Approved For Release 2009/08/03: CIA-RDP05T00644R000200430038-5

The Director of Central Intelligence



Executive Registry

78-3531

Washington, D. C. 20505

14 November 1978

The Editor

<u>Michigan Daily</u>
University of Michigan
420 Maynard Street
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48107

Dear Sir:

In your 24 October 1978 editorial, "The CIA on Campus," you contend that "no one seems to have authority over the CIA," that the CIA has "too long been permitted to continue their surreptitious activities outside the sphere of civilian control" and "that the agency has gotten out of control is apparent." This assertion is incorrect both historically and as regards CIA activities today.

The Senate Select Committe chaired by Senator Church stated in Book I of its final report, "The CIA has come to be viewed as an unfettered monolith, defining and determining its activities independent of other elements of government and of the direction of American foreign policy. This is a distortion. During its twenty-nine year history, the Agency has been shaped by the course of international events, by pressures from other government agencies, and by its own internal norms. An exhaustive history of the CIA would demand an equally exhaustive history of American foreign policy, the role of Congress and the Executive, the other components of the Intelligence Community, and an examination of the interaction among all these forces."

Although never released to the public, the report of the House Committee on Intelligence (Pike Committee) was reported in <u>Village Voice</u> to have arrived at an even more categoric conclusion concerning the control of the CIA: "All evidence in hand suggests that the CIA, far from being out of control, has been utterly responsive to the instructions of the President and the Assistant to the President for Security Affairs."

After the first session of the 95th Congress came to a close, Senator Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, reported to the Senate that, "There is no question that a number of abuses of power, mistakes in judgment, and failures by the intelligence agencies have harmed the United States. In almost every instance, the abuses that have been revealed were a result of direction from above, including Presidents and Secretaries of State. Further, in almost every instance, some members of both Houses of Congress assigned the duty of oversight were knowledgeable about these activities."

Today, the President's Executive Order 12036, signed January 24, 1978 (copy enclosed) lays out specific directions for carrying out intelligence activities, restrictions on those activities, and creates several new mechanisms for oversight.

In the Executive Branch, the new Intelligence Oversight Board, composed of three distinguished civilians from outside the government, are directed to investigate all allegations of illegal or improper intelligence activity. Anyone may communicate directly with that Board. Their findings go directly to the President.

In the Legislative Branch, a select committee on intelligence exists in both the Senate and the House. They are kept fully informed of intelligence activities and, in turn, exercise genuine control over all such activities. There is no question in my mind or in the mind of anyone in the Intelligence Community that we are held accountable for what we do.

These two Congressional committees are now in the process of drafting charters which will codify in federal law the various restrictions and limitations as well as the missions of the Intelligence Community. I fully and actively support that endeavor.

Consequently, rather than being out of control as you allege, the United States Intelligence Community, and specifically the CIA, are under the tightest internal and external controls of their history.

Further, you find my refusal to comply with Harvard's faculty guidelines peremptory and outrageous. In fact, it is neither. The CIA and Harvard have been engaged in a productive dialogue for over a year. During that time the majority of our differences have been reconciled. There remain but three points of difference:

1. The Harvard guidelines require that relationships between Harvard faculty members and the CIA be reported to the Harvard administration.

CIA has no objection to this requirement but believes it is the prerogative of the faculty member to reveal those relationships which are external to his faculty responsibilities, not the CIA. CIA considers all such relationships private and personal. The faculty member may deal with them in any way he chooses.

2. That only relationships with intelligence agencies are required to be so revealed.

While the guidelines you propose in your subsequent editorial, "The University Guidelines" on 29 October 1978, recognizes the diverse opportunities for conflict of interest which are present on all campuses, e.g., consulting arrangements with businesses, private publication opportunities, part-time jobs, etc., Harvard's quidelines do not. It seems naive to me to assume that only a relationship with an intelligence agency has the potential for conflict or for infringing on academic or personal freedom. Additionally, this requirement infers that all other relationships are preferable to one with the U.S. Government. This is neither sound logic nor realistic. If this guideline were extended to cover all business or professional relationships external to the faculty member's university responsibilities, CIA would have no objection.

3. That CIA should not establish any confidential relationships with faculty members for the possible purpose of assessing or contacting foreign students.

Again, in light of the thousands of confidential recommendations prepared annually by faculty members for students applying to businesses, graduate schools, and other government agencies, a guideline prohibiting the same kind of recommendation to the Intelligence Community is inconsistent with recognized and accepted faculty practice. No student at a university is totally free of confidential appraisal in one form or another; none of us is either in school or at work. If a particular student's qualifications result in a specific work or study proposal by a business, another university, or a government agency, and the student is not interested, the student is free to decline the proposal. It is difficult to see how this abridges anyone's freedom.

I am enclosing a copy of the CIA's internal regulation governing our relationships with academic institutions and a statement I made at the University of Kentucky which describes those relationships and the oversight process in greater detail.

Sincerel

STANSFIELD TURNER

Enclosures As stated