



Directorate of
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Near East and South Asia Review



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23 October 1987

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Articles

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Israeli Strategic Doctrine: The Debate Continues [Redacted]

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Spurred by the debacle in Lebanon, Israel's political and military leaders are reevaluating current defense concepts in formulating future strategies. Whatever the outcome of the debate, Israeli strategic thinking probably will continue to stress the offensive to ensure a swift, decisive victory. [Redacted]

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Jordan: In Search of a Modern Fighter Aircraft [Redacted]

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King Hussein is deeply committed to modernizing Jordan's small and increasingly obsolescent Air Force. The King prefers Western aircraft, but without substantial financial assistance from the Gulf states he will probably turn to the Soviet MIG-29 as Jordan's next generation fighter. [Redacted]

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The Syrian Army in Lebanon's Quagmire [Redacted]

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The Syrian military is sinking deeper into the Lebanese quagmire as it extends its presence into urban areas. The military is coming under increasing attack by various Lebanese groups, particularly as tensions rise as the 1988 presidential election approaches. [Redacted]

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Lebanon's Syrian-Supported Christian Renegades	[Redacted]	21	25X1
[Redacted]	[Redacted]		25X1

The former leader of the Christian Lebanese forces militia Ili Hubayqa continues to play a spoiler's role in Lebanese Christian politics by virtue of his enduring relationship with Syria. Hubayqa's role probably will increase in the coming months as he supports Damascus's attempts to influence the outcome of Lebanon's presidential election in 1988. [Redacted]

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Lebanon: Sizing up the Militias	[Redacted]	25	25X1
[Redacted]	[Redacted]		25X1

As the central government's authority has declined, Lebanese politics has become a patchwork of local power struggles. Militias have become the major factor in this complicated welter of actors, and to evaluate the militias we have devised a method of examining them in terms of their military, social, and political environment. [Redacted]

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Iraq-Libya: Modest Improvement in Relations	[Redacted]	31	25X1
[Redacted]	[Redacted]		25X1

Qadhafi's need to burnish his international and domestic image and Saddam Husayn's desire to isolate Iran have induced Libya and Iraq to improve their ties. Baghdad remains suspicious of Tripoli's intentions, and relations could deteriorate if Libya sends Iran large amounts of weapons to help in its pursuit of its war with Iraq. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]	[Redacted]		25X6
[Redacted]	[Redacted]		25X1
[Redacted]	[Redacted]		25X1

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Technology in Pakistan: Glitches and Glitter	[Redacted]	37	25X1
[Redacted]	[Redacted]		25X1

Despite few resources allocated to research and development, Pakistan has attained sophisticated technology, at least in defense-related areas. Civilian technology has languished from a combination of low education expenditures, high illiteracy rates, and bureaucratic impediments to imported technology. [Redacted]

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South Asia-Japan: Growing Economic Relations

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South Asian countries are increasingly looking to Japan for financial and technical resources to assist in their economic development. They want Japan to provide more concessionary economic assistance, direct investment, and tariff relief for their exports. [redacted]

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India-United States: Antinarcotics Cooperation

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Prime Minister Gandhi has become more receptive to US suggestions for increased cooperation on narcotics, but the Indian Government will probably continue to be reluctant to involve US private or governmental agencies in Indian domestic programs. [redacted]

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India: Increase in Sikh Militancy

53

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The Indian Government appears to be losing ground in its campaign against Sikh extremists in Punjab, despite almost six months of direct administration from New Delhi. The growing influence of the militants underscores the ineffectiveness of New Delhi's policy and its need to reevaluate its approach to Sikh grievances. [redacted]

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Afghanistan: Insurgent Peace Terms

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Recent public statements by Hizbi Islami faction leader Gulbuddin and a conference of insurgent commanders in Ghowr Province suggest the insurgents' military successes in 1987 have not made them more tractable in seeking a political settlement to the war. Gulbuddin and the commanders offered Moscow terms that do not allow a face-saving withdrawal. [redacted]

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The New Afghan Constitution: No Magna Carta

59

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The new Afghan constitution unveiled by the Kabul regime on 15 July purports to guarantee human rights and provide for a transition from the current one-party state to a multiparty system. In reality the draft constitution perpetuates the dominance of the Afghan Communists and is little more than a propaganda exercise. [redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Afghan Paramilitary Forces: An Overview

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[Redacted]

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The Kabul regime deploys several paramilitary forces to help the army maintain control in the countryside and to expand the influence of the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. These units, however, have substantial problems and have not achieved their political or military goals. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Some articles in the Near East and South Asia Review are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Occasionally an article will represent the view of a single analyst; an item like this will be designated as a noncoordinated view. [Redacted]

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Israeli Strategic Doctrine: The Debate Continues

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Spurred by the debacle in Lebanon, Israel's political and military leaders are reevaluating current defense concepts in formulating future strategies. The most recent examination conducted by a Knesset subcommittee, headed by Likud activist Dan Meridor, provides insight into Israeli strategic thinking and policy development. The Meridor subcommittee focused on the military's wartime role, debating how it would preserve its qualitative edge on the modern battlefield and maintain its combat effectiveness while reducing force size.

Whatever the outcome of the reassessment, Israeli strategic thinking probably will continue to stress the offensive to ensure a swift, decisive victory. A war of attrition is viewed as unacceptable by Tel Aviv because of the high human cost and the possibility that it could lead to a widening of the conflict—either by drawing in other Arab states or forcing superpower intervention. The latest assessment comes during an unprecedented period of stability and security for Israel, despite the politically polarized electorate and economic belt-tightening in every sphere including the defense budget.

The Meridor Report

National media attention is focusing on a recently completed Knesset report addressing the future of Israel's defense. The 32-page document presents the findings of a subcommittee chaired by Likud's Dan Meridor—also a member of the Knesset's prestigious Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee—which during the past 13 months interviewed a host of defense experts, both civilian and military, according to [redacted] and Embassy reporting.

Although no revelations are expected to emerge from this review, the report is notable in that it reflects the views of the current generation of military leaders who will influence the defense establishment's development in the coming decade.

The study purports to be a comprehensive review of Israeli security issues since the early 1950s, but the invasion of Lebanon in 1982 has probably had a major

influence on the committee's outlook. Disillusionment with the Lebanon war and the requirement for increased efficiency made necessary by a reduced defense budget have contributed to the need for a fresh look at Israel's strategic doctrine. The focus of the report is on a strategic concept for the future that recommends stressing quality over quantity, while reducing the size of the active and reserve forces. The committee's recommendations reflect the new mood in the military leadership that argues for a more streamlined force, with less emphasis on the armor-heavy doctrine prevalent since the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict.

Defining the Threat

Tel Aviv considers a unilateral Syrian attack as the most likely threat to Israel's security in the next decade. Key assumptions contained in the Meridor report that reflect this view include:

- The peace treaty with Egypt will endure, allowing military planners to concentrate the bulk of their forces against the eastern front—principally Syria and, to a lesser extent, Jordan, if necessary.
- The de facto peace between Israel and Jordan will probably continue despite the recent diplomatic rapprochement between Damascus and Amman.
- Iraq will remain bogged down in a costly war of attrition with Iran. Moreover, Syrian support for Iran and the intensity and duration of the conflict have eliminated the likelihood of Iraqi participation in a war against Israel in the near term.

Countering the Threat

Israeli planners define national security as assuring the survival of the state, but within this context they seek to determine an acceptable margin of losses. Foremost among their considerations is limiting the

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length of a future war, its political and economic impact, and human costs. The underlying problem for Israeli strategists is how to defend a state with a small population—demonstrated by the extremely small standing army dependent on rapid mobilization of a much larger reserve force—limited territory lacking strategic depth and sufficient economic resources, and heavily reliant on US support. Faced with these constraints, any Israeli government—whether led by the Likud or the Labor Party—will be intent on achieving a quick victory, minimizing Israeli casualties, and carrying the war into the enemy's territory.

A review of Israeli doctrine since 1948 reveals a tendency to swing from offensive to defensive strategy influenced by both political and military circumstances. reporting. Before 1967, Israeli strategy emphasized preemption. After the decisive victory in June 1967, Israel altered this approach, believing that its newly acquired territorial depth eliminated the threat to its survival and enabled it to absorb a first blow. Although Israel ultimately won the October 1973 war, the high Israeli casualties shattered Israel's confidence. The policy of absorbing an Arab attack was eventually abandoned, and preemption was restored to Israeli doctrine.

Defensive Strategy. Current proponents of this strategy—a small minority among strategic planners—believe employing more sophisticated weaponry would enable Israel to destroy the enemy and decide the war's outcome without entering enemy territory, thereby minimizing Israeli casualties and reducing the chance of superpower intervention. Improved weapon systems—such as precision-guided munitions—have enhanced defensive capability, making an invasion a much costlier enterprise. The increasing effectiveness of firepower would cause heavy enemy losses and slow their advance until reserve forces arrive. The key to this approach, according to its advocates, is to wear down the enemy who will be conducting costly breakthrough tactics and demonstrate that nothing can be won by continuing the attack.

A fundamental flaw in this concept, critics argue, is that it runs counter to the purpose of Israeli strategy to deter Arab aggression and, failing that, to ensure the indisputable military defeat of the Arab force. A defensive strategy essentially prevents Israel from achieving a decisive victory, and, without the ability to decide the war's outcome, deterrence is lost. Furthermore, critics contend, a defensive strategy would allow the enemy to decide when and where to fight and lead to a war of attrition. It also would not permit Israel to capture territory it can hold for negotiation. While strongly encouraging continued development and procurement of advanced weaponry, the military remains steadfast in its belief that Israel must retain the battlefield initiative.

Offensive Strategy. Ever since the surprise Arab attack in 1973, Israel has clearly geared itself toward launching preemptive strikes should its national security appear in jeopardy. This concept entails striking Israel's enemies before they become too strong. The ultimate goal of such a policy is to destroy the warmaking capability of the enemy for several years. Moreover, an offensive policy accords with Israel's highly developed sense of independence, allowing it to show both its enemies and allies that on critical matters of national security Israel can act autonomously.

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This strategy advocates maintaining a smaller, but highly efficient quick-reaction strike force to seize the operational initiative, to concentrate military force at critical junctures, and to conduct swift, highly mobile offensive operations. This concept also necessitates clearly establishing a set of "red lines," which, if crossed, would force an immediate Israeli reaction. Its supporters, particularly those in the military and Likud hardliners led by Commerce Minister Ariel Sharon, believe an offensive strategy compensates for Israel's numerical inferiority. Speedy offensive operations minimize the risk of a war of attrition and forestall the entry of more Arab states and the

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superpowers. Furthermore, a smaller force is more economical and ensures shorter offensive operations less likely to result in high casualties.

Critics argue that this strategy risks involving Israeli forces in preventive operations to further political interests rather than as a last resort when diplomacy or deterrence has failed. They cite Israel's invasion of Lebanon as proof. The political, material, and human costs of launching a preventive war without provocation detract from its supporters' claims that it is less expensive. Finally, adopting a doctrine based on wars of choice and prevention reinforces the international image of Israel as an aggressive, militaristic state and arouses international reactions against Israel, possibly leading to sanctions.

Outlook

The continuing debate among Israeli strategists is unlikely to result in fundamental changes in doctrine, although it underscores an evolutionary process under way in Israel's strategic thinking. Israel's doctrine is likely to remain offense-oriented and conventional. Bitter lessons from the Lebanon war will lessen

somewhat the proclivity of Tel Aviv to choose preemptive attack—short of an imminent threat to national security.

The Meridor report essentially mirrors concepts already under consideration or being implemented by the defense establishment. The increasing technical sophistication of Israel's adversaries threatens to erode the qualitative edge deemed essential to ensure Israel's conventional deterrence. The Meridor report generally endorses the high-technology concept and innovative application of state-of-the-art weaponry in defense strategy to preserve Israel's lead. Furthermore, the recent cancellation of the costly Lavi aircraft project probably will ease the burden on the defense budget, providing more funding for procurement of additional modern equipment.



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Jordan: In Search of a Modern Fighter Aircraft [REDACTED]

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King Hussein is deeply committed to modernizing Jordan's small and increasingly obsolescent Air Force, which is composed of three squadrons of US F-5E interceptors and two squadrons of French F-1s. The King prefers Western aircraft such as the French Mirage 2000, the British Tornado, and particularly the US F-16. The US F-16 is unavailable to him, and he cannot secure financing for either of the West European fighters. Lacking substantial financial assistance from Saudi Arabia and the smaller Persian Gulf states and because of a generous Soviet financing offer, the MIG-29 will probably become Jordan's next generation fighter. [REDACTED]

The King's Requirements

King Hussein realizes that he cannot begin to compete with the impressive military buildups of his potentially hostile neighbors, Israel and Syria, but he wants to retain a credible force to deter attackers and to defend Jordanian airspace. Moreover, we believe Jordanian pilots, who are aware of Israel's purchase of 75 advanced US F-16s and Syria's recent receipt of a squadron of MIG-29s, will become increasingly disgruntled with their aging planes and the King's inability to redress this situation. [REDACTED]

The King wants two squadrons of modern fighter aircraft—about 30 to 40 planes—to replace some of his aging F-5s that no longer compete with his neighbors' more capable inventories. With his limited resources, the King probably would prefer a multirole aircraft to fulfill both air superiority and ground attack missions. Although two squadrons of fighters would not appreciably narrow Jordan's military inferiority compared with Israel or Syria, they would present a more credible obstacle to an attacking force. [REDACTED]

Jordan's Limited Options

The first choice for both King Hussein and the Jordanian Air Force is the US F-16. But the United States has not concluded any agreements for the

Table 1
The Air Balance in the Levant

	Israel	Syria	Jordan
Total	620	680	96
Modern fighters	420	580	28
Other aircraft	200	100	68

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provision of major new weapon systems to Jordan in more than four years, and the King has no illusions that the United States is about to reverse that trend. Given the unavailability of the US F-16, Jordan is left with three alternatives—the French Mirage 2000, the British Tornado, and the Soviet MIG-29. [REDACTED]

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The King views the US Congress's stipulation that he begin negotiations with the Israelis before it authorizes major arms sales to Amman as unrealistic and unfair, and he is looking to alternating suppliers to fulfill his needs. Increasingly, the king is turning to the Soviet Union because of the few limitations on the weapons it sells and lower Soviet prices than for comparable Western equipment. The King would prefer to purchase a major system such as a fighter aircraft from a more politically compatible source. Hussein has long distrusted the intentions of the Soviets and recognizes their motives for selling him the MIG-29 are self-serving—principally to gain greater access to Jordan's military and to increase their influence in the Middle East. [REDACTED]

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Despite clear political preferences, Jordan's options are limited by its struggling economy. Jordan cannot pay for the aircraft—at a cost of between \$500

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million to \$1 billion per squadron—unless it is granted generous repayment terms. Specifically, the Jordanians require a lengthy grace period, about five years, allowing them first to pay back their current foreign military debt. The only supplier willing to comply with Amman's need for lenient financing has been the Soviet Union. [redacted]

Without generous terms from France or the United Kingdom, the Jordanians will require substantial financial assistance from Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf states to purchase a West European fighter. Despite repeated requests, significant assistance has not been forthcoming. [redacted]

[redacted] As a last resort, Hussein may take advantage of the Arab summit meeting scheduled for early November to lobby the Gulf states for additional aid. [redacted] Hussein has delayed his decision on purchasing MIG-29s until February to give the Gulf states additional time to come up with funding and to assess the various West European offers. King Hussein had originally intended to decide before the end of this year. [redacted]

Assessing the Competition

We believe all three alternatives to the F-16—the Mirage 2000, the Tornado, and the MIG-29—are technically excellent aircraft. Although performance criteria are important in choosing a modern fighter, political and economic criteria are probably the driving forces that will determine Jordan's decision. [redacted]

Political Scorecard. Either West European fighter would be preferable to the MIG-29 for political reasons, and the British Tornado probably edges out the French Mirage. The King has a long history of dealing satisfactorily with the British, and, since the US moratorium on arms sales, he has turned to them increasingly for both hardware and training. The French have less of a stake in Jordan, and the Jordanian Air Force has been frustrated by inadequate French support of an earlier purchase of F-1 fighter aircraft. Furthermore, the Saudis—who would be instrumental in funding a Jordanian purchase of either plane, as unlikely as it appears—purchased 72 Tornados and could press Jordan to buy similar aircraft. [redacted]

Economic Issues. Obtaining funding to purchase the aircraft is the most important factor determining the King's decision. Given the King's commitment to modernizing Jordan's Air Force, we are convinced that he will buy whichever aircraft he can most easily afford, and, using domestic resources, his only option is the MIG-29. The Soviets have offered generous terms, including a grace period and interest rates well below international norms. [redacted]

Jordan believes it can afford the purchase without outside funding. The French have made a counteroffer. [redacted] this does not come close to matching the Soviet offer and would be unaffordable without Saudi funding. The British also have improved their original offer for Tornados, but the plane is substantially more expensive than its competition. The Jordanians probably would have to settle for under 10 planes for the same money that would buy an entire MIG-29 squadron. [redacted]

Performance Criteria. The three planes are difficult to compare—the MIG-29 and Mirage are basically designed as agile fighters. The Tornado—in the currently available strike version—is much larger, less maneuverable, and carries roughly twice the bomb load of either of the other two. Nevertheless, assuming similar weapon loads at constant weather conditions and altitude, we can compare basic performance levels:

- **Maneuverability.** The MIG-29 outperforms the Mirage 2000 by a substantial margin, and the Tornado trails even further behind. According to available data, the MIG has superior thrust to weight and has much higher specific excess power, which measures an aircraft's inherent ability to accelerate or decelerate quickly and is an excellent guide to comparing overall maneuverability.
- **Endurance.** The MIG-29's extremely limited combat radius is one of its most serious deficiencies. Fitted with a centerline tank, the MIG-29's maneuverability advantage deteriorates considerably. The Tornado has better endurance than the Mirage, particularly important if Hussein

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Table 2
Characteristics of the Competitors

	F-16	Mirage 2000	Tornado	MIG-29
Wingspan (meters)	9.4	9.0	13.9	11.5
Length (meters)	14.5	15.3	16.7	15.0
Combat weight (kilograms)	10,100	14,000	39,700	14,000
Maximum speed				
At 10,000m	Mach 2	Mach 2.2	Mach 2.2	Mach 2.35
Ceiling (meters)	20,000	18,000	21,335	20,200
Combat radius (kilometers)	380	250	420	230
	1,070	840	850	230
Armament	1 20-mm gun 2 Sidewinders	2 30-mm cannons 4 Matra	2 27-mm guns 4 Skyflashes 2 Sidewinders	1 30-mm 6 AA-8, -10
Bomb load (kilograms)	5,000	4,500	8,000	2,000

plans to base his new fighters some distance from Israel and Syria to shield them from preemptive attack in case of hostilities.

- **Maintainability/Logistics.** Again the Soviet plane falls short. The MIG-29's engines need to be replaced more than twice as often as the West European fighters' engines and require return to the Soviet Union for major overhaul after only 600 or fewer hours of flight time. Although the Saudis have had considerable problems with their Tornados and have probably shared these experiences with the Jordanians, the Jordanians probably expect British support to be superior to that from the French. Thus, we believe the Tornado leads in this category.

Overall Performance. Despite its limited endurance and problematic maintenance record, the MIG-29 probably is a better performer—particularly in air-to-air combat—than the two West European fighters. Its

substantial lead in maneuverability makes it well suited to the Jordanian Air Force's desire for an agile fighter and would place the Jordanians at a distinct advantage over less capable Syrian pilots flying similar aircraft. Jordanian pilots have flown the MIG-29 at least once in Moscow and consider the plane a close competitor of the F-16.

The Bottom Line

Hussein's commitment to his military—the linchpin of his regime—will prevail over opposition to expanding his military ties to the Soviet Union. If he becomes convinced by early next year that the MIG-29 is his only alternative then he will follow that course. Given the advanced state of Jordan's negotiations with Moscow, Saudi reluctance to fund a West European alternative, and Jordan's economic limitations, the MIG-29 sale is becoming increasingly likely.

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Secret**Table 3**
Performance of the Competition

	Specific Excess Power ^a	Thrust to Weight	Sustained Turn Rate ^a	Sustained G's ^a	Combat Radius ^b
Mirage 2000	2	2	2	2	2
Tornado	3	3	3	3	1
MIG-29	1	1	1	1	3

^a Calculated under similar air combat circumstances, 6,000-meter altitude.

^b Calculated using similar weapons and fuel loading and flight profile.

Nevertheless, if the Saudis offer funding or the French or British dramatically improve their packages to equal Moscow's offer, we believe the King would gladly forgo his negotiations with the Soviets and accept the West European option. [redacted]

Implications for the United States

Regardless of which fighter Hussein chooses—or is forced to choose because of financial imperatives—it will put further distance between Jordan's military and its US mentor. Jordan's purchase of the MIG-29 would particularly damage its military ties to the United States, as the Soviet stake in Jordan would rise dramatically. A MIG-29 purchase would result in at least doubling the number of Soviet advisers in Jordan, from about 50 to over 100, substantially increase Jordan's debt to Moscow; and deepen Jordan's reliance on Soviet training and supply of spare parts and maintenance. US advisers probably would be prohibited from bases at which the MIG-29s were stationed, and joint exercises between the US and Jordanian military probably would be limited to those involving Jordan's older aircraft. [redacted]

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The Syrian Army in Lebanon's Quagmire

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The Syrian military is sinking deeper into the Lebanese quagmire as it extends its presence into urban areas. The military is coming under increasing attack by various Lebanese groups, particularly as tensions rise as the 1988 Lebanese presidential election approaches. The attacks have been triggered by the growing tensions among the Lebanese factions and outside groups who operate in Lebanon. Any move by the Syrians to counter the attacks will be tempered by their desire to avoid sinking still further into the quagmire and their desire to avoid a confrontation with Israel.

The Syrian military presence in Lebanon numbers about 25,000 troops and occupies approximately 65 percent of the country. Syrian motives for maintaining a large presence in Lebanon are based on the desire to place a government in power that is favorable toward Syria—if not subservient—and the need to protect the western approaches to Damascus from the Israeli threat. The first motive stems from the popular notion of "Greater Syria," which includes Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan. The second stems from the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the resulting battles in the Bekaa Valley.

Since their move into Lebanon's urban areas between late 1985 and early 1987, the Syrians have come under increasing attack. The attacks are usually small-scale and aimed at small groups of Syrian soldiers. The typical attack involves sniper fire, rocket attacks, satchel charges, or car bombs against Syrian positions. Civilians in the urban areas usually find themselves in the middle of the violence. Syrian forces in the cities of Beirut and Tripoli are more frequently under attack, but the troops in the Bekaa Valley are not immune from violence.

Background of Syria's Military Involvement in Lebanon

Syria has maintained a military presence in Lebanon since the 1975 civil war. It entered under the pretense of trying to end the bloody civil war, and its



Tripoli after Syrian bombardment, 1985

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intervention helped elect Elias Sarkis, a pro-Syrian Christian, to the presidency in 1976. With the Israeli invasion in 1982 and the subsequent Syrian retreat from Beirut and areas south of the Beirut-Damascus highway, Damascus focused its military resources on maintaining a presence in western Lebanon to protect the approaches to Damascus. Syrian forces generally stayed out of the country's large coastal cities.

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Syrian urban involvement resumed in Tripoli in 1985 when they crushed a Sunni Islamic fundamentalist movement that was sheltering the remnants of Syria's Muslim Brotherhood. In February 1987 the Syrians intervened in Beirut with 10,000 troops, to shore up their Lebanese Shia Amal ally in its fight against the Palestinians. These urban deployments have brought the Syrians in increasing contact with opposing groups and further entangled them in Lebanese politics.

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
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The Partition of Lebanon, September 1987



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Where Are the Syrians?

Ground Forces. The Syrians maintain major elements of one mechanized infantry division, one special forces division, and at least six independent special forces regiments throughout Lebanon. The forces are concentrated in four areas—West Beirut, including the Metn overlooking the capital and the coastal highway south to Sidon; the Bekaa Valley; the northern coastal region including Tripoli; and the Syria-Lebanon border—giving Damascus control of approximately 65 percent of Lebanon. [redacted]

The heaviest concentration of Syrian forces is in West Beirut, where, according to [redacted]

[redacted] the Syrians have deployed major elements of the 14th Special Forces Division, the 51st Armored Brigade of the 10th Mechanized Infantry Division, and the 46th, 41st, and 35th Independent Special Forces Regiments. The 51st Armored Brigade is located in the hills of Khaldah, south of Beirut International Airport. The 36th Special Forces Regiment (mechanized) of the 14th Special Forces Division surrounds Beirut International Airport. The 554th Special Forces Regiment of the 14th Special Forces Division and the 46th, 41st, and 35th Independent Special Forces Regiments man checkpoints throughout West Beirut, along the supply routes through the Metn, and along the coastal highway to the Awali River just north of Sidon. The concentration of lightly armed special forces units in and around Beirut provides the Syrians with the urban warfare capability to cope with a deteriorating situation in West Beirut. [redacted]

With two brigades from the 10th Mechanized Infantry Division, the Syrians occupy the Bekaa Valley from the Syrian border to Lake Qirawn.

[redacted] the 93rd Armored Brigade is deployed in the north around the city of Ba'labakk, in the Al Hirmil area northeast of Ba'labakk, and in the Aynata-Schlifa area northwest of Ba'labakk. [redacted]

[redacted] major units of the 85th Brigade are deployed near the villages of Qabb Illyas and Ghazzah in the central Bekaa. They occupy positions along the valley's two major north-south routes and are near the major east-west route through the valley, the Beirut-Damascus Highway. The 122nd Field



Syrian special forces soldier in Tripoli [redacted]

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Artillery Regiment of the 10th Mechanized Infantry Division is also deployed throughout the Metn and the Central Bekaa Valley. [redacted]

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[redacted] three independent special forces regiments—the 53rd, 54th, and 44th—occupy the northern coastal area, which extends from the Syria-Lebanon border along the coast to Kubba and eastward to Mount Lebanon. The 53rd Brigade's principal area of operation is around Kleiat Airfield, near the Syrian border. The 54th operates in and around the city of Tripoli. The 44th operates south of Tripoli along the coast. The last area of Syrian control in Lebanon is the border area or the "bulge," where elements of the 554th and 556th Regiments of the 14th Special Forces Division are deployed. [redacted]

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Other Forces. Syria maintains few air force and air defense elements and no naval forces within Lebanon. The major Lebanese airfields—Riyah, Beirut International Airport, and Kleiat—are in Syrian control. No significant number of Syrian aircraft are

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maintained within Lebanon, other than 8 MI-8 (Hip) helicopters which are based at Kleiat Airfield in northern Lebanon, according to [redacted]

[redacted] The defense attache reports that Kleiat Airfield can accommodate Syrian MIG-21 and MIG-23 aircraft in an emergency. [redacted]

[redacted] Syria maintains a strong air defense along the border with Lebanon, consisting primarily of SA-2 and SA-6 missile systems. The heaviest concentration of the surface-to-air missiles is along the western approaches to Damascus where two of the SA-6 sites lie just inside the Lebanese border. [redacted]

Syria's Principal Opponents in the Occupied Areas

The Syrians probably face their greatest opposition in Beirut. The Syrians' desire to reshape Lebanese politics places them in conflict with the Palestinians, the Lebanese Shia Hizballah, the five Christian brigades of the Lebanese armed forces, the Christian Lebanese Forces militia and, to a lesser extent, the Druze. It was the conflict between the Palestinians and the Syrian-backed Amal militia, which Amal was beginning to lose, that prompted the Syrians to enter Beirut in February 1987. The Syrians—along with Amal—want to contain the Palestinian presence and keep it from regaining its strength in Lebanon. Containment of the Palestinians is also a major reason for Syrian attempts to control the coastal road south to Sidon, Fatah's major base in Lebanon. [redacted]

Hizballah's growing strength conflicts with Syria's plans for Lebanon. Hizballah's goal is to establish an Islamic republic in Lebanon. Such a state would be in conflict with, and present a threat to, the secular Ba'athist regime in Damascus. Hizballah has effectively resisted Syria's presence, refusing to lay down its arms as requested by Damascus and in June kidnaping a US journalist within several hundred feet of a Syrian-manned checkpoint. The Syrians also confront Hizballah in the Bekaa Valley, where its stronghold at Ba'labakk provides the Syrians with an easily accessible pressure point. [redacted]

The Christian Lebanese Forces militia and the Christian brigades of the Lebanese armed forces also present obstacles to the Syrians and their policies. No major clash has occurred between the Christians and the Syrians since the Syrian arrival in Beirut. The Christians are surrounded by the Syrians and fear a Syrian intervention should Christian political infighting in East Beirut deteriorate to that of West Beirut before the Syrian intervention. [redacted]

Sunni fundamentalist groups, especially the Islamic Unification Movement, are the major opponent of the Syrian presence in the Tripoli area. It is one of the most active groups in openly challenging the Syrian presence. Several major clashes have occurred between the Syrians and the Islamic Unification Movement, with the most recent occurring in December 1986. In previous Syrian-Islamic Unification Movement clashes, especially in 1985, Syrian forces used indiscriminate artillery bombardments of populated areas to coerce the group to accept Syrian control, demonstrating Syrian ruthlessness when crushing resistance. [redacted]

The Israeli military provides the major impetus behind the Syrian desire to maintain a strong presence in the Bekaa Valley and along the border. Other motives besides defensive ones require their presence in this area. The Syrians are trying to contain Hizballah by maintaining their presence along the main axis through the valley and around Ba'labakk. The Syrians also are probably attempting to limit the amount of smuggling that occurs between Lebanon and Syria. [redacted]

None of the Lebanese opposition groups are strong enough militarily to confront the Syrians. Hizballah, the Palestinians, and the Sunni fundamentalists at most present a guerrilla threat to Syrian dominance. By their adept use of bombs and sniper attacks, these groups force the Syrians to be constantly vigilant. Only the Lebanese Forces, the Lebanese armed forces, and the Druze have any significant military

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capability, and they lack the numbers, the strength, and, at the moment, the desire to take on the Syrian Army. [redacted]

Reporting to Damascus

No single military officer appears to be in overall command of Syrian forces in Lebanon. Syria has divided Lebanon into various sectors to aid in command and control. Both the Syrian military and Syrian Military Intelligence, each with their own commander, maintain extensive operations in Lebanon. The prominent Syrian commanders in Lebanon are Maj. Gen. Sa'id Bayraqdar, commander of the II Corps and all Syrian expeditionary forces in Lebanon, ¹ and Brig. Gen. Ghazi Kanan, chief of Syrian Military Intelligence in Lebanon. All commanders have direct access to Damascus, with differing degrees of influence. This decentralization of power is to prevent any one commander from controlling too much and threatening the regime.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] the Syrians maintain two major air defense warning sites within Lebanon, one at Dayr al Baydar in the mountains east of Beirut and the other near Riyaq airfield in the Bekaa Valley, providing a link between the forces in Beirut and the headquarters on the border. [redacted]

[redacted] maintain headquarters within Lebanon for II Corps Lebanese operations at Judaydat Yabus on the border, Intelligence at Anjar, Intelligence in Beirut at the Beau Rivage hotel, and Syrian forces in West Beirut at the Bain Militaire. [redacted]

¹ The Syrian Army is organized into two corps, each with its own area of responsibility. The I Corps, also known as the Golan Corps, is composed of the 5th and 7th Infantry Divisions, the 9th Armored Division, and the independent 61st and 90th Infantry Brigades. The II Corps, also known as the Lebanon Corps, is composed of the 1st and 11th Armored Divisions and the 10th Mechanized Division.

[redacted]

Potential for Conflict With Israel

The geography of Lebanon limits large military movement to the Bekaa Valley and the coastal plain. The Bekaa Valley is the most likely area for a Syrian confrontation with Israel, but its geography is more conducive to a northward thrust by Israel than to a southward thrust by Syria. [redacted]

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In the near term we believe any Syrian-Israeli conflict in Lebanon will be triggered accidentally by a clash between their respective surrogates or by an unplanned clash between Syrian and Israeli forces in the southern Bekaa. Israeli and Syrian units patrol only a few kilometers apart in that contested area. We believe neither sees an advantage in deliberately provoking a confrontation at this time, but Syrian forces have contingency plans for both defensive and offensive war in the Bekaa. [redacted]

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[redacted] Syria would use two to three of their nine armored and mechanized infantry divisions in a confrontation with Israel in Lebanon.

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[redacted] the 10th Division, II Corps would form the first Syrian echelon in the Bekaa Valley, and the 1st Armored Division, II Corps garrisoned at Kisweh would make up the second echelon. The 1st Armored Division is responsible for the Bekaa Valley south of the Beirut-Damascus highway, [redacted]

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[redacted] expects this unit to move west and then south in the early stages of a crisis. The 10th Division already maintains two brigades in the Bekaa Valley, and a third, the 62nd Mechanized Infantry Brigade, is within striking distance from its garrison at Qatana, Syria. The US defense attache in Damascus reports that Syria has arrayed its forces in the valley primarily for defense. [redacted]

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A Syrian offensive thrust against Israeli units in southern Lebanon would be made as a diversion in conjunction with an effort to retake the Golan. The move through the Bekaa Valley would involve at least two armored divisions, one mechanized infantry division, a commando division, and at least two additional commando regiments. Two commando

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regiments would move from the vicinity of Sidon to the area around An Nabatiyah, confronting at least one Israeli infantry brigade. One mechanized infantry brigade would move down the eastern side of the Bekaa Valley through Kafr Mishki and be joined by a commando regiment moving out from the Rashayya area. An Israeli infantry and a mechanized brigade would move up to block their progress through the southern part of the valley toward the Israeli security zone. Once inside the security zone, one Syrian armored division would proceed toward Metulla and the finger of Israel, while the remaining Syrian elements would proceed toward the western Israel-Lebanon border. [redacted]

Outlook

The Syrians will continue to maintain troops in Beirut in hopes of influencing the Lebanese presidential election next year. No major withdrawal of Syrian troops is likely in the near term. Between now and the election, Syria will try to achieve a national conciliation agreement between the various factions that is to Damascus's favor. [redacted]

In the immediate future, the most likely repositioning of Syrian troops, if any occurs, will be toward Sidon, Lebanon's third largest city, to shore up Amal in its struggle with the Palestinians. Damascus would move only reluctantly, probably after a significant deterioration in Amal's position such as occurred in Beirut in February. The Israelis, by their silence, have acquiesced to Syrian deployments in Lebanon, but Tel Aviv would be seriously concerned about a sizable Syrian troop movement southward. [redacted]

Syria would be wary of possible Israeli or US responses to a move against Christian elements in Lebanon. The Syrians probably would enter East Beirut only if fighting erupted between Christian forces loyal to Lebanese Forces leader Samir Ja'Ja and Phalange forces loyal to President Amine Gemayel. This situation could provide the Syrians an opportunity to extend their "Pax Syriana" into East Beirut. [redacted]

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The likelihood of the Syrians withdrawing troops from the Bekaa Valley is slim, even in the long run. The valley has become a critical part of Damascus's plan for protecting Syria from the Israelis. Only if a stable agreement were reached between Syria and Israel would Syrian troops withdraw. Even then the added pressure of not allowing any other power, that is, Iran, to gain a foothold in Lebanon would provide Syria with an additional motive for maintaining its hold on eastern Lebanon. With the growing strength of Hizballah and the presence of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps in Lebanon, the potential is strong for Iran to gain a level of influence that rivals Damascus. A strong, uncontrolled pro-Iranian presence in Lebanon would present a threat to Damascus. [redacted]

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Lebanon's Syrian-Supported Christian Renegades [redacted]

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The former leader of the Christian Lebanese Forces militia Ili Hubayqa continues to play a spoiler's role in Lebanese Christian politics by virtue of his enduring relationship with Syria and growing tensions within Lebanon's Christian community. An assassination attempt against Hubayqa last month illustrates continuing Christian opposition to his plans to establish a stronghold in northern Lebanon as a base for taking control of the Christian community.

Trained by the Israelis in the late 1970s, Ili Hubayqa became Lebanese Forces chairman in May 1985. He aroused fierce opposition within the Christian community and alienated his core supporters when he cooperated with Syria and signed the Tripartite Accord in December 1985. By January 1986, Hubayqa had been violently ousted from the Lebanese Forces and forced to flee to Damascus. Since that time Damascus has pressed him to plot a return to power.

Consummate Opportunist

Involved in Christian militia politics since he was 14, Hubayqa's allegiance has shifted drastically over the years. A principal adviser to Bashir Gemayel, Hubayqa, as chief of intelligence for the Lebanese Forces, was responsible for liaison with the Israelis.

[redacted] While chief of intelligence, press reports accused Hubayqa of leading the massacre in the Sabra and Shatila Palestinian refugee camps in September 1982. In March 1985, Hubayqa led a series of revolts against the leadership of the Lebanese Forces and senior Phalange politicians to gain independence for the militia from Lebanese President Amine Gemayel and the Phalange party. At the time, Hubayqa was angered by Phalange cooperation with Syria.

After his forced departure from East Beirut, Hubayqa took refuge in Syria. We believe Hubayqa and Damascus were behind car bombs targeting Lebanese

Forces' officials and President Gemayel in East Beirut, intended to force Christian acceptance of the Tripartite Accord. Cementing his ties to Damascus, Hubayqa, with Syrian assistance, launched an attack on East Beirut in late September 1986 to regain control of the Christian community. Unsuccessful, Hubayqa retreated to Damascus to regroup his followers.

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Northern Foothold

Since his ouster from East Beirut, Hubayqa's principal stronghold has been the Syrian-occupied city of Zahlah in the Bekaa Valley. Zahlah, the largest Christian town in eastern Lebanon, has long been a center of Lebanese Christian political activity.

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Hubayqa has about 300 armed fighters in Zahlah and could mobilize up to 800 in a showdown.

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In recent months, Hubayqa has begun an effort to reassert Christian Lebanese primacy in northern Lebanon, with Syrian backing.

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Hubayqa recently announced plans to open an office in Akkar, near the Syrian border. In addition, he plans to form a security committee in the northern cities of Andaqat and Qubayyat to deal with internal security matters, independent of Damascus.

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Syria appears to be backing this venture in an effort to extend its control in the region.

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[redacted] believe the primary motive behind the move of [redacted]

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intention to tighten control on the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction, another dissident Christian group with ties to Syria.

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the reason is to counter the presence of the Abu Nidal organization in the region. Regardless of the motivation, given Hubayqa's financial and logistic

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Ili Hubayqa (right) after the signing of the Tripartite Accord



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indebtedness to Damascus, his presence in North Lebanon could strengthen Syria's hold on the region and on Lebanon's Christians.



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Adverse Reaction

Hubayqa's renewed activity, although limited, brought quick and harsh reaction from his adversaries. Before a rumored intense recruiting drive in Akkar—a move that could hurt both the Lebanese Forces and the Lebanese Army—Hubayqa became the target of an assassination attempt. On 15 September, during a meeting in Hubayqa's stronghold of Zahlah, an explosion occurred, trapping Hubayqa under the rubble for several hours. Hubayqa was wounded, but not seriously, according to press and Embassy reports. The press reports at least 30 others were injured as a result of the explosion.

Haddad's apparent devotion to both Hubayqa and his archbishop makes his sole responsibility for the assassination attempt suspect. Although the Lebanese Forces have the most to gain from Hubayqa's death—the removal of a divisive force—other groups appear eager to thwart Hubayqa's potential political power and Syria's tightened grip in the north. The confessionally split Lebanese Army would be further weakened by the emergence of another strong Christian militia should Hubayqa regain popularity, as would President Gemayel's troubled Phalange Party.

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Samih Haddad, a Greek Orthodox priest and member of Hubayqa's forces, has been saddled with responsibility for the assassination attempt. Haddad, a former member of the Lebanese Forces, followed Hubayqa when he split with the militia.



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With Haddad's death, it is unlikely that a reliable link will be made to implicate any group.

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Haddad detonated the remote-controlled bomb shortly after verifying Hubayqa's attendance at the meeting with his archbishop. Haddad confessed to Syrian military intelligence and committed suicide after wresting a rifle from his guards.

Outlook

As the Christian community in Lebanon becomes increasingly divided between militant supporters of the Lebanese Forces and followers of President Gemayel, Hubayqa will probably continue to reassert

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his presence in Lebanon. Since the assassination attempt Hubayqa has remained uncharacteristically quiet, but it is unlikely that he will be daunted by the recent attempt on his life. [redacted]

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Hubayqa's ties to Syria remain strong despite reports that Damascus has been disappointed in his ability to quickly gain significant support and recruits. It is the Syrian link alone that maintains Hubayqa as a viable alternative among Lebanese Christians. Thus, Hubayqa's role probably will increase in the coming months as he supports Damascus' attempts to broker the formation of a multiconfessional front before Lebanon's presidential elections in 1988. [redacted]

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Lebanon: Sizing up the Militias

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As the central government's authority has declined, Lebanese politics has become a patchwork of local power struggles, particularly in Beirut. Because they play the dominant role in grassroots politics and can mobilize supporters along sectarian lines, militias have become the major factor in this complicated welter of actors. Over the last five years, West Beirut has become a patchwork of small areas loosely controlled by confessional or ideologically based militias and plain gangsters.

Militias are nothing new in Lebanon. The history of most Lebanese sects, particularly the Druze and the Maronites, is interwoven with episodes of a private military force supporting the religious community. The flight of minority communities to refuge in Lebanon was often accompanied by quasimilitary resistance from inhabitants already there. The militia system is characterized by several features—foreign patronage, economic self-sufficiency, and intense alliance politics.

We have devised a method for rating the militias. Our rating of Lebanon's militias allows readers to keep track of the groups and to assess the fluctuations in their fortunes. Because we have examined the major militias in terms of military, social, and political factors, this rating can help illustrate why some communities prosper under militia rule and others do not and why Lebanese politics grows increasingly violent.

Characteristics of Militia Politics

Lebanese militia politics involves a malevolent dialogue. Its trademarks are amorality and violence. Car bombings and political assassinations occur so often that they are regarded as commonplace. These acts are sometimes a crude, but effective, form of communication between militias in which unreasonable warlords are confronted with the limits of their power and induced to behave more circumspectly. In some cases, the car bombs and

killings are the attempts of underlings to seize power in their militias. In others, the goal is to eliminate recalcitrant opponents from other militias.

The hallmark of Lebanese militia politics is the interplay of weak groups that are forced to make alliances with domestic rivals and foreign powers to survive in an anarchic system. Its daunting complexity reveals that its leading characteristic is the absence of a central authority. Not even the government can impose consensus on the system, nor can two or three groups working together bring about a working national political order.

The continuing power struggle among Lebanon's militias has transformed Beirut—once a major commercial, intellectual, and tourist center of the Arab world—into a lawless militarized zone contested by confessional and ideological factions. Turf battles, terrorism, rampant street crime, and the lack of centralized authority make the area, especially the Muslim western sector, uniquely dangerous. Beirut's lawlessness has markedly curtailed the social and economic activities of government institutions and provided sanctuary for extremists of various affiliations.

Foreign Patrons

Virtually all militias have foreign patrons who supply them with weapons and attempt to use them to maintain political influence in Lebanon. On the basis of US Embassy reporting over a period of years, we judge that Syria supports the Shia Amal organization as well as the Druze and several small militias according to the dictates of Syrian policy. Iran backs Hizballah. Libya has provided financial backing to the Druze, some Nasirist groups, and the Lebanese Communist Party. The Saudis give money to Christians, Druze, and Sunni groups. Israel has had

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Militia Groups in Lebanon: A Lexicon for the Perplexed

LF—Lebanese Forces . . . Christian . . . aims to establish independent Christian political entity outside framework of 1943 National Charter . . . leadership repudiates political compromise with Muslims . . . may be best armed militia.

PSP—Progressive Socialist Party . . . Druze militia in Shuf area, but an amalgam of Druze and leftists in West Beirut . . . aims to guard independence of Druze, particularly in Shuf stronghold . . . famed for expedient, sometimes short-lived political alliances . . . may be best fighters in country.

PLO—Palestine Liberation Organization . . . umbrella term for mainly pro-Arafat Palestinians . . . covers diverse groups in refugee camps such as Democratic and Popular Fronts for the Liberation of Palestine as well as Abu Nidal's Revolutionary Council . . . Palestinians generally cooperate against attacks by hostile Lebanese militias . . . probably best disciplined group in Lebanon.

Amal—Afwaj al-Muqawamah al-Lubnaniyah Shia militia . . . established by revered, charismatic, and martyred cleric Imam Musa al-Sadr . . . pro-Syrian . . . popular among Lebanese Shias, but appeal slipping . . . leadership weakened by division between pro-Syrian and pro-Iranian wings.

Hizballah—Party of God . . . Shia militia . . . pro-Iranian . . . rose to prominence following Israeli invasion of Lebanon . . . seeks to establish Iranian-style Islamic republic in Lebanon . . . may be most pragmatic political actor on scene . . . effectively exploits ties to Palestinians and Iran . . . winning struggle with Amal for loyalty of Lebanese Shias.

Murabitun—Small Sunni militia . . . attempts to fill power vacuum created when PLO retreated in 1982 . . . periodically bashed by pro-Syrian groups . . . marginal influence militarily, but important as representative of Lebanese Sunnis.

contacts with both the Christian and Druze militias. The Christian Lebanese Forces militia does not hide its ties to the United States from other Lebanese actors. The Soviet Union has provided military aid to the Druze militia and the Lebanese Communist Party militia.

Plunder and Profit

Just below the surface of Lebanon's traditional economy lies another layer of services and trade that sustains the economy. Militias have established a civil arm that imposes taxes and provides public services. According to the US Embassy, all the major militias—for example, the Lebanese Forces, the PSP, Amal, and Hizballah—aggressively solicit funds from local and foreign sources. Increasing competition between rival militias for funds intensifies the factional struggle and further undermines the state's authority. According to our analysis, militia sources of revenue include:

- Fees from unofficial ports operated by the militias.
- Support from foreign patrons.
- Contributions from coreligionists at home and abroad.
- Fees collected at checkpoints throughout the country.
- Informal "taxes" imposed on local business.

Machiavellian Alliances

In Lebanon, the principle that the enemy of an enemy is a friend can bridge even the widest ideological differences. Still, militia alliances are often temporary and are limited by the militias' changing regional interests. There is abundant evidence that Hizballah has an important tactical alliance with PLO leader Arafat and his supporters in West Beirut. In South Lebanon the US Embassy in Beirut and the at least on one occasion fought the Palestinians near the town of Maghdushah. Elements of the Amal militia, which opposed the Palestinians in West Beirut and South Lebanon, participated in attacks with Hizballah and some Palestinians against Israeli forces and pro-Israeli militias, according to Embassy and press

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reports. The Christian Lebanese Forces militia aided the Palestinians return to Beirut, according to Embassy and press reports.

Where Is Square One?

Several important factors must be considered before rating the militias: quality of data, measurement schemes, objectivity of measurement criteria, and the validity of the exercise as an analytical tool:

- Because the militia situation is so fluid and much of our data concerning military factors is estimative in nature, this study rates the militias against each other rather than against an objective standard.
- We know of no standard—other than combat performance—by which militia fighting proficiency can be gauged, but the outcome of fighting against one militia is only a crude indicator of how a militia will perform against another. Our strategy is to rank Lebanon's militias as if they were baseball teams, averaging the evaluations of a panel of experts on the militia analogues of pitching, fielding, and hitting.
- The goal of the exercise is to produce a scorecard of militia actors that illustrates the major factors affecting the political and military strength of major Lebanese militias.

The Evaluation Process

We rated the militias on three clusters of issues: military, geographic, and political. The rating scheme used the integers from 1 to 9, with 9 representing the "best," "largest," or "richest" and 1 representing the "worst," "smallest," or "poorest." Additional criteria to be considered or instructions to the evaluators are included as necessary.

Military Factors

Manpower. Military Effectiveness. Rank each militia using three criteria—weaponry, training, and presence of advisers. The militia with the "best" weapons should be ranked 9; the one with the "worst,"

1. Use the same scheme for training and advisers. (The score for military effectiveness was determined by dividing the composite score by 3.)

Leadership Effectiveness. Cohesiveness and command and control. (Composite score divided by 2.)

Motivational Factors. Morale, pay, and degree of ideological indoctrination. (Composite score divided by 3.)

Social Factors

Geographic Factors. Concentration (geographic) and potential for self-sufficiency. The militia that has its forces dispersed over several noncontiguous areas would receive a 1—it is the most dispersed. The one that has its forces concentrated most in one area should get a 9. The militia's potential defensability from attack is a factor to be considered. The militia with the highest potential to defend an economically self-sufficient canton should be ranked 9. (Composite score divided by 2)

Financial Resources. Ability to generate funds from activities inside Lebanon or from supporters abroad (this is one subcategory) and to obtain financial support from foreign governments. The militia that can get the most money from foreign patrons should be ranked 9. The militia that has the best fund-raising from Lebanese sources (both domestic and expatriate) should be ranked 9. (Composite score divided by 2.)


Political Factors

Popular Support. Imagine every Lebanese could vote for his or her favored militia. The militia that would get the most votes should be ranked 9.

Foreign Support. Rank each militia in terms of the reliability of its foreign patron, the effectiveness of the patron's support, and the degree to which the interests of the militia converge with those of its patron. The

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LEBANON'S MAJOR MILITIAS



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militia with the most reliable foreign patron should be ranked 9. The militia with the most effective foreign supporter should be ranked 9. Since militia politics in Lebanon is fluid, gauging the durability of the militia-patron relationship is important. We believe that the most durable relationship will be one in which the militia and the patron have shared long-term political interests. The least durable one will be when the militia and the patron have divergent interests—a tactical alliance. Therefore, the militia with the best fit of interests with its patron should be ranked 9; the one with the worst fit 1. (Composite score divided by 3.)



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Iraq-Libya: Modest Improvement in Relations [redacted]

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Qadhafi's need to burnish his international and domestic image and Saddam Husayn's desire to isolate Iran have induced Libya and Iraq to improve their ties. Baghdad remains suspicious of Tripoli's intentions because Qadhafi still sides with Tehran in the Iran-Iraq conflict. Relations could deteriorate again if Libya sends Iran large amounts of weapons to help in its pursuit of the war. [redacted]



Masud Barzani [redacted]

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From Friendship to Enmity

After Qadhafi came to power in 1969, Iraq and Libya enjoyed a brief period of good relations based on their shared anti-Western views. In 1970, Iraq became the first state to recognize Qadhafi, but relations declined after Iraq and the USSR signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1972. Qadhafi recalled his ambassador temporarily from Baghdad on the grounds that Iraq had aligned itself too closely with a non-Muslim power. [redacted]

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Relations deteriorated further after Libya sided with Iran following the fall of the Shah. Since then, satellite imagery indicates that Tripoli has transferred to Iran Scud surface-to-surface missiles, T-55 tanks, 130-mm artillery, and AT-3 antitank missiles from its inventory of Soviet equipment. The Scuds have caused several hundred civilian casualties in Baghdad and contributed to a break in Libyan-Iraqi diplomatic ties in 1985. Libya also has provided heavy machineguns, mortars, SA-7 surface-to-air hand-held missiles, and financial assistance to Mas'ud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, leaders of the two largest Kurdish dissident groups in Iraq. [redacted]

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[redacted] Baghdad has also provided commando training to the Libyan National Struggle Front, an exile group that occasionally conducts terrorist attacks against Libyan diplomats and government offices outside Libya. According to the US Embassy, Baghdad sent Chad armored vehicles, heavy machineguns, RPG-7s, and SA-7 surface-to-air missiles in early 1987. [redacted]

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Recent Improvement in Ties

Since the beginning of the year, Libya and Iraq have taken a series of steps to smooth over their differences. Iraq shut down the Libyan dissident radio station and promised Libyan officials that it had stopped its aid to Chad, according to the US Embassy. Libya reduced its military aid to Iran and Iraqi dissidents and called for an end to the war without retention of captured territory by either side. These steps culminated in an agreement to restore diplomatic ties in September. [redacted]

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Iraq has retaliated against Libya by supporting Libyan exiles and the Chadian Government. Baghdad set up a Libyan exile radio station broadcasting from Iraq and was host in 1985 to the annual meeting of the National Front for the Salvation of Libya, the largest Libyan exile organization. [redacted]

Reasons for the Rapprochement

Qadhafi has several reasons to improve ties to Iraq. In addition to hoping that better relations will lead to an end to Iraqi support for Libyan dissidents and Chad,

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
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Jilal Talabani [redacted]



Muhammad Yusif Maqaryaf
Secretary General of the
National Front for the
Salvation of Libya [redacted]

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Al Watan Al Arabi

Qadhafi probably wants to reduce his international isolation and improve his badly tarnished image in the Arab world. Qadhafi may also be responding to Soviet entreaties to modify his hostility toward Iraq. Moscow has expressed concern to Libya in the past about the transfer of Soviet weaponry to Iran, particularly the Scud missiles. Finally, Libya almost certainly wants a diplomatic presence in Baghdad to monitor Libyan exiles and possibly to subvert Saddam's regime. [redacted]

Hizballah. Moreover, Libya probably will draw closer to Tehran if the Iranian-US confrontation continues over an extended period. Libya has already vigorously defended Iran's actions in the Gulf and has sent it mines [redacted]

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Iraq's opening toward Libya is part of its diplomatic campaign against Iran. In addition to seeking an end to Libyan military support for Tehran, Baghdad hopes that better relations with Libya will isolate Syria in the Arab world. Syria is now the only Arab country that fully supports Iran. [redacted]

Baghdad will remain sceptical about Qadhafi's intentions. Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz told US officials after the resumption of diplomatic ties was announced that Iraq believes that Libya's recent moderation is a ploy. Should Qadhafi resume sending large quantities of military equipment to Iran, Baghdad is likely to again support Libyan dissidents and increase its aid to Chad. [redacted]

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Outlook

Despite the recent rapprochement, relations between Libya and Iraq will remain tense and limited. Libya still values its ties to the region's most anti-Western country, Iran, and admires Tehran's willingness to confront the United States in the Persian Gulf and Israel in southern Lebanon through support for

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Technology in Pakistan: Glitches and Glitter

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Despite few resources allocated to research and development, Pakistan has attained sophisticated technology, at least in defense-related areas. Islamabad's longstanding priority to acquire and develop unsafeguarded nuclear technology has hindered other technological development. Civilian technology has languished from a combination of low education expenditures, high illiteracy rates, and bureaucratic impediments to imported technology. Pakistan probably will need to acquire equipment and training from Western nations in view of its inability to fully develop a technological base. Nevertheless, Pakistani leaders have never hidden their desire to acquire nuclear technology first and have only recently discussed a need for "appropriate" technologies.

award in physics in 1979. Pakistan is the first Third World nation to enrich uranium by the centrifuge process. Pakistan's nuclear power reactor provides little electricity. The purpose of Islamabad's nuclear program—producing nuclear weapons-grade uranium—is a major stumblingblock in the country's foreign relations, principally with India and the United States.

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Technology in Pakistan

Pakistan probably is the most technologically advanced country in the Middle East and South Asia, with the exception of Israel and India. Pakistan's rush to procure modern technology began in the 1960s when the acquisition of agricultural technology was a national priority, according to press reporting. The perceived threat from India's explosion of a nuclear device in 1974 and its superiority in military forces, however, moved Pakistani leaders to shift most of their resources from agriculture to nuclear development. Prime Minister Bhutto's statement that Pakistan would eat grass to build a nuclear bomb is indicative of the direction of technology since the early 1970s. Diversifying Pakistan's technological base to assist the country's development needs in the 1980s and 1990s is a major endeavor of Prime Minister Junejo's Five-Point Program.

The nuclear program, while technologically sophisticated, impedes the development of a broader technological base. We believe nuclear development in Pakistan absorbs large sums and large numbers of trained personnel that otherwise could have assisted the civilian sector. Pakistan has difficulty obtaining advanced Western computers and equipment that could advance civilian projects. The West has restricted exports of such equipment to countries like Pakistan that possess unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, including a uranium enrichment plant; refuse to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; or are suspected of having a nuclear weapons program. Therefore, Pakistan must develop the technology itself or obtain it covertly at a considerable increase in cost. Because of sanctions on Pakistan's nuclear program, its ability to procure equipment for nuclear-generated electricity has been hampered at a time when the country's economy suffers from periodic power outages.

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Priority Areas of Technological Development

Nuclear Program. Islamabad places top priority on nuclear research and development—it has become a matter of national pride and security. High pay, national prestige, and other incentives have attracted a concentration of scientists and technicians in this field. Pakistan's only Nobel Prize winner earned his

Space. After nuclear research, space development has the highest priority. Suparco (Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Committee) has made formidable progress in space science and technology. Suparco may launch its first communications satellite using its own rocket in 1988—nearly 25 years after launching its first rocket. Much of Suparco's work is defense related—it was previously run by the Ministry of Defense—and Suparco probably maintains close ties to the military. We believe

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Suparco's civilian space program is closely linked to Pakistan's efforts to develop ballistic missile technology. Suparco is in the process of setting up an Aerospace Institute at Karachi that will offer postgraduate degrees in space technology and space science. As is the case with nuclear technology, Pakistan has made strides in space as a result of an intensive, focused effort despite the small number of scientists available. [redacted]

Ballistic Missile Program. Suparco not only has the task of space exploration, it also runs Pakistan's only missile test range. Probably in conjunction with the Precision Engineering Complex, Suparco has undertaken a long-term program to develop a ballistic missile capable of carrying a nuclear weapon. The Precision Engineering Complex has built a facility to manufacture solid rocket motors, probably for use in a ballistic missile. We believe missile guidance technology will be the most difficult technology for Pakistan to obtain, hindering development of a ballistic delivery system for at least the next 10 years. [redacted]

Defense-Related Industry. Islamabad's third priority is the development of defense industries that typically have higher technology and better management expertise than civilian industries. [redacted] in a survey of manufacturing industries, those dedicated to defense production were more concerned with quality control than were those dedicated to civilian manufacturing, which concentrated on output. [redacted]

[redacted] one Pakistani engineering facility—primarily geared toward military production—has state-of-the-art printed circuit board manufacturing, automated plating, precision computer-controlled drilling machines, and equipment for advanced optics manufacture. [redacted]

Civilian Technology

Because Islamabad continues to place a high priority on defense-related technology, civilian sectors are characterized by a lack of advanced equipment, low quality control, and inadequately trained personnel. Foreign competition, high capital outlays, low profit margins, and technical inefficiency for the initial years of production have prevented many private

entrepreneurs from investing in Pakistan's civilian industrial sector. To soften the impact of the inordinate investment of national resources in the nuclear program, a few officials are beginning to encourage private investment in industry and public investment in education and training to promote technologies appropriate to civilian sectors. [redacted]

Computers. Computing is a vital part of any technological base, but Pakistan is notably short on computing power. Minister of Commerce and Planning Mehbub-ul Haq has called for the country to develop national computerization over the next 10 to 15 years. By 1995, Haq expects to train 2,000 information analysts, 20,000 systems analysts and programmers, and 100,000 data entry people, computer operators, and direct users. According to a professional journal, an acute shortage of experienced computer operators, programmers, and systems analysts exists because of the large number of these specialists who emigrate to the Middle East, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Until recently, the unavailability of computer systems and programs in the national language, Urdu, also hindered the growth of computer technology. [redacted]

Telecommunications. Pakistan is particularly advanced in television and radiobroadcasting, as well as telephonic and data communications. According to the World Bank, Islamabad recognizes the link between telecommunications and economic development and has planned in the Sixth Development Plan (FY 1984 to FY 1988¹) to expand these services 15 percent annually versus the historical average of 7 to 8 percent. The National Communications Satellite System, Paksat, recently called for the operation of two spacecraft—one in orbit and one spare—with a ground station in Karachi to replace the ground-based system for telephone, telex, and computer links. The ground station will provide alternative systems for air traffic control and radio networks. We believe Pakistan's first satellite

¹ The 1988 Pakistani fiscal year began on 1 July 1987 and will end on 30 June 1988. [redacted]

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will be launched sometime in 1988. The satellite would greatly enhance communications to remote areas and, in this manner, may be used to transmit government policy to typically antigovernment areas.

Agriculture. Significant strides in scientific research and agricultural education in the 1960s brought improved productivity and economic gains to Pakistanis. Agriculture is the mainstay of Pakistan's economy. Some 60 percent of Pakistanis earn their living from farming, accounting for 30 percent of the nation's gross national product. Pakistan has evolved from a net importer of food to a major exporter of rice and is nearly self-sufficient in wheat. Although wheat and rice output per hectare has more than doubled since the early 1970s, most of the recent increase in agricultural production has come from increased acreage. Average yields remain low by world standards, according to World Bank reports.

Research in plant pathology, genetics, and agronomy has produced many new, improved varieties of grains, according to press reporting. These technological innovations probably will improve agricultural production, but many of these improvements can only be used by farmers who have the financial means to implement the new technology.

Technology Transfer Via Foreign Investment

Pakistani officials have stated that the ultimate purpose of foreign investment is the transfer of new technologies to Pakistan as well as the development of industries to replace imported goods. In practice, the Pakistani bureaucracy places so much emphasis on developing industries to replace imports that it discourages foreign investment. Foreign investment in high-technology industries is hampered by excessive government control, cumbersome review procedures, unrealistic indigenization policies, and infrastructural shortages, according to US Embassy reporting. Investors—foreign or domestic—who want to set up a plant that uses significant quantities of imported goods are typically required to promise to “delete” the imported goods over time and to obtain them from local manufacturers. In the case of a joint Pakistani-Suzuki automobile plant in Karachi, the deletion policy requires that 80 percent of the components be manufactured locally within five years, according to press reports.

Pakistan's Memorandum of Understanding on Technology With the United States

A fully implemented Memorandum of Understanding with the United States would probably increase Pakistan's expectation of greater access to US technology. The Memorandum of Understanding would allow Pakistan to import commodities and technical data on the US Commodity Control and US Munitions lists, given government assurances that sensitive technology will not be transferred to hostile governments and that end user guarantees are submitted. Complications in implementing procedures for the import certificate and delivery verification have delayed high-technology transfer.

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Many of the goals of transferring technology to Pakistani industries via import substitution are not achieved. Local industries often import needed components because local manufacturers cannot supply components of the needed quality at competitive prices. The deletion program has largely failed because imported parts are often cheaper than those purchased locally. International suppliers can ship large quantities of components to accompany their goods, according to press reporting. Another problem associated with deletion programs is that local component manufacturers cannot quickly adapt production to match improvements or innovations in imported goods. Private industrialists are quick to blame foreign manufacturers for not readily transferring technology to local industries, according to press reports. One possible solution suggested by Pakistani businessmen is to standardize imports as well as local assembly procedures so that sufficient quantities would be produced locally, thus reducing the cost for each unit.

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Obstacles to Technological Advancement in Pakistan

Pakistan spends only a small amount of its GNP on research and development, hindering its ability to create a technology base. In the Sixth Development

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Pakistan's Ministry of Science and Technology

The Ministry of Science and Technology was established in the mid-1970s to adapt advanced technology to local needs and to develop technology. The Ministry also supervises administrative and research organizations, including the Pakistan Science Foundation, which supports research, primarily at universities, and establishes museums. The Ministry's budget increased more than sixfold from the Fifth Development Plan (FY 1979 to FY 1983) to the Sixth Development Plan (FY 1984 to FY 1988). Three strategies to promote nationwide development of technology have been developed:

- *The first calls for a three-tier technology transfer network—a National Center for Technology Transfer, provincial technical centers, and technology extension units in each administrative division. The National Center would provide advice on negotiating technology agreements and assign priorities to a list of imported technologies.*
- *The second encourages and sponsors programs to bring appropriate technology to small-scale manufacturers. Appropriate Technology and Research Development Corporations are to be established.*
- *The last is the creation of a "risk fund" for commercial development of Pakistani technologies. The fund would be allocated to support projects based on new inventions and innovative entrepreneurs with limited resources wishing to expand local technology.*

We believe the Ministry of Science and Technology will fall short of achieving its objectives. Because of the rapid change of technology, Pakistani firms involved in supplying parts for imported goods cannot keep up with improvements that are made overseas. The limited size of local markets and the variety of modern products—automobiles, tractors, televisions, and air conditioners—make local production of components uneconomical.

Plan, Pakistan budgeted a mere 0.5 percent of its GNP for research and development. On the basis of recent spending patterns, we believe the figure is closer to 0.2 percent annually. Other countries in the Middle East and South Asia typically spend about 0.3 to 0.4 percent of GNP on research and development, according to UNESCO statistics. Pakistan falls far behind the Third World average of 0.4 percent and even further behind India, which spends 1.2 percent of its GNP for this purpose.

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The lack of resources allocated to education has strained Pakistan's technological development and perpetuated Pakistan's literacy rate of only 25 percent, according to official statistics. Public expenditure on education has hovered around 2 percent of GNP annually for the past 20 years, according to press reporting, causing research and development innovation to languish. Although Pakistani universities specializing in science are the premier institutions in the country, most universities are geared to teaching. They cannot afford to have the low teacher-to-student ratio that is typical of Western schools with effective research and development programs, according to press reporting. Prime Minister Junejo has recognized the problems in education, staking much of his political future on his Five-Point Program, which calls for a literacy rate of 50 percent by the 1990 election and construction of an additional 10,000 primary and mosque schools, according to the US Embassy in Islamabad. Because of the lack of spending on education, we believe these goals will not be met.

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Outlook

Several major constraints will probably prevent widespread development of technology in Pakistan. Expenditures on research and development as well as education—areas crucial to developing a technology base—probably will fall short of the goals of the Sixth Development Plan. On the other hand, a technology embargo prompted by Pakistan's nuclear program will severely limit its ability to import sophisticated Western technology. Islamabad's weak foreign exchange position also hinders its ability to import

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high technology. Limited domestic markets for modern consumer items prevent efficient local production of these goods. Pakistan's deteriorating communications networks and unreliable power supplies will minimize some of the advantages of any new technology Pakistan does acquire. Lastly, the absence of software skills will limit the adaptability of new programs to needs peculiar to Pakistan. [redacted]

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Islamabad will continue to make progress in its high-priority areas—nuclear weapons development and short-range rockets. These efforts probably command large chunks of the resources at Islamabad's disposal. Rocket capabilities probably will be greatly expanded in the 1990s, with a Pakistani-produced satellite and rocket and possibly a fully operational ballistic missile. Civilian technology will limp along, mainly to support defense-related projects. Countrywide communications and computerization probably will not make many breakthroughs in the next decade as infrastructural deficiencies will limit their development. [redacted]

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South Asia-Japan: Growing Economic Relations [redacted]

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South Asian countries are increasingly looking to Japan for financial and technical resources to assist in their economic development.¹ They want Japan to provide more concessionary economic assistance, direct investment, and tariff relief for their exports. During a five-day visit to the subcontinent in August, Japanese Foreign Minister Kuranari affirmed Japan's intent to promote political dialogue and increase economic cooperation with the region. The countries of South Asia will remain wary of new promises without more action on Tokyo's part. Many South Asians believe that Japan is still primarily interested in quick sales of manufactured goods and will continue to require lengthy negotiations before buying more South Asian goods or concluding major aid agreements. [redacted]

Regional Issues

Relations between South Asia and Japan before the late 1970s focused on bilateral trade that was nearly balanced. Japan purchased mostly raw materials and agricultural and marine products and sold manufactured goods. By the early 1980s the South Asian trade balance with Japan moved into a serious deficit, reaching \$2 billion in 1986. The value of Japanese imports of raw materials has grown only slowly, while the value of Japanese exports of manufactured items, particularly capital goods, has grown rapidly. Japan, subsequently, has become the largest commercial exporter to South Asia and the second largest trading partner, slightly behind the United States. [redacted]

Some of the growing trade imbalance has been offset by increasing Japanese aid to the region. By 1986, Japanese official development disbursements exceeded \$800 million. Except for Pakistan, Japan is the largest Western bilateral donor in each of the countries. Only a small portion of the Japanese aid is explicitly tied to imports from Japan. Most purchases

financed by the aid, nonetheless, generally are made in Japan because of other conditions. One frequent requirement is that the aid is untied only if the purchases are made from another less developed country. Most of the equipment that fills requirements for Japanese aid projects, however, is not available from less developed countries. [redacted]

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South Asian countries are eager to acquire a large share of any additional foreign aid that might be offered, especially since Japanese aid payments generally are not tied to political and economic reforms.² Tokyo appears unsure of how to respond to all the aid requests from the area. According to the US Embassy in Tokyo, Japan would like to coordinate its aid activities through the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) if the organization develops a serious role in the region. Japan appears to be encouraging the countries in the region to delegate additional powers to the organization. During his trip to the subcontinent, Foreign Minister Kuranari announced that Tokyo would convene a Japan-SAARC symposium sometime before next April. [redacted]

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A major expansion of economic relations between Japan and the South Asian countries faces important obstacles. South Asians remain wary of becoming a dumping ground for Japanese manufactured goods. Tokyo, on the other hand, has found it difficult dealing with South Asian bureaucracies on issues such as trade laws and aid projects. Aid appropriations have sometimes gone unused because of delays and inefficiencies in the programs designed to receive the assistance, and the South Asian countries sometimes have problems coming up with

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[redacted] Tokyo has no plans to significantly change the geographical proportions of its aid allotments, but the absolute amount going to South Asia is likely to grow as available Japanese aid disbursements increase. [redacted]

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

¹ The South Asian countries covered in this article include Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. [redacted]

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
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the large-scale projects Tokyo requires for most loans. We believe it will be several years, if ever, before SAARC can play the regional role the Association of Southeast Asian Nations plays in coordinating economic relations with Japan. [redacted]

India

Prime Minister Gandhi has personally encouraged greater Japanese participation in his drive to modernize India's economy. He has sought Indian access to Japanese high technology, greater direct Japanese investments, and exposure to Japanese entrepreneurial expertise. Gandhi would like the Japanese to compete more actively with the United States and Western Europe in selling high-technology items to India. [redacted] New Delhi will look more to Tokyo over the coming years as a neutral and reliable high-technology supplier. [redacted]

Foreign diplomats in New Delhi predict that Japan will become India's largest trading partner in a few years. The value of trade between the two countries grew by more than 20 percent in 1986 to almost \$3.4 billion. Last year Japan passed the Soviet Union as India's second largest commercial trading partner after the United States. In volume terms, Japanese exports to India in 1986 increased by 100 percent from the level of 1980, and imports from India were up by almost 75 percent. [redacted]

Direct Japanese investment and industrial collaboration also show signs of growth. Indo-Japanese joint ventures have increased from 34 in 1980 with \$1.4 million in Japanese investment to 108 in 1986 with \$12.6 million in investment. Although Japanese investment in India remains small—less than \$100 million over the last 30 years—Japan has become the second largest foreign investor in India after the United States. Japanese direct investment has been oriented toward the Indian domestic market, especially the automobile industry. India has been pushing for more Japanese investment in export-oriented industries and joint ventures that would help India sell goods to third countries. [redacted]

We believe Tokyo's increased bilateral assistance will facilitate even greater trade and investment. Japan has become India's largest Western bilateral aid

donor and provided almost \$230 million in loans, grants, and technical assistance in fiscal year 1986-87.³ During his visit to India, Kuranari pledged a loan of \$470 million for the fiscal year that ends in March 1988 to finance nine industrial projects, including construction of a fertilizer factory, a telecommunications facility, and an electric power plant. Tokyo also offered a \$200 million long-term, low-interest loan to purchase edible oils as a drought relief measure during Gandhi's stopover on his way to the Commonwealth Conference in Vancouver. [redacted]

Opening the economy to more Japanese high technology is a mixed blessing for New Delhi. India's trade balance with Japan has gone from a \$100 million trade surplus as recently as 1980 to an \$800 million deficit in 1986 as a result of the surge in the volume and cost of imports. New Delhi's imports from Japan, including major purchases of capital goods for industrial modernization, have more than doubled in value since 1980. Another major component is consumer goods, including parts used in assembling automobiles in India and consumer electronics equipment. Indian exports to Japan, which are primarily raw materials (iron ore) and food (marine products), have grown by less than 30 percent in value. [redacted]

We believe several areas of tension persist between the two countries that are likely to hamper growth in economic relations. Tokyo has shown little interest in opening its markets to a wider variety of Indian goods despite frequent requests from New Delhi. Japanese businesses continue to drag their feet on the indigenization of the supply line for Indo-Japanese joint ventures, thus worsening India's foreign payments. New Delhi continues to stew over Japanese conditions that require lengthy negotiations for sales and aid agreements, leaving some doubt that all the aid promised this year will be disbursed. [redacted]

³ Japan might be India's largest overall bilateral aid donor. Moscow has offered India about \$3.4 billion in economic assistance since 1985, but some of the funding is scheduled for long-term projects that have not been started. We have no reliable information on the actual level of disbursements. [redacted]

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Pakistan

Commercial and international pressures underscore Japan's interest in Pakistan's economic development. Pakistan offers a large consumer market, low wages, and a relatively advanced industrial base, as compared with many less developed countries. Partly in response to the US designation of Pakistan as a strategically important aid recipient, Japan provides generous economic assistance and technical cooperation. It is a leader in food donations for Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Japan will raise its profile in Pakistan this fall when it holds a "Japan Week" in Islamabad, Lahore, and Karachi. [redacted]

Japan's assistance package in Pakistan not only fulfills some of Pakistan's development needs but benefits the commercial interests of Japanese manufacturers and engineering firms. In many cases bids by Japanese firms on major projects have been backed by government aid credits of 30 to 40 years, with interest rates of less than 3 percent. Tokyo concentrates on commercial sectors that other major donors ignore, according to US Embassy reporting. The Japanese have been active in telecommunications, energy, transportation, industrial machinery, agriculture, water resources, health, and education. Islamabad's satellite earth station was financed almost entirely by Japanese aid, according to US Embassy reporting. [redacted]

We believe that Islamabad hopes Japan will become an even larger aid donor in the future, in part because Tokyo does not tie its funding to internal policy reforms, according to US Embassy reporting. The most recent Japanese aid agreement—signed in July of this year—totals \$230 million in long-term, low-interest, and untied loans covering four projects and one commodity loan. [redacted]

Bilateral trade and foreign investment have increased steadily over the past 10 years. Japan now accounts for 13 percent of Pakistan's trade, passing the US 11-percent share. Japanese companies are expanding manufacturing plants in Pakistan, Suzuki recently announced that it intends to build a new plant near Karachi, doubling its production of cars and pickup trucks. Two truck companies—Hino and Nissan—plan on building manufacturing plants. [redacted]

Pakistan's mounting trade deficit with Japan and Islamabad's delays in submitting aid requests could adversely affect the pace of improved economic ties. Last year Pakistan had a \$530 million trade deficit with Japan, the largest deficit of any trading partner. As Islamabad and Tokyo negotiate new trade protocols, Pakistani officials will be aware of the domestic backlash to such a large deficit and will emphasize the need to link Japanese exports to Pakistani exports. Pakistan is likely to miss out on some of the aid requested because of its inability to define economically sound projects and Tokyo's inability to process all project proposals. [redacted]

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Bangladesh

Japanese assistance of \$250 million in 1986 was the largest among bilateral donors and one of the few programs in Bangladesh that do not emphasize economic and political reforms. Most of the project plans are generated by Japanese trading companies in Dhaka that collaborate with the Bangladeshi Government to draft proposals. The passive role that Japan plays in policy discussions is viewed by other Western donors as undermining their efforts to encourage political and economic reforms. [redacted]

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According to the US Embassy in Dhaka, grants—which account for nearly one-third of Japan's aid program—are tied to purchases of Japanese equipment and raw materials, raising the procurement costs of development projects by 15 to 20 percent. Moreover, most of the projects focus on capital-intensive sectors that serve Japan's commercial interests and generate spare parts orders for its equipment. The US Embassy in Dhaka projects Japanese assistance to double by the end of the decade and the composition of aid-funded activities to continue to benefit Japanese companies. [redacted]

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The Bangladeshi Government presented several proposals to expand economic cooperation to the Japanese Foreign Minister during his trip to Bangladesh in August, according to Embassy reporting. These proposals include the establishment of a Bangladesh-Japan joint economic commission

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and expansion of joint and private ventures in Bangladesh. As a gesture of good faith, Japan donated 100,000 metric tons of rice and wheat to alleviate the problems associated with the devastating floods last month. Japan was the first contributor to the relief and rehabilitation effort. [redacted]

The trade imbalance remains a major area of contention between Dhaka and Tokyo. Bangladesh's exports to Japan have failed to exceed \$100 million, and imports from Japan now exceed \$400 million. Bangladesh has urged Japan to lower tariffs on jute products and expand imports of garments. Dhaka has been unable to maintain sufficiently high-quality control to compete with garment imports from Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, according to US Embassy reporting. [redacted]

Sri Lanka

Japan emerged as Colombo's largest bilateral foreign assistance donor in 1986, with disbursements amounting to \$127 million. Loans make up slightly more than 45 percent of Japan's assistance, and grants and technical assistance account for the remainder. Japan recently pledged additional financial assistance this year for reconstruction in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. [redacted]

Over half of Tokyo's assistance is used to finance development programs. Most of these funds are used to construct large, highly visible projects, such as hospitals, telecommunications and transportation networks, and improvement of port and power generating facilities. Unlike multilateral lending organizations and most Western bilateral donors, Japan does not tie its assistance to the government's economic philosophy, such as increased privatization schemes. [redacted]

Japan is Sri Lanka's second largest trading partner, closely trailing the United States. Tokyo accounts for about 20 percent of Colombo's imports, which include consumer goods, such as calculators, electronics, and manufacturing inputs. In contrast, 4 percent of Sri Lanka's exports are destined for Japan. [redacted]

Outlook and Implications for the United States

We believe Japan will continue to make major economic inroads in South Asia. The prospect of a large new market opening as a result of liberalization efforts undertaken by countries in the region has prompted a major influx of Japanese seeking new business ventures and markets for exports. Growing aid disbursements, even though not directly tied to sales of Japanese products, will facilitate Tokyo's activities, possibly at the expense of the United States. Japanese businessmen, however, will not relinquish their autonomy in favor of an equitable partnership with a foreign partner. Many of their business ventures will serve primarily as markets for Japanese exports. [redacted]

We expect Japanese companies to remain aggressive in sales of high-technology items, particularly to India. The one exception is likely to be supercomputers. Japanese companies probably will wait until the first US supercomputer is delivered before launching their marketing efforts. Recent reports that Japanese high technology has reached the Soviet Union through India may lead to licensing delays for some of this equipment in the future. [redacted]

South Asian countries are wary of Japanese business and trade practices but will seek a closer economic relationship with Japan. They will continue to accept reluctantly a large trade deficit with Japan because much of it can be balanced by inflows of capital from Tokyo. Japan is also a politically acceptable supplier of economic assistance and high-technology equipment. Some Indians express concern that their country has become too dependent on the United States for high-technology equipment. [redacted]

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**India-United States:
Antinarcotics
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Prime Minister Gandhi has become more receptive to US suggestions for increased cooperation on narcotics and has identified two areas in which he would welcome bilateral efforts—drug interdiction and treatment of drug abuse. New Delhi is increasingly concerned that India is rapidly becoming a major conduit for Asian heroin, a development that is feeding India's fast-growing domestic appetite for heroin. New Delhi is seeking US technical training to improve India's drug interdiction efforts and support for appropriate drug abuse prevention and treatment programs. Technological enhancement of India's existing port of entry security programs, training in drug treatment techniques for public health care providers, and drug education materials are likely to be especially welcome. The Indian Government, however, will probably continue to be reluctant to involve US private or governmental agencies in Indian domestic programs. [redacted]

New Delhi recognizes that some domestically produced opium is entering the domestic black market but doubts that large quantities of Indian opium are flowing into the international drug trade. India is the world's largest legal producer of opium—some 600 metric tons annually. About 200 metric tons of this production is sold to US pharmaceutical companies. We believe Indian domestic production is a significantly expanding source of illicit opiates. Licensed poppy farmers obtain yields two to three times the government-imposed maximum of 32 kilograms per hectare and sell the excess to traffickers, [redacted]

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In addition, illicit poppy cultivation—from licensed farmers increasing their fields after government inspection or unlicensed farmers cultivating poppy outside legal areas—feeds the black market. Using this opium and readily available domestic precursor chemicals, Indian traffickers are refining heroin to sell on the local market and, in a few cases, to the international trade. The improving quality of the Indian product will soon make it competitive with other Asian heroin in international markets. [redacted]

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India—Conduit for International Drug Trafficking

Because of its long, porous borders, its location between the world's two largest heroin-producing regions, and its relatively sophisticated communication and transportation networks, India is becoming a major conduit for Southwest and Southeast Asian heroin. Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, drug traffickers have altered their routes to move increasing amounts of heroin through Pakistan and India. Although reliable data do not exist, we judge that half the approximately 12 tons of Southwest Asian heroin that reaches the West each year transits India. In 1986 the Indian Government seized 2,500 kilograms of heroin—almost all captured near the Pakistani border—including the world's largest single heroin seizure of 604 kilograms. Furthermore, the India route appears increasingly attractive to Southeast Asian heroin traffickers seeking to avoid greater enforcement efforts and rising competition along traditional routes through Thailand and Burma. [redacted]

Moving Slowly With Pakistan

New Delhi and Islamabad have responded to long-term encouragement from Washington to cooperate in combating illicit drug flows and have explored ways to reduce cross-border drug trafficking. Since early 1986, New Delhi and Islamabad have publicized antinarcotics programs as a key area for increased bilateral cooperation, and several exploratory sessions have been held. Senior Indian and Pakistani officials have agreed that cooperation between antinarcotics officials and border security forces are the necessary first steps toward increased border interdiction. Both governments have also encouraged the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation to make regional antidrug cooperation a priority issue. [redacted]

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Mutual suspicion and a reluctance to share sensitive information limit effective antinarcotics cooperation between India and Pakistan. Gandhi faces strong domestic pressure from powerful anti-Pakistani elements in his administration who seek to prevent accommodation with Islamabad on issues affecting Indian national security. [redacted]

A Growing US Role?

The rise in drug trafficking through India has led to an explosion of domestic heroin addiction since 1980. We estimate India has some 500,000 heroin addicts primarily in New Delhi and Bombay, and drug abuse is spreading to smaller cities and towns. New Delhi has attempted to step up narcotics control, passing a comprehensive national drug bill in 1985 that mandated tougher sentences for convicted drug pushers and created an antinarcotics squad to improve drug interdiction efforts. [redacted]

Although New Delhi has sought to increase Indian antinarcotics effectiveness, the central government cannot—or, in several instances, will not—institute the far-reaching bureaucratic changes necessary to significantly reduce drug activity in the country. Indian drug enforcement is largely in the hands of state police, security, customs, and finance officials who are unresponsive to central government direction and have limited access to foreign assistance. The much publicized national Narcotics Control Board established over a year ago has yet to demonstrate its institutional independence or its ability to spearhead antinarcotics efforts in key drug-trafficking regions, such as the northeast and Tamil Nadu. [redacted]

Moreover, New Delhi's drug reform efforts are opposed by powerful participants in the Indian drug trade. Low- and middle-level government officials routinely receive large payoffs from drug producers and traffickers and have little incentive to reduce the traffic, [redacted]


Many drug traffickers use legitimate Indian business concerns to cover their activities, effectively concealing drug profits and connections within legal international business transactions. Sikhs and Sri Lankan Tamil insurgents are active in smuggling—including drugs—in key areas and resist New Delhi's efforts to disrupt their access to this source of funds. [redacted]

Corruption—A Permanent Stumblingblock

Corruption involving payoffs and kickbacks for government services—expediting state paperwork, securing licenses, guaranteeing favors—is endemic in Indian society. Drug production and trafficking are an additional source of high financial return for relatively little risk for some politicians and officials.

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Outlook

New Delhi probably welcomes increased US support in developing drug treatment programs that do not involve US officials or private agencies working directly in India. India probably seeks increased access to US expertise in developing television and film spots or other educational materials to improve public awareness of the risks of drug use similar to the US-sponsored programs used in Pakistan, Burma, and Thailand. New Delhi may also be interested in training in detoxification techniques appropriate for Indian health care systems. [redacted]

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We believe Gandhi's administration will face bureaucratic opposition and official footdragging when it tries to introduce improved domestic antidrug programs. Corrupt government officials will obstruct New Delhi's efforts and denounce US involvement in

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the effort. Gandhi's administration is still reeling from corruption scandals that rocked the ruling Congress Party during early and mid-1987. In our judgment, Gandhi will not take on an issue as contentious as the role of corrupt administrators in drug trafficking, given the greater potential for embarrassment than political reward. [redacted]

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In our judgment, New Delhi's and Islamabad's suspicions and conflicting national interests in areas unrelated to the antidrug effort will continue to obstruct effective antinarcotics cooperation. Neither country appears willing to share the sensitive intelligence regarding troop placements, border security tactics, and the involvement of high-level officials in drug trafficking that is crucial to the long-term success of bilateral drug interdiction efforts. Islamabad and New Delhi probably will be content to seek maximum public relations value from only minimal compliance with any bilateral drug interdiction agreements for the foreseeable future to appease international pressure for movement on these issues. [redacted]

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India: Increase in Sikh Militancy

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The Indian Government appears to be losing ground in its campaign against Sikh extremists in Punjab, despite almost six months of direct administration, or President's Rule, from New Delhi. Violence in the state instigated by the militants is up sharply from 1986. The militants are taking advantage of the vacuum created by the resignation of several moderate political and religious leaders to consolidate their hold on key religious positions. In our judgment, the militants lack widespread credibility among the Sikh population, but they are strong enough to undermine the influence of moderates who had mediated for New Delhi. The growing influence of the militants underscores the ineffectiveness of New Delhi's Punjab policy and its need to reevaluate its approach to Sikh grievances.

The Rise in Violence

New Delhi took over the state administration in Punjab last May ostensibly to curb terrorism, but most statistics cited by the press show an increase in Sikh extremist violence. According to press accounts, terrorist-related deaths in 1987 already number at least 200 more than the approximately 650 in 1986,¹ and reports of six to 10 dead per day are routine. Press and Embassy reporting suggests part of the problem in Punjab is New Delhi's ineffective use of the large number of military, paramilitary, and police forces in the state to contain the extremists. The security forces continue to rely on curfews, searches of alleged militant hideouts in residential areas of the Golden Temple, roadblocks, and heavy patrolling of Punjab's border with Pakistan to root out the extremists. These efforts have had little effect on the militants' ability to plan more numerous and lethal operations against Hindus and moderate Sikhs.

New Delhi claims to be making progress in combating the militants despite the apparent rise in violence. Julio Ribeiro, chief of the Punjab police force, says his

security forces during the past year have jailed or killed over half the state's extremist Sikh leaders, which he numbers at about 45. Some press accounts discount Ribeiro's claims, but the recent arrest of a prominent leader and the killing of another suggest the police are getting good intelligence on militant membership, tactics, and operations from captured militants. Police in New Delhi gained front page headlines in early September with their arrest of one of the most notorious Sikh militants, Harjinder "Jinda" Singh, who was wanted for bank robberies and the assassination of a prominent Indian Army general. Indian police scored another victory by killing Gurdev Singh Usmanwalla, one of several militants who last April issued a controversial and highly publicized call for Punjab's secession from India.

The Alienation of Sikh Moderates

The imposition last May of President's Rule, which involves suspension of the state legislature and administration of the state by the central government, has undermined New Delhi's and the moderates' credibility in the state. Several moderate political leaders in Punjab, including Chief Minister Barnala, lost their positions as a result of President's Rule. During the past several years New Delhi looked to these leaders to serve as intermediaries with the militants.

New Delhi's ineffective political and security measures have discouraged moderate religious leaders in Punjab from retaining key religious and political posts. For example, Darshan Singh Ragi, Punjab's head high priest and the main spokesman for the moderates, resigned in September. He announced he was frustrated with trying to bridge the gap between militants and moderates and was leaving to "pave the way for militants to run the affairs of the Sikhs." Ragi's retreat was, in our view, as big a loss for New

¹ Some of the killings classified by the police as terrorist-related probably are criminal acts or the settling of old scores. Punjab historically has had a high incidence of violent crime.

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Delhi as it was a gain for the militants because he was the most prominent Sikh leader with credibility among militants and government officials.

New Delhi's failure to address Sikh grievances is discouraging moderate Sikhs throughout India. According to US Embassy reports, most moderates reject the call for an independent Sikh state—Khalistan—but they argue the government ignores their legitimate grievances—such as demands for control over the state capital, Chandigarh, which Punjab shares with neighboring Haryana State. Moderate Sikhs believe the government and Hindus indiscriminately lump all Sikhs together and blame the whole community for the actions of a relatively few militants. According to the US Consulate in Calcutta, some Sikhs outside Punjab are concerned that harassment by security services is rising. Other Sikhs claim that roadblocks set by security forces discriminate against Sikhs and that some Hindus avoid Sikh business and will not serve Sikh customers, according to the US Embassy in New Delhi.

Sikhs and Indian Government officials trade accusations over which side has failed to address Sikh demands. The Sikhs believe New Delhi reneged in implementing the Punjab accord and regard it as defunct. Indian officials counter with claims that Sikh leaders have obstructed efforts to find a solution for Sikh demands. They say, for example, that state government officials in Punjab never decided on the territory they would offer Haryana in exchange for control of Chandigarh. That indecision led in part to the failure of the Punjab accord, which hinged on the Chandigarh transfer. Central government officials administering Punjab are trying to placate the frustrated Sikh mainstream by offering job training programs for unemployed Sikh youth, according to press reports. Unemployment is rising in the state because of the worsening business climate and agricultural setbacks Punjabi farmers suffered as a result of India's failed monsoon this season. About one-third of Sikhs are landowning farmers of the Jat caste, which is also the most important political group in Punjab.

Militants Supplanting Moderates

Militant Sikhs are capitalizing on the unstable security situation and trying to gain legitimacy and support in Punjab by taking over leadership posts

from moderates. Priests affiliated with the militants are assuming control over these posts by issuing Sikh policy pronouncements traditionally under the purview of legitimate religious organizations. Militant priests sitting on a key religious policy making council are working to install a militant as the Sikhs' head high priest—the post vacated by Ragi. They are also trying to dominate this year's election for the Sikhs' temple management committee, which serves as a Sikh religious parliament.

The security crackdown is prompting Sikh youths to join the militant ranks, according to Embassy reporting. Many Punjabi Sikhs believe security forces in the state routinely murder innocent youths in staged "encounters" with alleged Sikh militants. Some Sikhs estimate that five youths join the militants for each encounter" death, which they number at about 200 this year. Older Sikhs say the government's intransigence toward Sikh grievances spurs deeply embedded desires for revenge among younger Sikhs.

The militants have not consolidated their hold on power, in part because their leadership is fragmented. In early September, for example, four key high priests announced the unification of 16 militant groups in a Sikh "war of liberation." The following day, the temple management committee disavowed the high priests' remarks. At least two major militant factions later backed the temple management committee. Moreover, the militants do not have the support of most Sikhs. US Embassy officials say the moderates fear expressing opposition to militant tactics and goals because of militant intimidation.

Outlook

The Indian Government does not plan in the near term to end President's Rule by reinstating the state's legislative assembly. New Delhi probably calculates that the restoration of the assembly now—when security conditions in Punjab are deteriorating—would highlight its inability to curb terrorism in the state. Moreover, Indian officials refuse to acquiesce to militant demands and probably will delay further talks until new moderate leaders emerge.

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Indian officials will be hard pressed to enlist the support of moderate Sikhs against the militants without offering concessions on some Sikh grievances, such as the release of some Sikh detainees. Indian officials probably will have an even harder time hammering out an agreement than they did fashioning the Punjab accord in 1985. The new negotiations will have to overcome the legacy of the failed accord and the loss of the Congress Party government in the Haryana State election last spring. Haryana's cooperation will be crucial for New Delhi to answer some Sikh grievances, such as water sharing.

Gandhi will face increasing domestic criticism of his handling of the Sikhs as President's Rule proves ineffective. State political and security officials are running out of excuses for why Sikh violence is increasing six months after New Delhi took over the state administration. Criticism of Gandhi probably will crystallize when Parliament convenes in early November to debate, and probably pass, a six-month renewal of President's Rule. New Delhi probably will look to new tactics in the next few months to stem the

rising tide of killings and keep government critics at bay. Indian officials may revive talk of a political settlement to try to highlight conciliatory tactics and prevent militants from further undermining the moderates.

For their part, the militants will try to use their new religious positions to legitimize their goals and tactics. Militant domination of these posts, coupled with intimidation by younger extremists, will help the hardcore religious leaders ensure that the moderates resist either open rapprochement with New Delhi or efforts to rally moderate opinion against militant plans. The extremists probably also judge that they can press their case for greater autonomy by using violence to press Hindus to move out of Punjab.



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Afghanistan: Insurgent Peace Terms

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Recent public statements by Hizbi Islami faction leader Gulbuddin and a conference of insurgent commanders in Ghowr Province suggest the insurgents' military successes in 1987 have not made them more tractable in seeking a political settlement to the war. Gulbuddin and the commanders offered Moscow terms ruling out a post-Soviet role for the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and providing for a Soviet departure from Afghanistan that could mirror the US departure from South Vietnam in 1975. In our view, the insurgents' military successes this year have set back the limited inclination they had to discuss a political solution that would allow the Soviets to save face.

Gulbuddin's Draconian Peace

In late August, Hizbi Islami faction leader Gulbuddin told a press conference in Rawalpindi that the resistance would continue to insist on a short, logistically based timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. He said that an interim government acceptable to the insurgents must replace the PDPA regime. Gulbuddin argued that the guerrillas military successes in 1987 had placed Soviet and Afghan regime forces on the defensive and outlined a four-stage peace plan that he said was being studied by the seven-party resistance alliance:

- Soviet authorities would withdraw their forces from the current war zones and concentrate them at the Bagram, Shindand, Dehdadi, Dashti Abddan, and Kolagia airfields. The USSR's departure from Afghanistan would be conducted from those bases.
- The PDPA regime would be replaced by an interim government acceptable to the resistance. There is no role in this government for former King Zahir Shah.
- The interim government would disband all regime army units created since 1978 and assign the remaining forces to their prewar garrisons. The Soviet withdrawal would be supervised by the purged Afghan army under the command of officers

who had defected from Kabul to the resistance after the PDPA coup in 1978. All of the interim government's officer appointments would have to be approved by the insurgents.

- After the Soviet withdrawal is complete, the interim regime would be replaced by a temporary resistance-led government that would conduct an election for a representative assembly. The assembly would then choose a national leader and shape Afghanistan's future political system.

Gulbuddin's peace plan is notable for its specificity and its almost complete lack of flexibility. The plan offers the Soviets nothing that would allow them to conduct a face-saving withdrawal. It also guarantees the elimination of the PDPA. We believe, Gulbuddin's peace plan provides no basis for negotiations with Kabul and Moscow but accurately reflects the greater political and diplomatic intractability instilled in the fundamentalist party leaders—probably including Jamiat-i-Islami leader Rabbani—and the field commanders by the improving military performance of the resistance.

The Commanders' Conference: Hardline Attitudes Dominate

Jamiat-i-Islami commander Ismail Khan held a conference in late June and early July of several hundred insurgent commanders of all parties in Ghowr Province. A similar but smaller conference was held in April in Quetta. According to reporting of varying reliability, up to 500 commanders representing insurgent groups from Ghowr, Herat, Badghis, Faryab, Farah, Helmand, Qandahar, Oruzgan, Wardak, Lowgar, and Kabul Provinces attended the meeting. Ismail Khan apparently organized the gathering to promote insurgent unity and cooperation in western Afghanistan. Although Jamiat-i-Islami officials in Peshawar claim that the

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meeting was conducted under the party's auspices, US officials report that Ismail Khan deliberately minimized the party's role during the meeting as a means of promoting harmony among the attendees.

Ismail Khan dominated the proceedings and played a significant role in drafting the final communique, which—like Gulbuddin's peace plan—gave no indication of flexibility regarding the manner in which the resistance would “require” the Soviets to withdraw. The most important points of the communique are:

- Only those Afghans who have fought against the PDPA regime will be allowed to participate in shaping the country's political future.
- The commanders' rejection of all peace proposals made by Kabul since last January is reaffirmed.
- The Soviets must withdraw unconditionally and pay a war indemnity to avoid being attacked during the withdrawal.
- A “Supreme Revolutionary Council” of commanders would be formed in early 1988 to formulate and coordinate the military and political activities of the resistance inside Afghanistan.

In our view, the outcome of the Ghowr conference displayed what Jamiat leader Rabbani has described as the increasing self-confidence and assertiveness among commanders as a consequence of their growing military prowess. The commanders ruled out a face-saving Soviet withdrawal, an interim role for Zahir Shah, and the survival of the PDPA—all of which the moderate resistance party leaders, the Pakistanis, and most Western observers believe are essential to achieve a Soviet withdrawal. The commanders' attitudes toward a negotiated peace are unlikely to become more flexible as long as insurgent military effectiveness continues at its currently high level.

The Upshot

The harshness of the peace terms presented by Gulbuddin and the commanders indicates that the resistance has for the present no plans to propose a moderate response to the Soviet-Afghan regime peace initiative. Insurgent military successes since late 1986 probably have hardened the resolve of the fundamentalist party leaders and most field commanders to rely on intensifying combat as the

principal vehicle for effecting a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. There is little reason to expect that the resistance would respond positively to genuine concessions from Moscow or Kabul on a withdrawal timetable or a coalition regime. Islamabad almost certainly anticipates having to exert strong pressure on the alliance, and through the alliance on the field commanders, should Kabul offer significant concessions at the next round of UN-sponsored peace talks in Geneva.

We believe there are at least two reasons why the alliance and the Pakistanis cannot control the commanders simply because they administer the insurgents' supply line. First, the significant amount of stockpiling occurring inside Afghanistan will soon lessen the dependence of many major commanders on supplies from Pakistan. Second, and more important, the major regional commanders who are working to forge insurgent unity and durable political and military institutions inside Afghanistan—Ismail Khan in the west, Ahmad Shah Masood in the north, and Mullah Malang in the south — have historically been able to fend for themselves with materials captured from Soviet and Afghan regime forces.

We regard the Ghowr conference as the strongest manifestation yet of the insurgent commanders' growing dissatisfaction with the endless bickering and disunity of the seven party leaders. Although nominally held under the banner of the Jamiat-i-Islami, the Ghowr meeting involved commanders from all seven insurgent parties and focused on outlining political and military activities that could be undertaken by the commanders without external assistance. Although a break between the commanders and the party leaders is unlikely in the near term, the rift between the commanders and their Peshawar-based political chiefs will grow unless the alliance begins to show signs of internal unity and promotes a policy that approximates the attitudes displayed by the Ghowr conference.



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The New Afghan Constitution: No Magna Carta [redacted]

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On 15 July, Kabul unveiled the draft of a new Afghan constitution that it claimed would serve as the basis for peace and reconciliation” within Afghanistan. According to Kabul media reports, the regime intends the draft constitution to be the subject of a national debate among all segments of society—including resistance groups. Articles in the constitution purportedly ensure human rights and provide the mechanisms for turning the current one-party state into a multiparty political system. In our judgment, however, the draft constitution is intended to perpetuate the dominance of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA)—the Afghan Communists—and is little more than a propaganda exercise. [redacted]

sources of varying reliability to be controlled and directed by the PDPA. According to speeches by Najib, new parties must support the regime’s national reconciliation program and the “consolidation of traditional and historic friendship with the Soviet Union.” A party that fails to obey these rules may, according to the constitution, be disbanded. [redacted]

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The regime may already be taking steps to create “independent” parties under these provisions.

[redacted] the PDPA set up three new parties during its plenum in June 1987.

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[redacted] Hizbi Islami would represent proregime religious leaders; Hizbi Dehqanan would be organized from existing farmers’ unions to represent the peasantry, and Hizbi Boozwa would represent small businessmen. We believe existing regime front groups such as the National Front have failed in their efforts to broaden the regime’s popular base. [redacted] these

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The seven chapters of the new constitution include sections on the rights of citizens; foreign and domestic policy; and the organization and powers of the legislative, judicial, and executive branches of government. The draft constitution is intended to replace the 1980 “Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan,” which called for “all-out cooperation with the Soviet Union” and established the current system of one-party government. [redacted]

[redacted] these front groups are ineffective outside Kabul, are widely perceived as “Communist puppets,” and suffer from the same divisions as the Kabul regime. We believe the new parties will not expand their membership beyond the same small pool of party members, government bureaucrats, and previously co-opted tribal leaders. [redacted]

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[redacted] the regime claimed the Fundamental Principles were only an interim measure until a new constitution could be drawn up and a national election held. [redacted]

The Legislative and Executive Branches

All nonparty policy and legislation is in theory handled by the Revolutionary Council—a group of about 146 senior party members and “independent” figures chosen for their proregime views. Najib, the President of the Revolutionary Council, is both head of state and Secretary General of the PDPA.

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According to official regime statements, the Revolutionary Council is to regularly convene *loya jirgas*, or popular councils of tribal and religious leaders, to appoint Council members and set overall regime policy. According to media and US diplomatic

Party Politics—The Usual Suspects

A major feature of the draft constitution is its provision for the creation of a multiparty political system. We believe this represents an attempt to win non-Communist collaborators, rather than genuine Soviet and regime willingness to share power. The regime’s “Law on Political Parties,” released along with the constitution, requires all new parties to apply to the government for their charters. According to this law, the new parties are to affiliate with the National Front (formerly the National Fatherland Front), a grouping of proregime nonparty figures reported by

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***Selected Articles of the Draft Constitution of the
Kabul Regime***

Article 4

In the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, political parties are allowed to be formed provided the platform, charter, and activity of the party are not opposed to the values embodied in the constitution and laws of the Democratic Republic.

The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan is the organizer and guardian of the implementation of national reconciliation policy in Afghanistan. The PDPA shall struggle for justice and social progress.

Article 40

In the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, freedom of religious rites is guaranteed to all Muslims.

Followers of other religions are fully entitled to perform their religious rites provided they do not disturb public peace and order.

No citizen has the right to use religion for antinational and antipeople propaganda purposes, creation of enmity, and commission of other deeds contrary to the interests of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Article 42

Punishment incompatible with human dignity, torture, and harassment are prohibited.

Article 49

Citizens of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan enjoy the right of freedom of thought and expression.

Article 64

No one has the right to exercise the rights and liberties enshrined in the law against public interest.

Article 114

The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan supports the struggle of the peoples and nations for peace, national independence, democracy, social progress, and the right of nations to self-determination and fights against colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, Zionism, racism, apartheid, and fascism.

Article 134

Whenever the preservation of independence, national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and internal security become impossible through the channels provided for in this constitution due to war, danger of war, disturbances, or similar conditions, a state of emergency may be proclaimed by the President . . . (who may) suspend or renew provisions of this constitution.




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PARTY AND STATE STRUCTURE, 1980-PRESENT



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reporting, however, the regime has limited this popular participation to show *jirgas* that have unanimously praised regime policy and the Soviet presence. [redacted]

The draft constitution's planned reorganization of the Kabul regime's apparatus, in our view, presents the image of wider public participation in government


while ensuring continued PDPA domination. The new legislative system described in the draft constitution would replace the Revolutionary Council with a bicameral National Assembly—made up of a House of Representatives and a Senate—and a *loya jirga* of government ministers. A president elected by this

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PROPOSED STATE STRUCTURE

STATE INSTITUTIONS



loya jirga would retain veto power and the right to dissolve the legislature or suspend the constitution. The position of Prime Minister—frequently mentioned as a possible post for a nonparty figure—will be given little real power. The constitution does not specify that the president must be a party member. According to the US Embassy in Kabul, Najib has hinted that nonparty members such as former King Zahir Shah might be eligible. We believe

the mechanisms for choosing members of the *loya jirga* will ensure continued party domination. In our view, Najib's appointment as President of the Revolutionary Council and head of state on 30 September 1987 was meant to strengthen his position during the transition to a new government organization.

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According to the draft constitution, two-thirds of the members of the House and Senate will be chosen in a national election, while the remaining third will be appointed by the government leadership.¹ This election will almost certainly be limited to areas controlled by the regime and be subject to massive fraud. According to reporting from the US Embassy in Kabul, previous elections held by the Kabul regime have been run by the Afghan intelligence service KHAD, which used threats of jail and beatings to discourage dissenting votes. [redacted]

Proposed changes in the *loya jirga* also appear intended to further regime control. *Loya jirgas* are traditionally gatherings of tribal and ethnic leaders who, according to academic reporting, used their personal power to win concessions from the central government in return for their support. The new constitution, however, calls for a *loya jirga* made up of government officials and leading citizens chosen by the National Front. In our view, this attempt to use traditional Afghan institutions to further the Kabul regime's claim to legitimacy will backfire. We do not believe tribal or regional groups are likely to view a *loya jirga* so completely dominated by regime figures as legitimate. [redacted]

Human Rights—Legislating Loopholes

In our view, the articles describing the basic rights of Afghan citizens are designed to answer foreign criticism of the regime's human rights abuses and do not offer genuine protection. The articles forbid torture and unwarranted search and seizure and call for freedom of religion, thought, and expression. Later articles, however, state that these rights may not be exercised "against the public interest." Provisions are also made within the constitution for the President to suspend civil rights in case of "war, danger of war, disturbances, or similar conditions"—all of which, in our view, could be used by the regime to justify continued human rights abuses. According to the US Mission to the United Nations in Vienna, UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Ermacora has also criticized article 117's provision for the creation of

¹ The appointment of one-third of the legislature is similar to the arrangement during the parliamentary period in the 1960s when, according to academic sources, the King appointed one-third of the members of one of the two houses. [redacted]

"specialized courts." According to Ermacora, the article would permit the regime's continued use of revolutionary courts and show trials for political dissidents. [redacted]

No Fresh Start

We believe the many loopholes in the draft constitution and its premise of continued PDPA domination indicate that the regime's current offers are little more than propaganda ploys. Soviet and regime leaders have already tried to use the constitution in their campaign for wider international recognition. According to the US Embassy in Kabul, Foreign Minister Wakil used the constitution's pro-Islam statements as the basis for his claims that Afghanistan should be readmitted to the Islamic Conference Organization. In early September the Soviet representative to the UN Human Rights Commission tried to introduce a resolution praising the new constitution and the national reconciliation campaign, according to the US Mission to the United Nations in Geneva. We believe the new constitution has also played a central role in the Soviet and Afghan regime lobbying before the UN General Assembly vote on Pakistan's Afghanistan Resolution. [redacted]

In our view, the new constitution will only marginally affect the Kabul regime's lack of domestic and international legitimacy. We believe promises of human rights will not win much support when the regime's large-scale abuses are so well documented. Similarly, the offer to share power with any resistance group willing to endorse the Soviet presence seems disingenuous. The most likely result of an attempt to implement the draft constitution will be increased regime factionalism as the proposed organizational changes increase governmental disarray and threaten established power bases within the regime. [redacted]

[redacted]
Soviet and regime leadership had expected their national reconciliation program to split the resistance and win over many Afghan refugees. We believe the release of the new constitution shows an intention to

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continue the program—despite its apparent failure—
for at least the near term. [redacted]

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[redacted] the Khalqi and Babrak Karmal
factions in the PDPA opposed national reconciliation
from the beginning. In our view, Najib believes these
factions would use an admission of the program's
failure to oust him from power. Najib and the Soviets
are likely to use the draft constitution as part of their
continuing effort to win some form of visible success.

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[redacted]

[redacted]

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Afghan Paramilitary Forces An Overview [redacted]

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The Afghan regime deploys several paramilitary forces to help the army maintain control in the countryside and to expand the influence of the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). These groups are designed to combat the insurgency, extend regime control to outlying areas, and help integrate the rural population into the PDPA. In our view, these units have substantial problems and have not achieved their political or military goals. [redacted]

Background

Kabul has been using paramilitary forces—especially police-type units and tribal militias—since the Marxist coup of April 1978 installed the PDPA in power. Cuban officials assisted in establishing the first Defense of the Revolution militia units in late 1979. In addition to their military functions, these forces allow the regime to establish a minimal presence in some regions. [redacted]

[redacted] regime officials believe the militias enable Kabul to integrate traditional elements of Afghan society into structures controlled by the PDPA. Most groups are designed to force the local population into accepting the Kabul regime as part of their lives. The deployment of these units away from their homes also works to Kabul's advantage because these previously uncommitted militia forces are exposed to insurgent attacks, which usually creates a permanent vendetta between the two groups. [redacted]

The army's growing inability to prosecute the war has led the Kabul regime to become more dependent upon paramilitary forces, in our view. Recent indications suggest that the Afghan *sarandoy* (police), Defense of the Revolution units, and various tribal groups are seeing more combat. The army, handicapped by high casualty and desertion rates, inadequate training, and low morale, cannot shoulder the burden of the counterinsurgency. We believe, however, that these paramilitary groups have proved to be little better than the regular army in dealing with the insurgents. [redacted]

Evolution and Role

In our view, paramilitary forces are primarily intended to maintain a measure of self-defense, support the PDPA's presence in areas where regular army units are unavailable, and integrate traditional society into the Marxist structures of the current regime. These units have been a major factor in the regime's counterinsurgency efforts since the PDPA assumed power in 1978. For example, *sarandoy* units, responsible for securing regime installations in Kabul and in the provincial capitals, were established shortly after the regime came to power. Defense of the Revolution forces and tribal militias were formed in outlying regions to frustrate insurgent infiltration at about the same time, [redacted]

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[redacted] Defense of the Revolution forces consisted mostly of local citizens who were trained and equipped to secure provincial outposts. By 1980 additional units were established in other villages. Since 1978 the Kabul regime has armed and supplied tribes along the border with Pakistan in the hope that they would block insurgent passage. [redacted]

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Paramilitary groups took on a more active role in the early 1980s, when the regime realized that its regular forces could not quickly eliminate the insurgency, even with Soviet aid. In 1980, Kabul gradually increased the offensive capabilities of some groups, [redacted]

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For example, the regime authorized uniforms and increased supplies to Defense of the Revolution units, [redacted] Some of these forces began participating in combat operations with regular army forces later in 1980. Kabul evidently transferred Defense of the Revolution units from the party's control to the Ministry of Interior to centralize management of its paramilitary forces by 1982. [redacted]

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Paramilitary Forces

Sarandoy. This combined police-light infantry force under the Ministry of Interior is the largest and most capable regime paramilitary unit. In late 1984, the *sarandoy's* force was expanded, given new weaponry, and assigned more tasks. We estimate total *sarandoy* manpower at 15,000 to 20,000, about 35 to 40 percent of the authorized level, [redacted]

[redacted] We believe that the *sarandoy* is responsible for maintaining the regime's presence in provincial capitals and supporting the regular army in combat operations. [redacted]

Defense of the Revolution. These forces consist of two paramilitary organizations under the control of the Interior Ministry. These units are primarily responsible for carrying the regime's Marxist message to outlying regions and providing military support to regular army units. We do not know the size of these forces. The two subunits are:

- Revolution Defender units, which consist of poorly armed tribal militias in each province. They are responsible for securing their villages against insurgent attacks.

- Soldiers of the Revolution units—first seen in 1985—consisting of party members or candidate members who act as armed propagandists for Kabul in rural areas. We believe their function is almost entirely propaganda, although there has been recent reporting suggesting they also support military operations. [redacted]

Tribal Militias. The Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Nationalities and Tribal Affairs have supported and armed various tribes and former insurgents to limit guerrilla infiltration from Pakistan. [redacted]

[redacted] in late 1986, the Kabul regime has attached these tribal forces to army divisions to participate in operations on their territory. The regime's one major recruitment, Ismatullah Muslim Achakzai and his force of almost 1,000 men, hampered insurgent resupply into Qandahar during the first half of 1986 before guerrilla successes and Ismatullah's feuding with Kabul diminished his effectiveness. [redacted]

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Recent Developments

By the mid-1980s paramilitary forces were beginning to assume more combat responsibilities. In late 1984, Kabul, for example, expanded the *sarandoy* by giving it new weaponry and assigning it more tasks, [redacted]

[redacted] By late 1986 *sarandoy* units were conducting their own independent reconnaissance operations. According to sources of the US Embassy, *sarandoy* units were deployed on the frontline, manning artillery positions during large-scale operations in Paghman this past June. [redacted]

For most of 1987 the *sarandoy* has been ineffective despite its larger role in the counterinsurgency, according to the US Embassy. In late March *sarandoy* forces suffered serious casualties in Qandahar. In May, Embassy sources reported that

sarandoy forces suffered additional losses in Laghman. A month later, in Paktia, large numbers of *sarandoy*—recently transferred from Kabul—defected to the insurgency, [redacted]

[redacted] the regime has been bolstering its Defense of the Revolution forces. In 1985, Kabul established Soldiers of the Revolution units, an elite militia organization consisting solely of members or candidates from the PDPA or its youth wing. These units, primarily responsible for publicizing the regime's ideology, were generally well armed, mobile, and active as of a year ago, [redacted] In our view, Kabul

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has also reestablished several Revolution Defender groups on a smaller scale. We judge that these groups are little more than an armed and untrained citizenry.

We believe Kabul's efforts to win military support from various tribes have failed, except for the recruitment of former insurgent commander Ismatullah Muslim Achakzai and his tribal adherents from Qandahar in April 1985. Achakzai's men curtailed guerrilla resupply along the 120-kilometer-long Chaman-Qandahar road in early 1986, according to sources of varying reliability. Tribal differences, increasing insurgent attacks, and problems with Kabul ultimately weakened his force's grip on the area in late 1986. Other attempts to gain tribal support have been unsuccessful. Many tribal chiefs have accepted weapons, money, and other inducements from the regime but refused to support Kabul's initiatives.

the regime has established several tribal regiments" in eastern Afghanistan. Although we know little about these groups, they have had almost no impact, in our view.

Chronic Problems

The effectiveness of the Afghan paramilitary forces has been hampered by the same problems that have hurt the regular army — limited manpower, a lack of equipment and training, low morale, and collusion with the resistance.

Manpower. In our view, the Afghan army has priority for the limited manpower available to the regime. As most regime units are seriously under strength, we judge that the number of forcibly conscripted males available to the paramilitary forces is extremely limited. This shortage is compounded by high casualties. In late 1986 the Soviet press reported that the *sarandoy* had suffered 6,500 killed during the war, a significant number given their limited size. These constraints have forced Kabul to adopt desperate measures to staff these forces. For example, in April and May 1987 the regime released prisoners into the custody of the *sarandoy*,

Defense of the Revolution forces have resorted to recruiting women to fill the ranks of some units.

Weapons and Training. Most paramilitary units are handicapped by a lack of weapons and inadequate training. *Sarandoy* units are an exception and are comparatively well equipped. Several *sarandoy* units deploy a mix of Soviet armored vehicles in addition to 82-mm mortars. Given the poor performance of the *sarandoy* during engagements with the insurgents earlier this year, we judge that the *sarandoy* cannot take advantage of this equipment.

Most Defense of the Revolution units are poorly equipped, in our view, and are often armed with antiquated weapons. For example, a photo appearing in the government-controlled press earlier this year showed a Nangarhar-based defender group armed with British single-shot rifles and World War II Soviet submachineguns. Ammunition for these weapons is probably in short supply. Soldiers of the Revolution units are better armed, but still lack modern weapons.

Morale. Morale within the regime's paramilitary units has been chronically poor, and recent events have worsened the situation, in our view. In mid-February Soviet advisers, dissatisfied with the *sarandoy's* performance in Kabul, ordered army and state security forces to replace some *sarandoy* units in the capital, according to Embassy reporting. The redeployment of as many as 2,500 *sarandoy* forces to less secure provincial cities prompted a riot at Kabul Airport that required the personal intervention of Interior Minister Gulabzoi. By March, according to an Embassy source, *sarandoy* personnel were paying bribes to prevent reassignment from Kabul. In an unrelated development, two *sarandoy* battalions based in Baghlan defected with their weapons to the insurgents earlier this year after killing their Soviet advisers.

Other paramilitary groups have suffered similar morale problems. female members belonging to northern-based Defense of the Revolution units have been abused by fellow

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militiamen or party members with whom they are supposed to work. In February a tribal militia battalion and 20 army officers attached to the 18th Infantry Division in Mazar-e Sharif defected to the insurgency with all their weaponry, [redacted]

government from exerting greater control in Qandahar city. Government counterinsurgency efforts in Herat were hindered last September when the *sarandoy* commander refused to obey the order of the army commander, [redacted]

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Insurgent Collusion. We believe that many *sarandoy* units have been penetrated by insurgent forces, and some outposts manned by the *sarandoy* have reached an accommodation with the guerrillas. There have been cases of active complicity between *sarandoy* officials and the resistance. In October 1985 the chief of the Lowgar Province *sarandoy* was arrested for actively working for the guerrillas, [redacted]

The regime's relative success with Ismatullah's tribal militia ended largely because of Kabul's interference in the group's operations. The turning point occurred in October 1986 when the regime replaced a post commander without consulting Ismatullah, [redacted] Ismatullah killed the appointee, prompting the regime to retaliate by killing an undetermined number of militiamen. Ismatullah's forces countered by opening fire on a Kabul regime office in Qandahar, killing 27 officials. [redacted]

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Marginal Political Success

We believe that Defense of the Revolution forces have colluded extensively with the insurgency. [redacted] Defense of the Revolution units often have tacit agreements with local guerrillas to leave each other alone. [redacted] the Kabul regime has been assigning out-of-area militiamen to different Defense of the Revolution posts to hinder collaboration with local insurgents. In other instances, some Defense of the Revolution forces request extra ammunition based on exaggerated expenditure reports in order to pass the excess to the resistance, [redacted]

The continued existence of paramilitary groups suggests that Kabul has made marginal gains in winning tribal support and expanding its influence to the countryside. In some cases, the regime has been able to recruit new party members from the ranks of the paramilitary organizations. Most of these militias lack enthusiasm, political motivation, and organization. [redacted] Several of these ostensibly proregime groups are probably cooperating with the insurgency. [redacted]

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Outlook

Weakened Cooperation

The effectiveness of the paramilitary forces has been handicapped by bureaucratic infighting in the regime, in our view. Friction regarding overall provincial authority between the local *sarandoy* commander, the regular army, and provincial officials has reduced the effectiveness of the *sarandoy*, [redacted] In Qandahar the *sarandoy* and the military maintained only minimal cooperation during operations last year, a result of personal animosities between the commander of the II Corps and the provincial *sarandoy* chief, [redacted] The lack of cooperation, [redacted] prevented the

Kabul will probably continue to develop its paramilitary forces because they are an inexpensive means of maintaining a limited regime presence in the outer regions and they free army troops from static defensive positions. In our view, these units will continue to be only marginally effective because of manpower, equipment, and morale problems. [redacted]

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In our view, an expansion in militia personnel or their outposts would be an indicator that the regime can expand its influence. Success for Kabul's proposed national reconciliation campaign, which ensures continued PDPA control, would probably be best

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demonstrated in a proliferation of outposts in areas that were considered to be proresistance or neutral. Such activity is unlikely in the near term. [redacted]

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We judge that most of the regime's paramilitary groups will quickly disintegrate in the event of a Soviet troop withdrawal. Most guerrilla groups will attempt to increase their control of the countryside to bolster their party's influence during the withdrawal by attacking vulnerable militia posts. Regular army support is unlikely as they probably will be deployed to key cities to protect regime personnel and installations. [redacted]

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