

Gulf area, and who knows where it would go from there?"

Footnote: A White House spokesman refused to confirm or deny the contents of PDM No. 51, or to discuss U.S. nuclear policy with respect to the Middle East.

(Pentagon spokesman Thomas Ross said yesterday that "Presidential Directive 51 does not 'outline a new U.S. nuclear policy for the Middle East.' In fact," Ross said, "PD 51 does not mention the Middle East in any way whatsoever.")

Mismanaging the News — Once again President Carter is trying to manage the news. His subordinates leak sensitive information that makes him look good, such as the top-secret testing of the "invisible plane," but try to suppress information that makes him look bad.

Saturday morning [Sept. 20] CIA Director Stansfield Turner asked me to kill the Monday [Sept. 22] column because he feared it might jeopardize security. Saturday afternoon, a White House press aide charged that the same column was false. The president cannot have it both ways. If the column was false, it could not possibly jeopardize security.

If fact, the story is true, and the president knows it. I withheld many details, including direct quotes, to protect security. The charge that the column could damage efforts to free the hostages is pure rhetoric. The truth, as the president knows, is that my columns have helped the secret negotiations. By citing the danger of a Soviet-American confrontation in Iran, my columns have spurred Iranian leaders to resolve the hostage issue.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE D15THE WASHINGTON POST
23 September 1980**JACK ANDERSON**

CIA Conspired to Save a Terrorist

In the "wilderness of mirrors" that makes up the espionage game, the Central Intelligence Agency once conspired to save the life of the world's most notorious terrorist—Carlos the Jackal.

He picked up his animal nickname from the fictional assassin who almost nailed Charles deGaulle in Frederick Forsyth's novel, "The Day of the Jackal," but his real name was Ilitch Ramirez Sanchez. He was the eldest son of an expatriate millionaire Colombian lawyer in Venezuela.

This is his story as pieced together by my associate Dale Van Atta from top-secret CIA and State Department documents:

- 1966: At 17, already influenced by a younger brother who was a leader in the Venezuelan Communist Party, Carlos was trained in one of Fidel Castro's guerrilla camps. There he learned the terrorist's art from Gen. Viktor Simonov of the Soviet KGB.

- 1969: Carlos was expelled from Lumbumb University in Moscow where he had developed a fast friendship with a Palestinian commando named Mohammed Boudia.

- 1970: Carlos fought with Palestinian guerrillas in Jordan against King Hussein.

- 1971: Carlos was the hit of the Latin-American cocktail crowd in London, where he escorted his beautiful mother and charmed women with his guitar-playing talent. He was known as "El Gordo"—the fat one.

- 1972: Carlos helped organize the massacre of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics, and the Japanese Red Army's indiscriminate machine-gun slaughter at the Tel Aviv airport.

- June 1973: An Israeli hit team assassinated Carlos' old Moscow friend Boudia, and Carlos took over Palestinian terrorist operations in Europe. Libyan strongman Muammar Qaddafi financed the extremist Palestinian group, called the Rejection Front.

- December 1973: Carlos shot Zionist department store tycoon Joseph Sieff in London, but failed to kill him.

- January 1974: Carlos bombed an Israeli bank in London.

- August 1974: Carlos planted three bombs in downtown Paris aimed at a Jewish newspaper and two French newspapers that supported Israel.

- September 1974: Carlos supervised the Japanese Red Army seizure of the French Embassy at The Hague, Netherlands, using grenades stolen from a U.S. Army depot in Germany by the Baader-Meinhof terrorist gang. Carlos tossed a grenade into Le Drugstore in Paris, killing two and wounding others, preparatory to the embassy takeover in Holland.

- Late 1974: Enter the CIA. Through its intelligence contacts, the agency learned that an assassination squad of the six-nation consortium of South American dictatorships, known as "Operation Condor," had been ordered to kill Carlos. The assignment was apparently in retaliation for Carlos' assassination of Col. Ramon Trabal, Uruguay's military attache in Paris; and for two other murders he was suspected of plotting—that of a Bolivian ambassador in Paris and a Chilean official in the Middle East.

According to a top-secret document based on CIA internal files, Carlos was spared when the CIA warned the French government of the proposed

execution, and the Condor nations were warned to call off the murder plot.

Why did the CIA save Carlos? Several sources in the agency suggested that it was a Mafia-like professional concern—that if Carlos were murdered, it would cause chaos in the murky world of international espionage.

One source thought it was at least possible that Carlos had been a CIA informant, and that the agency was simply protecting one of its own. This source did not, however, suggest that Carlos had ever been a paid killer for the CIA.

At any rate, Carlos was spared, thanks to the CIA's intervention, and lived to wreak his bloody handiwork for at least a few more months. He was captured by French police in June 1975, but managed to escape after killing an informant and two policemen; he masterminded the kidnaping of the OPEC oil ministers in December 1975, and was reportedly rewarded with a \$2 million bonus by his paymaster, Qaddafi; he helped engineer, in July 1976, the hijacking in Athens of an Air France plane which wound up at Entebbe Airport in Uganda, where the Israelis pulled off their daring rescue mission.

After that, Carlos the Jackal dropped from sight. Intelligence sources say he wound up in Iraq, and may have been exterminated in that nation's secret purge of Palestine terrorists. There is some speculation he is now in Libya, but the smart money in the intelligence community bets that Carlos is dead. Still, no one is sure.

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22 September 1980**JACK ANDERSON**

Soviets Believe U.S. Will Invade Iran

Ultra-secret Soviet intelligence cables intercepted by the National Security Agency disclose that the Russian leaders have believed since at least July that the United States is planning an invasion of Iran.

And the movement of Soviet troops and weapons in recent months demonstrates that the Kremlin is prepared to intervene militarily in the event of an American move.

Following the April rescue mission fiasco, the Soviets warned the United States that they would not sit idly by if we threatened military action against Iran. Intelligence sources confirm that the Russians have put their muscle where their mouth was in the months since then, and are now poised to move into Iran at the first provocation.

[In a statement over the weekend, the White House said:

["Jack Anderson's latest column alleging that the U.S. plans to attack Iran and that Soviet leaders believe in the seriousness of such plans is as false, grotesque, and irresponsible as were his columns a month ago on the same subject. The latest charges are complete inventions, which can only damage efforts to obtain the prompt and safe release of the American hostages in Iran and the prospects for peace in that region. What is true, however, is that Soviet propaganda has exploited Anderson's similar false allegations to inspire anti-American sentiments in Iran and elsewhere to prolong the hostage crisis and construct pretexts for aggressive Soviet actions."]

Heavily coded cables from Russia to its Warsaw Pact allies have warned them to be prepared for a military confrontation in Iran. The KGB's "best estimate," according to the cables, was

that the United States was getting ready for military action, and the Soviets would have to meet force with force.

The NSA is convinced that the Soviet communications it has been intercepting are genuine, not a "disinformation" ruse intended to be picked up by U.S. intelligence.

According to top secret Defense Department documents, the Red Army has shifted significant numbers of men and materiel from Europe to the Iran region since the first of the year. As early as January, nearly half the Soviet strength in western Afghanistan had been deployed near the Iranian border—some as close as 12 miles from the frontier. Many of the troops are still there.

Drawing mainly from the 103 Soviet divisions facing NATO at the beginning of 1980, and from other mobile divisions, the Russians now have at least 23 divisions in position to move into Iran. Under a 1921 treaty, the Soviets have a right to intervene in Iran, and though the Iranian government abrogated the treaty last year, the Kremlin does not recognize that unilateral action.

What has alarmed U.S. analysts more than the quantity of the Soviet buildup near Iran is the quality of the forces arrayed there. An ominous example is the withdrawal of nuclear howitzers and mortars from the NATO front to the Iranian borders.

Other disturbing evidence is the presence of the Russians' new, top-of-the-line SA11 tactical surface-to-air missiles near Iran. Experts doubt that the Soviets would deploy most of their SA11s to their southern borders—weakening the defenses against China and NATO—unless they seriously ex-

pected a military confrontation in Iran.

Lending support to the interpretation that the Kremlin believes a U.S. invasion is planned is the fact that the weaponry being deployed near Iran is primarily defensive in nature. This indicates the Russians are preparing for counterattack rather than an invasion of their own.

Still, some experts warn, it is possible the Russians are setting up an excuse for an Afghanistan-style aggression.

While there is no disagreement in the intelligence community that U.S. military action in Iran might bring a Soviet armed response, there have been differing estimates of the kind and degree of the response. A recent Defense Intelligence Agency analysis warned that a nuclear confrontation could be expected—albeit tactical, not strategic. But by the time this reached the president's desk, it had been watered down to the possibility of a major air and ground assault. The CIA was more optimistic, warning only that Soviet intervention could not be ruled out.

STORM WARNINGS AT OUR DOORSTEP

by Jack Anderson

Most Americans still think of the Caribbean countries on our southern shores as a luxurious string of "Fantasy Islands"—honeymoon hideaways where we can bask in the warm sun, fanned by gentle tropical breezes.

The grim truth is that the Caribbean nations are today being swept by revolutionary winds, fanned by Cuba's Fidel Castro in behalf of the Kremlin. Soviet strategists see the islands as political machetes aimed at more vulnerable and vital governments throughout Latin America. The Soviet goal, according to intelligence analyses, is to encircle the fabulous Caribbean oil reserves off the Mexican coast.

There is no doubt in the minds of American analysts that the Kremlin's wily old Leonid Brezhnev is hiding behind Castro's beard. Declares one top-secret study: "Castro has demonstrated that the issues that had strained Cuban-Soviet relations so severely [13 years ago] are no longer even minor irritants. Cuban submission has been complete. The brash, young Caribbean rebel of the mid-1960s has been replaced by a mature, responsible, self-critical member of the team...."

Not until recently have U.S. policymakers awakened to the fact that our island neighbors, most of them newly independent of colonial rule, have become pawns in a power struggle for control of the Caribbean. Previously, the State Department treated the islands as training schools for young, inexperienced personnel or as pleasant but unimportant havens for aging diplomats and political hacks.

Only in the past few months has the Carter Administration begun to realize that a major confrontation is boiling up on our back doorsteps.

Two islands, Grenada and Jamaica, have already been drawn into the Castro orbit. Tiny St. Lucia is being magnetized in the same direction. So are the governments of Guyana and Surinam on the rim of the Caribbean basin. Across the Gulf of Mexico in Central America, our past treatment of Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala as banana republics is bearing bitter fruit.

I have examined hundreds of pages of secret intelligence documents, which underscore the seriousness of the situation. In dry language, the disturbing documents tell a story of indifference, indecision and incompetence in Washington. Although this negligence now jeopardizes vital U.S. interests in the Caribbean, the story has been swept under the secrecy cover to avoid official embarrassment.

Consider these developments, which the Carter Administration has seemed helpless to cope with:

- A coup in Grenada in March 1979 provided Castro with a solid new foothold in the island chain. Marxist Maurice Bishop ousted the leader backed by the United States, Eric Gairy, and installed a totalitarian regime heavily reliant on Cuba.

- In Jamaica, Prime Minister Michael Manley has come under Castro's spell. With general elections in the offing, one secret intelligence report predicts he will "present a more moderate image to the voters" and play down his "intimacies with Havana" temporarily. But his heart, the report suggests, belongs to Castro.

- In Central America, the Nicaraguan junta is indebted to Castro for supporting their guerrilla movement, which ousted dictator Anastasio Somoza. Now the Cubans are repeating the Nicaraguan strategy in El Salvador and Guatemala.

Castro has been able to score these successes at a time when his own island economy is in sore distress. Cuban agriculture has been ravaged by two devastating crop years in a row. Falling living standards and worsening depression have caused widespread disaffection. The Soviets, with economic strains of their own, are unwilling to pump into Cuba more than the \$9 million a day they now invest.

Manpower, more than money or military manipulation, has been the secret of Castro's success in the islands. Take Grenada, where, according to a secret CIA report to Congress, "...as far as we can tell, the coup occurred...from local circumstances. The Soviets had nothing to do with it, or the Cubans either...."

But once the coup took place, Castro moved swiftly. A cadre of 250 Cubans went to work in the capital of St. George's, building a modern jet airport while the Americans twiddled their thumbs. Now Castro's military instructors are training Grenada's new people's army.

Within a week of the Somoza overthrow, Castro sent a consignment of 200 teachers to Nicaragua to help the new regime open schools for the fall session. By the close of the school year this summer, 1200 Cuban teachers were

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scattered throughout Nicaraguan classrooms parrot Communist propaganda. A State Department official glumly commented: "Castro has an over-abundance of manpower. He has over-spent in the public service field so he can send school teachers, agronomists, health technicians and doctors into a country after a coup. They're on the job while we're still trying to push a package through-Congress."

Fifteen months after Somoza's downfall, a Peace Corps program for Nicaragua is barely out of the planning stages. A \$75 million economic aid proposal for Nicaragua has been delayed in Congress by opponents of the junta government.

A defense intelligence study explains Castro's behavior this way: "Castro supported Latin American insurgents almost indiscriminately in the 1960s, despite the strains it created in his relations with Moscow. But he apparently now accepts the Soviet view that Latin America is not yet ripe for armed revolution.

Castro reportedly also agreed in mid-1975 that any future support for armed insurgency would be channeled through the local pro-Soviet Communist parties."

A similar CIA report warned that Castro in 1975 entered a period of "passive association with armed struggle. Guerrillas were told by Havana to finance their activities through robbery and kidnapping and to increase their arsenal through theft and purchases through local sources."

The soil for revolution is fertile on almost every island of the Caribbean. High unemployment, primitive health conditions, illiteracy, widespread crime and government corruption are rampant. The per capita annual income runs from a starvation-level \$250 in impoverished Haiti to \$2000 in prosperous Barbados.

The coup in Grenada followed a period of unemployment that put 25 percent of the work force on the streets. A dangerous 50 percent of the youths couldn't find jobs.

Never shown in the travel brochures are the festering urban and rural slums, the gnawing malnutrition, the anguishing infant mortality rate. And just as the tourists are carefully screened from the stark, sub-human realities of life in the islands, the policymakers in Washington sometimes seem equally uninformed.

cused on the Caribbean. His attention was attracted by the appearance of a 3000-man Soviet combat brigade, the lengthening of military runways and the digging of holes just the right size for missiles. But the Iranian hostage seizure and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan distracted him.

Meanwhile, he assigned a troubleshooter, ex-Assistant Secretary of State Philip Habib, to scrutinize the situation. He found the U.S. position deteriorating dangerously.

Summed up Habib: "With the possible exception of Trinidad and Barbados, economic malaise and political and social

difficulties have created instability throughout the region. The existence of high expectations exacerbates this situation so that political leaders, especially those now on the scene, frequently espouse radical approaches to deal with seemingly insurmountable problems."

The troubleshooter offered a series of urgent recommendations to prevent the Caribbean countries from being picked off one by one by the Communists. His report, together with secret intelligence evaluations, is gathering dust in Washington files. Yet it offers a blueprint for averting political disaster on our threshold.

To begin with—let's face it—money can be a valuable weapon in countering the Communist threat. Dollar diplomacy has fallen into disfavor among many foreign policy experts, but the fact remains that the Caribbean governments are direly in need of cold cash.

In Jamaica, Manley's leftist government is strapped with a \$450 million debt and a stagnant economy. The International Monetary Fund turned down a credit and refinancing deal with his regime in March, and Manley has been scrambling for economic help ever since. His friend Castro has been unable to help because of Cuba's own economic crunch.

Unfortunately, Washington has been just as miserly. Congress has proposed a mere \$130 million development program for the entire area in the 1981 fiscal year, with nearly two-thirds of it being given directly to the recipient countries.

money, but better use of it, is needed. Too often the money never ends up in the hands of the impoverished people but in the pockets of profiteering government officials.

His report also strongly urged that Washington upgrade the diplomatic status of the Caribbean islands. "West Indian leaders," Habib wrote, "believe the United States has ignored the region, has sent to it in the past second-rate representatives, (and) failed to respond sufficiently to its needs...."

The White House has shown little interest in the proposals beyond assigning a few more experienced ambassadors to the region. In contrast, Castro is playing his diplomatic aces in the Caribbean. Two of his most senior and influential foreign service members have been sent there—Julian Rizo to Grenada and Ulises Estrada to Jamaica. Both are believed to hold high posts in the Cuban intelligence operation as well.

There is a hawk-and-dove dispute currently smoldering in Washington between human rights adherents such as the Interamerican Policy Group panel and military-intelligence officials. The IPC says crying wolf at Castro's presence "lacks credibility," and it argues against increasing military aid.

The CIA and Pentagon contend that the Cuban threat is real and that increased American military assistance is essential. The argument between the two camps is expected to erupt in Congress, which has banned the use of U.S. aid to assist police forces in the region with weaponry.

The Caribbean cold war between Castro and Carter will reach a climactic-showdown this fall in Jamaica when elections are to be held. Opposing Manley is conservative leader Edward Seaga, who has closely aligned himself with the United States.

The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research has stressed to Carter that Manley, from the first days of his administration, was taken in by Castro. "Manley's left

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wing supporters would like him to turn Jamaica into a Jamaican version of Cuba. Manley may indeed be tempted since he seems genuinely impressed with Cuba," warns one report.

Even if Seaga ousts Manley from power, the infighting will go on in the Caribbean, according to the Defense Intelligence Agency. In a secret report to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the DIA predicted Castro will continue to meddle in Caribbean waters.

Speculating on a possible Seaga victory, the document said: "We believe that this brief respite from leftist inroads in the Caribbean basin will be of very short duration. This area remains plagued by deep-rooted economic and social problems that seem insoluble. Moderate forces and democratic institutions in the region will

survive only if economic and security assistance is provided. DIA is convinced that despite Cuba's domestic problems, Havana remains determined to exploit the social and economic ills of the region not only to preserve the gains it has achieved up to now but also to pursue the goal of becoming the regional power. We will continue to see Cuba and the indigenous Marxist groups in the Caribbean and Central America probing further. They apparently believe that they can operate in the area with a greater degree of impunity than they have in the past."

This foreboding prediction will hold true as long as Uncle Sam persists in gazing southward at a fool's paradise of insignificant, untroubled islands in the sun.

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SPY WARS

IN EINER KLEINEN KONDTOREI...

Man soll es nicht für möglich halten! Da sitzt ein netter Mann im Café, den man dort sieht, immer um dieselbe Zeit. Nach einiger Zeit grüßt man sich. Dann trinkt man zusammen Kaffee, lernt sich kennen. Und all das soll nur ein Trick gewesen sein? Unmöglich! Leider, nicht. Agenten haben den Auftrag, jemand kennenzulernen. Sie haben viel Zeit und Geduld. Und sie haben keinen Skrupel, menschliche Gefühle auszunutzen.

Wer darauf besteht, daß Sie gegen Ihre Dienstpflicht handeln, liebt nicht Sie. Sondern Ihr Wissen. Denken Sie bitte daran...



West German poster, headlined 'In a small café,' warns government employees of the danger to state security posed by East German spies. 'Agents have the assignment to get to know someone,' it says. 'They have a lot of time and patience. And they have no scruples about exploiting human emotions.'

IV. THE TWO GERMANYS

Front lines of espionage

By Daniel Southerland
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Bonn

In two quite different ways, West Germany fights on the front line of Western Europe's spy wars.

First, this nation of 60 million people undoubtedly has to cope with more spies per square mile than any other major European nation — or, for that matter, any other major nation in the world.

Second, the West German government must pursue a ear-guard battle for public support from a skeptical press and parliament.

The fight against East German spies is, in its intensity, reminiscent of the cold war. But spies who are caught in the

act are not liquidated. They are often simply exchanged. Sometimes the West Germans trade an East German spy for an East German dissident. Sometimes they pay cash to get an agent back.

Because of East-West German détente, little cold-war rhetoric can be heard these days. Soviet-bloc attempts to discredit West Germany through "disinformation" and propaganda campaigns have been muted.

It can all be quite civilized.

And many West German citizens have grown so accustomed to spy stories that, as the writer John Dornberg once put it in the Paris daily, the International Herald Tribune, disclosures of espionage scandals usually cause about as much of a sensation as the weather report.

But it is serious business, indeed. In recent years, East German agents have succeeded in seducing more than half a dozen West German secretaries with access to defense se-

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crets in both the NATO alliance and the West German government. A retired, high-ranking NATO officer told this reporter recently he thought there were few NATO secrets left.

The East Germans have also perfected the art of stealing West Germany's industrial and technological secrets. An entire section of East Germany's foreign intelligence agency, consisting of four departments, is devoted to this task. Since West Germany is ahead of its neighbor in some aspects of industrial and high technological development, such as computers and electronics, this makes for savings, for the East Germans, of millions of dollars each year. Of the more than 40 Soviet-bloc spies uncovered in 1979, three-quarters were engaged in this type of "business-suit espionage." Some of them specialized in one thing only — the growing field of computer espionage.

West German sources say that East German spies can be found at all levels of West German industry. They have also made attempts to infiltrate West German churches, and, not surprisingly, quite a few of them have been found in the government and Army.

"We must just assume that there is no place that doesn't have its agent from the other side," said Karl Kaiser, a prominent West German scholar who directs an institute for foreign affairs in Bonn.

West Germany's equivalent of the FBI, the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) estimates that 3,000 to 4,000 East German spies are operating in West Germany. Their easiest "target" has been single women working as secretaries for the West German government.

As far as is publicly known, their most highly placed agent has been Günther Guillaume, political aide to former Chancellor Willy Brandt. Some West German officials say that Guillaume's importance has been exaggerated. The agent, they say, almost never dealt with defense matters and was only one of several special assistants to Brandt. But he was important enough to bring the downfall of Willy Brandt, a pioneer in East-West détente.

West Germany epitomizes all of the problems a relatively open society confronts in the face of highly disciplined spies. But in addition to those problems, it has some special ones of its own. Sending a spy into West Germany has been a relatively easy matter for the East Germans.

In some cases it has been as easy as putting a man on the S-bahn train at East Berlin's Friedrichstrasse station. Within 10 minutes, the agent can travel from austere East Berlin into rollicking West Berlin. He can be relatively certain that no questions will be asked upon his arrival. A West German spy trying to make the reverse trip would have to face a phalanx of police.

Sensitive to any suggestion that it might be reviving repressive measures such as existed in Germany's Nazi past, West Germany has adopted a system of relatively lenient prison sentences for spies.

On top of all this, the East Germans have the advantage of speaking the same language as the people whom they are spying on. Some of the "escapees" who have come from East Germany to the West have turned out to be spies.

The West German government some years ago undertook programs aimed at educating West German government employees to the dangers of espionage directed against them. Posters were placed in government ministries to warn secretaries, that, among other things, "during your vacation, there are [East German] agents whom you should be careful about." One West German secretary had, indeed, met her East German Lothario at the beach.

The secretary problem is still a difficult one to cope with. For one thing, Bonn is one of the world's dullest capitals. On the weekends, many of its political appointees and civil servants flee to other cities. Many of the secretaries are obliged to stay.

"We don't want to forbid love," says Manfred Schüler, state secretary in the chancellor's office, who is the coordinator and supervisor for West Germany's secret services.

Love, according to Dr. Schüler, is the most frequent motive for which a person will agree to spy for East Germany. Next comes that age-old motive, greed. Then comes the person who is unhappy with his or her work or social standing and is flattered to be asked to do dangerous work, said Dr. Schüler.

But the government has tightened its security checks.

And it has had several victories, including a major intelligence coup last year: Werner Stiller, a defector from the East German foreign intelligence service, brought along a suitcase full of secret documents. It turned out that he had been collecting the contents of that suitcase for several months, apparently guided in part by helpful suggestions from the West Germans. When he turned the suitcase over to the West Germans, several of East Germany's specialists in industrial and technological espionage who were working under cover in West Germany packed their own suitcases — and three-piece suits — and fled to the East.

The West Germans claim that Mr. Stiller, while holding a relatively low-seeming rank in the East German service, was in some ways as big a fish as Guillaume had been: He had apparently been a key link in the East German paper flow.

According to one high-ranking West German official, the East Germans have a death warrant out for Stiller and have formed a special commando group to go after him if and when the opportunity arises. The West Germans have not allowed Stiller to make any public appearances, for fear that his life might be in danger.

West Germany's internal security agency, the BfV, is headed by Richard Meier, a handsome, blue-eyed, no-nonsense lawyer, who looks as if he came out of Germany's central casting to play his watchdog role.

Several years ago, Dr. Meier instituted a computerized system for checking identity papers that has led to the capture of a number of East German spies.

At the head of West Germany's Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), the other major security agency and the equivalent of the CIA, is Klaus Kinkel, an energetic man with a political background. He contends that while East Germany might appear to be ahead in the war of human spies, West Germany holds a lead in spy technology over the East that more than restores the balance.

Recruitment for the West German spy agencies is a problem. With an eye to the past, many West Germans want nothing to do with spy, or police work. And once a young man or woman joins the BfV or the BND, it is a one-way street. Other government offices or agencies will have nothing to do with someone who wants to transfer out of spy work.

Some intelligence officials would like to see the consolidation of the two spy agencies. But memories of the Nazi era and fears of another Gestapo make this inconceivable.

Both Dr. Kinkel and Dr. Meier believe that coordination between their two agencies has improved. If, indeed, this is the case, it is an improvement over the past.

A number of years ago West German security agents in Düsseldorf got a tip about the suspicious comings and goings of unidentified men at what was purported to be an export-import firm. After deciding that the firm was a front for spies, staking it out, and planning how to make their kill, the security agents discovered that the firm was, indeed, a front. A front for West Germany's other spy agency, the BND.

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Report from Berlin



A Western diplomat who has had glimpses of both the Soviet and East German secret services considers the East Germans as superior.

The difference shows, according to the diplomat, in the way in which the East Germans follow a man and search his room.

"I've seen them use 10 or 12 people and four different cars with radios, with the cars trading off as they tail you," the diplomat said, describing the movement of East German agents as a veritable symphony of spying.

"In Moscow or Leningrad, the Soviets will sometimes leave a mess in your room, partly to advertise their power over you," he said. "The East Germans would never do that. . . . They're compulsively neat.

"Their only mistake is they sometimes leave things a little neater than when they found them — books in a perfect row, for instance," the diplomat said.

"They do have a corps of bully boys," he continued. "The men in hooded parkas and polyester slacks whom you can spot about 200 yards away. But they never physically abuse you the way the Soviets sometimes do. . . . You're dealing with a more subtle, more sophisticated, more refined secret police. . . . And sometimes people relax around them and say things they shouldn't say."

The diplomat's comments were one of many signs that East Germany's secret police and intelligence services now rank among the world's top spy agencies.

But another, more significant sign of the East Germans' effectiveness can be found in half a dozen of the developing nations of the Middle East and Africa. Many of the East Germans stationed in those countries are specialists in the training of foreign intelligence officers and secret police forces. No one does it better.

Under the guidance of the Soviet Union, most of the East European intelligence services have developed specialties. The Czechs, for instance, have long excelled in the game of deception and black propaganda known as "disinformation." But there can be no more sensitive and important an assignment than the one that has been given to the East Germans in places such as Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and South Yemen.

East Germany is a nation of only 17 million people, so it is hardly likely to become a truly global intelligence power. But where the East Germans specialize, they do so with an imagination and meticulousness that impresses others in the intelligence business.

The man at the head of the effort at East Germany's Ministry for State Security in East Berlin is the athletic and dapper Markus (Mischa) Wolf. He took over his important position at the age of only 28 and now has run the East German secret service for nearly 30 years — the longest-serving intelligence chief in the East bloc. Diplomats say that while much has been written about Wolf, little reliable information is available about this superspy. It is agreed, however, that he was the son of Friedrich Wolf, a physician, writer, and diplomat, and that he got much of his education in the Soviet Union.

Wolf seldom appears in public. He was detected and photographed in 1978 on a secret mission to Sweden using an assumed name. He was seen this year in Belgrade at the funeral of Marshal Tito.

Wolf was once described by one of his agents as "one of those very smart, quiet functionaries who stands in the background. . . . What his colleagues take seriously, what they

fight for, what they are enthusiastic about, he sees only as a great game of chess."

Markus Wolf commands an estimated 2,000 intelligence officers, and, according to West German officials, the quality of those officers has improved markedly over the past 10 to 15 years. They are described as a privileged elite, often ideologically motivated, and often, when arrested, tough and tight-lipped.

"Before, the first thing some of their officers did was turn themselves in to us," said one West German official. "Now we're dealing with a new generation. . . . They're proud of their country. They've been educated from childhood to believe in what they're doing."

"They're usually recruited as students and trained for at least five years," said another official. "They're better than the Poles and the Czechs. . . . They're better than the KGB."

The East Germans have been given the title of "Fighters for Peace on the Invisible Front."

In contrast, the BfV, West Germany's internal security agency charged with detecting the spies being handled by these East German officers, has to fight against a poor image as well as against difficulties in recruiting persons qualified for counterespionage service.

To work against the East Germans, said one West German official, "You don't need dark glasses or a slouch hat. You need a good car and a good radio — and an ability not to talk too much. . . . But most of all, it's card-index work, the work of an archivist — putting together a mosaic one piece at a time."

Unfortunately for counterespionage men on both sides, spies from the East and West now use onetime, unbreakable codes. Each agent has his own code on a strip of film and changes that code with each transmission. Even when a number of computers are used against such a code, it is apparently impossible to break.

Pullach, West Germany

For an entire year, Klaus Kinkel was one of only four persons in the West German government who knew that a man close to the nation's chancellor might be a spy.

Dr. Kinkel and the others were sworn to secrecy while West Germany's counterespionage men did their work. All four, including Chancellor Willy Brandt himself, tried to carry on with business as usual, as if nothing was afoot.

When Günter Guillaume, special assistant to Willy Brandt, was finally exposed as an East German spy, the disclosure brought the chancellor down. It was later learned that Guillaume had suspected he was being watched, but his orders were to stay put.

Learning to keep secrets has proven to be an everyday necessity for Klaus Kinkel. As the head of West Germany's foreign intelligence service, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), he knows more secrets than most men.

After the CIA, the BND is the largest intelligence agency in the West. With a staff of nearly 10,000 it handles all of West Germany's foreign agents and all of its military signals and communications intelligence work.

The BND apparently has been expanding its intelligence-gathering role around the world in recent years, but the process has been a cautious one. For one thing, West Germany has its hands full coping with East Germany.

Manfred Schüler, state secretary in the chancellor's office, who is the coordinator and supervisor for West Germany's secret services, said that West German intelligence had "too many blank spots on the map," and that the blank spots must be filled in the coming years.

Only in this manner, he said, would West Germany be able to do its part in the intelligence sharing among the secret services of the allied nations. As he explained it, this is a process of give-and-take. In order to receive, West Germany must have something to give.

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But Klaus Kinkel, president of the BND, is cautious when it comes to elaborating on the concept of expanded intelligence gathering. He makes it clear, in his candid way, that while West Germany may be a strong and prosperous country, he thinks it is already stretched too thin. In his previous job as chief of the planning staff in the West German Foreign Ministry, Dr. Kinkel was already convinced that West Germany was trying to do too much in the way of assistance to other countries.

Dr. Kinkel talked about his work and his view of the world with this reporter recently in a three-hour interview at his headquarters at the village of Pullach not far from Munich. The only condition was that his words not be taped or reported in direct quotation. In that way, he explained, he could speak more freely.

The West German intelligence chief has inherited from his predecessors an office in the midst of a low-lying compound that was once part of the Nazi establishment. It escaped bombing during the war. Martin Bormann, Hitler's personal secretary, had his offices here, and one can see three statues of Third Reich maidens in the garden outside Dr. Kinkel's window.

The West German spy chief says that a Persian carpet on the floor was wrongly reported by a German magazine to be a gift from Savak, the Shah's secret police.

On one wall there is a photograph of divided Berlin. The long wall of the office is covered top to bottom with a map, and Dr. Kinkel sweeps his hand from West Germany eastward to show where West Germany's main intelligence gathering effort is focused.

In Western Europe, it is unusual for any foreign intelligence chief to talk with a reporter, but Klaus Kinkel is more open than most. To begin with, he is a politician and enjoys the give-and-take.

West Germany's system requires that the head of the BND and other security officials meet periodically with eight members of a parliamentary control commission in which all political factions are represented. A separate three-man committee oversees BND finances.

The parliamentarians are not told about intelligence operations until they are over. If necessary, an operation can be declared "covered" — too sensitive to be discussed at all. But Dr. Kinkel adds that West Germany focuses mostly on intelligence gathering and does little in the way of secret operations aimed at influencing events.

At any rate the West German parliamentarians are apparently told considerably more than their counterparts in most West European countries are told about their secret services.

Dr. Kinkel jokingly protests that the head of the rival East German secret service, Markus Wolf, doesn't have to put up with all that he does in the way of parliamentary oversight or press exposés.

Klaus Kinkel does not look like a man on whom the burdens of secrecy weigh heavily. He jogs every day. In order to identify with the many military men who work for his intelligence service, he has ridden in the back seat of a fighter plane and driven a tank during military exercises. He has an almost boyish face and talks with animation. In one burst of enthusiasm, he sideswipes a plateful of sweets with his hand, sending bonbons and cookies rolling across the table.

The West German intelligence chief does not pretend that West Germany did any better than the United States did in predicting the outcome of the past two years' major developments in Iran and Afghanistan (not just the CIA but also most of the US foreign policy establishment failed to detect and appreciate the growth of widespread opposition to the Shah of Iran in 1978 and continued to misjudge that opposition once it exploded into the open).

Dr. Kinkel says he is impatient with critics who pass judgment on all this with the benefit of hindsight. Making predictions in the intelligence business is the most difficult task there is, he says. There are those who say that the Israelis saw clearly what was happening in Iran, but he is not convinced that that is true.

He declines to agree with those who say that the quality of CIA intelligence has declined in recent years.

In Dr. Kinkel's view the West as a whole didn't take Ayatollah Khomeini seriously enough, early enough. It did not pay adequate attention to Islam. He fears that there will be more surprises.

West Germany's relations with the United States have been strained, in his view, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought differences between the Americans and their European allies into the open. But the basic interests and friendship that are shared by the United States and West Germany remain unshaken. Regardless of talk about West Germany drifting away from the US, it will always side with the Americans when the chips are down.

One problem, however, is that the Americans got used to West Germany agreeing with the US. Now that West Germany has recovered from World War II and is asserting itself, it is a bit hard for the Americans to take. Germany was a good boy in the allied ranks for so long that the Americans are now having trouble grasping that this child has suddenly got ideas of its own.

One of those ideas, which he holds, he says, is that it was wrong for the US to try to impose trade and credit restrictions on the Soviets as a result of their invasion of Afghanistan. He felt all along that such action would be ineffective, and he seems to have been proven right. The American-initiated Olympic boycott, on the other hand, was a good idea, as he sees it.



The West Europeans tend to see a mixture of offensive and defensive motivating factors behind the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, but they tend to place more emphasis on the defensive elements than the Americans do. For all practical purposes, Afghanistan was Soviet to begin with. The Soviets will never withdraw from Afghanistan, Kinkel says, but he does not think they have a long-term master plan to take over the world.

Having made its protest over the invasion, the world is going back to business as usual, and the Soviets must sense this, he says. They must also be happy with an important side effect of the invasion — divisions among the Western allies.

While President Carter was protesting the invasion, Soviet leader Brezhnev calmly went off on a vacation in the Crimea. That tended to leave the impression, Dr. Kinkel said, that the Soviets were calm, while the West was panicking. Unfortunately, much of the world's diplomacy revolves around such impressions.

Dr. Kinkel contends that one positive side effect of Afghanistan for West Germany is that the members of the West German Bundestag, the parliament, are now more understanding of the need for a strong national defense and strong intelligence.

D.S.
Fourth of six reports: Next: Political intelligence in the Middle East



ARTICLE REPRODUCED
ON PAGE 11

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
24 September 1980

SPY WAIRS

FRANCE

the
height of
international
intrigue

Paris copes with a new kind of spy

By Daniel Southerland
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Paris

The ancient Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu said there were five kinds of spies — ordinary, local, internal, expendable, and double agents.

At one time or another, the city of Paris seems to have had to cope with all of these. Now it must counter a new variety: the terrorist.

The Chinese strategist, whose writing amounts to the first systematic study of spying, does not, of course, talk much about terrorists. But terrorists, too, must spy to survive.

It is the terrorists who are making the headlines in the French capital these days. Because of France's long tradition of granting asylum to political dissidents and its liberal immigration laws, Paris holds "the gold medal for terrorism in all categories," according to the French magazine *L'Express*.

For men working in intelligence and counterintelligence, the ultimate fear is that one of the terrorist groups, somewhere, someday, will seize a nuclear weapon and then use it as blackmail, threatening what would amount to a suicidal act of war. The other nightmare would be terrorist-instigated sabotage in a time of crisis. But France's counterespionage men are also preoccupied with what they consider to be two more subtle, but perhaps equally significant, threats. These are the quiet, but relentless, efforts of the Soviet Union and its East European allies to: (1) steal French military and technological secrets and (2) mislead French public opinion through "disinformation" — deceptions and propaganda designed to pass for the truth and for legitimate journalism.

The men charged with coping with this "quiet war" conducted by Soviet and East European spies are the inspectors of the Directorate of Territorial Surveillance (DST), France's internal counterespionage organization. These over-worked gentlemen have had a checkered past. They are widely believed to be some of the world's leading phone tappers and bugging experts, and officials of most foreign embassies in Paris assume that the DST is listening in on them.

France's leading satirical newspaper, *Le Canard Enchaîné*, has written numerous articles about the DST's wiretapping. The paper's writers speak from personal experience. When they moved into their new offices on the Rue St. Honoré, not long ago, they ferreted out dozens of microphones, presumably installed by the DST.

What is less well known is that the men of the DST have nabbed an impressive number of Soviet and East European diplomats engaged in "improper activities" — namely spying. France believes it has a special relationship of détente with the Soviet Union, and it does not like to publicize the spy war. No one wants to be accused of reviving cold-war sentiment, or cold-war rhetoric. Were France to publicize all that is going on, the Soviet Union would surely accuse it of doing just that.

France and other Western countries also fear that publicizing the depredations of Soviet and East European spies might result in retaliation against their own spies or other

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citizens. Since the French are believed to have few spies in the Soviet Union or in East Europe, the retaliation would more likely come against innocent officials or citizens who happen to be stationed in those communist nations.

Figures released by a source in touch with the DST are worth noting, even if they fail to get much attention in France: Over the past six years, the French have expelled some 40 Soviet and East European diplomats because of spying. Among them was the Soviet KGB chief in Paris, a big fish indeed, who apparently got himself involved in the dangerous business of gathering intelligence from several French businessmen with defense contracts. Then there was the Soviet consul in Marseilles who took a special interest in plans for the latest model of the Mirage fighter plane as well as in French nuclear missiles and submarines.

Even if all of this were given more publicity, however, much of the French public might remain indifferent.

When the former chief of staff of the East German Air Force was arrested in the northern French city of Lille recently, and the DST found him to be carrying documents pertaining to French tanks and anti-tank weapons, it merited no more than a few lines in most French newspapers. The French have seen it all. And perhaps they feel there are no secrets left anyway.

An agent of influence



One afternoon in September 1978, Igor Kouznetsov, a Soviet diplomat based in Paris, seemed to be taking extra precautions to avoid surveillance. The French counterespionage officers of the DST who had been following him for days knew they were finally on to something.

Kouznetsov changed from the Paris Métro to a bus, and then finally took a taxi to an intersection where a white-haired man waited. But first the Soviet diplomat strolled down a side street, reappeared, and then took a last look around before deciding there was no danger of being followed.

Kouznetsov then crossed the street to shake hands with the white-haired Frenchman. The DST inspectors knew a great deal about Kouznetsov, a KGB officer working under cover at the UNESCO headquarters in Paris. But on this September afternoon they were more interested in the septuagenarian Frenchman.

When Kouznetsov and the Frenchman emerged from a restaurant, the men of DST moved — at a discreet distance — behind, in front, and to the side of their man. One of them was behind him when he arrived at his home. The man was Pierre-Charles Pathé, son of one of the founders of the French cinema industry. The DST began to look into Pathé's background. Ten months later, they were ready to make an arrest.

This time Kouznetsov and Pathé met at the small and nondescript café "Au Rendez-vous des Amis" not far from the Place Gambetta.

After leaving the café, the two men entered a side street. Thinking they were alone, Pathé took an envelope from his portfolio and handed it to Kouznetsov. As the Soviet slipped it inside his coat pocket, the DST swarmed into the street shouting "police." The Russian raised his arms, letting the envelope drop to the ground, swearing all the time that it did not belong to him.

This is how the magazine Paris Match described the arrest of Pierre-Charles Pathé, "agent of influence" for the Soviet Union for 20 years. Pathé, a journalist and publisher of the small bimonthly bulletin, "Synthesis," had been paid by the Soviets to provide them with analyses, reports on political personalities, and lists of subscribers to his review. In addition, he had readily agreed to weave Soviet-provided ideas and analyses into his bulletin.

The "biographies" Mr. Pathé gave the KGB detailed the social, moral, and psychological state of industrialists, journalists, and politicians whom he knew. The analyses covered everything from French arms sales to China to the probable state of Franco-Soviet relations in the event of a political takeover by the left. According to Paris Match, Mr. Pathé had also supplied the Russians with information about a member of France's secret intelligence service, the Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre Espionnage (SDECE).

Pathé moved in interesting circles. A man of the world, he was widely liked and respected, according to French press accounts. His articles had appeared in a number of French papers and magazines. Nearly 300 copies of his bimonthly bulletin went to deputies of the French National Assembly.

As far as anyone knows, Pathé never stole any defense secrets for the Russians. But the political intelligence he provided must have been of interest. He had been a member of a Gaullist-controlled political movement that aimed at a rapprochement between West and East Europe.

Although his father, the French film industry pioneer, had been a great admirer of the United States, the son, Pierre-Charles had become an admirer of the Soviet Union. Some of his work had been published there and he had had a short-lived marriage with a Soviet beauty queen.

On May 22 of this year, a state security court sentenced Pierre-Charles Pathé to five years in prison because of his work over the years on behalf of nine successive KGB officers. According to the DST, he was part of a Soviet "disinformation," or black propaganda, effort — a plan aimed at discrediting the reputations of certain persons and institutions while shaping opinion in directions favored by the Soviet Union.

It was the first reported case in Western Europe in which an "agent of influence," as he was being called, had been sent to prison. In a Western nation such as Britain, it might have been difficult to make a legal case against a Pierre-Charles Pathé. In the United States, he might have faced charges for failing to register as a foreign agent.

It was much easier for the Soviet Union to find such ideological recruits in the Western democracies immediately following World War II when sympathy was strong for the Soviet struggle against fascism and the wartime suffering of the Soviet people. But the invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia and revelations of the Gulag have taken their toll.

Ladislav Bittman, a Czech "disinformation" specialist who defected to the United States following the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, said that in the 1960s the Soviets and their East European allies invested money in a considerable number of small West European publications. Mr. Pathé's activities were not likely to be an isolated case, he said.

But one problem with some of these "agents of influence," was that they were so nonideological that they would work for anyone. Mr. Bittman recalled a West German contact who, it was eventually discovered, had provided intelligence services not only to the Czechs, but also to the East Germans, the West Germans, and the Americans. According to Mr. Bittman, this "quadruple agent" ended up in an East German prison, and the West Germans paid \$40,000 to get him out.

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The French secret service

A French diplomat tells of a time 10 years ago when he and several colleagues used to gather every time an intelligence report from the French secret service arrived. The secret reports were considered a joke, and even though there was not much to be learned from them, they always made for a good laugh.

Another French functionary working in an Arab country some years ago said the SDECE was not only laughable, it was also not to be trusted. He feared that because of friends of the Israelis in the French secret service, anything he passed on to the SDECE would go, without regard to the sensitivity of his Arab contacts, straight to Israel.

Among intelligence men from the allied nations, the French secret services have long had a reputation for spying more on each other than on their foreign enemies.

"They'll never be any good at this business, because they simply don't trust each other," a former member of MI.6, the British secret intelligence service, said recently.

But eventually the SDECE began to get some compliments. In the past decade, French diplomats say, the service's economic intelligence has improved to the point where it is no longer laughable. A former American military intelligence officer says, with undisguised admiration, that the French have made "remarkable strides" in what would appear to be industrial and technological espionage.

The biggest compliment comes from James R. Schlesinger, former CIA director, who earlier this year told the journal "Politique Internationale" that the French intelligence services "represent something of a model in my mind."

The SDECE is small in comparison to the CIA or the Soviet KGB. Its reach is not global. The focus of its intelligence gathering is first on West Africa, and second on the Middle East. Its headquarters in Paris — nicknamed "La Piscine" after a nearby swimming pool — lie behind a yellow brick wall on the Boulevard Mortier.

The SDECE has a staff of only about 2,000 persons. An additional 800 or so are believed to be engaged in monitoring of radio and other communications signals. The organization's budget seems to keep up with inflation and in some years has been reported to have grown at a rate higher than the overall defense budget, from which its funding comes. Parliamentary oversight of the secret service is virtually nonexistent.

Col. Alexandre de Maranches was appointed to reorganize the SDECE 10 years ago. It had been shaken by suspected communist infiltration, links between some of its agents and crime networks, and a purge ordered by Charles de Gaulle after it was revealed that the SDECE had played a role in the kidnapping of a Moroccan dissident.

An acquaintance of the aristocratic, moustachioed Count de Maranches said that the SDECE chief is a great admirer of the wisdom contained in "The Art of War," believed to have been written in the 5th century BC by the Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu. The book, which happens to have been a favorite of Mao Tse-tung, was also admired by the founder of the West German foreign intelligence service, Reinhard Gehlen. Sun Tzu's highest stratagem consists of breaking an opponent's will without fighting.

Colonel de Maranches does not recommend that this aim be adopted by the Western nations against the Soviet Union and its friends. But he apparently believes that this is the approach the Soviets and company have adopted against France and other nations of the West.

As head of the SDECE Colonel de Maranches has tried to bring more professionalism into the service. He has apparently restored once-damaged relations with the CIA. But the secret service has not been able to offer the prestige or salaries needed to attract top-flight French university graduates to fight France's "invisible wars." It has attracted some dedicated military officers, and they constitute much of the leadership of French intelligence.

But the SDECE still appears to be plagued by infighting. Only two weeks ago, Col. Alain de Gaigneron de Marolles, head of intelligence gathering in the service, quit after only one year in that key position. A leading French daily, Le Monde, said that Colonel de Marolles was the fifth officer to leave that post since de Maranches took over the service a decade ago.

Le Monde indicated that de Marolles may have left the service largely as a result of differences over French policy toward North and black Africa. It cited an unnamed Israeli secret service source as saying that de Marolles had helped coordinate Egypt's border clash with Libya in 1977 and that in his latest position he had favored forming a Libyan government in exile. (Through its oil wealth and sometimes through military aid, Libya has worked against French interests in black Africa.)

According to Le Monde, de Maranches has long wanted to give higher priority to intelligence gathering, with the implication that secret "action," such as de Marolles was reported to be advocating, ought to be given lower priority.

Indeed, there are indications that the French leadership has relied less in recent years than it used to on the French secret service for intervention in black Africa. A turning point may have come after several coup attempts in the 1950s and '60s against Guinea's President Sékou Touré were badly bungled. In 1979, when French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing decided to oust Central Africa's Emperor Bokassa I, he is reported to have turned to a new intelligence group inside the French Army to do most of the job.

Jean Mauriceau-Beaupré, Gaullist, critic of President Giscard d'Estaing, and adviser to the Ivory Coast's President Félix Houphouët-Boigny, contends that the SDECE is not capable of clandestine action. Mauriceau-Beaupré is no stranger to coups. He said that among other things he had advised an Army regiment which revolted against Ghana's President Kwame Nkrumah in 1966. (In essence, his message to the Ghanaian Army unit was simple: "Rise, and march.")

"As for the SDECE, you are making a mistake to treat them as a serious subject for serious study," declared Mauriceau-Beaupré. "They are clowns, monsieur. Clowns!"

"You say they are supposed to have improved their economic reporting? Fine. They would make good commercial attachés. But not a serious secret service, monsieur. Never!"

East-bloc assassins at work

The assassination attempt against Vladimir Kostov in 1978 did not cause much of a stir in Paris, where such events have become almost a regular occurrence. But the Kostov case could have broader significance.

Kostov, a Bulgarian newsman, thinks he has three good reasons why Bulgarian attackers came after him and his compatriot Georgi Markov two years ago.

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- The Bulgarian leadership was clearly stung by the broadcasts made by the two men following their defections from Bulgaria. They had criticized the Sophia regime on Radio Free Europe, an organization that broadcasts to East Europe and is largely funded by the US Congress. (Radio Free Europe used to get financial support from the CIA, but that support is said to have ended some time ago.)

- The attacks were meant to warn others not to follow the examples of Markov and Kostov.

• Markov, a writer of distinction, and Kostov, a leading television newsman, were in a sense members of a family: the Bulgarian communist elite. Mr. Markov, who was killed in London in September 1978, had once known Todor Zhivkov, first secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party and chairman of the state council. The defection of the two men created something of a family feud.

Another Bulgarian defector, Stephan Sverdlev, formerly of the Bulgarian police, is convinced that the attacks on the two Bulgarians could not have occurred without the knowledge and endorsement of the Soviet Union. Bulgaria is tied to the Soviet Union more tightly than any other East European nation.

Kostov said he once had a friend in the Bulgarian secret service who told him there was an understanding that the Soviets had a right to recruit their own agents — directly from the Bulgarian service.

The newsman described the Bulgarian organization as well financed and said its special training school near Sophia produced men who were better prepared to work overseas than were regular diplomats.

After being assigned to Paris, Mr. Kostov himself had been asked to cooperate with the secret service whenever necessary. He was required to report in detail all contacts and conversations he had with foreigners. He said that men who made it to the top of the secret service as well as other government services in Bulgaria were for the most part cynical rather than ideological in their outlook. Some, he said, were disillusioned. But once they reached the top, the privileges they received were considerable.

Toward the end of the 1950s, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev apparently ordered a halt to assassinations of dissidents — at least overseas. If the attacks on Messrs. Markov and Kostov mark a revival of such action, their significance is greater than the limited press coverage would suggest.

'Disinformation' — a personal note



Having been the intended conveyor of at least one piece of "disinformation," I must admit to a strong prejudice against such operations.

In February 1973, when I was working as a correspondent for The Christian Science Monitor in Saigon, a Vietnamese was introduced to me as a person who had information about two colleagues of mine missing in Cambodia.

The man professed to be in touch with someone connected with the communist-dominated provisional revolutionary government of South Vietnam. He claimed to be in a position to know what had happened to Dana Stone, free-lance photographer then working for CBS news, and Sean Flynn, then working for Time magazine.

I had my doubts about the man but listened to what he told me and passed it on to another reporter who was trying to locate the missing newsmen. I had been with the two only minutes before they were captured in April 1970 next to a burning automobile in the Parrot's Beak region of Cambodia.

It was assumed that Vietnamese communist troops had captured them, then perhaps turned them over to Khmer Rouge guerrillas. My Vietnamese informant said the two were still alive.

One day the Vietnamese arrived with a new story to tell. He had it written out in longhand on several sheets of paper. It was a sensational story: There had been a battle at the communist headquarters near the Cambodian border, with one faction of communist leaders — all of them South Vietnamese — pitted against a northern faction. North Vietnamese troops were called in to fight the southerners. A top leader was wounded. Another purged.

It seemed unbelievable that the communist leadership, which had shown extraordinary unity throughout the war, would suddenly be torn by such dissension. But the story seemed too hot to ignore. I checked key aspects of it, but got nowhere.

Within a week or two I learned that a respected colleague from a prestigious West European newspaper had published the story. It was picked up by the British Broadcasting Corporation, and it created a sensation in Saigon. I later learned that my European colleague had been presented with a tape recording of a communist official describing what had happened.

When it turned out that most aspects of the story were wrong, however, my European colleague was devastated. Having first been congratulated for his scoop, he was now besieged with anxious queries from his newspaper.

Years later, a communist defector indicated to another colleague of mine that there had, indeed, been an incident near communist headquarters at that time — but not of such sensational magnitude.

Whoever planted that story — and I suspect it was "black propaganda" specialists of the South Vietnamese government — must have been delighted with the result. A left-of-center European newspaper of considerable standing had run a story about a major split in the communist leadership. The BBC had picked the dissension story up and played it back to Vietnam, and the BBC had great credibility among the Vietnamese.

Even once the story was denied, doubts might have been created among some of the men who were fighting for the supposedly divided communist leadership. Damage to a reputable newsman's credibility might have been a secondary aim of the operation. The man who tried to give the story to me never showed up again.

Former CIA men whom I have interviewed recently said that their propaganda specialists would not have tried to plant such a story. For one thing, they said, the CIA's propaganda efforts were more sustained in those days.

But one should perhaps recall ex-CIA man John Stockwell's account of how the Washington Post once unwittingly published a CIA-planted story to the effect that Soviet advisers were operating inside Angola during that country's civil war.

A disillusioned spy moves West



For Ladislav Bittman, spying began as a game of wits but ended in disillusionment.

Mr. Bittman, a Czech now living and working in the United States under a new name, was at one point deputy chief in the Department for Black Propaganda and Disinformation in Prague. Under the cover of press attaché in Vienna, he later ran agents for the Czech secret service. According to Bittman, East-bloc spies had deeply penetrated Austria.

One of his disinformation service's greatest coups came in 1954 when it planted Nazi documents in a lake in Czechoslovakia, knowing that they would be found and would create the impression that many Nazis held high positions in West Germany.

"I'm still a little proud of that one," he said, recalling what was known in the Czech secret service as Operation Neptune.

But in 1968, after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Bittman called it quits and drove from Vienna to the West German border, where he told the German police he was seeking asylum in the United States.

"In the disinformation business, you are trying to misuse people, and all your thinking is negative," he said. "You are not building human beings up. You are tearing them down."

He said that quite a few members of the Czech secret service whom he knew became "paranoid" and that there were at least 10 to 15 suicides among them in the 1960s.

"Many of my colleagues suspected every second person in Prague of being a West German or an American intelligence agent," he said.

Bittman said he became a member of the Communist Party at the early age of 15. His mother and his father, a welder, had been party members. He felt honored when asked to become a member of the Czech intelligence service. Disillusionment began about the time the Soviets moved into Hungary in 1956.

In Austria, he said, the Czech secret service was successful to the point where it knew of a few decisions before Austrian Cabinet ministers did, in the fields of counterintelligence and foreign trade. Czech trade negotiators knew in advance what their Austrian counterparts' bargaining tactics would be.

"There were no secrets in Austria," Bittman declared. "None of the Austrian agents who were recruited to work for him in the 1960s were Marxist-Leninists. "They were either bought, blackmailed, or doing it for adventure."

The former secret service man said his best agent in Austria was a wealthy businessman who held dinner parties for important people and played the role of a conservative. At the same time, according to Bittman, the agent did not believe in communism.

"He was one of those agents who enjoyed the danger and the intrigue," Bittman said. "It helped to maintain his vitality."

Within hours after Bittman made his escape to West Germany, the Czech secret service arranged to bring the Austrian agent to Czechoslovakia.


The adjustment was difficult for Bittman when he first came to the United States. For a few years, he said, he had recurring nightmares in which Czech secret service men chased him. He later learned that the Czech service was, indeed, trying to find him and had devised a plan to have Cubans kidnap him and bring him back to Czechoslovakia by way of Cuba.

How can one spot a communist intelligence officer?

"The intelligence officer is much more tolerant and unorthodox than a regular diplomat," he said. "He will feel far less threatened if he is detected doing something unusual. . . . He can just say it's just part of the tactics."

"The intelligence man will be more willing to make mistakes, and from time to time he might criticize the government as a means of drawing people out and gaining their friendship."

Third in a six-part series on spy wars. Next: The two Germanys meet head on.



ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 11.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
23 September 1980

SPY WAR

II. The Big Two



Yuri Andropov, KGB chief



The Lubyanka — headquarters of the KGB

KGB

The Soviet Union's principal intelligence agency

By Daniel Southerland
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Rudolph Albert Herrmann of the KGB did not look
such of a spy.

Indeed, when exposed to the press by the FBI earlier this
year, the onetime agent of the KGB (Committee for State
Security) looked like a bit of a joke — a small-time

intermediary and a transmitter of messages to Moscow. It
was difficult to know what he accomplished during his decade
of secret activities in the United States.

But Colonel Herrmann is the product of a system that,
while highly sophisticated in its use of computers, spy satel-
lites, and code-breaking techniques, still places enormous
stress on the deployment of human spies. In the case of this
KGB colonel, who lived under the cover of an assumed name
as a free-lance photographer near New York City, the real
spying payoff might only have come in a time of crisis, many
years after the Soviets planted him.

The Soviets apparently placed their greatest hopes in
Colonel Herrmann's 15-year-old son. He was being prepared
by the KGB like a "baby mole," to enroll in an American
college and study political science, with the aim of eventually
seeking employment with the United States government.

In this game of planting spies inside an adversary govern-
ment or society, the Soviets enjoy a huge advantage because
of the relatively open nature of many nations in the West.
And because the US is a nation of immigrants, the task of an
intelligence officer such as Colonel Herrmann is made all the
easier. His neighbors in Hartsdale, NY, saw nothing unusual
in the man's accent or the fact that he and his family kept
largely to themselves.

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Colonel Herrmann was kept busy with coded radio message assignments that often included nothing more than the servicing of other Soviet agents. In June 1976, for example, his son traveled to Chicago to bury two containers carrying instructions from Moscow for another intelligence operative.

The Soviet agent's most ludicrous-seeming assignment involved an attempt to get the United States to stop an Apollo manned space flight. Moscow headquarters sent him, by radio message, the text of an anonymous letter he was to send to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) alleging that a space vehicle had been damaged. Following instructions, Colonel Herrmann bought a used typewriter and typed the letter. He then traveled by a circuitous route to Atlanta and dropped the letter in a mailbox. When a NASA officer got the letter, he gave it a quick glance and dropped it in a "crank letter" file. The flight went off on schedule.

In a sense, Colonel Herrmann was an up-to-date version of KGB Col. Rudolf Abel, a much more famous Soviet spy who was active three decades earlier. The full extent of Colonel Abel's efforts at spying were never known, but the FBI has no real evidence to show that he accomplished much.

After several years in prison, Colonel Abel returned to Moscow as part of a "spy swap" for the downed American U-2 reconnaissance pilot Francis Gary Powers. Like Colonel Herrmann, his real importance might have come to light only in the midst of a crisis, when limitations placed on Soviet diplomats, for instance, might cause them to shift certain responsibilities to agents living inside American society.

Like Colonel Abel, Colonel Herrmann was an example of the careful, long-term planning in which the Soviets at times seem to excel. The men moved in slow stages toward the US, and then passing some time in Canada before taking on the big target — the United States.



Col. Rudolf Herrmann

Colonel Herrmann was arrested, as the result of a blunder by his main KGB contact, and he agreed to cooperate with the FBI in order to avoid prosecution. He then went to work for the Americans as a double agent, reporting to them on his continuing KGB activities.

When the KGB showed signs of suspecting that Colonel Herrmann had been "doubled" and insisted that his son return to Moscow for advanced training, the FBI arranged for Herrmann and his family to drop out of sight.

Colonel Herrmann helped to provide information on a Canadian university professor who had been a Soviet spy for 30 years. An expert on oil economics and the transfer of high technology to third-world developing countries, Prof. Hugo Hambleton of Laval University had traveled on behalf of the KGB as far as Latin America and the Middle East.

In an interview with the Toronto Sunday Sun, Professor Hambleton — who had agreed to tell everything he knew to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) — said he made forays in the summer of 1979 into Israel and Saudi Arabia under the guise of studying economic conditions there. For two years, he was chief adviser for Canada's foreign programs for Haiti and Peru.

But the Soviets may have made one mistake with him that is characteristic of some of their operations: They kept going for more from the professor. He was a "meticulous spy," said the Sunday Sun, keeping careful records of all his contacts and hiding places. The RCMP seized them all.

Another apparent KGB tendency, which other intelligence agencies have been known to share with it from time to time,

has been to distort political intelligence from the field in order to give the masters at home what they want to hear. Some American officials think that Soviet intelligence — perhaps military intelligence, rather than KGB — probably presented a false picture of potential Afghan resistance prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

But a US official who once had a chance to see some confidential Soviet reporting on other subjects said, it was relatively objective.

What seems incontestable is that the KGB is the world's largest and most formidable intelligence organization. Some people think its overseas operatives may outnumber the CIA by about four or five to one. But in many ways, it cannot be compared with the CIA, because in addition to its foreign intelligence function, it has the internal mission of policing the Soviet population.

It has become rare for the Soviets to succeed in finding ideological recruits overseas any more, so their task may in some ways be more difficult. But it is also clear that under the leadership of KGB chairman Yuri Andropov, the elite of the KGB at work in sensitive foreign posts have grown more sophisticated.

The modern man of the KGB, at least the one dealing with foreigners, is likely to be a master of languages and socially at ease. If he is working in Washington, D.C., it would not be surprising to find that he can discuss the latest trials and triumphs of the Washington Redskins football team.

Vladimir Sakharov, a KGB officer who defected to the United States after working in the Middle East, recently warned a gathering of Americans not to place too much reliance on satellites and computers. He said the Soviets felt most secure with human intelligence — "the kind of thing you can feel and touch."

"The KGB will keep a man in a country for a long time — to the point where he becomes a real expert," said a former CIA case officer, who added that he and a few of his colleagues had on occasion socialized with their Soviet opponents in a foreign capital.

He said that both sides pretended to be regular foreign service officers, and found without giving away secrets that they had a lot in common, including resentment of regular bureaucrats.

CIA

The United States tries to fit the pieces together

By Daniel Southerland

Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

When Americans think of spies, they usually think of the US Central Intelligence Agency. But among Washington bureaucrats who read intelligence reports the highest prestige seems to attach these days to the nation's supersecret electronic snooping organization, the National Security Agency (NSA).

The United States faces enormous difficulties in its continuing efforts to place, or find, human spies among the ranks of its chief adversary, the Soviet Union. The Soviets keep foreigners under close observation, and they invest a great deal of talent and manpower in the arts of counterespionage.



Stansfield Turner

The US has overcome its disadvantage, to a degree, by excelling in the ever-more-refined arts of electronic monitoring and satellite reconnaissance.

Until the Soviets caught on, the NSA was reputed, among other coups, to have developed a system whereby it could listen in on telephone conversations between Soviet government leaders in the Kremlin and other leaders moving around Moscow in their chauffeured limousines. A high-ranking US intelligence official says that thanks to its technological means, the US is not likely to be surprised by any major buildup of Soviet military forces.

But most of the raw material provided by the NSA and other technologically oriented US agencies means nothing unless there are highly qualified intelligence officers there to interpret the material and place it in the larger context of the Soviets' suspected intentions.

As Adm. Stansfield Turner, Director of Central Intelligence, put it in a speech to former intelligence officers last year: "Our capabilities in the photographic and signals intelligence areas, especially, are growing more rapidly than anyone, I think, ever imagined. Our real problem is becoming how to process, evaluate, and act on what we are able to detect."

But Admiral Turner insisted that even as technology commanding the skies and radio waves has burgeoned, so has the value of the human intelligence agent on the ground been enhanced: "As photographic and signals intelligence answer questions, they also raise new ones, new ones which only an individual on the ground can answer."

That may be the case with regard to the Soviet Union, but the value of the individual may apply even more when it comes to a key "growth area" for foreign intelligence gathering — such as the Middle East — where an intelligence officer's understanding of a foreign culture may prove to be more important than anything technology can provide. Admiral Turner says that human spies are out there working for the US, in regions such as the Middle East, but that human agents are being "targetted more carefully" than before.

Admiral Turner's critics — among them many former intelligence officers — think, however, that the admiral has been to a great extent oriented toward technology and uncomfortable in the murky world of human spies. They also fear that the activities and quality of CIA case officers — the men who handle secret agents in the field — may have suffered from what they consider to be uncertain leadership from the White House and the CIA.

One former CIA officer with more than 20 years experience is skeptical of the Turner approach. He sat in a Washington, D.C., hotel recently and tried to describe to this reporter what he would look for in the ideal case officer, one who has been assigned to recruit a Russian. Few assignments could be more challenging.

"The key to getting to that Russian could be anything," he says. "The key is the man. He may like boating, he may like chasing girls, he may collect postage stamps."

"The good case officer is the guy who has the capacity and the imagination to find those keys — to find a human rapport. You've got to overcome the Russian's other loyalties. And it's not a matter of using blackmail."

The retired CIA officer is concerned that the agency may no longer be attracting the kind of man he thought was the ideal case officer: imaginative, socially adept, and well educated not only in foreign affairs but also in American literature, history, and ideals. The former CIA officer was a graduate of a prestigious Ivy League university and thus part of the "old boy network" Admiral Turner seems to resent. Indeed, for many years, many of the men at the top of the CIA have come from the Ivy League. Today, the percentage of such men throughout the agency is apparently much smaller than it once was.

The CIA has plenty of statistics to support its counterargument that the quality of agency officers is improving, not declining. Despite the investigations and scandals of the past, the CIA has been getting more than 100,000 employee inquiries every year. Of these, the CIA interviewed 16,000 in fiscal year 1979 and apparently hired only a small percentage of that number.

According to Alec Monroe, chief of the CIA's recruitment division, about 16 percent of the new recruits held doctoral degrees and 38 percent held master's degrees.

Mr. Monroe said that in the first half of fiscal year 1980, more than 30 percent of the recruits in the professional and technical fields were women. The CIA claims that both men and women have a tendency to stay with the agency longer than other government officials stay with their respective agencies.

But few women are used on the "front line" as case officers, apparently because in most countries, male chauvinism is still a fact of life. Most secret agents would apparently balk at being directed by a woman. An exception may have been Martha Peterson, an American vice-consul in Moscow who was accused by the Soviets in 1977 of having engaged in espionage in the Soviet Union. She was subsequently expelled.

Out of a total CIA manpower of perhaps 16,000 or 17,000 persons, only a few are chosen to be case officers. These are the people who do some of the agency's most sensitive work, not only gathering intelligence in the field but also, when the Washington policymakers deem it necessary, planning actions aimed at influencing overseas events. Such actions have apparently increased since the fall of the Shah, the taking of the American hostages in Iran, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. But one high-ranking US official said that "political action" by the CIA amounted to "peanuts" today compared with some of its past operations.

Some experts on intelligence think that members of what is known as the clandestine service of the CIA were treated in the past, at least, as too much of an elite. It is said that their favored status worked to the detriment of the agency's analysts. The analysts are supposed to provide the president of the United States and other policymakers with a clear and independent view of where real threats to the United States lie and where potential threats are likely to develop. Recently they have come under considerable scrutiny.

Despite the mystique attached to the work of the clandestine service, several former case officers said that morale, which is good among the younger officers in the service, begins to decline when one moves into the middle and upper ranks.

Of the 15 former CIA officials interviewed by this reporter, the majority were critical of the current director of the CIA, Admiral Turner, who also holds the all-embracing position of Director of Central Intelligence. They concluded that while Admiral Turner may have been a fine military man, one cannot run an intelligence agency like a battleship. They charge that the admiral, while publicly espousing a "collegial" system at the CIA, has actually failed to encourage the kind of give-and-take with veteran CIA officials that would be required to get the most out of their experience. A couple of these veteran CIA men said they simply "gave up" on Admiral Turner and took early retirement.

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"Admiral Turner is, in some ways, the antithesis of the kind of people who made the agency powerful, interesting, and lucrative in an intellectual sense," said one of these critics, a former CIA chief of station. "There was an enormous premium put on unorthodoxy, but he's doing it according to the book."

According to almost everyone's account, Admiral Turner's attempt to establish a National Intelligence Tasking Center to coordinate the assignments for the collection of intelligence has been a flop. A retired Army lieutenant general with little apparent experience in intelligence was chosen as its first director.

"The general," said one former intelligence professional, "was considered to be out of his depth. He came down and gave us a preview — papers with flow charts and lots of mumbo jumbo. It was truly laughable."

Officials from other Washington bureaucracies say that the agency's analytical products are sometimes impressive, an example being a report on oil production that shows the Soviet Union moving toward becoming an oil deficit nation in the mid-1980s. But they also say there is a great unevenness in quality. (The agency's less-than-brilliant performance in the difficult business of providing political intelligence and predictions will be reported on in part five of this series.)

The outlook at CIA headquarters, seven miles outside Washington, D.C., in Langley, Virginia, is by no means totally grim. Several of the agency's senior officers are highly respected. One of them, Bruce C. Clarke Jr., director of the National Foreign Assessment Center is often pointed to by Washington officials as a first-class professional.

Admiral Turner has instituted more vigorous standards for promotion. People who deal with the CIA budget say that it is now more coherent than it had ever been in the past. And the failure of most of the foreign policy establishment to forecast events in Iran in 1978 and 1979 has resulted in a devil's advocate look being taken at intelligence estimates on a regular basis as well as in the establishment of what is believed to be a more effective intelligence warning system.

Far from being the aggressive monster it remains in the eyes of some people on the political left, the CIA still appears to be trying to recover from purges, criticism, and the lack of a clear foreign policy to serve. But the agency is also far from being the shackled, helpless giant some Republicans say the Carter administration has made it.

Regardless of who wins the presidential election this November, there appears to be a consensus in Washington that the CIA, or at least the intelligence-gathering work it does, is indispensable. Increasingly, the question being asked in the US Congress is how to strengthen the CIA, not how to restrict it.

A Louis Harris poll taken in the wake of events in Iran showed that 73 percent of the Americans polled would like to see a strengthening of intelligence-gathering activities. But according to Lou Harris, many Americans have reservations about seeing the CIA engage in secret political actions that might prevent other peoples from determining their own destinies.

(The questions of secret action, secrecy, and public opinion will be analyzed in the sixth and final part of this series.)

Watching Soviet spies — then and now



For 26 years, Soviet spies were Larry McWilliams' specialty.

Now retired, the plain-spoken Mr. McWilliams once interviewed the much-publicized Soviet spy of the 1950s known as Col. Rudolph Abel.

Unlike some modern-day American intelligence men, who speak of the Soviets as "our principal adversaries," Larry McWilliams still calls them "the enemy."

But the former FBI man also speaks with respect of his erstwhile opponents, having watched many of them develop from ill-clad bumblers in the 1950s to the smooth technicians of today. In his view, "Colonel Abel" was exceptionally clever for his time.

As Larry McWilliams sees it, the "greatest gift" that was ever given to Soviet spies anywhere in the world was the United Nations headquarters in New York. When he worked as a special agent against the Soviets in New York, the UN was off limits to the FBI. Apparently, it still is today.

"Russian spies at the UN had complete freedom to travel anywhere in the US," he said. "But the FBI was never allowed to enter the grounds of the UN."

The Soviets were nonetheless easier to deal with in those days, according to the ex-agent.

"In the early days, you could pick out a KGB man in a short period of time," said Mr. McWilliams, speaking of Soviet intelligence operatives who posed as diplomats, scientists, newsmen, or trade representatives as they pursued the cold war spy trade.

"They stuck together," he said of the KGB men. "They shunned the real diplomats. . . . For a while, they seemed to be the only ones who had cars."

"In the early days, you'd have a guy come over, and he'd say, 'I'm the embassy scientific attaché,' but if you talked with him about electric light bulbs, he wouldn't know the first thing. Now some of them have got PhDs."

"You could spot all the Russians about a mile away," he said. "They'd wear those bell-bottom trousers, and they'd keep the same shirt on for a week."

"These days they don't have the old inferiority complex," said Mr. McWilliams. "They no longer walk around with a chip on their shoulder."

"Before, if a Soviet saw an American icebox, he'd immediately tell you what great things they have in the Soviet Union. Now he'll say, 'Hey, that's interesting. Let me take a look at that.'"

Despite the advent of détente between the Soviet Union and the United States in the early 1970s, the Soviets continued to spy on the US at a brisk pace. And, if anything, just as the number of Soviet tourists, seamen, and trade representatives visiting the United States increased, so did spying. As a result, the FBI fought some battles with the State Department over certain cases where visa restrictions were relaxed. State, of course, had the final say. At one point, the FBI also requested a significant increase in manpower for counterespionage, but apparently never got it.

Some State Department officials felt the FBI was being alarmist, either mistakenly overestimating the Soviet spy threat or deliberately exaggerating it to support budget requests. The State Department had an additional concern — making certain the US was living up to guidelines established through the Helsinki agreements of 1975 for easing visa restrictions.

At any rate, the FBI's problem did appear to be expanding. When Larry McWilliams started working as a special agent against the Soviets in the early 1950s, Soviet and East European officials stationed in the United States numbered only a few hundred. By the time of his retirement as chief of the FBI's foreign counterintelligence training in the late 1970s, the figure had reached nearly 2,000. As many as one out of every two or three of these Soviet and East European officials were believed to be intelligence officers.



Col. Rudolph Abel

In Mr. McWilliams' view, however, the most important change was the growing sophistication of the Soviet spies and their colleagues from the East European countries. The Soviet spies became more carefully integrated into the Soviets' overall diplomatic, political, and economic effort. At the same time, KGB men who appeared to have a watchdog role over other officials seemed to come under greater control. Larry McWilliams detected a rise in the prestige and authority of Soviet scientists. And the FBI once monitored a meeting at which a scientist with a group visiting the United States told one of the KGB's "watchdogs" to "get away. . . . I'm sick and tired of having you interrupt me."

Like most of those who met Colonel Abel of the KGB, Larry McWilliams was impressed. Colonel Abel was working, not under diplomatic or other official cover, but as "an illegal," as they are called in the trade. He took up painting in a Brooklyn studio, and apparently maintained contact with Soviet agents who never knew his real name. Despite the

press's description of Colonel Abel as a "superspy," the FBI was never able to determine whether he stole any significant secrets.

"I remember once Abel asked for some paper and a pencil," said Mr. McWilliams, recalling a visit he made to the colonel in an Atlanta prison. "He started writing out some Einsteinian equations — just for fun."

Colonel Abel had so many hobbies — someone said he played the guitar like Segovia — that one wondered when he had time to pick up secrets.

"He was an artist, a master mechanic, and radio technician," said Larry McWilliams, describing a few of Colonel Abel's many talents. "He was a magnificent enemy — a pro."

Second of six reports. Next: Paris, a capital that has everything — from the most violent of terrorists to new-style KGB sophistication.

It's fun to be a spy



Spying can be fun. And often no harm is done. The two sides simply cancel each other's efforts out and then go on to other things.

One former CIA man said he once spent a great deal of time in a foreign capital playing tennis and partying with a Soviet counterpart. While bantering and enjoying themselves, he and his CIA colleagues were studying the Russian and his family, trying to see if there was a weakness or need the Americans could satisfy. They would then begin recruiting the Soviet to work for them.

The CIA team made elaborate contingency plans. It looked for the right moment to make a pitch to the Soviet, or to "pop the question," as they say in the spy trade.

The Soviet, for his part, appeared to enjoy the swinging Western way of life that prevailed in that particular diplomatic community. But he, too, was a devoted professional, and he was looking for a way to "turn" one of the CIA men.

Neither side succeeded in its designs. But everyone had a good time trying.

Another CIA man, who retired recently, told how he made meeting one of his foreign agents more agreeable. His agent had arranged their first contact near a drab and obscure castle outside a West European capital.

It was a hot and dusty day, and at the end of a long bus ride, the CIA man found himself in the absurd position of marching in the woods near the castle wearing a gray suit and carrying a briefcase. He had not expected to be taken so far from the capital.

"Don't you ever do this again," the CIA man recalled telling the agent after they had stopped to talk. "If you're so security-conscious, you can make the meeting places a different place each time. . . . But I want you to give me an education in this country."

The only requirement was that each meeting place be of culinary or cultural interest — a three-star restaurant, an art exhibition, or an antique show, for example.

The arrangement worked nicely. The CIA man could now write a Guide Michelin of sorts for other visitors to that country.

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SPY WARS



The global struggle for power

Who's who in the world of espionage

By Daniel Southerland

Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Paris: Riding the escalator out of the Paris Métro station, Vladimir Kostov felt a sharp sting just above his belt. At the same time he heard a sound like a pebble striking the metal stairs. He turned to face a tall, athletic-looking man who quickly disappeared into a crowd along the Champs-Élysées.

Kostov later learned that the man was an assassin — probably a member of Bulgaria's secret intelligence service. In the eyes of the Bulgarian regime, Vladimir Kostov, a defector to the West and a former member of the Bulgarian Communist Party, was a traitor.

From what was believed to be a fountain-pen shaped object, the attacker had fired a poison-filled metallic ball about the size of a pinhead into Kostov's back.

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It was extraordinary that the dark and slender Kostov lived to tell about that sunny day in Paris. That afternoon, when he confided to a French physician that he thought he might have been the target of an assassination attempt, the man scoffed and told him he had probably suffered nothing more serious than a wasp sting. It was only later that it appeared that the Bulgarian's life might be in danger from poisoning.

The attack at the Etoile Metro station took place on Aug. 26, 1978. Thirteen days later, an assassin struck in London. The victim this time was another Bulgarian defector, writer, and commentator, Georgi Markov. His attacker was carrying an umbrella, and the suspected weapon was that same umbrella, apparently designed to fire a metallic object — about the size of a pinhead. Markov did not survive.

The two attacks looked like something straight out of a James Bond novel. Indeed, they were testimony that in today's spy world, James Bond-style villains actually live, breath — and kill. But the United States has for some years publicly disavowed assassination as an instrument of its intelligence agencies. And the Soviet Union is not believed to have directly engaged in any overseas assassination since the early 1960s.

If one looks at today's spy world as a whole, it is clear that many intelligence officers, in the major countries at least, rarely leave their desks, computers, and air conditioned offices. And many of the new specialists in intelligence wouldn't know a poison dart from a ballpoint pen.

When active and former officers of the Central Intelligence Agency and other experts in the field of spying met at a colloquium in Washington, D.C., last year, many of them spoke like graduates of the Harvard Business School. A lot of them sounded like bureaucrats.

Ian Fleming, creator of James Bond, would no doubt have been appalled.

The talk was of such things as the "estimative process," the "finished analytical product," and the interaction between "producers" and "consumers" of intelligence.

The Washington, D.C., session dealt with intelligence analysis and estimates, and not with secret action. But as everyone knows, intelligence officers are supposed to be flamboyant, or at least mysterious. At the CIA, however, bureaucratic and scholarly men are on the rise. More than half the new recruits entering the CIA this year have advanced degrees.

This does not mean that the CIA is completely out of the business of secret action. All indications are that there has been a limited revival of such activity over the past year or so, most of it in the propaganda field. If the impression continues to grow that the US is less in control of events around the world than it used to be, the agency may come under further pressure to engage in what is known in American spy lingo as "political action" — secret action aimed at influencing events overseas.

But the CIA is also under pressure at the moment to do better what it was intended to do in the first place: that is, to provide clear warnings to American policymakers about real and potential threats against the United States. In the midst of all this, Congress is still trying to decide what kind of restrictions it wants to place on the CIA and on those whom it deems to be a threat to the safety of the agency's intelligence officers overseas. Whatever the outcome in the Congress, the future state of the agency's morale and effectiveness remains far from predictable.

If one were to draw an intelligence map of the world, the biggest question mark would, indeed, have to be suspended over the CIA. But in a sense, it hangs over all of the Western democracies. If the US executive branch and the Congress come to a clear consensus about what they want out of the CIA, it could eventually have considerable impact on the way

in which other Western countries pursue the spy trade. Parliaments in a number of these countries are studying the American approach to the difficult task of trying to balance the need to keep secrets against the need to preserve freedoms.

What is the future of the CIA?



Intelligence men in nations allied with the United States are watching anxiously to see if the CIA recovers from the purges and criticism that have shaken it.

No one can be certain how all this will be resolved, in part because many Americans, perhaps more than most peoples, have ambivalent feelings about intelligence work. They have a tendency to swing from fascination with the alleged quick-fix exploits of spies to feelings of shock and guilt when the abuses of those same spies are revealed. What can be said with reasonable certainty is that in the post-Iran, post-Afghanistan atmosphere, few Americans seem to be proposing that the CIA be put out of business. Quite a few, including both Ronald Reagan and President Carter, advocate that it be made stronger.

In the meantime, while the Americans sort things out, the rest of the world's foreign intelligence agencies can be expected to go about business pretty much as usual. Few parliaments in the world — and certainly none among major countries outside the United States — have anything like the power of the US Congress to monitor and investigate their spy agencies. In many of these countries, a majority of the population seems to accept secret services as a necessary evil.

What the American specialists in the field sometimes refer to as "the chief adversary," namely the Soviet Union, can be expected to continue to build its intelligence arm in a steady fashion, much as it builds its military strength. The Soviets' allies — most notably the Cubans, Czechs, Poles, Hungarians, and East Germans — can be expected to do the same.

What has been changing most is the nature of what many of the world's spies do. Instead of slipping, like James Bond, in and out of a casbah teeming with exotic characters, many "spies" are up to their ears in paperwork. Some are busy sorting out and analyzing photographs and tapes gathered from satellites and vast networks of electronic listening stations. Only a relatively small number of intelligence officers, perhaps 1 out of 20 in the CIA, for example, are in the sometimes exciting, occasionally hazardous, and often tedious business of handling secret agents in the field.

With computers and satellites doing much of the work, such secret agents would appear to be an endangered species. But most countries would be reluctant to give them up. By all accounts, highly placed spies are rare. Both the Americans and the Soviets, and their friends, keep trying to place them, or find them, however, in the hope of getting those spies to provide them with key pieces of the intricate intelligence puzzle.

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Trying to figure out how many people are engaged in the intelligence business is no easy task. It is even more difficult to determine the cost of financing intelligence operations around the world. In the United States, estimates of what all of the nations' foreign intelligence agencies spend run as high as \$5 billion to \$10 billion a year. But if one studies the literature available and asks a few questions about what might be considered to be a dozen of the world's leading nations in the field of spying, it would not be unreasonable to suggest that these nations employ as many as a quarter of a million people in foreign intelligence work. That figure would, of course, include both civilian and military intelligence officers, clerks, technicians, scientists, and specialists in propaganda, as well as a few experts in sabotage. Thousands of others would be working for them, in turn, as agents implanted in foreign countries.

The following table gives rough estimates of manpower in a dozen of the world's leaders in the spy trade. Totals include both military and civilian officers and clerical and technical staff, focused on foreign intelligence but based at home and abroad.

1. Soviet Union	100,000 (includes KGB, GRU, technical and monitoring services)
2. United States	70,000 (includes CIA, NSA, DIA, and Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence)
3. West Germany	9,500
4. Britain	No estimate available
5. East Germany	5,000
6. China	No estimate available
7. Poland	3,500
8. France	3,000 (about 800 involved in electronic monitoring)
9. Czechoslovakia	3,000
10. Israel	2,000
11. Cuba	1,500
12. South Africa	Unavailable

It is also difficult to determine who the winners and losers are. The inconclusive nature of much intelligence work does lend itself easily to descriptions prevalent in scorecard, or horserace, journalism. Men and women working in the spy trade are often reluctant to rate their brother, or sister agencies in terms of effectiveness. By its nature, much of their work is compartmentalized.

But interviews with more than 40 active or former intelligence officers in five countries — the United States, Britain, France, West Germany, and Israel — show that the highest prestige ratings for spying often accrue not to the super-power intelligence agencies but to small and medium-sized countries: Israel and East Germany, for example.

The intelligence services of Israel and East Germany would appear to have little in common except an obsession with secrecy. Secrecy, of course, helps to create a mystique for an intelligence service. And mystique can be useful. It keeps potential enemies off guard and encourages potential friends to cooperate.

Secrecy safeguards some missions. It also helps cover up mistakes.

But even when it comes to the much-vaunted Israeli secret service, some mistakes cannot be hidden. The Israelis' miscalculations and surprise in the face of Egypt's 1973 attack is often cited as an example of an intelligence failure. Less well known, in the United States, at least, was the misguided attempt of Israeli secret service assassins to kill the man Israel held responsible for the 1972 "Munich massacre" of Israeli Olympic athletes. The Israelis went all the way to Norway to get their man. But they killed the wrong one. They finally found the intended target, Ali Hassan Salameh, closer to home in Beirut.

In Israel today, the head of the foreign intelligence agency, known as the Mossad or "the institution," is Gen. Yitzhak Hofi, an apparently dour and meticulous former paratroop commander.

The two leading spymasters of the Soviet and East-bloc countries (if one can call them a bloc after what has been happening in Poland) would have to be Yuri Andropov, head of the Soviet Union's KGB, and Markus Wolf, chief of East Germany's foreign intelligence service. The dapper and urbane-looking "Mischa" Wolf has become a legend in the spy world. He has planted agents in high places in West Germany and has trained East German Lotharios to seduce any number of West German secretaries.

But it is a tribute to communist secrecy that little reliable information is available concerning either Mr. Wolf or Mr. Andropov. The latter is described in John Barron's classic book "KGB" as "a tall, scholarly looking man with cultured and reserved manners."

Even in the Western democracies, there are few intelligence officers with a liking for openness toward their respective publics. Few would agree with Adm. Stansfield Turner, the US Director of Central Intelligence, in his advocacy of "controlled openness." Admiral Turner makes speeches, grants interviews, and has authorized the publication of a number of CIA studies. Sixteen persons are at work in the CIA's public relations office.

In Western Europe, the closest one could come to finding openness in a high-ranking intelligence officer of a major country would be in West Germany: Klaus Kinkel, president of West Germany's Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), West Germany's external intelligence service, is a boyish-looking, energetic man, who enjoys talking and debating. A veteran politician, he also spends quite a bit of his time explaining his secret service's activities to selected members of the West German parliament, or Bundestag. But even Dr. Kinkel is reluctant to be photographed or quoted on the record.

In Paris, Col. Alexandre de Maranches, the portly chief of France's Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionage (SDECE), is known to lunch occasionally with a journalist or two. But the colonel is hardly a widely known public figure.

In London, little is publicly known about Arthur Temple (Dickie) Franks, chief of Great Britain's MI.6, the British foreign intelligence service. Under the "D" notice system, a kind of honor system or self-censorship in place since 1912, British journalists are asked not to publish the names, whereabouts, or activities of present or former intelligence officers. The system is being increasingly questioned. But only one publication, the New Statesman, is known to have mentioned that Mr. Franks heads the secret intelligence service.

If one were able to take these eminent spymasters, who among them probably command more than half of the world's top spies, and ask them to weigh their victories against their defeats, it is not at all clear that they would be able to produce a convincing balance sheet. In peacetime, it is difficult to measure either success or failure among the intelligence services. Arguments can be heard on all sides.

In each of the countries in which this reporter worked to prepare this series of articles, there were knowledgeable commentators who felt that the importance of the secret services is overrated or that they consist largely of cops who can't shoot straight. But that appears to be a minority view.

Some diplomats are convinced that spies working under diplomatic cover live much too good a life and that they end up congregating in certain West European capitals simply because life is pleasant there. Vienna, for example. Home of many international agencies, including the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Vienna is also a conduit for refugees from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

"But I think there's another reason why a lot of spooks live in Vienna," said an American diplomat. "I think it's because they like living there. . . . They end up spending a lot of their time just watching each other."

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There is one level at which the prowess of the international spy agencies can be more easily measured, and that is in the technological fields. High-ranking Western officials declare that the Western nations, with the United States in the lead, enjoy "technological superiority" over the East in the collection of intelligence. What this means is that the Western nations are supposed to be better at:

- Breaking the communications codes of other nations while protecting their own.
- Using satellites to take photographs and subsatellites to record radio and radar transmissions.
- Storing information for rapid retrieval through the use of computers and microchips.

American satellite pictures are assumed to be sharper than those of the Soviets. From Big Bird satellite photos, experts are supposed to be able to distinguish individual persons. One joke has it that US specialists studying these photos have nicknames for a number of Russian truck drivers whom the Big Bird frequently films. But it is not true, as someone once claimed, that satellite photography can pick out the lettering on golf balls. Not yet.

American and allied listening posts pick up conversations between Soviet fighter pilots and between Soviet tank drivers.

But it is in the use of computers that the Western nations, and the US in particular, are supposed to be most markedly ahead. The Soviets are believed to employ thousands of people doing jobs America's supersecret National Security Agency (NSA) gets done with acres of computers. Code-breaking today is to a great extent a matter of computers, and some experts think the NSA has broken more than half of the world's existing governmental codes.

"The Soviets probably suffer from a lag in their ability to store information and process and manipulate it as quickly and easily as we can," said one American intelligence specialist. "Ten years from now, they may be right where we are. . . . But we'll be somewhere else."

Challenges for the '80s



A high-ranking American intelligence official says that because of its technological means, the United States is not likely to be surprised by any major buildup of Soviet military forces.

A word of caution: The Soviets are expert cryptanalysts, and had a number of code-breaking and code-protecting victories to their credit in World War II. The major codes of the Soviet Union, like those of the US, are believed to be unbreakable. The Soviets' spy satellites are thought to be quite effective, even if the Soviets have not pushed the state of the satellite art to the degree that the Americans have.

Michael Handel, a research associate at Harvard University's Center for International Studies, who has studied the question of military surprise, warns that the US has repeatedly underestimated the Soviets' technological capabilities.

At any rate, a revolution has taken place in both East and West in the field of intelligence technology. A major challenge for intelligence men in the 1980s will be how to sift through and analyze the fallout from the "explosion" of information the satellites and listening devices have released.

Another challenge to both sides will be to monitor the rapidly growing sophistication of new nuclear weapons. The CIA made major advances in the 1950s and '60s in devising ways of monitoring any possible Soviet cheating against nuclear arms control agreements. But without a new strategic arms limitation (SALT) treaty, new weapons developments could outstrip new methods of arms control.

Where the Soviet Union and its "little brother" intelligence services of Eastern Europe and Cuba seem to be ahead is in the use of human — as opposed to technological — spies. This is partly because the more open societies of the West are more easily penetrated by such spies. East German agents used to make West Germany look like a piece of Swiss cheese. But it may also be partly because the Soviets, for one, place more faith in human agents than the Americans do. With a long history of secret services and conspiracy and counterconspiracy, the Russians seem to accept espionage as a way of life.

In most countries of the East, intelligence is of high priority and its practitioners have become an elite. They are better trained than many of their counterparts in their nations' regular diplomatic services.

"A diplomat who doesn't work for the intelligence service is considered only half a diplomat," said Vladimir Kostov.

The peoples of the Western democracies, however, have mixed feelings, at least in peacetime, about the need for espionage. The level of education for new recruits into the CIA is high, but much of the American public still views the agency with an uncertain mixture of fascination and mistrust. In France and West Germany, it is difficult for the secret services to recruit from the best universities, and those services must rely heavily on military men.

The intelligence services of both East and West face certain common challenges in the 1980s. One of them is to understand the rapid changes that are occurring in the developing nations of the world. The ability of the United States and its partners to understand the changes taking place in and around the Persian Gulf could be of vital importance. A highly placed American intelligence officer puts it this way: "Given increased competition for raw materials, where the difference between the two sides may lie in the decade ahead is not in our ability to counter each other but simply in our respective abilities to understand events in the developing countries of the world."

The United States did not do well on that score in Iran. But some people think it may before long get a further chance to test its ability to understand rapid change in ancient societies — in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan.

The countries of the East are expected to continue to deploy special sections of their intelligence agencies in the coming decade in pursuit of their longtime aim of splitting the United States away from its allies. Some experts think that in pursuing this goal, the Soviet Union and its friends will rely increasingly on "disinformation," or deceptions, designed to mislead foreign public opinion. Other experts think that disinformation is a much overrated phenomenon that backfires more often than it succeeds.

One thing is virtually certain, and that is that the East will continue to place heavy emphasis on industrial and technological espionage. Hundreds of millions of dollars are to be saved through the stealing of Western secrets in these fields.


For the Western intelligence agencies, terrorism may become of growing importance in the 1980s. Some American intelligence officers think that not enough is being done to penetrate terrorist groups before they launch attacks.

In the pursuit of almost all of their goals, the intelligence agencies of the East work in tight coordination and under overall Soviet guidance. The exception is Romania. Defectors say that that country is able to withhold a great deal of information from the Soviets.

A Czech defector who came to the West some years ago said he believed there had been tension between some members of the Polish secret service and their Soviet counterparts. One way in which the Soviets overcome such problems, he said, is simply by secretly recruiting agents and collaborators among comrades inside the various brotherly secret services. In that way, the Soviets know what's going on even when some people may be holding back. They have spies spying on their fellow spies.

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In the Western alliance, arrangements are looser. American intelligence officers complain that their allies sometimes withhold specifics from them — the true nature of certain sources of information, for example — because of a fear that the information will leak once it reaches the United States. But on both sides of the Atlantic, officials say that relations among the Western intelligence agencies are, in fact, often better than those that prevail at the government-to-government level.



'A diplomat who doesn't work for the intelligence service is considered only half a diplomat.'

— Vladimir Kostov

"Perhaps the unrest in political relations has even contributed to consolidating relations among the intelligence agencies," said one high-ranking West European intelligence officer. "It almost seems to be a rule that intelligence services fill gaps."

"They provide a kind of stabilizing force," said another West European intelligence officer.

Indeed, if one could imagine a "common market" of intelligence information, it would show major exchanges of information flowing among the US, Britain, France, West Germany, and Israel. To a much lesser degree, but on certain specific subjects, South Africa would be cut in. The relations of Western governments with South Africa have been strained in recent years. But among intelligence men, relations seem to have suffered little.

South Africa is of importance to the spy world as a major source of mineral resources and a potential trouble spot. It is also considered important because South Africa's main foreign intelligence agency, known, until recently at least, as BOSS the Bureau of State Security, has information to trade. BOSS is rated highly by the Americans, West Europeans, and Israelis for its information on southern Africa.

"Why are the South Africans good at intelligence work?" asked a former intelligence officer. "Because they are frightened. Because they have a lot of money. And because they do a lot of business in the world."

Intelligence is often "traded" under informal understandings. Favors are received eventually in return for information. One former intelligence officer said that after Israel turned over to the United States a copy of Nikita Khrushchev's famous secret speech denouncing Stalin at the 20th Communist Party Congress in 1956, it was perfectly understood there would have to be a quid pro quo in it for Israel.

American sources say that Israel and the United States do have a formal agreement not to spy on each other. But the agreement is apparently unclear when it comes to the question of industrial and technological espionage. It is widely believed in the US government that Israel several years ago illegally obtained uranium, for building atomic weapons, from a nuclear materials plant in Apollo, Penn.

Even closer than the US-Israeli intelligence relationship is that which exists between the United States and Britain. The base of information from which the two countries work is virtually the same. An American official said that through cooperation with Britain, particularly in the field of signals intelligence, some people estimate that the United States saves more than \$500,000 a year.

Sometimes the relationship between intelligence agencies can be described only in business terms. Latin American intelligence services have been known to form "consortiums" against their enemies.

Just as Japan does not have an army commensurate in size and strength with its economic power, so does it not appear to have much of an external intelligence service. But one American informant gives high marks to the Japanese for gathering economic intelligence, particularly in Asia. The US, he said, was able at one point some years ago to "piggyback" with the Japanese in order to get useful intelligence on the Chinese economy. This arrangement apparently reduced the importance of intelligence "equities" which the British were able to offer the Americans in Hong Kong and Peking.

In the novels of John le Carré, whose real name is David Cornwell, men of the British secret intelligence service, or the "Circus," speak of the need to barter information with the "cousins," namely the rich American cousins in the CIA.

George Smiley, in Mr. le Carré's "The Honourable Schoolboy," sees it this way: "Unless the Circus produced, it would have no wares to barter with the cousins, nor with other sister services with whom reciprocal deals were traditional. Not to produce was not to trade, and not to trade was to die."

But the British are not the intelligence power they once were. Just as political power has been dispersed through the rise of new nations, so has intelligence power spread. And one gets the impression that a good deal of espionage derring-do now is carried out by nations of which one is only dimly aware.

"Don't ignore the Romanians," a West European intelligence officer advised. "They're very active. . . . They can be very dangerous."

Western intelligence experts also give high marks to the external intelligence service of Cuba. The Dirección General de Inteligencia, or DGI. This is not only because of the DGI's work in Miami, the Caribbean, Central America, and Africa, but also because of its efforts to win friends and influence people among third-world diplomats in places as far-flung as Paris and Tokyo.

Cubans in Tokyo? They are there not only to work the third-world beat but also to nab industrial secrets and watch other Cubans, such as seamen coming in on ships.

Part of the Cubans' effectiveness seems to derive from a revolutionary fervor that has long been absent among their more cynical big brothers, the Soviets.

A number of American intelligence men insisted that the DGI is little more than an extension of the Soviet KGB, with Soviet officers sitting in the Cuban headquarters in Havana. Be that as it may, the Cubans sometimes have an appeal among potential recruits from other nations that is denied to the Soviets. A certain romance still attaches to the Cuban revolutionaries.

"Cuban intelligence is growing up," says Harry Rositzke, founder of the Soviet division of the CIA and author of a forthcoming book on the KGB. "They are more acceptable in many places than the Russians. . . . They are brown and black. They are a revolutionary power."

Another secret service worth watching — but it is not easy to find — is that of China. A former CIA specialist on the Far East said that as the Chinese take a more active role in foreign affairs, so are they also likely to begin developing their intelligence service into a truly global organization.

The Chinese apparently rely on third parties to do much of their spying for them. They do not go in for the aggressive pursuit of secret documents the way the Soviets do. They have a great advantage in foreign countries where there are large numbers of Chinese residents. Many of these overseas Chinese, as they are called, are likely to feel a strong identification with their homeland. New China News Agency, the main news service, apparently helps with the gathering of political intelligence.

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The FBI seems to think the Chinese are going to make the United States a major intelligence target now that they have established diplomatic relations with the US. A China scholar from a major American university said he was startled not long ago to find an FBI man in the audience when he was giving a lecture on modern Chinese politics. The FBI man explained that now that many Chinese communists were studying in the United States as well as visiting the US, he and a number of his colleagues had to begin learning all they could about China.

But most of the Chinese students in this country seem to be studying too hard to do much spying. And the FBI seems to have its hands full trying to watch Soviet spies who pose as visitors, seamen, diplomats, and trade representatives.

As the table on comparative manpower on the preceding page indicates, it is the Soviet Union and the United States that remain the truly big players in the worldwide intelligence game. Only these two nations reach all the world, deploying the full panoply of espionage, from spy satellites in the sky to agents on the ground.

Next: The KGB and the CIA

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Miscellaneous

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U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
29 September 1980

Washington Whispers

Intelligence officials in the Mideast are convinced that Israel will step up its attacks on Palestinian strongholds in southern Lebanon in coming weeks on the assumption that it need not fear any U.S. pressure before Election Day.

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ON PAGE 35-38

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
29 September 1980

Behind Disarray in U.S. Foreign Policy

Just when the nation faces massive problems overseas, American diplomacy is being hamstrung by confusion and indecision at home.

With U.S. foreign policy being battered by one setback after another, the people and institutions in charge of managing America's affairs overseas are coming under critical scrutiny.

Among the questions being asked with increasing intensity—

Why is Washington constantly surprised by such developments as Iran's revolution, the alliance crisis over neutron-bomb deployment and Pakistan's cold rejection of a military-aid offer?

Who is responsible for the zigzags that undermine the credibility of U.S. diplomacy—for instance, a vote for a United Nations resolution critical of Israel, followed within hours by White House repudiation of the action?

Why is today's State Department so seemingly ineffectual in shaping policy or even implementing it overseas?

A broad inquiry into these questions produces a picture of a confused and struggling policymaking apparatus, torn by internecine rivalries, a proliferation of agencies competing for a piece of the foreign-policy action and a steady disintegration of the nation's professional diplomatic corps.

It is, many experts warn, a situation with the potential for disaster for the U.S. in the 1980s as America confronts increasingly complex problems overseas and the challenge posed by overweening Soviet military power.

There is, says a former ambassador with more than 30 years' service abroad, "a greater danger than ever of our blundering into a truly major crisis somewhere just through our sheer stupidity."

Often stymied. The most striking feature of the chaos in American diplomacy is the hamstringing of the State Department, traditionally responsible for shaping and implementing foreign policy. A pair of recent incidents illustrates how far that process has advanced.

One was the resignation of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance last May. He quit ostensibly in protest of the hostage-rescue mission in Iran that proved to be the failure he had predicted. Still, that was only the culmination of three years of similar frustrations.

The other was a public complaint in August by Vance's successor, Edmund Muskie, that he had been frozen out of deliberations that led to a crucial change in U.S. nuclear-war strategy—a shift with far-reaching implications for U.S. relations with its allies and with its Soviet adversaries.

Malcolm Toon, a veteran American diplomat and former ambassador to Moscow, characterizes failure of the new Secretary of State to force a test of strength on this issue as "a fatal mistake." Says Toon: "Muskie should have threatened to resign on the spot if this sort of thing happens again."

With weak bosses at the State Department, an ambitious national-security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, in the White House and an increasingly powerful Pentagon, the administration has spoken for more than three years with confusing and often contradictory voices on international affairs.

Failing "process." As a former high-ranking State Department executive puts it: "The failing of this administration in foreign policy has been a failing not so much of substance as of process—not a matter of whose view prevailed, but the impression on the outside that everyone's view prevailed."

The result has been a series of diplomatic debacles largely because of mixed signals at high levels:

■ **Iran.** In the months before the overthrow of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the State Department, Brzezinski



Unhappy diplomats. Muskie says he is ignored in decision making; Vance's frustration led to resignation.




and the Pentagon all were pressuring the monarch in one way or another—often working at cross-purposes.


As the State Department was barring shipments of riot-control equipment to Teheran, Brzezinski was encouraging the Shah to take a stand against the mobs. Later, the White House dispatched Air Force Gen. Robert Huyser to Teheran to deter the Iranian military from seizing power. Confused by all this conflicting diplomacy, the Shah became increasingly paralyzed with indecision.

■ **SALT.** In the early weeks of the Carter administration, a radically new strategic-arms-control proposal was drafted in Washington without any input from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. When Vance unveiled it to the ambassador while both were en route to Moscow, he was nonplused to hear that the Russians would bluntly reject it and that arms-control negotiations would be sidetracked for a long time—a forecast that was precisely on the mark.

■ **Mideast.** In early March, the American envoy to the U.N., on State Department instructions, cast the first U.S. vote ever for a resolution critical of Israel's policies involving Arab land occupied in the 1967 war. Criticized

 U.S. Foreign Service in Profile	
Embassies overseas	144
Consulates	67
Missions to international organizations	12
Liaison offices	1
Foreign-service officers	3,564
Total State Department employees abroad	4,086
Foreign citizens employed abroad	6,131
Budget for diplomatic service overseas	\$444.4 mil.

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by Jerusalem and the American Jewish community, Carter repudiated the vote, asserting that it resulted from a misunderstanding between him and Vance. The Secretary took the rap.

■ Cuba. Without the knowledge of the White House, the State Department disclosed through Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho) the presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba. In the ensuing confusion, Vance struck a tough stance, claiming that the "status quo" was "unacceptable." The Russians, contending that the brigade had been on the island for years and represented no violation of agreements with the U.S., refused to budge. An embarrassed Carter allowed the crisis to dissipate, with Moscow's combat unit still in Cuba.

Parallel services. The collapsing influence of the Secretary of State is not the only cause of confusion in foreign policy and of the decline in the State Department's role. Another is the growing complexity of U.S. interests overseas.

The political and other diplomatic affairs normally discharged by the foreign service now are only one aspect of this country's international relations. Global defense, trade, finance, agriculture, energy, aid, environmental problems, Peace Corps operations—all of these and more are part of the business embassies must conduct.

U.S. government agencies responsi-

ble for these specialized areas assign their own officials to foreign posts. As a result, only a small minority of Americans representing this country abroad are foreign-service officers—fewer than 23 percent of the total of 16,000 American officials who are assigned to overseas missions.

They are outnumbered by the 5,000 military attachés, security-assistance planners and other personnel from the Pentagon. The Central Intelligence Agency also stations a major contingent of its own officials in U.S. embassies. So do the Treasury, Commerce, Transportation, Agriculture and Justice departments and dozens of lesser agencies. Even the Tennessee Valley Authority staffs one embassy post.

The most recent agency to create its own private "foreign service" is the Department of Energy, which has assumed responsibility for dealing with international oil questions. This trend has multiplied the number of nondiplomats who communicate directly with Washington through "back channels," circumventing the State Department and diluting the professional foreign service's control over foreign policy.

That control has been undercut even more drastically by the ease of international communication. On many occasions, for example, Carter speaks via satellite telephone directly with Egypt's

President Anwar Sadat and Israel's Prime Minister Menachem Begin.

Airborne diplomatic missions are taking over much of the process of negotiation with foreign countries. Spectacular feats of summitry and shuttle diplomacy have relegated traditional low-key diplomacy to a back seat.

A vast parade of junketing senators and representatives is increasingly getting into the diplomatic act, adding to the confusion already aroused by the expanding role of Congress in foreign-policy issues. "In many ways," says one observer, "the State Department has become a glamorous travel agency."

Professional envoys also complain about the antics and utterances of Washington officials on hastily planned "diplomatic" trips to sensitive areas.

Disturbing "amateurism." To quote former Under Secretary of State George Ball: "There is an amateurism about these people in the administration and in Congress that worries me very much. Very often their idea of diplomacy is to climb into a big jet with lots of television cameras and go have a good time."

Brzezinski is singled out for special criticism. Two examples of the national-security adviser's freewheeling style of diplomacy frequently are cited:

■ He is quoted as telling his Chinese hosts while climbing China's Great Wall in May, 1978: "If we get to the top first, you go and oppose the Russians in Ethiopia." The indelicacy of his remark at a sensitive moment in superpower relations over Russian moves in Africa distressed U.S. diplomats.

■ At the Khyber Pass in Pakistan after Moscow's invasion of neighboring Afghanistan, Brzezinski ostentatiously aimed a rifle across the border as he joked about "a march on Kabul."

While the authority of professional American diplomats has been whittled away from the outside, it is also being buffeted by a crisis from within.

A survey by the American Foreign Service Association discloses that 48 percent of diplomatic officers serving overseas are "seriously considering" resignation. Among senior diplomats, the number is even higher—as much as 60 percent. Included in their grievances: A feeling that they are no longer where the action is, that the real business of diplomacy is being conducted in Washington rather than overseas.

"An institution under assault" is how the association's president, Kenneth Bleakley, describes the foreign service. He adds: "We are in danger of losing our talent and ability to maneuver in what is going to be a very dangerous world in the years ahead."

It is not only job frustration that ac-

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Salvadoran guardsman stalks leftist rebels after rocket attack on U.S. Embassy. Over last decade, Americans have been targets of unprecedented terrorist attacks.

counts for the threatened exodus of America's most experienced diplomats. The mounting stress of their everyday lives is another factor.

Terrorism is ever a concern. Long before the U.S. Embassy in Teheran was seized last November 4, the 1970s had become a decade of unprecedented violence against American diplomats.

Alarming tally. The record of the past 10 years: 14 American diplomats, including 5 ambassadors, murdered; 32 seriously wounded in terrorist attacks; 38 kidnapped. All told, there were 208 armed assaults either on American officials or diplomatic missions, an average of 1 attack every 17.5 days. On September 16, for instance, leftist guerrillas fired three rocket grenades at the U.S. Embassy in El Salvador.

In the past 18 months alone, 3,500 diplomats and dependents have been evacuated from foreign capitals because of violence or the threat of attack.

Adding to the pressures on diplomats is the impact of America's social revolution. Foreign-service wives—and in some cases, husbands—no longer are automatically content to accompany spouses overseas at the expense of their own career opportunities at home. The result is increased divorce, marital discord and personal stress.

Some experts see these as potentially the most serious clouds over the future of the foreign service. William Bacchus, a top State Department official, puts it this way: "Ten years ago, we never got complaints about this. Now, it's all we hear."

Further undermining the morale of the career diplomatic service is a one-two punch of seriously declining income compounded by an expanding workload. Hit by worldwide inflation and the decline of the dollar, the pay of

U.S. diplomats is falling behind that of Americans working at home by 3 to 4 percent annually, according to the Office of Management and Budget.

Another analysis estimates that, during the course of their careers, U.S. diplomats earn 25 percent less than counterparts in the civil service.

The increased workload stems from several factors. One, with roughly the same number of officers, the foreign service is staffing 60 more missions overseas than it did 20 years ago.

Also: Consular work, such as visa processing and assistance to American nationals abroad, has increased 900 percent as a result of the enormous growth in foreign tourism and commerce. Washington's demands for reporting cables from U.S. embassies overseas have increased fourfold. "It's a hell of a crunch," says Benjamin Read, under secretary of state for management, "and it has hurt deeply."

Even more disturbing for the veteran diplomatic corps is what many officers see as a steady dilution of traditions of excellence that the foreign service claims as a hallmark of its trade.

They complain, for one thing, of a lowering of admission standards to enable more women and minority applicants to qualify. While top State Department officials hotly deny this criticism, they acknowledge a change in scoring the written service examination to eliminate perceived cultural biases.

After the change, the number of women passing the exam jumped dramatically, from 19 to 43 percent in one year, while minority applicants receiving passing grades climbed almost 300 percent—from 6.4 to 17.4 percent.

Whether or not it is a direct result of revised grading for written tests, the number of women in the foreign ser-

vice has leaped from 289 to 845 during the past decade. Blacks and members of other minorities, once less than 1 percent of foreign-service strength, now account for 8.3 percent. All minority applicants who passed the written exam last year were invited for further job processing. This compares with 46 percent of applicants over all.

At the same time, foreign-service veterans complain about the decline in language requirements for men and women joining the State Department for overseas service. Because of the dramatic decline in foreign-language studies in American high schools and universities, familiarity with a second language is no longer required of new recruits at the time of acceptance.

As a result, according to a study by the General Accounting Office, language competence in U.S. foreign-affairs agencies is "less than required for maximum effectiveness and efficiency."

What is most distressing for many career diplomats—and most damaging in their view—is an increasing tendency to politicize the State Department.

The Carter administration carried the trend to a new extreme, naming noncareer political appointees to all but six of the 25 top department posts. No other administration since World War II has approached that level.

And despite a campaign pledge to name envoys solely on the basis of merit, Carter nevertheless has made extensive use of top assignments for political patronage. These have included ambassadorships in such critical areas as Saudi Arabia, Mexico and the Soviet Union.

The trend provokes this reaction from career diplomat Martin Herz, former envoy to Bulgaria: "We've gone too far in destroying excellence and professionalism. Who would you want to send to the moon—a highly trained astronaut or John Q. Public?"

Fix-up moves. There are faint signs of growing concern about the decline in professionalism in the conduct of American foreign policy. Congress, for instance, is moving to upgrade the pay for career foreign-service officers, a move that could cost an additional 34 million dollars in 1981 plus more than 200 million over the next five years.

The administration also is taking steps to bolster the security of diplomats in the wake of attacks on missions in Iran, Pakistan and Libya.

But the consensus among foreign-policy experts is that it will take much more than cosmetic measures to reverse the decline of U.S. diplomacy—and with it, the conduct and credibility of a superpower's foreign policy. □

By ROBERT S. DUDNEY

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 25

NEWSWEEK
29 September 1980

Playing the Game of News Leaks

Leaking secrets to the press for political advantage is one of Washington's oldest games, but lately things seem to have gotten out of hand. In recent weeks details of the new U.S. nuclear strategy, the stealth aircraft, the shortage of plutonium for nuclear warheads and the combat shortcomings of six Army divisions have all turned up in the media. There are even phony leaks: last week, several news organizations received copies of a memo, purportedly signed by national-security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, urging U.S. intelligence agencies to spy on U.S. black groups. Some of the leaks seem designed to enhance President Carter's re-election chances; others seem to have come from his political foes. "Classified information has become the currency of the political campaign," says a White House aide.

The stealth leaks first appeared in Aviation Week and The Washington Post and were finally confirmed by Defense Secretary Harold Brown. Did the Administration arrange the leak to counteract GOP charges that Carter was soft on defense? Testifying before a House subcommittee last week, former Chief of Naval Operations Elmo Zumwalt said that sources "in the Pentagon and the White House" told him that Carter himself had ordered the disclosure, thus giving Brown the opportunity to confirm it. Zumwalt even claimed he knew the source of the leak: deputy national-security adviser David Aaron. Aaron and the Post denied that he was the source, and Carter ordered the FBI to investigate.

Tipped: Critics also saw the fine hand of Jimmy Carter behind the disclosure of the new U.S. strategy for a limited nuclear war. Picking up hints from an unnamed source, The Boston Globe pieced together the story last July and officials later confirmed it. White House aides claimed that Brown had planned to announce it officially all along.

Carter has clearly been the target of some leaks. Quoting official documents—one obtained from Carter "political opponents"—The New York Times last week reported that the United States is so short of plutonium that the new MX, cruise and Trident submarine missiles probably cannot be deployed on schedule. The Times detailed disputes between officials over whether to expand U.S. plutonium production, at a time when Carter has urged other countries to cut back.

Leaks sometimes turn up in unlikely places. The Daily Oklahoman, for example, was the first to reveal the existence of a new super-secret classification, known as "Royal," for especially sensitive material. Reporter Jack Taylor quoted sources



Clip job: A rash of recent disclosures, rumors and mysterious memos

charging that Royal would mainly protect politically sensitive information, and that it had already been used on a document in which Libyan officials described Billy Carter as "our agent of influence." White House aides confirmed the new classification, but denied that it had been used for political purposes. To some newsmen, the tactic was clear: get a sympathetic publication to peddle your line, thus forcing the Administration into a denial that confirms part of the story and gives the untrue claims wider circulation.

Memos: Some leaks sound totally fabricated. A mysterious memo circulating around Capitol Hill alleges that the Sixth Fleet canceled maneuvers in the Mediterranean because of pressures brought by Billy Carter for his Libyan friends. Another—accompanied by persistent rumors—charges that a senior staff member of the National Security Council got drunk at a party and let slip information that led to the unmasking of a CIA spy in the Kremlin. White House aides suspect that the memos are coming from Congress. "There's a printing press going up there," charges one official.

The rash of leaks poses problems for the press. Reporters must determine which leaks are accurate and try to assess the political motivation behind them. Some news organizations have refused to print disclosures they could not verify independently; several newspapers, for example, balked at running a Jack Anderson column last month alleging that the Administration had plans to invade Iran. Other times, the press has held back accurate information that would have jeopardized national security. "We've gotten to the point," marveled the head of one intelligence agency last week, "where reporters are behaving more responsibly in handling classified material than government officials."

MELINDA BECK with DAVID C. MARTIN in Washington

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ON PAGE A15THE WASHINGTON POST
22 September 1980

Philip Geyelin

Cutting The NSC Down To Size

Here we go again with one of the hardest perennials in the whole field of foreign policy making. After four months or so of on-the-job training, Secretary of State Edmund Muskie is putting it about that (surprise!) the system doesn't work.

There's too much power in the hands of the president's adviser for national security affairs and too many people at the White House working on foreign policy. There are too many voices. There is too much back-channel undercutting of the State Department's presumed-to-be predominant role, too much pushing and shoving for the president's ear.

A first, post-election order of business, Muskie is saying, has to be a drastic reduction in the size and scope of the White House-based National Security Council—no matter who wins. It is not a matter of clashing personalities, Muskie is arguing; it is "institutional."

Now that, of course, is the polite and politic thing to say when you're in office. And it sounds so simple: just shrink the NSC by cutting its overblown staff way back and that will free up the State Department to perform its traditional role as the leading exponent, after the president, of foreign policy. But it won't work, because this isn't just an institutional problem, susceptible to bureaucratic reform.

On the contrary, it has almost everything to do with personality. By this I mean, in particular, the personality of the president: his character and temperament; his work habits and managerial skills; his past experience and the knowledge of foreign policy that he brings to the job; his relationship with (and confidence in) his secretary of state.

The almost unanimous judgment of former secretaries of state and former national security advisers, exhaustively recorded in congressional testimony, is that the foreign policy making machinery has worked the way it has over the years, for better or worse, because that's the way successive presidents have wanted or allowed it to work.

Consider the history. To begin with, when you hear talk of dismembering the NSC, it's important to remember that the NSC itself, established by law in 1947, was intended to be merely a working group consisting of the president, the vice president, the secretaries of state and defense,

the director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs. It was supposed to be a device for dealing into the decision-making all the top people responsible for matters having to do with national security, all of whom had their own staffs.

According to Clark Clifford, who helped draft the law as a Truman White House aide, "it was not even conceived" that there would be a national security adviser to the president. Under Truman, Clifford and an assistant did the staff work. Eisenhower was the first president to feel the need for a special national security adviser. Over the years, successive advisers felt the presidential demands upon them required a bigger and bigger staff.

It's this NSC staff—now grown into a mini-State Department—that Muskie is presumably talking about pruning drastically. And he has a point. At its peak, the NSC power house assembled by Henry Kissinger under Richard Nixon numbered more than 156, some 50 on the White House payroll and the rest on loan from other agencies. This, again, was no more than the inevitable consequence of presidential personality—of a considered decision by Nixon, out of disdain or distrust (or fear) of the State Department, to gather foreign policy decision-making tightly in his own hands.

The number now, under Carter, has shrunk by roughly one-third. But Muskie's right: it's still a power house. NSC has a staff of just under 100, of which about 35 are carried on the White House budget. It includes specialists on the Soviet Union and East and West Europe, on the Far East, on the Middle East, on North-South relations. That's the "regional cluster."

There are also special staffers for refugees, international economics and energy, nuclear non-proliferation, defense, science, intelligence, human rights—and a public relations officer.

But the question is not whether to cut the staff; it's whether to scale down the job description of the president's adviser for national security. What needs pruning is not the branches but the roots; do that, and the staff's influence and activity will inevitably die back.

If the powers (and profile) of the security adviser are reduced (as most old hands will tell you they should be) to that of a largely invisible policy coordinator and internal troubleshooter, the State Department would have a lot more running room—if that's what it wants. But it's no use talking in the abstract about cutting the NSC down to size. What Muskie needs to establish (if he didn't before he took the job) is whether that's what the president wants.

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ON PAGE A-1NEW YORK TIMES
22 SEPTEMBER 1980

Nuclear Gains by Russians Prompt a Reaction by U.S.

By RICHARD BURT
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 21 — The United States military, long used to having a clear edge over the Soviet Union in nuclear might, is being forced to adjust to a new era in which the American strategic arsenal is becoming outdated and ever more vulnerable.

In recent statements, President Carter, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and other senior officials have asserted that, in the area of nuclear weaponry, the United States is still "second to none." At the same time, however, Mr. Brown and his top aides have started to contend that if present trends in the nuclear balance continue, the United States, by the mid-1980's, could find itself vulnerable to nuclear blackmail by Moscow.

Mr. Brown, for example, told a group last month at the United States Naval

Defense: Is the U.S. Prepared? *Second of seven articles.*

War College in Newport, R.I., that, without improvements to the ballistic missiles and heavy bombers that make up the country's deterrent force, Washington could face "at best a perception of inferiority, at worst a real possibility of nuclear coercion."

Throughout the 1950's and 60's, the United States led the Soviet Union in nearly every measure of strategic power, including numbers of missiles and bombers, warhead totals and overall weapons performance. But Moscow, spending as much as three times more than Washington on nuclear forces during the 1970's, is generally seen as having attained what analysts call "rough parity" in strategic power.

In a national intelligence estimate prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency early this year, it was estimated that Moscow could surpass the United States in nearly every measure of nuclear capability by 1985.

Administration officials maintain that, under Mr. Carter, Washington has begun to counter Moscow's growing missile power. Nevertheless, military specialists acknowledge that several serious problems in the nuclear arsenal need to be rectified in the next few years, including these:

☛ American missile and bomber forces

are becoming increasingly vulnerable. For the first time, Mr. Brown said last month, the Soviet Union might now be able to destroy all 1,053 of the Air Force's land-based missiles in their underground silos in a surprise nuclear "first strike." A few weeks earlier, William J. Perry, Under Secretary of Defense for research and engineering, told a House Armed Services subcommittee that Soviet bomber defenses were rapidly improving and that over the next 10 years Moscow could find a means of detecting and destroying the Navy's 41 missile-carrying submarines.

☛ Components of the nation's nuclear arsenal are wearing out. The mainstay of the Air Force's nuclear bomber forces, the B-52, is about 20 years old, and officials report that the planes suffer from an increase in expensive maintenance problems. The service's 53 Titan 2 missiles, meanwhile, have also been in place for two decades and have recently been plagued by a series of well-publicized accidents. The problems besetting the Titan 2 were vividly demonstrated in Damascus, Ark., last week when a fuel tank of one of the missiles, punctured by a falling socket wrench, exploded and sent a cloud of toxic chemicals into the air.

☛ The Government's facilities for manufacturing nuclear weapons are said to be in bad repair. A confidential report prepared recently for the Department of Energy, the agency assigned the task of producing nuclear warheads, concluded that "serious deterioration of equipment and utilities has occurred over the past several years which could seriously impair our ability to meet the nuclear weapons [requirements] forecast for the 1980's." At the Pentagon, aides said that over the last 15 years, several Government plants producing critical materials and components for nuclear warheads had been shut, producing significant delays in weapons programs. One official, for example, said the deployment of a new version of the Army's Lance tactical missile had slowed by 18 months because of a shortage of plutonium for the system's warhead.

☛ Malfunctions are plaguing the strategic early warning and communication system. In two instances over the last year, computers at the headquarters of the North American Air Defense Command in Cheyenne Mountain, Colo., have malfunctioned, triggering false alarms in which missiles and bombers were made ready for take-off. Congressional auditors, meanwhile, reported earlier this year that a new generation of computers for the military's worldwide command and control system would not be able to handle the demands created by a major military crisis. The existing system, moreover, is considered vulnerable and inadequate.

Capacity to Retaliate

Pentagon aides stressed that, while these problems were real, none of them meant the United States was in danger of losing its capacity to retaliate after a Soviet nuclear attack. They said, moreover, that intelligence reports indicated that American nuclear forces, as a whole, were still superior to the Soviet arsenal in terms of readiness and reliability, although Soviet forces were considered more powerful.

In addition, they said that Mr. Carter had approved numerous programs over the last three years meant to remedy the emerging nuclear deficiencies. Although in 1977 the President canceled the B-1 bomber, which was proposed as a replacement for the B-52 force, officials said that Mr. Carter's decision to equip the older bombers with air-launched cruise missiles in the next few years would guarantee the Air Force's ability to penetrate Soviet air defenses through the 1980's.

The 1,000-mile range missiles, which fly at treetop altitudes, would permit B-52's to "stand off" from Soviet air defenses, a less demanding role that officials believe will save wear and tear on the aging bombers.

Farther in the future, Secretary Brown and other senior Pentagon aides are excited about the prospects for deploying a Stealth bomber, which would be nearly invisible to Soviet radar.

Submarine Realignment

At sea, the Navy this year deployed the first of a new class of Trident missile submarines that will gradually replace the 10 Polaris vessels built in the 1960's. Each of the new submarines will carry 24 Trident 1 missiles, a 4,600-mile-range missile that

CONTINUED

is also to be deployed aboard the Navy's 31 Poseidon submarines.

With considerably greater range than current naval rockets, the Trident I missile, according to Defense Department aides, offers an effective counter to Soviet antisubmarine warfare because it expands the area of ocean within which American submarines can hide.

Problems with strategic early-warning and communications systems are also said to be receiving high-level attention. A top Pentagon aide said that after the most recent nuclear false alarm last July, Secretary Brown asked teams of Government and private computer specialists to study the warning system and make recommendations for improvements.

At the same time, White House national security aides said that Mr. Carter had approved in the last year two directives calling for improved procedures for protecting senior political and military leaders in the event of nuclear war and improved communications facilities that could survive a large-scale Soviet attack.

Weapons Production Studied

The aides also said that an interagency committee was studying the future of the plutonium production and weapons assembly facilities and that Mr. Carter was likely to be presented soon with a plan for modernizing the Energy Department's facilities, including increasing the output of plutonium.

Although Pentagon aides are optimistic about correcting most of the nuclear deficiencies, they express greater concern about the new vulnerability of land-based missiles to a Soviet "first strike." Under a concept first elaborated by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara in the early 1960's, the Air Force's land-based missiles form part of a "triad" of nuclear forces also consisting of submarine-launched rockets and long-range bombers.

Under the "triad" concept, the United States needed to deploy three different types of retaliatory systems, so that if Moscow were able to threaten one or even two "legs" of the "triad," Washington would still be able to respond to a Soviet attack. The American strategic submarine force and, to a lesser extent, the bombers, are still considered to be invulnerable. But most military experts, in and out of the Government, consider the impending vulnerability of the Air Force's Titan 2 and Minuteman missiles the most pressing nuclear problem confronting Washington.

In part, this is because analysts fear that in a severe military crisis, Moscow might be tempted to launch a pre-emptive strike against American land-based missiles, for fear that Washington might launch its rockets first. Planners at the Pentagon also assert that land-based missiles are more responsive and accurate than the other two elements of the "triad," which, they added, makes them the best systems for carrying out the Administration's new strategy of emphasizing pinpoint, retaliatory attacks against Soviet military and political targets instead of major population centers.

Controversy Over MX

The Administration's proposed solution to the vulnerability of land-based missiles is the \$34 billion MX mobile missile, a system that the Congressional Budget Office has estimated could end up costing almost \$60 billion. Under the present Air Force plan, 200 of the giant missiles would be carried by trucks along a huge road network to be built in arid and underpopulated parts of Utah and Nevada. Interspersed along the roads would be 4,600 concrete shelters from which the MX missiles could be lofted.

By moving the missiles in and out of empty shelters, military aides believe that it would be possible to deceive Soviet surveillance satellites about the location of each of the rockets, thereby frustrating any nuclear "first strike."

But the MX plan has run into stiff local opposition in Utah and Nevada and is also drawing fire from liberal and conservative military experts in Washington. Arms control proponents, for example, called the MX a Rube Goldberg design that would prove too costly and could rule out the effective monitoring of future accords limiting American and Soviet strategic arms.

MX opponents, such as Paul N. Warnke, Mr. Carter's former disarmament director, also criticized the Pentagon's plans for fitting each MX with 10 highly accurate warheads, because it would give Washington 2,000 missiles and thus its own "first strike" capability against the 1,400 Soviet land-based rockets. A further argument against the system was supplied by Herbert Scoville, a former high-ranking Central Intelligence Agency aide, who contended that, by the end of the decade, the Soviet Union would possess enough accurate warheads to threaten all 4,600 missile shelters, making the MX as vulnerable as existing rockets.

A Submarine Alternative

These arguments have led some analysts to push for deploying the MX at sea. The idea, worked out by two physicists, Sidney Drell at Stanford University and Richard Garwin of I.B.M., calls for putting the missiles on a fleet of small, diesel-driven submarines that would cruise off the American coast. In recent presentations to Congress, Mr. Drell and Mr. Garwin argued that their proposal would cost roughly half as much as the Air Force's plan and added that if only 100 MX missiles were deployed in all, the system would not pose a "first strike" risk to Moscow's land-based rockets.

Administration aides contested these assertions, saying that the submarine option for the MX would cost at least as much as putting the missiles on land. Mr. Perry and other military scientists also said that deploying the MX at sea would make the United States much too dependent on submarines for deterrence.

"The idea of putting missiles on a fleet of small, coastal submarines is worth exploring, but not as a substitute for land-based systems," said a senior White House national security aide. "The 'triad' concept is still valid."

At the Pentagon, officials acknowledged that, by the time the MX is fully deployed in 1989, Moscow might have enough warheads to threaten every shelter. But they said the MX was being designed so that another 4,600 shelters could be quickly added to the system. Another alternative, they added, would be to equip each of the 200 MX missiles with its own antiballistic missile defense system, a step that would further complicate any Soviet "first strike" attempt.

There is vigorous support in conservative circles for revitalizing development of antiballistic missiles, but there is disenchantment with the Administration's MX proposal. Paul H. Nitze, a former Deputy Secretary of Defense and now a member of the promilitary Committee for the Present Danger, said that the problem of land-based missile vulnerability needed to be solved more quickly. Both he and William R. Van Cleave, Ronald Reagan's top military adviser, called for construction of thousands of new underground silos around existing missile sites in the Middle West that the Air Force could use to hide its current force of 1,000 Minuteman rockets. According to Mr. Van Cleave, this "quick fix" mobile basing system for land-based missiles would be available some five years sooner than the MX.

Criticism From the Right

Conservative critics also suggested that Mr. Carter was dragging his feet on modernizing the bomber force. Although Secretary Brown recently told reporters that a new bomber embodying Stealth technology could be built by 1987, Senator John Tower, the ranking Republican on the Armed Services Committee, contended that radar-defeating aircraft were unlikely to be deployed before the 1990's. Mr. Tower, as well as several high-ranking Air Force officers, said that if funds were spent on developing an advanced version of the B-1, it could be ready before 1985.

In response, Pentagon aides said that crash programs for a new B-1 or a mobile Minuteman force would soak up money that would be better spent on more distant but more capable weapons, such as the MX. At the same time, they said that, over the last three years, a consensus had emerged within the Administration over the need to refurbish the nuclear arsenal.

"But the difference between us and the Republicans is one of time frame," said a senior Pentagon aide. "They seem to think that the balance has already tipped and the threat of war is right around the corner. We see a potentially dangerous situation emerging further in the future, toward the end of the decade. Let's just hope we never have to find out who was right."

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THE WASHINGTON POST
21 September 1980

VIP

By Maxine Cheshire

The American Civil Liberties Union is going to help publishers and authors fight future cases that come under the recent Supreme Court ruling that awarded the CIA all former agent Frank Snepp's earnings on his unauthorized book on Viet Nam, "Decent Interval," because he did not submit it for censorship. A 20-member committee will be named later this fall to review CIA censorship says Morton Halperin, with a "distinguished figure from the publishing world" as chairman. Best bet for the job is Robert L. Bernstein, president of Random House, which published the Snepp book.

PUBLISHERS WEEKLY
19 September 1980

**FACING REALITY: From World
Federalism to the CIA**

Cord Meyer. Harper & Row, \$15.95
ISBN 0-06-013032-6

Since George F. Kennan's "The Cloud of Danger" (1977) we have not had a more sobering and thought-provoking assessment of the reality of Soviet power and policy as we enter the century's closing decades. Meyer, who as a young man was a World Federalist, served the CIA in high-level posts from 1951 to his retirement in 1977—a time when the agency was reeling from exposures of its spying on the Vietnam antiwar movement, the "destabilization" of Chile under Allende and other unsavory operations. There's a sense in which Meyer's 448-page book (CIA-approved, in part an autobiography) can be taken as a reasonably effective volley in the agency's counteroffensive against its critics. But whether Meyer's too-cautiously written admissions and pro-CIA explanations will satisfy every reader seems of small moment when set against his book's latter half. This is a measured and sometimes eye-opening analysis of the ruthless Soviet strategy and the piecemeal aggressions which, from Angola to Afghanistan, have caught us short. [October 29]

ATLANTA JOURNAL
8 September 1980

Who is Correct?

IN A REPORT to a House Intelligence Subcommittee, the Central Intelligence Agency asserts that the Soviet Union is spending about 50 percent more on its armed forces than is the United States.

And Sen. William Proxmire, D-Wis., has charged that the CIA report is a "gross exaggeration."

It would be helpful to know who is correct.

The CIA analysis follows prescribed procedures in determining spending levels of the two superpowers. And the CIA's director of strategic research throws in a disclaimer to the effect that spending levels do not necessarily reflect "the relative effectiveness of U.S. and Soviet forces."

Sen. Proxmire is apparently basing his position on the grounds that the Soviet Union is not as efficient as the United States, and therefore the Soviets cannot do as much with their spending as does this nation.

But there is another factor which we consider pertinent and we have seen no reference to it in this controversy. Sen. Proxmire's reference to relative efficiency does not stand up on the subject of personnel costs.

More than half of the U.S. defense budget goes to pay people in uniform. The Soviets do not use anything like that percentage in paying their people. Pay and perquisites in the Soviet armed forces—particularly among the lower echelons—are minimal and take only a fraction of the Soviet defense budget.

When the personnel pay factor is thrown in we can only wonder at the validity of Sen. Proxmire's claim of our superiority in efficiency.

We have no way of knowing whether the CIA is totally correct or whether Sen. Proxmire is totally correct or whether the correct answer lies somewhere between the two.

But in view of past experiences in which Proxmire has fleeced the U.S. public, we're inclined to lean toward the CIA's analysis—even if it is nothing but bad news for all of us.

DAILY OKLAHOMAN
6 September 1980

Politically Sensitive 'Secrets' Buried, Sources Say

By Jack Taylor
Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — For the last eight months, sensitive U.S. intelligence information has been handled under a new and unusual system that effectively cuts off most congressional, military and other government officials, sources familiar with the system told The Daily Oklahoman Friday.

The new security classification system was secretly ordered by President Carter on Jan. 7. It installed a classification called "Royal" above the previous highest classification, "Top Secret," the sources said.

The "Royal" system is considered highly unusual by the intelligence community because it is vague and general in scope and is not associated with protecting sensitive sources or particularly sensitive information.

The five sources, all of whom deal with extremely sensitive intelligence on a daily basis, contend the "Royal" classification is intended primarily to protect only politically sensitive information.

The real effect, the five sources contend, is protecting President Carter from potential embarrassment.

However, an administration official said Friday, "Those allegations are totally false."

The official denied that "Royal" is in use, saying it is part of a classification system that has not yet been implemented by the government.

"It's part of a new and still unimplemented system for handling extremely sensitive classified information," the official said. "Within that system, 'Royal' is only one of many designations."

The five sources say the type of intelligence classified in "Royal" is sometimes of more significance from a political than an intelligence viewpoint.

For example, some intercepted diplomatic cable traffic among Libyan diplomats was given the "Royal" treatment — including the cable in which the Libyans described the President's brother, Billy, as "our agent of influence."

Other information classified "Royal," and therefore restricted to only a handful of officials in government, according to the sources, has included:

— Reports surfacing early this year, sup-

pressed for two months within the intelligence community, that the Soviet Union had conducted tests in November of a new surface-to-air missile, the SA-10. The administration still has not acknowledged the reports, though they have become an issue in Congress because of the potential violation of both the Anti-Ballistic Missile and SALT I treaties.

The more significant reports about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, including details that the administration had received its first intelligence, based on deployment of initial small units of Soviet troops, weeks before the actual infusion of enough troops to call it an invasion.

"All 'Royal' does is institutionalize this sort of thing," one source said. "Nobody sees the information, so it can never become an issue."

The new system is so restrictive that even the National Intelligence Daily, a summary sent to only 100 key individuals in government, has become devoid of meaningful information — or, as one senator put it privately, "lifeless."

The very existence of the "Royal" system is so secret that many members of Congress, military officers and other government officials who have "Top Secret" clearances don't even know it exists.

Rep. Philip M. Crane, an Illinois Republican who was an early presidential candidate this year, was surprised when asked about it Friday.

"I've never heard of it," he said. "But it's certainly intriguing and I intend to find out about it."

Only eight members of Congress — four senators and four congressmen — have been given access to "Royal" information.

In the Senate, they are Sen. Birch Bayh, D-Ind.; Sen. Barry Goldwater, R-Ariz.; Sen. Howard Baker, R-Tenn.; and Sen. Robert Byrd, D-W.Va.

The only congressional staff members given access are the staff directors of the Senate and House intelligence committees.

But because "Royal" information is closely held, even the eight members of Congress are unlikely to be aware of its daily digest unless they take the time to go to intelligence committee offices each day to read it, the sources said.

"When you establish something this restrictive, you, in effect, deny access to the minority party, which could have an effect on policy," one source said. "In fact, it is against administration policy which requires making all verifications and SALT violations available to all parties."

Politically sensitive information such as some intercepted Libyan diplomatic cables concerning Billy Carter never get to Republican members of Congress, the sources said. Because the system is effectively controlled by the administration.

Normal intelligence information is classified "Confidential," "Secret" or "Top Secret."

There are special code name classifications beyond "Top Secret" for communications intelligence, satellite photography, intelligence collection methods and cryptographic technology.

But, unlike "Royal," which fits the broader category of general intelligence, all "code names" deal with sources of collecting information.

According to one of the sources knowledgeable about "Royal," Zbigniew Brzezinski, the president's national security adviser who personally picked the word "Royal," wrote Adm. Stansfield Turner, director of the CIA, that the new system is designed to protect the product regardless of the source.

"That translates," said one source "to protecting politically sensitive, potentially embarrassing information."

Ostensibly, the sources said, the directive implementing this system states that it is intended to provide selective key policymakers with advanced intelligence so they can formulate positions that will appear, publicly at least, more timely and responsive. should a subject of the reports become an issue.